Restoring
Peace and Prosperity to Macedonia
-- The Rule of Numbers
By Victor Bivell
The 2001 Albanian insurgency and terrorism
in Macedonia - together with its appeasement by the
international community, the one sided concessions
by the Macedonian side in the Ohrid Agreement, and
other national problems such as the slow pace of
economic development, have left many Macedonians
around the world pondering the future of Macedonia,
and what they can do to help their homeland.
One of the hardest things for Macedonians
to accept is that under the Ohrid Agreement the long-sought-after
ideal of Macedonia as a homeland for the Macedonians
has suffered a setback. Under the new Constitution,
Macedonia is no longer a homeland for the Macedonians
in the same way that Albania is the homeland for
the Albanians and Greece the homeland for Greeks.
Commentators have said the Constitutional changes
mean that Macedonian society is no longer based on
an ethnic model like its neighbours.
Although the international community calls it a civic model,
in reality it is a bi-ethnic model: before the Ohrid
Agreement Macedonia was a country of one nation,
the Macedonians, now it is a country of two nations:
the Macedonians and the Albanians.
How did the ideal of a homeland for
the Macedonians come to suffer this set back, and
what can people of Macedonian background, including
those who live outside of Macedonia, do to help build
Macedonia into a secure, peaceful and prosperous
country?
The Answer Is In The Numbers
In the absence of a military victory
by the Macedonian military and a resolute response
to the Albanian terrorism by the international community,
the Albanian terrorists were successful in winning
political concessions for the simple reason that
the Albanians form a large minority within Macedonia.
In international minority politics,
numbers count. Whether it is right or wrong, small
minorities have small rights and large minorities
have larger rights. Minorities of one to two per
cent are everywhere and are unexceptional. Minorities
comprising say around 10 per cent of the population,
such as the Turks in Bulgaria, are large enough to
cause severe international stress. The Albanians
in Macedonia, at 22.7 per cent of the population,
are by world standards a very large minority and
this size brings certain rights and privileges not
afforded to smaller minorities.
This does not excuse terrorism nor
insurgency, made worse in the case of the Albanians
because they were already a privileged minority by
every Balkan and world standard.
But it does explain, for example, why
large minorities are often allowed official use of
their own language while small minorities are not.
This fact of international politics
explains why the Albanians in Macedonia continually
exaggerate their numbers, bandying about percentages
of 30 and 40 per cent, without any regard for the
most recent internationally monitored census. It
also explains why Greece continues to swear against
all the evidence that it is 98 per cent Greek,
and why it recognizes only a Muslim minority,
even though the world knows there are Macedonians,
Turks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Roma and others.
It explains why the Greek Government does nothing
to clarify the situation and why it does not have
a question on ethnicity in its census.
As a rule, large minorities are very
unpopular with governments and with majority populations,
both of whom see them as representing large political
and social trouble. Worse still is a situation such
as that in Macedonia where there is a large minority
yet the majority ethnic Macedonians, at only 66.7
per cent of the total population, are well below
the level for most ethnic majority populations around
the world. This is an inherently unstable situation.
The point can be illustrated if we look at four multicultural
countries: Australia, USA, Canada, and Fiji.
Australia has become a world leader
in multiculturalism for at least two reasons: because
the dominant ethnic group, in this case those of
British descent, comprise about 75 per cent of the
population, and secondly, while there are over 200
minority groups, the largest is only 4.3 per cent
of the total population. In this model, no minority
is large enough to constitute a threat to the dominant
culture. This is a formula for long term peace.
In the US, white Americans form the
majority at 75.1 per cent of the population, but
among the minorities are two very large ones: the
Hispanics and Latinos who are 12.5 per cent of the
people and the African Americans who are 12.3 per
cent.
These are large percentages. However,
their respective political force is diminished because
the populations are dispersed throughout the country.
If each group were to compact itself into certain
States, their right to further rights would improve.
For example, if enough Hispanics were to move to
say New Mexico, California or Texas where they are
already strong and enough African-Americans move
to say Louisiana, Mississippi or Georgia, so that
each group became the majority in its chosen State
or States, then they would gain new rights. Among
them, if they chose to exercise it, would be the
right to a referendum on independence and secession
from the US.
This is in fact the situation in Canada,
also a multicultural country with many ethnic groups.
Those of French origin comprise about 23 per cent
of the people, but they are a compact group, particularly
in Quebec where 81 per cent of the population have
French as their mother tongue. Already Quebec has
had two referendums on independence, both failing
by only a small percentage of votes.
If we take this process one step further
and look at Fiji, we see a country that historically
had one dominant group, the Fijians, but where under
British colonialism Indian workers were brought in
whose descendants since the second world war outnumbered
the indigenous Fijians. In 1988 the Indians won the
majority of parliamentary seats, a situation untenable
for the indigenous Fijians. In the 14 years since,
there have been three coups detat to maintain
Fijian rule. After some population displacement,
the current ethnic mix is 50.8 per cent Fijians and
43.7 per cent Indians.
The Macedonian Model
How does Macedonia fit into this model?
The majority Macedonians comprise 66.7 per cent of
the population, the Albanians 22.7 per cent, and
the other minorities are less than 4 per cent each.
Furthermore, the Albanians are compacted into the
north west of the country and form the majority in
Tetovo and Gostivar and some smaller localities.
This is a situation conducive to long term political
instability, particularly as current demographics
indicate an increase in the proportion of Albanians
and because the Albanians have shown a willingness
to use ethnic cleansing of Macedonians to further
compact their community.
The roots of Macedonias demographic
dilemma lie in the influx into Macedonia of 150,000
Albanians from Kosovo in the 1970s and 80s. Had this
not happened, Albanians would comprise around the
12.5 per cent of the population as they did in 1961,
a large minority but not sufficient to threaten political
stability or Macedonia as the Macedonian homeland.
The converse is that the percentage
of ethnic Macedonians has fallen from 71.2 per cent
in 1961 to the current 66.7 per cent. Compare this
with say Slovenia where the Slovenians are 88 per
cent of the population. The Slovenian homeland is
secure, and free of ethnic divisions they have been
able to get on with the serious business of economic
development.
Clearly, the Macedonian politicians
have been negligent in allowing the proportion of
ethnic Macedonians to fall to such a dangerously
low level and the proportion of ethnic Albanians
to rise to such a high level. The following chart
places into an international context just how diluted
has become the ethnic Macedonian population in Macedonia.
Perhaps we should not be surprised
that the stability of the country has now been shaken
by terrorism, insurgency and near civil war between
the two groups.
Comparing Ethnic Majorities in
Their Homelands
Country
|
Ethnic
Majority
|
% of Total
Population
|
Largest
Minority
|
% of Total
Population
|
Japan
|
Japanese
|
99.4
|
Koreans
|
<0.6
|
Albania
|
Albanians
|
95.0
|
Greeks
|
3.0
|
Armenia
|
Armenians
|
95.0
|
Kurds
|
2.0
|
Germany
|
Germans
|
91.5
|
Turks
|
2.4
|
Romania
|
Romanians
|
89.0
|
Hungarians
|
7.1
|
Croatia
|
Croats
|
89.6
|
Serbians
|
4.5
|
Slovenia
|
Slovenes
|
87.8
|
Croats
|
2.7
|
Slovakia
|
Slovaks
|
85.7
|
Hungarians
|
10.7
|
Taiwan
|
Taiwanese
|
84.0
|
Mainland Chinese
|
14.0
|
Bulgaria
|
Bulgarian
|
83.0
|
Turks
|
8.5
|
United Kingdom
|
English
|
81.5
|
Scots
|
9.6
|
Singapore
|
Chinese
|
77.0
|
Malays
|
14.0
|
USA
|
White Americans
|
75.1
|
Hispanics & Latinos
|
12.5
|
Australia
|
British descent
|
75.0
|
Italians
|
4.3
|
Thailand
|
Thais
|
75.0
|
Chinese
|
14.0
|
Sri Lanka
|
Sinhalese
|
74.0
|
Tamils
|
18.0
|
Macedonia (1961)
|
Macedonians
|
71.2
|
Albanians
|
12.5
|
Cyprus
|
Greek Cypriots
|
70.0
|
Turkish Cypriots
|
30.0
|
Macedonia (1994)
|
Macedonians
|
66.7
|
Albanians
|
22.7
|
Northern Ireland
|
Protestants
|
60.0
|
Catholics
|
40.0
|
Malaysia
|
Malays
|
58.0
|
Chinese
|
26.0
|
Belgium
|
Flemings
|
58.0
|
Walloons
|
32.0
|
Fiji
|
Fijians
|
50.8
|
Indians
|
43.7
|
Source: Victor Bivell, based on
...
Australian Bureau of Statistics
NSW Government
US State Department
and various national census agencies
While the majority numbers for Albania
and Bulgaria are likely overstated, they indicate
the relative ethnic strength of two of Macedonia neighbouring
countries.
The international comparison shows
that, like Macedonia, many small countries are homeland
states for their ethnic majorities, but unlike Macedonia
they are not threatened by a diminishing majority
or rising minority. The size of the majority is sufficient
to secure its homeland.
Countries where this is not so are
Fiji, which has suffered extreme political and social
instability, and Malaysia which has had to resort
to numerous affirmative action programs to preserve
the majoritys position within its homeland.
Sri Lanka, where the Tamils are 18
per cent of the population, has suffered many years
of civil war between the two ethnic groups.
Also interesting is the situation in
Croatia where the Serbians where a 12.5 per cent
minority until the recent civil war which saw their
numbers fall to 4.5 per cent.
Belgium is an interesting case where
peace between the Dutch speaking Flemings and French
speaking Walloons is maintained by a Federal system
and ethnically based autonomous economic regions.
A countrys political and social
stability are also affected by how ethnically assertive
or even aggressive is the minority, and by the attitudes
of the majority.
However, as the chart shows, it is
a general rule that the presence of a dominant ethnic
majority is a factor for social stability.
The Way Forward
There is a clear need for Macedonia
to achieve long term political and ethnic stability,
and the international comparison shows that achieving
these can be assisted by increasing the proportion
of the majority Macedonian population to a level
in line with other successful multicultural societies.
What that level should be is a decision
for the Macedonian leadership and the Macedonian
people. It would be interesting indeed to see the
Macedonian people have such a public discussion.
For my own part, I believe a safe level
would be a minimum of 75 per cent of the total population,
as this would bring Macedonia in line with the Australian
model, which I believe is worlds best practice.
Such a level would deliver many significant
benefits. It would:
* Clearly secure Macedonia as the Macedonian
homeland
* Help to avoid civil war with the
Albanians
* Restore harmony between the ethnic
groups
* End forever Macedonian concerns over
the Albanians becoming the majority
* Make it easier for Macedonians to
make available high level rights to the minorities,
including the Albanians.
* Provide a dramatic boost to the economy
and economic development.
How To Achieve It?
How such an increase is achieved should
also be part of the discussion. For example, it need
not be achieved through a reduction in Albanian numbers,
although there exist internationally acceptable options
if this is desired. Rather, it could be achieved
relatively quickly through an influx of ethnic Macedonians
from the diaspora.
No precise numbers exist for the size
of the Macedonian diaspora, but it is credibility
estimated on the conservative side at between 1.5
to 2 million and on the generous side at 3 to 4 million
including those who have given up or lost their Macedonian
consciousness. Certainly there are sufficient to
achieve almost any target. The real problem is motiving
a significant number of them to return to Macedonia.
So far the Macedonian Government has
shown no inclination to use population policy to
achieve political stability. Should this attitude
continue, the policy can still be implemented by
the Macedonian people, although it will take longer
to achieve.
There are many expatriate Macedonians
who are very willing to return, and many ethnic Macedonians
from outside the Republic who would like to move
to Macedonia. It happens continually. Many others
would do so with only the slightest encouragement.
Many feel a strong desire to help their homeland,
and some of these may respond to the idea that they
can help Macedonia by simply returning home, by having
their feet on the ground and being a Macedonian in
Macedonia.
But there are many others who would
like to return but see no future for themselves in
Macedonia, due mainly to the limited employment opportunities.
Ironically, Macedonias level of economic development
makes it a land of opportunity, and the growth of
existing businesses and the formation of new businesses
are areas where returning Macedonians would have
both the ideas and the capital to make a big impact.
There are many successful business people and professionals
in the diaspora who could provide a real economic
impetus if they could be enticed into establishing
a business in Macedonia.
In addition, the large influx of Macedonians
would immediately boost demand and therefore employment,
enhance the countrys pool of capital and skills,
and increase the formation of new businesses.
In this way, if it chooses, the Macedonian
diaspora can play a substantial and even a decisive
role in resolving the ongoing political tension between
the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority,
and also speed up the pace of economic development
and reduce the related social problems of high unemployment
and poverty.
This is one way to help bring peace
and prosperity to Macedonia and secure its long term
future.
Published in Australian Macedonian Weekly 2 July 2002
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