Macedonia has been a bone of contention among Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade since the second half of the 19th century. These countries, aware of the fact that whoever obtains Macedonia becomes the dominant power in the Balkans, have constantly tried to obtain as much of its territories as they could.

An historical survey reveals that the fundamentals of the Macedonian Question have not changed since its beginning. Macedonia continues to be the microcosm of the Balkan problem: A quick look at the books and editorials published in the years preceding the Balkan Wars, which led to the partition of Macedonia, confirms this evaluation.1 Macedonia was divided into three in the Bucharest Treaty in 1913, and since then it has remained divided.

Historians generally agree on 1870 as the "birth year" of the Macedonian Question. In that year, a separate Bulgarian Church (Exarchate) was established in Macedonia with the Edict (Firman) of the Sublime Porte issued on March 11. This outlined the territorial extent of the Bulgarian Church's activities in Macedonia, resulting in the Bulgarian factor entering the Balkan power politics in Macedonia in addition to the Greek and Serbian. Greeks and Serbians, having no stomach for the establishment of an independent Bulgarian Church, initiated a struggle to counter the Bulgarian activities in Macedonia.

So began the three-sided contest for Macedonia, waged first by priests and teachers, later by armed bands, and later still by armies.

The propaganda of the Balkan nations in Macedonia to "convince" its inhabitants that they were Greeks, Bulgarians or Serbs, and then to mobilize them against both the Ottoman rule and the sympathizers of the other Balkan nations were conducted through religion with the help of the national churches and through education with the help of the schools founded and the teachers sent there. Following the cultural and religious propaganda of Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian priests in the region, the struggle over Macedonia evolved into an overt war of gangs and Macedonia became another tool in the diplomatic equations of the European great powers at that time.

The great powers of Europe had become intensely interested in the Balkans in view of Czarist Russia's expansionist schemes there, which were in addition to their own schemes. By 1870 Russia had chosen Bulgaria as the best channel for expansion of her influence in the Balkans. Macedonia was a major issue in European diplomacy in the second half of the 19th century because it was located at the convergence of great power spheres of influence.

The aborted San Stefano Treaty of March 3, 1878, with the support of Czarist Russia, had created a "Greater Bulgaria" in the Balkans, including nearly all Macedonia except Salonica (now Thessaloniki). The "Greater Bulgaria" of the San Stefano Treaty was due to Czarist Russia's policy of obtaining a strong position by making use of an enlarged Bulgaria in the Balkans.2 However, at the Congress of Berlin in July 13, 1878, the Great Powers, mainly Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, fearing the increasing influence of Russia in the Balkans, annulled the decisions of the San Stefano Treaty. Obtaining these lands then became one of the main objectives of Bulgarian foreign policy.3 Thus the Macedonian dispute began.

Greek and Bulgarian claims conflicted in Central Macedonia and Bulgarian and Serbian claims in both Central and Northern Macedonia. In 1890 the Bulgarian government was granted a "berat" (edict) by the Sublime Porte in Istanbul to appoint Bulgarian prelates in the Macedonian cities of Ohrid and Skopje. By the end of the 19th century, the religious struggle in Macedonia between the adherents of the autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate Church and the followers of the Greek Patriarchate had developed into a covert conflict between Greece and Bulgaria. Deligiannis, the Greek Prime Minister, was reported as saying to the Greek King George I that Greece would not survive without annexing Macedonia.4

In a long memorandum prepared for King George II, Prime Minister Tsouderos emphasized that one of the deadliest threats to the security of Greece would be the establishment of an "autonomous Macedonia". Tsouderos had contended that it would separate Greece from Serbia, her traditional ally in the Balkans, and would result by necessity in a Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement for the establishment of a South-Slav federation. Greece ought to prevent such a development at all costs.

After the end of the World War II, the Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement was tried, but failed. Nearly half a century later, an independent Macedonian state emerged.

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