

*The Balkan Mega-ethnos*  
National Doctrines of Macedonia's neighbours



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(Translated from Macedonian to English and edited by  
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## **THE BALKAN MEGA-ETHNOS - National Doctrines of Macedonia's neighbours**

NOTE:

At first, when I started working on this paper, my wish was that this subject did not exist, that the national doctrines of our neighbours had simply not been written. I wished that these doctrines, which have been collected, as well as those from the older generation, simply did not exist. I thought that the Balkans and particularly Macedonia would be much happier without them. Yet, realistically, they are part of the objective positions of Macedonia's neighbours and, like it or not, they are well shaped. And thus they could not be denied. No matter how subjectively, nationally and ethnically biased they are, they influence policy and relations in the Balkans, and still not resolved, they are current in the relations between Macedonia's neighbours and will probably continue to be that way.

And as such, I took on the task to research and critically look at them. I simply could not resist the temptation not to do it. And this is the result of my contribution. The essence here is to understand that relations in the Balkans and around Macedonia do not occur randomly and spontaneously. They have their genesis, social history and social development base. They have their own motives, actors, promoters, supporters and formulations. And understanding all these complexities can help crystallize relationships, procedures and policies among the countries in the region, between Macedonia and its neighbours, and even inside some state systems. And as such the neighbourhood will start thinking differently. It will no longer think that we here amongst us do not care about these doctrines. We want them to know that we know about them, that we carefully studied them, that we have analyzed them and that we have not kept silent about them. We don't want them to think that we are not influenced by their reality and that we ignored them. I truly believe that these people, this nation, this country, regardless of the doctrines and current politics and challenges, will survive and hold on, and will not succumb to the temptations to which they have been exposed. And as our great poet Gane Todorovski once said: "We are as many as we are, that's for sure!"

Many of my co-workers, friends and colleagues encouraged and helped me in this endeavour. Therefore, I would like to mention a few of them. First I want to mention my editor and publisher of this book, my friend Gligor Stoikovski who, for a long time, motivated me, gave me his support and helped me with the editing of my work. I also want to mention my colleagues and reviewers Dr. Branislav Sarkaliats and Dr. Dalibor Iovanovski and thank them for their valuable suggestions and guidance, as well as my friend Dr. Zlatko Kramarich, who I want to sincerely thank and M.Sc. Eng. Melita Ianchevska for her help with the technical editing.

Most gratitude, however, goes to my wife, Aneta Mircheva, who not only encouraged me but also put up with me with much benevolence while I was preparing this book.

The author

## **Foreword: Balkan Mega-Ethnos – From Ethno-Romanticism to Ethno-Violence**

### 1. Introduction and Background

This book contains ten articles, more like fragments of texts which represent the ethno-political platforms of Macedonia's neighbours. These are: "Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences" from 1986, published in several places, taken from the Zagreb "Our themes"; after that fragments of V. Shesheli's work "Ideology of Serbian nationalism" from 2002, and an extract from Momchilo Subotich's paper "The Serbian state in the Serbian political party programs to the Dayton Agreement" from 2006. Included are two Greek texts "the Macedonian Question. Overview of attempts to create an artificial nation", by the Institute for International Political and Strategic Studies in Athens, released in February 1993 and "Skopje searching for an identity and international recognition", released in Solun in 1994. Also included are three fragments of Bulgarian texts "Bulgaria in the 21st century, The Bulgarian national doctrine, Part One", prepared by the Scientific Centre for Bulgarian National Strategy, issued in Sofia in 1997. Part Two of the same doctrine, released the next year in Sofia, and after that a long fragment of the booklet "Bulgarian policy towards the Republic of Macedonia", published ten years later by another publisher, also in Sofia. The Albanian doctrine included is called "Platform for solving the Albanian national question", adopted and published by the Academy of Sciences of Albania, Tirana, 1998. At the same time there was another of the league's program specification documents released in New York, in the Albanian American Civic League web site. The document was entitled "Challenges to democracy in multiethnic states", by Arben Xhaferi, which is also contained in this book.

The documents are sorted in alphabetical order by country and then by the time of publication; they have been translated from the original and are analyzed and qualified in the preface. Bibliographies and short explanations are included.

There is no doubt that these documents were the basis and, in some places, a prelude and a precursor of many political movements in the



region; some even played a direct role in events (riots, clashes and violence) in the Balkans in the last decade and a half (prior to 2013). After all, this is the case with all foreign policy doctrines, especially those of the Great Powers. Here are some of the more famous historical doctrines; The American Monroe Doctrine of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Wilson Doctrine and the Marshall Plan of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Japanese Mайдзхи Doctrine, the German Drang-naht Osten Doctrine, the Soviet Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, etc. The ones that originated in the Balkans don't have far reaches but, no doubt, have impact on regional and on a wider range of political relations. They appeared like a second wave of national or ethno-political doctrines, in the last twenty years or so (prior to 2013), after the major system and state political changes in the Balkans that followed after 1990. The first wave of doctrines was established in the nineteenth century, the era of national revival and romanticism, the era during which the Balkan countries were established and consolidated, when they all established and followed expansionist programs, conquests and other similar concepts.

Let us mention a few here. The Serbian Foreign Minister Ilija Garashanin's "Nachertania" was released in 1844. It had aims at restoring Dushan's empire. The same year (1844) the "Megali idea" (Greater Greece) was launched by Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Koletis. It had aspirations to restore the Byzantine Empire. A mention of the "Megali-idea" can be found in a speech made by Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Koletis to the Constituent Assembly in Athens in January 1844. After that came the Order (Constitution) and the program of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee released to the workers for the freeing of the Bulgarian nation, prepared in 1869 in Bucharest by G. Rakovski, L. Karavelov, V. Levski, H. Botev, I. Tsankov and T. Peev. Then there was the 1878 Program of the Albanian League of Prizren. Following that was Kemal Pasha Ataturk's Doctrine of 1925 entitled "Peace at home, peace over the world". The Doctrines examined and analyzed here are mainly a modernization of the texts from the past two centuries, adapted to new circumstances.

The point of this analysis is not to criticize or to disdain the texts, even less to turn them into historic or other arguments, though in some places it can not be completely avoided. Neither can the

legitimacy nor right of every ethnicity, nationality, nation, and so on, be ignored. And no social group or human community should be inhibited from focusing on its problems, from envisioning its future and from pursuing its dreams... Ethnicity and nation, regardless of the dynamics of globalization and the rise of civil society in the world, are a reality and, of course, not a short future of human social organization and spirituality. Hence, they are not an anachronism, nor a tide of modernism as an alternative or a competition of ethnicities, in a nation-centrism.

And as such, the sum of social ties, reproduction patterns, emotions, feelings and transpositions of people in the future, who will carry their ethnicity and nation with them, which in fact are similar to the religious forms and transpositions, deserve a real and legitimate existence, even when social and especially political contradictory and retrograde obstacles exist. But then from here on, just as legitimate, responsible and called to account, is the analytical and critical approach to the research of these social phenomena.

The problem, as it is highlighted in the scientific texts about nations and nationalism, by Anthony Smith, famous researcher of modern nationalism, originated as a result of contradictions between laws that are not intrinsic to science: those between the “essence” of the nation and its “designed” quality; between the nation’s antiquity and its purely immediate appearance, as well as between the cultural basis of nationalism and its confrontation with exclusive political aspirations and goals. Born in those contradictions in law are one-sided and twisted ethno-symbolisms which include scientific and rational attempts to identify and legitimize nation centrism. They often deeply affect historical scholarship and political activities of the so-called “new nations”, and also their nationalist circles (Smith, 1998 p.170). In sociology, in a more general way, the problem as identified by Berger and Lukman more than 30 years ago belongs to the “social construction” of reality, in which science plays only a small part (Berger and Luckman, 1967).

There is no doubt that ethno-symbolism with everything that reflects social reality, coupled with ethno-politics, have essentially affected the lives of modern people living as ethnic groups within a social group as a community and as groups of communities in multiethnic

or multinational compositions. Much influence is also placed on events and developments in the region and on the international community in general. It follows that all social phenomena or processes that focally examine sociology, for example, social groups and grouping, production and reproduction patterns, mobility and social dynamics, cultural and spiritual production and expression, all fall under the strong influence of ethno-phenomenology and ethno-symbolism. The study of them and thinking about them is also under great influence. It equally applies to processes studied in political science, economics, culture and other basic sciences, for example, management and governance, marketing and ownership, manufacture, and especially distribution, etc.

Hence, the purpose of publishing this book was to add to the familiarity of ethno-symbolism, ethno-centrism and ethno-politics in the region in which we live, and not with a different aim than to be better able to understand and to respond more appropriately to manifestations and expressions. Why precisely these documents and not others? Why not more documents, other documents or older documents? Because, namely, it is known that the region, the Balkans, and particularly the countries of the former Yugoslavia, were so fertile a ground that the fertility fertilized the ethno-political platforms, documents and acts as much as it did the movements and drives.

In the wider region, for example, in the other republics of the former Yugoslavia, there are variations of such doctrinal documents; the Slovenian, and especially the Croatian and Bosnian, influenced the conflicts, and the violence, especially in 1990 to 2000. Let us also mention here the “Contributions to the Slovenian National Program,” published in December 1987 in number 57 of the Ljubljana “New show,” authored by Hribar, Urbanchich, Rupel, Puchnik, Ianchar, Grafenauer, etc., after that, in late 1989, the political programs of HDZ in Zagreb, created by a group of scientists from the Lexicographical Institute, led by Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovich’s Bosnian SDA in Sarajevo.

It is worth studying all these texts and documents together, historical and recent, using the same methodology and analytical procedures. However, in the selection of papers we opted for one of the more

modest documents, one of the new ones belonging to a bordering neighbour, with whom we live and communicate directly and with whom, by them or by us, we share ethnic communities “behind our borders”. In addition to all that, there are significantly more doctrinal documents, in addition to the collection available through the media, through scientific, journalistic and even literary papers. Yet, we had to put boundaries on our scope, and those boundaries were their importance and influence on policy.

The documents we made available are of more recent testimony. Even though they are built on the concept of historical role, rights, merits and contributions to ethnicity, they are shaped in an effort to face modernism and to create and reconstitute some kind of order that has its basis in the current changes and dynamics in the Balkans, in Europe and in the world beyond. In that, they have serious problems not only in redefining nationalism and ethno-centrism, as they were known in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but by overcoming the apparent contrast with the modern trends of civil society, development, globalization and regionalization, of the new market democracy and human rights (especially the latter), etc.

We cannot say that in many of them, or in part of any of them, there is no realism and objectivity in the evaluation of the then state of affairs and conditions, as well as in transformed and libertarian rhetoric. As there is much ethno-centrism, destruction, threats of violence and in passing on the other sides of the rights of other ethnicities, nations, states and communities. Therefore, despite the criticism of abstinence and denial or disqualification, we can not look at these documents as “not nationalistic”, and some of them as “not aggressively nationalistic”.

The question is where in this collection is the Macedonian ethno-political program or national doctrine? There isn't one, simply because such documents do not exist. And if they existed, we could not find any. Otherwise, of course, we would have included them in our study. It is understandable, of course, that there are national doctrinal elements in many sources from the revival period, from the uprisings and from later periods. Let us mention a few here. The Constitution (Rules) of the Kresna Uprising Headquarters belonging to the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee of 1878; The 1890

Constitution of the Macedonian League in Sofia; The nation building program and Manifesto of the Provisional Government of Macedonia 1880/81; The MRO (TMORO) and later VMRO statehood documents, etc. (Minoski 2008, part one, chapter 3, Popovski, 2002). The purpose of these documents, and others like them was to defend the liberation and statehood character, and not to indoctrinate conquest, expansionism and aggressive tendencies towards the neighbours. Most of these national doctrinal elements were there to advance cooperation and joint action against outside aggressors.

More recently, there were several attempts to make, or at least to sketch, such a platform or program. From 1990 onwards, there were incentives and appeals to different forums, advisors, intellectuals and academic circles, asking for suggestions and proposals for an all-party or inter-party team, to lay some groundwork and set some “benchmarks” for our national interests. Unfortunately all those attempts failed. There was, and today there is much criticism from intellectuals and from the media for the lack of such a platform. There is a serious problem facing Macedonia and the Macedonian people, not only because there is no such platform but because no effort has been made to put one together. The lines followed by policy development, movements, etc., are not known and are creating some of the problems we are facing today. And as such we are powerless against the unilateral challenges of other nations and nationalities, and the modernism of the uncertainties of the future. Perhaps in these demands and criticism there is a grain of rationality and truth. But, what is essential is to develop a strategy that reflects the plural, civic and multicultural character of this country and to have a clear and long-term government policy, democratically shaped and legitimately adopted. And of course that it must work.

By saying this we don't mean that no Macedonian nationalism, ethno-centrism or ethno-romanticism exists in Macedonia. We do not say that there are no party documents, program documents, or journalistic texts, which express nationalistic sentiments. Plenty of them do exist but are not shaped, designed, ideologically and systematically rounded, to counter those other documents in our collection.

Macedonia has its own perspectives and a future as a developed civil society, with strong harnessed production and human resources, economic prosperity, stability in its democratic institutions and a market economy, as a multicultural society in its composition and reproduction, liberal and tolerant in its spiritual values and aggregates. Macedonia's direction and benchmark is European and global integration. The Macedonian national identity, language and culture can survive and thrive only in such developmental conditions, included among which must be the survival of the Macedonian minorities and the Diaspora outside the Republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian people have no other national interests outside of these qualifications. This means that the identity sign, historical foundation, potential, outlook, challenges and ambitions of the Macedonian people can materialize and positively focus only in conditions of modernity, democracy and human rights, development, good neighbourliness, tolerance and dialogue. These values, however, are common, and not against, or at the expense of Macedonia's neighbours, nor at the expense of the ethnic communities in Macedonia who live together. If so, and if the development of internal relationships and structures in the country are moving in that direction, the Macedonian nation will have a legitimate claim to a moral authority to fight and to not give up its identity, national independence and statehood, for anyone, no matter with what plans, doctrines, platforms, ambitions and illusions they are presented which will prove to be powerless and out of perspective. It is necessary, therefore, to develop a state and civic strategy, which will open space for the flourishing of our national and cultural independence.

## 2. Issues in the Balkans

And yet, in relation to Macedonia and the Balkans there is a basic question that needs to be put forward: "From where did all that nationalism, ethnocentrism, ethno-political charge get its meaning and will it have future tragic events, conflicts and doctrinal debacle failures or disappointments from the events that occurred in the last two decades in our country and the wider region?"

The dissolution of socialism in Eastern and Central Europe, especially during the dramatic last decade of the last century, was

not necessarily the cause or challenge of nationalism and ethnocentrism. Nor did the break-up come as a result of external pressures, blows or isolation to which socialism was eventually exposed. And as a Slovenian analyst concluded, contrary to many expectations, the socialist political and economic systems were not beat by their generic opponent, Western capitalism. The situation did not explode through a revolution and a counter-revolution. But rather it imploded, dissolving in its own contradictions, bursting with accrued problems which could not be resolved internally (Kocijančič, 1996, p.7-8).

These systems actually pulled apart the very basic stitches that held them together: the economic and production efficiency, freedom and democracy, human and civil rights, living standards. The implosion released a great energy directed at these stitches and freed the deeply hidden potential to renew progress and the stunted growth and to get into the modern flow of our civilization.

Nothing less, that energy was not a national emancipator: namely, to reaffirm national freedom, culture, value systems, traditions and creativity, part of the human and civil liberty and culture, which, until then were held in the hall of “liberation of labour”. Yet, some societies and communities were able to develop and grow, they were truly capable of creating growth, with the rise of civil society, market and democratic institutions and benefits, including a mechanism for solving extremely sensitive, and explosive issues. For example, in question were the fates of the major USSR, CHSR federations, the position of minorities, which in some of these newly formed countries amounted to 40% of the population. In other societies and communities, like the ones in the Balkans, for example, and in the former Yugoslav federation. The national energy here often widened into a destructive conflict, taking a violent direction. Why exactly did this happen in the Balkans and perhaps Chechnya and occasionally in a Caucasus republic?

What is the diagonal in those countries which closed or closes the possibility, the energy of national or ethnic empowerment or affirmation to be involved in the transition from the current system into a civil democracy, with human rights, entrepreneurship, and to have a liberal culture of freedom? Is this the legacy of socialism, to

tighten the knots of national and ethnic inequality to a point of making it impossible to coexist and to have permanent conflicts?

On the eve of the collapse of socialism in the late 1980s, all expectations and forecasts in the Balkans, in South East European countries and in the West, were that development in these countries was going to follow the track of liberal democracy, civil society and state, and that the so-called “Nation-building” Western models of democracy would follow. For example, citizens living in equality would participate in the new forms of communication, urbanization, mass education and political processes, through the institutionalization of the so-called nation-state and nation. This was going to be the model that was going to produce national affirmation and cultural development, rapid and balanced economic growth and prosperity, open channels of expression, a responsible and organized public, maturity and pro-actively reacting elite. Such a nation-building process was expected even before the collapse of socialism, for example, from the process of decolonizing Africa and Asia. In part of the dictionary and conceptual sources of the time, that model was equated to nationalism, which in some of the documents in our collection was comically accepted as a way of “becoming nationalists.” And that is “the others against the others”.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, this optimism proved to be touchingly naive, as was earlier mentioned by Anthony Smith, British theorist of nations and nationalism. Namely, not only were the early democratic dreams of the African and Asian nations not realized, but even the developed Western countries began to experience tremors of discontent and ethnic fragmentation, while in the East, the disappearance of the last great multiethnic empire crumbled and so did the cosmopolitan dream of brotherhood and its ethno-national components. Smith wrote: “The great waves of immigration and massive growth of information technology has put into question old beliefs that a single civic nation with a homogenous national identity can be used for ‘healthy’ national development...” Deconstruction of the nation (unitary - D.M.) will place conditions and will pull apart the theory of nationalism. (Smith, *ibid.* p.3).

Some of the documents in our collection, not only hold onto the concept of “nation building” as it was applied the old way, but



actually transpose or reconcile Marxism with other, older and more traditional theories, such as those of primordial-ism and ethno romanticism.

### 3. Appearances and stereotypes

In any case, the tragic events that took place in the Balkans in the nineties, contributed to the renewal and even to the traditional performances cemented in the arena of inter-ethnic hatred, strife and violence, wars, fragmentation and continuous struggles and aspirations for secession. The “powder keg” syndrome and the violent and primitive-tribal region stereotype of the Balkans, is deeply rooted in the consciousness of the international community, science and politics, whether deserved or not. This is undeserving, because there never is conflict or significant events in the Balkans, which are not instigated by the foreign factor and which do not play a certain, often primary role in the initiation or conduct of such events. Unfortunately, outside beliefs are that these events and causes of conflict are internal and native to the Balkans. The persistence of this syndrome is reflected in the documents in this collection. But, no matter what the people or ethnicities were, earlier or now, be it they were victims, participants, or perhaps the “users” of the conflict, no one is immune or innocent in the “Balkan syndrome”.

This idea that the Balkans should succumb to critical analysis, review and change is ripe. There are indications that as much as this perception is unfair it is that much more inappropriate. It has become a mental block for the current transformations in the region. For example, it is in the way of a speedy and integrated socio-economic development of the region and of each country individually. It is in the way of opening investment, communications, tourism, culture, etc. It carries risk everywhere in the region. And the reason for that is not because of certain opinions from the public or from the media or from factors outside of it, but primarily because of the movements that are taking place internally.

It is true that historically and traditionally, the Balkans are considered the earthquake prone region in Europe. There has been no greater serious crisis in Europe and the world in the last two

centuries, than the ones that took place in the Balkans. The Balkans have been the epicentre. Let us for example, go back to the Great Eastern Crisis of the 1870's, the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, the Ilinden Uprising in 1903, the two Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913, the two World Wars, the first of which began in the Balkans, and finally the five "wars" that reflected on the disintegration of Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2001. Included in those was the Macedonian conflict. But the list would be much longer if we were to add the national liberation wars and numerous bilateral armed conflicts, such as the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict, the Greek-Turkish conflict, etc.

True, all these conflicts, wars and feuds, reflect, and actually create a huge amount of negative and destructive energy, ethno-nationalism, chauvinism and hatred, which has shown, say, tendencies towards fragmentation, separatism, division and self-isolation. Hence, in the dictionary and encyclopedia of literature, the terms Balkans, Balkan-ism and Balkan-ization have become synonymous with conflict, fragmentation, ethno-egoism, ethno-primitivism, synonymous with endless divisions and demarcations.

And as such, The Random House dictionary has defined Balkan-ism to mean the division of a country, a territory etc., into small, diverse and ineffective states (The Random House. 1966. p. 113). A long time ago, in 1922, historian Ferdinand Schevill, defined the term Balkan to mean a country, which, contrary to the other parts of Europe that are compelled by geographic forces to aspire to national, economic and political unification, is "divided into many geographically separated units, each separated from the others by natural boundaries, populated by different peoples living in those areas which did much to help them hold their one instinctive desire to have their separate personalities which to this day are successfully opposed to all efforts of political unification". Some years ago, the Shevil thesis was repeated. (Schevill, reprint, 1995, p.13).

Well known is also Ambassador George Kennan's assessment presented in the revised preface of his published report for the Carnegie Foundation about the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, written in 1993, which speaks of the same Balkan world where "ancient hatreds" persist and generate inter-ethnic violence and wars, with

the only differences between now and then being military technology (Kennan, 1993, p. 9). In his well-documented study of social sources and causes of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, and in search of sociological explanations for the events, British sociologist John Allcock, cites a number of sources from the violent history of the region, which recently led to the rise of fanatic nationalism and hatred of other peoples. He then asks the question: "What do you expect from a region whose name became synonymous with violence, fragmentation and disorder?" It follows that the Balkan nations are almost genetically designed for violence, mutual confrontation and conflict. "Hatred," Allcock writes, "was apparently endemic in the Balkans, stretching back almost to its antediluvian past... It would be difficult to fully document the assumptions for the irreversible irrationality and violence that is endemic in the Balkan societies." (Allcock, 2000, p. 2- 5).

In his often-quoted travel book "Balkan Ghosts," publicist Robert Kaplan even connected the Balkans with the rise of Nazism. He wrote: "The history of the twentieth century begins in the Balkans. Here people were marooned in misery and ethnic rivalry, convicted of hatred... Nazism, for example, may have its roots in the Balkans. It was in the inns in Vienna where fertile was the soil for ethnic resentment, so close to the world of the Southern Slavs, where Hitler learned how to hate so contagiously." (Kaplan, 1993, c. Xxiii). Even some modern writers, when they seriously looked at the violent nature of the Dinaric and Balkan "anthropo-kind" or tribe, always added a little spice to the meal. Catherine Carmichael, English professor of social psychology, in her illuminating study of nationalism and the destruction of tradition, concentrated mainly on inter-ethnic violence, brutality and atrocities in the Balkans, especially relying on testimonials from recent wars. She tries to construct and outline some historical analogies, typical of cults and rituals of violence and destruction, albeit with much sense of importance of context: "We need a science of human behavior 'in extremis', which is sensitive to the locality, history and politics. Also, we should make a clear distinction between what happened in the Balkans and what is from the Balkans." (Carmichael, 2002, p. 107).

Could it be true that the Balkans and our neighbourhood are what they think they are? Could it be that the documents found in our collection are only a stone in the ethno-myth of the Balkan mosaic? It is not coincidental, that we can successfully deal with ethno-centrism and nation-centrism, only if we deal with its wider created historical reflection. Bulgarian historian Maria Todorova, in her remarkable study entitled “Imagining the Balkans”, makes a clear distinction between the production of scientific knowledge and popular mythology rooted in debates on the Balkans. She very rightly claims that a good part of the reasons for the causes of intra-Balkan conflicts are actually imported from abroad, and that a myth is created in the Balkans, instrumental for the identification and self-identification of the Western Europeans and of Western culture and values in general. “As it is in the Orient, the Balkans serve as a dump for negative characteristics against which is constructed a positive and self-serving ‘European’ and ‘Western’ performance...” (Todorova, 1997, p. 188).

Todorova and many other authors are struggling to resist the Balkan negative myth with successful and even masterful historical debates in “defense” of the Balkans which clearly shows that unfavorable ethno-models still exist in Western European and so-called general Western civilization countries; the past can be projected into the present, and very often into the future. In other words, the Balkans are what they were, but even other regions or parts of humanity were not and will never be any better. They will stay where they are because the Balkan Region, for a long time, was the way it was and will stay that way, because that’s how the Balkans are stereotyped. On top of that, one not so small group of reports and modern strategic studies has added to the Balkans and its ethno-profile, inclinations of corruption, organized crime, trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons, as well as other “civilian” criminal activities. John C. Dick from the British Academy of Defense recently assessed that: “It is hard for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, most of the countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania, not to mention Belarus, to use their imagination in this light (Europeanization-D.M.). None of them, in recent times, own or show any willingness to develop a stable civil society, with common Western values, the rule of law and an effective, more or less, honest bureaucracy. The transition will likely move towards ultra-

nationalism and authoritarianism (quite possibly to neo-fascism) than to liberal democracy... These countries, from the other side of the EU border, in the new division of Europe, will likely remain relatively underdeveloped in economic areas and substantially deprived of the fruits of globalization. Politically, they are inclined towards instability and vulnerability or towards authoritarianism and suffering.” (Dick, 2003, p. 41-42). The diagnosis of this author is that the region of former Yugoslavia, for example, has not only lost its potential for conflict, but the wars of succession are probably not finished. And this is only the first round...

#### 4. Counterpoint and development

However, there is another line of analysis, which confirms that the crisis in the Balkans can be interpreted differently, if applied thorough scientific discourse. It raises the very notion of Balkan-ism and the “State of Balkania”. Victor Friedman from the University of Chicago, an expert on Balkan linguistics and cultural history, in many of his papers has shown that public and political stereotypes about the Balkans are nothing more than an attempt to project the modernity of the region on the basis of its past, especially on the basis of specific understanding of its past. “Balkan-ism” he writes, is not primarily a clue or a synonym to “political and ethnic fragmentation”. “There is a widely accepted meaning of the term ‘Balkan-ism’ which is quite different from the term fragmentation. In linguistics, Balkan-ism is a property that is shared by unrelated languages of the Balkans. The grammatical structures of the languages in the Balkans confirm centuries long multilingual and multiethnic coexistence, even at the most intimate level.” (Friedman, 2001/2, p. 152).

It is true that since ages ago, the Balkans has been exposed to an intense process of interaction, inter-influence, interdependence and coexistence between the majorities of nations. It is also true that most of the disputes and wars in the Balkans were not ethnic or religious; they were either part of a much broader conflict or were imported from abroad. Friedman’s emphasis, and that of many other authors, above all, is that Balkan-ism and therefore the emergence and expression of nationalism in the region should be studied and treated not as a primarily mental and ethno-mental phenomena, not

as historical and geo-genetic formation, but as a social and developmental phenomenon, i.e. a phenomenon that can thoroughly explain the causality of sociology and culture-ology. Exactly on this point, psychogenetic explanations of nationalism, of ethno-collisions and of the matrix matching of the tangled and twisted ethno-symbolism and the notion that in all the Balkan people, in principle, forms of conflict prevail, and in their hand the power in their argument is significantly minimized.

Sociologically speaking, the entire Balkans and some of its wider region, is significantly less developed than other European regions, especially if compared to Western Europe. In European social and economic history, the Balkans has been left behind the longest in the stage of pre-industrialization and agricultural production in phase with pre-civil social stratification and structure; actually, the reality is that most typical civil revolutions and changes in this part of the continent, which had no typical civil political institutions, came under pressure from the developed bourgeoisie. The national liberation and revival movements in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as a rule in all the Balkan countries, were popping up and led mainly by uneducated peasants from the rural and agricultural lands, with the exception of the few elite who were educated outside of the Balkans, in other countries. This fact has prevented the creation of nation-states in the interest of the civil class and civil society which fashions nations after itself, but in the interest of capital-relations and a market economy.

Because of this, most of the small Balkan states became somewhat dynastic, oligarchic and authoritarian with strong and tighter internal contrasts, contradictions and uneven development. They in turn each individually experienced large developmental differences, meaning, inside of each there were great differences and that was in line with the centre-periphery. After that, between them as countries, and in the end, the Balkans as a whole periphery, developed as regional European centres. This aspect of the well-known sociological theory of development and centre-periphery ratios was thoroughly studied by Dr. Denko Maleski (Maleski, 2001/2002). In fact, despite all the claims that the Balkans, and certain individual states, are located at the central geo-strategic position in Europe, that they virtually control the passage between West and East, that hold the bridge that

bridges the continents, economies, cultures, religions and so on... , it is true that the Balkan countries always, especially after the 14/15 century, were the peripheries of the great empires - the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Reich. Uncertain and insecure in their relationship. Hence, there was no interest to invest in their development, or to secure and homogenize their culture or civilization. Some regions or states, however, were closer to the centres and away from the peripheries. Typical examples are Slovenia, Vojvodina and to some extent Croatia.

In conditions of underdevelopment, poverty and isolation such as these, the Balkan countries, namely the ruling circles in the Balkan countries, as a rule, saw their future in wars of conquest, conquering new territories in order to become the great nations they wanted to be. By doing so they played right into the hands of the Great Powers for support or to receive a dynastic lineage from them. These moments, important stages of the social history in the Balkans, are documented by a set of well-known authors (M. Glenny, S. Troebst, St. Pribikjevikj). In the remarkable study of the Balkan economies up to the First World War, M. Palairret has evaluated how economies evolve without development (Palairret, 1997). These are more endogenous reasons for the contrasts in the Balkans, on which the external stakeholders can build and exploit.

The second significant sociological-developmental moment and explanation of ethno-genesis and ethno-relations in the Balkans, especially in the relations in each Balkan country, is expressed in the fact, and in the total fact-ography, that some people are located and exist outside of their home country, in underdeveloped peripheries of other countries. For example, the Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish and Vlach minorities in Northern Greece live in a region which, according to Greek and EU standards, is underdeveloped. And so is the western region of Macedonia, in which most of the Albanian population lives, according to national standards. But then if we look across the border in the same region, but in Albania where mostly Macedonians and Vlachs live, we see that it too is undeveloped. The same is true in the northwestern region of Albania where Montenegrin, Serbian and Macedonian minorities live. The Pirin part of Macedonia in Bulgaria also falls into the same undeveloped category, a region which is, in good measure, inhabited

by Macedonians and other minorities. Let's not forget Kosovo which, in great measure, is inhabited by Albanians. Former Yugoslavia and later the FRY and Serbia-Montenegro are also examples of underdeveloped regions. Similar differences in economic and social development can also be seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in the spaces inhabited mainly by Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. However, if a systematic study is conducted we will see that we can even make a case for Slovenia and for some small regions inhabited by Hungarians in Međimurje along with some Serbs in Bela Krajina, and in Kninska Krajina in Croatia.

The aim of this introductory analysis is not to research and illuminate the whole issue of relationship of ethnicity-development-standard in the Balkans; this subject will not be examined in depth. But it is true that it deserves special consideration, about which, recently, we published two articles in foreign mediums (Mirchev, 2003, Mirchev, 2008). The studies that we are referring to are examples relating to the former Yugoslav federation which, even after a half a century of oriented production, politics, accelerated progress and investment in the underdeveloped regions, republics and provinces, did not succeed in making any difference in the development of living standards for the population... more or less they were kept in balance. In some important aggregates, there were total failures and living standards took steps backwards.

According to a number of analyses (Mencinger, 1989, Bilandzic, 1985), the differences in production, productivity, profitability in exports and imports, and in employment / unemployment, the average income of the population, etc., between developed and undeveloped regions in the federation, had ratios of 4, 3 or 2:1. It was an objective basis for tension and proved that some were exploiting others or some lived worse than others, or they did not live well enough and did not develop sufficiently as fast as they could. On that basis, especially in the decade before the formal dissolution of the Federation, tensions had risen in politics, the media, in public forums as well as in economy, and in the sciences and culture; about which republic and province profited and which lost in the joint survival of the country. Naturally, because the republics and provinces were national and ethnic-based entities, tensions over development trends, delays or progress, received



primarily ethnic and ethno-political charges or were objective bases on which nationalism and ethnocentrism was generated.

Under normal conditions, in countries with developed markets, with proprietary and open economies and political systems that do not allow political interference in the economy and law and respect civil liberties, developmental discrepancies can be solved through quite different mechanisms, for example, through the market, through the banks, by encouraging investment, lending, etc. But amid the party controlled and distorted federal and socialist systems, the differences lead to nothing more than struggle for redistribution of income and increasing trends of ethno-political control over the reservoir of wealth. But because of this non-uniformity, developmental differences in the population and in selective regions were the immediate reasons for waves of conflict, tension and later wars.

Sociological explanations of interethnic relations and contrasts in a community are much more complex and layered. In multi-ethnic communities, nationalism and ethnocentrism, in fact, appear usually with the predominant and with the smaller groups, in other words, with both the ethno-majority and with the ethno-minorities. They cannot come to this because of correlated action-reaction, nor can they necessarily do this at the same time and in the same way. Nationalism in the predominant nations in the Balkan countries may be the result of dissatisfaction with progress blaming the ethno-minorities for the stagnation, or as a result of fear of change, during which people would supposedly lose their leadership position in their community, or in the international community. With other ethnicities, outside of dissatisfaction with standards and social conditions, it may be a result of feeling repression and hopelessness, loss of social and cultural identity, especially in periods of crisis and change.

In Macedonia's case, for example, we can surmise that the overall social and economic development after 1945, stimulated different, separate and separated forms and patterns in the development of the Macedonian, Albanian and other ethnic groups. The Macedonian ethnic group increasingly tied itself to urban settlements, industry, government and the public sector. Its mobility and migration was mainly to the other Yugoslav republics or in the form of permanent

overseas migration. The Albanian ethnic group tied itself more to agriculture and farming, to the village, and because of the political and ideological system, it was depressed and neglected. Yet the system fit the demographic boom of the Albanian population, here and in Yugoslavia in general. Namely, the cost of reproduction was paid for by the state regardless of which field, be it agricultural, industrial and so on. But agriculture in each case was suppressed.

That in turn led to the need for more manpower. In the beginning at least, there was some impact on the demographic boom. Moreover, in Macedonia, this ethnic group (Albanian) was tied more to the private sector, ownership, trade, temporary migration to close European countries, etc. It is certain that “family economy and solidarity” had an impact on patterns of reproduction. Along with differences in religion, education, etc., these two and other communities developed in parallel, separately, and to a certain extent in different contrast. This influence on the socio-demographic and developmental differences increased the essential ethno-distance, stereotyping, isolation and communicability between the communities but only on a symbolic level (Savev, 1996 Tasheva and others..., 1998, Petroska-Beshka and others ..., 2000). On a political level, as a means to an end, these differences led to discrepancies and ethno-conflicts, as a basis in Macedonia in 2001.

Hence, the derivative of the sociological analysis of social and developmental discrepancy as an objective basis for the emergence and persistence of nationalism and ethno-centrism, regardless of the ethnic-minorities, regardless of the size of the countries in question, is the commitment to balance the socio-economic development, an accelerated development, in which, as active stakeholders, it will include all the countries in the region, all ethnic groups and communities from which they will all benefit and improve their social conditions. If this accelerated and balanced development coincides with the development of the structures of civil society, the rise of open market economy and entrepreneurship, the processes of global and regional integration and communication, it will cut off or significantly weaken some of the strong roots of ethno-centrism, ethno-aggressiveness and ethno-expansion which has taken place at the expense of other communities. However, we have to admit that

this is only a hypothesis for which there are no real or recognized arguments.

In contemporary literature on nationalism and ethnocentrism, i.e. regarding nations and ethnicities, the issue of community development, primarily of socio-economic development, is given considerable attention, although the views are not anywhere near the same. British sociologist Tom Nairn, whose strong views deserve respect and consideration, believes that imperialism and uneven development are the causes of nationalism as a global phenomenon. Nairn largely looks at that reason from the aspect of the larger, more developed entities, which create the context of reaction among the minorities, on which it is based.

That is true. Nationalism, ethnocentrism and disrespect for the rights of ethnic minorities can, among the ethno-majority, be generated as feeling and so can the fact of stagnation, lack of rapid development, or from the low standards compared to others and so on.

Furthermore, when we talk about imperialism, we certainly do not think of the one created by Leninism or by Marxist terminology, but of each “imperialism” including the ones of modern times, regional and local. Basically, the problem is in the creation of feelings, which find fertile soil because of uneven development, which is consistent with Ernest Gellner’s findings. Ernest Gellner is a renowned ethno-sociologist. (See Nairn, 1977; Gellner, 1964).

However, with its warnings of the dangers of sociology and lines of social and ethnic grouping that supposedly can distort the image of the roots of nationalism, quoted below by Russian ethnographer Vladimir Tishkov, but even more so as quoted by professor Anthony Smith of the London School of Economics. This rightly suggests that nationalism is found in all socioeconomic backgrounds and contexts, as in all systems; not necessarily only in those that lag or are developmentally different and depressed (Smith, *ibid.* p.35). Which means that there is no other objective basis that will influence, at the end of the line, the production and operation of nationalism and ethno-centrism, especially in the final and brutal statement of account?

In the case of former Yugoslavia, and Macedonia in general, it was a natural desire and ambition to overcome, during that time, the deep social and economic crisis in the country, and to also harness the aforementioned open energy of national and ethnic emancipation, in order to create new social demands and groups of identities by generating waves of disobedience, rejection and by discrediting the previous socialist system. The key mediator in the changes that were on the threshold were the ethno-political elites. Our study will show that the conditions for the federal and ethnic-based state formations were set to maintain the old elite in power and to preserve the power and position in a legitimate way, the only viable solution that would appeal to their ethnic group as a real existing community which was to provide protection and legitimacy to a government.

In the former Yugoslav Federation, from 1974 to 1990, legitimate resources were moved from the federal top to the republics and to the provinces, in other words, to the ethno-political entities. However, the collapse of communist parties as the only skeleton of federalism in these communities meant that it was not only the end of socialism, but also the beginning of ethno-political centrism and nationalism. That is why, very often, behind the natural and desirable threshold of change in the direction of civil society, ownership, entrepreneurial economy, political democracy, was the national economy, the ethno-centrist state and the old communist elite now in their recycled ethno-elite status. (Mirchev, 1993).

## 5. Transition tangle

The problems of transition in many of the Eastern European and particularly in the Balkan countries can be understood and explained by the dynamics and the process of mobility of the elite. In that sense Vladimir Goati, in the case of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia as was with the post Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's community, which he has studied, confirms the conversion from the old Communist elite to the new recycled ethno-political elite. Slobodan Antonich, in a remarkable sociological study, has demonstrated the whole social mechanism of the passage of the Communists in Serbia – in Milosevich's elite: populist, autocratic and nationalist. Antonich has concluded that the underlying reasons for the persistence of the Milosevich regime in

particular lay in the arrangement of power and the personal character of the holder of the regime, who managed to prevent the independence of the ruling elite and bound them to him. (Goati, 1999, Antonich, 2002). Srgian Darmanovich reached a similar conclusion about Montenegro. (Darmanovich, 1995). Sociologically speaking, there were almost no political elite in the transition countries, which, at the threshold of change, had no nationalistic aims, in order to be able to identify, create and legitimize themselves in the ethno-social base.

Researching a little further away from the Balkans, Seleni, Treiman and Vnuk-Lipinski observed similar trends in the formation of the transitional elites in Poland, Russia and Hungary (Szelenyi et al., 1995). V. Tishkov, one of the best scholars of international relations in the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet states, in a wider sense about nationalism in the transition period in these countries, warns about the one-sidedness of the sociological approach to nationalism. Above all, as per the analysis of serious disproportions and correlations between ethnic and social structures, there is no automatic mechanism that provides a basis for nationalism. Second, it is not quite correct that the political and nationalist struggle for sovereignty that took place in Russia should be treated as an inter-ethnic conflict. Conflicts often repeat the same logic of decentralization of large multi-ethnic state formations and this in turn necessarily includes strong ethnic and cultural parameters; this is because most of its initiators and leaders belong to the ethno-titular groups. But as Tishkov wrote: “Russia has striking examples of ‘ethnic camouflage’, by which the political struggle for the powerful interests of local elites in the republics and in the autonomous regions is presented as a struggle for ‘national self-determination.’ ...” (Tishkov, 2003 ).

Today, under current conditions, the dilemmas about nations and nationalism, ethnicity and ethno-centrism largely boil down to two questions, which at the start were only a theory and then transposed themselves into political and practical issues. The first is a question of social and political structure of the nation and ethnicity, rather the production performance of the nation and ethnicity. The second question is that of mediation of performance and of construction - in policy and action. Both questions can be merged into one: who, with

what, and how one participates in the generation of ethnocentrism, which is expressed not in the form of emancipation, but as a socially intrusive and aggressive act towards the other side?

Putting this confrontation aside, there is a very simple question to ask: is it true that a common man, as part of a mass of citizens in a society or community, or any segment thereof, given his social status, poverty, poor education, envy, short-sightedness and selfishness, will plunge into nationalism and ethno-centrism, without the slightest signal that all this will improve his living situation? It would be very difficult and very unlikely that such a scenario would occur. Sociologically speaking, at this level of review, it raises another issue which is; how much are the citizens of a community even aware of how rich or poor they are. Which raises the question as to why they live like this: less rich, worse, with less freedom, with less rights and responsibilities, especially compared to “others”? Somewhere, in some communities, primary or secondary, even tertiary, people do ask: “Why do we live like this?” Their immediate life experiences are reflected unfavourably first at the primary level and later at higher levels: political, psycho-political, ethno-political, and culture-political. So-called group identities are created at that level, but those identities are always created in relation to another group of identities: class, status, racial, religious and of course ethnic.

Following along this point, Nairi, Brubeiker, Anderson and other contemporary authors see this as the basis for nationalism and ethnocentrism. But of course, this is just a basis, only an example; an instance. However this instance translates into politics, into action, and in some cases into clashes and violence, through a complex social and socio-psychological mechanism, in which the “media” or “intervention” groups play a key role, for example: bureaucracy, the already mentioned political elites, including intellectuals and scientists, and even media circles. It is also not coincidental that all the documents in our collection, and many, many more, are a product of the academies of sciences and of scientific institutes.

Nationalism is a suitable source of legitimization for the political elites, because the nation is a real and powerful community,

especially its identity and the sense of its legitimacy. Bureaucracy, however, does not have such a legitimizing basis. Its legitimacy must be sought of in its profession. But, since profession, especially in countries in transition, means very little, the bureaucracy is forced to turn to ethnicity and nation for its legitimacy. During transitional conditions, however, when intelligentsia, science and the media are mainly materially and professionally dependent on state-party sources, and these in turn are structured ethno-politically, it becomes clear why at least some of these layers are turning to the production of ethno-centric products.

S. Bronner, an American provocative author who has studied the correlation between ideas and actions, regarding nationalism, has concluded that: “Nationalism is still a valid ideology in our time. Nation-state inflexible bureaucracies still have an interest in reproducing it. Outdated understandings of national sovereignty and self-determination, ancestral traditions and customs still have internal drive power.” (Bronner, S. E., 1999, p. 334). It is interesting that German sociologist H. Kohn has described the role of the intelligentsia in Eastern European countries in a similar way. Sixty years ago he wrote: “The intelligentsia plays a pivotal role in the periphery, where the petty bourgeoisie lacks faith to choose its way into self-sustaining growth. In place of the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia needs to secure a mythical sense of a different fate for the community, by forging a national culture that is based on folk elements and mass mobilization. And hence, harness the power of idealistic and subjective components of peripheral nationalism.” (Kohn, H., 1967 ch.7).

And finally, let us say something about the exquisite piece of research conducted by Czech sociologist M. Hroch regarding nationalism in Eastern Europe, in which he revealed a common pattern of development of nationalist movements in the region, starting with a small cluster of intellectuals, writers, actors, who elaborated on the idea “that the nation is in danger”, and then spread that idea to wider circles which included patriots, agitators, teachers, journalists, with aims at creating wide awareness and in the end, a mass movement. (Hroch, M., 1985).

## 6. A theoretical approach to a nation

There is no single or general theory about nations and ethnicities adopted in the social sciences today which holds true for both the absence of a theory and for many other social groups, categories or processes. There are no unique views for multiple terms, derivative from the nation: a nation-state, nationalism, nation-genesis, nation-centrism, etc. And as such, the more enriched the research fund of knowledge is about the phenomenology of ethnicity and nation today, the more isolated are some latent characteristics of the phenomenon. To the same extent, we get closer to the arguments, favourable and unfavourable, of which nations and ethnicities participate in today's flows and dynamics of our civilization. When it comes to nationalism and ethno-centrism, be they in the form of doctrine, ideology or politics, it should be said that there is no modern theoretical stream that would justify them or on which they can be based. They can be based, or, again, they themselves can summon ideological and theoretical sources, or, again, meta-theoretical concepts. This, in fact, is a problem of social and scientific projections of past reality and future.

The twentieth century, however, bestowed upon us a few more pronounced and affirmed theoretical views of "nation" and "ethnicity". At the beginning of this century, particularly during the creation of large statist and imperial works in Europe, ethno-romanticism had a lot of impact, particularly that of German jurist Heinrich von Trichke, French philosopher Ernest Renan and many other modern and otherwise directed thinkers: Kant, Fichte, Arndt, then Durkheim, Weber, Herder. They, with some differences, affirmed the so-called ethnic and ethno-linguistic determinism, emphasizing the alleged primordial and spiritual nature of a given nation and the importance of its historical memory and "organic" political will, in the establishment of primary human culture, spirit and endeavour. A. Smith, who gave a thorough and critical review of this, considers it most essential in the foundation of "voluntary" and "organized" views of nationalism and its projection on modernity. They, Smith said, had the longest history and the most dramatic consequences. The cult of the ancestors, past history and the alleged collective political will are the materials of ethno-



determinism when “forging” the nation, concluded Smith. (Smith, 2001 ch. 2).

Marxism and the Marxist concept of “nation”, in this area, was the second significant unexplored heritage of the last century. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Marx himself and his like minded thinkers, even though they were able to ignore and criticize the concept during their time, they played with it; with the question of expression of nation and nationalism. By definition, Marxism was a cosmopolitan and universal ideology, and at the time when it was taking place, nation and nationalism were already politically harnessed against the liberation of labour and against the then popular “world revolution”.

At the beginning of the XX century, Marxism had to solve the problems of “world revolution” that were taking place in the “nation states”, so that communist politics could succeed in national terms. But unable or unwilling to answer that question, the Second International Conference collapsed. At that time the labour movement was divided on the issue of whether or not to vote for war credits in the parliaments, leading to the First World War. At that time, Marxism also first affirmed the view of the so-called Austro-Marxists, who were based on a, more or less, consistent definition of Otto Bauer’s nation. In his famous treatise “The National Question and Social Democracy”, Bauer wrote that the nation “is the totality of how people with a common destiny and common communication, which is the intermediate language, relate to a cultural community”. (According to: D. Miljovski in- B. Petrovska, 2000, p. 346). This definition is relatively broad but generally not far from today’s understanding by ethno-symbolists. Bauer believed that, at least, European nations had evolved from communities with an ethnic origin, through class differentiation, by shaping “communities by character”; i.e. that the nation is an ethno-cultural community which has its own historical and class basis, but whose evolution can be influenced politically. A nation, Bauer believed, did not get in the way of modern development, nor did it tie itself with a defined political territory. It was able to keep its special historical and cultural significance, but also was able to participate in the wider integration and emancipation.

In the strain of imperial power, Stalinism, 1) became aware of the importance of the nation in modern politics and state, 2) made a decision not to bring it on a collision course with the class struggle, and 3) decided that it looked like a useful tool that could be used to its advantage. Sometime before World War II, Stalin in his “Marxism and the colonial question”, defined a nation as a “historically formed stable community of people, formed on the basis of a community of language, territory, economic life and political constitution, which was manifested in a community of culture.” (ibid. Petrovska p. 347). Understanding Marxism, Stalin meant: it is true that it was formed close to capitalism or in it, but as a compact social community: it had its own economic, territorial, political framework and finally, of course, a culture. Culture or language or destiny, however, were not primary features. The national characteristics created by “capitalism”, namely, the inequalities between nations, or between states, inflexibility, hegemony, etc., were to be solved by socialism and communism through the liberation of labour, and that’s why it was important that national emancipation become a category of freeing labour. This, today, could easily be converted from freeing labour to freeing the citizen, in a Hegelian formulation for raising humans to a level of citizens of the state as an act of emancipation; In this case it is similar to empowering an individual member of an ethnicity and a nation to a constituent fabric of the state.

Hence, political intervention and constitution in the dynamics of nations was a crucial component of Stalinism. Here is how Stalin conducted himself during the time of Soviet hegemony and totalitarianism: relocate, evict, decimate and destroy entire populations and ethnic communities, which were classified according to their loyalty to the system, and the hegemony of the largest nation which was formally secured. This ideology, apart from the calibration of ethnic groups according to the degree of “historical ripeness” was used to deal with: ethnic community, nation and ethnicity! This variant of the Marxist definition of nation, however, was not authentic to Marxism but it was functional and very much used in shaping the national or ethno-political doctrines of the Balkan states, as we shall see in the texts we have published here. Political intervention in these texts simply meant ethno-engineering and assimilation, be it voluntary or forced.

During the time when the biggest debates on the SFRY Constitution were taking place in 1973, Kardelj wrote a new preface to his famous work “The development of the Slovenian national issue”, from 1958, in which he defined the nation as a “specific folk community, based on the division of labor in the age of capitalism, living in a compact territory, using a common language and having close ethnic and cultural similarities in general.” (Kardelj, 1973, p. 47). In other words, Kardelj tied the nation to capitalism and to class based economic reproduction, which means that any discrepancies, deviations and extremism that nations and nationalism might bring would be attributed to capitalism and to the bourgeoisie, and ultimately to a counter revolution. Kardelj also wrote for “a compact territory”, which was a precursor for the right to self-determination aspirations of “a preset” ethnic territory of the nation. Later, even though Kardelj’s popularity dropped, his emphasis became a lightning rod for the fighting in that region of the former Yugoslavia; namely for “ethno-territory” and for each nation to exist on its own, in its compact territory. According to Kardelj, socialism responded to nationalism in the Yugoslav authenticity; with the concept of complete equality of nations (the Yugoslav nations) and then, through a process of freeing its labour, with equalization and homogenization of the nation at some distant time. In Tito’s doctrine, this was the policy of “brotherhood and unity” and consequently the creation of a Yugoslav nation. And thus the term “Yugoslavian” appeared in the census box. Yet, this was not a policy of forced assimilation or of creating nations.

Marxism maintained and still maintains a calibration of ethnic community, people’s community and national community. And as such it plays an interventional role as a political factor in the “design” of international relations, equality, rights, territorial compactness, which in terms of liberal socialism, authoritarian party and person in charge, could maintain the Yugoslav federation as a whole for a long time. The basis for Yugoslav Marxism and the doctrine of the nation, were created, as Hans Cohn has written, by the “intelligentsia at the periphery of the continent”, to mobilize the masses in a mythical feeling of unity and reality of community, based on the idealistic and subjective components of “peripheral nationalism”. This concept has been used and abused by

Macedonia's neighbours, writers of contemporary national doctrines.

It has already been established that there are two streams of thought in the prevailing theory of the interpretation of a nation, ethnicity and ethno-politics: the modernist and the ethno-symbolic. But then again, they are not prevalent. On the contrary, they exist and highly influence the concepts of primordial-ism and ethno-romanticism somewhat using derivatives from Marxist thinking. Their differences in modern thought of nation and nationalism are formed around the dilemma of whether nations are iconic, eternal and historical works, or works of the modern age, society and political development. The primordial-ists believe that nations are, say, bio-social groups that have links to some primordial ethno-genetic, racial, organic and even blood-birth character. And that, "cultural, linguistic, religious and natural givens" of social existence, are formed on this basis, and that the state and political organizations are mainly a secular and civilian cover for the nation. Shils and Geertz, among other famous bearers of this idea, insist that nations are communities of organic and organic-developmental nature, and that they are eternal and non-circular. (Shils, 1957, Geertz, 1973). This, as we can see, gives a broad sweep to the rise of nationalist ideologies that prove that just some select nations, just "their" nations, as opposed to other nations, are historical, clean, genetic or psychosocially genetically distinct. They, however, have two major problems: 1) The first is empirical, namely how to explain that modern nations are non-disputable, for example, the American, the Swiss, the Indian and many others that have surfaced in recent centuries by mixing several nations, religions, ethnicities, languages; and 2) The second is bio-genetic research which negates the collective genetic code of the nation.

We cannot speak about modernism in the context of a "single view". Modernists believe that nations are not rooted in the past and don't have a long-standing history. They are the fruits of modern history and our recent past. Most nations in the world are rounded and full and there are no sociological or cultural records that show that they were "pre-modernist" collectivities. They are not a product of natural or genetic deeply rooted factors. They are, it is believed, the product of ratiom and planning or at least of similarly orientated

activities, conditions or objectives in our modern era. Some are even “imagined and invented” communities, “inventions that destroy tradition”. Included among the many world-famous authors, sociologists and political figures, who have explored this topic and have argued in this direction, are: R. Bendiks, G. Olmend, L. Pai, K. Deutsch, V. Eisenshtadt, D. Lerner, E. Hobsbawm, E. Gellner, E. Kaduri and B. Anderson. Hobsbawm and Anderson belong to the so-called Western Marxism stream. Some of their works have been translated here.

The knot that ties all these authors together is the idea of “building a modern nation” based on the conditions of modernity and the factors of construction, as well as the proportion of the nation and the state or the political factors involved in the process of construction. In other words, nations are a product of modernity, from the French and other civil revolutions onwards. In that era, not only did markets require a large space for commodity production for exports and investments, for overall mobility and exchange, but also traditional feudal communities and their links with their country, the region, the primary social groups were broken. Civil society had not yet been built, and the state and industry needed instruments of stability, homogeneity, education, communication and so on, and not on the basis of separate groups, such as, for example, classes, races, stratum, linguistic communities, etc. Smith recognized these needs as reflected in the thought and actions of father-founders and thinkers of modern nations: J. J. Rousseau, E. Burke, T. Jefferson G. Macini, J. Herder and others. (Smith, 2001, p. 22).

In short, uneven and contrasting social processes of modernization and necessity for globalization, lead to the necessity of having to create or, at least, produce the nations. The need for growth and social development, required standardization, homogeneity, central support and a high culture in society, a culture that filled and covered the entire population, and not just the one ethnic elite group. Gellner was very convincing in the presentation of this argument. He was just as convincing when he made the argument that a nation is only functional in industrial societies. (Gellner, 1964, 1983).

David Held and Anthony McGrew, in their famous study of globalization and anti-globalization (Held and McGrew, 2002), fully

developed the theoretical base initiated by Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and especially by Anthony Smith in which the nation was defined as being a historical-cultural community identity, a newly-constructed imaginary objectified community, strongly prompted by the political elites of the modern European states. In the last two centuries the creation of the nation was viewed as a reality, in terms of generating the political state in Europe. “The conditions for the creation of the modern state were often the same conditions that generate a sense of nationality... Because the generators of the state needed centralized political power in the newly acquired territories in order to secure and strengthen their power base. And for that they depended on cooperative forms of social relations with their citizens”. (Held and McGrew, 2002, p. 26). The rulers that ruled the new states were dependent on a centralized government to regulate and govern human and financial resources. Created with the “nation” was a greater reciprocity between the managers and the managed, and the terms of “exchange” became a matter of eligibility. This would add to the gradual development of human rights and democratic institutions. That, however, did not happen in most Balkan countries.

Demands made on the modern state such as military, administrative, education, taxes, employment functions in the civil service, pensions, etc., “politicized” social relationships and daily activities. Gradually, people became aware of their association with a “shared” political community, in which “one” had a common destiny with the “others”. According to Held and McGrew, the nature of this binding identification was initially dubious and questionable, but with time it became more definitive and precise... Their conclusion was that, “The consolidation of the ideas and the story of nation and nationality is related to many factors , including an attempt by the ruling elites and governments to create a new identity that would legitimize and strengthen state power and coordination of public policy... in accordance with its creation and, through general education, the idea of a common framework of understanding the meanings and practices, in order to strengthen the process of state-coordinated modernization... which would significantly facilitate communication between the classes, diffusion of national histories, myths and rituals for the newly thought out community or nation.”

Held and McGrew made these claims by relying on B. Anderson and E. Smith's research. Using these means they were able to explain the construction, in a historical sense, of a "homeland" and of deep-seated memories and consolidation of ethnic communities - through common and shared public culture and public rights and duties. It was questionable, however, how the so-called nation as a political "project", as an explicit project driven by elites, was "of complete imagination"? It is likely that the elite and the state shaped by them, did not rely strictly on the generation of sense of nationality and allegiance to the nation, to the "national community of fate", and did not consider only the nation as a purely social and cultural entity which extended on a territory.

Nations, according to these authors, were "communities of history and culture", of a separate territory, in which often is found a distinct tradition of rights and duties of its members. But, in that respect many nations were built on the basis of "pre-modernist ethnic cores" whose myths and memories, values and symbols, shaped the nations in a way that modern elites were able to falsify and misuse. Meaning, we have again returned to the ethno-political engineering in the sense that was given to us by A. Smith (Smith, 1990, s.181). The identity that nationalists seek to maintain is largely one that cloaks and exploits "ethno-history" of the community to highlight its diversity in the world of competitive political and cultural values...

Modernists in general believe that there is no historic nation and that nations are the fruit of nationalism which is generated by industrialism and underdeveloped civil society, and that the nation is transformed by the state. Of course, no one disputes that the effective maturity of the nation requires some prerequisites and predispositions: linguistic, religious or cultural homogeneity, ethnic origin etc. And that the states, in general, direct, affirm and complete the process. It is thought that modern nationalist leaders, with effective institutions and norms of a civil state and a "nation state", can build a nation that has homogenized citizenry that strives towards common goals.

Accordingly, for many of the modernists, as well as for Anthony Giddens and Eric Hobsbawm, nationalism and the nation are bound

to and are dependent on the state and political elites. Without them they have neither sense nor chance. Nationalism, for example, must have a political agenda. Without such a program, without power as a means to an end, it makes no sense. The state provides the structural framework for nationalism and for the nation, and they in turn give the state a socio-psychological sense. (Giddens, 1985, Hobsbawm, 1990). Hobsbawm specifically explored the whole apparatus of rituals, symbols, devices that monitor or assist in the rise of nation states, primarily in Europe in the XIX and XX century as well as to the so-called production process of past national history, full of half-fiction and falsifications when necessary. Nationalism, in this sense, is almost “panem et circences” in the modern era, almost a “substitute for lost dreams”.

The concepts of nation and ethnicity, which the ethno-symbolists and modernists develop today, are as influential in sociology, political science and ethnology as they are in social psychology. The differences between them are not so much in that the nation and ethnicity are considered non-historical or historical phenomena that appear to be subject to the dialectic of development: birth, development, twilight. The differences are basically in the understanding of whether and how much influence can be placed through them on social and political action, as long as the nation and ethnicity are historical or non-historical categories, i.e. for as long as they yield results in the objective or development of invention and imagination? Perhaps by using social and political engineering? Perhaps by using ethno-engineering in every direction? Modernists generally respond positively, while the ethno-symbolists mainly retract. But among the ethno-symbolists this is an important specific, the self-determination of nations, the ethnicities, the self-identification, independent of the “other”, it is a basic human right, as much individual as it is collective. No matter how many of them can be influenced by engineering.

Both streams are in agreement about what nations are and are not. Namely, that they are not religious groups, compact social groups, language groups, race groups, etc. J. Guno, political scientist at the University of Paris, in his famous study “The End of Democracy” (Guno, 1997), said that a nation is a unique combination of historical givens, which are never limited to one measure; linguistic, religious,



racial, social . He wrote that the European commitment to “nation” unites people based on what they are, but also based on what “they were”. A nation has no other definition other than historical, and it is a matter of general history, general accident or luck. It is a place of general, common destiny. In Europe this “memory”, according to Guno, refers to some “remembered” territory... where someone claimed a certain property since Roman times by Roman law. (ibid. p. 15-17). This actually applies to all Balkan nations and nationalism, though some do not have such “historical claims”, while others do. The problem with the nation and the nation-state, Guno thinks, in the modern world, in the economic, political and cultural world, is losing its significance, no matter how persistent. The nation-state is in obvious crisis. This very much applies to the Balkans.

However, it is also certain that modernists, in the affirmation of the “nation-state” and in the approach to nationalism as a need for industrialism, for anti-colonialism or as a result of the collapse of a totalitarian state, think of “ethno-engineering” as forced assimilation of nations or creating nations without social and cultural backgrounds. Hence, many of them use the adjectives civic and cultural nationalism (D. Miller), liberal and economic nationalism, political and democratic nationalism (Mann and Hobsbawm) and even “constitutional patriotism”, especially in relation to the modern Euro-integration processes (Habermas) , thus making a clear distinction from neo-nationalism, ethno-nationalism, ethno-populism, ethno-centrism, ethno-secessionism, ethno-linguistic nationalism, etc. Is this a twisted kind of nationalism, Aristotelian logic, the substance of civic nationalism? Is it necessarily aggressive, destructive, isolationist? Whether and how they hinder the development of a civilization and in the end, what kind of social causes and consequences do they have? These are profound questions for discussion. The famous German philosopher, Jan Werner Muller, using Jurgen Habermas’s arguments in 2002, says that the nation states remain necessary despite the processes of globalization and Europeanization, even when they cannot offer a model in which, for example, the European Union should be shaping itself. In the same vein, liberal forms of loyalty to the nation-state are not suppressed but “complemented” with European constitutional patriotism. However, “complement” is probably the

wrong word, because it suggests that “identity” is more or less like a pile of bricks. Habermas, said Muller, asked Europeans to build another floor (a European floor) over their national identities or to raise a “European dimension” (Muller, 2010, p. 166).

The derivative of these analyses is that the civil version of nationalism is more attached to the values of modern civilization, that it has a rational and active component in the participation of all common goals and that it involves a distinctive public culture. This in turn affects the ongoing process of globalization in the world (Habermas, 2002, Held and McGrew, 2002). On top of that nationalism has not only become anachronistic but also is an active obstacle in the development of democracy and human rights; it runs afoul of civic culture and has become incongruent to culture.

Smith and, to a large extent, Phil Barth, John Fine, Loring Danforth and John Breully (Barth, 1969; Fine, 1991; Danforth, 1995; Breully, 1944) offer an intermediary but very relevant paradigm in their explanation of modern nationalism and nation, that of ethno-symbolism and common culture being the cornerstone of national consciousness. That reality may prove to be productive when researching issues of modern nations and nationalism, and their ratios. These authors by right point out some bumps and contrasts in the modernists, primarily that nationalism today occurs in all socio-economic contexts, and that it is not automatically linked to development, and that it is not even necessarily linked to territory or aspirations for “own” state. Nation, in terms of history, Smith said does not always occur without reason, purely by accident.

It is not necessary that nationalism precede and fatefully affect the creation of the nation, nor does the state need to have such influence. The ethno-symbolists have also posed the question: Is the role of the elites overestimated in the creation of the nation? Finally after agreeing that the international order created after World War II is inclusive in its principles of absolute sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination of nations, they asked the question: What if a large number of aspirants for national independence, objectively, found themselves in advance, outside of that order? What if that order with its norms is not shown to be sufficiently permissive to all the subjects in the emancipation? (Smith, 1998, p. 79). Using these

questions, Smith and the ethno-symbolists actually problem-atize all present international political and legal orders, particularly the UN Charter and Statute.

According to A. Smith, nation and ethnicity (he used the French term “ethnie”) are an essential identity or self-identity of a population, one that the same population assigns to itself and others attach to it. It becomes that when it acquires its identification marks, its recognizable name, symbols, and its own myth of common and unique past. For Smith and other ethno-symbolists, no less important is the sharing and preservation of historical memory, tradition (which otherwise must coincide with historical truth), understanding of the “historical territory” of the ethnos as a “homeland”, and finally the elements of common culture, a measure of solidarity, at least at the level of the elites.

Smith saw the importance of political factors, such as the state, armies, churches, etc., as relative because such factors are relevant in the creation of the nation as much as is the importance of creating counter-ethnic, counter-groups. If some social group is building an identity, it would seem to go against or in respect and relation to other groups, which follows the law of dialectics. (Smith, 1998, p. 170; Smith, 2001, p. 57-61). Smith and other ethno-symbolists used this argument to address the issue of history and mythology (or the historical truth) in the creation, survival and development of modern ethnicities, nations and nation states. In fact, according to Smith and according to the literature from almost all modern nations, even the largest nations, and all the modern nation states, most identities were based on myths and mythology. Why is it then okay to deny the new or recently “established” nations and nation states their identity? Is it because nations and nation-states often share the same or similar symbols, myths and mythologies? The one basic question ethno-symbolists, directly or indirectly, often ask is: Why should a nation or ethnic group, or a national state need to prove that it is authentic, historical, cultural and linguistic, or religious based on ethno-genetic information if its population feels different from another or from neighbouring nations? And this is definitely the case with the Macedonian nation and state.

Held and McGrew, in their theoretical approach, have significantly confirmed A. Smith's assertions. For them, "the nations are above-class collectivities that share a sense of collective identity and political destiny. Their base in the real and imaginary, cultural, linguistic and historical generalities is highly variable and fluid, often resulting in a different expression and contradictory relationship to the state. Nationalism is a force that binds the state with the nation; it reflects on the psychological relationship between the individual and his or her specific national identity and community as much as it reflects on the project and the state in which a nation is dominant (Held and McGrew, 2002, p. 27).

The issue of nationalism can be raised with respect to modern and Balkan terms. Is there, for example, a relationship between state and nation that determines, above all, the status of the nation, the ethnic groups and the national minorities in the country, which are by nature and by definition unique, direct, positive? Or is this ambiguous, imagined, and even contradictory - aggressive towards the other?

The point of this question, it appears, according to the analysis of Anderson, Gellner, Held and McGrew and especially Smith, is to separate form and substance in terms of value. Is there positive and negative nationalism? "Good and bad"? Civil and ethnic? There is a difference. One form and substance relates to nationalism in developed civic societies in which the nation-state, national state, develop in parallel and include; order of human rights and civil liberties, the introduction of an autonomous civil society which includes law and practices in kinds of self-determination for its citizens.

The kind of "nationalism" that prevails today in the developed Western civil world caters to homogenous nations and their positive attitude towards minorities. Held and especially Habermas have advocated for expanding the concept and category even at a supranational level, particularly in relation to the processes of globalization and Europeanization (European unification), to include what Habermas "referred to" as a concept of European constitutional patriotism.

The second form and substance is the kind of nationalism found in newly democratized countries, most of which belong to the Balkan countries and Macedonia's neighbours. This kind of nationalism seeks to be counted among the modern nationalisms, thus having an alibi for violent and forced assimilation of numerous ethnic groups and minorities, especially the Macedonian, and others. Its specificity is; to proclaim itself as modern and a member belonging to the "builder of modern nations" persistent in denying the existence of other nations, ethnicities, minorities, at the level of violent, illegal and unlawful inclusion and assimilation, declaring all citizens members of its nation-state on the basis of "equal civil rights".

## 7. Use of theory and history

Writing about the ideological sources of nationalism, Eli Keduri, professor at the London School of Economics, in 1960, in his famous work "Nationalism", said that language, culture, sometimes even religion, according to the nationalistic doctrine, represent different aspects of the primordial entity – the nation... Namely, beyond any doubt this doctrine divides humanity into separate and different nations, claiming that such nations can create their own sovereign states, and that members belonging to these nations have achieved freedom and self fulfillment by fostering their particular national character, as well as with belonging to the greater whole of the nation (Keduri, 2000., p. 87-87). Keduri has provided sufficient analytical information that follows the nation formation process of European countries since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, but also believes that the process can create confusion when analyzed in terms of categories of nationalist historiographies. For example, when a particular anthropology and metaphysics is used in the interpretation of the past, then history takes on a completely different and distorted feature. According to Keduri, for example; the people who thought they acted in accordance with God's directives, in the realization of the truth, or to achieve dynastic interests, or simply to defend the country against aggression, were included in those geniuses of the event and in the construction of a separate nationality... The author here points out the misuse of historiography in nationalistic goals.

Similarly, when nationalist historiography is applied to the European past, we catch a glimpse of nations being created slowly, gradually,

so that at the end their territorial sovereignty as states can be confirmed. As Keduri has indicated, Prussia, Venice, Flanders, etc., were such typical entities, calling that method an irritating scientific anomaly. “Inventors of this doctrine endeavoured to show that nations are the result of the natural division of the human race, invoking history, anthropology and linguistics. But this trend is unsustainable, because regardless of what ethnological or philological doctrines could be shaped, at some point there is no plausible explanation as to why people who speak the same language or belong to the same race etc., should therefore with only that be able to create their own state exclusively...” (Keduri, 2002, p. 93).

What lacks in this doctrine, says Keduri, is people’s right to persist on the differences that divide them from others, whether these differences are real or imagined, important or not, because of these differences they have the right to create their own first political principle.

Following Keduri’s logic (also that of Gellner and Smith in particular) it can be said that nationalism is a doctrine bound to Europe in the last century and a half, as the need to construct states and statehood. And in that statehood, since the French Revolution and onwards, prevailed the politics of human rights, civil liberties and autonomies in civil society. Where then is the fusion of Western or European or American nationalism and democratic order and policy? It is in human rights, in the right to self-determination, including the right to self-determination of ethnic and national collectives. These rights are already regulated by several international legal acts, in particular the UN, the Council of Europe, the European Union. These rights are a blend and symbiosis of identity and self-determination, nationalism converted to patriotism, in sympathy with their country and group, loyalty to their order and readiness for its defense; but without suppressing others. On the other hand, the nationalist doctrine is complex; it sometimes includes universal feelings in a community, such as xenophobic feelings towards foreigners, outsiders, i.e. the “others”. The juncture sometimes creates confusion when the national doctrine is based on specific anthropology and metaphysics, as Eli Keduri once wrote (Keduri, 2002, p. 88). At this point it seems the distinction of

nationalism as patriotism, and nationalism as a policy of suppression, oppression and denial of the rights of “others”, minorities, ethnic groups and all vulnerable and underprivileged groups. Differentiated at this point is “good from bad” nationalism, civic patriotism from ethnic nationalism.

A good part of the Balkan nationalisms, even when declared as nationalisms of the Western type, when references are made to “citizenship in a nation-state” are actually ethnic nationalisms in the service of “specific anthropology and metaphysics”. This is well understood by American historian Tom Gallagher, who paraphrases M. Todorova, in saying that it is not about creating “nation-states” of the Western model, but about creating “ethnically homogenous states”, which are at the root of much of the organized violence, similar to that in Western Europe, in a longer time frame, and in which “external factors” had more impact than the local factors (Gallagher, 2001. p. 3)

Ethno-symbolism, in its own critique of ethnic nationalism, actually built and affirmed the identity theory of nation and ethnicity. Z. Kramarich, prominent Croatian culture-ologist, linguists and Macedon-ist, conceptually and analytically followed B. Anderson, A. Smith’s (and others) line of ethno-symbolism, especially the problems of “self-identification” and “double identity” of ethnicities, analyzing cases of Macedonian literature, culture and national consciousness. And for him, equating “ethnicity” to “nationality” was purely a matter of converting one dominant or ruling political elite in state structure and then objectively standardizing the group, jointly, eventually – to ethnic memory and a sense of close connection... That together becomes a culture, a national consciousness or self-awareness; it is a sense of solidarity, a sense of belonging to a country that has political power, sovereignty, governing regulation... The cultural identity (language, ethnic identity, a sense of unity, a sense of community, of shared history, myths, etc.) for Kramarich was essentially a base for statehood. This in turn formalizes, institutionalizes, and standardizes those official elements dominating national consciousness. And what happens when there is no state or the state is “forbidden”? The cultural basis for national identity and consciousness becomes a sense of

community which the state significantly strengthens somewhere to the extent of nationalism.

Exploring this using the Macedonian and Greek identity as an example, Loring Danforth concluded the following: “The relatively late establishment of the Macedonian state, compared with other Balkan countries, does not mean, as the Greek nationalists argue, that the Macedonian nation is “artificial” while the Greek nation is “authentic”... The Macedonian national identity and the Greek national identity are constructed equally”. (Danforth, 1995 p. 108).

Following the same line of argument, Kramarich, in a recently published study called “Identity, Text, Nation” (Kramarich, 2010), suggested that it is important in the creation of modern nation to use “material”, i.e. cultural, historical and other heritage from the pre-nationalist era (according to Gellner), but after that the material loses significance. Kramarich leaned more towards the opinion of Anderson and Smith who believed that the “umbilical cord” between the pre-national community and the modern nation remain unbroken, and that it mainly consist of: the name, myths, symbols, values, memories. The nation that was in the past must remain in the future... an irreversible memory and an unlimited future. The vacuum between the nation and the state can be filled, as long as that emptiness is reduced to nationalism, in the Balkan conditions it can be progressive and that much more traditional.

Kramarich paid great attention to M. Hroh and his explanation of the difficult process of emancipation and promotion of the so-called small nations (those “without history”, which in their pre-capitalist past were not independent political centres and those which from the Middle Ages had their own political entities and feudal ruling classes, but lost their political independence, before developing into modern nations). The situation in the Balkans today is typical of that. The ruling class of the larger nations had more people around which gravitated the potential ruling classes of the smaller nations. This means that these smaller nations had no opportunity to build complete social structures typical of this stage of social development; they lacked “their own ruling class”. Hence there were resulting inequalities in their development and in their national existence, not to mention in their experiences with the assimilatory



processes and state intervention. The level of “submission” substantially differed in the new people and ranged from cases at the margins of national existence to cases of political and economic dependence and cultural stagnation.

“This failure to deliver is characteristic of some ethnicities even after the formation of an independent state. In fact, even with a national state, conditions begin to surface for the realization of economic, cultural and political sovereignty, which manifest themselves in a clear and firm ‘will’ to take over power... And here, wrote Kramarich, is apparently the delay: all this is happening at the ‘wrong’ time, because ‘the concepts of homogenous national cultures, for compact stories of national cultures or ‘organically’ fused communities today can no longer count on cultural comparisons’...” (Kramarich, 2010, p. 81). But, self-identification remains strong, maybe the strongest pillar of national existence; it over-rides the unclear, double or multiple identities.

This opinion is also shared by John Fine in his study of ethnic groups in the Balkans in the early middle ages, published 15 years earlier. “It is obvious that in this period a broad ethnic mix of Slavs and Greeks appeared; it is likely that few Greeks remained purebred, if such a thing had even existed before the Slavic invasions. Several centuries later, many Albanians also migrated to these regions and further increased the ethnic mixing. So, it is not reasonable to believe that the Greeks of now are any more pure-blooded than any of the other Balkan nations. But of course, what plays a role here is culture, not blood lines.” (Fine, 1994).

At the completion of the identity of nation theory, Z. Kramarich analyzed and made reference to the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, who believed that you don’t need a nation to represent a “linguistic community”. Of course, according to Žižek and Kramarich, homogenization and national identification does not automatically mean acceptance of each and of any identity. Kramarich calls Žižek’s critique of the nation a purely discursive category.

It is, namely, necessarily fixed with an unspoken, un-linguistic nucleus of pleasure of the canonized aspiration: “Nationalism is a

privileged outburst of enjoyment in the social field. The national goal, ultimately, is nothing more than a way that subjects a given ethnic community to organize its enjoyment from its national myths.” (Zhizhek, 1996. p. 13).

The problem with nationalism is that it encroaches on the identity of “other or others”. Just like “nationality”. Modern political nationalism cannot be understood without reference to former ethnic ties and memories (in some cases even the memories of pre-modern identities and communities). Kramarich fully agrees with Smith on this that “the ethno-symbolic approach can help us understand why nationalism has often such a broad support from the people, i.e. why nationalist agitation by the intelligentsia encountered such an echo among “the masses”...” (ibid. p. 173). The intelligentsia, for reasons already described, chooses “selective use and abuse of history and historiography”, about which Kramarich quotes from E. Keduri’s famous analysis fragment: “Selective use of history... leads intellectuals to read the past through political glasses. The ideology that is shaped by that means encourages and conducts violence, and the people affected by its achievements, managed to mobilize only when history ‘harnesses’ the national cause...” (Kramarich, p. 173). This is a mechanism which functions on the long road of ethno-romanticism and noble ideas about ethno-empowerment of the rigid forms of ethno-nationalism and violence.

It seems particularly important for the Balkans, and its nations and states, and especially the national minorities and their rights, including entities in Macedonia as a country and as a mother of many minorities in neighbouring and distant countries, to follow the logic of free base, expression and institutional, be it political-national, political-cultural, ethno-cultural and normative expression of nations, ethnicities and their interests and identity symbols, of course, in the measure that it is political and ethno-psychological, which is internationally legal and politically regulated in terms not to the detriment and against the rights and interests of others. There is no theoretical, abstract or conceptual-legal basis that would justify opposition to it. Exactly from that aspect are analyzed the typical national-doctrinal sources of Macedonia’s neighbours published here. They, however, are operational and truly function in the foreign and domestic policy in most neighbouring countries.

Our analysis shows that, first, most of Macedonia's neighbours deny or prohibit the right to self-identification for minorities in general, and in our case - the Macedonian national minority. They are in sharp contradiction with today's pre-governing modernist and ethno-symbolic doctrine that prescribes - if a nation, nation state, national minority, ethnic group, etc., feels and self-identifies as distinctively different from others, it has the right to feel that way and be distinct. And, there is no obligation or duty for it to prove why it is feeling that way and why it wants to self-identify. Also, it does not have to prove historically, culturally, linguistically, religiously, or by any other acts, that it exists as a group different from others.

Second and more important is a good foundation and body of provisions in international public law documents and acts, which guarantee, protect and promote the right of identity and self-identity of national minorities and ethnic entities. That is, the human rights of an identity, at an individual, national and cultural identity level. Here is a good place to also mention the UN charter and acts, the European Charter on Human Rights (articles 8, 9, 10, 11) also articles 1 and 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities concerning human dignity, as well as articles 1 and articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which relate to non-discrimination of cultural, religious and language identity.

## 8. The Albanian national doctrine

Published in October 1998, as a platform to address the Albanian national question, it is, according to its introductory explanation, an official product of the Albanian Academy of Sciences, "concerned not only with the status of Kosovo, but also with the future of the entire Albanian nation". The draft platform was initially discussed at the Academy Assembly and then embedded in it were justified objections and suggestions from Albanian intellectuals from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. The document was eventually adopted by the Academy Assembly. The Academy's thoughts were, reportedly, to organize a National Assembly in which scholars from all regions and the ethnic Albanian Diaspora participate in its adoption and then "together try and achieve it". This is actually an

indication of the outcome of the Kosovo issue and the events that followed in Serbia and Macedonia. The entire Platform is a salient fact of the synchronization of Albanian ethno-radicalism in the Balkans, but also abroad, including the Albanian lobbyists in Europe and the United States.

This Albanian Academy platform is a repetition and renewal of the romanticism for creating a Greater Albania from the time of the League of Prizren. However, in relation to the 1877-78 League of Prizren program, the analysis should separate its national-  
emancipatory and liberating character of its large Albanian and expansionist character. Five years after the publication of the Platform (2003), in a speech at Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, Ambassador Girt Ahrens (first Special Representative of the Presidency of the EU in Macedonia, and then a representative of the OSCE Presence in Albania), said that today Greater Albania is basically a means of unifying Albania with Kosovo, and that none of the leading politicians from Albania, Kosovo and from wherever, are for that because it certainly separates Albania from the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Ahrens confirmed that this did not mean that the idea of a Greater Albania was dead forever. When the Yugoslav crisis began, most of the Albanian speakers were innocently making noises about it. But in October 1998, the Albanian Academy of Sciences announced that a “platform for solving the Albanian national question” was available and would go in that direction, and that once the Albanians would go in the EU direction, states without borders, it would become irrelevant. Of course, the question was; what would happen if their integration into Europe failed to materialize?” (Ahrens, 2003, c. 133). About a year after the Platform was released, the so-called Kosovo crisis began, and three years after that the Macedonian amplitude began in the Albanian crisis.

The platform of the Albanian Academy is not pretentious, theoretical or a scientific text. Its starting point is that the ethnic, historical and territorial identity of the Albanians in the Balkans is not disputed and that it can be proven scientifically and historically; but it is not necessary. Quite incidentally, it has been cited in several historical and bibliographical sources, however, the Platform does

not depend on any sources or evidence, only on priori claims. Priorism is unconditionally reliant on the primordial Marxist theory of the nation - which is supposedly historically shaped, and even years before capitalism, which has community-based organic-blood, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic ties, developed in a compact ethnic territory. What then is the hypothetical construction on which the Platform is based?

First, beyond any doubt, the part of the Balkans north and east to Nish and Pirot, then down through Kumanovo, including Skopje as the capital of Kosovo Vilayet, over Shtip, Prilep and Bitola, Voden and Kostur to Ioannina etc., was (allegedly) Albanian ethnic territory. It belonged to the Albanians from time immemorial from their ancestors onwards - the Southern Illyrians and Dardanians. If at some time, there were other countries in these territories, for example, Byzantine, Serbian, Greek, they were only political authorities and occupiers. If there were migrations of nations (as was the time of Charnoevich, late 17<sup>th</sup> century), such migrations were Albanian population migrations (in Italy). For the current, tragic division of Albanians and Albanian ethnic territories, against which the Albanian national movement has always fought, not only were “the centuries-old Ottoman occupiers guilty, but also the nationalist circles of the neighbouring countries, and together with them the lack of interest by the Great Powers”. So today, among the nations of Europe, the largest territorial fragmentation is suffered exactly by the Albanians (first sentence of the platform).

It was extremely unfortunate and tragic that the Great Powers, for example, at the 1912 ambassadorial conference in London, partitioned Albania, as they did in Versailles in 1920. Consequently, the Albanian nation was always torn apart and oppressed, until the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1998), when Albanians were found in five different countries. In four of them, the Albanians were without, or with very minor ethnic rights (Macedonia) and were subject to denial, oppression and genocide. The fact that Hitler unified Greater Albania is only partially correct, because he gave it to Italy to manage. It was quite similar to the assessment of fascism in the Bulgarian doctrine. The strongest argument for the fragmentation and genocide of the Albanians, however, was the

Milosevic regime (1987-1998) and its tolerance by the international community.

Hence, the document has clearly asked for and accurately anticipated the NATO intervention in Kosovo and Serbia, which suggests there was synchronization of policies with the external factor: the pro-Albanian and anti-Milosevic forces. At that point, the document is openly aggressive. Namely, as is in the Serbian and Bulgarian doctrine, it expresses concern, “not only on the status of Kosovo, but on the future of the entire Albanian nation” and calls for solving the Albanian Question in general... Of course, the document suggests: “Gradual resolution with today’s international political conditions and processes that lead to the integration of the Balkans into the European Community”. But besides the option for a peaceful solution, especially in relation to the principles of the UN and the EU, for example the un-changeability of state borders by violent means, for peaceful resolution of conflict, etc., the Platform also stands for “military intervention” (the Kosovo- DM) as a rapid solution to prevent an Albanian humanitarian disaster.

What happens if the international community does not intervene? According to the Platform, “Albanians in these circumstances should be able to use all the tools and all the opportunities offered to them by the international community at the present stage. It is essential that they demonstrate the necessary determination and take the kind of action that will encourage the international political factors to overcome the current hesitation to adopt the necessary decisions...” This became a strategic decision, which later was used in the crisis in Macedonia. Encouraged along with that was military action as was the case in Kosovo - KLA, until the creation of the Republic of Kosovo, as well as the appeal for action to the State political leadership and to the Albanian national movement as a whole. After several months, the intervention in Kosovo was realized.

What are the Platform’s plans in relation to Macedonia? The same old story is repeated about the territory and about the population, which alleges at least 35% Albanians and 55% Macedonians, together with those who feel like Bulgarians; and unfortunately, even though they enjoy some rights, the Albanians, it alleges, are

discriminated against under police torture, inequality in the judiciary, education, forbidden to fly their flag, symbols, to use their language in official acts and so on. But with the population growth, “if the pace continues there will be a distant day when the Albanian population will catch up, and even surpass the Macedonian population”. With this demographic threat in turning the Macedonian population into a minority, the Platform sees only two options for “the porous state” that tries to “stand on its feet with crutches from the international military forces”, stationed on ethnic Albanian territories: Or a bi-ethnic state like the type of Austro-Hungary, or an Albanian autonomous province in Macedonia.

And with their European integration, there will be no boundaries... The Platform also deals with the status of the Albanians in Montenegro, where reportedly, due to intense assimilation of Orthodox Albanians, discrimination and emigration, the Albanian population has been reduced to only 8% of the total population, but it remains compact in its own ethnic territory with Ultsini as its capital. Then, there is the status of the Albanians in Greece – Chameria Region with Kostur and Voden, and finally the status of the Albanian communities in the Diaspora; treated separately in Italy and Greece, but also in other countries, in communities where ethno-cultural or linguistic identities are protected.

At the end the document again makes the assertion for “fair aspiration of all Albanians who since the last century have yearned for the unification of all Albanian territories into a single nation state”. The political status of these regions in the present phase, proposed in the paper is as follows: a) the Republic of Albania; b) An independent and sovereign Republic of Kosovo; c) the Republic of Macedonia as a bi-national state of Albanians and Macedonians with an ethnically divided sovereignty, or as an autonomous province of Albanians in Macedonia; d) the Republic of Montenegro with a local autonomous Albanian territory, with its capital in Ultsini; e) Measures to be taken by the Albanian government in Greece, i.e. Chameria to introduce the Albanian language to school children and provide restitution to the migrants after 1945.

A month after the release of the Platform, in November 1998, Arben Xhaferi uploaded the text under the title “Challenges of democracy

in multiethnic states” in the New York website belonging to J. DioGuardi of the Albanian American Civic League. The text represented the operation-alization of the Academy Platform. The text’s editor was Shirley Klois, Balkan Affairs Adviser who had included many more specific requirements than those in the Platform, particularly in relation to Macedonia. This document, as a directive for action, was issued one month before Xhaferi’s party entered the ruling coalition in Macedonia and it is probable that the coalition partners were aware of it. They may have even had it reviewed as a coalition. According to the rhetoric, content and proposals in Xhaferi’s text, it was in “intellectual symbiosis” with the platform. Xhaferi otherwise systematically used the terms FYROM, Slavo-Macedonians, and other offensive terms and statements (for example “Slavo-Macedonian power structure”, “in this view there was no essential difference between the politics of Milosevic and the politics of Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia”, etc.).

Besides the familiar claims made about Macedonia being a bi-national state and a state that deprives Albanians of fundamental political, civil, ethnic, cultural and other rights, Xhaferi twisted the facts and their meaning, especially about Macedonia violating international laws. For example, UN acts and resolutions, the right to self-determination, civil and political rights, economic and cultural rights, international agreements for the former Yugoslavia, especially Carrington’s document, etc. In all this there is not a single reference to an international body which reported on these, and hides the fact that in its admission to the UN, in the Council of Europe, OSCE and in its partnership with the EU, Macedonia was subjected to rigorous monitoring, which did not show such deviations, and least of all “ethnic engineering” and the marginalization of the Albanians in Macedonia.

Also hidden is the fact that the Macedonian constitution, adopted in 1991, was, from the draft phase up until its implementation - subject to strict supervision by the Badinter Commission and the EU, the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission, etc. No less twisted are the facts that the right to self-determination (the right to secede, according to the Marxist definition to which Xhaferi was inclined), does not apply to minorities, ethnic, linguistic and other such communities, it only concerns nations and nation states. Probably



because of that, Xhaferi insisted that the text and strategy identify two kinds of people living in Macedonia. In the same sense, at the end of the text, Xhaferi abused the work of prominent American political scientist Arendt Liphart from the University of California, who in his famous study “Democracy in plural societies”, described multiple options for the prospects of democracy, for example a consociational system that assumes consensual agreement of communities in decision-making, of course, with the right to veto. Xhaferi took that to mean proportional representation everywhere, and a sovereign and equal voice in decisions. He was openly against Milosevic’s slogan of one man-one vote, for no other reason than because the Albanians were diacritic (like the earlier representatives of other nations in Yugoslavia). There were a number of other problematic issues raised in the text, such as local government representation in the administration, the judiciary, education, etc. But those were issues triggered by everyone in Macedonia and not just Xhaferi.

What if the propositions in Xhaferi’s text (i.e. from the AAS Platform) were not met? About that, Xhaferi wrote; in FYROM dangerous confrontations between the two peoples, Albanians and Macedonians, exist today, the output of which can be constructive or destructive. Ideally, the confrontation should be resolved by peaceful, civilized means, but it must not be peace at any cost. The maxim “it is shortsightedness to have bad peace rather than a good war because inevitably bad peace will lead to a terrible war”. And exactly in accordance with this cataclysmic maxim of Xhaferi’s, events and the crisis unfolded in 2001 in Macedonia.

That crisis proved that the Platform, specified by Xhaferi, assumed a combination of violent and non-violent, democratic and non-democratic means, with the ultimate purpose of achieving the radical ethno-political and demographic-territorial ambitions of its authors. The crisis and its resolution with the Ohrid Framework Agreement as well as with the constitutional changes in 2001-2002, showed that the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia was truly faced with real problems in their position and rights, and that these problems could be resolved within the institutional order, without violence, heavy casualties and material damage that usually occur in serious crises and conflicts; constitutional changes were adopted, with significant emphasis on multiculturalism. Political expressions

were improved and traditions and multicultural coexistence were enriched in our society. Finally, exit from the crisis was achieved with visible and expressed participation from the international community, which shows that solutions imposed by force and violence are not acceptable. And neither are principles of self-determination for minority ethnic groups in a wider community and even in a state, where there is no unilateral acceptance of changing state boundaries.

At the end of the text, even though it applied strategically to the entire postulated “Albanian national-territorial problem”, an agreement was proposed between Albanians and Macedonians to change the national system to a bi-national system, with ten points, six of which were cosmetic-commercial and four accurately reflected the substance of the AAS platform: a) statehood, languages and flags; b) the referendum (D.M.-recognition.); c) constituting a bicameral parliament; d) free movement of the Albanian people, ideas and goods across Albanian territories;

These articles and this approach have been implemented and are still in use today. No one and nowhere did anyone contest, deny or criticize them. Western and public politics, with all its liberalism, including its technological web-liberalism, with the exception of individuals like G. Ahrens, took absolutely no notice of their implementation. Almost no one noticed even in this country

## 9. The Bulgarian doctrine

Part of the Bulgarian doctrine was published in 1997 in the form of a scientific study, during a difficult time in the country (the collapse of the economy and the currency, instability, the rise of organized crime), but also during the time of dedication to European integration. Even though it was compiled by an independent collective of authors and published by an independent publisher, the names of the authors, reviewers and participants in the “project” as well as financial donations made, suggest that the Doctrine was directly linked to the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, BAS, and to senior military, government and church circles. Only the first part was published that year under the title “Foundation of the Bulgarian National Doctrine”, which dealt mainly with conceptual issues and

with history, until recent times. The following year the second part was published under the title “National programs related to Bulgarian national ideals and national interests”. Both parts concentrated on a nationalist ideology, hidden behind the veil of academism, modern rhetoric and “historical science”.

The Doctrine as a motif has apparently followed the fact that all modern states (mentioning the United States, France, Germany, Japan, etc.), including their neighbours, have national doctrines, but Bulgaria did not have one. (This so-called fact however is incorrect, just like many other solid “facts” listed throughout the text). Outside of that, here we will find mention of the need for unity and the unity of the entire nation in difficult times, leading its politics on a “scientific basis” rather than on intuitions, and having a road map for the development of the nation and the state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and that definition is found in the national doctrine, ideals, interests, etc. What follows, and is emphasized, is that this doctrine is supra-social, trans-party, class, ethnic, religious, which means it takes precedence over all others, just as the national ideals and interests take precedence over all others, including the state.

According to the introduction, the purpose of the doctrine, as is in the SANU Memorandum, is an appellative guide to “statesmen and politicians” to act actively and in compliance aimed at achieving the Bulgarian national ideal and Bulgarian national interests, and at the same time it calls on the entire nation to direct its creative energy and will towards those aims. Again, in the introductory section, the paper tries to ascertain scientific justification and theoretical basis for its approach, again starting off from the alleged “fact” that in the world today there are two understandings of the nation: one that goes beyond, on whose basis is the “ethnos” in the narrow sense of the word, that is, the so-called ethno-nation conception, or conception of ethno-nation; and the other is supposedly what French educators today call, as was said in the text, the basis for state regulation as most of the countries in the world function (France, USA, Switzerland, Spain and many others); this is the concept of a socio-cultural (political) nation, the definition of which is attributed (without a source) to the French educators: “society of citizens, united by a common idea of statehood”. The doctrine is resolute, of course, by this second conception.

Besides that, this great surprise is followed by the definition of the Bulgarian nation in a clean and strict Marxist formulation (ethnicity-nationality-national consciousness – for creating its own church and state) - historical - and - territory with full and compact political, economic and spiritual space. When it again starts with the ethnic, meaning nation-genesis of the Bulgarians, the doctrine does not rely on any Marxist conception, but rather on the most archaic concepts of ethno-romanticism and ethno-determinism.

Yet, basically, these two doctrinal texts follow - Marxism. In general, even today, Bulgarian academics, largely suffer from Marxism and Leninism when looking at their national question. These two texts are in complete continuity and argumentation with the famous BAS Institute of History pamphlet from 1968 regarding the Macedonian Question, which allegedly should have had clearer views of the Bulgarian stand towards Macedonia, and for the imminent improvement of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations and regarding the Tito- Zhivkov and Krste Tsrvenkovski-Zhivkov talks. There was not even a millimetre of movement, except for the criticisms against Dimitrov for “improperly” understanding Lenin’s take and Stalin’s “abusive” politics - the right of nations to self-determine up to secession (Mlakedonskij vpros, 1968).

However, it was clear even to the Bulgarian academics that theoretically, the doctrine was quite shallow and bare and required reinforcing. In 2000, the Sofia publisher “Paradigm”, in support of the doctrine, published the book entitled “Ethnicity, nation, nationalism” by historian V. Todorov. It is interesting that Todorov, after a solid analysis of the works of A. Smith, B. Anderson and E. Gellner and others, from the circle of modernists and ethno-symbolists, in his conclusions he was totally confused. First, in his preface he criticized former President Zheliu Zhelev, who in 1993 allowed his book about “Fascism” to be translated and published in the Macedonian language and later came to Skopje to launch the book. Todorov said that he was more of a philosopher than a historian, and that he somewhat mixed up history with politics. But in his fourth part of the book, Todorov was determined not to recognize Macedonia as a nation. He named them - non-Albanian political forces in Macedonia, as a Christian majority and leadership

in Macedonia, and “Macedonian governors” of the Republic of Macedonia. Note that “republic” of Macedonia was written in lowercase letters, unlike the pamphlet of 2008, in which “Republic” was written with capital letters - differentiating it from Bulgaria, without the “republic”. In both cases - it implied - an artificial creation and name. (Todorov, 2000).

The entire text in the doctrine was organized to make an impression on the scientific community to show that it was systematic and serious by giving definitions to all terms and categories, performing some kind of hierarchical construction: ethnicity - nationality - nation - nationalism – national ideal - national interests - practical politics. Very often these definitions did not match either the theoretical or the dictionary literature, some even sounded academic, tautological and even funny. The construction of the doctrine was quite simple: the Bulgarians as a nation and state are among the oldest people in Europe, and of course the Balkans, but by force of circumstances, today they are relegated to only one part of their territory, and that a significant amount of territory and population is found outside of their state. Those historical circumstances were – encroachment and attacks from the other neighbours, from the Byzantines and Turks to the Serbs, Greeks, to Stalin and the Comintern, etc., but, of course, there were some weaknesses and mistakes made by their leaderships – by kings Peter and Boris, by Ferdinand, by Prime Minister Stamboliski and by Dimitrov and others. Great damage was done to the Bulgarian cause by the Bogomils, by the Great Powers, by the Bulgarian Communists, and by all its neighbours alike.

Apparently, Bulgaria today is on the right track, as it has declared, and truly stands as a single nation of people, because that’s what it says in its Constitution, and some ethnic groups, or individual citizens can declare themselves differently, but still they are all members of the Bulgarian nation. The only requirement for that is - to be loyal and united like all other nations; like the French, the Americans, etc. But, of course, all throughout the entire text there are echoes of the tragic loss of Pomoravia, of Macedonia, of Thrace, of Moesia, and part of Dobruia, which conveys the optimism that these things can be fixed, especially Macedonia because the Macedonians have always been Bulgarian in the purest sense. The

criterion for declaring minorities as part of the Bulgarian nation, apparently does not apply to the status of Bulgarians in other countries. According to the doctrine, the Bulgarian character of Macedonia and the Macedonian people is indisputable. The Macedonian nation, according to the Bulgarian doctrine, is a quasi-nation created with the forced removal of territories and population from the Bulgarian nation skillfully manipulated by Serbs, communists and some autonomists, hungry for fame and power. Undoubtedly the Macedonian language is a dialect of the Bulgarian language. Macedonian history and culture are part of the Bulgarian history and culture. The only reason they are assumed to be different is because of Serb and other propaganda which, under certain circumstances, proved to be successful in Macedonia (again Stojan Novakovich). The Bulgarian thesis alleging the artificial character of the Macedonian nation is equivalent to the Greek and indirectly to the Serbian doctrines.

Interestingly, the Bulgarian doctrine openly favours fascism and king Boris's role in World War II who ignored all reality, and like the Greek doctrine, skips whole chapters of history and facts such as the Second Balkan War, the First World War, the National Liberation War of Macedonia, the recognition of an independent Macedonian state by Bulgaria in 1992, or the recognition of the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church over the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The entire text is intertwined in an emotional charge of regret for its illustrious past, accusing other countries and peoples for the Bulgarian national tragedies, with uncritical glorification of the Bulgarian "genetic capital" and bright future, if only Bulgarians wake up and unite around their national ideal. The last part of the doctrine, in which an attempt is made to derive some demographic, economic, social, scientific and cultural policies, is actually the weakest part and far below the official national programs for EU accession.

## 10. The Greek doctrine

We will be analyzing two documents, the first, placed here almost in its entirety, deals mainly with the "Macedonian Question. Overview of attempts to create an artificial nation" published in February 1993. This document was formulated by the well known Greek

academic and research institution associated with external-political authorities in that country. It was published just before Macedonia was admitted to the UN and was distributed at UN headquarters and to a significantly wider audience in an attempt to prevent Macedonia's admission to the UN and to establish and explain its stand on Macedonia's name in the resolution for its admission. In that, Greece partially succeeded. From that we can say that the document did its job in performing its daily political and pragmatic role. Sadly it also revealed that the Greek official position towards Macedonia and Greece's other neighbours who have minorities living in Greece, has remained unchanged; constant and continuously intact. The views expressed in this document are the same views expressed more than a century and a half ago telling us that nothing has changed, no progress has been made and nothing has evolved in their essence. Indicative of the same stand, a short while later, Professor Evangelos Kofos, chief expert on the "Macedonian Question" in Athens, released a very similarly worded document in New York (Kofos, 1993).

As it turned out, the document revealed that Kofos was relying strictly on selected sources and used "facts" or "semi-facts" that were completely in line with the old Greek national ideals and expansionist aspirations from the time when Greece was created, from 1822 to 1850. It is also interesting that the publishing of "Nachertanijata" by I. Garashanin in 1844, was timed to almost coincide with the publication of a similar book, the so-called "Blueprint", namely, "History of the Greek nation" by Konstantinos Papanigopoulos, a book specifically designed to bridge the historical and cultural identity and continuity of the Greek nation-state in the regions where the ancient Hellenic polis and Alexander the Greats' empire existed, through the Byzantine Empire to modern Greece.

The book publishing coincided with the famous speech delivered by Ioannis Koletis, President of the Greek government, in January 1844, when, during the Greek Parliament's first session, and after the adoption of the Greek Constitution, he revealed the well-known "Megali-idea" or Greek national and foreign policy program. In the same speech, Koletis, among other things, said: "The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece. It is only one part, the smallest and poorest part. This is not the only kingdom where Greeks live; Greeks also

live in Ioannina, in Thessaloniki, in Seres, in Edirne, in Constantinople, in Smyrna, in Trebizat, in Crete, in Samos and in each country that is associated with Greek history or with the Greek race... There are two main centres of Hellenism: Athens, the capital of the Greek kingdom and “The City” (Constantinople), the dream and hope of all Greeks...” (Quote taken from Just, 1989, also from Jovanovski, 2005, p. 31/2).

British sociologist S. Grozbi called the composition “retrospective nationalism”, meaning “old epochs” are interpreted in light of later or modern concepts and preoccupations, which, incidentally, is characteristic of all the documents we have in our collection. This is the composite by which Greek historians have emancipated themselves, at least some Greek historians. P. Kitromilides citing A. Smith, by his strong criticism of modernist Greek nationalist historiography and Greek nationalism, believes that from the Middle Ages until the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Greeks were, along with them the newly established Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian political communities, part of the comprehensive Byzantine Empire, after that of the Ottoman Empire, and always part of the Orthodox ecumenism. They had no particular national characteristics; they were encouraged by the political community (Kitromilides, 1998).

But, the “Macedonian Question”, like Greek operational politics, was kept hidden and far away from public awareness and knowledge. It should be noted that in the spring of 1992, just as Macedonia was leading its hottest battles for its international recognition, the then Prime Minister Mitsotakis, probably synchronized with Milosevic, organized a so-called “conference of heads of states and governments of the signatories of the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest”. The 1913 Treaty of Bucharest ended the Second Balkan War and divided Macedonia which then was annexed by its three neighbours (Greece 51%, Serbia 39% and Bulgaria 10%). The idea behind the conference was to establish that after the breakup of Yugoslavia, the one part, i.e. the Republic of Macedonia, had no sovereignty because of the Yugoslav collapse, and its population had no historical or national identity. And because of that it should be up to the signatories of the agreement (i.e. the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest signatories) to review its case and decide what to do. Namely, decide whether to divide its territory in



accordance with the same principles, or to authorize another state to annex it? The conference did not take place because it was canceled at the insistence of Italian Minister De Mikelis and the EU. But that did not stop Greece from preparing arguments for removing the Republic of Macedonia from the international arena. Those arguments are summarized in this document.

In its brief introduction, the motives of the publication and the Greek policy concerning the Macedonian question were revealed through four points: The first point called for the acceptance of a new Slavic nation existing in Macedonia; this implied that “Skopje” stole part of the Greek cultural heritage. Here Greece attempted to legitimize the idea that Greek cultural heritage was stolen from the Greek people who had become the main instrument for cultural and territorial expansion at the expense of Greece; The second point made allegations that “Skopje” was promoting the idea of only a fraction of the total Macedonian territory was freed. In other words Greece was alleging that the Republic of Macedonia was indirectly “reaching out” for the sovereignty of Greece, meaning the Republic of Macedonia had territorial ambitions towards the part of Macedonia annexed by Greece in 1913; The third point claimed that the Republic of Macedonia was encroaching on Greece’s sovereignty by using the name Macedonia and Macedonian place names; and the fourth point alleged that by using the name Macedonia, “Skopje” was in fact expressing cultural claims on Greece’s geography as a whole in order to give itself a national identity.

There were, however, more motives: to prevent threats to the peace and security in the Balkans that would arise from the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia; to respect international law, according to which “Skopje” has not achieved sovereignty of its territory. And finally the most important point, which otherwise fully coincides with the position of the SANU Memorandum position, the Macedonian nation was invented by Tito and the Comintern, to strip Serbian power in the Yugoslav Federation.

After that, sources that claimed that a Greek historical identity existed in all of Macedonia’s territory whose inhabitants were “authentic Greeks like their brethren in the south” were extensively

cited. The same document also alleges that up until 1914, there was reportedly no memory of a “Macedonia in a national sense”. The Ilinden Uprising in the Greek town Krushevo was, according to this document, incited by the Bulgarians against the Turks, but with complicity to exterminate the Greek population. Created by Tito in 1945, the People’s Republic of Macedonia included Skopje and Tetovo which have never been part of Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia, according to the same document, holds the territory on which, in addition to the Greek population living there also live Serbs, Vlachs, Turkish speaking Muslims, Bulgarians and what have you - under the Slavic Yugoslav hat endeavouring to get to the Aegean Sea.

In the second part of the document, paradoxically, the Greek premise regarding Macedonia starts from a certain truth: namely, that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the Balkan peoples constituted their own nation-states, their national ideologies coincided with the zones that had mixed populations and precisely because of that point each nation came up with its own national claims.

In accordance with that, Macedonia was one of those regions in which interweaving national ideologies and pretensions were particularly strongly expressed. Quite correctly it is argued that the population in that region fell under four antagonistic ideologies, aspirations and propaganda, Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian and Albanian, each trying to assert its own identity. Otherwise, apparently according to this Greek document, historically and geographically the Macedonian people were Greeks, and Macedonia was perfectly homogeneous and part of the Greek state.

That, in turn, was possible because the population itself was ethno-amorphic, in spite of its Greek background, it remained backwater rural. Especially pronounced was the Greek-Bulgarian antagonism during which Bulgaria had greater successes because it used the linguistic affinity of the population in its communication and the impact of its newly founded Bulgarian Exarchate Church.

Amazingly, some of these opinions are true even though they are handed down from Greek sources and sound self-critical and “anti-Bulgarian”. Some opinions, unfortunately, like the one of Ilinden

and the slogan “Macedonia for the Macedonians”, the document treats only as a maneuver of a few people, leaders of the Bulgarian National Movement – working for the autonomy of that zone, but without insisting on changes in the Bulgarian historic identity of that region. This, in summary conclusion, means that the determination of the nature of the ethno-population primarily depended upon the success of propaganda, during which time the Greeks were not so successful. The Serbs, who were less successful than the Bulgarians, came to another tactic (thinking of S. Novakovich); to recognize some kind of autonomous population identity that would attract people to the Serbian side rather than repel and frustrate them. This thesis is completely identical to the assessment made by S. Novakovich in the Bulgarian documents.

This point brings us to the main structure of the denial. Apparently, during the Second World War, the Bulgarian army was hailed with enthusiasm by the population when it crossed into Macedonia. But the Yugoslav Partisans (read as Tito and the Comintern, not Serbian partisans), took reprisals against the Bulgarian occupation authorities, which in turn caused mass discontent with the Bulgarians, and in the end it allowed Tito to promise the population that it would live better and would be equal to the other populations in Yugoslavia if it fought against the Bulgarians. Tito, according to the document, did this in order to attract the population to his side and to create the Republic of Macedonia in 1945.

According to the Greek document, language, history, culture, education, etc., were fabricated later, largely with thefts from neighbouring languages, cultures and histories. Tito’s idea was “imperial”: first to create a Balkan Federation under his control with help from Dimitrov and Bulgaria, then merge Pirin Macedonia with the Republic of Macedonia for which he had already obtained concessions, and finally for Stalin to create a south- Slavic federation which would annex part of Greece and the Aegean coast. Fortunately for all the neighbours, and especially for Greece, Stalin did not agree with Tito’s policy and first rejected the idea of a Balkan federation, and then dispensed with Tito. It is interesting that the text does not mention even a word about the Greek Civil War and the period after the war.

The “Theoretical alchemy of Skopje”, according to the Greek authors of the document, has no national identity or cultural, linguistic or historical grounds, with perhaps a small part of the population in the central part of the territory of “Skopje”, which earlier had a certain Slavo-phone linguistic distinctiveness and sense. The last part again, because of the effect on the reader, cites sources to prove the Greek character of the territory was undeniable.

## 11. The Serbian doctrine

Of the many documents analyzed and presented here, three speak to the Serbian national doctrine. The first document, arranged chronologically, was the SANU Memorandum which appeared in the fall of 1986, a period when Yugoslav society was in a severe crisis, both economic and political. This document was published in various forms, techniques and lengths in order to create immediate and strong reaction among the political leadership of the country and in most republics, including Serbia. Seeming as if it had been planned that way, there was an absence of serious public and scientific debate. Up until 1991 most of its authors were “black listed” by the authorities as they dedicated their full effort working on the political scene first in former Yugoslavia and later in Serbia and FRY. The second document (fragmented) was an extensive paper (a book with over 1000 pages) compiled by Voislav Shesheli and published in Belgrade in 2002 under the title “Ideology of Serbian nationalism. Scientific and published works of Professor Lazo M. Kostich”. The fragments in this document reveal substance of extreme Serbian national ideology and doctrine, based on the works of Serbian quisling and emigrant Lazo Kostich, who Shesheli used to explicate his own views. The accused Shesheli of war crimes by The Hague was a long time head of the Serbian Chetnik movement and the Serbian Radical Party, part of the government and parliament of Serbia, especially during the first period of the Yugoslav crisis. He took an active and even an operational (with paramilitary units) role in the violence in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Kosovo. Shesheli’s SRP Party programs are no longer available, they were simply withdrawn, but his alleged scientific effort about Lazo Kostich is in widespread public use in Serbia.

The third document contains the fragmented works of Dr. Momchilo Subotich under the title “Serbian state programs in the Serbian political parties to the Dayton Agreement”, published in 2006, not as nationalistic or doctrinal, but as a scientific text, which only analyzes the content of party programs.

The Memorandum was believed to be the ideological introduction to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation which directly affected events in Serbia that led to Milosevic coming to power. It was also believed to have outlined contours and subsequent Serbian Socialist Party policies and extreme political formations in Serbia and of Serbs in other republics. The memorandum itself was not aggressive, but raised the question of Yugoslavia’s survival with Serbia in it, and called for a debate on the 1974 Constitution that defined a “very loose state union”, which underwent a major economic and political crisis. At the end, as a pretext to the need for such a debate, the document stated that for the other republics “other alternatives had to be considered, and not only about Yugoslavia, indicative of the positions of recent Slovenian public figures and former Macedonian politicians. Such deliberations are surely a danger to Yugoslavia which will push it to unravel even disintegrate...”

And as such, Serbia could not calmly wait for its future to unfold in such an uncertainty so it had to determine its national interests, and come out of the debate with its own initiatives as had the others... Serbia, said the document, insisted on federal regulation and advocated for AVNOJ principles, but everything was not dependent on Serbia; the others too could have other alternatives... And thus in that lay the political definition of the problem of disintegration: first, on the basis of understanding the Memorandum, Serbia, more precisely its leadership, assumed the role of defender of federalism, socialism, democracy, the sovereignty of the country – as was its place to do. Second, Serbia ultimately overpowered the others, so that the others would not have the opportunity to debate alternatives during the famous events in 1991. It is certain that the Memorandum was not the first and only such text that contributed to the breakup of Yugoslavia, but it immediately sparked tensions and quick responses from the others with similar texts and began to create “the well-known division” between politicians, the media, science and the

public; between “federalists and separatists”, “pro-Yugoslavs and anti-Yugoslavs”, “centralists and decentralists”, “AVNOJ-ists and reformers”, etc.

Interestingly, the first part of this document, which accounted for roughly two-thirds of the text and which analyzed the crisis in Yugoslavia’s economy and society, managed to provide a true diagnosis of the situation in the political, economic, cultural, moral and scientific scenes. The last decade (1975-1985) was a time of severe consequences in terms of economic failures, development of policy, embryonic failures in economic reform, etc. A “contracting economy” was introduced by legal means through the Law of associated labour from 1976. During that decade the gross national product in Yugoslavia grew at an annual rate of barely 0.6 to 0.8%, unemployment was rising at 100% compared to the previous decade. The productivity and competitiveness of firms also declined by 15%, and the standard of living quickly declined. The country was incurring large credits.

The so-called “market, self-governing socialism” did not provide a good standard of living. It did however introduce stagflation and inflation, a deficit of basic goods and fuel, while increasing regional disparities. These social processes and their consequences, were described in detail by the document which, surprisingly, provided a diagnosis which generally differed from those provided by the economists from other republics (compared for example to that of Mencinger in 1989). There were indications of constant tension between politics and the economy and the fact that the political elite, regardless of system and performance plans, conducted effective control over the economy and the market, and pointed out the discrepancy of “consensual economy” and politically mediated “free exchange of labour” (1976) with “long-term programs for economic stabilization” (1982), which required a pure market economy, monetarism, defined ownership and market role and freedom for the firms. At the end we came to the so-called collision with “The critical analysis of the functioning of the political system” (1985), which, again, is a purely ideological document that advocates for more discipline and individual and collective agreements. The memo argued that because of these relations and reform delays,

damage was done to all the republics and all the economies, a price they are all now paying.

But here is where the obsolete-scientific and arbitrary analysis begins. Namely, claims are made that in all these movements and developments, the Serbian economy had suffered the most. As proof of this, relatively small-investment in the Serbian economy are given which show lower “output” per unit of invested capital, and depressed prices of energy, raw materials and agricultural products, and the “off shoring” of military and heavy industry outside Serbia. Mentioned in the document is also what is referred to as the “flood of capital” in the developed regions of the Serbian economy.

In fact, at that time all republics showed similar analyzes; i.e. lag in their economies or at least being “amortized” faster than other developing economies, and of course blame for all that was placed on the other republics in the Federation or on federal politics. Horvath, Matsuura, Bate, Mencinger and others, however, proved that this was a systemic contrast and preponderance of the administrative and ideological sector over the economy, differences in productivity, investment management and organization, and the disparities that the market itself was creating and receiving were characteristic of the political tensions and rising nationalism, not that it is nationalist or has a conscious relationship with the Serbian economy and society. (Katz, 1985, Horvath, 1985).

The Memorandum, at this point, in the second part of the document offers a completely different argumentative structure, in terms and from the aspect of the Serbian people, not the Serbian state or between inter-republic relations. Deconstruction, it says, began between the two world wars, when a strong Comintern created a strategy to break up the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and as a result, through the CPY, it propagated the idea that the Serbian people in Yugoslavia were an “oppressive” nation, and that the other nations were “oppressed” nations. The assessment was that the political hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie was followed by economic dominance in the kingdom and that the CPY had accepted the Comintern evaluation and tried to weaken this alleged Serbian position. This, according to the document, created a lasting bond between the Slovenian and Croatian communists (i.e. Tito and

Kardelj) which gave rise to a national - Croatian and Slovenian CP before the war, and as such decisions and constitutional reforms made after the war, took power away from Serbia. The Serbian people have reportedly been repeatedly accused of being “oppressive”, “centralized”, “authoritative”, and exposed to a “sense of historical guilt”. Hence, Serbian communists were always put on the defensive and had to keep silent unless they wanted to be accused of “hegemony”, of “unitary-ism”, or of “centralism”. Hence, the Serbian disadvantaged economic position continued to be depressed putting Serbian politics and the Serbian economy into an inferior position in the Federation. The document also criticizes the Yugoslav ruling ideology, not because of its Marxist vision of the nation and international relations, but for its deviation from it. However, when it is expected to offer Marxist views, it remains critical of the policy of interethnic relations. It fails to bind itself to the Marxist or any other more modern conception of these relations.

The memorandum has highlighted three main points where the Serbian position is allegedly inferior: 1.) even with systemic measures and a conscious economic policy its economy lags and is depleted; 2) With the 1974 Constitution and with the federal authority organs, Serbia is in an unequal position in relation to the other republics because it has two provinces whose jurisdiction it cannot penetrate, but they participate in Serbia’s management and even play a part in the Federation, and in parallel with Serbia are equal to it in Federation policies. Besides that, they have the right to veto over the Assembly of the Republics and the provinces are equally represented. Therefore the Federation no longer makes any sense because it is not decentralized but acts like it is... in essence it has disintegrated. 3) This deals with the position of the Serbian people in the other republics. The Serbian people in the other republics including Kosovo, which is within Serbia, are treated like minorities where their rights in their own language, education, culture, etc., are being revoked and decreased especially in Kosovo, where for decades genocide has been carried out against the Serbian people. The memorandum also details cases of maltreatment of Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo.

Besides all that, the Memorandum focused on many more causes for discontent: the treatment, for example, of Serbian history which, in



some places, was officially misconstrued (perhaps because of how the Macedonian people were mistreated during the Balkan Wars and the fact that Macedonia was divided by force in three parts and one part was occupied by Serbia), or the treatment of Serbian literature in school programs being called Montenegrin, or Bosnian, or Voivodian. Or for example the so-called “common core” subjects in schools that were taught with quality works of Serbian authors yet were mechanically labeled “low quality” by other literatures. The Memorandum text is full of emotionally charged examples strictly selected to make the most impact and create the most amount of difficulties. The text, it seems was almost designed to put blame on the others, on the other peoples, or more precisely on high political officials and to indirectly accuse them of committing some kind of conspiracy against Serbia and against the Serbian people; to blame politicians for their self interests and privileges which were obviously not firmly rooted on the side of national interests. Of course, the paper also called for immediately drawing up a national program and fighting for its implementation.

But for which system solutions did the Memorandum call for in those days? Undoubtedly it called for a framework of democratic socialism, civil and human rights of the Western type, for modernity and for civilized values, for the rearrangement of relations in the Federation in order to stop the erosion and disintegration.

Specifically, in relation to possible changes to the Constitution, the Memorandum advocated four main points: a) sovereignty of the people and free will as the sole source of political legitimacy (meaning not the elite, bureaucracy, high officials, party, and others, but national and independent civil elections, majority, minority, public scrutiny etc.); b) self-determination of the nation, conceived in a multi-national community as a principle of a single state and state policy, coupled with the principle of political and cultural autonomy of nations and national minorities, but not the sovereignty of the parts (republics) that revoked the rights of others (e.g. the Serbs); c) human rights, in the widest range, whereby not emphasized, but coupled with the assessment of equitable representation of all parts of the Federation, resulting in commitment to the principle of “one vote – same privilege”, i.e. majority representation from that republic in the Federal

representation; d) rationality: no conditions for a rational policy. The country would be composed of eight separate and poorly connected parts, no single policy would exist, and if it existed on paper, it could not be realized in practice...

All rhetorical and internal sense of the Memorandum, regardless of the principally correct diagnosis of the ills of the federal and political-economic system and self-administered performance, the proposals are remodeled to rearrange relations in the Federation in terms of accepting the national interests of the Serbian people, their special position whatever it may be, their increase of power in the federal decision making process (by majority vote), favourable position in the economy (through increased participation in the joint accumulation) and cultural autonomy for the Serbian nationalities and minorities. In other words, the Federation would not be preserved. From that aspect, this document should be looked at in light of its churning literature, journalism and pure politics of the most tragic kind: military conflict. According to S. Antonich, this was made evident in the Academy circles which revolved around Milosevic, about which he wrote in his remarkable sociological study called a "Trapped country. Serbia during Slobodan Milosevic's rule". (Antonich, 2002 ch. 2). Slavko Milosavljević, "in his conversations with Dobriša Cosić" refuted all the principal arguments in the Memorandum, particularly those which referenced to Macedonia. (Milosavljević, 1997).

However, the substance of the Serbian national doctrine is crystal clear as it is laid out by Shesheli's efforts in terms of Lazo Kostich's works. Although at the time of the book's release in 2002, circumstances in the Balkans and in the former Yugoslavia, since 1992, had completely changed but the substance of the book, nevertheless, remained the same. In this write-up we will deal mostly with the fragments that are of concern to Macedonia and to the Macedonian people and will dispense with the rest in spite of arguments and politics being the same. Viewed from the outside, the book says, the Serbian people are seen as a matured, cultured, triumphant and civilized people in the Balkans and in Europe. They have been credited for their participation and for all their great victories and setbacks in European history – from the St. Sava and King Dushan in the Kosovo battle, uprisings, Balkan and World

Wars... In all this, the Serbian people were seen as heroes, conquerors and holders of spirituality and culture, progress and prosperity in the Balkans. And in all that time, say from the Mesozoic period, they were also victims; deprived, disadvantaged, misunderstood and oppressed. The book deals mostly with relations between Serbians and Albanians and particularly between Serbians and Croats, who were supposedly their worst enemies, executioners, thieves of their language, culture, religion, etc. For example, numerous documents cite the genocidal acts of the Ustash Croats in the Second World War, the war of 1992-1995, etc. Extensive but highly selective sources are also cited that talk about Serbian supremacy and superiority, originality and authenticity, about Serbian history and culture in the Balkans and in Europe, as well as the inferiority of the others.

Selectivity of sources, biased and one-sided interpretations, a-priorism and reductionism are the basic features of Shesheli's methodology.

Both Shesheli and Kostich are not so exclusive to deny the Macedonian people their rights as an ethnic group, living in a specific territory and community, especially given the realities of the Second World War and the political engineering of the communists, and Tito and Tempo in particular.

They have been successful because, always, the indigenous population in Macedonia had some linguistic and historical specificities and traditions. Basically, says Shesheli, Macedonians cannot say that they are Serbians in the true sense of the word, but they are closely related, like twin brothers. Other Macedonians in Pirin and Aegean Macedonia have already been assimilated. Macedonians objectively survived only in the part of Macedonia that was liberated by the Serbian army, though Macedonia was always considered an integral part of Serb-ism. This was somewhat contradicted by the author who further down the document stated that during the Balkan Wars 50,000 Macedonian fighters participated on the Serbian side. Kostich even cited dozens of historical documents to prove the Serbian character of Macedonia; the existence of Old Serbia and South Serbia as the cradle of Serb-ism and named a host of senior Serbian politicians, artists, scientists

who came from Macedonia to a number of international peace conferences when Macedonia was given to Serbia along ethnic principles.

Tsvinich and a number of old authors have been cited making claims that the population in Macedonia is a floating and amorphous mass which, when necessary, leans towards the Serbians, towards the Bulgarians or again - the Vlach population – towards the Greeks. Between the two World Wars, the Macedonian population had the opportunity to become Serbian, in other words for Macedonians to become Serbians, citizens of a higher order, nationally to rise up to become Serbians, which is, otherwise, a Bulgarian theoretical paradigm for assimilation. But since by virtue of military and other circumstances (communist engineering) it did not happen, and for as long as federal Yugoslavia survives, Macedonia ought to be recognized as a federal unit; if it does not survive, Serbia should annex it and give it wider autonomy. On what grounds would it be merged? It is clear that both Kostich and Shesheli played the international legal heritage card of the Kingdom of Serbia, by which in Bucharest in 1913 this part of Macedonia was annexed. And the legal successor of that kingdom was the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the successor of that was the then Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, FНРY, Yugoslavia, FRY and at the end, Serbia again. This idea was identical to the one discussed by Mitsotakis and Milosevic in 1992.

The third Serbian documents, the one about the Serbian state in the programs of the Serbian political parties to Dayton, describes the national and statehood conception of the political forces in Serbia. But here we will only mention those of Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) and Shesheli's Serbian Radical Party (SRP). The first is directly affected by the SANU Memorandum, adopted in 1990 and revised two years later, after Yugoslavia had disintegrated and during the heat of conflict in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The program here called for Serbia to be a unitary state with retention of autonomous provinces only as self-governing territories without state responsibilities, and the Federation Assembly elected in principle one vote -the same privilege; corrective, but without great power; a would-be-assembly of elected federal units selected on a parity basis, obliged only to Serbia to

maintain cultural and other relations with its minorities in the other republics.

In 1992, after Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina separated from Yugoslavia, the SPS program was significantly changed. Regarding the separation, the program, just like Milosevic in The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, used the term “secession”, to mean illegal breakaway from the Federation, etc. It also used the term “self-determination of peoples”. But because the minorities in Vojvodina and Kosovo were not classified as peoples but as minorities of other peoples, they had no right to self-determination. And because the Serbian minority in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, had a status of peoples because they were living together as a nation in the same family, they were recognized as people and as having the right to self-determination including secession. Based on this program, the Serbian Republics “Republic of Srpska Krajina” in Croatia and “Republic of Srpska” in Bosnia and Herzegovina were immediately established and preparations were made to create other entities. Thus, the SPS program became the ideological introduction to the Yugoslavian inferno that sparked the tragic conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in Kosovo.

The SRP program was more extreme. It foresaw Serbian sovereignty in all the countries outside the current Serbian state. It foresaw a united Serbia, abolition of the autonomists in Serbia, non-recognition of the republics that “broke away”, including Macedonia, and eventually - their merger in Western Serbia. Looking down the long road, it foresaw recognition of the autonomy of Macedonia within the new Serbian state.

In the past, hundreds of thousands of people were turned into victims with such “genocidal” programs. It is interesting to know how such programs can be implemented in practice and also how many hundreds of thousands of people believe in them.

## 12. Analysis and diagnosis

In our analysis of the ethno-political platforms of our neighbours, we have noted a number of attributes in the sociological

terminology, i.e. qualitative indicators that make them similar, and at times obviously the same. In reality, it is possible that someone may use these attributes and indicators as arguments to negatively represent or create a negative image of the Balkans, which we already have discussed in the first part of this document. In the least, one can use these arguments as a by-product and deviation to arrive at a process of transition, in a systemic and even national emancipation in the Balkan countries, but also in the entire Southeast and Central Europe. In fact, relapses and deviations in the same sense undergo historically and systemically more considerably here than in established countries in the West.

Analysis of texts or documents, of course, can be performed with quantitative methods, very common in contemporary sociology and general science, such as semantic or socio-linguistic quantitative analysis. We can demonstrate, for example, the degree of weight of these articles by looking at ethnicities, history, politics, geophysics, geopolitics, theories and pragmatics. We could demonstrate the degree of optimism or pessimism, determination or reluctance, aggression or peace, studiousness or superficiality etc. that filters through these documents. For our purpose however, we will perform a general summary which will reveal some common or specific attributes in the documents. We chose to do this because all these documents did not come from the same period, or from the same source, and especially since they did not come from a similar social and political context.

First, what catches our eye is the fact that all these documents were generated by various academies of science, or at least by the higher scientific institutions which are linked to high government, church, military and other authorities of the state apparatus. This means that the documents, their creators, financiers, publishers, etc., were not the fruit of pure “*intervala ethno-lucida*” of some academic circles in those countries, but of social and mental contexts of high ethno-politicization in those countries. Behind them, we have to point out, hid the particular interests of the ethno-elites; but not so much for the struggle for human, civil and ethnic rights and freedom as one might think. In Macedonia for example, in 2002 there was an attempt by the Academy of Sciences to engage in preparing documents and political propositions on the basis of ethnicity (for

those who don't know we are referring to the famous scandal that proposed the so-called "exchange of territories" with Albania), to divide Macedonia over a frivolous argument; "if two people who are married don't agree they should divorce". It is true that throughout history some "immortal" academics are shown to be "mortal" and even "ethno-mortal". In the Balkans all this seems more pronounced.

Second, the analysis leads to the indication that almost all doctrines, or at least their basic approach, are associated with the Marxist theory of nation and ethnicity, alleged liberty, self-awareness, unity and freedom. But in fact, they are a simple eclecticism of elements of ethno-romanticistic, primordialistic and Marxist interpretations of nation and ethnicity, especially wrapped in a wafer of civil conception of the nation-state or of a national-state. Mostly used are Stalin's and to some extent Kardeli's modalities of these theories, with strong emphasis on "freedom" of an ethnic community, which has historically blood-tribal, territorial, cultural and linguistic ties, as well as political identity and continuity. Freedom is reportedly achieved only as long as the nation or ethnicity in unity occupies its "own" territory demographically, linguistically, culturally and politically. Thus, the theory implies that in this historic phase, there is no freedom of the community without recognition of those elements. Even though, basically, Marxist theory does not consider the nation as an agent of liberation of people and labour, but as an inevitable and derivative product of capitalism, which does not interfere in the freeing; but quite the opposite, it becomes part of that general emancipation.

Robustly overstating the historic roots of each nation, their role in history, their belligerence and methods of occupying space, their oppression of other nations and neighbours, their economic and cultural unity... exactly fit modern nationalism and ethno-centrism. However, because all doctrines agree on the definition of a nation in the modern sense of the word, i.e. connecting the nation with freedom and creating national statehood which coincides with civic nationality, at this point they leave not only the Marxist, but all other theories on which they are based; but because of their departure from eclecticism they can not formulate new or different theories. This is because these and many other and more modern theories,

bind the rise of nations to classical capitalism/socialism, state and its dynamics, and reproduction. Not to modern civil societies, democracy, human rights, open market space, etc. Hence there is rejection and animosity toward modernist, ethno-symbolist, identity theories, and towards international legal theories of the nation, ethnicity, etc.

Therefore, the doctrines which are otherwise the meta-theoretical premise, speak about an ethnic state (first degree or stage) which in a historical development that will first give birth to a nation and later to a nation-state. The documents themselves provide many conclusive arguments that the nations they are referring to are reportedly a sprout in the creation of states, in other words the nation, encircled, existed before the state.

They also try to argue as much, if not more, in the fact that the nation, as a primordial category, gave birth to the state. And that's the concept of primordial-ism and ethno-romanticism. That eclecticism and the mixing of theoretical substances is present in all documents (i.e. in all the documents, directly or indirectly, there are claims that "their" nation created their state, and at the same time their state consolidated the nation, or at least it began to free the nation until it is completely freed).

Here arises the problem of how the Macedonian nation is treated. The Macedonian nation, even if it is understood in an ethno genetic sense, it truly had no state of its own for a long time. How then did that nation originate without its own state? ...And hence all the denials... silence... negation... of the Macedonian statehood... for example from Samoil and Vladimir, Radomir, Hris, etc., over Kresna-Razlog and through the Ilinden Uprising, i.e. to the Krushevo Republic and then to ASNOM in 1944. This of course is indicative of how Macedonia and the Macedonian people have been treated by their neighbours. The neighbours are silent on these matters because these are "shameful" or "delicate" moments or periods in their national state history. This is how it has been in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbian predominance in politics, economy and culture. This is how it has been in the last decades in Yugoslavia not to mention the silence about the Greek Civil War, the Second World War in Bulgaria and Albania, the Holocaust in Bulgarian



territory, Serbian rule in Macedonia, between the two World Wars, etc.

And second, truthfully how a Macedonian state and statehood could be created if there was no prior ethnic or national foundation in its population and territorial framework? The doctrines here are caught in a knot of confusion and contradiction and solve the problem in a purely Gordian way by proclaiming that the Macedonian nation and state are artificial entities. In other words they again turn to Marxism, to ethno-romanticism and primordial-ism, but this time they interpret primordial-ism according to the Marxist theory and Stalinist practice - of political engineering the production or liquidation of nations and states. In this sense there are no principal differences in the approach of all four doctrines we are looking at. They directly or indirectly, primarily use Marxist theory, even when they make accusations of influencing in the creation of artificial nations or when influencing territorially or through the population, to “damage” their own nations.

Namely, be it as it may, truthfully, these doctrines cannot be connected to Marxism, not even to the Austro-Marxist modality (Bauer). In aid comes the Comintern, or Stalin’s stagger-operation-alization of Marxism. According to the SANU Memorandum as well as the Greek and Bulgarian doctrines, exactly that operation-alization in interstate and international politics, has turned the Serbian nation into a minority in Yugoslavia; has in time defrauded the Bulgarian nation; and has artificially created the Macedonian nation. According to Albanian doctrine, again, (even its title is reminiscent of Kardeli and the resolution of the Slovenian national issue), the historical, linguistic, cultural and ethno-cultural compactness and development of those territories, gives them their undeniable sovereignty in which UN documents and international pacts and laws are only a helpful argument and derivative.

These doctrines have almost no association with the modern interpretation of nation and nationalism, especially if we are talking about the positive interpretation of these categories. The most widespread current in this sense, which modernists and ethno-symbolists, who we already have mentioned, such as Smith, Hobsbawm, Gellner, Anderson, Brubeiker and others, speak of, is

identity, ethno-culture and legal qualification of nations and minorities, not their historical origin, blood or clan connections, or distribution of territory, statehood, economies, etc...

Overall, this means that the doctrines have no conceptual consistency or a solid benchmark in political statements. Work is done namely for the eclectic-ness in the conception and in the claims. Where they don't function, a segment of symbolism and modernism is used; sometimes they turn to primordial-ism or Marxism. But then again, the basis of the doctrines are rooted in ethno-romanticism and primordial-ism with the added Marxist component of state interventionism in the creation of own or negation of other nations (Macedonia, for example), like the added component of modernism (or convenient disasters) of state influence on the nation.

Built on this point are the absurdities and paradoxes of the modern doctrines of Macedonia's neighbours: They rely on alleged European and world doctrines and democratic practices in building single nations ("nation building") and national state ("nation state building") but forgetting, ignoring and dismissing the fact that Western and democratic doctrines and practices (except for the most conservative and nationalistic right) in parallel foster human rights and communities, including the right to self-determination and the protection of individual and collective rights. In the case of Macedonia's neighbours however, their doctrines directly justify and advocate integration into nations and nation-states, with assimilation and denial of human rights. National doctrines, at this level, are politically engineered, conservative in nature, retrograde in character and much uncivilized.

In the same sense, and in that doctrinal direction, used (in fact abused) are international documents, laws, pacts, conferences, which should confirm the purity of the national, i.e. nationalist aspirations and requirements. Besides the Serbian document (indirectly), all four other documents directly refer to such conferences and laws, which are supposed to support their arguments and requirements (territorial, population, etc.). Those acts and conferences that fit are hailed as great (San Stefano in Bulgaria for example), and those that conceptually do not correspond (the Treaty of Berlin for example)

are ignored. Xhaferi has used such tactics almost as a rule along with his twisted interpretation of international documents. As can be seen, all these documents ignore historical periods and important events, such as the Greek Civil War, the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia, the genocide of the Macedonian Jews, etc. Even more so ignored is the creation of a Greater Albania in 1941 to 1943/4, and the Enver Hoxha period in Albania. Enver Hoxha is mentioned but only as a speaker at the Paris Peace Conference. Nothing less is absent from the European documents for ethnic and human rights, with which Macedonia's neighbours have serious problems or international litigation.

A few common statements and a summary of the analysis of these documents

All documents emphasize a deep concern for the fate of their nation or ethnic group, as well as their responsibility for that fate to further develop favourably. All documents emphasized the need and means for realizing national interests, goals and perspectives, as primary with respect to all other: state, party, international, European, etc. The fate of the nation and perspective become the primordial interests of the doctrines, compared to everything else; for example, for as long as work is done for the logic of European integration, or pluralism and democracy or market economy, NATO etc., then those elements are only auxiliary and instrumental for the emancipation and promotion of that nation.

The documents were designed to appeal to statesmen, politicians, intellectuals, international factors and bodies, but also directly to the masses - to unite, to associate, to perform joint actions, to take concrete measures to achieve national interests, mythical ideals, ambitions and often - pretensions and aspirations. Hence, all doctrines are - aspiration-al and irredentist in their substrate, and directly or indirectly amount to unification schemes, mergers, unifications, territorial unity, even homogenization and assimilation of nations. Regardless of their rhetoric which calls for creating civic nation-states, or the rhetoric for European integration (typical of the Bulgarian and Albanian doctrines), or democratic socialism or market economy principles or civil and human rights (SANU Memorandum), the doctrines are truly about posturing and

ambitions. The doctrines in this section have a visible nationalistic-action component.

All doctrines, without exception (though the Serbian is more indirect, with references to countries and regions where there is a Serbian minority population), plead and keep in their sight the idea of “combining and uniting” the nation in their historical and geographical territory which practically covers the entire Balkans. In other words, the “ethno-memory” territory is viewed as the nation’s own territory, provided for which are arguments, maps and charts, sources and selected documents that show that this territory is theirs and only their ethnic territory. The Serbian doctrine, not directly (but some of its authors in their later works, of course), and other doctrines directly, have pretensions on the central Balkan territory, i.e. Macedonia; what is funny about this is when their selected ethno-geographic cards are placed one on top of another: first, Macedonia does not exist, and second, if it does exist it is a province of their nation-states. But then, according to some Macedonian individual sources and publications, the ethnic Macedonian territory and the “nationally amorphous or seduced” population, should also be stretched out to “large pieces” of the territory in our neighbourhood today. These are the Balkan Dreams of mega-ethnicity. There are no substantial differences in “Balkan” territorial claims and appetites.

In cases where there are no members of the respective nation in such a territory (a typical case is the Albanian platform looking at the situation from 2000 years ago), or if there were some members of that nation - they would be declared a majority supposedly because pre-historically they were manipulated (Greek doctrine), or, again, they say that members of their nations were unaware and amorphous of their national feelings and thus needed a little help to get back on track (Bulgarian and Greek doctrines). The SANU Memorandum however is working on a different context and through other purposes, requiring no more territories or no immediate aspirations. It is asking for special rights for the Serbian nationality in the other Yugoslav republics, and requires domination of those territories. Several Serbian academics have translated that into their literature and have directly elaborated on Milosevic’s political program calling on all Serbians to live in one state; that Belgrade should be

the capital of all Serbs and that they all should have one leader, etc. The idea of all members of a nation needing to live in one country is an open principle not only in the Serbian but also in the Albanian and Bulgarian doctrines, somehow obliged by the current UN and EU principles. It is interesting to note that in several places in the texts, European integration is synonymous with “open borders” in which ethnic territories can be integrated into one whole.

The idea was to anger their own people with their sense of so-called victimization: the doctrines, almost as a rule, elevate people, ethnic groups or the entire nation, in relation to others, i.e. neighbours or minorities – to epic historical dimensions. This was the situation with the Bulgaria doctrine leading the pack and the others following not far behind. Adjectival qualifications such as - courage, endurance, resilience, sacrifice, intelligence, creativity, high value of “genetic capital” (Bulgarian doctrine), etc., are only reserved for their people, which typically are “victims of the others”, their neighbours, of aggressors, of circumstances etc., and thus they suffer suppressed, oppressed, deprived... And thus, the superlatives for their historical merits and victims need to provide a foundation for their supremacy in their own country and unite it with the parts outside of that country, but also for the return of historic claims, debts and rights taken away.

The factors which supposedly defrauded, damaged, took away rights, stunted development, stole territory, took away standards and reduced the greatness of the people..., are mostly foreign factors: historic circumstances, other people or surrounding nations, the Great Powers, the Comintern and Stalin or Tito, the European Union, the UN, but also internal factors: the elites, incompetent leadership, the disunited, the unconscious national and ethnic - politicians, or again historical circumstances: war, balance of power, unification with other countries, geo-political location, propaganda and many other factors.

Pervading at the end of each text is optimism, confidence and faith in correcting these historical errors, injustices, adverse dispositions, especially when it comes to national awakening, unity and homogeneity, with an obvious action component; ethno-political mobilization, above all, of the politicians, of the statesmen, of the

intelligentsia and so on. Since it is clear that the international community has firmly set up some barriers - against repeated political and territorial changes and limitations, the doctrines often see the future of their nation or minority in a “borderless” Europe after joining the EU, or in a separate and autonomous status or rights for its parts in other countries. Unfortunately these very same states make no such concessions for the minorities of other countries living on their territory because of their widely used assimilation tactics for their need to create a “civic nation”.

### 13. The Mega-Ethnos

The documents found here are another testament to the ethno mental image of the Balkans, though the documents do not seem to be typical, objective and a realistic picture of the region. They, as we have already stated, are not official, state-recognized, political or operational documents. But then again they have not been officially or realistically rejected, denied or criticized, at least not in the countries of origin. On the contrary, influential circles, even government agencies, academic circles, the media and public institutions in those countries - have accepted and acted according to their directions. It is rare that there would be the occasional interlocutor or author in those countries who will not agree or who will decide that the documents are outdated, irrelevant; belonging to a narrow circle of people who are non-influential, etc. However, most of the documents played or are still playing a significant political role in the contemporary Balkan ethno-political and national-political scene.

At the very least, the documents were responsible for the ethno-identification of some of the Balkan peoples, even when they contained no direct pretensions or irredentist goals. Today, as we have noted, one of the widespread doctrinal and theoretical frameworks in the science of nation and nationalism, the one that belongs to the modernists and the ethno-symbolists and to the often quoted Anthony Smith, defines nation and nationalism on the basis of identity. Namely, as a social category and as a course of action aimed at internal (intra) population groups that self identify; certainly compared to the others but not necessarily against the others. Of course, there are in it and for it defined identities;

historical, ethno-distinctive, linguistic, cultural and even mythic-symbolic predispositions or bases.

Individual and collective self-identification, for ethno-symbolism and identity conception of the nation, is a significant statement for the direction of forms of social organization of communities, and the state organization. It, of course, does not place a specific statement in the real-political situation, in relation to or in the balance of forces in the international or regional entities such as the Balkans. Also, it was not a priority of science and theory, which itself has a high value. That is because it justifies and builds a foundation for the modern principles of international human rights, and national and ethnic rights. In what sense?

First, if a community or population group separates or feels special or distinct from the others, from its neighbours, from those with whom it communicates, or is affiliated in a political sense, let it feel that way on an ethno-symbolic basis (myths, mythology historically created symbols and distinctions), it has the right to feel that way and to acquire all the rights of self-identification and self-determination; it has no obligation or duty to prove to anyone why it feels that way or why it has separated.

Second, these doctrines are very much out of touch with the modern and important international legal acts regulating the human right of an identity. This in turn is defined in the more binding provisions of international legal acts and documents. Among other things, in the first Articles (8, 9, 10, 11) of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Article 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and in several Articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The right to one's own identity and self-identification is already deeply rooted in the corpus of international law and in that regard, there is no turning back.

Third, understanding the theory of identity of a nation somewhat underestimates the effect i.e. of so-called ethno-political engineering, especially by the states, and in the shaping of national consciousness, and otherwise - of lack of awareness and symbols especially if the states of those ethnicities doesn't exist. And finally, they neglect or simply do not problem-atize the global factor on

cultural values, on the rights and freedoms of people and citizens, and on the methods and means of achieving identity of ethnic rights and positions. The globalization factors today are playing an increasingly important role, in international law, in international policy, in international morals, etc. in the founding of positions of minorities and ethnic groups. Is it then the same or not, in the globalization and in the integration frameworks and trends, as is with the others basing their claims on the “romantic history of their people” (Petar Stoyanov, Bulgarian President), or the “demographic explosion of their people” (Albanian doctrine) or the “current position of their people” (Serbian and Greek doctrines)? Yet, the problem is not in the understanding of the modernist, or ethno-symbolic or identity nation theory. The problem is in their inception and contact with the theory of human rights under international public law and joint statement and contact mechanisms and regulations to protect and promote the rights of peoples, self-defined ethnicities, without violating the rights of others.

The Balkan mega-ethnos is a people that exist ideally, by doctrine, and latent if not real. It is not purely a fictional people; it has not disappeared, like the people of Atlantis, or like the Mayan and Aztec people, or like the Khazars and Phoenicians. Similarly, the Balkan people are not the people of Utopia, or of the City of the Sun, or of Orwell’s Animal Farm. The Balkan people have their historical and geographical identity and location, their own memory and cultural symbols but, unfortunately, they are incomplete and underdeveloped. Instead of achieving full development in a civil union and society, with human rights, economy, communications, open culture and mentality, they continue to endure their mythology and struggle against each other to expand at the expense of the others.

Circumstances conditioned the Balkan people to develop a European or continental periphery, to have an uneven and rough rhythm of production and cultural development, to even have a stagnant and stunted rhythm in economic trends, in a rapid shift of immature historical, political and social formations. The mixing of historical formations of the Middle Ages with modernity, the absence of industrialism, market, civil society, with the abstract and cultural matrix that is responsible for creating a contemporary civic nation as



a primary identity social group, not as a social group or a competitive alternative, even pitted against other groups, influencing one people to grow slowly and differently from the other modern nations.

Of course, there are many instances throughout history with such uneven development of nations and even whole regions and continents, burdened with material, political and cultural encumbrances. The Balkan mega-ethnos is, however, specific in that which the time-lag, burden and social conditions were seen as causes by other people, by external factors, wars, foreign regimes in power and by imposed forms of life, not of their own production of conditions of life or of life circumstances. This difference is reflected in the consciousness of the search for the identity that was taken or prohibited. As a result the reaction is turned into a quest, looking into history and into the idea of the mega-ethnos. It seems like the mega-ethnos, population wise, territory wise, demographic wise, resource and culture wise, can restore everything that was lost; the development to modernize production and social structures and to dignify and humanize survival. The ideological statement in that consciousness is in ethno-centrism, in the ethno-megalomania and in the ethno-conflict-alizm.

Social and developmental differences between these Balkan nations encourage a strong national and nationalist ideology which, in turn, becomes an obstacle in the rise of industrialism, civil society, democracy, the rule of law and the values of a modern civilization. For as long as any and all Balkan nations are not emancipated from their mega-ethnic ideas for their own future, and even reality; for as long as they are not looking at their own reality and future; to look for and build in relation to themselves and for themselves, then nationalism will create obstacles in their development which will lead to conflict, frustration and inter-group contrasts.

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## **Albanian Academy of Sciences - Platform for Resolving the Albanian National Question - “Shkenca” (Science) Publishing house, Tirana, October 1998.**

Note:

In October 1998, after many internal discussions, the Albanian Academy of Sciences adopted and published a paper called “Platform for solving the Albanian national question”, a document which, with its content, messages and recommendations certainly reflects the policy of the country and makes suggestions for subsequent events in the region, but it also explains a great deal about Albanian internal political attitudes. There is a striking similarity in its approach and from the title to Edward Kardeli’s Marxist analysis in his pre-war work entitled “Development of the Slovenian National Question”, however Kardeli’s, version lacks the “Greater-State” statements or messages. The text was published integrally, with very small cuts marked in it.

Shortly after the platform of the Albanian Academy of Sciences was released via the Albanian American Civic League in New York website (<http://aacl.com>, October 1998) Xhaferi, who then was coordinator of the Albanian “cause” in this part of the region, declared the AAS platform an action plan in neighbouring countries and even foresaw these actions and developments. The text is left in its original form. On the same website, one and a half months after the start of the armed conflict in Macedonia, he published the so-called “The Non-Paper of DPA”, in which were precisely defined the position, attitudes, and political steps of the Albanian factor in Macedonia as a specification of the AAS platform. (<http://aacl.com/Non-Paper.htm>. 6 / 5:01) The text was not published for reasons of space, but is available.

## INTRODUCTION

The Albanians have suffered the most territorial fragmentation among the nations of Europe. Today their territory is divided among five states in the peninsula, of which only half is found in their national state. Outside of Albania’s borders most ethnic Albanian territories are under Serbian occupation. Among those territories is



the province of Kosovo, where Albanians represent about 90% of the total population of a little over two million people. Other Albanian territories are located in Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece.

This territorial fragmentation has consistently been a source of concern for the entire Albanian nation, inside and outside of Albania. Due to Serbian police terror, unrest in Kosovo recently jumped to dramatic levels. Belgrade's stubbornness not to recognize the universally proclaimed Albanian national rights in Kosovo, has created a danger of expanding the conflict beyond its borders, along the Balkan Peninsula and even beyond. The striking crimes committed against the Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian police apparatus is putting the conflict in danger of expanding beyond the Kosovo boundaries, putting in motion not only the large offices (cabinets), but also international organizations. In the diplomatic network and in world journalistic circles various ideas are being discussed on how to resolve the Kosovo issue. The International factor, most probably, is treating the "crisis" in Kosovo only as a means to prevent the spread of armed conflict outside of Kosovo. As a consequence of this limited goal, suggestions are being circulated to give Kosovo a vague autonomy - some within Serbia, and others within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

But these suggestions are not acceptable to the Albanian public and to the Albanian political forces inside and outside of Albania. However, they have focused their attention only on resolving the status of Kosovo, not the resolution of the national Albanian question in general.

The Albanian Academy of Sciences, concerned not only with the status of Kosovo, but also with the future of the Albanian nation, has prepared this Platform for solving the Albanian national question in general. Described in this Platform are historical, political, diplomatic and legal arguments of the Albanian national drama along with a thesis designed to gradually solve problems in accordance with today's international political conditions and processes which will lead to the integration of the Balkans into the European Community.

The platform, in its original version, was sent to the Academy Assembly for discussion. After its review by Albanian intellectuals from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, remarks and suggestions to improve our national issue were made. After they were passed and incorporated into the platform, the document was adopted by the Academy Assembly into the current version.

By submitting the Platform, the Albanian Academy of Sciences thought to organize a National Assembly, in which intellectuals from all ethnic areas and Diaspora community circles can participate in the hope that they will all adopt it. After that we all will try to implement it together.

## **Platform for Resolving the Albanian National Question**

### History of the national question

The Albanian national question in context with the movement for the liberation of the Albanian territory from foreign occupation and its unification into a single nation state was born at the same time as the national movements of other peoples in the Balkan Peninsula. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, it was born here under centuries of Ottoman occupation.

These developments were sparked by the 1789 French Revolution which then began to spread in the Balkans prompting the oppressed people to seek freedom, equality and brotherhood of peoples, which could only be realized if each nation achieved its own independent, democratic and illuminating state.

But the Albanian national movement, since its first steps as an opposing force, had not only the centuries-old Ottoman occupiers, but also the nationalist circles of the neighbouring countries and on top of them, the disinterested Great Powers.

Immediately after they created their national states, Serbian and Greek ruling circles were engrossed in chauvinistic pretensions for annexing Albanian lands, which were still under Turkish occupation. The realization of these aspirations were publicly proclaimed in 1844 by the rulers in Belgrade under a plan known as “Nachertania”, and by the rulers in Athens under the platform called “Megali Idea” which would not leave any room for the existence of an Albanian state.

As part of their nationalist aspirations, Belgrade and Athens very quickly found a common language in the political and military fields about mutual division of Albanian lands without forgetting Montenegrin aspirations for these territories.

This common language was first presented at the secret talks held by Serbian and Greek diplomats in Istanbul in 1862, from which materialized a secret alliance between them in Vienna, Austria, in

1867 to carve the Albanian territory with a common border – the River Shkumbin and the road Egnatia.

In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, when they were preparing these annexation plans, the Albanians - descendants of the ancient Illyrians, without regards to the suffering they endured under centuries of pressure from external forces, with permanent territorial narrowing, continued to inhabit the western regions of the Balkan Peninsula, where they had settled from the beginning of history. Approximately accurate information of their ethnic territory, stretching to the middle of the last century, was given by a large number of objective European observers who are closely familiar with the human geography of the Balkan Peninsula. Among the many, let us mention the famous French erudite Ami Bue (1840), British researcher E. Spencer (1847) and the famous Austrian scientist J. Hahi (1853). According to these scientists, the Albanians were present as an indigenous population to the north of Nis, Leskovac and Vranje, east to Kumanovo, Prilep and Bitola, south to Konica, Ioannina and Preveza. They do not deny the fact that in this region there were residents of neighbouring Balkan nations (Greeks, Vlachs, Macedonians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks), who were minority islands in the Albanian open sea. At that time, these regions were separated by the Ottoman Empire in the four recesses - Kosovo, Shkodra, Bitola and Ioannina. Among them, the largest was the Kosovo Vilayet with Skopje as its main centre. The geographical area of the Kosovo Vilayet was populated mostly by Albanians, whose territory incidentally approximately coincided with Dardania, the ancient Illyrian province whose main centre was also Skopje.

According to geographic size, the second largest territory was the Ioanina Vilayet, which extended from the Gulf of Arta on the south to the River Seman on the north, meaning, it encompassed the ancient province of Epirus, which incidentally in antiquity and in the middle of the last century was inhabited with more Albanians than with Hellenes.

Greek rulers have supported their nationalistic pretensions based on three historical arguments, which are factually worthless: on the Hellenic colonies that emerged on the ancient Albanian coast, as well as several Mediterranean coastlines, on the political rule

imposed by force by the Byzantine Empire in these regions, and on the dependence of the Orthodox churches in these regions belonging to the Istanbul Patriarchate. Based on these “reasons”, which were built on the platform of the “Megali Idea”, the entire regions of Epirus to the Shkumbin River and the whole of Macedonia to Korcha should belong to Greece. Athens’s nationalist rulers do not take into account the fact that there was no general ethnic Greek population in most of these regions. In the absence of Greeks, Greek authorities considered the Albanians who were members of the Greek Orthodox Church to be Greeks. But the fact is that they were Albanians who, because of their religious affiliations, relied on the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Greek attempts to artificially increase the number of Greek citizens however had little success.

Regardless of their affiliation with the Greek Church and the Greek language which served it, the Orthodox Albanians, with a few exceptions, had not lost their awareness of their Albanian nationality. It is well known that many renowned personalities of the Albanian national movement emerged from their ranks, such as Naum Vekilharzhi, Konstandin Kristoforidi, Thimi Mitko, Iani Vreto, Nikola Nacho and others.

Serbia at the time had no documented support to enact its aspirations towards the Albanian territory. It was hoping to realize its territorial pretensions with help from its big sister - Czarist Russia. Serbia’s primary aspiration, according to the “Nachertania”, was to occupy historic Kosovo with Skopje as its main centre, and then to expand to the Adriatic coast. But because Serbian inhabitants in this region were a minority, Belgrade nationalist circles prepared other arguments to justify this, but they too were without merit.

The Serbians made claims that the Albanians were not descendants of the Illyrians, and even less of the Dardanians, the ancient inhabitants of Kosovo, and that the Albanian population had arrived in this region after the Slavs. The Serbians made claims that the Albanian population came from the eastern regions of the Peninsula and that Kosovo is the cradle of the medieval Serbian state, meaning that Serbia’s memories, legends and monuments of its conscience and of its nation are related to Kosovo. In short, according to Serbian claims, at the time of the Slav arrival, Kosovo was without

inhabitants, and therefore the Kosovo Albanians are not the autochthonous population, but immigrants settled there after 1689, when the Serb population from that area was forced to move north after the Austrian defeat that year by the Ottoman army. Serbian historians offer historical arguments for these claims.

The Serbians took advantage of the fact that their thesis was accepted by its allies, who did that purely for political interests, not because of conviction. Similarly, they used their advantage to delay development of the Albanian scientific historiography, despite two centuries of Slavic growth. But now, with the research conducted in the last few decades, Albanian historians are able to, with irrefutable historical facts, confirm that the ideas of the Serbian historians never had any merit.

Serbian historians have blamed Muslim Albanians in Kosovo for having been associated with Ottoman rule in the disenfranchisement of the Serbian population in their territories. This accusation is totally unjustified. The Albanians have always been free from religious prejudices and animosities. They (Albanians) should be credited with saving them (Serbians) from destruction, almost four hundred years, the Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo, the otherwise Serbian medieval rulers, who once occupied Kosovo and leveled to the ground all Bogomil and early religious and cultural monuments built before their conquest. Besides that, during the centuries of Ottoman occupation, the Kosovo Albanians were marked with armed uprisings against Istanbul. Even independent historical sources claim that the Kosovo uprising of 1689 was done with mass regional Albanian participation.

The same sources also show that not only Christian Albanians, but a considerable number of Muslim Albanians from Kosovo participated in this uprising under the leadership of the Albanian Catholic bishop Piet Bogdani. Moreover, after the 1689 Serbian Liberation Movement began to decline in Kosovo, the Albanians continued with the uprisings against Istanbul. Some of these uprisings were very fierce, for example, the 1844 uprising led by Dervish Tsara, terrified the Porte so effectively that it sent the Rumelian army to quell it. Then, during the Eastern Crisis of the 70s in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Southeastern Europe was engulfed in the

swirling of the Russo-Turkish War, the main event in the Balkans was the Albanian Prizren League, under whose leadership the Albanians returned to Kosovo, the main torch of their national movement.

During 1878-1881, they (Albanians) initially fought against the decisions of the Berlin Congress to defend the integrity of their ethnic areas, and then against the Sublime Porte to create an autonomous Albanian state. The Albanian League of Prizren took over the Albanian movement and raised the threshold to the realization of independence, but it was violently crushed by the Ottoman armies. Kosovo became red with the blood of thousands of its (Albanian) sons.

The terror established by the Sublime Porte did not destroy the spirit of the resistance. On the contrary, Kosovo Albanians continued the uprisings against Istanbul, several times injecting serious fear into the Porte in 1899, 1909 and 1910 for example. The first liberation flag to be flown in Kosovo in the spring of 1912 was the Albanian flag. During the few weeks that encompassed the uprising, all Albanian regions rose to finally get rid of the centuries old Ottoman occupation. The Turkish armies everywhere were either smashed or were surrendering or hiding their barracks. During the summer the Kosovo cities freed themselves one after another. On August 12, 1912 the Albanian liberators liberated Skopje, the capital of the Kosovo Vilayet. But, as is well known, when the general uprising was on the verge of victory, the course of events changed to their (Albanian) disadvantage. Concerned by the rapid turnaround in the situation, the Balkan monarchies immediately declared joint war on the Ottoman Empire. Weakened by the Albanian uprisings, the Ottoman Empire was shattered and suffered defeat after defeat. And as it is well known, in the complicated situation that was created by the Balkan conflict, delegates came from all Albanian regions, including Kosovo, Macedonia and Chameria, and gathered at the National Assembly in Valona which, on November 28, 1912, declared National independence for Albania and the inclusion of all ethnic areas they represented in a single nation state.

## Fragmentation of ethnic territories

After the resolution derived from the historic meeting in Valona, the Albanians hoped that, with their centuries-old struggle against the Ottoman occupation and with the legitimate right they had in their ethnic territory, the six Great Powers which together dictated the fate of the peoples in the continent would recognize the creation of their independent state and that within its boundaries they would cover all their ethnic territory. But the London Conference, founded by the Great Powers for preparing a new map of the Balkan Peninsula after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1913, after several fluctuations conceded just the act of creating an independent Albanian state, while the other decision of the Assembly of Valona - the Albanian unification of ethnic territories within an independent Albania was not accepted. The borders of the new state covered less than half of the ethnic Albanian territory. The other half was split between three neighbouring Balkan monarchies.

Of these, Serbia took the whole historic Kosovo with its capital Skopje; Greece annexed the Florina (Lerin) and Kastoria (Kostur) districts together with Chameria, which the Great Powers rushed to award them during the time of the Berlin Congress on account of warnings from the Prizren Albanian League of an armed conflict with Athens; they gave Montenegro Plav, Gusinie, Hot, Gruda, which the Prizren League defended with blood during the Eastern crisis in the 1870s.

The fragmentation of the Albanian territory and annexation of more than half of it by the neighbouring monarchies was an injustice and a stab in the back for this ancient nation, which always persisted before the challenges of history. Moreover, the annexed regions, instead of been given freedom for which they had fought for centuries, were placed beneath another foreign occupation. The Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek rulers did not provide even a single right for Albanians in the annexed regions; not even the right to education in their native language. On the contrary, since the autumn of 1913, immediately after signing the decision during the ambassadorial conference in London (July 29, 1912), the governments in Belgrade, Athens and Tsetinie began to displace the ethnic Albanians from their territory, forcing them to immigrate to Turkey, meaning away from their own borders. With the mass displacement that Greece undertook in the decades after the



annexation of the Albanian regions, especially after the biblical exodus of the Chams at the end of the Second World War, it was thought that it had completed the cleaning of ethnic Albanians from its borders. But, as can be seen, there are ethnic Albanians still in these regions. And Serbia, although the ethnic cleansing started in the time of the Russo-Turkish wars of 1877-1878, and after 1918, Yugoslavia continued for decades campaigning for the resettlement of Albanians from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, but the ethnic cleansing of the annexed regions was not finished. Albanians are exactly where they were in the past thousands of years, with the exception of the peripheral zone.

Two world wars were fought since 1913. Both of these wars were won by the forces that promised that the oppressed people would be given freedom and their national rights would be respected. But the injustices carried out by the Great Powers during the ambassadorial conference in 1913 were never touched. The ethnic Albanian territory was left dismembered, except for the regions outside of Albania's borders, which in 1913 were divided between the three neighbouring monarchies (Serbia, Greece and Montenegro), and from 1918 to 1991 between Yugoslavia and Greece. Albanians were disappointed at the Treaty of Versailles (1920) and the Larissa Conference (1946). But the biggest disappointment they experienced was in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In 1918, when the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created and later called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, many political scientists predicted that the large number of nations and nationalities living in that Kingdom could not sustain a long life. In fact, with the development of the national movement of the oppressed nationalities, which flourished in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the age of multi-nation states was coming to an end.

The multi-nation Yugoslavia, ruled mainly by Serbian nationalist circles, was formed at a time when three multi-nation Empires, Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire were destroyed, no matter that the Russian Empire recovered (but only for a few decades) thanks to the promises the October Revolution made

to the oppressed nationalities to form republics or autonomous provinces with national characters within the Soviet Union.

During the Second World War the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, concerned about internal nationalist contradictions, crashed after the German Army crossed its borders.

Hitler, the irreconcilable enemy of the Versailles card, within the violent border changes that he made in the whole of Europe, took apart the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at which time Croatia declared itself an independent state, understandably as a German satellite.

Serbia became narrow. Bulgaria was awarded the territories of Macedonia and Hungary took Vojvodina. Italy, Germany's closest ally, also took part in the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

It had been said, even during the war, that Germany and Italy were going to give Albania the province of Kosovo. This assertion is not entirely true. Hitler, the author of the new map of the Balkans, did not give Albania the ethnic Albanian territory in Yugoslavia. He gave it to Italy, which in turn give it to Tirana but only from an administrative aspect. Moreover, of the six prefectures where Albanian populations existed, which included historical Kosovo, only four were administratively united with Albania. The prefectures were Pristina, Pech, Prizren and Tetovo.

Hitler left the Mitrovitsa prefecture (with the prefectures Mitrovitsa, Vuchtri, Gnilane and Poduevo) within Serbia which remained under German occupation along with the Trepcha rich mine for Berlin to use, and not for Rome. On the other hand, the Albanian regions of Skopje, Kachanik, Presevo, Kumanovo and Prespa were given to Bulgaria. The government in Tirana was also given Debar, Struga and Kichevo regions to administer. In the Montenegro sector Tirana was given Ulcinj, Tuz (Hot and Gruda) to administer together with Gusinje and Plav. Almost half of the ethnic Albanian territory in former Yugoslavia was united under the Tirana administration which amounted to 11,780 square kilometres. But the ethnic Albanian region in former Yugoslavia remained, albeit on a different scale, again dismembered, this time between Italy, Germany and Bulgaria.

One cannot deny the fact that the Albanian administrative regions that were united under Tirana, although they were under Italian occupation, had some advantage in the area of national rights. Above all, they were freed from the Serbian genocidal occupation and from the total denial of their national rights which the government in Belgrade was neglecting. The creation of the Albanian state administration unfettered the use of Albanian literature and took away the political borders with Albania that had been there since 1913. The tormented Albanian population under Serbian and Montenegrin occupation benefited as a result of this. But the assessments of the collaborators in Tirana, who compare these benefits with the liberation of Kosovo, of course were wrong. Moving from one occupation to another, no matter if one was easier than the other can never be compared to the liberation of the nation. After that, if the war was won by the Berlin-Rome Axis, Albania along with the part of Kosovo that was going to unite with it would have been left under fascist Italy and the Albanian ethnic regions would have remained in pieces again. Besides that, it should not be forgotten that the opponents of the fascist bloc, initially England and France and later the Soviet Union and the United States, which, at the end of 1941, formed a large Anglo-Soviet-American anti-fascist coalition, the Atlantic Charter (August 1942), which stated that the aspirations of the peoples for freedom and democracy would be considered at the end of the war, it is understood by the contributions people made in the conflict against the Nazi-fascist aggressors. Under these circumstances, the Albanians sought to work uncompromisingly to engage against the Italian occupiers, with the conviction that this war would serve as an asset to raise their voice at the end when it came to determining the boundaries.

In fact, during the Second World War, Albanians from Albania and from Kosovo contributed significantly to the defeat of the fascist Italian-German bloc. At the end of the war, anti-fascist forces in Albania amounted to about 70 thousand and in Kosovo about 50 thousand partisans. Based on this significant contribution (compared to the size of the population) that was given in aid of the victory in the war against the fascist aggressors, the Albanians from both sides of the border expected that the great allies thereafter would respect

the principles of self-determination and uphold the engagement for the respect of the national rights of the people.

## Denial of the right to self-determination

But things went differently than the Albanians had hoped. At the end of World War II the diplomatic cadres of the Albanian national question were less constructive than at the time of independence. Then, Serbia and Greece spoke as victors over Turkey, while the Great Powers played the role of arbitrator. And in 1946, at the peace conference in Paris, Yugoslavia and Greece had an even stronger position than in 1913. Now they were participants in the antifascist coalition which won the war and they, as victors, made the decisions without arbitration. Under these circumstances Albania's ability to realize its legitimate territorial aspirations was left to the detriment of Yugoslavia and Greece, and as history has shown there are no cases where the winner left the territories, especially when they were its illegal masters, in favour of another state to which these territories rightfully belonged. Besides that, even though Albania was recognized as a participant of the winning coalition, during the peace conference Athens accused Tirana of being an aggressor, just like Italy, because the Shefkit Vrlatsi quisling government in Albania was waging war against Greece in October 1940. Consequently, Greece not only did not agree to discuss the national rights of the Albanians that inhabited its territory but Greece demanded territorial and financial compensation. Greece wanted southern Albania or "Vorio Epirus" as the Greeks call it as compensation. Moreover, a year before the peace conference, the government in Athens, in order to definitively resolve the issue of the ethnic Albanian regions as found within its borders, with a flash operation for a period of 48 hours, relocated the Muslim residents who populated the province of Chameria without regard (men, women, children, elders) and for no other reason except for the unfounded charges made against their people that they had collaborated with the German occupiers. To save themselves from being massacred by N. Zerva, the extreme Greek nationalist General, the unlucky Chams were forced to immigrate to Albania, leaving behind their homes. Enver Hoxha the President of the Albanian delegation at the peace conference, rejected Greek claims with the argument that Albania, in the great anti-fascist war had lost

28,000 fighters, without considering the major material damage and that in its territory it retained several Italian and German divisions which, if they were not fighting the Albanians would have been engaged in the Western or Eastern Front. Consequently, Albania did not come to Paris to give but to ask for compensation from the common enemy. The anti-fascist part of Albania had nothing to do with the collaborators who declared war on Greece. These were shameful acts of the Albanian collaborators just as they were the shameful acts of all collaborators in all European countries. At the same time, the president of the Albanian delegation rejected Athens's motives for resettling the Albanians from Chameria. Cooperation of some people with the German occupiers, he said, was no reason for the displacement of an entire population, including young children and housewives. Above that, the collaborators should have been tried in court, just like the Greek nationality collaborators were, because the Albanian Chams were also Greek citizens.

Regardless of the fact that the Greek government, for more than thirty years, continued to view itself as being in a state of war with Albania, for the peace conference and for its participants the Albanian label as an aggressor country was rejected back in 1946. Also, Athens's calculations that the displacement of the Chams would close the issue of national rights for Albanians, was not true. The issue of the Chams is still open and awaiting resolution.

The issue of the ethnic Albanian territory in Yugoslavia had other parameters. Unlike Greece which had declared itself a state of the Greek Orthodox nation, Yugoslavia was formed in 1918 as a multi-national state. In fact, many nations which did not speak the same language, have the same culture and who did not practice the same religion existed in its territory. So, in order not to repeat the mistakes it made before the war, the Karagiogevich dynasty, divided the nations under its rule in terms of political rights into three categories: Serbia (first category), other Slavic nations (second category) and non-Slavic nations, in which the Albanians were included (third category). Marshal Tito and his comrades, on the other hand, raised the banner of self-determination of nations and their political equality rights. Based on this principle, as adopted by AVNOJ in 1943, the nations of Yugoslavia, at the end of the war

received their rights to form separate republics with equal rights in the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia. Based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and decisions made by AVNOJ and the contribution made by their partisan units in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the Hitler-ist occupier, the Albanian delegates - nationalists and communists from Kosovo along with Serbian and Montenegrin communists from their regions, on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1944 during a Conference held in Bujan, decided that after the war the principle of self-determination would be applied to Kosovo.

But very quickly Tito's promises of equal rights of nations evaporated. It was decided that the people of Yugoslavia would be divided into nations and nationalities, of which only nations would have the right to form republics, while nationalities may, in special cases, form only autonomous provinces within a republic. So, the Albanians, with thousands of years of being historic Kosovo residents with uninterrupted territorial unity, with many century old cities, with a common ancient culture, with a population, which, according to the numbers was in third place after the Serbs and Croats, with a rich history of fighting for independence, had fulfilled all conditions for having their own republic. But the young Yugoslav leaders considered only the six Slavic communities (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Macedonians and Montenegrins) to qualify as nations, while Albanians were considered a nationality, meaning that they were excluded from the right to self-determination and the right to have their own republic.

But immediately after the war and after two Albanian partisan divisions had returned to Albania that had fought against German forces in the Yugoslav territory, federal leaders in Belgrade, in July 1945, encouraged Serb leaders in Kosovo to reject the Bujan Resolution.

The exclusion of Albanians from their right to have their own republic was an arbitrary act. Their discrimination was particularly striking if we consider that the Montenegrins, who by population were six times less, the Macedonians, who were two times less than the Albanians, were allowed to form their own republics and the Albanians were not. Consequently the inequality that existed in pre-

war Yugoslavia, just changed shape, size and components, but for the Albanians it remained in force.

Putting the Albanians in the “nationalities” category meant that they were discriminating against their national rights. Yesterday’s leaders of Tito’s Yugoslavia and today’s Serbian nationalist leaders argue this with the old thesis that the Kosovo Albanians are not autochthonous, but newcomers, and with the new thesis that they cannot form their own republic in the Yugoslav federation because one already exists next door; the Albanian state outside of Yugoslavia. Consequently, there may not be two Albanian states at the same time. But Serbian leaders have neither historical basis nor legal support for these two theses.

The first question of whether the Albanians in historical Kosovo are indigenous or a newcomer in historiography has been discussed many times. In this treatment, which has the character of a platform, it is impossible to count the documented sources that debunk the Serbian thesis. Suffice it to say briefly that a large number of Albanian historians, archaeologists, linguists, ethnographers, and foreign sources have proved that the residents of ancient Dardania, meaning historical Kosovo, belonged to the Illyrian ethnicity and that they defied the process of Romanization as well as that of other populations of the same ethnicity who lived in the southern Illyrian provinces. Besides, it is now confirmed that the Albanians are the descendants of the Southern Illyrians, including those of Dardania, who in ancient times were dispersed in and out of the territory in today’s Kosovo, south to Shtip (Astibos), and north to Nish (Naisos). At the same time there is no historical evidence that the Slavs colonized ancient Dardania in the 6<sup>th</sup> or 7<sup>th</sup> century. The Slavic toponymy, which Serbian historians use as an argument to confirm the Serbian colonization of Kosovo at the beginning of the early Middle Ages is irrelevant, because the documentary sources show these to appear in this region at the beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century. But even more so, early medieval historical sources speak of Christians inhabiting Kosovo, and Slavs, as is well known, up to the 10<sup>th</sup> century were pagans. Also, it is not true that Kosovo is the cradle of the Serbian state, because it is known that Serbia’s beginning was Rashkiot Region in Sandzak. Kosovo’s conquest by the Serbian state began at the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. Furthermore,

the Serbian medieval kingdom had no permanent capital. Prizren was one of the ambulant capitals of this country, which had aspirations to expand its permanent conquests to the south, including into the Greek states, with aims at replacing the Byzantine Empire and definitively establishing its capital in Constantinople. Nobody can claim that Serb rule in Kosovo continued over three centuries. Besides that, we now have a collection of sources that confirm that during these centuries the Albanians were present in historic Kosovo and that the pressure put on them by the Serbian state and church, to a large extent, were responsible for the Slav toponyms and names of the residents. There are a large number of cases, where Albanian names have been Slavo-cized (i.e. Lek-ich, Pal-ich, Petr-ich, Gonovski, Gin-ovski, etc.). The Belgrade thesis that only Serbs participated in the Kosovo historic battle against the Turks in 1389 holds no water. There are a number of independent sources that confirm that Albanians, including Kosovo Albanians, were included in the ranks of the anti-Ottoman coalition.

Also, the thesis that circles in Yugoslav historiography claiming that the Kosovo Albanians who settled there came from the northern regions of Albania after the Serbian exodus in of 1689 has no documented support. First of all, historical sources do not support a large scale exodus taking place in 1689 like the one claimed by Serbian historiography. At the same time documented sources, no doubt well-known to Serb historiographers, have no mention of a large scale move over mountainous regions to the north of Kosovo, no more than the population of these regions at the threshold of events in 1689. Be it as it may, as confirmed by contemporary sources, it was small in relation to the Kosovo Albanian population that inhabited the region from Tetovo to Nish. There are dozens of historical sources, also known to Serbian historians, but are deliberately left in obscurity, which confirm that during the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, meaning before the so-called “mass” exodus of the Serbs in 1689, the majority of the population in Kosovo was made up of Albanians. Also, there is lack of independent historical sources that claim, as it is said, that in the Kosovo uprising of 1689, Albanian participation was greater than that of the Serbs. Finally, it should be added that the Kosovo Serb exodus was not a separate phenomenon. It also included the Kosovo Albanians who left and either went to regions in modern Albania (i.e. relocation of



Albanians from the region of Prizren in the Mirdita zone), or emigrated, like Serbs, to the north (i.e. in 1737 a large number of Albanians from Kosovo and from the surrounding regions occupied by Austria, moved to villages in today's Slavonia - Nikinci, Hrtkovac, Jarak, Opalanka).

Consequently, Serbian government pretensions for its historical rights to Kosovo have no basis. Historical rights are fully on the side of the Albanians, because they were constantly present in Kosovo before and after the arrival of the Serbs in the Balkan Peninsula. The three centuries of Serbian occupation cannot upset the historic right of the Albanian population as ethnic residents of historic Kosovo, just as it cannot void the five centuries of Ottoman rule in the region. The Serb minority in Kosovo is a remnant of political rule, just as is the Turkish minority in this region. The historical monuments, which the Serbs are trying to argue gives them their historical rights belong to 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century as opposed to the Albanian monuments which have existed continuously for many centuries, and which, regardless of their ancient landmarks, have been turned into ruins by Serbian rulers (with similar attempts made today - the destruction of Croatian Catholic churches which shows that the Serbs have not yet waived their pathological hatred of their centuries old neighbours). The epithet used by Belgrade to show that Kosovo is the "Serbian Jerusalem", is speculative rhetoric with emotional aims. Myths cannot be used as arguments for annexing a territory inhabited by another nation. The real Jerusalem is a holy place for all Christians, but no Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox country has the right to seek its annexation, much less displacement of its residents - Israelis and Palestinians. With its centuries of history and with its majority population, Kosovo was and continues to be the hallmark of the Albanian nation.

Belgrade's second thesis also does not hold water. In none of the countless acts of worldwide political, diplomatic and legal history is there a sentence formulated and accepted by international law that says that a nation should have only one state.

Without getting into medieval history, just look at the history of modern Germany and Italy, which had, until the third quarter of the last century, several independent states.

History has many such cases which exist even today. The Arab nation, for example, is torn between dozens of countries and no one is protesting on account of Tito's thesis being violated.

We can even look at our southern neighbours - Greece, one nation with two states - Greece and Cyprus, both independent and internationally recognized republics. Consequently, the Tito-ist thesis is entirely without any legal basis.

It was forged by the fanatical nationalists in Belgrade to justify the exclusion of the Albanians from their right to have their own republic, and even more so, to deprive them of their legitimate political rights recognized by all international bodies.

### Further fragmentation of ethnic territories

Another brutal violation, with profound historical consequences for the national rights of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, was made by Belgrade at the end of the Second World War.

We are talking about the fragmentation of historical Kosovo. As we stated earlier, historic Kosovo with its capital Skopje was unfairly given to the Kingdom of Serbia by the London Conference of Ambassadors (1913) because it was considered Serbian land. Regardless of this injustice and the stab in the back of the Albanian nation, the Albanian population in the entire historical Kosovo, which according to its size numbered almost the same as that of Albania, all came under Serbian occupation and under the control of the Serbian government. Living together under the occupation of one country, the Albanians in Kosovo had a historic opportunity to protect their centuries-old economic, social, political and cultural ties together and to sustain the struggle for their national rights. But then the proclamation of the six federation republics was enacted and with it came political boundaries. The boundaries were set arbitrarily from above, without any national referendum, and without a plebiscite vote. Neither the Albanian population nor its officers were asked. With aims at breaking up the territorial unity of the Albanians and to weaken the strength of their political resistance, the Tito-ist leaders divided up historic Kosovo into three

parts - between the republics of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. The Republic of Serbia, grabbed today's province of Kosovo (the narrower Kosovo) together with the districts of Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja. The Republic of Macedonia annexed the south part of historic Kosovo (the districts of Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Kichevo), along with the districts of Debar and Struga. Montenegro annexed the northwestern part of Kosovo (Plav, Gusinje, Rozhaj) which in fact was held since 1913.

In historical terms this was the third time the Albanian territory was fragmented - the first time it was done at the Berlin Congress (1878) the second time at the ambassadorial conference (1913). But this third time the very act was most devastating for the unity of the Albanian people. The Albanian regions, which before World War II were divided between three countries (Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece), were now crumbling between five (Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece). The last fragmentation (communist), in contrast was moral and political in accordance with international law - moral because it was not right to fragment an innocent nation in order to continually punish it, politically, also because it was not right in modern times to make decisions on the backs of people without a plebiscite vote. The time of the medieval sovereigns who gave away provinces or cities as rewards or bribes, belongs to the distant past. In this case, the heads of the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia committed political crimes against the back of the Albanian nation and political violence on the backs of the Serbian state, because historic Kosovo was a gift given to Serbia by the London Conference in 1913. Macedonia's annexation to the south, which even today is inhabited by an ethnic Albanian majority, is an illegitimate act. Moreover, the Serbian political circles, acknowledging this fragmentation, recognized that the southern part of historic Kosovo with its capital Skopje was not Serbian land, as stated in the 1913 resolution. In fact, it is neither Serbian nor Macedonian land. The ethnic population that resides in the southern part of historical Kosovo or the northern part of the Republic of Macedonia resides on Albanian land.

After World War II, there was steady growth of aggressive Slav nationalism combined with the weight of a communist dictatorship which occupied and worked against the Albanians in Yugoslavia.

Their national rights were denied. Education in their mother tongue was forbidden even during the period when relations between socialist Albania and socialist Yugoslavia were more than friendly.

After relations between Tirana and Belgrade broke off in 1948 the Tito-ist leadership used demagogy combined with terror to destroy the Albanian resistance.

As a measure taken to destroy the Albanian resistance, the Belgrade appointed rulers of the Albanian annexed parts in the Republic of Serbia created - the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, with an area of 10,877 square kilometres with Prishtina as its capital. Based on its first Constitution (1953), the province of Kosovo gained simple autonomy. Moreover, outside of the province were three districts that stretched to the northeast of Kosovo - Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja which, ethnically, historically and geographically were artificially separated from and left outside of the province. With their separation, Belgrade further fragmented the Albanian region as a whole and Kosovo itself in particular.

On the other hand, Belgrade circles intensified their police regimes which, outside of torturing, arresting and interning Albanians under false charges and without court trials, forced many Muslim Albanians to move to Turkey. As a result of these Serbian genocidal policies, during the 1950s and 1960s alone, over 50 thousand were killed and approximately 300 thousand were displaced outside of Yugoslavia.

However, the national consciousness of Albanians was not crushed and neither was their spirit to resist. After a quarter century of abuses, the Albanians were the first nation in the Yugoslav federation to publicly protest against national oppression.

The oppressed Albanians erupted into strong demonstrations in 1968 by which they made requests that Kosovo (unfortunately only to a part of Kosovo) be given the status of republic within the Yugoslav federation. The 1968 demonstrations, which can be considered as the first shot fired at the federal Yugoslav structure, announced the approaching storm. Oppressive measures were taken by Belgrade which made the situation tenser from year to year. To avoid things

from getting even worse, in 1974, the Yugoslav federal authorities gave the province of Kosovo a new constitution. Kosovo and Vojvodina, under this Constitution were recognized as autonomous provinces of Serbia and at the same time, constituent elements of the Yugoslav federation. As a consequence of this decision Kosovo and the six Yugoslav republics each had their own special constitution, their own executive bodies, provincial assembly and constitutional court. Each had a representative in the Yugoslav Presidency and Yugoslav Federal Executive Council. Serbian republic authorities could not exercise their jurisdiction over Kosovo without approval from the Kosovo Provincial Assembly, Executive Council and Constitutional Court. Participation in the adoption of laws was done through the Board of delegates from the republics and provinces that sat on the Federal Yugoslavian Assembly. So, the province of Kosovo, although it continued to be called an autonomous province, practically acted like one of the Yugoslav federal republics.

The 1974 Constitution, compared to the previous situation, was a victory for the Albanians in the area of national rights, especially in the field of education and culture. But very quickly they saw that it was not enough. It had limitations.

Sanctioned within it was the possibility of once again separating the province of Kosovo from the other Albanian territory within the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia. The mere creation of a province, and not a republic with a population greater than some of the other republics in the Federation legalized the inequality between the Albanians in the province and the Albanians in the other Yugoslav republics. As a result of these limitations, the Albanians were treated as second-class citizens and as such they were discriminated against economically and culturally.

But even though they were restricted, Serbian nationalist circles continued to revolve, stubbornly persisting in totally denying the Albanians their national rights. The reason for their intervention; to quell the Albanian student demonstration at the Pristina University, which erupted in the spring of 1981, which, according to these Serbian nationalists, were attempts by the students to apply 1968 principles in order to convert Kosovo into a Yugoslav Republic. Belgrade tanks suppressed the popular events, just as Moscow did in

Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. Regardless of how these 1981 demonstrations were seen, they marked another shot taken at the now porous Yugoslav federation. The shakeup that Belgrade suffered from the Albanian national movement showed how porous the Yugoslav federation had become. With the brutal Serbian military intervention which crushed the 1981 demonstrations, there was gradual loss of autonomy for the province's institutions which, by March 1989, were liquidated and in an arbitrary manner so was Kosovo's autonomy with military violence. By the end of the year, the province of Kosovo was converted into an administrative unit of the Republic of Serbia and was no longer a constituent element of the Federation. The 1974 Constitution was unilaterally withdrawn by Serbia's Parliament, which was inconsistent with its Constitution and by the tanks which were imposed on the Assembly of Kosovo. Albanian protests in Kosovo were bloodily crushed. A Serbian military occupation was established accompanied by a police regime of terror, arrests, internments, murder and pressures to alienate the youth from their homeland. Albanian schools were closed and their teachers removed.

### Proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo

The Kosovo provincial Government authorities remained passive against Belgrade's military and police violence. But representatives from the Albanian population of Kosovo, relying on the well-known principle of the right to self-determination, on September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1990 gathered together in Kachinik, during the time just before the Yugoslav Socialist Federation fell apart. There they proclaimed Kosovo a Republic and tried to separate it from Serbia. They proclaimed it an equal subject of the Yugoslav federation and adopted a Constitution. With the proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo, they finally realized the demand made in the Bujan Conference in the beginning of 1944, when such a request was again made by the popular protests from the autumn of 1968, and repeated with strong demonstrations in the spring of 1981.

Even though the Republic of Kosovo did not ask for inclusions in the framework of all its ethnic Albanian regions that suffered under Yugoslav occupation, the special proclamation it did make however, marked an important step towards the realization of the greater

program - Albanian national revival. Even more so, it marked the beginning of the breakup of Socialist Federal Yugoslavia...

(Following are some pages that describe conditions and events in Kosovo from 1981 to 1989 when a state of emergency was declared in the province, about the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, and about the Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia/Carrington, which does not take into account Kosovo's requirements for independence, the usual compendium of facts and harsh national rhetoric).

As is well known, in the month of February this year (1989 DM), when the Serbian armed police began its terror campaign, the Kosovo Albanians could no longer remain patient. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA-UCK) appeared on the scene with its armed wing of Albanian resistance. Getting out on stage the KLA collided with the political line of the international community about the resolution of the Kosovo "crisis" in a peaceful manner. Because of the intransigence on the part of Belgrade this line found itself in a deadlock, the international community, rather than putting pressure on Slobodan Milosevic, reacted negatively about the KLA justified armed action. This reaction gave Milosevic reason to undertake military operations against the peace-loving Kosovo population. But Belgrade's hopes that with these operations, the violence in Kosovo would quickly end and the Kosovo "crisis" would be solved before the international forces intervened in Bosnia, was a complete failure. Even after killing thousands of Albanians, burning tens of thousands of homes, causing major destruction to the provincial economy, displacing hundreds of thousands of Kosovo residents, the spirit of the Albanian resistance was not destroyed. The KLA, rather than weakening after each battle, intensified its pressure. By now, in the eyes of the international community, it had become a major factor in the Kosovo crisis. Belgrade charged that the KLA was a terrorist organization and it could no longer be trusted. Day by day the belief intensified that the cause of this great stain on this humanitarian disaster that was taking place in the heart of Europe at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was Slobodan Milosevic, together with his Serbian political class, from the time it was drugged with aggressive nationalism. Every day more and more voices were raised demanding that Slobodan Milosevic and his associates be taken to

The Hague and tried for the mass murder they committed against the peaceful people and crimes against humanity.

However, there were still influential international circles which could not easily be separated from the outdated prejudices that Kosovo was Serbian land. It was necessary that these circles understood that it was not because of the guilt of two million Albanians demanding national freedom, but because of these prejudices cultivated by Belgrade, the so-called “Kosovo crisis” was now no longer only a Serbian crisis, but a widely expanding crisis in the entire Balkans. Consequently, a solution was needed to resolve the crisis in Serbia together with that of the entire Balkan Peninsula.

Also, there is a need for the international factor to observe the “Kosovo crisis” not only at a political level, but also at a historical, economic, social and cultural level. The issue of the Albanian territory separated from the Albanian state is a matter of a fractured nation. We are talking about a nation whose territory from centuries ago, before it crumbled in 1913, had achieved economic, social and demographic balance between the field (agriculture) and Mountain (livestock), a balance which was broken when this territory was given to the neighbouring countries by the great diplomacy. The most productive parts of the Albanian territory were given away while squeezing the narrowing Albanian independent state mainly in the mountains and wetland areas. Therefore, the Albanian national question is not only about the spiritual aspiration of an ancient nation unjustly torn apart by the great diplomacy, it is also about a crippled nation with imperative requirements, half of which is in danger of physical extinction, while the other half, even though it has its own independent country, continues to feel the effects of territorial fragmentation in the economic, social, cultural and demographic fields.

### The road to resolution

Posed a long time ago, in itself arises the question that worries all Albanians: “what should be done to overcome this drama in which the Albanian national question is found today?” All Albanians, no matter where they are settled, from this or that side of the border, inside or outside of their ethnic territory, all desire faster unification



of their territory into a single Albanian state, and as they put it in their programs, “our great renaissance from the last century”. But are there objective and subjective factors, national and international circumstances, political and material possibilities for their realization?

There is no doubt that the present Albanian national question situation is more complicated than that in the period of their national revival. In those days all Albanian regions were under the domination of a single state - the Ottoman Empire. In those days all Albanians were together in one line and fought against the Sublime Porte. Today, however, the ethnic Albanian territory is broken up between five countries, four of which are foreign. But, unlike the period of the national revival, today there is an independent Albanian state, acknowledged in the international arena, whose primary task is to hold open the flag for the national question. This, certainly, is a positive circumstance. But on the other hand, in order to realize this great program the boundaries of the four Balkan national states need to change, and to also be affirmed in the international scene. This is a negative circumstance, but if we want to be realistic, we should recognize that there are difficult obstacles that we need to overcome in the current environment. Our national question cannot be addressed without the support of the international community.

In regards to the international community, we need to keep in mind the epoch when the Great Powers manipulated the political map of the continents which lasted up until 1946. After World War II, regulation of national issues was left in the hands of the United Nations (UN), in whose charter was fixed the basic principle of self-determination of peoples. The post-war years unfortunately were characterized by a division of the world into antagonistic blocks and attempts to establish order was done by force. The international situation in the last decade however, thoroughly changed.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the end of the Cold War, the time for political realignment and attempts to bring change to world order by force, came to an end. Consequently, the time for the Balkan states being established in opposing blocks, now also belongs to the past. With the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact,

created by the Soviet Union to defend the communist world, fell apart. With its disintegration, all countries belonging to the communist world made attempts to enter NATO. Today, regulation of national issues has fallen into the hands of strong world and continental bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Safety and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and other organizations, acting on the basis of the charters and statutes adopted by Assemblies. And, as is well known, their main aim is to prevent armed conflicts that bring suffering to humanity and to protect the weaker states from military violence from the stronger ones.

For these reasons, all international organizations respect the principle of political borders, regardless of injustices inherited from the past and strive to correct wrongs peacefully and through talks. International and European political bodies have repeated three basic points in their post-war doctrine: no violent change in state borders, recognition of the rights of minorities, and peacefully handling all disputes between neighbouring countries. Otherwise, no state will be admitted into the ranks of NATO, nor will it be included in the circle of the European Community, nor will it have backing from the United States.

The use of violence against any party for whatever motive, including denial of national rights, will be penalized with a penalty ranging from economic sanctions, to military intervention. International bodies are convinced that this road will be traveled painlessly from a Europe of countries to a Europe of nations, whose political borders will be turned into ethno-cultural boundaries.

However, international bodies, particularly the United States, do not rule out the use of military force when it comes to government circles using their police forces to violently suppress human rights, and with their arrogant attitudes, to endanger peace in the region. As an example of this we have the Western powers pressuring Serbia to renounce aggression against Slovenia, to stop military operations against Croatia and to definitively not divide Bosnia.

With their intervention, the Balkan conflicts were resolved in some places by pressure and threats, in others by military means, while some problems still remain without a final solution.

However, although a number of issues have not been resolved definitively, some significant results have been achieved. Serbians in Bosnia, for example, previously did not have the status of a republic, not even an autonomous province. With the Dayton Agreement Bosnian Serbs established their own republic (Republika Srpska) within Federal Bosnia. Conversely, Kosovo which previously was an autonomous province with a constitution approaching the status of a republic, arbitrarily lost its autonomy which it had gained in 1974, when in effect it should have acquired the right to be a republic within Federal Yugoslavia. The international community, aware of the problem, rightly asked Serbia; why the Albanians of Kosovo, who by population were three times more than the Serbs in Bosnia, were denied that right? Or; why did Western forces deny the Albanians the same right that was given to the Serbs?

Several months passed during which time there was talk about NATO militarily intervening in order to force Belgrade to stop the terror against the Albanians and to withdraw its police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. Military intervention was understood to be a means of saving the Albanian population from a humanitarian disaster, but then what would be the political status of Kosovo? Many ideas have been proposed in order to give Kosovo broader autonomy, according to some within Serbia, and according to others in the Yugoslav Federation.

Why must the problem get worse, misunderstandings fired up, debates made difficult, solutions made complicated, when all the international bodies, from the UN and the OSCE to the Council of the European Parliament, have already proclaimed in their charters that the highest principle for solving national rights is the right to self-determination. According to the Albanian Academy of Sciences: if the ethnic problems in the Balkans, including the rights of the ethnic Albanians in the region, are addressed by the application of the principle of self-determination, then the Balkan Peninsula will find peace, and only then will the Balkans no longer

be a “powder keg”, and there will be no more need for political deployment of states against each other.

The Balkan neighbouring states, within whose borders exist ethnic Albanian regions, have formally accepted this doctrine in principle, but not entirely in practice; some have accepted more some less. Serbia, which leads the rest of Yugoslavia and governs outside of Albania, has used police violence to oppose these principles. Consequently, the ethnic Albanian regions, annexed in 1913 by Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece, have problems relating to their national rights. But because of the large weight of the Albanian population, or because of the political conditions these compatriots find themselves in, the tasks put forth to address the route to a solution are not the same. Regardless of that, the resolution should be sought within the historical process that engulfed the European continent - meaning the road to peace, with democratic means and with the support of international bodies, which proclaimed and defend these principles.

### The Kosovo Question

The most critical and immediate problem to solve is the state of affairs of the Kosovo Albanians. There is a need above all to explain once again that the province of Kosovo, totaling 10,877 square kilometres, with Pristina as its capital, does not cover the entire Albanian territory that lies within the Republic of Serbia's borders. Without considering the historic parts of Kosovo, which Federal Yugoslavia divided and gave to Macedonia and Montenegro, in Serbia, outside of the Kosovo province, there are three other territories that are located in southern Serbia; the Kosovo Province (along with the three territories) accounts for about 14 thousand square kilometres, meaning approximately half the territory occupied by the Republic of Albania.

These special features should be taken into account together with the Kosovo issue.

The end of July 1998 marked 85 years from the day that the Conference of Ambassadors took place. The Conference was held in London under the presidency of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir

Edward Grey, where, among other things, six Great Powers decided that Kosovo and Macedonia be annexed by the Kingdom of Serbia. On August 12, 1913, two weeks after the signing of the verdict, Grey, head of the Foreign Office, while explaining the situation to the House of Commons, with regard to determining Albania's borders by the Conference of Ambassadors, admitted that this injustice was committed on the backbone of the Albanian people, and at the same time pointed out that this injustice committed by the Great Powers did, in fact, one important thing, save the peace in Europe. But did the sacrifice of the rights of the Albanian people truly save the peace? No it did not!

A year later, on August 4, 1914, the First World War broke out, whose spark was ignited by Serbia, led by the appropriation of foreign territories.

We should not forget that Europe gave the Serbian dynasty Kosovo and Macedonia in 1913 because they were allegedly Serbian lands, as claimed by Belgrade, but the real political and strategic reasons for this was to prevent the expansion of Austria-Hungary to Solun.

But this factor no longer exists. With the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia with its acceptance by the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade admitted that the part of Macedonia, which was annexed in 1913, was not Serbian land. Kosovo, which is also not Serbian land, has the same right to separate just like Macedonia did.

During these 85 years, since Kosovo was annexed by Belgrade, not only did the Albanians but also the Serbs themselves never had peace. History in the last 85 years has shown that Serbia, treating Kosovo as "Serbian territory", which needed to be cleansed of its Albanian inhabitants, is in fact punishing Serbia. By its own policies Serbia has turned Kosovo, not into a healing wound, but into a festering gangrene that is eating away at it from the inside. It is true that Kosovo has fertile agricultural lands and rich mineral deposits that bring Serbia revenue, but the Serbian authorities must also take into consideration the damages that come from it. The police terror, which was to secure Serbian peace inside, is definitely not working. The gap between the Serbian government and the Albanian population is only deepening. To keep the Albanians under

surveillance, Belgrade constantly burdened the state budget with parasitic military spending. Similarly, the policy of ethnic cleansing is not working. Moreover, the policy of ethnic cleansing weakened the Serbian government's awareness in solving other problems that would have accelerated its economic progress. The aggressive Serbian nationalism, which, after the whirlpool in Bosnia, concentrated in Kosovo, ignited tension in the Balkans and in Europe. It also has continued to discredit Serbia's image in the international arena. Serbia's stubborn continuation of its policy to ethnically cleanse itself has already been defeated, and will only lead Serbia in the hopeless adventure on which it has been since 1913. Briefly, Serbia can only get rid of the gangrene it calls Kosovo if it removes it from its body.

Serbia has evolved much since it annexed Kosovo (1913) - during the Kingdom of Serbia, during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, after that during the socialist federation and now in the Federation of Republics - has even changed its legal status towards Kosovo. The valuation of Kosovo in the Yugoslav Constitution as a component of the Federation; with the breakup of Yugoslavia and with the separation of some of its republics; with the non-participation of the Kosovo Albanian in parliamentary elections in Serbia; with the special parliamentary elections which in the meantime were organized by the Albanians in Kosovo; with the proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo by the Assembly in Kachanik; and in the end, with the national referendum in September 1991, which proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Kosovo, based on the principle of self-determination, Serbia lost its legal title which justified its sovereignty over the province of Kosovo.

Finally, despite the policy of ethnic cleansing that Belgrade led from the time of the Russo-Turkish wars of 1887-1878 to this day, despite the pain it caused for the Albanians, mostly in historic Kosovo, the Albanians still are where they were all these centuries. Despite mass migrations, forced by Belgrade, their numbers are increasing.

Today these Albanians represent about 90 percent of the province's population. If their demographic growth is to continue at the current pace, and even at a reduced pace, the day will come when the Serbian authorities will have to deal not like today with two million

Albanians, but double that and even triple. Do the Serbian authorities think they are confident that they can keep them all under surveillance, in the bay of the European continent, this mass of people thirsty for freedom, at a time when the gap between the Serbian political mass and the Albanian population in the province is so deep so that their coexistence in the future is almost impossible?

The present international situation for resolving the Kosovo issue is more favourable than at the time of Socialist Federal Yugoslavia, when the European Union did not take into account its rights. Today, thanks to the continuous growth of the Albanian national movement and the arrogant attitude of the nationalist government in Belgrade, the international community is very sensitive towards the Kosovo issue and especially towards the national rights of Albanians in general. The sensitivity and concern from the international bodies extends even further, to the danger of unrest caused by Belgrade expanding in Kosovo and outside its boundaries. Consequently, the question of international military intervention in Kosovo to end Slobodan Milosevic's nationalistic-territorial ambitions, like it did in Bosnia, has been on the agenda for several months. Under these circumstances and at the present stage Albanians should be able to use all the tools and all the opportunities offered to them by the international community. It is essential that they demonstrate the necessary commitment to take such actions, which will encourage international political factors to overcome the current hesitation to adopt the necessary decisions for a fast resolution of the Kosovo issue, proclaimed by the universal principles of human rights and the right of government. At the same time, Albanians should guarantee to the international community that the Republic of Kosovo in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula will equally be open to Serbia and to Albania as a factor of peace in Southeast Europe and beyond. To be above party differences is a necessary condition for the realization of this sacred task of uniting all Albanians into a single national front.

In conclusion, given that international standardized principles for freedom of peoples and nations and for the self-determination of nations are on the Albanian side, and especially considering that the then coexistence of Serbian political circles with the Albanian masses in Kosovo forever will be a source of unrest in the region,

we think that the only possible solution that will ensure peace, welfare and prosperity of the two peoples is the quick involvement of the international community to force Belgrade to recognize the Republic of Kosovo separated from Serbia, leaving its people alone to decide its status as a republic.

## The Albanian Question in Macedonia

Just like in the Republic of Serbia, a considerable number of ethnic Albanians live in Macedonia. Just like in Kosovo, these ethnic Albanian regions too have territorial continuity. Until a few decades ago they were part of historic southern Kosovo. The Albanian regions here span from the north and west of the Republic of Macedonia, from Debar to Kumanovo. There are, say, twenty years during which time Macedonian authorities did not publish the exact number of Albanians. Officially they say that the Albanians represent 23 percent of the Republic's total population. At the same time they locked out 170 thousand Albanians under the pretext that they lost their Macedonian citizenship, which is not true. But other sources speak of a greater number of Albanians. It can be said without fear that they represent not less than 35 per cent of the total population. The Macedonians represent only 55 percent of the population, including those who consider themselves Bulgarians (the rest are Serbs, Turks, Roma, etc.).

With their significant numbers the Albanians in general cannot be treated as a minority, and thus must be treated the same as the Macedonians in their own state. Sadly, no matter that they enjoy some rights in primary and secondary education, and more or less in local administration, the Albanians in Macedonia are treated as discriminated citizens in comparison to other citizens. The Skopje authorities are doing their best to reduce or even to offset the weight of Albanians in state structures and political life in Macedonia. In fact, the participation of Albanians in state structures is about two percent of the civil and military apparatus. The number of Albanian members in the Macedonian Parliament, because of the maneuvers made during the election, do not represent the exact numbers in the Albanian population. There is one Macedonian MP in parliament in Skopje representing about 8 to 10 thousand Macedonians, while in



the Albanian zones one Albanian MP represents 15 or 18 thousand inhabitants, and in some cases more.

As a consequence of this discrimination against Albanians, regardless of positive assessments from international circles, the Republic of Macedonia is a porous state. International military forces stationed on ethnic Albanian territories are attempting to hold up the Macedonian building on its feet with crutches.

World news mediums repeatedly broadcast on the police violence perpetrated by the Macedonian administration, whose victims are Albanians. Certain international circles have even made attempts to silence the crisis which is eroding the Macedonian state from the inside. But the crisis will not soften, let alone be overcome, if they do not recognize the national rights of the Albanians, as required by fundamental international laws.

What was said about Serbia, over the pace of growth of the Albanian population, applies even more to Macedonia. If the same pace continues, there will be a distant day when the Albanian population will be the same, and even surpass the Macedonian population. Consequently, today's problems in ethnic relations will not be reduced, but will rise. So, in order to prevent the deepening of the internal crisis that exists in Macedonia, which causes violation of the Albanian national rights, there are two options for a solution: a) either the Albanians will be considered equal to the Macedonian citizens, and therefore, Macedonia will be considered their common country, according to the famous example of the Austro-Hungarian state, or b) the Albanians will enjoy the right to an autonomous province within the Republic of Macedonia. Only then will today's treatment of Albanians in Macedonia, as second-class citizens, be removed, among other things, the discrimination in terms of budget funds, the inequality in the courts, the prohibition of Tetovo University, the national flag, the use of the Albanian language in official acts, etc., etc...

(There are also five more pages of text left out of the volume, which refer to the Albanians in Montenegro, Greece and the Albanian ethno-linguistic minorities in Italy, inside Greece, Bulgaria, Thrace, Croatia etc. The point of the text is non-recognition of their ethno-

cultural rights but more than that - in Montenegro (autonomy) and the same in Greece.)

## Conclusion

As was said before, the deserving aspirations of the Albanians are the same as those set out back in the last century during the Albanian renaissance - unification of all Albanian regions in a single state. To date this union unfortunately has not been achieved but we cannot blame the Albanians for it. On the contrary, half of the ethnic Albanian territory is still within the control of foreign countries. Consequently, the Albanian national question is still unresolved. More than a century ago, in the wake of the Berlin Congress, Abdul Fraseri, one of the most active ideologues of the Albanian national movement, warned the European offices that: "For as long as the Great Powers punish this heroic and libertarian people and wish them to remain in bondage or far worse - to partition them between the neighbouring countries, the Balkan Peninsula will never have peace because the Albanians will never stop fighting to gain their national independence. Conversely, if the Albanians are granted their national rights, Albania will become a factor of peace in the Balkans". History gave Abdul Fraseri the right to warn the world that as long as violations are carried out against the Albanian national rights they will be a continued source of concern for Albania, Serbia, the Balkans, and even beyond.

The Albanian Academy of Sciences thinks that history is leading Southeastern Europe towards European integration, regardless of the problems that concern the Balkan Peninsula today.

The Albanian Academy of Sciences also thinks that under the present circumstances when international factors do not allow changes in the current boundaries and as long as radical nationalist pretensions still persist in the Balkan Peninsula, the great goal of the national revival will be achieved gradually, hand in hand with the process of movement of the Balkan integration into the European community. The first step in achieving this great goal is by speedily freeing half of the Albanian nation from the shackles of aggressive nationalism. Under the current circumstances, the Academy of Sciences requires all Albanian democratic forces and the

international factors to jointly weigh in on the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo as a constituent element of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As for the Albanians in Macedonia they should be treated as equal citizens as the Macedonians, meaning, they should be given the right to be a constituent nation. The Albanians in Montenegro on the other hand need to have their own autonomous province. The Albanians in Greece need to have the right to be taught in their native language in the public schools. These are legitimate universally recognized rights, which must not be infringed upon in today's political boundaries in the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. The Albanian Academy of Sciences is convinced that if the ethnic Albanian territory, annexed by the oppressors, is freed, the neighbouring authorities (especially the Serbians) will also be freed of the burden of being oppressors, as well as the Balkan hotspots from tension. This is the only way to accelerate the process of real democratization in the Balkans. This is the only way to facilitate the marching towards European integration, towards a united Europe in which the political boundaries of the states will no longer have a Chinese wall, but will join Western Europe as ethno-cultural communities, within the borders of friendship and brotherhood.

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Albania - Challenges to Democracy in Multiethnic States**

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## Introduction

Since the fall of communism, the economic, social, ethnic, and cultural problems that previously were concealed and suppressed by Communist ideologists have reemerged, and often in tragic ways. Five decades of the suppression of ethnic and social conflicts in the service of Communist ideology have resulted in the “revenge of history over ideology,” which, in post-Communist States, has manifested itself in two troubling phenomena: the creation of “ethnic States” and the creation of colonial relations, and in some instances, apartheid relations, among different ethnic groups.

Consequently, in post-Communist States, there is and there will be for the foreseeable future a struggle between the forces that seek to affirm and cultivate diversity and democracy and those that seek the ethnic, religious, economic, and political domination of one group over another. The attempt of dominant ethnic groups to achieve hegemony is being orchestrated through the misuse of Western values. Democracy is proclaimed and then subverted by officials who have transformed it into an instrument of elimination, a method for marginalizing non-dominant ethnic groups. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), for example, a parliament that represents the dominant group of Macedonians “votes” to legalize their “right” to dominate the minority.

With the shattering of the former Soviet Union and the corresponding rise in ethnic wars of secession, two competing claims in the sphere of international law now confront each other: the right of self-determination, including emancipation and decolonization, and the right of sovereignty, including the inviolability of borders. The former right is inalienable, whereas the latter right is not absolute—it simply defines the ways in which

borders can or cannot be changed. The right to self-determination is under attack by those who would replace the ideological totalitarianism of the Communist system with ethnic totalitarianism. In Bosnia, we have witnessed ethnic cleansing. In Kosova, we have watched as apartheid unfolds into genocide; in FYROM, we have seen the second largest ethnic group, the Albanians, marginalized; and in Russia, a Slavophile diplomatic policy prevails. The efforts of dominant ethnic groups in the post-Cold War world to deny individual liberties and ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious rights among ethnic groups seeking freedom and self-determination have been justified using arguments of: –legality

–the inviolability of borders

–conspiracy (unfounded speculations about attempts by “foreign enemies” to overthrow the State)

–racist or ethno-centrist theories

–history, including fictitious claims of national destiny

–the threat of instability posed by false comparisons between, for example, the demands and status of American Hispanics, Aborigines in Australia, Basques in Spain, Arabs in France, and Albanians in the former Yugoslavia.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his staff resort to most of these arguments when they discuss the factors that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. They blame foreign agents, the West in general and former U.S. Congressman Robert Dole and former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Genscher in particular, as responsible for the disintegration of their country. Simultaneously, they hold aloft Serbia as the bastion of Orthodoxy preventing the penetration of Catholicism in the East and Islam in the West. In order to justify their hegemony, the Serbian regime oscillates between the ethnic argument (Bosnia and Hercegovina) and the historical argument (Kosova is Serbia’s “Jerusalem”).

Similarly, in FYROM, when the Albanians called for more extensive use of the Albanian language and the official recognition of the Albanian University of Tetova within the Macedonian educational system, the government of Kiro Gligorov dismissed these demands by arguing that if such rights were given to Albanians, then the same should also be given to Hispanics in Texas and Arabs in Marseilles.

Nevertheless, we stand at the beginning of a new era in which old federations are dissolving, their constituent parts are seceding, and the right to self-determination is emerging as a defining issue on the historical stage. In the face of massive human rights abuses and economic, cultural, and political disenfranchisement, a people's right to self-determination must have priority over territorial integrity. Emerging new States should be recognized only if they guarantee human rights, freedom, equality, peace, and democracy for all groups.

## Yugoslavia

Tito's Yugoslavia was built on principles that were supposed to prevent Serbian hegemony forever. Eight confederal units, including six republics and two autonomous provinces, were formed, which respected ethnicity and historical legacies. Tito's system, which made domination of a larger group over a smaller one impossible, was the product of consensus based on adherence to communism. When communism collapsed, it was not replaced with democracy but with ultranationalism—a phenomenon brutally manifested by Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, who rose to power on the principle that “one man, one vote” would secure Serbian majority rule. (In this regard, there is no substantive difference between Milosevic's policy and Kiro Gligorov's policy in Macedonia.)

Serb nationalism, which resulted in the destruction of human rights of all non-Slavs, was the primary factor in the destruction of Yugoslavia. Serbia under Milosevic has demonstrated not simply an unwillingness and inability to build inclusive systems, but instead, through its campaign of ethnic cleansing, a propensity for unrestrained domination over others.

There are no legal, moral, or geostrategic arguments that would convince Albanians to accept and remain under Serbian domination. After the bitter experience of the past decade, the international community should give Albanians the historical chance, which the Serbs were unable to make use of, to create their own States and to build a tolerant, inclusive, and democratic society.

## Kosova

Kosova has always been an independent entity—geographically, ethnically, and administratively. In ancient times, it was called Dardania. Later it became the Vilayet of Kosova, and under Tito's Yugoslavia, it was autonomous. Autonomy was granted to Kosova because the Albanians, not the Serbs, wanted it. Kosova was a constituent element of the former Yugoslavia, with veto power. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosova automatically won the right to secession, as did all the other coequal members of the confederation.

The independence of Kosova is supported by a whole range of legal, historical, economic, and geostrategic arguments, including the following:

1. Yugoslavia unraveled because the formula of coexistence did not work, and therefore all of the constituent parts, including Kosova, achieved the right to self-determination.
2. Kosova has its own administrative borders, with its own Constitution and institutions.
3. Kosova is a cohesive and discrete entity—ethnically, geographically, and economically.
4. More than 90 percent of Kosovars voted for independence in a referendum.
5. Kosova is occupied by a foreign power that exploits it as a colony under a system of apartheid. Therefore it must be decolonized.

6. The independence of Kosova will create peace and stability in the region. Its occupation, or its remaining within the framework of the former Yugoslavia, destabilizes the region and poses a threat to peace and civilized values.

7. Kosova has the right to secession on the basis of precedence.

There are no arguments that justify forcing Kosova to remain within the framework of Serbia, or Yugoslavia, except those that justify hegemony, expansionism, colonialism, and apartheid.

### The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

In spite of its pronounced bi-national and multicultural structure, the FYROM is defined as the national State of the Macedonians, a State in which Albanians are guaranteed only their civil, technical rights. They are deprived of their history and their land.

Some critical mistakes were made during Macedonia's secession from the former Yugoslav federation. The right to self-determination was given only to the State's Slav Macedonian population, not to its Albanian population, who against their will see themselves as separated from part of their national body. The referendum on the independence of the FYROM was proclaimed without prior definition of the premises and the social relations within the new State. Only the rights, and not the obligations, deriving from the former Yugoslav system, were embraced, such as the question of new citizenship or the compensation of the institutions of the Albanian national entity. Finally, the political will of the Albanians who boycotted the Macedonian referendum and organized an Albanian referendum on political and territorial autonomy was violated and ignored.

In the process of building the FYROM as an independent State, a number of errors were made through the institutionalization of exclusively nationalist definitions that eliminate and marginalize "the other," such as:

1. In the Constitution of the FYROM, the essential interests of the Albanians are not reflected.



2. The Constitution was adopted against the will of the representatives of the Albanians, who abstained en bloc.
3. The international agreements on the former Yugoslavia, especially the Second Chapter of the Carrington Document, were ignored.
4. The spirit of the Albanian-Macedonian talks conducted at Oher with the mediation of Gert Ahrens was disregarded.
5. The “one man, one vote” concept was used to impose the will of one people over another during the secession and also in the course of establishing parliamentary procedures and the creation of the Constitution and the laws that define national rights.

In new multiethnic States in which inalienable national rights have not been previously defined, distorted democratic procedure, as I have stated earlier, turns into an efficient instrument for the legal marginalization, even elimination, of the non-dominant group or groups. The FYROM is a classic example of distorted democracy at work, in which mechanisms of power favor the primary Macedonian people and penalize the secondary Albanian population, who nevertheless make up one-third of the country. The electoral system, for example, is a majority system that minimizes the impact of the Albanian vote through the addition of electoral units, with the result that, on average, an Albanian deputy has double the number of voters compared with a Macedonian deputy. Recently, when public talks were held about this electoral model, a professor on the law faculty at the University of Skopje, who was previously head of the Forum for the Defense of Human Rights, Minister of the Police and Internal Affairs, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted that in the FYROM the proportional system could not be implemented because Albanians would then have all the votes, would elect more deputies, and eventually would secure a mandate to form the government. His message was simple: Make sure that Albanians do not receive their votes.

In the same vein, the executive branch in the FYROM has the power to approve the decisions of local administrators. The local

administration (the commune), which is legally in the hands of the Albanians, comes under the control of the executive, which is controlled almost totally by Slav Macedonians. The rights of the local administration, as outlined in Article 115 of the Constitution, are divided into three categories: 1) the direct rights of the commune; 2) rights that are granted only with the approval of the Slav Macedonian executive branch; 3) rights that the FYROM may transfer to the communes. Even the first category of rights cannot be extended without the law, with the result that what is put forth in the Constitution is not included in the law. In reality, all decisions are made at the center of power, even the appointment of school headmasters. Within this framework, the government of Macedonia may suspend any local administration, which, in Western Macedonia, are all in the hands of the Albanians.

The relationships and instruments of power that were established in the FYROM in the process of its secession from the former Yugoslavia and its emergence as a new State in actuality stem from primordial intentions to exclude, subjugate, and exploit Albanians and other non-Slav Macedonian groups. The statistics bear out this assertion: Albanians, who make up one-third of the population represent only 3 percent of the country's public officials and professionals—in the government, the army, the courts, the media, and in the various cultural and scientific institutions. Not surprisingly, under this colonial system, the percentage of investments in the Albanian-inhabited areas of Macedonia—from the infrastructure to the cultural and educational institutions and to the sphere of employment—is ten times lower than the contribution of Albanians to the society as a whole.

In light of these facts, we can rightfully assert that the system has been constructed to serve the Slav Macedonian population at the expense of all other nationalities. The inherent inequity cannot be undone simply by appointing some Albanians to ministerial posts, or by boasting about a legal system that distorts democratic values, or by proclaiming the status of Albanians in Macedonia to be superior to that of other “minorities” in the Balkans. As to the latter, the presumption that Albanians are a “minority” in the Balkans flies in the face of historical fact: Albanians are the third largest ethnic group in the region and the descendants of the Illyrians, the oldest

indigenous population. They are a majority that was divided by force.

The ways in which the Slav Macedonian power structure misuses the forms of democracy to subjugate the Albanian population, which it tragically misconstrues as a dangerous competitor, can correctly be termed “ethnic engineering.” Ethnic engineering leads to a permanent reductionism in public life. The Constitution is narrower than reality; because that which is allowed under the Constitution is prohibited by law. What is permitted by law is, in turn, limited by the institution, and what is allowed by the institution is not realized by the individual. This phenomenon is manifest at all levels of society, down to the desk of the petty bureaucrat.

Albanians are now conscious of their true position within the Macedonian system, of the projects that are intended to marginalize them, either through openly brutal or more sophisticated means, and of the withering of their creative energies. As a result, today in the FYROM there is a dangerous confrontation between the wills of two peoples—the Albanians and the Macedonians—the outcome of which can be either constructive or destructive. Ideally the confrontation should be resolved by peaceful, civilized means, but it cannot be a peace at any price. The maxim “better a bad peace than a good war” is shortsighted, because inevitably a bad peace leads to a horrible war. The crisis in the Balkans is the product of an artificially-manufactured peace. Peace cannot be built with ethnocentric and hegemonic projects. In the FYROM, ethnic competition can be stopped and a stable peace established only through genuine dialogue and consensus on the following issues:

–The right of self-determination, which has been validated under UN Resolution, No.

637 A (vii), 1962 and UN Resolution, No. 1514, 1960.

–The Declaration of Human Rights, which confers on all people the right to “life, liberty, and security of person” and disallows all forms of persecution.

–The 1970 Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations defining what constitutes friendly relations between States.

–The 1966 UN Pact on civil and political rights and the UN Pact on economic and cultural rights, which states in Article I that “all people enjoy the right to self-determination, and that under this right they should freely determine their political position.”

–Recognition that in the FYROM, the State does not represent the interests of all its citizens and that, in fact, the Macedonian system is designed to marginalize and control the Albanian population.

–The referendum on the political and territorial autonomy of the Albanians of Macedonia.

–The 1991 boycott of the Macedonian referendum.

–The Carrington Document (second chapter).

–Recognition that Albanians support the stability of the State of Macedonia, that they are politically aware and organized, and that, therefore, they should be recognized as subjects capable of implementing the right of self-determination in a responsible fashion.

–The creation of a system of equal opportunities, democracy, and tolerance.

–Coequal responsibility for the interests, rights, and the fate of the other.

Albanians and Macedonians need to arrive at an agreement that changes the national system into a bi-national and multicultural system, and this agreement must rest on an understanding of the following issues:

–Inherited rights.

–State formation, languages, and flags.

–The Carrington Document.

–The referendum on political and territorial autonomy.

–Democratization, including free elections and a proportional electoral system.

–Formation of a two-chamber parliament.

–Establishment of a market economy.

- Adherence to European standards of human rights.
- Adoption of Western standards and, ultimately, incorporation of the FYROM into Western institutions.
  
- Free movement of Albanian people, ideas, and goods throughout Albanian territories.

This agreement would not entail change of borders, and it does not impinge on the State and national interests of the Slav Macedonians. Instead, it would serve to end ethnic competition and conflict, and therefore create stability within the existing borders of the FYROM. If, on the other hand, an agreement of this kind is not reached, the FYROM will enter a downward spiral similar to that of the former Yugoslavia. It cannot survive on the basis of an exclusive ethnocentrism; it can only survive if it embraces decentralization, diversity, and sincere interaction across ethnic lines on the basis of mutual interests. As Arendt Lijphart, a political philosopher at Yale University, has argued in his book *Democracy in Plural Societies*, consensual decision-making offers the only chance for the survival of multiethnic social formations. Anything else will lead to confrontation, polarization, ethnic despotism, and, in the end, the disintegration of the State.

October 1998

Scientific Centre for the Bulgarian national strategy

## **BULGARIANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

Bulgarian national doctrine. First part foundation of the Bulgarian National Doctrine Professor Grigor Velev, responsible editor, Professor Angel G'labov, Professor Georgi Bakalov, Professor Georgi Markov, and others. Sofia 1997. Publishing house "Znanie" EOOD.

The publishing house "Znanie" EOOD and the Institute for Metaloznaje at BAN, financially supported the elaboration of the first part of the Bulgarian national doctrine.

Note

After 1990, after the fall of the former regime, a number of so-called national strategic centres and institutes were formed in Bulgaria which focused on Bulgaria's national strategy. Although not officially, they were mainly connected with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS). They are: the Scientific Centre for Bulgarian national strategy, the Foundation "Manfred Werner" in Sofia, the Macedonian Scientific Institute, Sofia, the magazine "Macedonian Review" and many more.

Informally, according to the composition of authors, editorial and collaborative sponsorship or circles, they are surely strongly associated with the political centres in this country and with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS). We will be conveying derivatives of three documents: the first and second part of the Bulgarian National Doctrine (published 1997 and 1998), from which we will be conveying the entire contents from the first and parts of the concept and definitions, as well as broader key statements concerning their attitudes towards Macedonia and the Macedonian people; conveyed from the second part will be the assessment and strategy following in the same direction. Omitted are maps, which, of course, selectively present the broadest ethnic territory at different times.

The third document, references to “good neighbourly relations” with the Republic of Macedonia, was published in 2008 in Sofia, in booklet form entitled “Bulgarian policy towards the Republic of Macedonia”, from which we will convey only one key statement.

## 1. ESSENCE OF THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL DOCTRINE “BULGARIA IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY”

When the nation and state find themselves in difficult times it is necessary to sprout new views on the sources of our national history and to draw wisdom and direction. It requires us to look towards our neighbours and beyond; to Europe and to the world to become familiar with other people’s national policies and the means by which they achieve their national views.

Many of these countries owe their successful and permanent existence and the realization of their national interests, to their national doctrines.

The national doctrine represents a theoretical base system of the officially accepted views and principles of the historical aspirations, perspectives and goals of the nation, which leads the way to achieving the national ideal.

## 2. THEORETICAL BASIS (TERMS AND PRINCIPLES) OF THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL DOCTRINE

Prior to building the national doctrine, it is necessary to explain some basic concepts and principles, such as:

Nation;  
National awareness and identity;  
Nationalism;  
National self-esteem, pride and dignity;  
National spirit;  
National ideal;  
National interests.

This is important to us because these terms have long been discredited by the “Marxist-Leninist ideology”. Moreover, those

who used terms derived from “nation” during the years of the totalitarian regime in their scientific or political activities were declared “enemies”.

This is how the opinions of entire generations were manipulated and deformed in order to distort the real meaning and essence of these terms.

## 1. ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY, NATION

Before we present the definition of nation, it is necessary to present the definition of ethnicity and nationality. It is important in order to avoid misunderstandings in terminology.

### 1.1. Ethnos (ethnicity)

Ethnicity is a collective term referring to any racial, tribal, linguistic and ethno-cultural community and represents a tribal (clan) substrate of a nation. Ethnic self-awareness is self-determination through identity or origin.

### 1.2. Nationality

Nationality is the intermediate stage which distinguishes the tribe (relations) from the nation. A nation is a community of people who have not reached the level of national consolidation but are aware of their common ancestry and cultural heritage. The term “nation” was introduced by the Soviet ethnography to fix the intermediate stage. In western ethnology, the term “nationality” is not used.

The terms “ethnicity” and “nationality” can be used interchangeably.

### 1.3. Nation

The nation as a concept sprouted in Europe during the Enlightenment years and came into use after the French Revolution. This concept was formed as a counterweight to the clerical-aristocratic order which resisted democratic unity and social equality in the participation of all citizens. There is no other concept which would precisely represent the notion of a free society. In different



historical periods a different content was included and it produced different determinations. In the formation of the national ideology of various countries there are mainly two prevailing concepts of the nation: 1) the ethnic concept (ethno-nation) and 2) the socio-cultural concept (political nation).

### 1.3.1. The ethnic nation (ethno-nation)

At the core of the ethnic concept stands “ethnicity” in the narrow sense of the term.

It is well known that there are about 200 nations in the world today, which in themselves have united more than 10,000 ethnic groups. Moreover, the formation of modern nations, are representative of almost all known tribes, ethnicities and races, some of which have already disappeared. No nation in the world can claim to be an ethnic monolith or having ethnic homogeneity (purity). Therefore, the ethnic concept of the nation should be viewed as a stage that has passed in the historical development of the theory.

### 1.3.2. Socio-cultural (political) nation

According to French educators, this type of nation represents a “society of citizens united by the ideal of general statehood”.

This understanding of nation is grounded in the underlying social structure of most countries in the world - France, USA, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, Austria and the Balkans - Greece and Turkey. Therefore, all citizens of the United States and France are treated as members of the American and accordingly, the French nation.

## 2. The Bulgarian nation

During Ottoman rule, born and created on the basis of the “Bulgarian nationality” was the “Bulgarian national consciousness”. It was expressed with the desire to: 1) have an independent Orthodox Church, and 2) have an independent Bulgarian state.

Thus, the ethnic (national) factor and the “orthodox religion” each played a separate role in the formation of the Bulgarian nation.

Over a long period of time ethnicity, ethnic consciousness and the Christian religion became the defining characteristics of the Bulgarian nationality. Almost all of our nation’s options after we gained our freedom, including: “our roots”, “our Bulgarian blood”, “our Orthodox Christian faith”, “our Bulgarian faith” are factors in making us who we are. Living within the boundaries of the Bulgarian state, as its citizens, are Turks, Tartars, Gypsies, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Karakachanians, Gagauzians, Vlachs, Aromanians (KutsoVlachs or Vlachs), etc., about who Levski wrote in his letter to Gancho Miliiov: “whatever they may be, for everyone they will all be the same...”

This question is not only of theoretical but also of paramount practical importance to our country.

After Bulgaria was liberated, there were no characteristic manifestations of xenophobia and ethnic conflict among our people. Those of our countrymen, under certain conditions, on the strength of the ethnic concept of the nation, can be disconnected from the composition of the Bulgarian nation.

Today we look at the Bulgarian nation as historically created, persistent, a self-developed community that sprang up and is functioning in the territory which is a single political, economic, social and spiritual region.

This region includes material and spiritual values that are the product of specific collective independence of its members, regardless of their ethnic, religious, racial, etc., origin. It is constantly evolving, moving to new heights of quality.

All Bulgarian citizens are members of the Bulgarian nation:

Regardless of their ethnic or racial backgrounds;  
Regardless of their class affiliation;  
Regardless of their religion;  
Regardless of their political views;

Those who recognize Bulgaria as their country and fatherland;  
Those who guard and pass on to future generations the spirit of Bulgaria's historical destiny;  
Those who speak the Bulgarian language to the extent that they participate as equals and equally in the affairs of the nation;  
Those who do not seek a foreign national identity. Understanding that the nation is a "socio-cultural or political" community, which is the basis of the modern Bulgarian state.

Clearly and categorically underlined in our Constitution is that Bulgaria is a single-nation state, characterized by ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, which contributes to the stability of society and acts as a strong unifying factor.

In Article 167 the Bulgarian state flag is called the "national flag". All Bulgarian citizens, regardless of their ethnic and religious consciousness are valued under that flag.

According to Article 116, "state servants are executors of the will and interests of the nation". The Constitution speaks of "national security" and the president as a state leader "embodies the unity of the nation".

This approach does not mean that we give up keeping and developing our relationship with the Bulgarians who live in other countries, with whom we bind our kinship and historical and cultural ties.

In terms of the development of the integration processes into Europe, there is a theoretical possibility that the nation will outlive the current state in its classical form. A country can be destroyed by force, but not the nation. This is due to the existence of an exceptional force in the national identity that: 1) undergoes a serious questioning of the spiritual energy and the genetic power of the nation in difficult times, 2) comfortably adopts foreign national values and thus enriches its own value system, and 3) gives birth to national democracy, which is the most lasting form of political legitimacy.

## 2.1. The Bulgarian national consciousness (identity)

The national consciousness is expressed through the cultural identity of the nation. It is a permanent system of values (cultural, material, intellectual and emotional) that characterizes the nation as a socio-cultural community.

Today, the subject of the Bulgarian national identity is not class, religion or political party all by themselves, but as parts of the nation, which at every stage of its historical development is able to unite on a number of fundamental ideas, principles, values, interests and ideals. It generally determines the national identity and its practical realization.

## 2.2 National unity

The issue of national unity is complex. To address this problem, different countries in the world use different political approaches. The most important of them are:

**Agglutination.** This is a voluntary and time continuous process which unites two or more ethnicities and cultures.

As an example we can point to the agglutination (confluence) between Thracians, Pre-Bulgarians and Slavs, as a result of an educated Bulgarian nationality.

**Integration.** This is a process of national unification of different ethnic groups, preserving their ethnic and cultural identity.

This process aims to: Overcome all pure ethnic elements that divide the nation; Guaranteeing equal rights and opportunities to all citizens, regardless of their differences by race, ethnicity, religion or language.

Bulgaria has traditionally adhered to the policy of integration.

Integration contributes to nation-building as a socio-cultural community. This means that its members are mutually accepted as

compatriots who have common interests and a common national identity.

Integration confirms the fact that the existing ethnic, religious and other groups, did not occur through annexation of foreign lands, but through the settlement of our country and as a result of the religious (Islamization) and cultural assimilation with our Ottoman oppressors. These groups represent an integral part of the Bulgarian nation and are citizens of the Bulgarian state.

At the same time, parts of Bulgaria, together with its population, exist in neighbouring countries as a result of annexations after the wars. That is why Bulgaria is called upon to protect the rights of its countrymen by investing unrelenting care to maintain and develop their knowledge about Bulgarian culture.

Assimilation. This is a process based on the idea of primacy of the dominant ethnic group and its culture in order to achieve homogeneity in the state. This process is achieved voluntarily or through violence against ethnic groups in order for them to give up their ethnicity and culture.

The Bulgarian population in Vardar Macedonia is exposed to assimilation and so is the Bulgarian Pomoravje population by Serbia, the Bulgarian population in Aegean Macedonia and Aegean Thrace by Greece and the Bulgarian population in Eastern Thrace by Turkey.

Segregation. This is a process by which, at its base, stands the idea of preponderance of the dominant ethnic group and culture on the other and smaller groups. It is expressed in isolating these smaller groups in certain areas or ghettos. This policy continues to be applied, to this day, in a range of countries.

### 2.3. The Bulgarian nation and the question of national minorities

The ethnic groups that constitute a nation can be placed in various positions - from a tolerant attitude towards them - to - a state of injustice and repression.

Regarding the socio-cultural nation, the Constitution stipulates that “all citizens of the state are members of the nation”, irrespective of their ethnic origin and are equal before the laws of the State and protected by its constitution.

The Council of Europe has proposed a Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities. Envisaged in it is the development of national legislation to protect human rights, including those of separate national groups. The term “national minority” is not formulated in this document. Therefore, its provisions provide an opportunity for each state to determine on its own the kind of legislation necessary to protect the rights of the representatives of other national groups. The convention does not provide for recognition of collective rights. It does not provide for directly, but through the national legislation of each country.

Article 2 of the Constitution defines the Republic of Bulgaria as a “unitary state” in which “no autonomous territorial units are allowed”.

Article 36 of the Constitution ensures the right of every person use of their own language, if the Bulgarian language is not their mother tongue. Other provisions provide for other individual civil and human rights.

#### 2.4. The Bulgarian nation and the supranational governance structures of a united Europe

The construction of a United Europe has created conditions for forming a supranational governance structure. The current and projected future development of the European integration process provides a basis that will not restrict the rights of the various nations and will also expose them to even stronger national presence and national identities as an expression of unity in numbers.

The Council of Europe, its Committee of Foreign Ministers and Consultative Assembly with representatives from the parliaments of the Member States, the Commission on Human Rights, the European Court and other cooperative organs, will not limit the national rights of states, but will support them in their development.

Bulgaria is a member of the Council of Europe since 1992. This is an important act which will best help to protect its national interests. Our inclusion in the European Union and in NATO will increase our opportunities to pursue our interests.

### 3. BULGARIAN NATIONALISM

Nationalism to some degree is synonymous with patriotism. Patriotism is an expression of love for the country, i.e. for the land of our grandfathers.

Patriotism expresses love towards birth, tribe, people, historical memories and traditions.

Patriotism reflects on personal and social behaviour motivated by rational arguments, and from emotional and natural virtues of loyalty and duty, of love and of self-sacrifice.

Nationalism is a rational structure, built around its core values - the nation. It has the features of a unifying idea, giving significantly wider meaning and content. Included in it is the love and commitment for the homeland and for the nation, with its spirit, aspirations, ideals and values.

Representatives of the Bulgarian nation carry its distinctive mark - Bulgarian nationalism.

Nationalism is an active state of national spirit and knowledge. It is an active expression of concern for the historical destiny of the nation. It is sincerely attached to its interests, values, ideals and historical identity. Therefore, it is an active and dynamic state of the national identity.

There are many reasons for us, up until now, not having a clear idea of the essence, appearance, development and the role of nationalism. One is that the Bulgarian, almost always suffered no less from lack of ideas and concepts, than from lack of collective will and willingness to unite around one of them.

This contributes to an almost permanent necessity to oppose the anti-Bulgarism and chauvinism practiced by some of our neighbours. Our inadequate responses to their behaviour, has been mostly an expression of lack of national self-esteem, which Father Paisi tried to awaken so long ago.

Over a period of almost 50 years, the term “nationalism” has been discredited here. It was deliberately leveled by the leaders of the “proletarian revolution” with national-socialism - nazism - social national movement - fascism, etc.

Nationalism, as an emanation of the spirit of any nation, in no form and means should be associated with the ideologies of national socialism and fascism.

The communist ideology declares nationalism a “reactionary and decadent” bourgeois doctrine for “a born expression of national awareness”, like one nation attempting to claim dominance over another. It led us to create a deformed representation of the essence of the concept, as well as deleted our historical memory of several generations of the true meaning and essence of nationalism. So, many young people including intellectuals today are afraid to use it, and if they do mention it, they give it only a negative sense.

It is necessary to cleanse the term “nationalism” by scientific means from the unjustified accusations, curses and deformations it has received from the ideologists of the totalitarian regime in our country.

Nationalism, in principle, can in certain circumstances mutate into three negative forms: 1) national extremism, 2) national chauvinism, and 3) national nihilism...

National extremism. National extremism is a phenomenon of bad national education, when national pride is turned to arrogance, when derogatory behaviour towards members of other ethnic groups or nations is exercised. This stands at the base of intra-national dislike, xenophobia, confrontation, and often turns into aggressive behaviour and lawlessness.



Chauvinism. Chauvinism is a term derived from the name of the French journalist “Shoven”, a sergeant in Napoleon’s army.

It means making unsubstantiated claims or grabbing territories and people who, historically, legally, politically, ethno-culturally, never belonged to a given nation and state. This kind of chauvinism was demonstrated by our neighbours during the wars. They grabbed ancient Bulgarian lands, fully inhabited with Bulgarians (Serbia - Bulgarian Pomoravje, Timochka Krajina, Zapadnite pokraini and Vardar Macedonia; Greece - Aegean Macedonia and Aegean Thrace; Romania - Severna Dobruja; Turkey - Odrin Thrace).

Never have the Bulgarian people and Bulgarian officials in Bulgarian history appeared or demonstrated chauvinism, because Bulgaria, from the day it was freed to today, borders only with its own lands and people.

There is not a single document that shows that Bulgarian politicians were aiming to wage war against the primeval lands of Serbia - Sumadija or Kosovo or Greece - Peloponnesus, Thessaly, Epirus, Crete and Cyprus, nor against the territories of Romania and Albania...

National chauvinism. This term reflects the connection in the manifestation of national-chauvinism and extremism.

National nihilism. National nihilism is the fruit of alienation and withdrawal from belonging to the nation and its value system. Concrete nihilism among us is manifested in our national reconciliation of the position of some of our statesmen and politicians, as well as our intelligentsia, who have hesitated to act against the denationalization and assimilation of the Bulgarians in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, in Aegean and Eastern Thrace for nearly 80 years, as well as attempts to alienate significant parts of the Bulgarian nation in separate parts of our country.

National nihilism in us was born as a result of: 1) ruined national ideals of unification after the Balkan Wars (ending with the Bucharest and Constantinople Agreement) and the First World War (complete with the Nice Agreement), sparking national pessimism

and complex “unrealizable national ideals”, 2) erosion of national awareness, at that time and then the growing leftist communist teachings, social democrats and anarchists, 3) international and bad national upbringing during the totalitarian regime in our country, 4) as a result of a de-nationalization policy, such as the one that was deliberately exercised in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia nearly 84 years ago, and in Aegean and Eastern Thrace 77 years ago, all working against the Bulgarian population.

National nihilism commonly manifests itself in two forms which are extremely destructive for nationalism: 1) internationalism, and 2) cosmopolitanism.

Internationalism. Internationalism is one of the basic attributes of Marxist ideology. It is derived from the formula “proletarians of all countries unite”, putting the unity of the working class in all countries above the unity of the nation.

Internationalism, instead of nationalism, was supported over a significant part of the last three generations of the Bulgarian nation.

Cosmopolitanism. The notion of cosmopolitanism sprouted like an antipode to the idea of a nation. That is why it was regarded as an antipode to nationalism. It is characteristic of disregard, indifference and contempt for national values, interests and ideals. In a broader sense it advocates renouncing the national state and cultural and national identity.

The philosophy of cosmopolitanism can best be expressed by the famous formula - “My homeland is where I feel best”. A variant of cosmopolitanism is “global-ism”. Here, the moral values of cosmopolitanism are transformed by the formula “I am a citizen of the world”.

Proper understanding of the term “nation” and “nationalism” is especially important today, when the complexes, dogmas and opinions of the recent past have not been outlived...

### 3.1.1. New national ethics

New national ethics are expressed in a tolerant attitude towards members of the entire nation, regardless of their ethnic origin, religious or political views, occupation and social status. Contribution to this is given by the inherent sense of the tolerant Bulgarians. It excludes disrespect and any other form of discriminatory behaviour towards members of our nation - Gypsies, Turks, Jews, Armenians and others, or the representatives of officially recognized religions - Muslim, Catholic, Protestant and other denominations. Sadly, many Bulgarians call their Bulgarian brothers living in Serbia - “Serbians” in Greece - “Greeks” in Macedonia - “Macedonians” in Bessarabia - “Russians”, etc. This is unfounded and offensive.

Following are the new national ethics underlying the new characteristic behaviour of the members of the nation:

- Renouncing all situations where members of the Bulgarian nation negatively relate to one another through offensive labels, expressions or other compromising means that would offend personal dignity;
- Renouncing the placing of interests of certain social groups, organizations, parties and economic groups over the interests of the nation and the state;
- Democracy, the foundation of equality and equal standing before the law of the country, social integration and national unification;
- Pluralism, which will not convert the differences into confrontation and into privileges or into the seeking of a foreign national identity;
- Nationalism, which sharpens the integration of the various social groups as the only reasonable form of national union;
- Recognition of national institutions and of the individuals who represent them;
- All encompassing of all Bulgarians throughout the world, as well as immigrants from other ethnic groups in the national spiritual space, to feel real support in their homeland;

- Giving consideration to the people of our neighbouring states, regardless of the contradictions that existed in the past and still exist today;
- Not allowing other countries to interfere in our country's internal and external affairs;
- Wide integration into Europe, the preservation of our cultural self-determination, sovereignty and independence...

National self-esteem. This is a special, elevated status of the national spirit, reflecting the nation's satisfaction with its spiritual and material achievements - the result of the nation's individual and collective labour, talent and intellect.

The national self-esteem of the Bulgarian people, also determined by Bulgaria's historical and political fate.

History shows that Bulgaria is one of the oldest countries in Europe. Indisputably Bulgarians have contributed to world and European culture and history. Bulgaria has been given recognition by world famous historians and cultural-ists as one of the European civilizations. Included in the discoveries in the Varna necropolis are golden treasures from the fourth millennium BC, which proves that the oldest golden European civilization sprang up there - older than the contemporary Cretan-Mycenaean and Egyptian civilizations.

By force of historical circumstances, Bulgaria became the real fatherland of Slavic literacy, created by the brothers St. Cyril and St. Methodius, and also the literary culture, which flourished between the Slavs and the Western part of Great Moravia. The Politics of Prince Boris and his descendants - the kings Simeon and Peter created the maximum beneficial conditions for the improvement of Slavic literature, which turned Bulgaria into a third parallel centre of European civilization in the same row as the Latin-Roman and the Greek-Byzantine culture.

The Bogomil movement was born and developed in Bulgaria, accepted by many as a rational cause because of its substance, which according to its content and reformation, was a religious philosophy, aimed at determining the authenticity of Christianity. The rational element in its philosophy found followers even outside of the country. In the West the Bogomils becomes known as the “Bugri” (Bulgarians). The Bulgarian Bogomils outside of Bulgarian space became known as Fundagiagiti, Babuni, Katari, Patareni, Albigoitsi, Bugri and Strigolnitsi, confirming the resounding Bulgarian contribution to the formation of pre-renaissance European culture.

Since the second half of the 9<sup>th</sup> and until the mid 10<sup>th</sup> century AD, Bulgaria has experienced its “golden century”, which placed it in the leading countries of the Christian world. At that time, countries like Germany, France and England, according to their cultural opportunities, stood far behind the Bulgarian Empire. In the hierarchy of friends and allies of the most powerful Christian empire, Byzantium, the Bulgarians occupied first place.

It is an undeniable fact that the Serbians and Russians created their self-reliant literature with direct participation from the old Bulgarian educators...

Thirteen centuries of Bulgarian history gives us the basis to have high self-esteem and national pride in ourselves and in the fact that we are Bulgarians.

#### 1.2.4.1. Birth of the Bulgarian nation

Serious changes took place in the socio-economic, political and cultural development of the Bulgarian people during the 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Specialized areas of agricultural production began to pop up in Bulgaria in the second half of that period. Textile plants began to take shape in regions with strongly developed livestock production. They facilitated trade in textile products in the Ottoman Empire. A series of villages on the slopes of Stara Planina and Sredna Gora transformed into skill producing centres. More and more Bulgarians began to migrate into the cities, with the Bulgarian element in many of them becoming dominant. This was one of the most important phenomena in the life of the Bulgarian people. The

first manufacturing companies began to appear in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, and later the first factories (D. Zheliazkov's textile factory in Sliven in 1834). The process of economic recovery strengthened and so did the pursuit of enlightenment, which was expressed in the opening of 1,500 schools in the churches, monasteries and municipalities. Hundreds of young people acquired modern education abroad. Cultural and literary activities were being developed and so was the Bulgarian publishing press. The Bulgarian intelligentsia began to develop. The political will of the Bulgarian people was being awakened with their participation in several Russian-Turkish wars (1768-1774, 1787-1791, 1806-1812) and in the Serbian (1804-1813) and Greek (1821-1827) uprisings. This testifies to the fact that the Bulgarian people had discovered their own slavish position and had started looking to get out of it.

Paisei Hilendarski, a carrier of enlightenment, opened the eyes of many of our countrymen with his publication "Slavo-Bulgarian History" (1762). In the few pages he not only reflected, like in a deep source, the glorious past of the Bulgarians, but he also revealed the road to national liberation and self-awareness. He gave the Bulgarian people faith that they "are not forgotten by God", and that they should reject the political and spiritual oppression forced upon them by the Sultan and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Greek priests and bishops, and that they should struggle for an independent church and an independent state. Thus, Father Paisei's "Slavo-Bulgarian History" appeared like a manifesto and put forth the principles of a national program for revival, for ecclesiastical and national independence.

Depicting the ethnic territory of the Bulgarian people, Paisei, with patriotic fervour, called on the people to protect their birthright and language and angrily chastised those who rebuked the fathers, fueling feelings of affiliation to the glorious past of the Bulgarians, who first created their own state from the Slavs.

Paisei Hilendarski's work marks the beginning of the Bulgarian national revival. This was the beginning of a turbulent and unsustainable yearning for education, economic development, church autonomy and the recognition of our rights to our national identity.

The national idea was established during the process of the turbulent development of Bulgarian education and the educational system. In the chronicles of the Bulgarian Revival, with particular strength, shone the names of the major educational activists in Moesia and Thrace - Petar Beron, Vasil Aprilov, Neofit Bozveli, and in Macedonia - Neofit Rilski, Marko Teodorovich, Ioakim Krchovski, Kiril Peichinovich, Gligor Prlichev, brothers Miladinovtsi, Jordan Hadzhikonstantinov (Giant), Kuzman Shapkarev, Raiko Zinzifov, M. Tsepenkov, and others. Macedonia became the cradle of the Bulgarian national revival.

The community bore and engendered the spoken and written language giving encouragement to the national literature. The first forms of the newly born Bulgarian poetry were created in Macedonia (according to the words of Serbian linguist Vuk Karadzich). In 1861, brothers Miladinovtsi released their collection of "Bulgarian Folk Songs" in Zagreb. They also published many primers, textbooks and teaching aids in the modern Bulgarian language.

The Bulgarian literary company, presided over by Marin Drinov, was formed in 1869 in Braila. The company was renamed "Bulgarian Academy of Sciences" in 1911.

#### 1.2.4.2. Self-determination - basis for establishing the Bulgarian national ideal

Besides the revival of general literature and the literary language, also revived were economic and business means, bookstores and schools, and a general Bulgarian national awareness was created. And thus the majority of the Christian population in the Slavic geographical regions of Moesia, Thrace, Macedonia, Dobrudza, Bulgarian Pomoravie and Timochko became known as "Bulgarian".

In terms of that wonderful process of national unity and striving for self-determination, the Bulgarian nation formed the Bulgarian national ideal. Although it naturally included the idea of the middle ages, the creation of statehood and nationality, language and culture, the pride of our glorious kings, saints and the people's army leaders

as a common past, the national ideal was a phenomenon of modern times. It was born under the influence of the new European ideas - primarily the idea of freedom for people and for citizens, the right of a nation to have an independent political life, i.e. independence and statehood.

Historical undertakings motivated the Bulgarian people to simultaneously look in all directions - Dobrudzha, Aegean and Odrin Thrace, Pomoravieto, Vardar and Aegean Macedonia.

This is because many compatriots, whose fate was violent and to which we are not indifferent, lived in this territorial coverage.

People without ideals cannot grow into a nation. National ideals determine national interests.

The ideal is constant and unchanging. But it can be developed and modernized in accordance with changes in the country and in the world. Sadly, our national ideals sometimes fold under the pressure of internal and international political conjunctures, unlike the example of our neighbours. And we are not just talking about change in geographical directions here, but also about the survival of these ideals.

(We have left out the twenty pages or so spanning from the history of the First and Second Bulgarian Empires, the Byzantine and Ottoman period, from the revival whose sections are full of appropriation from the rebirth of the neighbouring countries, events and personalities...)

(From third part) - 1.2.5. The third Bulgarian state

On February 19, (March 3) 1878, a prior Peace Agreement was signed at San Stefano. This Agreement suggested the creation of an independent Bulgarian state, which was to include about 80% of Bulgaria's ethnic territory in the Balkans (see map 8). It was anticipated that the new state would be a principality and would have its own government and army.



The population in this principality numbered about five and a half million Bulgarians living in the regions of Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia, which accomplished the ideal of an independent State.

The prior San Stefano Peace Agreement, however, was not recognized by Great Britain, which, during the creation of the Bulgarian Principality, suspiciously saw a “little Russia” in the heart of the Balkans and so close to Istanbul and its water flow. France and Italy reacted coldly to the Bulgarian proximity to the Mediterranean Sea. The negotiations in London between Solbery, the English Foreign Minister, and Count Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador, ended on May 18, 1878 with the signing of a secret convention, which recommended splitting Bulgaria along the ridge of Stara Planina. The agreement for this division was confirmed by the May 25<sup>th</sup> agreement between Great Britain and Austria Hungary. At the same time, Russia’s representatives of the government and the emperor were showered with gratitude received from the thousands of signed messages sent to them by the Bulgarian people from Dobrudzha, from Moesia, from Thrace and from Macedonia, pleading with them not to have their “united nation” torn apart.

In accordance with the decisions made by the Congress of Berlin (June, 1878 (see map 9), San Stefano Bulgaria was divided into five parts:

- 1) The Principality of Bulgaria - The free Bulgarian state with the territory of Timok to the Black Sea and the Sofia Sandzhak;
- 2) Eastern Rumelia - an autonomous area under the direct political rule of the Sultan;
- 3) Macedonia and Thrace regions were returned to the Ottoman Empire;
- 4) The Bulgarian Pomoravie with the cities Nish, Pirot, Leskovats and Vranie were handed to Serbia.
- 5) Northern Dobrudzha was given to Romania.

The Bulgarian people found it impossible to come to terms with the unjust decisions of the Berlin Congress and continued down the road with their struggle for full liberation and unification of their torn up homeland.

The establishment of the whole “San Stefano Bulgaria” as part of the great national ideal of the Bulgarian nation - “for a united and indivisible Bulgaria” became the national oath.

In 1878-1879, in the Principality of Bulgaria, with help from the Russian government, the basic institutions of the Bulgarian state were built.

The Grand National Constituent Assembly adopted the Turnovo Constitution, considered one of the most democratic constitutions in Europe.

On June 17, 1879, on the recommendation of the Russian Emperor, Prince Alexander I (1879-1886) was installed as head of the Principality.

Immediately after the publication of the Berlin Congress decision, the “Unity” committee began to organize in the three unlinked parts of our homeland.

On October 5, 1878, the Kresna-Razlog Uprising began demonstrating against the decisions of the Berlin Congress. The failure of the rebellion did not curb the faith of the Bulgarians in the ideal of national unity. The “Merger” committee began its establishment in Eastern Rumelia.

On September 6, 1885, led by the “compound” committee with Zahari Stoyanov at its head, the people shouted “Down with Rumelia! Long live the union!”

Based on Petko Karavelov’s government decision, young prince Alexander I confirmed the unification of the motherland under his scepter (see map 9). And as such, the Great Powers were placed before a fait accompli. The blow against the Berlin Treaty, however, brought painful echoes in St. Petersburg, where they did not want to

cooperate with Alexander I in his attempts to conduct an independent policy. The Russian officers were ordered to immediately leave Bulgaria. Thus, the Bulgarian army remained without high ranking military commanders.

While Bulgarian soldiers were preparing defenses at the borders with the Ottoman Empire, on November 2, 1885, Serbian King Milan declared war on Bulgaria, in order to carve out new Bulgarian territories. He was asked directly by Austria-Hungary to do this, with silent consent from Russia.

And as such the Serbo-Bulgarian war began. At that time, the entire Bulgarian army was sent to the southeastern border, to preempt any possible Turkish intervention. The Bulgarian people became like one when it came to protecting their homeland. Our young troops, led by captains, amazed the world with their feats in battle. The Bulgarian army inflicted serious blows and broke the Serbian attackers at Slivitsa, Dragoman, Tri Ushi, Tsaribrod, Vidin and Pirot. The road to Nish was opened, when, on behalf of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, an ultimatum was issued to immediately stop all military actions. A peace agreement was signed on February 19, 1886 in Bucharest, under the supervision of the Great Powers, which contains only a single demand - establish peace without changing the borders and without any kind of financial compensation. Ironically, with the defeat of the Serbian army, also defeated was our first attempt at Bulgarian national unification. This, however, gave the Bulgarian nation the moral foundation to cry out the national motto - "Unity creates power".

After the Serbo-Bulgarian War, tumultuous political events began to unfold in Bulgaria. Russia organized the dethroning of Prince Alexander I. The Bulgarian nation was divided into "Russophiles" and "Russophobes". During those vital days, the head of the Bulgarian state was Stefan Stambolov. Bulgaria's desire to lead an internal and independent foreign policy depended on the deteriorating relations with Russia.

The Grand National Assembly elected Prince Ferdinand I of Bulgaria without Russian consent. This further aggravated relations between Bulgaria and Russia.

For seven tumultuous years (1887-1894) the Stambulov Administration struggled uncompromisingly against all those who were willing to let foreign interference lead to limitations in Bulgaria's national sovereignty and independence.

During his administration, Stambulov enacted legislation that protected private property and products built by the Bulgarian industry, which recorded significant progress. Our rural economy was improved. Trade blossomed as it spread to export markets. Foreign loans were used to build railroads and armaments. Bulgaria was gradually transformed into a European country with European capital. Gymnasiums and hospitals were popping up near barracks and factories, creating a new image for Bulgaria. In Plovdiv, in 1892, the first agro-industrial exhibition was opened.

In these difficult times for the Bulgarian nation, the fate of the Bulgarians from Thrace and Macedonia remained in the background.

Yesterday's national-revolutionary, Stefan Stambolov, thought that the freedom of our Bulgarian lands should not be gotten by weapons alone, but by spiritual enlightenment and unification. He assessed that the Bulgarian Exarchate played a huge role in preserving the Bulgarian national awareness in Macedonia and in Thrace, with a means that everyone supported. With his savvy and ability, Stambolov harvested a means from the Sultan to appoint bishops in Macedonia and Thrace.

The Bulgarian Exarchate took root in Macedonia with seven dioceses, led by bishops in - Ohrid, Bitola, Skopje, Debar, Veles, Strumica and Nevrokop and seven deputies in - Kostur, Lerin, Voden, Solun, Polenie (Kukush), Seres and Melnik region, and two in Aegean Thrace - Drama and Odrin, with over 1,300 priests, 1,600 churches and 73 monasteries. The Bulgarian state, like a sister, helped the great work of the Bulgarian Exarchate. In Macedonia and Odrin Thrace there were 1373 Bulgarian schools opened, of which - 13 were high schools in Solun, Skopje, Bitola, Ser, Lozengrad and Odrin, with 2266 teachers and 78,854 students in total.

The Bulgarian Exarchate played an extremely important role in the historical, cultural and national development of the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Thrace. It supported the unity of the Bulgarian people.

Along with its educational and cultural activities, the Exarchate also gave birth to the national-liberation movement in Macedonia and Odrin.

Created on October 23, 1893 in Solun was the Bulgarian Macedonian-Odrin Revolutionary Committees (BMORK) by Damian Gruev, Petar Poparsov, Ivan Hadzhinikolov, Dr. Hristo Tatarchev and other activists. The creators of this organization fought to attain full political autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace, as a stage towards unification with Bulgaria. Later came the head of the organization Gotse Delchev, who built a comprehensive network of revolutionary committees throughout Macedonia and Odrin Thrace. Created in Sofia, in 1895, was the Supreme Macedonian-Odrin Committee (VMOK), with Traiko Kitanchev at its head. This was an organization of the refugees from Macedonia and Odrin Thrace, with the same goals and objectives. In 1902 BMORK was renamed to Secret Macedonian-Odrin organization (TMORO), and in 1905 it was renamed to the Internal Macedonian-Revolutionary Organization (VMORO).

On August 2 (Ilinden), on August 19 (Transfiguration) and on September 14 (Holy Cross in Sersko), 1903, VMORO in Macedonia and in Odrin Thrace began the Ilinden Uprising. The uprising was an expression of the impasse of the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Thrace, and their determination to give their lives for freedom. The European Great Powers remained silent, for lack of unity on the issue of Macedonian autonomy within the Berlin Treaty (Article 23).

Bulgaria was not able to directly help the uprising, due to reactions from all the neighbouring countries.

The smothered uprising encouraged about 50,000 abused Bulgarians from Macedonia and Thrace to seek refuge in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria's independence from the Ottoman Empire was announced on September 22, 1908. This was one of the most important political acts in the history of our nation taken by Alexander Malinov's government. Our country became a Kingdom, acquired legal equality in international relations and rejected its inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, a regime which capitulated to the Great Powers. In its 30-year-old free life, the Third Bulgarian state showed marked economic growth, built a network of railways, roads and ports and played a foundation for Bulgarian industry. Although Bulgaria was a rural-commercial country, it managed to achieve substantial economic and financial success. It created conditions for seeking political and military solutions to the realization of its national ideal - a united San Stefano Bulgaria.

Bulgaria could not engage in war alone, without allies, not only because of the significant resources available to the Ottoman Empire, but also because of the expected interference from the other Balkan states working against it. They would never allow Bulgaria alone to go after the Ottoman heritage in Europe.

Serbia set the conditions for respecting the principles for autonomy and for delineating spheres of influence in Macedonia. Any resulting difficulties were overcome by mediation from Petersburg, which aspired to build a Balkan alliance to defend against Germany and Austro-Hungary penetrating the region towards the flows and to the Middle East. With the agreement signed on February 29, 1912, the Serbian government recognized most of Macedonia as "indisputable Bulgarian" territory with Skopje Region labeled "disputed area", which needed to be declared by the high arbiter, Emperor Nicholas II.

Due to the dispute as to who was going to acquire Solun, an agreement between Bulgaria and Greece was signed on the May 1, 1912, but a dividing line was never determined.

This unfortunately gave Greece an advantage, later putting it ahead of Bulgaria. When Bulgaria was busy fighting in Thrace, Greece reached out for Macedonia. With Montenegro joining the Balkan war, full of contradictions and characters of temporary coalition, the alliance ended.

King Ferdinand I and Ivan Geshov's government's political shortsightedness had no foresight to assess the long-term tragic consequences for Bulgaria resulting from the Balkan Pact. Only the Bulgarian Exarchate, headed by Exarch Joseph I, condemned this act with his prophetic words addressed to King Ferdinand I - "For thirty years I have been digging a well with a needle in Thrace and Macedonia and you buried it with a single stroke!"

Launching of the First Balkan War (1912-1913). The Bulgarian nation welcomed the news of the war with gusto and patriotic enthusiasm. They believed that it would unite the tattered homeland and so the entire nation mobilized. People from the Macedonian-Odrin resistance movement joined the Bulgarian army during the first days of the war. This included VMRO Macedonian and Odrin resistance bands consisting of about 70,000 people.

The Bulgarian army bore the full weight of the war on its shoulders. For four weeks the Turkish army was defeated in the battles in Lozengrad, Ljuleburgaz, Bulair and especially in Edirne. A million and a half "brothers outside of Rila and Rhodope", in Macedonia and Thrace, were freed. The Bulgarian soldier who fought in these battles gloriously carried the battle flag and proved to the world that he was worthy of defending his family and homeland.

While the Bulgarian army was at war at the East Thracian military theater, the Allies occupied much of Macedonia. Breaching their agreement with Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece announced that the territorial division in Macedonia would not be based on ethnicity, but on the actual occupation of the territories. This was the main reason that sparked the disputes between the allies.

For the Bulgarians in Macedonia, their freedom ended in Vardar and Bregalnitsa by the abandonment of the contractual obligations on the part of the Serbian and Greek governments. On May 19, 1913, Greece and Serbia concluded their anti-Bulgarian alliance which was based on the ancient law of belligerence to stop "where the feet of soldiers stepped" and thus the Balkan alliance was destroyed from the inside. In his capacity as arbitrator, Nicholas II invited the four ministers to Petersburg to brief them on the necessity for

concessions in the disputed zone. Dissatisfied from the swallowing of “only” Silistra, Romania joined the anti-Bulgarian coalition. The Porte waited impatiently on the horizon to get involved in the new war to, at least, regain some of its lost territory. Bulgaria’s neighbours did not want to allow an educated and strong well-established state in the heart of the Balkans through natural national unification.

Subjected to a general suppression, the Bulgarian population in Macedonia sent urgent pleas for its protection. The unbroken “advantage” of the treacherous allies, according to their main command, was that they needed to obtain instructed resistance. And thus King Ferdinand, through his aide General Mihail Savov, issued the command “respond by all means possible”. (Confirmed by the Parliamentary Select Committee during the 17<sup>th</sup> regular National Assembly.) And thus on the night of June 17, 1913, Bulgarian forces attacked the opposing positions in Macedonia.

The long awaited occasion for war was shifted to Serbia and Greece.

Romania executed a mobilization and belligerently attacked the Bulgarian Army from behind. Turkish divisions pushed their way into Eastern Thrace and left it in disgrace, sowing death and destruction everywhere. Bulgaria was left alone to fight against the front lines of five countries. The Great Powers did not interfere, keeping themselves out in order to avoid a major war. The peace negotiations in Bucharest supported the right of strength.

The peace agreements that followed in Bucharest (July 28, 1913) and in Istanbul (September 16, 1913) gave Bulgaria only one ninth of Macedonia, also took away Southern Dobrudzha and Eastern Thrace, but preserved the exit to the Mediterranean Sea through Western Thrace (see map 10).

The Second Balkan (Inter-Allied) War, ended with a national disaster. Over 250,000 refugees from Macedonia and Odrin Thrace were expelled from their homes to Bulgaria.

World War I broke out in the summer of 1914 which strongly raised the political and military cost in Bulgaria. Bulgaria occupied a



pivotal position in the peninsula, had a strong and well-trained army and could act firmly against its neighbours.

Compromising diplomacy, particularly that of Russia, made a sustained effort to attract Bulgaria as an ally. It was proposed that it immediately take Eastern Thrace with the conditional promise that it could have the majority of the “indisputable zone” in Macedonia. King Ferdinand and the Bulgarian government, however, were convinced that Serbia and Greece, who had drastically expanded territorially in Macedonia, would not cede an inch of that land. The Serbian and Greek position was confirmed by the numerous declarations made in Belgrade and Athens.

Germany and Austria-Hungary, who were already at war with Serbia, showed greater generosity by unconditionally offering Macedonia, Pomoravie and Timok to Bulgaria. The Russian exit from the Carpathians and Visla in 1915, the collapse of the Dardanelles operation and the pacification of the Western Front put an end to the fluctuations in the political factors in Sofia.

On August 24, 1915, Dr. Vasil Radoslavov’s government signed an alliance agreement between Bulgaria and Germany. This subscribed secret agreement guaranteed Bulgaria’s acquisition of the disputed zone and undisputed Macedonian, Pomoravi and Timok territories. If Romania acted against the Central Powers, Bulgaria would get back the San Stefano Southern Dobrudzha frontier. And if Greece did the same, Bulgaria would get Southeastern Macedonia. An agreement was also reached between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire regarding the transition of the lower course of the Maritsa, with the railway line Odrin-Dedeagach falling under Bulgarian control. (See map no. 11).

The Bulgarian army, included in which were approximately 150,000 Bulgarians from Macedonia (the celebrated 11<sup>th</sup> Macedonian division), as well as units from the 34,000 Bulgarians who had deserted from the Serbian army and 19,000 who had deserted from the Greek army, showed unheard of feats of bravery in battle for Pomoravie, Macedonia and Dobrudzha.

The Great War was lost. Bulgaria was again drawn into the fall of national ruins. A military rebellion began to take shape.

On August 27, 1918, in Radomir, the agricultural activist Raiko Daskalov declared Bulgaria a republic. The rebellion was crushed.

King Ferdinand was forced to abdicate. During his 25 years he had contributed much to the successful development of the Bulgarian state. However, in the last six years, with his direct participation, Bulgaria was embroiled in three wars which led to two national disasters, which negatively reflected on his reign.

The throne was passed on to King Boris III (1918-1943). The entire national heritage was placed in his hands - the economic and social state of a ruined and divided society.

On November 27, 1919, Minister Alexander Stamboliski signed the Nice Peace Treaty (see map No. 12).

Under this Agreement:

- Serbia again received Vardar Macedonia and managed to win a strategic frontier in relation to Bulgaria. It further took Strumitsa, Bosilgrad, Tsaribrod and part of Kulsko-old Bulgarian regions;
- Greece, in addition to receiving Aegean Macedonia, also took Bulgaria's exit to the Mediterranean Sea, between the rivers Maritsa and Mesta;
- Romania- kept Southern Dobrudzha.

This led to a new wave of about 200,000 refugees from Macedonia, Thrace, Dobruzha and Pomoravie to flee to Bulgaria.

Heavy reparations were also imposed on Bulgaria. The mounting casualties and the failure to nationally unify the various Bulgarian people and territories weighed heavily on the souls of many Bulgarians who were now convinced that their opportunities for a militarily realization were remote.

In 1920, during a difficult post-war crisis, the Agricultural Alliance Party headed by Alexander Stamboliski came to power.

A series of reforms were implemented, but the Agricultural Alliance government caused serious tensions, discord and strife in society. This was reflected in the social discrediting of the bureaucracy, of entrepreneurship, of the activists of the national-liberation movement in Macedonia, Thrace, and Dobrudzha and especially in the officer ranks, which held prestige in society. The reason for this circumstance was the relinquishment of the BZNS leadership from the Bulgarian ideal for national unity and its distancing from the wars that were led for its realization. Regarding foreign policy, Stamboliski implemented a line of rapprochement with Serbia, to a large degree, at the cost of Bulgarian national interests.

On June 9, 1923 the Military Alliance executed a coup and put Professor Alexander Tsankov's government in power. The leadership of the Agricultural Alliance left for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, where some of them made themselves available to the Yugoslav and Greek governments.

A special place in our most recent history must be given to the Comintern and the interference it played in the political life of our country. Its main goal was to succeed in implementing Lenin and Trotsky's "doctrine of a world proletarian revolution". The Comintern converted all communist parties worldwide into satellite sections. Under the guise of these legal communist parties, it organized sabotage and terrorist actions in almost all European countries. Our country was one of the countries subject to such action.

According to a Comintern decision, V. Kolarov and G. Dimitrov were sent to Bulgaria to work against the will of BCP President Dimitar Blagoev and to prepare conditions for an armed uprising here in Bulgaria. How could the impoverished nation, frightened by the long and exhausting war, which it was neither armed nor ready for, be pushed into anti-government turmoil - and then be quickly and fiercely suppressed. In 1924 this gave the administration reason to enact the "Law for the protection of the state", which put a stop to all activities of terrorism and to conspiring parties and organizations.

On April 16, 1925 with a decision from the Central Committee, the BCP military organization conducted assassinations in the Sveta Nedela (Holy Sunday) Cathedral. It killed 147 and wounded 500 people, among them were many personalities from the Bulgarian political elite. It became an occasion for the mass execution of political figures and for causing a state of civil war in the much divided society.

Having learned its lessons from past national disasters, Bulgaria turned to peaceful attempts to calm the difficult and unfair revised solutions of Nice. The national program was divided into minimum and maximum, adjusted for moderation and gradation.

The “Peaceful review” required compliance with the development of international relations and finding cracks in the contradictions between the Great Powers. The struggle to garner Southern Dobrudza and an exit to the Mediterranean Sea had temporarily displaced the Macedonian issue as the main subject of foreign policy efforts.

At that time, the process of genocide and assimilation of the Bulgarian population in the Macedonian and Thracian territory occupied by Serbia and Greece was ongoing. The Bulgarian intelligentsia was persecuted en masse - priests, teachers and prominent figures. The people were extremely vulnerable to national and economic oppression. This raised the need for the restoration of VMRO and its armed and cultural-educational struggle against the new oppressors with demands for political autonomy and freedom for Macedonia. This struggle went through two periods - from 1918-1924, led by Todor Aleksandrov and from 1925-1941, led by Ivan (Vancho) Mihailov.

During this period, the Comintern made an exceptional effort to subdue the Bulgarian national liberation movement in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia under its class ideology. Its aims were to transform the IMRO into “a fist of the proletarian revolution in the Balkans”. To achieve this, the Comintern created its satellite organization the VMRO-United which worked against the VMRO. It used a number of communists from Macedonia and some leftist

farmers to create the VMRO-United as a United Federal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (or Federalists). By their actions, regardless of their ideological basis, these organizations at this time were serving Serbian and Greek interests in Macedonia. The Comintern attempted to infiltrate and take over VMRO through its agents, causing a sharp conflict which ended with a series of murders. They took place between VMRO activists led by Todor Aleksandrov and Ivan Mikhailov on the one hand and those led by the Comintern in Bulgaria, Vardar and Aegean Macedonia on the other. That is why the like-minded activists under Ivan Mikhailov's leadership were fiercely persecuted after September 9, 1944.

At the same time Serbia and Greece, in their own struggle against VMRO, managed to subdue with intimidation, some of the degraded activists of the organization - mainly Federalists, turning them into counter-revolutionaries in Macedonia. They left a bloody trail in a series of towns and villages in Macedonia.

VMRO attempts to save the organization from the Serbian and Greek Comintern agents, led to a fratricidal war, which remains misunderstood by a large part of Bulgarian society to this day.

Through its overall activity in that period, VMRO managed to keep the Bulgarian national awareness awake and the idea of freeing the population of Macedonia and Aegean Thrace alive. Over two decades it managed to keep the national question open to the world and, in the most dignified way, the Bulgarian national cause protected. Its contributions were not small, particularly those to the western provinces, Dobrudzha and Thrace which were left outside the homeland.

Robbed territorially and materially by its neighbours, and disarmed and left without an army, Bulgaria was exhausted.

Part of the Bulgarian intelligentsia devoted itself to the national half-heartedness and exit to the national nihilistic positions. This period coincided with the October Revolution in Russia and the revolutionizing of a significant part of the population in Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria, dissatisfied with the aftermath of the World War.

In this difficult period for Bulgaria, Prime Minister Andrei Liapchev (1926-1931) pledged that in this free state there was a need to preserve “the core of the Bulgarian nation”, because, “for as long as there was a Bulgaria, there would be hope for the enslaved Bulgarians”. It is more important to preserve what remains than to risk it for “almost nothing”.

Foreign policy was to rely on imposed moderation and on a weakened regular army in order to achieve the national ideals.

Bulgaria persistently said “no” to joining the Balkan Pact, signed on February 9, 1934, because it did not recognize the imposed post-war status quo.

Failure of the Serbian authorities to assimilate the Bulgarian population in Vardar Macedonia for thirty years necessitated a change in their tactics. And thus the doctrine of “Macedonian-ism” was put into action, concocted by the Serbian politician and scholar Stoian Novakovich in 1888. It consisted of 6 core theses:

1. Formally claiming that the Macedonian Slavs are neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but a separate nation - Macedonians;
2. The Macedonian dialect to continuously distance itself from the Bulgarian literary language;
3. The Serbian language to increasingly enter the Macedonian language;
4. To use the Serbian alphabet;
5. To blaspheme the work of the Bulgarian Exarchate as denationalization in Macedonia;
6. To continuously repeat that Macedonians have nothing in common with Bulgarians.

After the Comintern’s decision in 1934 to establish a “Macedonian nation”, the Bulgarian population in Vardar Macedonia was

subjected to an intense process of Macedonian-isation. At that time, the BCP steered us here along the line of creating a “Dobrudzhan”, “Macedonian” and “Thracian” nations.

On May 19, 1934, the Military Alliance once again began to interfere in the political life of the country torn apart by inter-party rivalry and by brutal interference from foreign powers in its internal affairs. The political scene was joined by the “Zveno” political circle led by Kimon Georgiev. (The leaders of this takeover (Kimon Georgiev and Damian Velchev) were later used by Moscow to carry out the September 9, 1944 coup, to establish the “Otechestveno frontovska” government under the leadership of the CPB.)

Along with the changes made to the Turnovo Constitution and along with the banning of political parties, a severe blow was also dealt to the national-liberation movements in Macedonia, the western provinces, Dobrudzha and Thrace, with the banning of their organizations including VMRO. With this anti-national procedure, the government actively served Yugoslav, Greek and Romanian interests.

This imposed military dictatorship paved the way for the authoritarian management of King Boris III for the rest of his life.

Fascism never came to power in Bulgaria. Only a small number of Fascist type organizations were created in this country which, among other things, opposed the government until September 9, 1944.

Bulgaria was pressed by the iron ring of its neighbours. For a decade the Bulgarian people gathered their strength to heal from the wounds of war, from which every family in the entire country suffered. It was not until the late thirties that the process of economic recovery began and reached its peak in 1939.

On September 7, 1940, based on the perfectly executed diplomatic actions of King Boris III and his government, headed by Professor Bogdan Filov, the Krajovskata Agreement was signed by which Southern Dobrudzha was returned to Bulgaria. (See map No. 13.)

With the signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, the totalitarian forces divided their spheres of influence and belligerence in new territories worldwide. As a result of this, the field for Bulgarian manoeuvring started to decline frighteningly. Tsar Boris refused to join Bulgaria to the newly established Pact, rejecting Mussolini's proposal to participate in waging war against Greece and would not accept the Soviet proposal for a pact of mutual assistance.

Bulgarian diplomacy was investing tireless efforts to preserve Bulgarian neutrality but soon it too went up in flames when the world caught fire. Hitler was determined to help Allied Italy, at all costs, which had suffered a humiliating defeat. That is why he issued the directive for the 12<sup>th</sup> Army to cross through Bulgarian territory.

In the beginning of 1941 Bulgaria's choices were narrowed to an alliance with Germany, which assumed a national unification or Hitler would break through and occupy Bulgaria. The necessity to preserve the state and the people from the horrors of war was overcome when, on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact.

King Boris III and Professor Bogdan Filov's government accepted the "formula" for achieving our national ideal - a "United Bulgaria", despite the uncertainty of the future. Bulgaria was united without a single soldier in the Bulgarian army shedding blood on the battlefield. (See map 14.)

Even if it was for a short time, Bulgaria had achieved its ideal - a "united and indivisible homeland".

Before the Bulgarian army entered Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, an exceptional political act took place.

The Bulgarian population in all towns in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia established "Action Committees". These committees represented the unofficial organ of the Bulgarian government and emerged as a demonstration of Bulgarian national self-



determination. They remained functional and later established the institutions for the Bulgarian state administration.

Our military was greeted as a liberator - with flowers, garlands in hand, in the newly liberated territories. It was only natural, because over two decades (1918-1941) the Bulgarians in Macedonia had led a struggle for liberation and unification. The fifth Bulgarian army, in which 70% of the officers and 50% of the soldiers were born in Macedonia, was relocated to Macedonia. They are now returned to their places of birth, their parents, brothers and sisters.

With the establishment of official Bulgarian rule in Macedonia, the Bulgarian state took over, according to proportions, a huge initiative to build schools, hospitals, churches, roads, bridges. It made urban plans for all the cities in Macedonia. It started to build rail lines to connect Macedonia to Bulgaria. It opened the University in Skopje. For the overall three years of freedom, Bulgaria invested in excess of 30% of its national budget in Macedonia alone. All this shows how the Bulgarian government behaved towards the oppressed and newly liberated iconic countries, Macedonia and Thrace, inhabited by Bulgarians.

After June 22, 1941, after the Comintern directive, the BCP organized a partisan movement in Bulgaria. It was directly linked and managed by Moscow, unlike other liberation movements in Europe. From here the movement looked more like “revolutionary - communist”. Its acts of sabotage and terrorist measures caused a sharp reaction from the government. A gendarmerie was formed which began anti-partisan and anti-terrorist actions. Several concentration camps were opened which, not only detained activists but also supporters of the BCP.

The Partisan movement showed no serious counteractions in the government’s internal or foreign policies.

Bulgaria was forced by the Tripartite Pact to declare war on England and the United States. This decision had fatal consequences for the country. Besides that, Germany would convince King Boris to send our troops to the Eastern front to fight against the Soviet Union.

In 1941, Bulgaria, under pressure from the German government, adopted the “Law for the Protection of the Nation”. Based on this law, the Bulgarian Jews were deprived of their civil, political and economic rights. Germany’s attempt to impose their extradition from Bulgaria, however, encountered a sharp reaction from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The Church opposed the extradition and destruction of the Jews. This democratic and humanist act protected the Jewish citizens of Bulgaria. Unfortunately, the Bulgarian authorities were unable to protect the Jews in the newly liberated countries because of the pressure put on by Hitler for his final solution to the Jewish question. A lot of these Bulgarian territories outside of Bulgaria, at that time, were not completely under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian state.

Abandon the national ideal and replace it with the ideology of “Building Socialism”

In 1944, after its successful Iash-Kishinev operation, the Red Army entered the Balkan military operating theater and moved towards Bulgaria’s borders. On account of the existing diplomatic relations between the two countries, on September 5, 1944 the USSR declared war on Bulgaria and on September 8, 1944 the Red Army invaded through Dobrudzha and occupied the country.

On September 9, 1944 a military coup was enacted by a group of officers connected with the “Zveno” political party circles, with “decisive support” from the Red Army. Konstantine Muriev’s government, composed of representatives from the democratic oppositional forces, was deposed and power was passed on to the Otechestven Front government headed by Kimon Georgiev, which in fact was run by the Communist Party.

Bulgaria declared war on Germany. The Bulgarian army participated in the last stage of World War II and saw action in the Balkans (freeing Pomoravie, Nish, Vardar Macedonia and much of Aegean Macedonia) and Hungary. During these battles against the German army, Bulgaria provided more than 32,000 soldiers who were killed, wounded and missing without a trace. However, after the Second World War Bulgaria was not recognized, including by the USSR, as a warring country of the grand coalition. Bulgaria, once again, was

placed on the bench with the vanquished. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference, representatives from the Bulgarian Otechestven Front government, headed by Vasil Kolarov, did not feel we were worthy to protect our national interests. Bulgaria managed to save Southern Dobrudzha but lost Pomoravie, Macedonia and Aegean Thrace. With that, our national ideal was dealt a hard blow. Bulgaria was again in a state of national disaster.

After the mass killings that took place without trials and without convictions (as those of 1923-1925), for the supporters of the former political regimes in Bulgaria and for the VMRO activists, meaning those who were responsible for this national disaster, a “People’s Court” was established. Those responsible for the catastrophe along with those who participated in the persecution of partisans were labeled “fascist” Bulgarian politicians. This also included many of the cultural activists. They were accused of “Greater-Bulgarian chauvinism” and of cooperating with their ally Nazi Germany during World War II. They were sentenced to long periods of imprisonment and many were sentenced to death.

With the Soviet military present in Bulgaria, the ruling BCP pressured leading Bulgarians to abandon their national ideal, which then was called “Bulgarian chauvinism”. The national question became subordinate to the class struggle and was sacrificed in the name of the “socialist revolution”.

The Yalta conference of the “Big Three” (February, 1945) decided the division of Europe, putting Bulgaria under the “Soviet Zone” of influence. This decision basically determined Bulgaria’s political fate for the next 45 years.

In circumstances of political violence in the presence of parts of the Red Army, a referendum was held on September 8, 1946 by which Bulgaria was declared a Republic.

Georgi Dimitrov’s government established the “people’s democracy” regime, a variant of the “proletarian dictatorship”.

Political parties and organizations were banned. New concentration camps were opened where thousands of detained Bulgarian citizens,

mostly intellectuals whose opinions conflicted with those of the BCP, were interned.

The whole nation was exposed to total dictatorship. The worst blow was against the Bulgarian intelligentsia and the loss of property by the entire population. There was also the nationalization of industry, expropriation of city property and forced collectivization of land.

The Bulgarian people were deprived of their basic human rights - the inviolability of the person, freedom of speech, the right to information and the right to travel in the world.

Our state was converted into a satellite of the USSR, with limited sovereignty and national independence.

In 1945 the People's Republic of Macedonia was created on the territory of Vardar Macedonia, within the Yugoslav federation. It was created in accordance with the famous Comintern decision of 1934, to establish a "Macedonian nation" and in accordance with Stoian Novakovich's "Macedonian-ism" doctrine mentioned earlier.

The Republic was built on an anti-Bulgarian basis. The creation of a "Macedonian language" with a Serbian alphabet was imposed by Belgrade. The Serbian alphabet was alien to the morphology of the language of the Macedonian Bulgarians. Its aims were to move them away from their Bulgarian linguistic form.

The process was designed to rob and forge the parts of the Bulgarian National History which refer to the geographical area of Macedonia. Along with it came the planning process which aimed to denationalize the Bulgarian people in Macedonia. As a result of this 23,000 people were killed and about 140,000 were sent to concentration camps, only because they did not give up their Bulgarian consciousness.

At the same time the same processes were developed and applied in Aegean Macedonia; assimilation and terror against the Bulgarian population living in Greece. We are talking about the Bulgarian people in Macedonia who the Greeks called "Bulgarian-speaking Hellenes" or "Vulgarofoni", and later "Slavo-phone Hellenes". This

population was deliberately drawn into the Greek Civil War by the Greek Communist Party, which made promises that, after it won the war, it would guarantee the people their Bulgarian national rights. The balance was tragic. Thousands of Bulgarians were killed; over 60,000 were exiled from their homeland and turned into permanent immigrants worldwide.

A large number of them joined the Macedonian Patriotic Organization in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe where they continued their struggle for the realization of the Bulgarian national ideal - national liberation and reunification with the motherland. A large part was displaced throughout the socialist countries, mostly in the USSR.

In order to achieve Tito and Stalin's desired solution for Vardar Macedonia, in August 1946, during the BCP Central Committee Tenth Plenum, under Georgi Dimitrov's leadership, a monstrous anti-national solution was adopted - to create a "Macedonian nation" in the Pirin region. Not a party and not a government in the history of the world would allow their own people to give up their nationality. While attempting for force this solution on the people, thousands of patriotic Bulgarians in Pirin Macedonia were tortured and interned, others disappeared without a trace.

Many preferred death over renouncing their Bulgarian name.

Throughout its 45 years of totalitarian rule, the BCP often led inconsistent, contradictory and voluntary-istic policies regarding the Bulgarian national question. Nationalism was seen as an expression of chauvinism and fascism, and national-nihilism as evidence of the high communist consciousness and internationalism.

In 1937 the cultural, educational and humanitarian organization "Rodina" was created by a number of Bulgarian-Muslims who, in a short time, managed to restore the Bulgarian national identity of some 90,000 souls who accepted Christianity. Shortly after September 9, 1944, "Rodina" activists in the Rhodopes Region were declared fascists and repressed. Almost all Bulgarian-Muslims who had returned to the Bulgarian nation were forcefully sent back to the

wing of Islam. With this act a new denationalization campaign was initiated with aims at denationalizing these Bulgarians.

The Turkish population in Bulgaria has been given special privileges. Dozens of Turkish public and high schools have been opened and teach in the Turkish language. A newly created Turkish intelligentsia has begun to manifest interest in Turkish nationalism, which has created problems for the socialist rule.

In 1956 Todor Zhivkov, head of the Bulgarian government, for a brief time turned the totalitarian regime in our country into an authoritarian regime.

Industrialization of the country and mechanization of agriculture continued during this period. A significant industry was created compared to the size of the country. The entire Bulgarian economy was tied to the USSR and to SEV members.

Free education was introduced and an atmosphere of social security was created. A row of high schools and cultural institutions were opened. Art and cultural activities were subordinated to party ideology - "socialist realism".

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church was deprived of the opportunity to perform its religious work and was converted into a "decorative institution". Everything possible was done, through "atheism", to remove it from the Bulgarian spiritual space.

"Regimentation" was imposed in order to manage the highly centralized economic system and as a result the standard of living remains low. It especially worked against the intellectual society but in favour of the unskilled "working class". The price, paid by the entire nation for building a "material-technical base of socialism" was very high. It contributed to the low standard of living during the entire totalitarian period.

In the course of over 45 years, the national ideal was replaced with "proletarian internationalism", "socialist patriotism" and other communist ideologies. For the sake of the supreme ideal called "building communism".

After 1961, the BCP began a new policy regarding the national question. The Turkish schools were closed and so was the process of the national reawakening of the Muslim Bulgarians and some of the Gypsies. Then in the 1980's this same process, under the name "revival", was spread around and embraced the Turks, Tatars and Gypsies.

Here is a good place to mention that not only during the governing of the BCP, but in the entire 120-year-old new Bulgarian history, the Bulgarian-Muslims have been Christianized (baptized) more than three times. These shameful pages of our new history are mostly the fruits of petty, party accounts and the absence of a clear and consistent policy on the part of our statesmen regarding the Bulgarian national issue.

Bulgaria, throughout the entire totalitarian period, did not lead its own sovereign and independent foreign policy. The "Brezhnev" doctrine of "limited sovereignty" was forcing us to constantly adjust every foreign policy issue in accordance with Moscow. This also applied to the Macedonian question which was very painful for the Bulgarian nation. The tides and manner in the political relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia determined the mood of Bulgarian politicians in terms of Vardar and Aegean Macedonia respectively, with respect to Yugoslavia and Greece.

There was much reluctance and lack of interest on the part of the administration during the time of the totalitarian regime which uniquely affected the fate of the Bulgarians living outside of Bulgaria. Only in the 1970's did the BCP begin to revise its policy on the "Macedonian Question", but on the principle of a double standard. On the one hand, allowing the Bulgarian scientists-historians to work on the problems of the Macedonian Question in order to protect the "historic truth" and on the other in its foreign policy, the BCP implemented a line to recognize the "Macedonian language" and the "Macedonian nation". (See - Decision no. 333 from June 22, 1971 of the BCP Plenum.)

With the approaching of the 1300<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian state, the ban on the complete exploration of the

Bulgarian national Question was lifted. It was realized that according to its measures, its penetration would have a significant effect on the Bulgarian national history and culture, especially in the world. This was greeted by foreigners with surprise and admiration, who had rediscovered the spiritual genius of one of the earliest European peoples.

The Bulgarian state's 1300th anniversary celebration was a highly energetic and brave attempt to restore the national ideal of the spiritual unification of all Bulgarians in Macedonia and the world. During the time of crisis in the communist system, which began in the early 1980s ("Solidarity" in Poland, dissidents in the USSR), this attempt was stopped due to heavy pressure from the KPSS, in the name of "socialist internationalism".

After 1985 an economic slowdown began to occur in Bulgaria, a prelude to the great economic crisis that started in the late 1980s.

Bulgaria in the post-totalitarian period

A political coup took place on November 10, 1989, which put an end to totalitarian rule in Bulgaria.

From the totalitarian regime the Bulgarian state inherited a \$12 billion external debt, an inefficient economy, limited export opportunities which strongly limited our traditional markets after the collapse of SEB (CMEA). The country was faced with a severe economic crisis; there was high unemployment which caused more than 250,000 men, mostly young and highly educated Bulgarians, to emigrate. A process of national intellectual impoverishment was taking place in Bulgaria.

The transition from totalitarianism to democracy had begun. To free ourselves from the economic crisis, we pushed for implementing structural and financial reform but it was too late. It greatly exacerbated the economic and social situation in the country.

Bulgaria was experiencing a severe demographic crisis. It was due not only to the emigration of large masses of Bulgarian citizens but also to the low birth rate. The declining standard of living and lack



of sufficient funds constantly disrupted the normal functioning of our health care and educational and cultural institutions in the country.

In 1991 the Grand National Assembly adopted a new constitution, which provided for a planned breakdown of the totalitarian state structures and for laying the groundwork for a parliamentary republic.

In the transition to democracy the necessity for a Bulgarian national ideal was reborn. We began to speak, write and act openly, with much concern for the fate of the Bulgarians outside of Bulgaria.

Today Bulgaria has no national ideal or reference to the closest national tasks.

On November 10, 1989 the national question came down to mutual relations between ethnic communities in the country. Thus, it was again directed inwards. The effort on the part of institutions, parties and organizations carried the spirit of insurmountable ideological opposites. It further deepened our national disunity.

The question of recovery in free Bulgaria becomes paramount and the fate of our compatriots “outside of Bulgaria” again was moved to the background. Self-empowerment was renewed with vigour: “First save ourselves, then we will help our brothers outside of our border”. The economic appeal of the Bulgarian state was reduced to zero.

The national ideal was carried on and passed on from generation to generation. It was possible to make changes to it or to endure interruptions, but its acceptability had to be strengthened. We, Bulgarians, are one of those people who are afflicted with an unrealized ideal, which weighs on us even when we are not aware of it. Our belief in “being” is deeply tender. Our belief in the ability in “being” is deeply ingrained. These ideals were ingrained in us from the time when we were children, from our children’s books, in which the internationalists replaced Vardar with Iskar, without the consent of Dedo Vazov.

Because of that it would be more honest for us to start with ourselves first, and then get angry at the other counterfeiters.

And yet we have no choice but to hope that the national ideal is not buried, but is rooted in the Bulgarian people, because without it we would become a population living on a certain latitude. Even the name Bulgaria would turn into a geographical concept...

#### 4. BULGARIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS

National interests are a function of the national ideal. They represent a dynamic category that can be modeled with time. National interests can be directed to solving: 1) external state problems, and 2) internal state problems.

Depending on the scope of activity, national interests may be: Political; economic; cultural; demographic; geopolitical.

The national interests, from past to present, determine relations between states in one region, or on a more global scale - in the world. They stand at the base of the contradictions emerging between states, some of which lead to war.

It is an important indicator of the difficulties and responsibilities that arise in the determination of national interests.

Under the UN Charter, which came into force on October 24, 1945, all members of the organization are equal and the same, whether they have large or small populations or territories. However, in practice major developed countries publish their national interests and protect them by all possible means, often far from their national borders.

Since Bulgaria's liberation (1878) to the present, Bulgarian national interests were systematically dealt, but not in terms of their formulation or in terms of their achievement.

In the scientific elaboration and formulation of our national interests, it is necessary to take account of the history of the problem, its necessities at the moment and its effects on the nation to

get on with its achievements. It is necessary to pull out the moral lessons, not the successes and achievements, but mainly the accumulated negative experiences. The history of the Third Bulgarian state is rich with such inconvenient experiences. It includes those mistakes and sins that have violated the Bulgarian national cause. Many of these errors can now be attributed to political absurdities that, during certain historical moments, drove the Bulgarian state to national disaster.

Bulgaria's national interests should reflect the most essential and long-term needs of the nation, placed at the base of the internal and external policies of the country.

The Bulgarian National Doctrine is necessary to mark only the strategic national interests. Its detailed development should be subject to the "national programs".

In them there is need to present sufficient facts and allegations, which will be modeled and used by the government, depending on the needs and realities of the moment.

Strategic national interests can be structured as follows:

## 1. Inter-state plan.

- 1.1. Strengthening and establishing a one-nation Bulgarian state and turning the Bulgarian nation into a socio-cultural (political) nation;
- 1.2. Solving the demographic problem in Bulgaria;
- 1.3. Developing the human potential in Bulgaria;
- 1.4. Effective use and development of natural and economic resources of Bulgaria;
- 1.5. Ensuring the national sovereignty, independence and security of Bulgaria;

## 2. Foreign policy plan.

- 2.1. Bulgarian national interests resulting from Bulgaria's geo-strategic position;

2.1.1. The Balkans; 2.1.2. In Europe; 2.1.3. In the world; 2.2. Acquisition of Bulgaria as an equal member in the European political, economic and military structures.

(Remaining are a few pages in which Bulgarian national interests, in the field of demography, education, human resources, safety, social, etc., are highlighted).

## **BULGARIAN NATIONAL DOCTRINE. Part Two**

NATIONAL STRATEGIC PROGRAMS. Program № 1

### **PROTECTION AND SPIRITUAL UNIFICATION OF THE BULGARIANS IN THE WORLD**

(Note: the same - editor, publisher, city of publication, year - 2008)

#### **5.1. DETERMINING THE BULGARIAN ETHNIC TERRITORY AND ITS ETHNO-CULTURAL SPACE**

##### **5.1.1. The Bulgarian ethnic territory (land)**

The Bulgarian nation as a unique ethnic, linguistic, economic, cultural and spiritual community was established in its territory (map №1) during the XVIII-XIX centuries included in which were:

- Misia, including all Dobrudzha and the Danube plain;
- The Western Bulgarian territories: Timochko, Pomoravieto (Nish, Leskovats, Pirot, Vranje); the Western provinces (Bosilgrad, Tsaribrod, the regions west of Vidin, Kula and Trn, mentioned in international treaties);
- Thrace;
- Macedonia.

The boundaries of the Bulgarian ethnic territory were determined by:

√ The Sultan's Imperial firman of 1870 for the creation of an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church and an Exarchate, which determined its dioceses;

√ A plebiscite conducted in the dioceses in Macedonia - Skopje, Ohrid, Kukush and Solun Regions and, on its basis, their inclusion in the diocese of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 1872;

√ Decisions made by the Ecumenical Delegate Conference of the Great Powers and Turkey during the course of 1876;

√ The previous San Stefano Peace Treaty Agreement of 1878 signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire, without the participation of Bulgarian representatives;

√ From the conclusions of European travelers, church activists, diplomats, scholars and military figures who visited these Bulgarian lands during the XIX century. They concluded that the ethnic boundaries of the Bulgarian nation were Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia.

According to a census taken by the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarian nation on these territories, during the middle of the XIX century, stood at about four million souls. Before it was freed it had reached about five million souls.

### 5.1.2. Bulgarian ethno-cultural space

The Bulgarian ethno-cultural space covers the territories inhabited by Bulgarians. They created the language, religion, traditions, art and science that form the Bulgarian national value system. This system has contributed to the development of human civilization.

The territory of the Bulgaria ethno-cultural space can be split conditionally in two zones:

\* “The old ethno-cultural space” - the territory inhabited by the Volga-Ural Bulgarians who created Great Bulgaria;

\* “The new ethno-cultural space” - the territory which was mutually influenced by the Thracians, Slavs and Bulgarians (map №1). Today that territory lies within the framework of our ethnic territory and the territory of Bulgarian settlements in the world. Traces of our ethno-cultural area could be found from the Tatritye to the Aegean Sea and from Sava and the middle course of the Danube to the Dnieper and the Black Sea.

## 5.2. BULGARIANS IN THE WORLD - GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

A large number of Bulgarians living in our neighbouring countries outside of our present border have no comprehension that they are living in foreign countries, but in the country of their ancestors. That is why, from a moral and psychological point of view, they do not consider themselves Bulgarians living abroad. No such term is necessary for them.

We also have Bulgarians living in our neighbouring countries who are descendants of our countrymen, who moved there long ago. These are the Bulgarians now living in Romania, the Serbian Banat, Moldova, Bessarabia, the Ukraine and Russia. Their national identity was subjected to de-Bulgarization and forced assimilation. Some have even been assimilated but, under certain circumstances, their self-awareness and official ethnicity can be restored. There are people with a dual consciousness. All this outlines the range of opportunities for the development or awakening of the Bulgarian idea. Our national strategic program rests on Bulgaria calling on all those people to give it their maximum support.

The place of residence and other quantitative characteristics of the Bulgarians outside of our country, as well as their status, have a number of characteristics in each particular country or region.

Professor Koledarov's research, shown by the following tables, is about the residence and number of Bulgarians living around the world:

**Bulgarians in 1878**

Total... 4 775 000  
 Principality  
 Bulgaria 1 315 000  
 Eastern Rumelia 565 000

2 180 000  
 Macedonia 1 000 000  
 Region 500 000  
 Albania, Kosovo  
 And Metohia 90 000  
 Timok Region  
 And Moravo Reg. 150 000  
 Nish Region  
 And S. Roravia 405 000  
 North Dobrudzha 35 000  
 Outside 695 000  
 Istanbul 25 000  
 Asia Minor 10 000  
 Vlach Mol. 500 000  
 Besarabia 70 000  
 Tavria 25 000  
 Hersonska g. 30 000  
 Astro-Hungary  
 (Banat) 30 000  
 Greece 5 000

**Bulgarians in 1928**

Total... 6 615 000  
 Bulgaria 4 650 000

Bulgarian territories under foreign rule  
 1 320 000  
 Vardar  
 Macedonia 640 000  
 Western provinces 75 000  
 Aegean Macedonia 300 000  
 Western Thrace 35 000  
 Eastern Thrace 15 000  
 South Dobrudzha 155 000  
 North Dobrudzha 70 000  
 Albania 30 000  
 Outside 645 000  
 Banat 35 000  
 Besarabia 255 000  
 Voiv. (Banat) 72 000  
 Istanbul 10 000  
 Asia Minor 30 000  
 Hungary 10 000  
 USSR (Tavria  
 Hersin and other) 150 000  
 USA 60 000  
 Canada 40 000  
 Argentina 15 000  
 Australia and other 20 000  
 Bulgarians in the process of  
 being denationalized  
 1 730 000  
 Nish Reg., Tim. Morav  
 860 000  
 Kosovo and Met.  
 100 000  
 Vlashko and Mol. 770 000

**Bulgarians in 1990**

Total... 10 505 000  
 Bulgaria 7 500 000

405 000  
 Western Province 105 000  
 Aegean Macedonia 200 000  
 Western Thrace 40 000  
 Albania 60 000

Outside 1 200 000  
 Roman. (Banat) 40 000  
 OND 600 000  
 (Banat) 30 000  
 Istanbul 5 000  
 Western Europe 120 000  
 USA 140 000  
 Canada 130 000  
 South America 30 000  
 Australia  
 and Oceania 105 000

Denationalized  
 Bulgarians 2 480 000  
 Tim. Mor.  
 Nish. 1 300 000  
 Vlashko and Mol.  
 1 100 000  
 East Thrace  
 and Asia Minor 80 000

This table does not include about 3 million Volga-Uralic Bulgarians.

Continents	Number of Bulgarians under the official data of respective country	Bulgarians in 1998 Number of Bulgarians under the centre of the Bulgarian strategy
<b>I. Europe</b>	<b>9 989 580</b>	<b>11 254 630</b>
1. Bulgaria	8 000 000	8 000 000
2. Macedonia	1 400 000	1 400 000
3. Yugoslavia	26 922	over 300 000
4. Croatia	80 000	80 000
5. Slovenia	1 900	2 000
6. Bosnia	1 900	2 000
7. Turkey	1 500	around 100 000



## 5. 2. 1. THE BULGARIANS IN MACEDONIA

The Republic of Macedonia was created after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. The Bulgarian government made a bold and responsible national act - it was the first country to recognize the Republic of Macedonia (card № 1). Thereby protecting its territorial entirety and state sovereignty.

Political realities. The population in the Republic of Macedonia up until 1944 always demonstrated its adherence to the Bulgarian nation. This fact is well known to the world's scientific and political community.

The Peoples Republic of Macedonia was created in 1945 within the framework of the Yugoslav federation on the basis of the belligerent anti-Bulgarian Macedon-ism.

The creation of the “Macedonian nation” and the “Macedonian language” by the Yugoslav Communist Party was done in support of the 1934 Comintern decision. It provided a foundation for falsifying our common history, denying the Bulgarian character of the language, culture and traditions.

The government of the Republic of Macedonia continued with the old Yugoslav policy of total confrontation with the Republic of Bulgaria. There was a prerequisite, as they pointed out, that in order to develop interstate relations we needed to first recognize the “Macedonian language” and the “Macedonian nation” in general, within the Republic of Macedonia. These requirements were prerequisites for territorial claims against the Republic of Bulgaria and against the Republic of Greece.

Political rights of the Bulgarians. In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, almost the entire Slavic population is regarded as Macedonian. Only 1850 souls are officially recognized as Bulgarians, most of those have moved there from the western provinces. The Slavic population has been deprived of its right to self-determination. Anyone who is openly declared Bulgarian is subject to sanctions under the “Law for the Protection of the Macedonian national honour”.

During 1913 and 1914, Serbian authorities killed more than 35,000 Bulgarians and over 680,000 were forced to go to Bulgaria.

After 1944 more than 24,000 people were killed and more than 140,000 were persecuted and sent to concentration camps and prisons without being tried. According to the latest data, the number of repressed during that period was over 300,000 Bulgarians. They were mainly activists of the VMRO. The entire population was driven to a state of permanent fear and psychosis. Nevertheless, more Bulgarians openly expressed their nationality.

There are about 1.4 million citizens with Bulgarian ethnic roots in the Republic of Macedonia today who are deprived of the right to self-determination (card № 2). Regardless of that, a dominant part of them consider themselves to be Macedonian Bulgarians, even though they are officially made responsible to call and register themselves as “Macedonians”. As a result of almost half a century of forced denationalization, the last two or three young generations, to a significant degree, have lost their historical consciousness. This is why a large part of them have declared themselves “Macedonians” or “Yugoslavs”.

The government and state apparatus in the Republic of Macedonia has raised a real Berlin Wall between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria. It is prohibited in the Republic of Macedonia to distribute Bulgarian books, newspapers and to broadcast Bulgarian movies and songs. There are extremely limited cultural exchanges. The measures taken have limited the hope of any kind of spiritual communion to overcome the so-called B-complex (Bulgarian complex), as they call it, or the motto - one people two countries - which, in broader terms, has been distributed among the people.

And besides all this, more and more citizens from the Republic of Macedonia visit their relatives in Bulgaria. More and more young people are referred to secondary and high schools in our country. Without interruption this increases the number of those who want to get a Bulgarian passport and dual citizenship.

The social status of the Bulgarians. Economic analysis show serious economic stagnation in the Republic of Macedonia. It has implemented labour-management and cash privatization. It has 44% of its working population unemployed. Emigration to America, Canada and Australia is staggering.

## THE BULGARIAN STRATEGY

1. The Bulgarian state clearly and firmly wants to prove to the world and to the diplomatic circles its inability to recognize the existence of a “Macedonian language” and a “Macedonian nation” other than Bulgarian.

2. The Bulgarian state is to conduct a policy of security and protection for the right of self-determination for the Macedonian Bulgarians.

3 Bulgaria to raise the question of full implementation of European norms for the national rights of the Bulgarians in the Republic Macedonia - freedom of speech, the right to self-determination, the right of association in national parties and organizations, the right to access information from Bulgarian sources - newspapers, radio - television, as well as access to scientific institutions in Bulgaria.

4 To organize and to conduct extensive action here inside our country and abroad for the disclosure of falsification of Bulgarian history, language, traditions and the value system. For this purpose:

√ Bulgarian national television is to ensure a signal, via satellite or direct transmission, which will cover the territory of the Republic of Macedonia;

√ Emissions from the Bulgarian National Radio to cover the entire territory of the Republic of Macedonia;

√ Bulgarian books to be printed in order to provide resolute resistance to all slander and falsifications perpetrated by the media in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as all others who support foreign interests at home and abroad;

√ The state to financially help the Macedonians and Macedonian Scientific Institute in Sofia and other international institutes which systematically research and publish papers and important documents on the Macedonian Question. In that respect the world will be presented with enough evidence to debunk unfounded claims propagated by the ruling circles in Macedonia;

√ To issue free newspapers and magazines dedicated to the history and life of the citizens of the Republic Macedonia with Bulgarian ethnic roots.

5 Bulgaria is to adjust constitutional and legislative norms which will gradually equalize the rights of Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia with the rights of Bulgarian citizens.

6 To establish mitigating circumstances to provide Macedonian Bulgarians with Bulgarian citizenship.

7 To provide enough scholarships to meet the wishes of all the young people in the Republic of Macedonia wanting to study in Bulgaria.

8. To work on eliminating customs tariffs for goods produced in Macedonia.

9 To significantly increase the presence of the Republic of Bulgaria in Macedonia through investment and participation in cash privatization.

10. To secure ranking of products from the Republic of Macedonia in the Republic of Bulgaria, after activating the work of the Bulgarian-Macedonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

11. To seek avenues for disseminating scientific contacts, by providing free specialization to Macedonian scientists and professors at Bulgarian universities and research institutes.

12. To develop cultural ties on both sides by organizing gatherings, holidays, festivals, guest writers, musicians, singers, and other ensembles.

13. To enhance sporting contacts.
14. To increase the number of Bulgarian tourists in the Republic of Macedonia and to establish widespread family ties between the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria.
15. To create conditions for normal relations and cooperation between the Orthodox churches in Bulgaria and Macedonia.
16. To organize and conduct meetings and discussions among intellectuals on both sides, dedicated to various issues of mutual interest.
17. To constantly expand transportation and communication between the two sides.

## BULGARIAN POLITICS TOWARDS THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Recommendations for the development of good neighbourly relations after Bulgaria's accession into the EU in the context of EU and NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans.

Liubomir Ivanov and others.

Foundation "Manfred Werner", Sofia, January 2007 / January 2008

This short booklet was published in the Bulgarian, Macedonian and English languages in January 2008 in Sofia. Its author Lubomir Ivanov is a senior associate at the Institute of Mathematics and Informatics of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) and concurrently Chairman of the "Manfred Werner" Foundation and the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. There are 25 more people associated with this publication who are related to the various BAS institutes. They are diplomats, experts from various ministries, from the National Assembly, etc. The publication has been sent to the various competent Bulgarian authorities. Besides the text, the booklet also contains a Joint Declaration from the Prime Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria and of the Republic of Macedonia I. Kostov

and L. Georgievski from 1999, as well as several different lines of testimonials and quotes.

## 1. BASIC ELEMENTS

... it is difficult to explain to the world why we have so many problems with almost all the countries (around us) and they have so few between them. (Utrinski newspaper - Skopje, December 31, 2007)

As a Balkan country and a member of the European Union and NATO, with direct borders with the Western Balkans, Bulgaria has a special responsibility to ensure (along with Greece) that candidate countries of the region achieve European standards and good neighbourly relations and place a healthy and permanent basis of bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, which is of interest not only to the citizens of Bulgaria, but no less to the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, and hence the Balkan region as a modern and prosperous part of a united Europe.

Recently Bulgaria took two important steps in that direction, which marked the end of the old and the beginning of a new stage in its relations with the Republic of Macedonia.

The first important step was taken by President Georgi Parvanov and Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin in 2006, to unequivocally warn Skopje that the unconditional credit and support given to it by Bulgaria for the Republic of Macedonia's membership into the European Union and NATO, has already been exhausted and further support will only be given if the Republic of Macedonia begins to apply a normal policy of good neighbourliness.

The second important step was taken during President George Bush's visit to Sofia in 2007, when both President Parvanov and Prime Minister Stanishev brought to Bush's attention the Republic of Macedonia's unfriendly policy towards its neighbours.

After these clear political messages were highlighted at the highest level it became necessary to elaborate, in greater detail, Bulgaria's policy regarding the full range of specific problems relating to the

development of bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia regarding the new conditions.

This paper formulates some of the possible starting points for such a policy with a proposal that these points be subject to expert analysis with lasting political solutions and accelerated deployment, and in a form and subject that opens public debate.

Bulgarian attitudes and views on the issues relating to Bulgarian politics towards the Republic of Macedonia, as well as relevant aspects of Bulgaria's relations with third countries, especially with Greece, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, have been established during various historical moments and thus are the product of various historical realities that are inherently difficult to overcome, and hence prevent any possible attempt to generate coherent and proactive policies.

These attitudes and views in no way reflect the newest realities after January 1, 2007 when, in addition to its membership in NATO, Bulgaria became part of the European Union, while the Republic of Macedonia is still not. On this occasion, the present analysis and recommendations, which arose from this, were based on a new interpretation and re-evaluation, looking at certain aspects and new approaches.

We should note here that the Macedonian cause is rejoicing (coming across- DM) with the attention it is getting from interested circles and the general public in Europe, the United States and Canada, and that it has its historical explanation. The Republic of Macedonia, in the last twenty years, has been building its arguments and peer effort based on a policy applied more than forty years ago, during which time the Bulgarian state was silent and definitely did not defend the Bulgarian position abroad. Another factor that increased the acceptance of the Macedonian arguments was sympathy for the small post Yugoslav republic publicly spread throughout these countries. The Republic of Macedonia was treated like a child, but also like a victim of the victors of the Cold War.

But, until now, in the pre-annexation period (before the Republic of Macedonia became an independent country) , its bilateral relations

with Bulgaria were not built on a correct and healthy neighbourhood basis, after that Sofia had very few tools with which to defend its cause while the possibilities of Skopje were increasing. Even Bulgaria's strongest arguments then were intellectually and morally vulnerable. We were silent and passive in the past about giving some explanation. But now that there is the requirement for good neighbourly relations by each candidate in order for them to join NATO and the European Union, it is important for us to access this criterion and break the silence. Let our voice be heard by our partners in NATO, the European Union and by the Republic of Macedonia itself. Make it clear that it has to legitimize its policies and practices. Let it know that no self-respecting country will accept them if they do not show respect for their neighbours - without good neighbourly relations.

This paper deals, primarily, with specific problematic moments in the relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, marking relevant measures in relation to joint infrastructure and other projects (including those funded by the European Union and NATO), Bulgarian investment in the Republic of Macedonia's economy, obtaining Bulgarian citizenship for the people of Balkan Bulgarian origin and easing their access to Bulgarian high schools etc., measures which undoubtedly will be suitable for solving, but which alone cannot resolve the problematic moments in question.

This paper focuses exclusively on the Bulgarian policy towards Macedonia. Special activities and policies towards third countries, the EU and NATO are considered only if they are essential to achieving the goals associated with the Republic of Macedonia.

## 1.1 The Republic of Macedonia

The Macedonian nation and state were created during the process of realization and evolution of the Serbian political construct, first published in 1889, supported by a decision from the Communist International in Moscow in 1934, and achieved between 1944 and 1991 in terms of the historical and geographical regions of Macedonia (about 36% of its total territory), known as Vardar Macedonia incorporated into Yugoslavia and governed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This idea proclaims that the



Bulgarians in Macedonia, who have lived in those regions since the VII century AD, have nothing to do with the Bulgarian state and with the Bulgarian nation, a claim that contradicts the predominant historical truth around the world.

The Macedonian doctrine was enforced in Vardar Macedonia by totalitarian communist state methods and tools: terror and repression against those who considered themselves Bulgarians (30,000 executed and 120,000 sent to camps and prisons); rewriting history through education and the media; falsifying authentic historical evidence and artifacts, and remodeling historic monuments (inscriptions in churches, monasteries and tombs etc.).

Similar activities in one form or another exist today in the modern Macedonian statehood. The reason for this is to further develop the newly established Macedonian nation which was created in terms of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia in the early 1990s. One possibility (current to this day) was to identify the objective parameters of this development, as they are: independent statehood within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia (joint state of ethnic Macedonians and Albanians); changes in the ethnic consciousness of much of the population of Vardar Macedonia after 1944; centuries of historical development of the population in the countries of today's Republic of Macedonia as part of the Bulgarian nation; the preserved Bulgarian ethnicity of some of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. The alternative, sadly preferred by the political elite of the state, was the Serbo-Yugoslav project, applied without changes, always anti-Bulgarian, now in a different environment and partly with new protagonists and carriers.

In other words, establishing a separate and independent Macedonian nation had not been done on the basis of recognizing and appreciating the real historical evidence of Vardar Macedonia, but rather on persisting in falsifying the past and designing processes that relate certain territory and a certain period (Vardar Macedonia within Yugoslavia, 1944-1991) to other territories and other periods. If the history of the population of the Republic of Macedonia has something in common with the population in neighbouring countries, then the project of prescribing history (back to the renaissance, middle ages, and even to antiquity) done to adjust the

historical and ethnic identity of the population of the Republic of Macedonia to the present one, affects both trying to some extent to redefine history, and hence to redefine the modern national identity of neighbouring nations and mostly of Bulgarians - something that normal people consider to be outrageous.

A new, important circumstance in the prolonging of the old project is that its bearers and promoters today are not only politically but also ideally-politically and biographically associated with the former Yugoslav nomenclature, and so are their ideological opponents, including those who were repressed like the Bulgarians or the Bulgarophiles of the past.

The very name “Republic of Macedonia”, later, due to Skopje’s neighbourly unfriendly policy, will create problems in the use of the name “Macedonia” in other important parts of the geographical region with the same name - Bulgarian (Pirin) and Greek (Aegean) Macedonia.

In this sense, given the initial credit of trust and the unconditional recognition of the new state in 1992, Bulgaria made an investment in good neighbourly relations between the two countries which, unfortunately, was not reciprocated. In hindsight the early recognition was done without requiring the new state to demonstrate clear standards for friendly neighbourly relations. There was no incentive for it to stop the continuation of the old Yugo-Macedonian policy and to replace it with better bilateral relations.

These relations today, to a significant extent, are insincere (representatives from Skopje say one thing during their visit to Sofia and another at home or with third parties) and, given the significant incongruity between public opinion in Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, there is potential for further deterioration, for which there should be no place between two European states, even less between two (in perspective) European member states.

Therefore, given its possible invitation to join NATO at the upcoming negotiation process for the Republic of Macedonia’s accession into the European Union, Bulgaria can not help but ask for the following - directly, and/or with the use of the opportunities

provided by the technology of the process of annexation, as well as from Bulgaria's status as full member:

1.1.1. Strict compliance on the part of the Republic of Macedonia in the Joint Declaration of February 22, 1999, which outlines the fundamental principles of good neighbourly relations between the two countries, with registration and open reference to all established violations of the Declaration. Strict monitoring of its implementation needs to become an integral part of the Bulgarian and EU assessment of the Republic of Macedonia's progress in achieving the standards and regulatory requirements (including the requirement to pursue good neighbourly relations) for the EU and for NATO alike.

It should be pointed out that failing to solve problems connected with the implementation of the 1999 EU Declaration will result in serious problems in bilateral relations, and the Republic of Macedonia's membership in the EU will be revoked.

Placed at Bulgaria's request in the solution itself, which recommends starting the negotiation process for the Republic of Macedonia's accession into the EU, should be strict obligations for Skopje to fulfill the 1999 Declaration.

During the negotiations Bulgaria needs to familiarize the European Commission with its assessment of the implementation of the Declaration and evidence of its failure, in general, must be reported in the European Commission's annual reports dealing with the Republic of Macedonia in meeting its criteria for membership. And no negotiation chapters must be opened and / or closed without the appropriate conditions being met.

Evaluations should apply only to the actual Republic of Macedonia's activities, not published in good faith (failures of such intentions being attributed to "old forces", "Serbian influence", etc. Of course, it would be naïve to think that such declarative intentions are anything but conjectural relationships, considered necessary for accession to the EU and NATO).

1.1.2. Harassment of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia who self-identify as Bulgarians. This harassment includes: hours of police interrogations of Macedonian citizens who have not committed any offense only because somewhere they identified themselves as Bulgarians; dismissal from their job; pressure on public Bulgarian organizations, etc.

1.1.3. The Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia (all who clearly self-identified as such) along with the other ethnic groups, in accordance with the local national legislation, which requires their cataloging in the preamble to the Constitution of that country; in addition to the aforementioned Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Roma, and then some added Serbs and Bosnians, we should also find Bulgarians, irrespective of their number, officially declared in the country.

In that sense, it is important to consider the thesis that today's ethnic Macedonians (non-Bulgarians) and ethnic Bulgarians in Macedonia are "one and the same", and that there is no difference between them; and in an opposite sense: one to imply that they are all Macedonians (non-Bulgarians), while the other consider them to be all Bulgarians (or according to some, at least in the process of "being Bulgarized").

Both interpretations of this thesis are unacceptable because they grossly violate the basic principle of ethnic self-determination: everyone alone determines who they are, which means no one else can make that determination for them, and not even they for someone else. Bulgaria must strictly adhere to this principle, and in no way cause interpretations that deviate from it. Given that there are Macedonians who identify as non-Bulgarians (of course we are talking here only about the descendants of the Macedonian Bulgarians, and not of the Albanians, Vlachs, Turks and other ethnic groups in Vardar Macedonia), one can not claim that Macedonians and Bulgarians are the same. Given that there are Macedonians who identify as Bulgarians, one cannot then claim that Macedonians amount to non-Bulgarians.

(While such views normally exist within the framework of ethnic self-identification of certain individuals within the framework of the

freedom of citizens and non-governmental environments, they have no place in the state).

Neither interpretation corresponds to the contemporary realities since the majority of the descendants of the Macedonian Bulgarians in Macedonia today self-identify as ethnic Macedonians (non-Bulgarians). This happened on the one hand, as a result of changes in the last sixty years, but on the other, the fact is that part of the population kept its Bulgarian ethnicity. It is clear that the first and the second have no means of being the same, because they differ in their ethnic self-identification. In other words, this argument is factually untrue. Moreover, the ratio between the two groups is considerably in favour of the first, the denial of the existing difference means joining the cause of anti-Bulgarian Macedon-ism which, above all, is to the detriment of the Bulgarians.

Therefore, it is mandatory and perfectly normal, according to European standards, for the ethnic Bulgarians in Macedonia not to be placed at a disadvantage compared to the other ethnic groups.

This kind of care by the Bulgarian state for the Bulgarians, who are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, is in accordance with the 1999 Joint Declaration. It is noteworthy to mention here that in this important aspect, the Declaration is essentially asymmetrical and excludes Skopje from protecting the status of persons in Bulgaria who are not citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

As for the eventual number of people included in the Bulgarian minority in the Republic of Macedonia and the fear that official recognition would reveal their numbers to be small, the Bulgarian policy should be based on the realities as they are. Our previous approach, to avoid the issue of recognizing the Bulgarian minority, allows for two possible interpretations.

One interpretation is that despite the growing number of people receiving Bulgarian citizenship, there is virtually no such minority. Here we are talking about the “hidden-Bulgarians” whose number will decrease with the change of generations. The other interpretation is based on the notion that the Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia are more than just a minority; that there is,

apparently, a comprehensive process of “re-Bulgarization” which, in the near future, will return the people of Vardar to the road of their historical continuity which is inherent in neighbouring Pirin Macedonia. Obviously, these two grades have different directions, based on accepting certain cases, both in general and not on objective data representative of the processes, but in every case in their referral of assumed future realities, it is not conducive for the realization of current policy.

Misplaced is the fear that recognizing the Bulgarian minority would “encapsulate” a category separate from the large number of residents (perhaps two hundred thousand according to some rough expert estimates) in the Republic of Macedonia who have dual consciousness; ethnic Macedonian and Bulgarian simultaneously.

The most notable Bulgarians in Macedonia repeatedly declare that they feel the need for more robust and active support from Bulgaria. Undoubtedly an important element of such support would be to take care of the Bulgarian minority whose recognition, visible presence and in the utmost confidence would bolster, not weaken their Bulgarian sentiments in them especially those who self-identify as both Bulgarians and Macedonians. (For comparison, it is worth noting that those who self-identify as ethnic Macedonians, and not as Bulgarians in Bulgaria, are not afraid of any kind of “encapsulation” in their distinction from the Bulgarians, and their cause is well represented internationally.)

1.1.4. Correcting history textbooks that completely falsify history and contain offensive qualifications about the Bulgarian state and nation, borders on open racism.

The Bulgarian request, regarding textbooks, must be officially approved by the competent authorities in the Republic of Macedonia, and must express the Bulgarian national affiliation (accepted by historians) of prominent figures in our common history such as St. Clement of Ohrid, King Samoil, the brothers Miladinovtsi, Gotse Delchev, etc.

The educational system (from primary school to university) is an essential tool for creating powerful and massive anti-Bulgarian

attitudes among the population in the Republic of Macedonia (the belief that Bulgaria is an occupier, an assimilator and a separator of the Macedonian ethnos), views which remain hostage to the politics of the Republic of Macedonia regardless of political or government changes.

It is important to stress that the elimination of counterfeit textbooks and the termination of the anti-Bulgarian media propaganda would not deprive the Republic of Macedonia of its foundations and its existence. The state must continue to exist on the basis of the present realities without projecting retrospectively to building some kind of unfulfilled past. The state must recognize the Bulgarian historical realities exactly as Bulgaria is prepared to recognize today's realities without transferring the past to the present.

1.1.5. Restoration of the destroyed or falsified articles in churches, monasteries, icons, frescoes, fountains, bridges, etc., in accordance with relevant international standards in this area.

1.1.6. Help for the restoration or removal of obstacles to the restoration of 471 Bulgarian military cemeteries - a particularly sensitive issue for Bulgaria.

1.2. Albania and Kosovo

1.3. Greece

(This was followed by two and a half pages of text, which referred to the alleged existence of the Bulgarian minority in Albania, Kosovo and to some extent in Greece, which Bulgaria appealed (regardless of their numbers) for their recognition, positioning them according to EU standards and activating this Bulgarian policy through education, assistance, scholarships, etc.; it is interesting that the Bulgarians think that due to their historical memory, Greeks, and Albanians alike, were aware of the Bulgarian ethnic character of Vardar Macedonia in the past and its evolution in recent decades.)

## 2. Action Plan

2.1. Frame

The practical implementation of the new Bulgarian policy towards Macedonia requires elaboration and the acceptance of an action plan with a clearly defined framework, which should include:

2.1.1 Instruments for applying Bulgarian politics (institutions - ministries, state agencies, municipalities, embassies, as well as scientific institutions, lobbyists, politicians and others.)

2.1.2. Take concrete steps to achieve the objectives set out;

2.1.3. The form under which Bulgarian statesmen and politicians need to publicly expose the damages caused by the Republic of Macedonia's policies, in the course of their visits or in international forums, is through repeated Bulgarian requests to maintain good neighbourly relations;

2.1.4. Necessary political and financial resources will need to be invested in lobbying for international support for implementing an open and active campaign against the negative propaganda in the Republic of Macedonia.

2.1.5. Priority of objectives must be separated in accordance with the resources necessary for their achievement and their importance to change the negative attitudes of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

## 2.2. Activities

The proposed basic elements of the Bulgarian policy towards the Republic of Macedonia requires a thorough review of the whole range of Bulgarian foreign policy relations, in which the problematic "Bulgaria - Republic of Macedonia" to review the significance of this write-up:

2.2.1. To begin with, it is necessary to be internally prepared with a solid package of Bulgarian historical, cultural, political, geographical, ethnographic, economic and other arguments in favour of the above thesis. The package would be the base of the country's foreign policy position. For the purpose of this we have recent



experiences and some from before 1989. The package is to mainly emphasize our positive attitude towards the Republic of Macedonia and to rely on the understanding that a state has prospects for development based on constructive activities and accomplishments, without requiring support from some fictional past.

2.2.2. The Bulgarian package should be well balanced with Athens's consistent policy for the protection of Greek interests from the unfriendly-neighbourly policy of the Republic of Macedonia, in a way that its general application can be cooperative towards Skopje, and preferably - cumulative and coordinated. With regards to Greece, the long and difficult period of Bulgaria's transition during which the national political priority and resources were oriented towards achieving full membership in NATO and the EU, as the cause of the current passive Bulgarian stance towards the Republic of Macedonia, should be pointed out. It is not necessary to search for a basis for specific cooperation with Greece other than our regional responsibility to both the EU and NATO and to make sure Skopje applies and upholds European standards. However, if in the event Greek pretensions towards Skopje contradict European standards, Bulgaria is to fortify the position of the Republic of Macedonia, which will show that the Bulgarian position on the Republic of Macedonia is principled and strong. There is no need for the international community or the public in the three countries to be left with the impression that the Bulgarian foreign instrumentation, with respect to the Republic of Macedonia, is a replicated imitation to that of Greece.

2.2.3. Sixteen years since the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia, is enough time to outlast the paternal treatment of the smaller neighbouring country, as well as to confirm that Bulgaria, who is a member of NATO and the EU, has no possible territorial claims.

2.2.4. The key diplomatic concept should be the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO as an occasion for the affiliation of Bulgarians from Macedonia, Serbia, Albania and Kosovo to the Bulgarian nation through achieving the required standards for national and ethnic minorities in the EU.

2.2.5. New Bulgarian activities must be prepared in advance and based on the critical analysis of the 1999 Declaration and its application on the grounds of a comprehensive concept for the future of our relations with the people and state of the Republic of Macedonia, all seen through expectations for ethical and positive relations with the Republic of Macedonia as a future member of NATO and the EU. This requires comprehensive and methodical coordination of Bulgaria's position with the United States and with other allies in NATO and the EU, starting with the most important among them, then after developing positive reactions move on to special cases such as Greece and other relevant Balkan countries such as Romania, Cyprus, Slovenia and Turkey. Due attention should be paid to countries like Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (and to some extent Russia) where politicians and scientists have provided some support to the Yugoslav Macedonian issue. Finally we need to elaborate on a specific approach with each country with which we have diplomatic relations and attract them to the Bulgarian thesis.

2.2.6. It is very important that our version, our view, be widely publicized in the European media, which is to including examples using well-known citizens of the EU, such as in Germany and Austria, Romania and Moldova, where building new nations on the basis of independent statehood is not accompanied by negativism of the Macedonian type.

2.2.7. On specific occasions it is necessary to place pressure on international human rights institutions, including through non-governmental organizations that are active on the issue.

2.2.8. Detailed "records" of the longstanding Skopje obstructionist activities, which prevent the development of a constructive relationship, despite Bulgaria's good measures, must be kept.

2.2.9. There is a need to highlight the specific actions and events that prompted Bulgaria to activate its critical position towards the Republic of Macedonia.

2.2.10. It is good to clarify the motivation of the prominent members of the Republic of Macedonia who are working for the deterioration

of relations with Bulgaria, and who still maintain contact with the secret services of the former Milosevic regime, as well as with other anti-democratic factions in Serbia today.

2.2.11. As a donor country working for the millennium goals of the United Nations, Bulgaria has decided to concentrate its efforts and resources in several priority beneficiary countries, included among which is the Republic of Macedonia. As part of this assistance (which will amount to 0.17% of its gross domestic product in 2010 to 0.33% by 2015) Bulgaria will develop a special program to provide the Republic of Macedonia useful experience, assistance and partnership in reforms which will aid its Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, civil society in the country, local government, business administration, etc., will accumulate much valuable experience in the preparation for joining the EU, experience which will be absolutely relevant to the conditions and to the initial position for a country such as the Republic of Macedonia (and some other countries of the Western Balkans). This kind of strategic investment is good for neighbourly relations and it would be a failure to leave it to others.

2.2.12. In the framework of the general practice of issuing EU visas, let us uncover all the possibilities which facilitate access to Bulgaria for the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, where the Bulgarian visa regime, for them as a minimum, will be no less liberal than the Greek one. We will facilitate trans-border cooperation and connections through opening more border crossings.

2.2.13. To create conditions for preserving and expanding the scope of educating students from the Republic of Macedonia in Bulgarian colleges and universities; to create appropriate forms for maintaining further contact with them as natural Bulgarian lobbyists in their own country, and to welcome potential participants in the increasingly attractive Bulgarian labour market.

2.2.14. To build administrative capacity for easier and more rapid issuance of Bulgarian citizenships, and to shorten the duration procedure from years to months. Bulgaria is on the threshold of a new stage in its socio-economic and demographic development, which will be an important feature for mass immigration into the

country, caused by the needs of Bulgarian business - spontaneous or managed through proactive policies to attract and integrate immigrants. The Bulgarian citizens in the Republic of Macedonia are an important resource in this regard. And, of course, Bulgarian citizenship in the Republic of Macedonia is already a substantial and growing population which, by all international legal grounds, guarantees Bulgarian intervention to protect their rights and interests.

2.2.15. To activate the Bulgarian cultural information centre in Skopje to promote Bulgarian culture and politics in the country by investing in necessary resources. To create Bulgarian cultural and information centres in Tirana and Pristina.

2.2.16. To encourage Bulgarian NGOs and businesses to become partners with Republic of Macedonia residents, become involved in their local initiatives and promote Bulgarian cultural and educational activities (creating Bulgarian reading rooms, clubs, etc.) in various towns in the neighbouring country.

2.2.17. To support prominent cultural, political and media leaders of the Bulgarian community in the Republic of Macedonia, facilitating their work in both countries.

2.2.18. To request the assistance of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, in the spirit of its historical traditions and opportunities to contribute to the rapprochement between the two peoples.

2.2.19. There is no doubt that in recent years one of the most serious irritants in bilateral relations was the issue of registering OMO Ilinden. Skopje and rights organizations such as the Helsinki Committee put this topic in the international context, from which Bulgaria has no benefit. Refusal to register OMO Ilinden will become difficult to defend, especially after the future membership of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO and the EU. Of course, the reason for that, above all, is legal, but the Bulgarian position and the Bulgarian cause would undoubtedly be stronger if we find a solution to this problem.

2.2.20. Regardless of the policies pursued by the governments of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, there are certain independent intellectuals, media and civil society groups in both countries who promote the idea that there is nothing in common between us and our neighbours.

These local factors have the ability to influence public opinion, form attitudes toward our neighbour and sometimes exert political influence. The strength that stems from them is that they usually have no opponent. Their ideas are a monologue; there is no dialogue, debate, conflicting facts, arguments and interpretations. The worst thing about this situation is that the general public in Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia does not understand the reasons, history and arguments of the other side. Therefore it is imperative that the Bulgarian side initiate and maintain public forums and debates in Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia with wide resonance in the media, with openness, good faith and a better knowledge of the other side, and of all disputed cultural and historical topics.

To build a policy towards the Republic of Macedonia to the level of today's challenges - it would be national irresponsibility to miss out on this present historic opportunity - it is urgent to adequately prepare the Bulgarian public, the media and official institutions in order to provide favourable conditions for success.

Sent to competent Bulgarian authorities on January 24, 2008

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# **THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION - REVIEW OF ATTEMPTS TO CREATE AN ARTIFICIAL NATION**

February 9, 1993

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On the cover:

Coin from Amphipolis Region, I century BC

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Note

The booklet is a translation of the text which, in February 1993 - just at the time when the United Nations in New York led talks on Macedonia's accession to the world organization, and after the European Union failed to overcome opposition from Greece over the name of the country - was circulated in the United Nations Headquarters. In order to state the facts and to avoid similar attempts by others, the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU), the same year gave an answer to this booklet with a significantly longer and documented text - "Macedonia and its relations with Greece", Skopje, 1993. Regarding this, again the next year, Spiridon Sfetas and Kiriakos Kentrotis of the Thessaloniki Institute for Balkan Studies gave their response. Basically they followed the contents of this brochure, by providing multiple sources or arguments. From their answers, we will transfer the last 15 pages that match chapters 13, 14 and 15 of the MANU study.

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **"THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION" TODAY**

The "Macedonian Question" can only be understood from the context of its historical development. A development tied to events in the region in general, which provide a better understanding of the great dangers that will be created in a zone that once again deserves

the definition the “Balkan powder keg”, by recognizing the state that bears the name “Macedonia” by the international community.

Using the geographic name (Macedonia), the Skopje expansionists have always strived to give it national acceptance in order to cut out a Slavic nation for themselves. It also means that they are attempting to divest from the Greek people and take part of the Greek cultural heritage that rightfully belongs to Greece. In the course of the last 45 or so years, the name Macedonia for Skopje was the only instrument of its cultural and territorial expansion at the expense of Greece.

Today, Greece has a number of serious motives to reject the recognition of the so-called “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, of which the most important are:

First, during the course of the last 40 years Skopje was an instrument of Tito’s expansionist policy, a policy that was based on a simplistic and erroneous vision of the region’s history. And that is which, by right it leaves us to assume the existence of these expansionist claims at Greece’s expense.

Second, allegations made by Skopje that “the entire region of Macedonia was never freed”, but “only the part that is controlled by Skopje is free” clearly calls into question the sovereignty of Greece.

Third, the use of the name Macedonia by Skopje, together with its persistent refusal to recognize the toponyms which were in force in the region since the Balkan wars is also a challenge to the sovereignty of Greece.

Fourth and last: by using the name Macedonia, Skopje wants to highlight its cultural claims regarding Greece to the extent that the geographical entity Macedonia belongs to Skopje and wants to make it its own national entity. In addition to that, any recognition of an independent Yugoslav republic that would be baptized “Republic of Macedonia” would be a constant threat to peace and security in Southeast Europe.

It is well known that Bulgaria, in Skopje Region and in the Slavic fraction of its population, is asking for historical ties and ethnic closeness and that it had recognized the “Republic of Macedonia”.

The composition of the population in Skopje Region risks leading the emergence of a nationalist conflict in the Balkans. Albanians, who make up a third of the total population in the Republic of Skopje, have already expressed their disagreement with the government in Skopje and seek self-determination.

In case of recognition, the non-homogeneous population in the Republic of Skopje (composed of Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Gypsies, Bulgarians, Serbs and others) could lead to domination of one of these minorities over the others, which ultimately would lead to absolute, unpredictable consequences.

Finally, it is clear that the Republic of Skopje today represents an economic entity which cannot survive, which is prey to ethnic antagonism and that, in addition, is surrounded by rival “contenders” and “protectors”. It also opens the door to large intervention forces, which want to increase their influence in the region.

Adding that, based on international law, the recognition of the Republic of Skopje as an independent state is unthinkable if it does not meet the determined conditions for recognition (a conceptual “nation” or “organized power”), for the following reasons:

- The historical identity of the so-called “Macedonian people” must correspond to the historical, ethnological and sociological criteria.
- The condition called “organized power” is not met: In fact, it is historically proven that the so-called “Republic of Macedonia” was created by Tito with aims at limiting Serbian power, which dates back to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Skopje’s first order was to gain access to the Aegean Sea.

## SHORT SUMMARY OF THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION



## 1. THE GREEK IDENTITY OF MACEDONIA: HISTORICAL OBVIOUSNESS

All historical sources agree on the geographic location of Macedonia: it lies between the Aegean Sea, the mountains Pieria and Olympus and Pieria to the south, the Ohrid and Prespa Lakes and Mount Babuna, Skomion (Rila mountains) and Rhodope Mountains to the north, the river Mesta in the East, while the west borders with the mountain ranges of Pindus and Gramos.

Residents of this region (Macedonians) are regarded as the oldest Greek tribes and friendly to Thessaly, especially to the Magnesians who were also of Aeolian origin. The language they spoke is one of the oldest idioms of Greece, and was similar to the Aeolian, arcade-Cypriot and Mycenaean dialect. As for the Macedonian religion, it was the same as that of the other Greeks, their myths and traditions were found throughout the entire Greek world. (1)

Skopje now wants to attribute Philip II of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great to a Slavo-Macedonian nationality (sic!) - Who not only acted as Greeks, but as champions of Pan-Hellenism by incarnating the old idea of a united Greek state which would include all the Greek cities.

The expert Johann Gustav Droizen, among others, in his “History of Alexander the Great”, said that Philip and Alexander “brought and gave the peoples of Asia not Macedonian culture, because it did not have special status, but Greek culture”.

During the following years, more precisely after the emergence of the Slavs and Bulgarians in the Balkans (VI and VII century AD), the geographical region of Macedonia, as they have defined it, remained a bastion and bridgehead of Hellenism as it was in ancient times.

Polibius qualifies Macedonia as a “first line of defense” and acknowledges the Macedonians, on account of their victory over the Barbarians (i.e. non-Greeks), “had aims at preserving the safety of (the other) Greeks” (2), a position which during the Byzantine

period was taken by the French historian Paul Lemerl, in his classic work:

“Philip and Eastern Macedonia” (Paris, 1945).

The terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonians” which define a separate ethnic group cannot be found in any official text, be it new or old. Neither can they be found in the Berlin Agreement nor in the Treaty of San Stefano, which was annulled by the first; these concepts were never spoken of as such. According to the official Turkish census taken in 1905, the people in the Solun and Bitola vilayet were thought to be Greeks, Bulgarian and Bulgaro-phones with a majority Greek element, but nowhere in that list is there any mention of Macedonians; that is because of the clear reason that no one has stated that such an identity existed. (3) E. M. Kuzineli, who was French consul in Solun, in his book “Journey to Macedonia” (Paris, 1851) tells us that Bulgarians (that’s the name at the time that was given to the Slavo-phones) “never entered the forests located in the foot of Mount Vermion where the population remained Greek”. The German geographer Leonard D. Schulze, while describing the same region in his works “Macedonian Lands” (Jena 1927) noted that in terms of language, traditions, cultural affinity, national will and religion, the inhabitants of Macedonia are “authentically Greek as are their brethren in the south”.

This author, by other means, because of that has accepted that which Lord Salisbeli has claimed. Salisbeli represented Great Britain at the Berlin Congress on June 19, 1878, during which time he said “Macedonia and Thrace are also Greek like Crete”.

The fact that a small percentage of the population in that region spoke a language whose substrate was Bulgarian, and in addition to the presence of numerous loans from the Slavic, Greek, Vlach and Albanian languages, is in no way evidence of a Slavic and Bulgarian origin. Just as was proven relatively recently with the forced return of the Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece who did not speak a word of Greek, linguistic criteria taken in isolation has no value.

It should also be noted that among the veterans of the “Macedonian Struggle” (1904-1908), many spoke a local idiom while keeping a perfect Greek consciousness, Kotas, Dalipis, Kiruna, Gonos and

many others. In connection to these non-Greek speaking Greeks, Russian historian E. Golubinsti (4) noted that “they had a horrible deep hatred and contempt for everything that was Bulgarian or Slavic”.

After the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, old Macedonia was divided so that 51% of its territory was given to Greece, 38.32% to Yugoslavia and 10.11% to Bulgaria. (5). Voluntary exchange of populations was done on the basis of bilateral agreements (The Nice Agreement of 1919 envisioned a voluntary exchange between Greece and Bulgaria, the same with the 1926 so-called Kafantaris-Molov Protocol) and the settlement of the Greek part of Macedonia, after the Greeks were returned from Turkey, which completed the homogenization of the Greek population: and in spite of the existence of some bilingual residents, the population since then has been pure Greek.

It should be said that Greek Macedonia became a perfectly homogeneous part of Greece; and what is more accurate is that after the occupation (1945-1949), almost all bilingual people who did not have a Greek national awareness left for neighbouring countries, especially to Yugoslavia (6). They must have trumped their Greko-phone or Bulgaro-phone nationality for a “Macedonian” nationality, in other words for a Slavo-Macedonian nationality.

Before the appearance of this situation, a number of violent episodes, such as the Ilinden Uprising, took place during which, on August 2, 1903, the Bulgarians rose up against the Turks in the town Krushevo, near Bitola, where the vast majority of the population was Greek. In fact, the Bulgarians rose against the Greek population there in an attempt to exterminate it - with the complicity of Turkey - without actually harming the other residents of the city. (7).

Up until 1914, “Macedonia” as a Slavic state and the “Macedonian nation” as a separate national entity were totally unknown concepts. Part of Macedonia, which was connected to Serbia as well as one that belonged to Bulgaria, represented only a small part of the territory along the Greek border and represented only an insignificant part of Serbia. Skopje, which today presents itself as the capital of the “Republic of Macedonia”, is actually located far

from Macedonia. When the “People’s Republic of Macedonia”, later renamed the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, was established at the end of the German occupation it became connected to Skopje and Tetovo, which never belonged to Macedonia. This was arbitrarily done with the intention of showing the presence of a Serbian population in this sparsely populated part of Macedonia which was located across the Greek border (in which both Serbs, Greeks, Vlachs, “Turko-phones” Muslim Bulgarians) or at least a Slavophone population had its own language and vague national consciousness. Creating a “People’s Republic of Macedonia” was the ultimate goal for creating a “Macedonian” state, this time under the Slavic cap and a way to the sea for Yugoslavia.

## 2. Conflicts between national movements in the XIX century

The peoples of the Balkans, during the XIX century, acquired their core around which they constituted their nation-states and their national ideologies which, in some places, coincide with zones of mixed populations which came under national pretensions.

Macedonia was one of those places in which such problems were especially strongly manifested. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this geographical area was the scene of a collision of four antagonistic national ideologies - Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian and Albanian. Because of that, to achieve their aspirations, it was necessary for each of the parties, as an essential factor, to use the national identity of the people of the region.

At that time, without talking about Muslims who represented about one third of the total population, it was extremely difficult to precisely determine the national identity of the Christians in Macedonia. Until mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the rural masses remained faithful to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, guardian of the Greek language, the Byzantine tradition and even historical memory. It should have further enhanced the spontaneous enthusiasm which led the non-Greek speaking groups to the Greek culture, i.e. the Slavophones, Vlahophones and Albano-phones. However, in the background, and, in particular Slavophone zones in the centre and north of Macedonia, the Greek national ideology slowly progressed;

already in the region it then began to spread to other places. Antagonism between the Greek and Bulgarian church ultimately increased after the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, which was at the root of serious clashes between Greeks and Bulgarians in areas of mixed populations in Macedonia.

## The Greek-Bulgarian conflict

The Greek national ideology, of course, put its emphasis on Macedonia's classical Greek past, in the era of Alexander the Great and his work. It was exactly in this era where the local Slavic idiom - but with the Greek alphabet - was soon printed and inserted in the programs of the schools that were still under Ottoman control, a brochure telling the life of Alexander and insisting on the continuity of the Greek nation. In parallel with that, was the effort to cultivate and spread the tradition of the Byzantine Empire. Both multinational empires - the empire of Alexander the Great and the Byzantine Empire - were actually offered as reliable examples, which made it possible to believe that despite the differences in language and customs, different population groups would choose to identify with the Greek culture in the broadest framework of the state. That was a vision of the sort that Rigas Pheraios (Riga Defere) had with regards to a Balkan federation.

For its part, the Bulgarian national ideology was trying to sell the Slavo-phones in Macedonia a Bulgarian cultural tradition. But here Bulgarians stumbled on one major obstacle: a significant part of the Slavo-phone population, especially in the central and southern regions, actually preserved their living, historic Greek tradition. Bulgarians soon realized that historical factors proved insufficient to ensure the spread of the Bulgarian national ideology; and thus turned to other ways of modeling their national consciousness.

They started to exploit linguistic affinities. After that they tried to manipulate the indignation of the people against the social oppression of the Ottoman occupation. Their goal was to start a people's uprising which, if skillfully led, would turn into a Bulgarian national movement. After that they tried to exploit antagonism between the rural population and the Greek clergy, fiercely denouncing what they called "spiritual submission to the

Ecumenical Patriarchate”. Bulgarian schools in towns and villages in Macedonia began to flourish with the help of the Bulgarian state. The original ambition of those schools was to instill a sense of pride into students with Bulgaria’s medieval history, especially with Tsar Samoil’s Empire, whose capital was Ohrid. But the Bulgarian historical arsenal could not be a counterweight to the Greek cultural and historical heritage of Macedonia; which pushed the Bulgarians to engage in systematic falsification of history, simply grabbing historical events and personalities.

And as such they took the Greek missionaries Cyril and Methodius and presented them as Bulgarians. The apostolic and educational work they brought to the Slavs became “a political and cultural act accomplished by the Bulgarians”. Some general texts of that time went so far as to claim that Alexander the Great, present in spirit and in the heart of the population in Macedonia, was of Bulgarian origin. It was a tactic that cannot but remind us of the current propaganda about Alexander the Great coming out of Skopje claiming him to be a magnate of Skopje.

Serbian, Romanians and Vlachs later appeared on the Macedonian stage. The Serbians felt the need to mobilize the memory of the Serbian presence in Macedonia in the Middle Ages - despite the fact that, from a chronological point of view, their presence was limited to the time of King Dushan and his successors (XIV century).

## The Romanians and Vlachs

In the last two decades of the XIX century another actor appeared on the Macedonian stage - the Romanians: the Romanians sought to impose their own national Vlach ideology. Of all the non-Greek speaking population in Macedonia, the Vlachs warmly supported the Greek national ideology. They represent a living example of the truth that one non-Greek speaking population can be perfectly integrated into the Greek national movement. During the war for independence in 1821, a similar phenomenon was observed in the Albanian speaking Christians (“Arvaniti”) who totally identified with the Greek national cause.

However, towards the end of 1860, the Romanian national ideology began to focus its attention on some Vlach communities and its impact increased in 1877 with Romania's independence. The Romanian propaganda machine excelled in the common Latin origin of the Romanian and Vlach language, while trying to exploit the historical factor, especially with the fantastic theories of a common Vlach origin between the southern Balkan Vlachs and the Danube Romanians. Although not negligible, the effects of such propaganda, however, remained limited. One of the root causes that prevented the Romanians from winning a majority for their cause was that the Vlachs, for centuries identified with the Greeks with whom they lived and actively participated in all the battles for the liberation of the Greek nation. Faced with such a living historic memory, historical arguments concerning the Roman period did not hold.

Another very important problem which began to unfold in the XIX century was: namely, to what extent the Slavo-phones were of Macedonian Bulgarians or Slavs belonging to a special Slavic group. At that time, the name "Macedonian" was widespread, either in its regional and geographical, or in its cultural significance. When the Serbians realized that they would fail to turn the Slavo-phones in Macedonia into pure Serbians, they decided to implement a special thesis which identified the Slavo-Macedonian as a separate people who were different from the Bulgarians but very close to the Serbians.

Later, some revolutionaries drawn from the ranks of the Bulgarian national movement began to promote the idea of a Macedonian state, independent in relation to Bulgaria and their slogan was "Macedonia for the Macedonians", but it was just a manoeuvre. In fact, it was an impression given by the leaders of the movement fighting for an independent Macedonia, they were very careful not to change the historical Bulgarian identity of the Slavs in Macedonia and to remain supporters of the Bulgarian national ideology. They only differed from Sofia with their political goal: autonomy and not unification.

### 3. "THE MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE"

After the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, clashes began to take place between the Greeks and Bulgarians in Macedonia. The main objective of the Greeks was to prevent Bulgarian attempts to control the Slavo-phone population living in the area between the line-Kostur-Ptolemaida-Enidzhe-Seres, and between Ohrid- Prilep-Strumitsa-Melnik-Nevrokop.

After the war of 1870, a defeat for Greece, the Bulgarians managed to force much of the Slavo-phone population in the region to join the Bulgarian ideals. This led to the Ilinden Uprising in 1903, the day of St. Elias, which the Turkish army brutally suppressed.

The rebellion caused the destruction of numerous Greek villages and towns, including the town Krushevo. Vandalism and persecution of the Greek population led to a general Greek mobilization and in 1904 it began the armed “Macedonian Struggle” which lasted until 1908. In the course of all those years, volunteers recruited from the free Greek state, Crete, Epirus, Thessaly and from other regions of Greece that were not yet freed, fought alongside the Macedonians who were able to overcome the spread of Bulgarian proselytism and preserved the Greek character of Central and South Macedonia. The Greek troops were largely composed of Slavo-phone and Vlacho-phone supporters who fought for the Greek cause. Because of their attachment to the Greek nation, the Bulgarians called them “grkomani”, i.e. fanatical Greeks. Descendants of those fighters still live in the area around Bitola.

In July 1908 the Young Turk revolution put an end to the armed struggle: The Young Turks dismantled the feudal regime of the Sultan and announced a general amnesty, at the same time promising equal political rights for all ethnic groups.

The Macedonian Struggle was started under very unfavourable conditions lasting for four years but ended with a very happy ending for Greece. This success can only be attributed to the fact that in this struggle the Greeks from free Greece, from Crete and from the other provinces which were still enslaved, came to fight alongside the Macedonians. But this was also because the Greeks fought in a region in which the people lived under friendly terms and supported the same ideals and the same allegiance to the Ecumenical



Patriarchate, the Greek national cause, even if they had not always spoken Greek.

#### 4. FABRICATING A NATIONALITY

The Turkish defeat in the First Balkan War brought the end for the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia. Macedonia was again divided, with 51% going to Greece, 39% to Serbia and 10% to Bulgaria. A mass exodus of the population, which found itself on foreign soil, began and went together with exchanges of populations which fundamentally changed the ethnic composition of the whole of Macedonia, especially in the Greek part.

Bulgaria's permanent defeat in the Second Balkan War and in the First World War contributed to the Bulgarian part of Macedonia developing very fierce Bulgarian-Macedonian nationalism; nationalism whose irredentist tendencies try to use Comintern slogans such as a "united and independent Macedonia" within a "Balkan Communist Federation".

In the Yugoslav part of Macedonia, the Serbian politics applied by Belgrade yielded mediocre results. To avoid abuse, one part of the population did not express its pro-Bulgarian feelings and even gave up its Bulgarian name, preferring the politically neutral name Macedonian.

Other parts of the population openly chose to integrate themselves into the Serbian national community.

In Greek Macedonia, on account of the exchanges of population, there were 100 to 150 thousand Slavo-phone speakers divided into two groups: one, the larger group, under a Turkish name, accepted the Greek nationality, and the smaller group joined the Bulgarian nationality and remained undetermined. During World War II when the Bulgarian army entered Slavic Macedonia, it was welcomed by part of the population as a first step towards being freed and integrated with the Bulgarian state. A similar phenomenon, though on a small scale, occurred in Greek Macedonia.

Under Tito, the Yugoslav partisans immediately realized that they needed to break the bonds between the populations of Yugoslav Macedonia at any cost. In other words they took advantage of the growing discontent in the population against the Bulgarian occupation forces: Bulgaria's reaction was swift and massively repressive.

Tito's supporters were saying that the Macedonians - i.e. the Slavs in Yugoslav Macedonia - in post-war Yugoslavia should enjoy the same rights as other nationalities and even be equal to the Serbs. They, however, insisted on the fact that the Slavs in Macedonia had nothing to do with the Serbians and Bulgarians, but were a separate "Macedonian nation". This idea of a "Macedonian nation" was very well received by much of the population in Yugoslav Macedonia. The political and social context was ripe to accept this new thesis: in fact Bulgaria was already defeated when Tito received consent from Stalin to put the new Macedonian politics in circulation and the population was tired of attempts made for over half a century by the Serbians and Bulgarians to impose their own identity on it.

After winning the Otechest Front in Bulgaria (managed by the Bulgarian Communist Party), in September 1944, negotiations on the future of Macedonia and the Balkan Peninsula began.

On August 2, 1944, the "Socialist Republic of Macedonia" was proclaimed in the monastery "Prohor Pchinski" within the new Yugoslav federation. In September 1944, a Yugoslav delegation headed by General Tempo and Lazar Kolishevski, general secretary of the Communist Party of Macedonia, visited Sofia and received a promise from the New Bulgarian government to provide autonomy to the inhabitants of Pirin (Bulgarian Macedonia), which represented the first step towards unification with "the Federal Republic of Macedonia" in Tito's Yugoslavia.

In April 1945, Tito imposed his federal system on Yugoslavia by establishing a government of the federal states of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Skopje, with the latter being established on April 30, 1945.

Meanwhile in view of the civil war that broke out in Greece, there was uncertainty. The Yugoslavs at the time exerted unbearable pressure on their Bulgarian friends to give up the Bulgarian part of Macedonia to Yugoslavia. Since late 1946, the Bulgarians made a number of concessions to the Yugoslavs regarding Macedonia. In August 1946, during the 10<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, it was decided to “work towards a cultural convergence between the inhabitants of Pirin Macedonia and those of the Republic of Macedonia”. The decision was followed by an extensive program of cultural exchanges, which the inhabitants in Pirin Macedonia regarded as an opportunity to choose between the Bulgarian and “Macedonian” nationality.

Lured by individual incentives, most of them opted for a “Macedonian” nationality. After long consultations, Tito and Dimitrov, heads of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, met at Bled, Yugoslavia. On August 2, 1947 they signed the Bled agreement, by which, for a small compensation, Bulgaria was to recognize the residents of Bulgarian Macedonia (Pirin) as “Macedonians” and pave the way for the integration of the Pirin province with the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”. In exchange, Bulgaria asked that its “Western parts” occupied by Serbia at the end of the First World War be returned. However, Tito’s grandiose plan, with ambitions to create a “Federation of South Slavs” under his domination, was soon ended by Stalin. It came to a halt during the summer of 1948 and with it ended Tito’s hegemonic calculations for the Balkans, imbedded in which was the “Macedonian Question” his main springboard. Bulgaria later used it to restore concessions make to Yugoslavia including the rejection of the thesis of a “Macedonian nation”. Bulgaria also drove out the Skopje commissars sent to its territory. After that Bulgaria capitalized on the difficulties facing Yugoslavia with aims at re-enacting the pre-war slogan “united and independent Macedonia”.

## SKOPJE’S THEORETICAL ALCHEMY

Cyril and Methodius, “ILLUMINATING MASTERS OF EUROPE”

It has been historically proven and accepted by Slavic historians that the Slavs arrived in the Balkans in the VI century and that their

cultural history began in the X century BC. The founders of Slavic cultural history were two Greek monks from Solun known as Cyril and Methodius, who taught the Slavs the Cyrillic alphabet and steered them towards Orthodoxy. On the other hand, it has been accepted that the substrate of Slavic cultural history consists of Byzantine achievements in sciences as well as in the literary and artistic field.

Some Slavic historians, however, believe that these two Greek monks were in fact “Slavs”, and Skopje has gone as far as to throw away one of the more unfounded theses and, with no basis, claim that Cyril and Methodius, since they were originally from Solun, were in fact Macedonian Slavs and therefore the inhabitants of Skopje are their descendants (!) who had the privilege to “enlighten” their brothers by birth.

Pope John Paul II, himself a Slav, dealt a heavy blow to those theories when he, on December 31, 1980 in the apostolic encyclical (*Egregiae Virtutis*) address to all Catholics and with a personal letter addressed to the President of the Hellenic Republic, called Cyril and Methodius “our Greek brothers born in Solun” illuminating masters of Europe. The Pope reiterated the statement on February 14, 1981 in the church of St. Clement in Rome.

In fact, numerous Slavic politicians and historians have said that Cyril and Methodius were Greeks, as did the Czech Byzantologist F. Dvornik, Serbian historians of old Serbian literature P. Popovich, D. Sh. Radovich and G. Trifunovich and Slovenian Professor B. Grafenauer from the University of Ljubljana.

In his works “History of the Old Slavic literature” (Belgrade, 1980), Professor V. Bogdanovich, a Serbian, wrote: “Cyril and Methodius were born in Solun and have a Greek, not a Slavic origin.”

## 2. WHEN MAPS REVEAL THE TRUTH

Skopje’s allegations are well known in its attempts to rest its maps on a faulty foundation. However, it is searching in vain because never has there ever been any map that was printed before 1944 in which the name Macedonia as a country has been found other than

in Greece. In 1944, in the first map published by the Yugoslavs, the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” appeared in South Serbia. In a later edition, the name “Socialist Republic” was omitted and the name Macedonia was no longer a figure in Greece: anyone who looked at this map would have concluded that “Macedonia” only existed in Yugoslavia and that there was a “Macedonian nation” which, of course had its own language.

The extent to which Skopje is willing to go to can be seen by the number of ethnographic maps produced by Skopje to demonstrate its theses regarding the existence of a, deprived of any basis, “Macedonian nation”. This includes:

- a) An ethnographic map of nationalities in Macedonia in the period 1912 - 1926, published in the 1970 edition of the University of Cambridge Modern History;
- b) The ethnographic map of Kieport (Berlin, 1918);
- c) The ethnographic map published by the Italian Amendore Virxili in 1908, calling on the Turkish census carried out by Hilmi Pasha;
- d) The map of Stanford.

In none of these maps, however, as well as in those that were published before World War II, does it contain any reference to a “Macedonian nation” for the simple reason that there never was such a nation until the Yugoslav Communist Party invented it.

At the time of the Ottoman domination (1529), the Turks applied their own system of division, as derived from the ethnographic map of 1908, based on the census carried out by Hilmi Pasha in 1904. The map does not mention Macedonia because the area was divided into “Sundzhaks” and “Vilayets” (Bitola and Solun vilayet). Shown on a map of 1350 was Emperor Stefan Dusan’s kingdom, which was mentioned as the “Kingdom of the Serbs and Greeks”. Dusan had divided his kingdom into two zones: the northern zone spreading down to Skopje, which he bestowed upon his son, and the southern zone (Greek) which he kept for himself. If there was a “Macedonian nation”, there is no doubt that he would have called his kingdom the

“Kingdom of the Serbs and Macedonians” or the “Kingdom of the Serbs, Greeks and Macedonians”.

“The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” was founded after World War I and then, if there were Macedonians, that kingdom would have been called “The Kingdom of the Serbs, Greeks and Macedonians”. In 1824, E. Z. Koal issued a new historical map of Greece in Baltimore. In the legend the map publisher wrote the name Macedonia as part of continental Greece and its border extended north of Bitola.

### 3. THE GREEK CHARACTER OF THE SLAVOPHONES

During the period marked by a strong Greek-Bulgarian rivalry, various statistics on the ethnic composition of the population in Macedonia were published. The data presented had significant differences, this is because the statistical information was based on various criteria and put in the services of the various national aspirations and their authors.

Macedonia in the Ottoman Empire was administratively divided into two vilayets, the Solun and Bitola Vilayets. The Inspector General of these vilayets resided in Solun. In the course before the Balkan wars, that position was occupied by Hilmi Pasha. The results of the census conducted under Hilmi Pasha up to 1904 seemed to be quite close to reality. The results appear in the following table:

	Greeks	Bulgarians
Solun Vilayet	373,227	207,317
Bitola Vilayet	261 283	178 412
TOTAL:	634 510	385 729

In a conversation with French writer Paiaris, in regards to the Slavophones, Hilmi Pasha said: “My personal opinion and the opinion of my government is that these people are Greeks. Our classification of our citizens is based on the function of the church and the school they go to. They themselves say that they are Greeks as long as there is no strong pressure exerted on them.” (8)

In 1871, Russian historian Golubinski wrote: “These so-called Greeks feel much more and deeper hatred and disdain than the real Greeks, towards anything that could be considered Bulgarian or Slavic”. (9) A memorandum addressed to the French Government in 1903 by the residents of Bitola Region, in this respect was more illustrative than any other source: “We speak Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian; but because of that we are no less Greek and no one could dispute that fact”. (10)

The considerable Greek education system in Macedonia provides additional evidence of the Greek character of the Slavo-phones and the other residents in the region in general. In Bitola region, in the city Bitola alone there were 284 Greek schools of which one was a high school, one was a general school, one for girls only, one for boys only, one for seminars, one Academy and 14 elementary schools. In Krusevo there was a high school with three classrooms, a school for girls, another for boys, four elementary schools and a maternity school. There were primary schools, schools for girls, secondary education institutions and maternity schools everywhere including in Magarevo, Tarnovo, Miloshishta, Nizepole, Gopeshi, Belishte, Brusnik, Lavtsi, Duhovo, Strumitsa, Gevgelia and Melnik.

In some cases the Greeks, who were forced to live with non-Greeks and were in constant contact with the non-Greek population, did lose their language but they never lost their national consciousness. In fact, they even spread their Greek national consciousness to the Slavic and Vlach populations.

The region connected with Greece after the Balkan wars encompassed most of the Solun and Bitola Vilayets.

During the course of 10 to 15 years (1913-1925) the large population movements that took place in Greek Macedonia substantially changed the ethnic composition of the region. During the wars of 1912 to 1919, tens of thousands of Bulgarians left the region until the final departure of 53 thousand Bulgarians who, based on a voluntary agreement of population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria, left for Bulgaria. Only the Slavo-phones in

western Macedonia remained, who largely had a Greek consciousness.

The following table contains statistics provided by the League of Nations about Greek Macedonia in 1926 (after the population exchange between Greece and Turkey):

Greeks	1,341,000	88.8%
Muslims	2,000,000	0.1%
Bulgarians	77,000	5.1%
Others (especially Jews)	91,000	6.0%
Total:	1,511,000	

Between the two wars, the Greek government led the following policy: in 1924, in the framework of the society of nations, Greece and Bulgaria signed a protocol - known as the “Kalfov - Politis Protocol” by which Greece sent its Slavo-phone population from its territory to Bulgaria. Unfortunately this created widespread discontent in the country prompting Serbia to react by dropping the Greek-Serbian alliance agreement of 1913 - a protocol which the Greek parliament refused to ratify.

Then the League of Nations liberated Greece from the obligations it had accepted.

#### 4. FIRST ATTEMPTS AT “SCIENTIFICALLY” ESTABLISHING A NON-EXISTENT NATION

Despite the fact that socio-economic conditions after the end of World War II were favourable to “mutations” in the population in terms of its national identity, the inhabitants of Yugoslav Macedonia, at the time, were far from consciously accepting such an idea. The future of the new “nation” proved uncertain if it was going to be put on solid ground so that it could be constituted. Therefore, it was necessary to act as soon as possible. The first concern of the builders of this new “nationality” was to find a name that would be acceptable. From that moment on the easiest solution was accepted; the geographical name of the region. But that name was common to all groups of the population living in the three parts of Macedonia.



Greeks called themselves Macedonians, separate from the Slavic groups using the term Macedonians, and Vlach Macedonians.

There was no dispute behind the geographical term, the name “Macedonian” contained a long historical and cultural tradition that could not be ignored. Initially, the builders of the new “nationality” preferred not to associate with the ancient Greek Macedonians. Their efforts largely went towards acceptance of the Bulgarian component in favour of the new “nationality” in the history of Macedonia. All that was Bulgarian automatically become “Macedonian”.

When it was possible, the same process was applied to the Serbian and Greek elements in Macedonia. Builders of the new “ethnicity” obviously were not willing to be satisfied with just the success of their experience. Once the “Macedonian nationality” was constructed, through the right of appropriation, they could have the right to call everything that was of Macedonian origin, in favour of the new “nation”.

Under the weight of events that occurred at the end of the 1940s, i.e. the beginning and end of the Civil War in Greece, Yugoslav leaders renounced their policy of territorial expansion in Macedonia but did not abandon their policy of historical and cultural expansion in favour of the new “Macedonian nation”. So the term was expanded and was given a “scientific” character which caused some strong reactions and criticism from some Bulgarian and Greek historians. The controversy led to the “Macedonian question” of a new species, which was far from being just a simple quarrel between erudites. The Yugoslav re-interpretation of Macedonian history was a “*conditio sine qua non*” for the survival and expansion of the new “nationality”. For Bulgaria it meant that it needed to react and oppose this policy in order to prevent the “de-Bulgarization” of the history of the Slavs in Macedonia and to stop the spread of the theory of a “Macedonian nation” existing among the Bulgarian population in Macedonia. For the Greeks, finally, questioning the Yugoslav positions represented a legitimate defense against any kind of claim to the Greek heritage of Macedonia and in reaction to attempts of appropriation and monopolization of the historical Greek name.

## 5. DOES A “MACEDONIAN” LANGUAGE EXIST?

The specific Slavic “Macedonian” language was unknown until the Second World War. The Language of the Slavo-phone speaking residents of southern Yugoslavia and southwestern Bulgaria was known as an idiomatic form of Bulgarian.

After the creation of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, linguistic ties that united the inhabitants of Yugoslav Macedonia with Bulgaria ceased to exist for purely political reasons. For that reason a myriad of linguists and philologists took on the task of fabricating a separate written language.

The “Macedonian language” was created based on the Prilep dialect and from borrowing from the Serbian, Bulgarian, Russian and other Slavic languages. It was then recognized by the Yugoslav Constitution as one of the three official languages of the Federation.

The fact is that in the centre, especially in the northern part of Macedonia, Slavo-phone residents spoke a special Slavic dialect. But it was only a verbal dialect - without a written form - whose poor vocabulary contained no more than about a thousand to a thousand-five hundred words. Many among them were of Slavic origin, but this dialect also contained a high proportion of Greek words, original or deformed, as well as Turkish, Vlach and Albanian words. Basically, it was the western idiom dialect of the Bulgarian language, which was spoken in northern Macedonia. What especially distinguished the official Bulgarian East language from the western dialect were the letters “JA” (the changing JA). These letters from the official Bulgarian language were turned into “E” in the western dialect; for example, the Bulgarian word “LJATO” (summer) was pronounced as “LETO” in the western dialect.

After 1878, with the introduction of Bulgarian education in the Macedonian region, this idiom came even closer to the Bulgarian language no matter that it was spoken in the Macedonian zones from ancient times onwards. But the overall work of the Macedonian philosopher Aristotle, as is well-known, was written in Greek.

N. Martis (12), in a characteristic way, has revealed that: “if we agree that Macedonians speak a special, non-Greek language, how do we explain that it brutally and radically disappeared without leaving any text, with no article preserved. How then is it possible that it was not made compulsory as a language, when the Macedonians were so proud of their origin?”

Plutarch has informed us that when Alexander the Great took 30,000 Persians into his service he chose to integrate them into his army and ordered them to “learn the Greek letters and to become familiar with the Macedonian weapons” (13)

In a report written by the Roman author Titus Livy, there was a claim that the Macedonians had the same language as the other Greeks. Livy described an assembly of Greeks in Aetolia, in 200 BC, in which “stood representatives of Aetolia, Acarnania and Macedonia, people who spoke the same language”. (14)

Nikolaos Andriotis, a linguist and professor at the University of Solun, in his book “Federal State of Skopje and its language” published in English (1957) and Greek (1960), wrote: “In September 1944, a commission was established in Skopje to determine the grammar and spelling of the ‘Macedonian language’ ...” (p. 34)

Italian linguist Vittore Pizani in his study “Makedonika” also noted (15): “In fact, the Macedonian language is a creation of purely political origin”.

In spite of the efforts invested in over 45 years, their new language still remains of the Bulgarian branch. That, of course, does not prevent the residents of Skopje, at home and abroad, of speaking of the existence of a “Macedonian language”. Historians from Skopje are trying to prove that this was a special Slavic language dialect in order to deal with the difference between a so-called “Macedonian Slav nation” and the Bulgarians. But Bulgarian historians challenge the entire series of elements, thanks to proving that the “Macedonian” textbooks, which the people in Skopje praise, are actually Bulgarian books published in the local dialect “for Macedonian Bulgarians”, as seen by their titles.

When residents of a region speak a language, they have a suitable educational system (teachers, schools, students).

Between 1878 and 1888, the number of Greek schools, academies and maternity schools in Macedonia increased, covering 58 thousand Greek students in a total of 900 institutions. This is indisputable evidence of the Greek character of Macedonia.

One modern writer in Skopje named Krste Bitoski wrote: “The churches and schools in Bitola in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century were in Greek hands”. (16)

The Greek character of the inhabitants of Macedonia is proven through a note sent in 1901 to the Romanian Government from the chief of Romanian propaganda, Lazarescu Lekada, in which he said:

“In the villages where the population consisted exclusively of Vlachs, the Greek schools were full of students, while the Romanian schools were gone. The Vlachs contributed to the Greek schools and when they died they left their fortunes to be used for Greek education”. (17)

Accordingly, there is no doubt that the “Macedonian” language was fabricated to strictly serve defined purposes.

It should be noted that the largest part of the linguistic work carried out by Skopje did not begin until 1944 and was aimed at eliminating all the Bulgarian elements that existed in the Slav-Macedonian idiom and their replacement with Serbo-Croatian words. This work was successful enough, so far, that 10 years later the Pirin Bulgarian Macedonians had difficulties understanding the radio programs originating from Skopje.

## 6. EXPANSIONIST “SELECTED PIECES”

On June 17, 1990, during the founding Conference of the VMRO-DPMNE ultra-nationalist party of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM), a proclamation was made that said that the party would “fight for a free, autonomous and united Macedonia” within the context of a “European Confederation”, based on the “ideals of

Ilinden". VMRO won legislative power in SRM, winning 37 out of the 120 seats in parliament.

The president of VMRO, Ljupco Georgievski stated that he was for "the spiritual and territorial unity of Macedonia" ("Borba" December 31, 1990) but on November 7, 1990 he said: "Pirin Macedonia, Aegean Macedonia and Vardar Macedonia do not make up Greater Macedonia, but only Macedonia. If one speaks of Greater Macedonia then they will have to include Belgrade, Sofia, Thessaly, Valore..."

Tupurkovski, the Skopje Representative of the former Yugoslav Federal Presidency, in a TV show during his tour in Canada said: "Europe has already demonstrated that it can address the question of unification of nations, as was the case of Germany. Just as it was demonstrated one time there would be no reason for Europe to distance itself in terms of the national ideal of a nation, the Macedonian nation". Answering a question put to him by a reporter who asked "shouldn't the Macedonians be struggling harder for cultural and intellectual unity than for territorial unity?" he replied: "I think the national ideal should not suffer from limitations and that it includes territorial unity".

Parliamentarian K. Petrov from the SRM Party in early January 1991 submitted a proposal supported by VMRO, for the acceptance of a proclamation of independence and sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and for that Republic to take steps in international organizations, "with aims at returning the lands seized by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, which belong to them, based on the fact that Macedonians lived on them."

In a NIN article (dated February 1, 1991) it was once and for all said: "Kiro Gligorov, Macedonia's new president, in a statement said that soon a major battle would be initiated to tell the world and the Balkan countries the truth about the parts of the Macedonian people in Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, who were divided and oppressed during the Balkan wars. The leading nationalist parties in Macedonia seeking a Greater Macedonia..., are not hiding their intentions to integrate such territories into a sovereign state, and do not hide their orientation: redefining, with Macedonian force, the

borders with Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, for them it is only a question of when...”

## 7. THE SKOPJE PSEUDO-MACEDONIAN CHURCH

Founded in 1967 in Skopje, in the beginning it was independent, after that it became the autocephalous, “Macedonian Orthodox Church”. Its basis and “Metropolis” in the United States took a serious propaganda campaign around the so-called “Macedonian Question”. It should be noted that the Republic of Skopje is the only Yugoslav Republic where an independent church was founded.

Created outside of the Orthodox canons, that “Church” is clearly not recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Serbian Patriarchate or by any other Orthodox Church.

For a communist state to form a (pseudo) Skopje “Macedonian Church” - especially when Christianity was persecuted, is a unique worldwide, historical phenomenon.

The creation of the “Macedonian Orthodox Church” against all autocephalous canons, by presidential decree despite the opposition of the Serbian Patriarchate, led to the suspension of spiritual ties that united the Slavs from the Republic of Skopje with the Serbian nation.

It should be noted that Tito personally accepted the official inauguration of its new ecclesiastical policy. On May 28, 1958, at the presidential palace, he accepted the hierarchy of the Serbian Church and in response to Vitentie, the Serbian Patriarch, said: “My wish is that you, as best as possible, address this problem with the Macedonian Church, according to the interests of our country.” (18)

In May 1958, despite Tito’s personal intervention, the Serbian Church refused to address the issue and the following years there was a strong struggle within the Communist Party over the issue of the creation of the “Macedonian Church”. Finally, on July 17, 1967, in a meeting attended by Skopje clergy and lay representatives, held in Ohrid, the “Macedonian autocephalous church” was declared. The Serbian Patriarch reacted immediately and, during a special session

held on September 14 and 15, 1967, it was decided that the “Macedonian Church” of Skopje, with its un-canonical actions would be forced out of the Orthodox Church and it would be labeled a “schismatic religious organization”.

It is clear, and all scholars accept this, that Tito’s government did not care to provide a better answer to meet the spiritual demands of the believers living under the Communist regime. Tito used this opportunity for political fabrications, for propaganda purposes and to highlight the Skopje theses abroad. However, and though it plays only a marginal role in the internal development, the pseudo “Macedonian Church” was effectively used to misinform and deceive migrants from the geographical area of Macedonia (Greece, Bulgaria).

## 8. IS THERE A “MACEDONIAN” MINORITY IN GREECE?

From looking at all previous data, which sets the logical foundations of the thesis that a “Macedonian” minority exists in Greece, we can arrive at a determination that such a minority does not exist. Of course, in the past, there were people with a Slavic consciousness, sometimes describing themselves as Bulgarians and sometimes as Slav-Macedonians. But after the Second World War and after the Greek Civil War they all left and found refuge mainly in Yugoslavia. There, in well-known conditions, they had ad-hoc education and the vast majority of them were assimilated into the local Slavic environment.

Greece rejects any claims made by Skopje for the recognition of a “Macedonian” minority in Greece for the simple reason that, from the moment the population exchanges took place in 1919 between Greece and Bulgaria, and the departure of the “Slavic Macedonians” in 1949, the Greek territory had no Slavic minority. The population with a Slavic consciousness had already emigrated overseas to Canada, Australia and the USA where it has remained to this day. As for the few individuals who speak the idiom and who have remained in Greece, they have shown, during the recent battles that were led by the nation, that they have a Greek consciousness,

particularly since they refused to join the Macedonian Slav national front organizations - the National Liberation Front.

Forty years after the events that marked the decade 1940-1950, urbanization, population mobility, a modern educational system and raising the living standards have greatly lowered bilingualism, i.e. use of other than the basic Greek language; the Slavic idiom (Bulgarian) which Skopje continues to call "Macedonian". Some Greeks from the northern part of the country have learned the idiom for commercial and tourist reasons. (The number of references in the text differs from the number of references that follow because of the difference from the original text from 1993 and the one now available on <http://www.hri.org/does/affair.html>. - noted DM)

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2. Polybious, *Historiae*, Leipzig 1898
3. A. Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 84ff, G. Rousos, *Recent History of the Greek Nation*.
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5. See- *Ekdotike Athinon, Macedonia*
6. E. Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, Thessaloniki 1964, pp. 185ff.
7. Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1915*, Thessaloniki 1966, and Dakin with K. Mazarakis-Ainian, E. Kofos and I. Diamantouros, *The Macedonian Struggle*, Athens 1985
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9. Op. cit., P.176.

10. Hellenism, 1903, p.717

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## **SKOPJE IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION**

Critical review of the MANU edition “Macedonia and its Relations with Greece”, Skopje, 1993

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(EXCERPTS, LAST 23 PAGES OF THE BOOKLET)

In April 1945 the Yugoslavs took advantage of the unstable political situation in Greece and, after the December events, created the organization NOF as a continuation of SNOF which, with the start of the civil war in Greece, joined the Greek communist movement. But soon Gotse's (Ilias Dimakis) group, consisting of Keramidzhiev (Michalis Keramidzis) and Pascal Mitrevski (Paskalis Mitropoulos), began to distribute the thesis of unifying Greek Macedonia with Yugoslav Macedonia, causing serious difficulties for the leadership of the Communist Party of Greece, which was performing military operations mainly with Yugoslav assistance. (To this day there is no document found that would attest to the CPG officially agreeing to sell out Greek Macedonia to Tito in exchange for Yugoslav aid. However that is exactly what the Yugoslav leadership seemed to expect from the CPG in return for aid, to meet its aspirations at the expense of Greek Macedonia. This process was already legally initiated in Bulgarian Macedonia. The October 14, 1946 Agreement was signed by Joanidis-Rankovikj-Karaivanov (see E. Kofos, THE IMPACT OF THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION ON CIVIL CONFLICT IN GREECE 1943-1949 ATHENS 1989, p. 42), which simply regulated relations between NOF and the CPG. Regarding this question, Zahariadis, during the 7<sup>th</sup> Plenum, expressed himself like this: "...Speaking about the significance the Yugoslav factor had for us, we should not forget the following: Tito and his clique for years led a vile, disruptive war against us, mainly between the Slavo-Macedonian population. Bargaining with the Yugoslavs then meant that the war would stop and the Slavo-Macedonians would struggle along with us". Indeed that was the agreement they reached

with Tito, and that point too was covered... See CPG 7<sup>th</sup> Plenum, same as above, p.173.)

Of course, after the Communist International decision for the existence of a “Macedonian nation” (1934) was made, the CPG theoretically recognized the Slavo-phones in Greece as a “Slavo-Macedonian minority”. But since 1935 it had abandoned the slogan “united and independent Macedonia”, which the Communist International had constructed in 1924 causing an internal rift in the party, which fully supported equality for minorities within Greece. After Tito’s clash with the Cominform (1948), the CPG leadership took the Soviet side and worked against Tito. Then, during the 5<sup>th</sup> Plenum (January 1949), it accepted the slogan “national rehabilitation and self-determination of the Macedonian people” to distance itself from Yugoslav Macedonia and from Tito.

“In northern Greece, the Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) people gave it their all and everything for the struggle and fought with full heroism and self-sacrifice which was admirable. There should be no doubt that, as a result of the victory of the people’s revolution and DAG, the Macedonian people would find their full national rehabilitation, exactly as they desire. And so they must spill their blood today to win. The Macedonian communists have always stood at the forefront of the struggle and our people. At the same time, the Macedonian communists should also be aware of the splitting and breaking actions that are led by foreign chauvinistic and reactionary elements to split the unity between the Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) and the Greek people, a split that will serve only their common enemy, the Monarcho-Fascists and American imperialism...” (See 5<sup>th</sup> plenum of the Central Committee of the CPG (January 30 and 31, 1949) - Reports. CPG CC Edition, June 1949, p.16.)

During the 7<sup>th</sup> CPG Central Committee Plenum (May 10 to 18, 1950) Zahariadis explained that this decision was directed “against Tito who, also like the Monarcho-Fascists, suppressed the Macedonian people. Our perspective was not only to free ourselves from the Monarcho-Fascists but also from Tito, who again threw the Macedonians under the imperialist yoke and imperialist exploitation”. (See: CPG Central Committee 7<sup>th</sup> Plenum, same as

above, p.175. After Tito's clash with Stalin, the CPG took the same positions as the Cominform. Because of this, Pascal Mitrevski's Slavo-phone group organized a desertion and left the Democratic Army and went to Yugoslavia where it propagated the spirit of defeat by claiming that the CPG sold out the struggle and that the "Macedonian" nation was spilling its blood in vain. This is the main reason why Zahariadis - according to his own claims - brought up the Macedonian Question during the 5<sup>th</sup> plenum and promised the Slavo-phones ministerial posts in the Interim Government. He wanted to cause interference in the Tito-phile NOF circles and provide support for the Slavo-phones on the eve of an impending battle for the capture of Lerin, where he was expected to install a partisan government. Regarding this issue Zahariadis said: "...Second, despite the fact that we were able to delay the proclamation of that work, which was basically correct, we scheduled the 5<sup>th</sup> plenum because we were under pressure. I say that, despite the fact that it did not correspond to our vested interests, we still emphasized the slogan. Why did we emphasize it? I understand this business and I will give you an explanation, as I understand it. Our wider interests were that in the broader framework that work then did not serve our interests. But, as a priority task before us then it was to ask that the battle for Vicho be won. Everything else was secondary. That thought was leading me when I proposed it when I wrote it and when I explained it. We had to activate all the Slavo-Macedonian forces to stop the desertion, to stop Tito's agents from undermining us, to get in front of the political obstacle. Our priority was to remove all political obstacles because they posed immediate danger to our job. And we did stop the imminent danger..." See: CPG Central Committee 7<sup>th</sup> plenum, same as above, p. 175. After Zahariadis's removal from the CPG (1956), the wider 7<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the CPG Central Committee (February 18 to 24, 1957) disqualified Zahariadis's policy deeming it wrong and restored the old slogan of "the right to equality for the Slavo-Macedonians... in an inseparable unity with the Greek people". See CPG Central Committee wider 7<sup>th</sup> plenum (February 18 to 24, 1957), CPG Central Committee Reports February 1957, p. 21.)

At the same time, many sharp criticisms were voiced at 5<sup>th</sup> Plenum. One of the sharpest criticisms was aimed at the heads of NOF who were accused of being organs of Yugoslavia and who were stripped

from their leadership positions. (See CPG Central Committee 5<sup>th</sup> plenum, same as above, p. 38)

During NOF's Second Congress (March 25 to 26, 1949) the old slogan "United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Communist Federation" was adopted. (On February 15, 1949 the decisions of the NOF Central Committee 2<sup>nd</sup> Plenary Session were published in NOF's "Nepokoren" publication which, among other things, said: "...the NOF Second Congress will be the Congress declaring NOF's new programming principles, principles that are centuries-old desires of our people, to declare the unification of Macedonia into a single united, independent Macedonian state in a Democratic People's Federation of the Balkan nations justified by this long bloody struggle..." See speech by Mitsos Partsalidis given during the CPG Central Committee 7<sup>th</sup> Plenum, same as above, p. 37-38. For the NOF 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress see V. Koitsev "Conclusions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> NOF Congress"; Dimokratikos Stratos, monthly military-political authority of the General Headquarters of the Democratic Army of Greece, May 1949 / t .5 / p. 316-318.)

This decision was aimed against Yugoslavia aspiring to create a united Macedonia within the Yugoslav federation. This turn of events had serious consequences in the sector of military operations. Yugoslavs responsible for defense closed the border, which until then had been used to supply the Greek communists. One part of the NOF Slavo-phones fled and went to Yugoslav Macedonia. After the defeat of the Greek communists in August 1949, the remaining followers of NOF followed the leadership of the CPG and relocated to Eastern Europe. Consequently, the fate of the Slavo-phones who participated in the Greek communist movement in the civil war was similar to the fate of the Greek communists. All those who moved to the Federal Socialist Republic of "Macedonia" became naturalized "Macedonians" and started to deal with the anti-Greek campaign. It was natural and expected of the Greek state to be extremely cautious. But one issue that kept the Skopje historians silent was that many of the Slavo-phones, during the occupation and civil war, had remained firmly annexed with Hellenism and even took arms and fought against NOF.

In chapter 12 of the book “THE IDEA OF MACEDONIAN LIBERATION BETWEEN THE TWO WARS”, p. 87-90, there was talk about a “Macedonian national force” which was fighting for an independent Macedonian state in the period between the two world wars: VMRO and the Executive Committee of the Macedonian brotherhood, Federalists, VMRO (United). It particularly emphasizes the effort to unify the “Macedonian” forces in May 1924, and the decision of the Comintern in 1934, of the existence of the “Macedonian nation”, was regarded as the first international recognition of the “Macedonian national identity”. (p. 89)

However, the actual historical facts are different. After World War I it was mainly the Bulgarian VMRO organization led by Todor Aleksandrov and Aleksandar Protogerov, which strived to gain autonomy for Serbian and Greek Macedonia with aims at later annexing them to Bulgaria. While, in regard to Greek Macedonia, they were trying (unsuccessfully) to set back the implementation of the Greek-Bulgarian agreement on the exchange of population in the Serbian part of Macedonia, where a significant portion of the population had Bulgaro-phil feelings, they applied partisan warfare tactics (1920- 1924), and assassinations of government leaders in the Yugoslav state (1926-1933), as a reaction to the politics of the region and to the Serbia-nization promoted by Belgrade. (S. SVETAS, MAKEDONIEN UND INTERBALKANISCHEN BE ZIEHUNGEN (1920-1924). VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DES INSTITUTS FUR GESCHICHTE OSTEUROPAS UND SUDOSTEUROPAS DER UNIVERSITAT MUNCHEN 1992, p.51-61, 89-127, 145-150, 187-197, 209-224 , 240-241. S. TROEBST, MUSSOLINI, MAKEDONIEN UND DIE MACHTE 1922-1930, KOLN-WIEN 1987.)

Since 1933, under the leadership of the VMRO, Ivan Mihailov propagated the thesis “United and Independent Macedonia” including the Bulgarian part of Macedonia. The VMRO political label “Macedonian” was absolutely a compromise for the Bulgarian national identity. A “United and Independent Macedonia” would be a second Bulgarian state. Federalists (T. bowls, F. Atanasov, N. Yurukov) that broke away from the VMRO in 1920/1921 propagated the idea of creating a federation of the South Slavs as a

way to resolve the Macedonian question. They used the term “Macedonian” for its geographical importance.

VMRO opposition was due in part to ideological and personal and, in part, to tactical reasons. The unification of these two organizations in 1924 followed Soviet diplomacy so that the United Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations, in cooperation with the Bulgarian Communist Party and with members of the Agrarian Party of Bulgaria would sweep to collect Tsankov’s government and establish a working class- Agricultural government in Bulgaria. Soviet diplomacy and the Communist International were trying to remove the Macedonian-Bulgarian organizations from pursuing Bulgarian nationalism and divert them to pursue the existence of a “Macedonian nation” torn apart between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria and to promote the creation of a “United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Federation” in order to erode the Balkan states. The May 6, 1924 Manifesto (published in the first issue of LA FEDERATION BALKANIQUE (July 15, 1924)) signed by the Federalists and by VMRO, which proclaimed covert cooperation between the Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations in Soviet Russia and the declaration of a struggle against the “imperialist” Balkan countries in the name of “Macedonian-ism” and an independent Macedonia, was a creation of Soviet diplomacy. (Negotiations between VMRO Federalists and the Bulgarian Communist Party, which led Vienna to create a “United National Front” against Tsankov’s government was led by the Soviet agent of Communist International in Vienna, Dr. EFRAIM GOLDSTEIN. For his identity see: F. LITTEN “DIE GOLDSTAJN / GOLDSTEIN-VERWECHSLUNG ,. EINE BIOGRAPHISCHE NORIZ ZUR KOMINTERN- AKTIVITAT AUF DEM BALKAN”, SUDOST-EORS CHUNGEN, BD.L (1991), p. 245-250.)

The decision of the Communist International (June 17 to July 8, 1924) about the Macedonian Question taken during the 5<sup>th</sup> Congress was also made in the same spirit.

“... Macedonia’s partition between Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria has further strengthened the desire of the Macedonian people in the parts of their fractured homeland to unite and create a unique and independent Macedonia... The Congress of the 6<sup>th</sup> Conference of the

Balkan Communist Federation (STS: December 1923 in Moscow) - regarded the slogans “United and Independent Macedonia” and “United and Independent Thrace” as quite wholesome and truly revolutionary. The slogans for autonomy for parts of Macedonia and Thrace within the borders of the artificially created bourgeoisie with the Sevres Agreement, etc., should be rejected as opportunistic. They are tantamount to an agreement between the rich layers of the Macedonian and Thracian population and the ruling classes of the corresponding states. The Congress also emphasized that the revolutionary struggle of the Macedonian and Thracian people for their national and social liberation will be successful if it is conducted jointly with the revolutionary workers and peasants of every Balkan state...” (RESOLUTION ZU DEN NATIONALEN FRAGEN IN MITTELEUROPA UND AUF BALKAN - MAZEDONISCHE UND THRAZISCHE, INTERNATIONALE PRESSE-KORRESPONDENZ (BERLIN 1921- November 1923 and Vienna December 1923 - March 1926), No. 134, 1924 15:10, p. 1272-1273).

Communist International plans in 1924, to turn Bulgaria into a communist country and to destabilize the Balkans suffered a setback. (For a critical approach to these issues see Sfetas, same as above, p. 302-337, 362-372.)

However, Soviet interference in the Macedonian Question led to a political and ideological polarization of the Bulgarian-Macedonian movement. The Tsankov government began to clean out all the cadres who had cooperated with the Communists from VMRO. Those who survived created the VMRO (United) in October 1925, and acted mainly in accordance with the activities of the Communist International as a political and ideological antipode to Mihailov’s VMRO under the banner “United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan federation”. The political impact of VMRO (United) in the Balkans was negligible because its headquarters was in Vienna and considered a communist organization by the Balkan states, which was developed mainly for propaganda purposes operating with its journalistic organs LA FEDERATION BALKANIQUE and “Makedonsko Delo” under the influence of the Bulgarian Communists. VMRO (United) pleaded for the national liberation of all oppressed nationalities in Macedonia. The term



“Macedonian people” meant all nationalities in Macedonia, but mainly the Bulgarians. In terms of Greek and Serbian Macedonia, VMRO (United) mainly condemned the national oppression of the Bulgarian people in Macedonia, both political oppression and economic exploitation of the Bulgarian population.

“If we look at the Bulgarian part of Macedonia, we will note that here too the situation is similar to the Serbian and the Bulgarian (translator’s note: ‘Bulgarian’- that’s what was written in the original text, it should read: ‘Greek’) part. The Macedonian Greeks and Turks, who once lived here, were expelled. The population that is living in that part of Macedonia, is of Bulgarian nationality, enjoys cultural rights, has schools, churches, etc., and that is the only difference between the position of the Macedonians in Bulgaria and the ones in Greece and Serbia”. (See VMRO (United) Memorandum from October 9, 1927 addressed to the President of the Congress for National Minorities in Geneva regarding the situation of the oppressed peoples in the Balkans, VMRO (United), documents and materials, Volume 1, Institute of National History, Skopje, 1991 p. 129-135 (here p. 134))

Dimitrov, who had significant influence on the VMRO (United), expressed himself similarly: “... the Bulgarian bourgeoisie is keeping Petrich District (Bulgarian Macedonia) under a strict and harsh regime in relation to the rest of Bulgaria, despite the fact that it considers the Macedonians from that region as a pure Bulgarian population, and is treated as an economic and political war zone. Outside of the language and culture being equal here, national oppression is apparent mainly through economic deprivation and political oppression of the Macedonian population...” (G. Dimitrov, AUSGEWAHLTE SCHRIFTEN, BD.2, 1921-1935, BERLIN ("OST") 1958, p.398-399.)

Up to 1934, VMRO (United) denied the existence of a “Macedonian nationality”. “In Macedonia there never was and there is no separate Macedonian nationality, as there was not, for example, a Swiss nationality. There were and there are certain nationalities who, in a smaller or larger analogy, live in Macedonia, as there are French, German, Italian and Romanian nationalities living in Switzerland, and as these four main nationalities constitute one geographical,

political and economic unity and carry the joint name Swiss people. The Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and Serbs, who are all born and live in Macedonia, constitute an assembled mosaic of people bearing the common name Macedonian people". (Balkan Federation, No.131, 20.3.1930, p. 2869-2870 in K. Paleshutki: The Macedonian Question in Bourgeoisie Yugoslavia 1918 to 1941. Sofia 1983, p. 197.)

In February 1934, for political reasons, the Communist International made a decision to recognize the existence of a "(Slav) Macedonian nation". After Hitler's government came to power and because of the close ties between Milailov's Bulgarian nationalist VMRO and Hitler-ist circles, the USSR wanted to deter the use of the Macedonian question by Nazi Germany in favour of the Bulgarian fascist circles. VMRO (United) and the Balkan Communist parties were invited to start, not only a political and ideological, but also a clear national struggle in favour of Macedonian-ism. It is worth mentioning that the Communist International decision about the existence of the Macedonian nation, characterized Macedonia as a military centre before the impending imperialist war and Bulgaria contesting her right to rule Petrich Region, with extensive claims made on all of Macedonia's territory. Vlahov in his memoirs clearly wrote that the Communist International Executive Committee decision to promote the idea of a Macedonian nation was directly linked to the advent of Nazism in Germany. The Communist International Executive Committee ordered the leaders of the Balkan Secretariat of the Communist International, the Polish Veletski the Czech Shmeral, to reach an appropriate decision. But since they were not familiar with the Macedonian Question, the text of the decision was mainly composed by Vlahov, a leading figure of VMRO (United). Vlahov was called on the negative reactions caused by the decision of the Communist International Executive Committee for highlighting the idea of a Macedonian nation, in the Bulgarian Communist Party (Kolarov, Stanke Dimitrov, V. Chervenkov) and in between the IMRO (United) cadres, who expressed doubt that the theory of a Macedonian nation could be a boomerang for the Organization. The corresponding preparatory discussions were attended by representatives of the Balkan communist parties who studied at the Communist University of National Minorities in Moscow. (See D. Vlahov, Memoirs, Skopje

1970, p. 356-358. Decision was published by the newspaper “Kathimerini”, 12/13/1992.)

VMRO (United) was forced to follow this new political line-up until 1936, when it disbanded. The decision made by the Communist International about the existence of a “Macedonian nation” was generally favourable for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as well as for “Macedonian-ism” and saw an opportunity to win over Serbian and Bulgarian claims on Macedonia.

In itself it is understood why Skopian historiography up until 1990 had no negative attitude towards Alexandrov and Protogerov’s VMRO, and towards VMRO (United). The first was considered as a Bulgarian-chauvinist organization aiming to merge Macedonia with Bulgaria, while the second was considered a Bulgaro-phil organization with ideological and political weaknesses. It is by no accident that the top leaders of VMRO (United), like Vlahov who after 1944 accepted “Macedonian-ism” and occupied leading positions in the Federal Socialist Republic of “Macedonia” was soon afterwards accused of being a “Bulgaro-phil” and removed. In his speech to the First Congress of the Communist Party of “Macedonia” (19/12/1948), Lazar Kolishevski noted that “VMRO (United)’s position was not the same as that of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, regarding the national question”. (L. Kolishevski, *Aspects of the Macedonian Question*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Skopje 1980, page 39.) In two letters to Kolishevski, one dated 05/12/1948, and the other in 1951, Vlahov expressed his opposition regarding the establishment of a basis for an anti-Bulgarian Macedonian nationality. Kolishevski’s indictment of VMRO (United) regarding its Bulgaro-phil character was rejected by the argument that the “Macedonians” literary language between the two World Wars was Bulgarian. See S. TROEBST, *DIE BULGARISCH-JUGOSLAWISCHE KONTROVERSE UM MAKEDONIEN 1967-1982*, MUNICHEN 1983, p.49 and “MIT IVAN KATARDZIEV-AUT DEN GIPFELPFADEN DER MAKEDONISCHEN GESCHICHTE”, *CUDOST- FORSCHUNGEN*, 47/1988, S. 255.)

The decision of the Communist International regarding the “Macedonian nation” remains a theoretical manifesto of the

Communist Parties in the Balkans without a reaction from the population.

S. SFETAS - K. KENTROTIS

## **SKOPJE IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION**

Critical review of the MANU edition “Macedonia and its Relations with Greece”, Skopje, 1993

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(EXCERPTS, THE LAST 15 PAGES OF THE BOOKLET IN THE THIRTEENTH CHAPTER)

Chapter thirteen (The Establishment of the Macedonian State in the Second World War, pp. 91-94) states that during the first days of the occupation, the Communist Party of Macedonia organized resistance which in 1943 and 1944 made considerable gains. Then, in accordance with the decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (29 11 1943 in the Bosnian town of Iaitse) and for the federalization of Yugoslavia, on August 2, 1944, the founding of the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” was proclaimed at the First Macedonian Assembly (ASNOM).

But historic events developed somewhat differently. It is well-known that the Bulgarian army at the time had occupied the Serbian part of Macedonia and was welcomed as a liberator with some sense of Bulgaro-phil euphoria during the first part of the occupation. The Slavic population that turned out had no communist views of a separate “Macedonian nation” or any idea of a Yugoslav federation. There was no Communist Party of “Macedonia” because the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s decision from 1934 to create a “Macedonian” Communist Party found it was not possible. The local communists under the leadership of M. Shatarov broke away from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and crossed into the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) under the slogan “one country, one party”. The subsequent resentment that developed against the Bulgarian occupying authorities was due to social (arbitrary, heavy taxation, contempt of local sentimentality) and not to national reasons. Unable to find favourable grounds, the resistance movement turned towards Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslav

Macedonia. Characteristic of this is the letter from Tito, dated January 16, 1943, addressed to the Local regional Committee for "Macedonia" of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia:

"Dear friends, from the material that you have sent us, it shows that you view the character and aim of our current people's liberation struggle as deficient and wrong, but you have made a huge mistake. In general, it is an obvious weakness of the party organization, which is influenced by the anti-Party clique and by the activities of your previous leader (by which he means Shatorov - our note) and has yet to solidify organizationally and recover politically and become independent. The main characteristics of the party organization in Macedonia are: insufficiently and inconsistently implemented in accordance with the political line of our party, indecision about their implementation, organizational weaknesses and mistakes, loose and reluctant attitudes towards the collective, foreign, non-partisan and opportunistic elements within the party, setting restrictions on the issue of the liberation and independence of the Macedonian people, absence in the links with the acting masses, tolerance for autonomist tendencies in the organizational-party character, and autonomist tendencies of national character..." (See S. Vukmanovich-Tempo, *A Revolution that Flows*, U. 2. Zagreb 1982, p. 371-372.)

The Communist Party of "Macedonia" was founded under great difficulty, in February 1943, by Svetozar Vukomanovich-Tempo, one of Tito's parliamentarians in Yugoslav Macedonia, but without having to change the situation. The armed resistance started developing only after Italy's capitulation (September 1943) and when Germany's defeat was discernible. This was when the CPY began its propagation of the older Communist International thesis on the existence of a separate "Macedonian nation" and with its plans to create a "Greater Macedonia" (which would consist of the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian parts of Macedonia) under a Yugoslav federation. The expansionistic spirit was strongly manifested in the ASNOM proclamation as well as in the texts and public statements made by members of Parliament. The unification of all parts of Macedonia stood out like a "fair and strong" wish on the part of the Yugoslav federation. To achieve this goal, Skopje was asked to play the role of a "Macedonian shield". After Tito's clash with the

Cominform (June 1948) and after the defeat of the Greek communists in August 1949, the Yugoslav leadership temporarily abandoned its plans for a “final solution” of the Macedonian Question and concentrated on growing and strengthening the new national identity of the Slavic population in Yugoslav Macedonia and the elimination of any antagonistic effects.

The “Macedonia-zation” was not realized automatically. It was a procedure during which, in its first phase, the Yugoslav leaders began to eradicate all Bulgarian organizations that were opposed to the idea of Macedonian-ism. The “Macedonia-zation” was then based on an anti-Bulgarian basis and on a new form of Serbian rule in the region. (See Chrnushanov, same as above, p. 283-329.)

At the same time, many veterans of the VMRO were charged with being “Bugaromani”, supporters of Ivan Mihailov and sentenced to imprisonment or death, because they aspired, according to their indictment, to the succession of Yugoslav Macedonia, as an independent state, being placed under the auspices of the Great Powers, believing that it would make it easier to manage the unification of all parts of Macedonia as a united and independent state. Included among the victims of this was Chento, the first President of ASNOM. (For the trials that took place during the second half of the forties and the events thereafter, consult Risteovski’s most recent book “Tried for Macedonia” (1945-1985), Skopje (publication of “Vreme”) 1993. Today’s President Kiro Gligorov was for the non-entry of Yugoslav Macedonia into the future of the Yugoslav federation in 1943. See K. Paleshutki, “NATIONAL PROBLEM IN THE JUGOSLAV FEDERATION”, BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES / INSTITUT FOR BALKAN STUDIES (SOFIA), NATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE BALKANS, SOFIA 1992, p. 96.20.)

At the same time, the Yugoslav leaders fielded questions about respecting the rights of the supposed “Macedonian” minority in neighbouring countries. Many references from the Yugoslav leadership, regarding this issue, clearly say that the regime established by Tito never showed much interest in a united Macedonia. Official historiography and social sciences in the former Socialist Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were mobilized

in one ethno genesis operation, which inevitably stumbled on a historical tradition and the cultural identity of most neighbouring nations. Skopje's fresh national ideology relied on the assumption that "Macedonian people" in all three parts of the eponymous geographic area will match and that the Greek and Bulgarian parts of Macedonia are not free.

Chapter fifteen (THE MACEDONIAN LANGUAGE IN THE BALKAN LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT, p. 105-111) and chapter sixteen (MACEDONIAN CULTURE, p. 113-119) talk about the morphological characteristics of the "Macedonian language", about its affirmation in international science and about its literary production after 1944.

The term "Macedonian language" at the level concerning the Slavic linguistic idiom has created confusion. The true Macedonian language is the language of the ancient Macedonians, a Greek Doric dialect. The so-called "Macedonian language", both in terms of morphology and structure, has many common features with the Bulgarian language. For example, the absence of the infinitive, the absence of descent, the use of the indefinite timing, member, the descriptive form of comparative, etc. Based on these facts the so-called "Macedonian language" could be characterized more as a Bulgarian idiom. (H. BRAUER, SLAVISCHES SPRACHWISSENSCHAFT, BERLIN 1961, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (Institute of the Bulgarian Language. The common Bulgarian language of the past and today, /from the Bulgarian magazine "Bulgarian language" 1/1978/ Sofia , 1978.)

After 1945 a systematic effort was made to de-Bulgarize the Slavic idiom. The Serbian alphabet was adopted, the typical Bulgarian letter "Ѣ" was abolished and many Serbian words (government, role, reality, profession, floor) were adapted despite the fact that there were corresponding Bulgarian words. The instrumental locative Serbian language was adopted as an object of expressing verbs with the proposed "so" plus the appropriate word, something which was unnatural in this idiom (for example: upravljam drzhavom - upravuvam so drzhavata), the extension of the surnames from "ova" and "ov" were turned into "ovska" and "ovski". (For the influence of the Serbian language see N. REITER "DIE



SERBISCHMAKEDONISCHE SYMBIOSE”, YUGOSLAWIEN, INTERNATIONSPROBELEME IN GESCHICHTE UND GENENWART. BEITRAGE, ZUM V. INTERNATIONALEN SUDOSTEUROPA - KONGRESS, GOTTINGEN 1984, p. 178-195.)

Similarly, it needs to be pointed out that the so-called “Macedonian language” is not unique and uniform, but there are many similar languages depending on the region. Several dialects from the region were used as a basis for creating a literary “Macedonian language” in the Federal Socialist Republic of “Macedonia”, because they were considered to be least influenced by the Bulgarian literary language. Despite raising the so-called “Macedonian language” to a literary level after 1944, and with the uptake of many Serbian words, it still remains a poor language.

Chapter fourteen (THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA FROM A MEMBER STATE OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION TO A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE, p. 95-104) deals with a modern view of the Macedonian Question, namely with the period after 1944 when, for the first time the so-called “Macedonians” gained their own state, and to today’s events with the secession of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation and its path to independence and international recognition.

The most important among the items to be made use of here, in relation to the post-war period, are as follows:

In the framework of a united Yugoslavia, the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” will become known worldwide and the “Macedonian” nation will be recognized by the international community.

Because it became impossible for the republics to separate from the federal system, their people decided to free themselves by getting rid of that framework. The “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, through a peaceful and democratic process, took the necessary steps which finally allowed it to gain its independence, as opposed to other Yugoslav republics which, even today, are trying through military means to assert their new status.

Significant elements of the liberation of the Republic of Macedonia from the Yugoslav federation and its departure on the path of parliamentary democracy were achieved through a referendum held on September 8, 1991. The referendum marked Macedonia's independence and its constitution was promulgated on November 17, 1991.

The Constitution, which was the result of centuries of struggle by the "Macedonian" people for their national freedom, fully corresponded with the general principles of international law as well as with UN and CSCE decisions for a democratically organized society, acceptance of the parliamentary system of governance, peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries, respect for personal and collective rights of all citizens, particularly the minorities, protection of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious customs of the citizens of this republic, etc.

Based on the expert opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Commission (K. Ioannou: The question of recognition of Skopje, Athens - Komotini 1992) for the Yugoslav crisis, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had met all conditions set by the European Union on December 16, 1991 for the recognition of the Yugoslav republics. (The joint position of the foreign ministers in the last paragraph specifically stated: "... the community and its member-states require of the Yugoslav republic, before being recognized, to provide political and constitutional assurances that it will not make territorial claims against neighbouring member states of the community and that it would not propagate hostile propaganda against neighbouring member countries in the community, including the use of the name 'Macedonia' which implies territorial claims...")

At the end of this chapter, two declarations were specifically mentioned by the Parliament of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The first declaration, made on July 3, 1992, refers to the Lisbon decision made by European Union member states on June 27, 1992, which required this Republic to choose such a name, which would not include the term "Macedonia" in order to be recognized and to join the European Union. The second declaration,

made on July 29, 1992, referred to the Republic of Skopje's decision to apply for admission into the UN.

From the particular findings and events listed in this chapter, one can make the following observations:

Writing about the first post-war multi-party elections of November 1990 in this book was telegraphic. According to the election results (B. Timovski / S. Stefanovski Elections: 90. Political parties in Macedonia, Skopje, 1991), which were quietly announced, the extreme nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) was the undisputed winner. The name and the political program of this organization were taken straight from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. It was indeed no coincidence that this party, in a State Department report (PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: APRIL 1991, WASHINGTON p. 18), in 1991, was named a terrorist organization precisely because of its activities being based on the old VMRO from a century ago. Also, displayed in its central campaign poster, was a map of Macedonia's entire geographical territory with the slogan: "Take its fate in your hands." Even its pre-election manifesto categorically stated: "VMRO-DPMNE considers that the parts of the Macedonian nation that live under occupation in Greece, Bulgaria and Albania are not national minorities, but segments of the enslaved parts of the Macedonian nation, for a nation that has lived for ten centuries in its own homeland cannot be qualified as a national minority. VMRO-DPMNE feels there is immediate need for the spiritual, political and economic unification of the Macedonian people... and truly cares about the Macedonian people living enslaved in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania..." (B. Timovski / S. Stefanovski, same as above, p. 137.)

During the Party's First National Conference held in Prilep on April 6 and 7, 1991 it was decided that the next conference would be held in Solun and after that in Blagoevgrad (Macedonian Voice (ROCKDALE AUSTRALIA) No. 29, 04/23/1991). There is a hidden game behind this referendum which was not referenced in this chapter and that is that 68.32% of the registered and 95.09% of the voters made it clear that they wanted "the sovereignty of an autonomous Macedonia, with the right to participate in a union of

sovereign states in Yugoslavia”. But inside the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and outside, the first part of the referendum question was stressed, i.e. the autonomy of the “Republic of Macedonia”, which was interpreted as “independence” and the second part was under-stressed. Also, the Albanians from that country did not participate in the referendum. It was not until January 11 and 12, 1992 that they organized their own referendum where 99.86% demanded territorial and political autonomy. (LE MONDE, 18.1.1992.)

Despite the amendments and other changes made to the Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it still maintained its irredentist character. The main accent is put on the disputed articles from the 1991 Constitution (3 and 49 with corresponding changes-additions, 68 and 74) with aims at acquitting the absence from conducting unfriendly propaganda and laying territorial claims by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Here is a direct reference pointing to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s expansionist aspirations found in the preamble of its Constitution: “... following in the state-legal traditions of the Krushevo Republic (1903) and in the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Macedonia (1944)...” ; the decisions that marked the creation of the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” within Federal Yugoslavia. Clearly, proclaimed with these decisions are the freedom and flexibility of all “brother Macedonians” beyond the artificial 20<sup>th</sup> century boundaries that shaped the Balkans.

Indicative of this is also the following excerpt from the “Report of the Organizing Committee of National Liberation of Macedonia” (ASNOM) in connection with the activities of the establishment to its first session (August 2, 1944).

“... At this instant, when all fighting forces in Macedonia are engaged in combat against the fascist occupiers, appealing to the other two segments of the Macedonian people to join the grand anti-fascist front, since it is the only way to win the right to self-determination and the path leading to the unification of the entire Macedonian nation in a free community of emancipated peoples of

Yugoslavia. The fighting Piedmont of Macedonia has fiercely proclaimed that it will not stint on support or sacrifice for the liberation of the other two segments of our nation and the universal unification of the entire Macedonian people. When we know that the fighting Piedmont of Macedonia is part of Tito's Yugoslavia then it is obvious how great our support could be and how firm our desire is for the unification of our entire nation..." (THE UNIVERSITY OF "CYRIL AND METHODIUS", FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY, DOCUMENTS ON THE STRUGGLE OF THE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND A NATION-STATE, VOL.2, 1985 SKOPJE, p. 607.)

Similarly, in the manifesto of the First ASNOM Session of the people of Macedonia (August 2, 1944) it characteristically says: "... In view of the centuries-old ideals of the people of Macedonia, the first Macedonian National Council proclaims to the entire world its just and resolute aspiration FOR THE UNIFICATION OF THE WHOLE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE on the principle based on the right to self-determination. This would put an end to the oppression of the Macedonian people in all its parts and would provide conditions for genuine solidarity and peace among the Balkan peoples..." (Ibid: DOCUMENTS, VOL.2, p. 635.)

The element of expansion is not essentially annulled with the amendments and partial amendments to Articles 3 and 49. It is possible, of course, by further amending Article 3 of the Constitution, that "the Republic of Macedonia will have no territorial claims against its neighbouring countries", which will represent significant progress. But, essentially, it has more of a symbolic gesture, if this amendment is supported as such or otherwise by state obligations (mandatory rule of international law - *JUS COGENS* to not have territorial pretensions under illegal means, such as the use of violence or breach of international conventions).

Article 3 in relation to Articles 68 and 74, which also relates to border changes, fits into the logic that, if such a change in the border is made, it is made to merge and not to lose territory belonging to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as if all its territory under the Constitution is "indivisible" and "inviolable". To this day,

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has not declared official recognition of the existing border with Greece.

In reference to Article 49 of the Constitution regarding minorities; “The Republic of Macedonia cares for the status and rights of the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries...” - Supplement and amendment on January 6, 1992, to say “that the Republic of Macedonia will not meddle in sovereign rights and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries” are also an essential lever for territorial claims at the expense of neighbouring countries. The unilateral and arbitrary Constitutional claim of the existence of “Macedonians” in neighbouring countries, when no such thing is recognized by international agreements, is essentially deemed as interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries with the motive of protecting the rights of the so-called “Macedonian” minority and, consequently, the said amendment - an amendment which is devoid of value and content.

Here we are specifically talking about the protection of personal and collective rights of the various minority groups in the Republic of Skopje - especially in some articles of the 1991 Constitution. Indicative in this book is the systematic reference of the role of international organizations (UN, CSCE, Council of Europe etc.). There is a clear effort to show that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in the framework of international legality, is applying the correct rules arising from its international obligations and in particular those that are quite agreeable with the latest understanding of the protection of minorities and human rights.

However, charges made by minority groups in the Republic against the practice applied by the Skopje state authorities, on their behalf, are daily and on a permanent basis. Indicative of the situation in the sector of minorities is a letter sent on June 18, 1993, from Nevzat Halili, President of the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to Kiro Gligorov, President of the Republic of Macedonia: “... decisions in the Macedonian Parliament are made by majority, on a national basis and anti-democratically, without achieving national consensus on core national issues. The electoral laws are creating problems. These laws are very unfavourable to the Albanians, if you take into

account the constituencies and the number of voters corresponding to one lawmaker. For an Albanian MP this corresponds to approximately 8,000 voters, while for a Macedonian MP it corresponds to 3,500 voters...” In all the cities of Macedonia, the regions carry only Macedonian names rather than names used by the inhabitants of the regions, even in cities where the Albanians are 50% or even 80% of the population, such as Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar, Kichevo, Struga, Krushevo, as in most parts of the city of Skopje. No city has an Albanian cultural centre or an Albanian name. There is only one Albanian-Turkish theater versus eight Macedonian professional theaters. The representation of Albanians in schools for secondary education is more than symbolic. There are no Albanian high officials in the court system or in any of the medical centres...” (Nova Makedonija, June 19, 1993.)

Member States of the European Union, on August 28, 1991 and again on September 3, 1991, established the Badinter Arbitration Commission. In the beginning it was decided that the Arbitration Commission would consist of five members headed by Badinter, President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of France, while two out of its five members would be specified by the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia. But the final composition turned out to be a little different; it was made up only of presidents of constitutional courts; Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain. The work of this committee had some notable characteristics:

- a) It did not clearly determine the issues of its diagnostic jurisdiction;
- b) There was no obligation from the interested parties to comply with its decisions;
- c) The Commission did not, according to the accepted tactics, do any research on the spot, nor question any witnesses;
- d) It exclusively relied on only two European Union texts and sent only one question to the interested parties supposing the European Union text covered the recognition of individual Yugoslav republics;

e) The Commission actually did not resolve any disputes, leaving the political framework of the texts, which had consequences, to further complicate the situation.

In delivering his expert opinion, No.6 from January 11, 1992, regarding the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Arbitration Commission was of the opinion that:

1. Constitutional provisions obliged international recognition as a candidate country;
2. Unilateral statements made by officials from a recognized state have mandatory importance in international law. (A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from December 20, 1991, as well as additional data submitted with another letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from January 11, 1992.);
3. It generally did not determine the meaning of “hostile propaganda”;
4. It finds the thesis that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, since it renounced its territorial pretensions on its neighbouring countries, through corresponding amendments to the 1991 Constitution, satisfactory and that the use of the name Macedonia could not imply territorial claims against another state;
5. It does not take into consideration Greek reservations and opposition, or the opinions of the various minority groups from inside the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Following the Lisbon decision by Member States of the European Union on June 27, 1992, with negative consequences for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, its expansionist policy was reinforced with the appropriation of the ancient Greek-Macedonian emblem, the Sun of Vergina with its sixteen rays, as the official flag of the Republic. In August 1992, the Parliament of Skopje officially confirmed a new emblem for the newly created Republic flag. There is nothing said about this in the book. This fact and events that



followed, to some extent, show that this move could have been interpreted as a tactical manoeuvre by the Former Republic of Macedonia state leadership. In some future negotiations Skopje could take down this symbol, a fact that would be interpreted by the international community as a huge concession to Greek claims, which in effect would seem as if something was actually being “returned”, something which, to this day, has never been considered as part of the historical development of the Republic of Skopje. (See article: A. Sholjakovski, “State symbol as an international problem”. About the flag see: Nova Makedonija, 1,2,3/5, 1993. D Maleski “Compromise to achieve our goal”, Nova Makedonija, 01/19/1994.)

If we were to create a general overview of the development of the Macedonian Question from 1950 to today, we would be forming the following picture: Since the beginning of the 1950’s Tito’s “Macedonian” policy was concentrated on two points. First, the growing and strengthening of the “Macedonian” identity of the population in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia in order to offset the impact of antagonistic Bulgaria. Second, protect the “Macedonian” minority in the neighbouring countries. Even the claim to these minorities was a basic parameter of Tito’s management tactic for the development of Yugoslavia.

Belgrade and Skopje’s interest in the “Macedonian” minority in the neighbouring countries was a result of wanting to create more points of contention and tension between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, compared to the level of relations with Greece, which Yugoslavia had maintained. The tones between Belgrade and Athens were lowered when, with participation from Turkey, the Balkan trilateral agreement (1953-54) was signed to strengthen Yugoslavia and the West’s anti-Soviet policy.

Contrary to the central government in Belgrade, the local leaders of the “People’s” and later the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” continued their sharp tone against Greece. The Greek part of Macedonia inevitably became a major subject of expansionist aspirations. Their aspiration was manifested in their need to emphasize all the characteristics fused in their national ideology, as well as historical roots, language and church. At the same time, they

were appropriately strengthening the arsenal of the national “Macedonian” ideology with the urgently necessary “great idea”.

This was required from the historians of this tiny state, to strengthen the “Macedonian” ethno genesis inside the state mainly through historical tradition and by the cultural identity of the neighbouring peoples. This was done by adopting and usurping every bit of foreign data and by disputing the origin of such data. The historical myth, i.e. unification of all parts of Macedonia, was necessary and needed to strengthen “Macedonian-ism” abroad, especially in the countries of the New World where the presence of people born in geographical Macedonia was especially pronounced.

The Slavo-phone emigrants from Macedonia became not only the recipients of the “Macedonian great idea” but also its primary carriers worldwide. Thanks mainly to the Slavo-phone communities abroad, the international community, during the period of postwar polarization, came into close contact with Skopje’s irredentist vision.

Strong nationalist tendencies began to develop in those communities in the late 1960’s which, at times were very different from Skopje’s official ideology. (Indicative of this is the Vergina Sun sixteen ray symbol, which become a subject of exploitation by “Macedonian” nationalist circles in Australia. See MACEDONIA. WEEKLY HERALD (KILMORE / VICTORIA), 15.9.1983.)

Following the general method of educating the post-war generations, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and abroad, it is easy to identify the two axes around which the dogma of the “Macedonian” national ideology revolves. The first axis contains the appropriation of the cultural heritage from the entire geographical area of Macedonia and from the ancient Macedonians. This is done through the constant challenge of the Greek-ness of the ancient Macedonians (See school accessories from Skopje regarding the old period. B. Draskovich - I. Malek. History for 5<sup>th</sup> grade, Skopje 1987, p. 71, 74. S. Mladenovski, History for 1<sup>st</sup> grade, Skopje, 1992, p. 129-134,148,158) and their language. Maps that clearly separate Greek Macedonia from its body, throughout history, are also included which, in an indirect way, identify the inhabitants of the

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the ancient Macedonians, with the geographical territory they ruled and also with their achievements. Based on the second axis of a “Macedonian” national ideology, post-war generations in the Republic of Skopje are raised with the sense that their Macedonia is freed in stages, by evolving first to the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” and then to the “Republic of Macedonia”.

The other parts of Macedonia held by Greece, Bulgaria and Albania remain enslaved and should be freed in the future. (Draskovich-Malek, same as above p. 55, 67, 73, 77, 86, 94, 109, 112, 114. Mladenovski, same as above p. 212.)

In fact, all throughout the postwar period, propaganda activities by official and unofficial circles of the Republic of Skopje, inside and abroad, never ceased. This irredentist policy was implemented either directly by official statements made by political leaders, or indirectly with the distribution of maps of a united Macedonia, leaflets, calendars and general publications with an aggressive spirit against Greece, which challenges the Greek cultural heritage and Greek symbols.

Throughout this entire period, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued to fully abuse the name “Macedonia”. It has used every chance to turn Macedonia’s geographical meaning into a national meaning, a country whose main characteristic is destruction of the presence of the national, linguistic and religious minorities, which do not identify fully with the Slavic culture and with the “Macedonian” irredentist ideology. According to the last census (Detailed census data from 1991 in Skopje, see Stanovnishtvo, 3-4 / 1990 1-2 / 1991, Belgrade, p. 300-301 STATISTICAL OFFICE OF MACEDONIA: BASIC STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE POPULATION <SKOPJE <DECEMBER 1991, p. 14-16) conducted in the Republic of Skopje on March 31, 1991, the first largest nationality was that of the Albanians, which numbered 21.1% of the total population (427,313 people, total 2,033,964). Albanian political and spiritual leaders, however, vigorously denied these official numbers and talk about higher percentages, ranging from 35% to 40% (about 800,000) (M. ANDRELEVITCH, “RESURGENT NATIONALISM IN MACEDONIA”, REPORT

ON EASTERN EUROPE, VOL.2, No. 20, 17.5.1991, p.27). On the other hand many Albanians did not participate in the 1991 census because they disagreed with the manner of its implementation.

The official data from the 1991 census (the census of 1991 does not mention specifically the existence of other minority groups, such as Greeks, Bulgarians and others) also included other minority groups, such as Turks 4.7% (97,416), Roma (Gypsies) 2.73% (55,577), and Serbians 2.17% (44 159). (So, even though the Serbians are the fourth largest minority group, according to the official data from the 1991 census, they are not mentioned in the preamble of the 1991 Constitution, including the nationalities which enjoy equal rights, the “Macedonians”.)

By summarizing all of the above, one can draw the following conclusion:

1. Only today’s Greek Macedonia can be considered representative of the ancient historic Macedonia;
2. No “Slav-Macedonian ethno-genesis” had ever surfaced, not in the Middle Ages as a result of mixing ancient Macedonians with Slavs and establishing a “Slav-Macedonian state”, nor in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century as a consequence of desire to differentiate the Slavo-phones from Macedonia from the Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs;
3. The so-called “Macedonian nation” is a creation of the Communist International and Tito’s Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia rejected Bulgarian claims on the Yugoslav part of Macedonia through this artificial nationality, and propagated its expansionism on the entire geographic Macedonia;
4. Although the epilogue of the book emphasizes the need for Greece to become the incarnate of the new European policy in the Balkans and in relations between Athens and Skopje, so that they are not under the influence of historical stereotypes of the past, however, the real purpose of this book was to convince the international public opinion of its historical rights, based on the “glorious past” of the “Macedonian” nation, its special national

identity and its right to a separate and independent state. Based on this “historic psychosis” of Skopje’s, even if a political regularity is found in the dispute between Athens and Skopje, for which many attempts have been made in recent years within the European Union and the UN, to achieve consensus among historians of the Balkan countries for the historical aspect of the Macedonian Question, it would be an unfounded view.

## **SANU MEMORANDUM**

(Group of academics of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) on current social issues in our country (Serbia))

Note

The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) Memorandum was written sometime in 1985/1986 and was published in various places by mainly semi-official publications. Here we will introduce it in the form published in "Nashe Teme", Zagreb, 1989, 33 (1-2), p. 128-163; the text contains a brief introduction and two parts: Crisis of the Yugoslav economy and society; and - Serbia and the Serbian people's position.

Because of space limitations, we will provide only a brief introduction and the second part of the Memorandum; items considered to be an ideological introduction to the breakup of Yugoslavia. The first section contains reviews of the Yugoslav one-party, non-democratic, self-governing and quasi-market system. It covers Serbian lag of development, inconsistently applied minority autonomy rights and majority democracy. We will continue with two texts (Shesheli Subotich) supplied with explanations. Here we are talking about a book of over 1000 pages, with a very complex structure (15 chapters with over 50 chapters, subdivisions etc., with numerous references, literature and so on.), which covers the entire history of the Serbians, territory, religion, language and culture, and its relations with the other neighbouring nations, and other topics. Special attention is given to its relations with the Croats, Albanians, Bosnians, etc., between themselves and the Macedonians.

### **INTRODUCTION**

Stagnation in the development of society, economic difficulties, growing social tensions and open international conflicts, causing deep concern in our country.

Severe crisis hit not only the political and economic system, but also the entire public order of the country. Everyday occurrences such as irresponsibility and neglect of job responsibilities, corruption and

nepotism, lack of legal certainty, bureaucratic arbitrariness, disregard of the law, growing mistrust between people and the more unscrupulous individual and group egoism.

The collapse of moral values, bad reputation of leading society institutions, distrust in the ability of those who make decisions followed by apathy and indignation in the people, alienation from all the officers of law and order. Objective examination of the Yugoslav reality has revealed that there is plenty of opportunity that the current crisis will end in a social shock with unforeseeable consequences, not excluding the devastating outcome of the breakup of the Yugoslav state. No one is entitled to close their eyes on what is happening and what could happen, especially not the oldest institution of scientific and cultural achievements of our people.

The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts feels obligated, at this fateful moment, to share its views on the social situation and is of the belief that it can contribute to the exit from current troubles. The nature of this document, however, does not allow a departure from the key issues of the Yugoslav reality. Sadly, included among these questions, we must also include the unspecified and, with the new developments, the very gloomy situation of the Serbian people.

## SANU MEMORANDUM (2)

(Changes to the Yugoslav Constitution, taking into account the following great, civilized principles that are a necessary condition for the rise of a modern society)

a) Sovereignty of the people. At the very foundation of modern civilization is the idea that the highest source of political power are the people, that the only legitimate political authority is one that comes from the freely-expressed will of the people, and therefore there are no moral or legal grounds for any elite (by the grace of God, by blood, religion, race, class, ideological affiliation, historical merit or by whatever other excuse) to take possession by force of the right to speak, to decide and to serve in the name of the people.

People can relinquish political power to their representatives only at certain times. People have the right to choose their representatives,

control them and change them and, if necessary, replace them, even by force. Should their representatives choose to break their “social contract” and pursue their own interests instead of the general interests of the public, then the people have the right to remove them. The people’s principle of sovereignty affirms the democratic political philosophy and practice of the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century. However, the ultimate consequences of this radical principle bring into being a socialist theory. If the monopoly of economic power is also one that is based on the formation of elites whose powers can be imposed on society and if they achieve full control of political life, then the people’s principle of sovereignty becomes incompatible and so are all the institutions that provide that monopoly, be it in a capital or bureaucratic state. In this sense the full sovereignty of the people would be realized even in a classless society in which political and economic and cultural life can be organized in a democratic way.

The assumption for such a democracy (“democracy of the councils” or “integrated self-management”) is a free choice of having the right to change all officials, to have public control over their work, to share in their governing powers and to remove bureaucratic privileges. These prerequisites have long been realized in modern societies. Yugoslavia, however, has not made that transition and has not yet reached that level, but for some time now it has made the proclamation for the idea of self-management, de-bureaucratization and the adaptation of professionalism in its politics.

b) Self-determination of a nation. In a modern society, every political oppression and discrimination on the grounds of nationality is unacceptable and uncivilized. The Yugoslav solution to the national question, in the beginning, could have been seen as an exemplary model of a multinational federation in which the principle of a single state and state policy were successfully attached to the principle of political and cultural autonomy of nations and national minorities. In the course of the last two decades, however, we have witnessed an increase in the weakening of the unity principle and in exaggeration in the principle of national autonomy, which in practice turned into parts of sovereignty (the republics which are not nationally homogeneous). Weaknesses that were present in the model from the beginning became increasingly



visible. All nations were equal: the Serbian nation, for example, did not receive the right to have its own state. Segments of the Serbian population, which lived in significant numbers in other republics, had no rights, as opposed to national minorities, to speak its own language and use its own alphabet, to politically and culturally organize, to jointly develop the unique culture of its people. The unprecedented persecution of the Serbians living in Kosovo showed that those principles that protect the autonomy of a minority (Albanians) are not applied when it comes to protecting minorities within the minority (the Serbs, Croats, Turks and Roma living in Kosovo). Given the existing forms of national discrimination in Yugoslavia today, this country cannot be seen as modern and democratic.

c) Human rights. The modern era has begun with the affirmation of human rights. Originally they were called civil rights: freedom of thought, of conscience, of speech, of movement, of conformity, to organize, public expression, demonstrations, choosing representatives. In this century these civil rights were added to the socio-economic rights: the right to work, to a free choice of profession, education, equal remuneration for equal work, to social security. The UN General Assembly formulated these rights in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10, 1948. Our country is one of those countries which had adopted this declaration; Yugoslavia is also a signatory to the Helsinki Agreement and all related documents.

There is no doubt that there are a number of modern countries which, to a degree, have realized even less human rights than we have in our country. But here, “verbal assaults” are still prosecuted, books are prohibited and destroyed, theatrical presentations are taken out of the repertoire because of “unacceptable ideas”, public sharing of opinions is hindered, organizing is prohibited, events and demonstrations are prohibited, use of constitutional rights to protest by sending petitions to state bodies qualify as hostile acts, protest leaders are pursued and persecuted, the election of officials is turning into a farce of self-appointments. While all this is going on we cannot consider ourselves a civilized and enlightened society.

d) Rationality. Our modern age is an age of rationality. Social institutions and the way social life is organized must pass the test in the court of reason. It is not always about rational objectives: a major weakness in our epoch is the separation of politics from ethics and science. But instrumental rationality and the ability to find adequate means, once adopted, effective implementation of policies ‘*conditio sine qua non*’ can be determined for any modern state. It further means that any modern state has a great system when individual parts are regulated in a unique way and also coordinated and directed so that the rules of the game are clear, stable and changeable only after serious study and preparation. State officials are selected primarily according to criteria of competence and personal integrity and decisions are largely made based on reliable information and on costs and benefits analysis. Here, none of those ‘rational policy’ conditions are satisfied: our country is composed of eight separate and poorly connected systems, and an overall development policy does not exist. And if it does not exist on paper it could not be realized in practice; the rules of the game are constantly changing ad hoc and at best are made known only one year earlier; our officials are selected primarily on a criteria of loyalty and are largely incompetent; decisions are made quickly, arbitrarily and with bias, without public discussion, on the basis of unreliable, one-sided information and without considering other possible alternatives. While this irrational working style prevails in our politics, we can not consider ourselves a modern society.

From this analysis it follows that political democratization and fundamental personnel renewal, real self-determination and equality of all members of the Yugoslav nations, including Serbia, full realization of civil and human socio-economic rights, consistent rationalization of the Yugoslav political system and policy development are those necessary preconditions without which it cannot even be imagined how we can get out of the current crisis that has gripped Yugoslav society.

## SERBIA AND THE SERBIAN PEOPLE’S POSITION

6. Many troubles that plague the Serbian people emerged in circumstances that are common to all Yugoslav peoples.

However, the Serbian people were also pressured by other troubles. The long-term lag in the development of the economy in Serbia, the non-regulated state-legal relations with Yugoslavia and the provinces, as well as the genocide in Kosovo, appeared on the political scene, with a strong joint force, that made the situation tense, if not explosive. These three burdensome issues, arising from the long-term policy towards Serbia, with its own dramatics, threaten not only the Serbian people but also the stability of the whole of Yugoslavia. Because of that, these issues must be given full attention.

It does not take much knowledge and information to determine the long lag in Serbia's economy. However, this was officially done in the 1981-1985 Plan, in which was written that; measures will be taken in this era to stop such tendencies. That obligation quickly fell into oblivion. Five years were spent doing new tests to determine if Serbia had lost pace in its development. However, arguably the findings confirmed what was already known which, according to important indicators, was that the economy was constantly moving below the Yugoslav average, with increasing lag. The slower development lacked the strength to overcome the economic underdevelopment of part of its territory that comprised 1.5 million people with a GDP per capita of over 30% lower than the corresponding income in the three underdeveloped republics.

The tests left no shadow of doubt about Serbia's relatively backward economy which was primarily due to lower investment per capita, and not due to the lower efficiency of investment. According to official statistics, performance in Serbia on the whole post-war period was second only to Slovenia and Vojvodina, and in the past decade (1973-1983) was highest in Yugoslavia. Greater efficiency could partially complement the loss of the social product for smaller investments, but could not prevent the formation of the value of fixed assets per capita for a total of 80.5% of the Yugoslav average, which was even less than that of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two underdeveloped republics.

During the entire post-war period, Serbia's economy was exposed to unequal exchanges. The most current example of such an exchange was the low-cost electricity being shipped in large quantities to other

republics. Instrumental measures taken in its current economic and credit-monetary policy, contributions to the federation fund, in particular, for the development of economically underdeveloped areas, more recently were the most important contributing factors to Serbia's relatively lagging economy. If we add to this that the most developed republics, because of the poor conditions in Serbia, began to pour their capital into Serbia's economy (agriculture, food industry, commerce and banking), we get a picture of a subordinate and neglected economy within the Yugoslav space.

The consistent discrimination against Serbia's economy in the postwar period cannot be fully explained without accepting the inter-nation relations that took place between the two World Wars, the way in which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia viewed and assessed them. In this respect, the authoritative Comintern had decisive influence on the effort to achieve strategic and tactical ideas internationally, which at the time pursued the policy of dismantling Yugoslavia. The ideological justification used was that the Serbians were an "oppressive" nation with the others being the "oppressed" people. This kind of policy was a dramatic example of the Marxist doctrine used for class division on every nation before its political pragmatism which, in its attempts to use national inter-friction, pushed class internationalism into the background. That somewhat explains why the CPY did not bother to do its own research in order to get to the truth about the economic nature of inter-nation relations. The assessment of these relations, which came down to the political hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie, followed by appropriate economic domination of Serbia, in fact, was taken from the separatist-oriented civil parties. Neither before nor after the war was the CPY in a position where it had direct knowledge of directly determining the true situation...

The consistent repetition of the pre-war assessment, during the course of the four decades that followed, suggests that there was an extremely large political and economic need to maintain this wrong assessment. It was meant to instill a sense of historical guilt in the Serbian people in order to frustrate their resistance to the political and economic system to which they were subordinated.

The pre-war assessment of Serbia's economy was based on postwar politics which, clearly enough, was declared in the interpretation of the first five-year plan. It was then decided that Serbia would follow a slower pace of industrialization following Slovenia. In practice, this policy began with the relocation of industrial plants for building airplanes, trucks and weapons to the other republics, it continued with compulsory purchases of raw materials and agricultural products at cut prices, with lower investment per capita in terms of the Yugoslav average and made contributions to the development of underdeveloped areas... Slovenia and Croatia started at the highest level of development and had the fastest growth. With the improvement of their position, a relative gap between them and the rest of Yugoslavia began to develop and deepen over the years. With this turn of events, which deviated from the originally proclaimed policy of balanced development, it was made impossible for the economic system not to be biased, and made it possible for those two republics to be able to impose solutions that suited their economic interests...

Serbia's economic subordination cannot be fully understood without understanding its inferior position, which determined all its relations. The economic hegemony of the Serbian people between the wars was not in dispute for the CPY, regardless of Serbia's industrialization being slower than the Yugoslav average. Opinions and behaviours, which had decisive influence on subsequent political developments and on international relations, were formed on that ideological platform. The Slovenes and Croats, before the war, had created their own national communist parties and gained decisive influence in the CPY central Committee. Their political leaders had become arbiters in all political questions during and after the war. These two neighbouring republics shared a similar historical fate, had the same religion and strived for greater autonomy and, being the most developed, shared common economic interests, which were sufficient reasons for a permanent coalition in trying to achieve political dominance. The coalition has solidified a long cooperation between Tito and Kardeli, the two most prominent political figures of post-war Yugoslavia, who enjoyed undisputed authority in the centres of power. This monopoly on power allowed them to significantly influence the composition of the Yugoslav political leadership in all the republics and provinces. Everybody

was familiar with Edward Kardeli's unprecedented contribution in the preparation and adoption of the AVNOJ decisions and all post-war Constitutions. He had the ability to incorporate his personal views in the foundation of social order, which were not subject to challenge. The determination with which Slovenia and Croatia oppose constitutional changes today, shows how the 1974 Constitution was derived. Changes to social order could not be accepted if they differed from the views of both political authorities; nothing could be done even after they died because the Constitution allowed veto which was insurance against any changes. Bearing all this in mind, it cannot be disputed that Slovenia and Croatia dominated politically and economically, which helped them realize their national aspirations and economic programs.

Under such circumstances, and being constantly accused of being "oppressive", "unitary", "centralist", "imposing", the Serbian people could not achieve equality in Yugoslavia, which turned them into the biggest victims. This retaliatory policy towards the Serbians began before the war when the Communist Party was in need of an "oppressive" nation. The Serbians were relatively underrepresented in the CPY Central Committee and some, probably to gain support, were declared as members of other nations. During the war Serbia was in no position to fully participate as an equal in the decision making process which would decide future inter-relationships and the social structure of Yugoslavia. Serbia's Anti-Fascist Assembly was created during the second half of 1944, later than those of the other republics. The Communist Party of Serbia was created even later, after the war. For the second AVNOJ Session, delegates were elected from the Serbian military units and members of the Supreme Headquarters who happened to be in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike some other Republic delegates attending the Session who came from their territories and who had national and political organizations behind them with pre-prepared stands and programs.

These historical facts show that during the war Serbia was not formally, and especially not essentially, in an equal position when decisions of far-reaching significance were made with regards to future state affairs. It does not mean that the Serbians would not voluntarily have decided on federalism as the most suitable solution

for the post war national community, but keep in mind that Serbians had no previous preparation and were without support from their political organizations, and found themselves in a situation, in military terms, where they had to accept solutions that left wide open opportunities for breakup. The position Serbia was put in, must be duly considered and regulated in terms of its national integrity and its continuous cultural development, and not just for the outstanding question to remain open to solutions which affects the vital interests of the Serbian people...

(Left out are two pages which were part of the original text- DM).

With a clear conscience and with the belief that it had fulfilled its solidarity debt, Serbia feels it has earned the right to end its contribution to the fund. Serbia alone has born full responsibility of assisting the development of the three undeveloped republics and Kosovo, at its own economic expense; which was not the case with the three developed regions. The contribution rate in proportion to the GDP, according to basic rules, was unfairly applied without weighing the economic strength of the obligated. The proportional rate spared Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina from having to progressively contribute, which allowed them to not only develop normally, but to also improve their relative position against the Yugoslav average. In Serbia, however, these rates posed a huge burden. Its economy amounted to about half of the net accumulation of the undeveloped regions, so much so that it came quite close to the economically undeveloped republics.

Besides its contribution, which helped the underdeveloped regions develop, it lessened the burden on the developed regions. For its own economic lag, Serbia found no understanding from either the underdeveloped or from the developed regions. Their mutual interests brought them into a coalition by which they maintained the current situation in which their interests were satisfied at Serbia's expense. This anti-Serbian coalition, with regards to the rate contribution, participated more openly and with less political savvy than before. Serbia was openly pressured to accept the overall imposed contribution rate. It is important to emphasize that this pressure is an important symbol of the traditional discrimination against Serbia which never weakened; if not increased.

Given what had happened in the postwar period, this kind of pressure was nothing new. What could have been new was Serbia's determination to resist that pressure. Unfortunately that did not happen. Its resistance was a little more than before, but still quite insufficient. Serbian leaders did not even use all legal means, such as the ability to apply veto, which left them in a situation all alone with their justified demands unfulfilled. And you would think that an appropriate response would have been to create a political crisis, if there was no other choice. Unfortunately that did not happen either. Politicians in Serbia proved to be unprepared for the historical task that was imposed on them during the extremely difficult relations in the Yugoslav community. At that historical moment, it was demanded of them to realize that the end of the war was coming and that the politicians would have to shift practice in the postwar period which would raise the question of Serbia's equality, the practice of discrimination of the economists, sociologists, philosophers and writers from Serbia who pointed out malignant social phenomena and warned of the consequences of wrong decisions, and the practice of removing capable businessmen and thus disarming Serbia's economy in a strong market competition.

7. Behaviour towards Serbia's economic backwardness has shown that the retaliatory policy towards Serbia had not weakened over time. Quite the opposite, fed by its own success, this kind of behaviour increasingly became stronger until it finally manifested itself in genocide. This kind of discrimination against the citizens of Serbia could not be tolerated politically. Serbia, despite its size in population and parity representation compared to the other republics, in practice had less say than the others when it came to appointing federal officials and delegates to the Federal Assembly. Serbian voices and voters were worth less than those of any other republic or province.

(Shortened- half-page DM)

8. The persecution of the Serbian people in Kosovo was spectacular testimony to our historic defeat. During the spring of 1981, the Serbian people experienced something truly undeserving; open and



total war prepared in the form of a variety of administrative, political and legal changes. Led by a skillful application of various methods and tactics, with a split role, with active, not just passive and not very covert support of certain political centres in the country - more fatal than that which came from the neighbourhood - that war, which had not yet been faced and called by its real name, lasted almost five years. It even took longer than the liberation war of this country from April 6, 1941 to May 9, 1945. The Nazi created Balist units rebelled in Kosovo and Metohija in 1944-1945, before the end of the war, and were smashed, but as time has shown the Balist movement was not politically defeated. The Balist movement in its current form, remade in a new fashion, was successfully being developed to a point that approached a victorious outcome. The old aggression in the neo-fascists was absent; measures taken took the aggression away from the streets and manifested it in strong racist and irrevocable goals that had to be achieved at all costs and by all means. Even trumped up charges against young offenders were used to ignite and deepen ethnic hatred.

The five year long Albanian war waged in Kosovo reassured its leaders and followers that they were stronger than they thought, that they enjoyed support from various power centres in the country, far more than the Kosovo Serbs enjoyed from Serbia, or the republic that has remained with the other republics in Yugoslavia. Aggression was encouraged, so much so that even the most official representatives of the province, as well as its scientists, behaved not only arrogantly, but also cynically, calling their slander and blackmail their legal rights. The organized political forces in our country, which concluded the revolution in almost impossible conditions, under the most powerful enemy in the entire century - suddenly showed themselves to be not only inefficient, restricted, but almost disinterested in fighting back and in coming to the defense of their people and territory. And when aggression is defeated, the political measures taken must not be tied with arrests, with "differentiation", with false loyalties, but with the real revolutionary struggle, with open debates, with the right to freedom of expression and by demonstrating different opinions.

The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija was the worst defeat in the

battles for freedom that Serbia led from Orashets 1804, until the 1941 uprising. The responsibility for that loss falls primarily on the still living Comintern heritage in the national policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the blind following of the Serbian communists that followed that policy, the extremely expensive ideological and political delusions, ignorance, inconsistency, or the already entrenched opportunism in Serbian politicians generations after the war, always being on the defensive and always caring more about what others thought of them and their timid “settings” about Serbia’s position, rather than caring about objective facts and conditions and being in charge of the future of the people that elected them.

The equitable national relations, for which the Serbians fighters fought hardest, in Kosovo and Metohija - with a very specific policy of “development” conducted with planned procedures and with a clear purpose - began to be turned against them by the Albanian nationalists in the Kosovo political leadership.

The autonomous region at that ripe moment in time received the rank of autonomous province, after that its status was upgraded to “constituent part of the federation” with greater prerogatives than the republic to which that province formally belonged. The next step of “escalation” that occurred, as well as the Albanian-ization of Kosovo and Metohija, was done by most legal means. Also things including the unification of the literary language, the national name, flag, textbooks - under instructions from Tirana - were done quite openly, as a matter of fact, and so was the state border between the two territories. Plots, which are usually forged secretly, in Kosovo were created openly and pointedly. This is why for many people the mass riots in 1981 seemed more like old habits, rather than like some new phenomenon. This was dangerous for the entire country, as was later revealed when the truth came out about Serbians being expelled from Kosovo, viewed as “digging the intestines of the Albanians” about which the “Belgrade press” wrote. This was a greater sin than the burnings, murders, rapes, desecrations, etc., many of which to this day have not been solved...

(Here are some pages with examples of the violence perpetrated against the Kosovo Serbs and about the destruction of Serbian monuments and Kosovo traditions - DM).

The rest of the Serbian people are not only constantly leaving their place of birth with an unabated tempo but, according to current practice, are being exiled through oppression, physical, moral and psychological terror. They are being prepared for their final exodus. If things do not significantly change, less than ten years from now the Kosovo Serbs will be gone and Kosovo will be “ethnically pure”. The racists have clearly expressed their purpose by following the programs and actions of the Prizren League from 1878-1881, which will be realized in full.

As a legal consequence of this situation, a petition was signed by 2016 Serbs from Kosovo Polie and submitted to the Federal Assembly and other bodies in the country. There is no forum for the Serbian people by which they can challenge this violence by legal means, and fight to protect themselves against the violence and destruction waged against them. If the province cannot protect them then they have no choice but to seek help from their Republics and from the Federation. The people have the right to express their civic conscience before the State and Federal Assembly. The steps taken by the citizens can be condemned as unacceptable and considered hostile only from an autonomous-separatist and chauvinist aspect...

In accordance with the ethnic profile of the Balkan Peninsula, the ethnic mixture in many Balkan regions, and a requirement for a pure homogeneous ethnic Kosovo, which will be carried out in part, is not only a direct and serious threat to the people who happened to be in the minority but, if accomplished, the initiated wave of expansion will be a real and daily threat to all nations in Yugoslavia.

Kosovo is not the only area in which the Serbian people are under the pressure of being discriminated against. Absolutely, and not just relatively, the decline in the number of Serbs in Croatia is sufficient evidence for this claim. According to the 1948 census, there were 543,795 Serbians in Croatia, or 14.48 percent of the total population. According to the 1981 census, the number dropped to 531,502, or 11.5 percent of the total population. No growth, only decline in the

33 peaceful post-war years, after the first census was carried out and when, because of the consequences of the war, the number of Serbian citizens was well known.

Lika, Kordun and Bania remained underdeveloped in Croatia, which strongly encouraged the Serbians living there to migrate into Serbia and into other parts of Croatia where the Serbians, as settlers, and other minority groups were highly susceptible to assimilation. The Serbian people in Croatia were indeed exposed to refined and effective assimilation. It was an integral part of the Croatian policy to ban all Serbian organizations and cultural institutions in Croatia, which had a rich tradition during the Austrian-Hungarian occupation and during the interwar years in Yugoslavia. After that an official language was imposed on them named after another nation (Croatia), which embodied national inequality. With constitutional provision this language became a required language for the Serbians in Croatia. Then Croatian nationalist-minded linguists with a systematic and well-organized action plan distanced this language more and more from the languages of other republics which spoke the Serbo-Croatian language. This contributed to weakening the ties between the Serbians in Croatia with other Serbians. This was done at the cost of tearing the linguistic continuity between the Croatians themselves and with removing precious international terms of communicating with other cultures; especially in science and engineering. But the Serbian people in Croatia are not only culturally cut off from the mainstream, but the mainstream is unable to inform itself about this fate, economic and cultural position, as long as some nations in Yugoslavia have contact with their compatriots in other countries. The integrity of the Serbian people and their culture throughout Yugoslavia lay in the fateful question as a matter of its survival and development.

The general picture fits the fate of Serbian institutions created during the war and immediately after. During the national liberation struggle and shortly thereafter, the national life of Serbians in Croatia intensively developed in their specific political, cultural and educational institutions. And thus with the ZAVNOH Executive Board's principle decision, made on November 10, 1943, the first Serbian club of ZAVNOH advisors was established on January 12, 1944 in free Otocets, to act as a political leadership of the Serbian

people in Croatia. After the war ended, at the initiative of the Serbian club, on September 30, 1945 the First Congress of Serbs in Croatia was held in Zagreb, where over 30,000 participants formed the Main Serbian Board in Croatia as a “broad political organization of the uniquely Serbian people of Croatia” in the composition of a Popular Front. By direct involvement, these political Serbian bodies then established their own cultural institutions and began to work towards national Education. And thus on October 22, 1944, on top of the ruins of the Glina church in which the Ushtash committed a terrible slaughter, the Serbian singing club “Obilich” was founded and less than a month later, on November 18, again in Glina, the Serbian cultural and educational society “Prosveta” was formed. In addition to “Prosveta”, which owned its own printing press and served as a publishing house, on January 4, 1948 a Serbian Central Library and a Museum of the Serbians in Croatia were established in Zagreb. Besides all that, starting from September 10, 1943 and onwards, NOP addressed the Serbian people in Croatia with a particular journal, printed in Cyrillic letters, called the “Serbian word”. In the postwar years, the name of the “Serbian word” was changed to “Prosveta”. During the 1944-1945 academic year NOP of the Serbian children in Croatia delivered a Cyrillic alphabet book, and the Presidency of ZAVNOH, with its decision, made on July 18, 1944, guaranteed to treat the Cyrillic alphabet as equal to the Latin and at the same time, above all, apply its use in the schools in the territory of Croatia with a Serbian majority.

All this, for the Serbian people in Croatia, had greater and deeper meaning than just recognition for their role in NOB (People’s Liberation War). With a special proclamation of “The Serbian people in Croatia”, on January 12, 1944, the ZAVNOH Serbian club advisers announced its emergence as “a sign of equality between the Serbs and Croats” and “guaranteed that the interests of the Serbian people will be properly represented in free Croatia”. During the establishment of the Main Serbian Board in Croatia it was designated as “a political organization of the unique Serbian people in Croatia”, whose task was to facilitate “the development of free thought” and that it will “sufficiently guarantee that the Serbs in Croatia will continue to enjoy benefits as equal people”. The Serbians earned these benefits by themselves with their own blood

and felt they were “significant signs of equality between the Serbian and Croatian people in Croatia”.

This situation lasted well into the war and immediately after the war, and then it all changed. It is not known whether the Serbs ever considered that some of these institutions were unnecessary, and that they should be abolished or replaced with different institutions that would live up to the spirit of the time. However, all these institutions were consecutively repealed during the fifties by decisions from the competent Croatian authorities. Last in the series to be canceled was the Serbian Cultural Society “Prosveta” decided by RSUP of Croatia on May 23, 1980. For the justification of that final act the SSRNH Republic Conference was engaged. It talked about the radical turn of events in relation to wartime and through the post-war time period at the conclusion of its consultation, held on October 2, 1980.

These findings essentially leave no room for any special requirements for establishing institutions for the Serbian people in Croatia: “Taking care of the complex issues of culture, history, life and work of the Croatian or Serbian nation in the Socialist Republic of Croatia cannot be left to the special national companies or organizations”. This attitude is explained by the following interpretation: “As far as it is justifiable our nations can independently develop cultural institutions and clubs, it is not justified however for such institutions to be opened by members of nations elsewhere in Yugoslavia, and especially not by the Serbs in Croatia and the Croats in Croatia”. At the end the following was said:

“We need to fight; the Serbs in Croatia are not silent as a people, they are not to be called settlers, as they are in some books. Our history is common, and so is our culture and language, but the specifics need to be recognized”. It was also said at the event that there is need to work harder towards learning the Cyrillic alphabet in Croatia.

With this kind of attitude, expressed by the SSRNH Conference, which no political body in Croatia or no one outside of Croatia stood against, one can only imagine what kind of life the Serbian people in Croatia lived, a life that was established during the course of the

long history of NOB. Inter-nation relations formulated by NOB were radically revised since then and so were constitutional guarantees of minority rights and freedoms, including the rights of citizens. The practical significance of the statements: “We must take care of”, “we need to fight”, “we need to learn the Cyrillic system”, and so on, can be assessed only when confronting the real language policy pursued by Croatia. The hard drive to constitute a special Croatian language is built in opposition to any notion of a common Serbian-Croatian language which, in the long term, does not leave much for the Serbian people in Croatia to preserve their national identity.

Excluding the period of Croatia’s existence, in the past, the Serbians in Croatia have never been as threatened as they are today. In an attempt to resolve their national position, the Croatians have imposed a first-rate political issue. If no solution is found, the consequences will be repeatedly harmful, not only in Croatia’s internal relations but also for the whole of Yugoslavia.

An important question, regarding the standing of the Serbian people, given the circumstance that they are outside of Serbia, especially outside of Serbia proper, where many Serbs live, a much larger number than other nations, must be asked. According to the 1981 census, 24 percent, or 1,958,000, of Serbs live outside of Serbia’s territory, which is significantly more than the number of Slovenians, Albanians, Macedonians, taken separately, and about the same as the Muslims. The total Serbian population living outside of Serbia proper is approximately 3,285,000 Serbs or 40.3 percent of the total Serbian population. The Serbian people were affected worse than any other nation by the general disintegration process that engulfed Yugoslavia. The current flow by which our Serbian society is moving in Yugoslavia today has completely reversed from that which it went through decades and centuries ago since our common homeland was formed. The process is aimed at completely breaking up the national unity of the Serbian people. The best illustration of this is how everything today is being aligned towards delivering autonomy to Vojvodina.

Vojvodina was given its autonomy because, among other reasons, the Serbian people purchased it from the Habsburg Monarchy at the

end of the XVII century. The Serbian people in Austria, and later in Austro-Hungary, tended to lean towards an autonomous region (towards despotism or dukedom which they called Serbia) surrounded by the larger and pre-eminent Hungarians and Germans to preserve their national individuality and Orthodox background. By creating a separate autonomous region in another state's territory, the Serbians worked on weakening that state with aims at making it easier to separate from it and unite with their brethren in the Sava and Danube.

That's how it was in the past with Serbian Vojvodina, created in 1848/49 with the blood of the Serbs living on it and with help from the Serbs from Serbia. Today it's the other way around. The political leaders in Vojvodina are not for creating unity and closeness; they struggle towards greater independence and separation from Serbia. Regardless of how unnatural the process is, contrary to historical logic, it delivers obvious results, powerfully contributing to the disintegration of the Serbian people.

9. For more than half a century now, the Serbian people have carried the load of being a prison guard of the other Yugoslav nations. The Serbian people have not been able to seek support from their own history. In many instances history itself was in doubt. The democratic civil tradition for which Serbia fought, and again fought for in the nineteenth century, because of the narrow-mindedness and partiality of its official historiography, until recently, remained completely hidden in the shadow of the Serbian socialist and labour movement. With such a historical picture of actual legal, cultural and state contributions, Serbia, as a civil society, is impoverished and narrowed down, so distorted that no one could spiritually and morally help it or give it support for the preservation and restoration of its historical consciousness. The dignified and brave liberation efforts of the Bosnian Serbs and the entire Yugoslav youth, to which Young Bosnia belonged, suffered a similar fate and, before history, were caught by a second plan with contributions to class ideology whose carriers and authors were the Austro-Marxists and not the national liberation movements.

Under influence of the ruling ideology, cultural benefits for the Serbian people were appropriated or devalued, ignored or not



appreciated. The language too was suppressed and the Cyrillic alphabet was left to fade away. The field of literature, in that sense, served as a major training area for arbitrariness and lawlessness. This was not done to any of the other Yugoslav people as was so rudely done to Serbia's cultural and spiritual integrity. No other literary and artistic heritage was so torn, broken down and looted as was the Serbian heritage. Political measures were imposed on Serbia's culture by the ruling ideology to devalue its valuable and powerful scientific and historical collection. While today the Slovenian, Croatian, Macedonian and Montenegrin culture and literature are integrated, the Serbian culture is left out to disintegrate. Ideologically it is legitimate to freely separate and distribute Serbian literature and call it Vojvodian, Montenegrin and Bosnian. The most significant work of the best Serbian writers is broken off and is artificially established as new regional literature. The appropriation and dissolution of Serbian cultural heritage goes so far that now it is taught in schools that Njegosh is not a Serbian writer, and that Laza Kostich and Veljko Petrovich are from Vojvodina, and that Petar Kochich and Jovan Duchich are writers from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mesa Selimovich was not allowed to declare himself a Serbian writer, and now his work is not respected because it is part of the Serbian literature. Serbian culture has more ineligible, banned, unspoken and undesirable intellectual writers and artists than any other Yugoslav literature, and many are even completely erased from the literary memory.

Prominent Serbian writers are the only ones that are blacklisted by all the Yugoslav mass media. In compulsory school literature, Serbian literature is heavily damaged, in other words, mechanically subordinated by administrative measures by Republic-Province reciprocity, not by the standard of quantity or value. In school programs in some republics and provinces the history of the Serbian people is not only grossly reduced, but exposed with chauvinistic interpretations. Thus, the Serbian cultural and spiritual heritage seems smaller than it is, and the Serbian people are losing their important mainstay of moral and historical consciousness.

The impressive and, indeed, revolutionary measures and cultural enthusiasm expressed in the first post-war decades for opening an

extensive network of educational institutions, from primary education to higher schooling, slackened off in the late sixties.

There appeared a phase of stagnation and even more pronounced regression, so today our education and upbringing with the existing school and educational system is very extensive and primitive with much lag for the needs and goals of our modern society and for the civilization in which we live. The school system is based on the so-called vocational education, with low quality teaching, which is a complete failure. Several generations have been spiritually crippled and impoverished; we have succeeded in the overproduction of primitive semi-skilled workers, unqualified to engage in economic and social activities and unprepared for the needed creative and intellectual development. There is no country in the world which has organized its educational system with such jagged legal regulations, as ours.

In total, Yugoslavia has one hundred and ten federal, state and provincial laws dealing with various types of education, many of which are repeatedly modified so that sometimes research is necessary to come to a final version of the law.

However, schooling in Yugoslavia has never been so extensively crushed and so low in quality as it is today.

Our legislative practice has legally created eight educational systems which have been increasingly moving away from each other and no agreement has been reached on a common core to stop these legally grounded developments. No discussion or negotiation lately or in the last fifteen years has taken place to reach a common goal. This has led to systematic disintegration of the Yugoslav community resembling a barren utopia. The most important first step is to repeal the laws that lead to separation. This will allow us to continue the line of togetherness and unity in this region which had been drawn more than a hundred and fifty years ago. Otherwise, we will create, and create, generations which will be less and less Yugoslavs, and to an increasingly greater extent, dissatisfied national romantics and lovers of nationalism. A country that has no single educational system cannot count on being unique in the future.

Since the XV and XVI century, the thinking was that schools would serve the intellectual needs of every individual to achieve a higher level of intelligence which will serve them in their entry into life. The idea that a school should serve only work and profession and be conditioned by it, is dead. It was a consequence of unsurpassed prolet-cultural sentiments which, ultimately, led to the creation of a primitive, slave consciousness.

The ideological battle against “elitism” bore bitter fruit: we, for at least two decades, pandered mediocrity in all social areas and education. No community fought against the elite of knowledge and skill and science and innovation. With the war against these elite, we created an elite of well-off individuals who were able to give their children opportunities to acquire greater knowledge than just primary and secondary education, but that did not happen.

The financial status of the school system disparaged its social status, and the term “moral-political suitability”, particularly in universities, dreadfully encouraged moral and political conformism and careerism, and the universities, and especially some humanities faculties, were deprived of the best intellectual staff of our generation. In no other European country was enlightenment so stagnant, materially and socially, as it was here.

Exactly during the time when funds were spent on frivolous things without thinking, was also the time when a restrictive policy towards universities was enacted by which the schools were provided with less and less resources. For a decade and a half faculties were unable to obtain new assistants and, as such, the oldest universities in Yugoslavia, mainly in Belgrade, never had such a high average of aged teaching staff. University science, which in all countries is a primary driver of growth during the tech-computer revolution, was completely neglected in our country. The “reforms” of universities, often imposed by political power, and not for scientific reasons (three - stage instruction, “ozeitization” of the faculties, etc.) were missed. Great damage was especially inflicted on the separation of science from the university, creating systematic and administrative compartments, including the “institute” and “university” science: the university lost its laboratory base, through the creation of parallel programs, and science from lack of staff unraveled and became

disabled by the normal flow of scholars from universities to institutes and from universities to faculties.

Because of all this: there is need to change the school system, the educational laws, to modernize and humanize the school curriculum, to open specialized schools, especially to help talented students to fully change the unfavourable financial condition of education, to pay special attention to the spiritual, not just the ideological profile of the teacher. There is need for the universities to attract the strongest scientific and intellectual forces and laws to achieve unity in the educational system in Serbia.

In this difficult crisis we must, today, begin to think about tomorrow, for the XXI century, even though current economic circumstances are not allowing us to create a vision for tomorrow's world in which our civilization will be based on micro-electronics, artificial intelligence, robotics, computer science, artificial insemination, manipulation of genes, etc. Because of all this, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts proposes that, immediately and without any kind of dogmatic ideological burdens and "governmental" inertia, a studious approach be taken to reorganize the social and institutional basis of our science that would lead towards modernization and efficiency, with greater material investments, with greater attention to scientific offspring, broader freedoms and autonomy for creative figures in the creation of scientific and research programs. In a word, it is very important for us to move faster and with all our scientific potential and join the modern trends of world science.

10. After the dramatic inter-nation clashes during the course of the Second World War it seemed that nationalism abruptly subsided, that it was on the way to completely disappearing. This impression however proved to be incorrect. It did not take long before nationalism began to rise and to complement institutional conditions fighting against any sort of constitutional change. Nationalism was generated from above; its main initiators were political people. The main reason for the multidimensional crisis lay in the idea that nationalism will defeat socialism. The disintegration processes, from all views, which brought the Yugoslav community to the brink of

collapse, along with the disintegration of the valued system, are a consequence of that defeat.

Its roots are found in the Comintern ideology and in the CPY national policy from before the war. Embedded in this policy is the retaliatory branding of the Serbian people as an “oppressive” nation which had far-reaching consequences in international relations in the social order, in the economic system and in the fate of the moral and cultural values of the people after World War II. A sense of historical guilt was imposed on the Serbian nation which, not only got in the way of solving the Serbian national question, but did not provide the Serbian people with a state like the other nations. Therefore, first and foremost, we need to free ourselves from the mortgage of this historical guilt imposed on the Serbian people, and to officially abandon the claim that we had a privileged economic position between the two wars and to not deny our liberation history and contribution to the creation of Yugoslavia.

We need to establish the Serbian people’s full historic democratic right and national and cultural integrity no matter in which republic they live. Gaining equality and independence for the Serbian people has deep historical meaning. In less than fifty years, in two generations, one after another, we have been twice exposed to physical destruction, to forced assimilation, to re-Christianization, to cultural genocide, to ideological indoctrination, to depreciation and denial of our own tradition under the guise of this imposed guilt complex. Intellectually and politically disarmed, the Serbian people have been subjected to vicious temptations that have left deep traces in their spiritual condition at the end of this century. If we care for our future and for being in the family of cultural and civilized nations in this world, the Serbian people must be again given the opportunity to find themselves and become a historical subject, again to gain awareness of their historical and spiritual being, and to clearly perceive their economic and cultural interests, to get into the modern social and national program that has inspired the present and will inspire future generations.

The continuous depressed state of the Serbian people, with a forceful expression of chauvinism and Serb-phobia in some places, satisfies the restoration of everything drastic in the manifestation of

national feeling in the Serbian people and their reactions which can be flammable, and also dangerous. It is our duty that, not for one moment, not for one case, we should not oversee and underestimate this danger. But, above that, in the principled struggle against Serbian nationalism, the ruling ideological and political symmetry in the historic guilt can not be accepted.

The rejection of that symmetry, devastating in spirit and morale with old injustices and lies, is a requirement for mobility and Yugoslav democratic effectiveness and humanistic consciousness in contemporary Serbian culture.

The citizens and the working class that are not represented in the respective councils can not be attributed only to national favouritism, but aspiration for Serbia to lead from a disadvantaged position and thus weaken its political influence. But the greatest tragedy is that the Serbian people have no state like all other peoples. It is true that contained in the first article of the Serbian Constitution is a provision that Serbia is a country, but inevitably the question arises; what kind of country is it when it is not allowed to administer its own territory and has no available means to maintain order in some of its territory, to ensure the personal safety and property of its citizens, to stand in the way of genocide in Kosovo and to stop the Serbian exodus from their century-old homes. This situation highlights the political discrimination against Serbia, especially if we consider that the SFRY Constitution imposed on the internal federalization is a permanent source of conflict between Serbia proper and its territories. Aggressive Albanian nationalism in Kosovo can not be suppressed if Serbia does not cease to be the only republic whose internal relations are governed by others.

With the SFRY Constitution, the formally established equality for all republics was impaired by the imposition on the Republic of Serbia to give up a good portion of its rights and powers in favour of autonomous provinces, whose status is largely governed by the Federal Constitution. Serbia must openly declare that this arrangement is an imposed arrangement. This is especially true of the position of the provinces, promoted in the republics which feel far more as constituent elements of the Federation, rather than as part of the Republic of Serbia. Besides the fact that it did not care

for the state of the Serbian people, the SFRY Constitution created irreconcilable difficulties when it was constituted. In order to meet Serbia's legitimate interests, inevitably the Constitution must be revised. The autonomous provinces must become true constituents of the Republic of Serbia, where they can have a degree of autonomy but not by disrupting the integrity of the country and to exercise the general interests of the wider community.

The unresolved issue of Serbian statehood is not the only drawback which should be removed by constitutional changes. Yugoslavia, with the 1974 Constitution, became a very loose federal union in which there were other alternatives to consider, and not just Yugoslavia, according to recent statements made by Slovene public figures and former Macedonian politicians. These alternatives and the way they were carried out suggest a planned disintegration and a breakup of Yugoslavia. The Serbian people cannot calmly wait for their future to unfold in such uncertainty. Because of this an opportunity must be opened for all nations in Yugoslavia to express their aspirations and intentions. Serbia, in such a case, could itself determine and define its own national interests. Discussion and agreements of this kind would have to precede review of the Constitution. Of course, Serbia cannot afford to take a passive attitude and just listen to what the others have to say, as it has often done.

While striving for AVNOJ choices, Serbia must consider that not everything depends only on Serbia and that the others may have alternatives. Because of that, the task placed ahead of it is clearly to look after its own economic and national interests. With its insistence on federal regulation, Serbia would contribute not only to the equality of all nations in Yugoslavia, but will also address the political and economic crisis.

The equal position for which Serbia must strive clarifies the initiative in addressing key political and economic issues with aims that this initiative also belongs to the others. Four decades of Serbia being passive, proved to be bad for the whole of Yugoslavia, which deprived it of ideas and criticism of an environment with a long state tradition, with a sharpened sense of national independence and with a rich experience in combating domestic usurpers of political

freedoms. Without the Serbian people's equal participation in the adoption and implementation process of all vital decisions, Yugoslavia cannot be strong and its very survival as a democratic socialist community would be jeopardized.

An epoch of Yugoslav community and Serbian existence apparently is ending with a historically worn out ideology, with general stagnation and regression primarily expressed in the economic, political, moral, and cultural and civilization-al sphere.

This kind of situation requires imperatively urgent fundamentals, deeply thought out, scientifically based and consistently implemented reforms to the overall state structure and social organization of the Yugoslav community of nations, and in the sphere of democratic socialism and faster and more effective participation in our contemporary civilization. The social reforms, to a greater extent, need to activate the human forces in the country to become productive, enlightened and a democratic society, to be able to live off their work and creation and to make a powerful contribution to the world community.

The first condition for our transformation and rebirth is the democratic mobilization of all of our nation's bright and moral forces, not only to carry out the decisions of the political forums, but also to create programs and to design the future of our democratic way, for the first time in our recent history, a general social task which really merges knowledge and experience, conscience and courage, inventiveness and responsiveness on a basis of a long-term program.

The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, on this occasion, has expressed its willingness, and wholeheartedly and with all its strength is dedicated and committed to these vital tasks and to the historical orders of our generation.



# IDEOLOGY OF SERBIAN NATIONALISM

Scientific and journalistic work of Professor Dr. M. Lazo Kostich

By Dr. Vojislav Shesheli

GREATER SERBIA a.d., BELGRADE 2002

Note

Of the many papers that have been published in Serbia in the last 15-20 years, which have made contribution to the building of the Serbian national doctrine, included certainly are those of Lazo M. Kostich. Vojislav Shesheli, leader of the Serbian Radical Party who was indicted by The Hague in 2002, has published a very extensive monograph on Kostich's work. It is a labour of over 1000 pages, with a very complex structure (15 chapters with over 50 sections, subdivisions, etc., with numerous references, literature and so on.), which cover the entire history of the Serbian people, their territory, religion, language and culture, and their relations with the other neighbouring nations, including other topics. Special attention was given to Serbian relations with the Croats, Albanians, Muslims etc., and between the Serbians and Macedonians. Only three excerpts of small sections are provided in this paper, all pertaining to Macedonia): "Serbian Macedonia" the 10<sup>th</sup> section of the first chapter (p.157-169); "Artificial construct of the Macedonian nation", the 14<sup>th</sup> Section of the sixth chapter (p. 464-467) and "the Macedonian Question", 2<sup>nd</sup> section of the 11<sup>th</sup> chapter (pages 725-737).

## 10. Serbian Macedonia

Serbian Macedonia covers only 37% of the total Macedonian territory, grouped mainly along the Vardar River. The Bulgarian and Greek part, Pirin and Aegean Macedonia, today exist only as geographic regions, seeming like the process of systematic assimilation and melting of the Macedonian population in Bulgaria and Greece has been completed. Today as a political entity, as an independent state and as the homeland of the Macedonian nation, only the section of Macedonia freed from the Turkish yoke by the

Serbian army exists. About the Macedonians, mostly we cannot say that they are Serbians in the true sense of the word, but they certainly are an ethnic group which is closely related to the Serbians. Serbians and Macedonians are like twin brothers - not the same, but very, very similar. The Slavs in the region borrowed the name "Macedonians" from the ancient inhabitants of the Macedonian state which they created in the early seventh century BC. The original Macedonians are a people of ethnic Greek structure with large additions from the Illyrian and Thracian branches, as well as other prehistoric peoples whose tribes were mixed with each other and were assimilated. In the mid-fourth century BC, Macedonia took the lead among the ancient Greek states, and its ruler Philip II, became the unquestioned master of the Balkans. His son, Alexander the Great, set out to conquer the world, and with amazing military successes he quickly conquered the eastern and southern parts of the known world. His majestic rise lasted only a short time: Alexander died in 323 BC, he was probably poisoned.

Alexander's military efforts rewarded his soldiers with rich booty, spread Hellenistic culture, but at the same time thinned out Macedonia which was strained a lot from its opportunities. Many Macedonian people died in the massive military campaigns or were lost to settlements in the conquered territories. The death of its ruler led to a rapid disintegration of the empire.

Barbarian invasions began in the third century BC. The Gauls then robbed Macedonia and almost its entire population was led into slavery which left the entire territory desolate. Macedonia recovered towards the end of the third century but then in the early second century BC the Romans took over and in 168 BC they occupied it and thoroughly robbed it. In 148 BC Macedonia formally became a Roman province, and after several uprisings against Roman rule in the following years, it was brutally crushed. The administrative position of Macedonia in the coming centuries occasionally changed, and in the time of Emperor Diocletian it entered the diocese of Moesia, today Serbia and then Constantine made it into an Illyrian prefecture. At the end of the third century AD, a new mass barbaric fury began. The first to tear through it were the Kostobots, then the Visigoths in the fourth century AD, the Huns in the fifth century AD who left almost no population. The Slavs then

participated in the devastation left in the eastern parts of the Balkan Peninsula, about which Byzantine sources made mention that they were Sclavinians under Hun domination. Unlike the Huns, the Sclavinians frequently settled in the conquered territories.

### a) Slavic settlements in Macedonia

We are talking about the south-Carpathian Slavs who were densely concentrated in the Gierdap at the mouth of the Danube. The Sclavinians belonged to the same Slavic group to which the Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Serbs belonged, which previously were visibly differentiated from the Leshka group which included the Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croats and Slovenes. At the end of the fifth century AD most of the Sclavinians were conquered by the Bulgarians, who blended in them, but they were able to impose their own name and royal coat of arms. The assimilation of Bulgarian Sclavinians did not occur on the territory of Macedonia, and this is the first differentiation of ethnic Macedonians from other Sclavinians. The second element of differentiation was the settlement of Serbs in the early seventh century AD in Solun Region. Very close to the Sclavinians, they quickly blended with them and then jointly assimilated and joined the remnants of the former population. The destiny of the Sclavinians north of the Danube was different.

They were assimilated by a larger number of Romanians, and with this ethnic melting they became Romanians. The entire sixth century was marked by repeated mass invasions of Sclavinians in the eastern half of the Balkans down to the Aegean Sea and into Epirus on the west side, while the western half was plundered by the Avars.

While Byzantine resistance was growing weaker, Slavic war booty was mounting as Slav military power grew and gained strength. Massively and systematically the Slav settlements in Macedonia continued from the eighties of the sixth century to the twenties of seventh century.

“The Dragovites settled in the most southern direction of the flow of the river Bistritsa, west of Solun to Bar. Immediately next to them the Velegezites settled and north of them, in the space between

Ohrid, Bitola and Veles, the Berzitites settled whose name is preserved in the people to this day. Close to Solun lived the Sagudatites. To the east of the city, along the river Struma and the Halkidiki peninsula lived the Rinhinities. Past the Struma River valleys and Strumesnitsa the Strumianites were settled and east of the river Mesta the Smilianites were settled. One part of the Dragovites later settled in Polog". ("History of the Macedonian people", Institute for publishing textbooks, Belgrade, 1970, Volume I, p. 73-74.)...

Mid way into the ninth century the Bulgarian Khan attacked the Macedonian territory of the Slav tribe, and Khan Boris, after 852, occupied almost the whole territory of Strumitsa and Bregalnitsa. After that he moved to the right riverbank of the Vardar and made his way to Ohrid. Under the 864 peace agreement between Bulgaria and the Byzantine Empire, the greater part of Macedonia fell under Bulgarian rule. Macedonia in its entirety firmed up at the time of the Bulgarian ruler Simeon between 893 and 927. It was definitely a time when Christianity was strengthened among the Slavs, the creation of the Slavic alphabet took place under the educational activities of Cyril and Methodius, Clement and Naum, Constantine Presbyter, Tsmnorizets Hrabar, and the priest Bogomil at the base of the Mount Banuna and the emergence of the Bogomil movement which spilled over into Bulgaria, Macedonia, Thrace, Bosnia and Raska. The Bulgarians on Macedonian territory broke apart the old clan-tribal social relations and introduced the feudal system.

## b) Macedonia at the time of Tsar Samoil

One of the most powerful nobles of the Bulgarian state during the reign of Peter was Prince Nicholas who was of Armenian descent. After Peter's death his sons David, Moses, Aaron and Samoil - in 969 incited a rebellion in order to take over the throne.

To prevent this, the Byzantine Empire helped Boris, son of Peter, to become a Bulgarian king, but while the Russians were invading from the east a rebellion was ignited south of Sofia. But in 971, after the Byzantine army defeated the Russian prince Sviatislav, the Byzantine Emperor Iovan I Tsimiski dethroned Boris and brought him back to Constantinople as a prisoner, and Bulgaria joined the

Byzantine Empire. Nicholas's sons kept a low profile until Tsimiski's death and then incited a new uprising, this time against the Byzantine Empire. The four brothers ruled the large freed territory jointly, then after David and Moses died in different places, Aaron and Samoil clashed, whereby Samoil won and executed his brother and his entire family, leaving only one of his son's alive. Samoil was an able military commander and quickly conquered large parts of Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia.

Samoil declared himself a Bulgarian ruler and formed his capital in Prespa. In 986, Samoil at Traian's door, near Sofia, dealt the Byzantine emperor Basil II a heavy defeat, and, using the internal unrest and struggle for the throne of the Byzantine Empire, continued with successful conquests, winning the whole of Raska and Duklia, and by fraud captured the Serbian King Iovan Vladimir, taking him captive in Prespa. He also burned down Kotor and Dubrovnik and devastated Bosnia and Dalmatia all the way to Zadar...

Basil II made it his personal mission to pursue Samoil militarily with an unexpected attack on the right bank of the Vardar River near Skopje, forcing him to flee. For commander of Skopje, Samoil had previously appointed the Skopje Roman emperor's younger son Peter, who surrendered the city to the Byzantine Emperor. Samuel's son banished his wife, the Hungarian princess, which then caused a conflict with King Stephen I, who defeated Samoil. Considerably weakened, Samoil was then defeated by Basil II in 1014 at Belasitsa but Samoil managed to escape to Prespa. Basil then blinded 10,000 of Samoil's captured soldiers, leaving every hundredth soldier with one eye to take them back to their military ruler.

Two days later, after Samoil saw the blind soldiers, he died from grief and so did his rule of this great state which he ruled for a period of over 38 years.

The country survived even after Samoil's death and embraced all the Serbian lands to the river Tsetina, almost all of Macedonia, most of Bulgaria, Albania, Epirus and Thessaly. Contemporaries called it a Bulgarian state even though the Bulgarians were an overwhelming minority. Even though all the Serbs and all the Macedonians lived in

his country, with only some Bulgarians and Greeks, Samoil wanted to follow Bulgarian statehood traditions. In his time he formed the Ohrid Archbishopric, and in his country he formed the Dubrovnik and Drach archbishoprics...

(Following are five shortened pages about the feudal Crusader wars in Macedonia up until 1282 when Macedonia was put under Turkish slavery.)

### c) Decades of rebellious turmoil

At that time Macedonia was gripped by a deep differentiation in the population. While Muslims were existentially tied to the survival of Turkish rule and saw their future only in it, the Macedonians viewed their perspective in a greater binding to Serbia, while many of the smaller number of Vlachs were in favour of the Greek option. The Bulgarians, by offering great bribes to Ottoman authorities in 1870, managed to secure a decree to establish a Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate, independent of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, to which they forcibly connected the Macedonian bishoprics in Veles, Skopje and Ohrid, as well as the Serbian bishoprics in Nish and Pirot. Instead of the Greek language, then provided in the church organization, they began to force the Bulgarian language, which caused Macedonian intellectuals to react by forming traditional schools and reading rooms, collecting and publishing popular literary works, writing and publishing a number of school textbooks in Macedonian, some of which were printed in Belgrade. The Macedonian vernacular gradually opened the way to literary transformation.

The poor economic situation, systematic oppression from the Ottoman authorities and the unproductive years sparked the 1876 great Razlovtsi uprising. In response to it, the Ottoman authorities strengthened their repressive measures against the Christian population. This was at the time when Russia, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottomans and when Islamic religious fanaticism began to unfold leading to the murder of the French and German consuls in Solun.

At the same time there was a coup in Istanbul, which dethroned Sultan Abdul Aziz who was then charged with being too lenient towards the Christian subjects and was executed. Leading the Razlog Uprising was Dmitar Patorgiev Berovski (Error: Dimitar Pop Georgiev-Berovski), who had lived long in Belgrade and excelled in fighting against the Ottomans and who, in 1862, bombed the Serbian capital. The Ottomans crushed this uprising but Berovski, although wounded in the head, slipped through the Ottoman encirclement and, with his closest associates and unit, continued to fight. The civilian population was again exposed to retaliatory Ottoman anger and robbery, which further increased their desire to resist. The next year the insurgency movement ignited again in support of the Serbian and Russian war effort. The main role was played by Dimitar Berovski. Many Macedonian volunteers joined the Russian and Serbian army and Russian, Serbian and Macedonian insurgents penetrated deep into Macedonia.

With the San Stefano Peace Treaty, Russia and the Ottoman Empire agreed that Serbia, Montenegro and Romania would expand territorially and gain their independence, Bulgaria would become an autonomous vassal state within the Ottoman Empire, included in which would be a large part of the Serbian and Macedonian national territories. The Russian army settled for two years in the Bulgarian vassal territory to allow for the establishment of autonomous government institutions. The Macedonians were the hardest hit by the fact that a large number of Muslims migrated from the Serbian and Bulgarian regions and settled in Macedonia, changing the population structure and making it hard for them to continue with their freedom fighting effort.

The resettled Muslims, being angry at having to leave their homes, took their anger on the Macedonian Christians. They looted and burned many homes and villages. They were joined by Albanian pillaging gangs whose effort grew significantly, threatening villages and even cities. There were not many choices left for the Macedonians but to band together and take part in anti-Ottoman bands in order to protect themselves. Then towards the end of 1878 the Kresna Uprising flared up in Struma. This uprising was led by a Russian Cossack ataman named Adam Kolmikov and his chief of staff was Dimitar Berovski.

The English government helped the Ottomans suppress the uprising by providing rapid transport for their troops...

After various conspiracy initiatives in Solun in 1894 (Error: should say 1893) the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and the Central Macedonian Revolutionary Committee were formed. Hristo Tatarchev was chairman and Dime (Error: Dame) Gruev was Secretary. In ideological terms its leaders were mainly influenced by Russia, by anarchism and by the Machiavelli-ists and Garibaldi-ists. The organization declared that its primary goals were Macedonian autonomy and awakening the Macedonian consciousness which, in organizational terms, insisted that the Macedonians were an exclusive nation, even though it had many intellectuals educated in Bulgaria. At the start there was a bitter struggle against the Bulgarian Exarchate organization and its policies, which effectively treated them all as Bugarophils with initial misconceptions. This motivated the Bulgarian government to step up its own propaganda and insurgency activities; at the same time it urged the Ottomans to suppress Serbian propaganda. To rival the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, a Congress was held in Sofia that included all Macedonian immigrant associations during which a Macedonian Committee was formed with distinctively pro-Bulgarian aspirations. The Bulgarian insurgency units did not achieve any significant results, but their activities managed to worsen the situation for the Macedonian people in the Ottoman yoke and to compromise their position in world public opinion. This further motivated the Macedonian revolutionary movement, led by Gotse Delchev who, during the Solun Congress in 1896, insisted on the autochthony and independence of the movement.

Financial problems forced the rebels to resort to terrorist methods for raising funds, primarily by kidnapping and extorting wealthy Ottomans.

Most successful was the kidnapping of American missionary Miss Stone in 1901. This brought prominence to the revolutionary Iane Sandanski who attracted a lot of money for the Organization as well as international, although negative, publicity. The Organization often used force to collect “voluntary” contributions from the richer



Macedonians. The organization increasingly became armed and quickly acceded to form guerrilla bands. The revolutionary movement became massive and was led mainly by teachers.

The Supremacists on the ground were of little opposition... The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization systematically prepared for the uprising, but then when its main leaders were forced to retreat deep underground or flee abroad, the presidency of the Organization was usurped by agents of the Bulgarian government and secret Supremacist exponent Ivan Garvanov, who scheduled a Congress in Solun in 1903 and pushed the movement into a premature uprising, although such a solution was opposed by Gotse Delchev who was absent and by Giorche Petrov and Iane Sandanski. An internal schism took place and, after the Solun assassinations and diversions, the Ottoman authorities arrested a greater number of the national fighters. Shortly afterwards, in a skirmish with the Ottoman army near Seres, Gotse Delchev was killed and the Ottomans captured Ivan Garvanov in Solun. The uprising in Bitola Region began on August 2, 1903, during the Ilinden celebration. Best organized were the rebels in Krushevo Region, led by Nikola Karev. Krushevo fell into rebel hands and became a major centre for the Ilinden Uprising and for the Krushevo Republic. The Republic formed a provisional government and began to organize life for the liberated territories. However, besides the rebellion in Bitola Region, there were no characteristic mass movements in Skopje, Solun and in the Odrin Districts. It only amounted to intensive insurgent actions. In Seres District clashes between the Macedonian national and Supremacist bands took place. To quell the Uprising, the Ottomans dispatched a large force of 170,000 soldiers and nearly 500 cannons. Despite the great courage demonstrated by the fighters in the three-month struggle, the rebellion failed. The angry Ottomans carried out massive massacres against the Macedonian population. They killed almost 10,000 people. But the tragedy of the Macedonian people had a strong echo in the world, increasing the animosity towards the Ottoman administration.

To ease the difficult Macedonian situation, the Russian and Austrian Kings, in November 1903, imposed on the Ottomans the so-called Murzsteg Reform Program which was enacted the following year

and which gave control to European powers to act inside the Ottoman administrative apparatus. In 1904 an agreement was reached between Serbia and Bulgaria to divide the sphere of influence inside Macedonia and intensify the deposition of guerrilla bands in the Macedonian territory. The Bulgarian Supremacist insurgents were under the control of Bulgarian General Tsonchev and their activities became massive in 1905. During this period there were numerous clashes between the Supremacists and Iane Sandanski's troops, delivering heavy losses and eventually defeating the Macedonian nationalists in Melnik Region. Since 1904, the Serbian government also established its own insurgency in Macedonia whose activities intensified in 1905, especially in Kumanovo, Skopje, Palan, Kratovo, Brod and Kichevo Regions. Serbian insurgents fought fiercely against the Bulgarian Supremacists bands. Included among the notable Serbian commanders were Gligor Sokolovich, Iovan Babunski, Iovan Dovezenski, Vasilie Trbich, etc. Greek guerrilla bands acted in Solun Region. The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization at that time was facing its own crisis, with problems, conflicts, strife, persecution, being persecuted by the Supremacists, with calling conventions, and with unsuccessfully trying to regain its former strength and political influence among the Macedonian people.

A new and important moment in Macedonian political circumstances appeared during the Young Turk Uprising in 1908, in which Macedonian Christianity became involved with great enthusiasm. Solun was the Centre of the Young Turk Movement. The Uprising managed to oust Abdul Hamid II and appoint Mehmed V as the new Sultan, but with the strengthening of Young Turk power, the Macedonian situation worsened markedly. Disillusioned and systematically persecuted, the Macedonian national revolutionaries, in 1909, formed a Federal National Party which, instead of primarily pursuing an armed struggle like before, turned to parliament to resolve its issues. The main leaders of the Party were Dimitar Vlahov and Iane Sandanski. Immediately after the Founding Congress, Bulgarian agents, for a second time, attempted to assassinate Iane Sandanski, who this time was badly wounded. Vlahov became a member of the Ottoman Parliament. But soon afterwards the party split from infighting and in 1910 Vlahov ousted Sandanski, wanting to distance himself from the revolutionary

elements. An Extraordinary Congress was held during which Vlahov was removed, but soon afterwards the Young Turk regime banned the party...

#### d) Serbian liberation of Macedonia

In 1912 Serbia and Bulgaria entered into an alliance and agreed to divide Macedonia. The union was soon joined by Greece and Montenegro. On October 18, 1912, the Allies declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian army delivered a heavy blow and defeated the Ottomans in Kumanovo and soon occupied Skopje. Here, to prevent its military destruction, foreign consuls encouraged the Ottomans to leave without a fight. The Serbians defeated the Ottomans in Bitola and forced them to flee. The Bulgarians pushed their way to the Aegean Sea and the Greeks entered Solun. Many Macedonians and Bulgarians joined the Serbian army in its area of operational activities. Macedonia's division sparked the Second Balkan War in 1913, during which Bulgaria was defeated and lost enormous territories: by the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest Macedonia's division became definitive. Serbia did not lift its military administration from its part of Macedonia because it had to suppress Albanian unrest and aid in the relocation of the Muslims to Turkey. After that the First World War started. The Serbian army recruited 50,000 Macedonians who fought bravely on all fronts. Even though the Allies demanded that Serbia sacrifice Macedonia to win over Bulgaria, the Serbian government did not agree because Macedonia was considered, felt and embraced as an integral part of Serbia in the true sense of the word.

In 1915 Serbia found itself in a very difficult situation. After Bulgaria entered the war and after heavy fighting in Krivolak the Bulgarians took the Serbian part of Macedonia. The Serbian-Greek border was formed at the front line which held Bulgaria back at the north end. The south end was held by Anglo-French troops. Bulgarian troops occupied the eastern part of Aegean Macedonia, forming the Struma front. The Serbians and the French, in 1916, freed Bitola, created a new line and continued to wage positional warfare.

The Bulgarian and German occupiers behaved brutally towards the Macedonian population exposing it to heavy reprisals.

“During the entire duration of the occupation, the Bulgarian and German occupiers and their allies implemented all kinds of requisitions in Macedonia from all sectors of life, including human and animal feed. They took massive numbers of cattle from Macedonia, slaughtered them and shipped them out. They took material and cultural resources. A massive part of the population was sent to forced-labour camps. Massive voluntary and forceful recruitment and mobilization of the Macedonian population was conducted for military purposes. Large numbers of people were interned and deported and many villages were burned down and the people slaughtered. These were basic and everyday occurrences in the multidimensional occupation of Macedonia. Then thousands of Macedonians died of starvation, disease, physical exhaustion and devastation.” (“History of the Macedonian people”, book II, p. 368.)...

Up until after the First World War, Vardar Macedonia was fully integrated into Serbian lands within the Yugoslav state. The war caused much destruction and a deep economic and social crisis. The government, rather clumsily, implemented agrarian reforms, which undoubtedly, influenced by the Bolshevik revolution, led to the breakthrough of the destructive Communist ideology. The state bureaucracy did not have a good ear for the ethnic, cultural and linguistic specificities of Macedonia, especially for the average educational level of the population, while the Bulgarian government continued to send insurgent gangs, putting them under the direct control of the remnants of the former VMRO. The western parts were rife with Albanian killer gangs. The strongest influence among the political parties in the Macedonian regions was the Radical Democratic and Turkish-Muslim Dzhemiet. The communists enjoyed significant success in the local and parliamentary elections up until the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was outlawed, being labeled subversive and an instrument of foreign powers. The central government abolished feudal relations and the Turks, a considerable number of local Muslims and some Albanians, moved to Turkey. Based on agrarian reform, from the total agrarian fund, 40% of the land was divided among the Macedonian peasants who had no land,

the other 60% of the land was resettled by peasants who had no land in the densely populated areas, with a view that Macedonia was sparsely populated, compared to the Yugoslav average. In 1921, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 49 residents on average lived on a square kilometre, while the average for Macedonia was only 31. The Radical Party had publicly expressed its willingness to have the Macedonian dialect officially used in the workplace and in the state administration, but there were no serious attempts to have that language regulated in its literary form. There can be no word about special national oppression for the simple reason that the regime was led by the concept of an integrated Yugoslavia and displaying the Serbian flag was not allowed and was deemed offensive...

Bulgaria and Greece signed the Nice Peace Treaty Convention for the exchange of population on the basis of which the Bulgarians and Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia and Thrace would migrate to Bulgaria and the Greeks from Bulgaria to Turkey. Macedonian refugees settled all across Bulgaria, which facilitated their denationalization. The Supremacists formed an autonomous VMRO, which acted together with the United VMRO inside the Yugoslav territory, lying to the people that they wanted an autonomous Macedonia, but enjoyed the support of the Bulgarian secret services and promoted Greater Bulgarian interests which, in practice, served only terrorist methods. The agricultural government led by Alexander Stamboliski had a very favourable attitude towards the Macedonians and their aspirations and developed friendly relations with Belgrade, wanting a Common Yugoslav union. In 1923, after three years of rule, the court circles enacted a coup and killed Stamboliski and many of his supporters.... The new regime disbanded the VMRO terrorist gangs and continued with its distinctively anti-Macedonian policy, systematically suppressing all forms of expression of the Macedonian national awareness.

Only 30% of the total population living in Aegean Macedonia was Macedonian before the First World War. There were 30% Turks, less than 15 % Greeks and the rest were various other nationalities. With the Lausanne Convention of 1923, Greece and Turkey agreed to a population exchange. Almost all Turks left and Greeks came from Asia Minor, and the region under the Greek national structure

finally became Greek. After that about 50,000 Macedonians left for Bulgaria and Yugoslavia from a total of 330,000. After that Macedonian participation in the Aegean structure slid below 25%. Given that soon afterwards twice the number or 640,000 Turkish migrant Greeks came to Macedonia, the percentage of Macedonians became even smaller. The Greek government has repeatedly avoided fulfilling its obligations under the ratified international agreements regarding the protection of minority rights and attempted more subtle methods to denationalize and assimilate the Macedonians. In 1924 the Greek government expressed readiness to treat the Aegean Macedonians as a Bulgarian national minority, but this led to severe disturbances in Yugoslav-Greek relations. “At the request of the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, the Yugoslav government, in particular, insisted that they be recognized as Serbians or as a Serbian national minority in Greece”. (“History of the Macedonian people”, book III, p. 233). The Greek government caved in and, in 1926, the Aegean Macedonians were recognized as members of the Serbian national minority in their own country. At the time of the Metaxas dictatorship in 1938, a special law in Greece was enacted which banned the use of the Macedonian language in private life, and members of the Macedonian national minority were discriminated against in every way.

After the Nazi’s invaded and destroyed Yugoslavia, a large part of Macedonia along the Morava, Nish and Timok Regions was occupied by the Bulgarian army. The western part of Vardar Macedonia was occupied jointly by the Italians and Albanians. Military police apparatus was fully imported from Bulgaria and installed in the Bulgarian occupied zone. The Bulgarians did not trust the local Macedonians. Most of the Bulgarian civil service was brought in from Bulgaria and placed in charge of the administrative apparatus. The Bulgarians applied a special occupation legal system, based on naked repression and execution of judicial power by the military courts... The Bulgarian occupiers were able to form a quisling government and were very successful in forming a network of informants and spies. They systematically spread propaganda about denationalizing the Macedonians and turning them into Bulgarians, especially through forced re-education. The communist movement in Vardar Macedonia lacked spirit and boiled down to sporadic diversions and attacks until Italy capitulated. Then, when

conditions were created to form a free territory, people sprang into action and freed Debar and Kichevo. Drazha Mihailovich's Chetniks in 1943 did not have such great success, when they recovered they formed the Vardar Chetnik Corps, composed of four brigades. The Partisans and Chetniks collided on Macedonian soil. The communists believed that the Chetniks were a much greater threat and more dangerous than the occupiers. However, the communists devoted special attention to the construction of an organizational infrastructure, in almost the entire territory, and were ready to welcome the great amassing of partisan detachments, as the Western allies placed their support behind Tito when the Red Army set foot on the Balkan Peninsula and German forces began to withdraw from the Aegean Sea. Fighting against the German and Bulgarian occupiers became more intense. Even during the war, the Communists proclaimed Macedonia a federal unit within Yugoslavia and its will was realized immediately after the war.

#### 14. Artificial construct of the Macedonian nation

The Macedonian nation was proclaimed by the communist regime and sanctioned in practice by decree. It then became a category in official statistics reports, even though Slavic scientific circles could not enthrone its broken off language. And as Kostich said: "That does not go so lightly: a nation cannot be created with a magic wand. It needs many props, one being primarily tradition." (p. 42) When, for the first time, at the beginning of this century, during the Ottoman occupation, the idea was launched to create a Macedonian language, the prominent slavist Vatroslav Jagich, in his book "Slavic languages", published in 1909, reacted with the following words: "The proposal comprised in this age, one Macedonian dialect to be made into a written language of the country, even if it was correctly thought of, must be decisively rejected..." (p. 42) According to Aleksandar Belich there are only three South Slavic languages: Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian and Slovenian. The old Slavic language disappeared and Macedonian never existed.

In 1878 Jevrem Gruich, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote to Jovan Tsviich, unofficial Serbian representative in the Berlin Congress: "The residents of Veles have written and hundreds of them have signed a petition begging to join Serbia

because they always have been Serbians (p. 43)... We cannot say about them that they have been settled in a completely strange and naturally different country". (p. 43) All those under the dictatorial communist government were forcibly recombined to form a new, artificial nation... and not just Jovan Tsviich, but many other scientists a long time ago proved that the areas of Skopje, Tetovo and Kratovo were not included in the "geographical notion of Macedonia, but of Serbia". And the "historical-geographical lexicon", printed in Basel in 1727, argues that Skopje is located in Serbia and Macedonia is located to the south of it, while the "universal dictionary", published in Leipzig in 1740, specifies the territorial scope of Serbia by the then understanding of science: "Serbia, Latin Servia or, according to some, Serblia, is a large fertile province in Europe, which the Romans called Upper Moesia, to the east it borders with Bulgaria, to the west with Bosnia and Dalmatia, to the south with Albania and Macedonia and to the north with the Danube and Sava Rivers which divide it from Erdelia and Wallachia. It certainly got its name from the Serbians..." And at the time when the Pech Patriarchate had the narrowest territorial scope, the Diocese of Skopje and Shtip belonged to it. While the territories south of Tetovo, Skopje, Veles and Shtip belonged to the Ohrid Archbishopric... According to Kostich's conclusion: "The toponyms in this region have left their Serbian footprint. In the northwestern part of Macedonia today, for example, there are villages called Srbinovo, Srbitsa and Srbiani, which are found to have originated from the Middle Ages. Srbinovo is not far from Gostivar in the down flow of the River Lakavitsa, whereas Srbitsa and Srbiani are located near Kichevo. Srbinovo today has 120, Srbitsa 170 and Srbiani 100 households. Albanians now live in Srbinovo and Srbitsa, and Macedonians and Albanians in Srbiani." (p. 50) Kostich is aware that the process of national identification in Macedonia has not been resolved and that the issue is very complicated. Decades of forced de-Serbian-ization has been performed in the Serbian part of Macedonia. In the Bulgarian and Greek parts meanwhile, the concept of a separate Macedonian nation is simply not supported. Scientists and experts have indicated that the Macedonian population is either Serbian or Bulgarian, but has never seriously been considered as a separate nation.



Official Bulgarian and Greek authorities do not recognize the existence of the Macedonian nation. Bulgarians claim that it was only about their compatriots. “The Macedonian nationality was created by Yugoslavia; by a clique of anti-Serbians. Bulgarian and Greek behaviour shows that, even during the time of the communists, Serbia would never have recognized a separate Macedonian nation. This was only possible because of Yugoslavia and because of some anti-Serbian leaders.” (p. 59)

A significant proportion of the Serbian population in Vojvodina is originally from Macedonia. Many people from many places in Macedonia were responsible and significantly contributed to the preservation of the Serbian national consciousness. Kostich cited Hristifor Zhefarovich, a prominent heraldic from the XVIII century, born in Ohrid, Atanas Jovanovich, a painter born in Vratse, the social lyric Kosta Abrasevich from Ohrid, prominent writer Angelko Krstich from Struga, Momchilo Nastasievich, a great writer, Petar Dzhadzhich, a literary critic from Bitola and others.

Even though their homeland was in the vicinity of Lake Prespa, Branislav Nushich had said that inside of him flowed Serbian, Vlach and Albanian blood, but mostly Serbian. Nowhere was it mentioned that, perhaps, he was Macedonian. And let us not forget the patriotic Serbian poet Vladislav Petkovich Dis, originally from Kumanovo. Jovan Jovanovich Zmai boasted of the fact that his great-grandfather moved here from Macedonia. Nikola Pasich, Branko Radikievich and Jovan Steria Popovich also came here from Macedonia.

### e) The Macedonian Question

The question of Macedonia, as a separate federal unit, was considered as a specific question by Kostich for as long as the Yugoslav federation survived. “Macedonia is territorially autonomous and demographically more diverse than any of the other regions, with its linguistic and even ethnic uniqueness. This ethnic specificity is quite recent:

“Macedonia was not ready, Macedonia happened quite suddenly even for experts (ethnographic and Slavists), it did not win its place at all, it was a gift. It was not a direct result of Macedonian activists

(they were divided between fondness and affection towards Bulgaria to Serbia), but rather a result of the activities of Svetozar Vukmanovich Tempo and his acquaintances. However, this ethnic distinctiveness was now widespread in the entire world and all parties entered it into their encyclopedias and lexicons (regardless of whether science accepted it or not), and the residents of Macedonia became more faithful. This will now never be able to be redefined, to be erased, or to be considered non-existent. No doubt that over time it will soften and it will get a more natural proportion, but it will never disappear. It was a worthwhile endeavour for the current rulers of Macedonia and Yugoslavia to be in an equally anti-Serbian mood.” (p. 121)

For the Serbians a Federation of four will be unfavourable because in the state there will be more Croats, Slovenians and Macedonians combined, and in the government there will be participation with one-quarter influence. Besides that, they will be exposed to coalition blockades in state institutions. “This collaboration of all units against Serbia is more than certain. I have already seen this with my own eyes. The elves always work together against the genie if they want to achieve something”. (p. 122) Kostich recognized the fact that Serbians living in North Macedonia were happy to join their territory with Serbia, whereas the Albanians from the western parts would prefer to be grouped with their own compatriots. “It is not impossible that even other ethnic factions may manifest themselves inside Macedonia that don’t correspond to the given moulds. Because today’s Macedonia with its nationality was not created naturally, as was said above. The nationality was imposed on the population. Perhaps a significant part of the population gladly accepted it, but there are many who were conquered by force, and have remained essentially what they were. Undoubtedly there are Serbians inside Macedonia, in the south and in the west, but are unable to surface. With freedom they may be able to rise again, and Macedonia with its uniqueness could be consumed”. (p. 122)

Here is what Kostich said about the Macedonian language: “It is a transitional type of language sitting between the Serbian and Bulgarian languages. To me it resembles the Bulgarian language (because I don’t know Bulgarian), and to the Bulgarians it resembles

the Serbian language. But no doubt it is close to the one and to the other”. (p. 123) There never was a Macedonian literary language or literature or literacy in general, until the Second World War.

“Similarly, it is well known to all historians and to all linguists that there never existed any old monuments with Macedonian writing on them, but only Serbian, and to a much lesser extent Bulgarian... In the Serbian part of Macedonia many dialects exist, but two among them behave almost as separate languages; the differences between them are very slight and almost resemble the Serbian language, or slightly less.” (p. 124)...

After studying the scientific research results generated by competent linguists, Kostich summarized the question of the Macedonian language with the following words: “The official ‘Macedonian language’, created in the year of our Lord 1945, is actually a combination of various dialects spoken in Macedonia. Not one dialect has a written form, but something oral is taken from each. But, the basis for the literary language of the Macedonians was taken from the western part of central Macedonia, primarily from the triangle Prilep, Bitola, Veles-Kichevo, and especially from the Prilep speech. From what we have seen, the dialect that differs most from the Serbian language was used to form the basis. According to all this, we can say that today’s Macedonian language is an artificial creation, something created and imposed rather than derived organically (like the Serbian language), a language without a basis and roots. After the new literary language was created, they were able to create a new alphabet in order to establish that language. And that was done very fast. Committee’s were appointed and the issue was resolved by decree”. (p. 125)...

Jovan Tsviich called the Macedonians a floating mass, ready to blend with the Serbians or with the Bulgarians, depending in which state they found themselves. Wendell described them in a similar manner. According to Joseph Berge, Macedonia is a deep melting pot of people and cultures. In addition to the archaic, prehistoric, Balkan and Slavic populations that settled here there were also the Pechenegs, Kumans, Cherkezs, Tatars, Turks, Arbanasians, and many Muslim groups. After the First World War this region was populated by a large number of Serbian colonies.

And as Jovan Tsviich wrote, the Macedonian masses, “according to linguistic and ethnographic characteristics and according to historical traditions, which are buried in their folk souls, are sleeping, but can easily be woken, and will show to be more Serbian or more Bulgarian. These kinds of Serbians exist in many areas around Skopje, Kratovo, Tetovo and on the northwest part toward Old Serbia, whose title is incorrectly spread over Macedonia. This area, together with Kosovo and Metohija, make up the heart of the old Serbian state, which is attached to the glorious traditions of Serb-ism, and all architectonic and artistic Slavic monuments are Serbian.” (p. 133)...

It was particularly important for Kostich that Macedonians exist objectively only in those parts of Macedonia which the Serbian army liberated. Pirin Macedonia is fully Bulgar-ized and Aegean Macedonia Greeko-sized by the further colonization of Greeks expelled from Asia Minor. The ethnic composition in the Greek part of Macedonia also changed with the mass exodus of Macedonians after losing the Greek Civil War that was instigated by Tito with communist signs... The protagonists of Titoist policy “imposed Macedon-ism hard, cleverly and ruthlessly on those who loved it and on those who hated it. They also sought out to compensate for the external losses inside Yugoslavia itself... So they increased and spread out the number of “Macedonians” by nationality... Because the term “Macedonia” has so far been only a geographical name, there was particular opposition for its acceptance by all residents, even those with non-Slavic origins. Because when they say they are Macedonians they are lying. Because of that, they do not want it to define their nationality, but the Macedonian authorities accept it and interpret it in a way that it is appropriate for them. This is how they succeeded in bringing in the numbers of Macedonians to tens of thousands from the non-Slavic population. Among these “Macedonians” are also Serbians and Bulgarians, and some true Macedonians who truly love their nationality. After that there are minorities, especially the Kutso-Vlachs, as well as Muslims”. (p. 142)

Many Serbs were forced to change their surnames from “ich” to “ski” and as such the numbers of the citizens of Serbian nationality

in the official statistics were artificially reduced. However, as Kostich said, "If this situation lasts longer, the Macedonian nation has a chance to consolidate, because they used scare tactics to strengthen it." (p. 143) Always and everywhere the Serbians are the most to be abused. "They were simply forced to give up their Serbian heritage and were assimilated into the Macedonians. For the world they are worth nothing being designated as Serbians. They can be Vlachs, Gypsies and whatever else but not Serbians. Even though they were always Serbians, even though the old for centuries were Serbians, even though they are descendant of Serbian priests, of Serbian insurgents, they cannot say that they are Serbians". (p. 145) Kostich was fully aware that the former Serbian official policy was to Serbia-nize the nationally unconscious Macedonian Christians. He was even aware that pressure had been put on the nationally-undetermined Macedonians to "become Serbians", which means that "persons without nationality were offered to join their own, and not some other, smaller nation. And now the "Macedonians", unknown to ethnography, are forced to quit their conscious Serbian national designation, to give up their Serbian heritage and become something new, hitherto unknown. From being members of a great nation, to become members of a people with no right to any past, neither great nor small. From being members of a culturally built people, who had Niegosh, Tesla, etc., to be forced to become members of a nation that has just begun to learn its newly created alphabet." (p. 146)

Kostich problem-itized the name South Serbia and did not reject any case of administrative arbitrariness or bureaucratic ignorance. However, with a justified view he rejected the communist phrase "Greater Serbian hegemony". "Accurately, the truth of the overall national 'oppression' of the Macedonians by the Serbians is based on the idea that the Serbians imposed the literary language on them. But we must once again emphasize that the Macedonians had no other, closer, literary language, which was prohibited. Also, the Serbian literary language was very close to the Macedonian spoken language. On the other hand, the Macedonians could, without restriction, use their own spoken language anywhere, in private and in government, especially in the courts. Even if the officials were Serbians from the north, they understood them as if they were Serbians themselves." (p. 151)

Kostich did not stop there but challenged the logic of this anti-Serbian communist hysteria and propaganda. It was alleged that Macedonia and Yugoslavia, in general, were ruled by a Greater-Serbian chauvinistic spirit. Well, let us say that it was true (although it was not exactly so). What does this Greater Serbian spirit want from the Macedonians? To be proclaimed an integral part of the Serbian 'ruling clique'? To be completely equal to the other Serbians? Here, there may be national imposition, but there is no national enslavement. If in a country or in a society, a nation is superior and paramount, then it can hardly be considered nationally 'exploited', when whole other language groups with vague national consciousness are received in that ruling layer as equal members. All-exploitative ruling classes in history were imprisoned and inaccessible. The Serbians provided the Macedonians with all the means to fully catch up, to melt into them, and to be accomplices and co-beneficiaries of the 'Greater Serbian hegemony'." (p. 151)

For what kind of national oppression can we talk if "the Serbians made the free Macedonians equals to themselves, made them members of the one great nation (relatively large), made them participants in their culture and raised them from a lower level to a higher one. Serbia found in Macedonia a national amorphous mass, to which it offered, not always on a dish, to catch up to the winners and to enter into their composition. It tried to give them a proper culture. Forcing the Macedonians to become Serbians was a lie, but at the same time they were given a chance to become part of a higher order, to rise nationally." (p. 151-152)...

Let us not lose sight in all this, of the international, legal and foreign policy aspects. "Just as Serbia was fighting for Macedonia it believed that it was fighting for itself, and that the Serbians were 'coming home', like King Nicholas said. That assumption was also recognized as a fact by all international factors based on which Macedonia was given to Serbia. If there was no faith in the national identity of the Serbs and Macedonians, the Great Powers would never have allowed the amalgamation of Macedonia and Serbia. No international forum would have done this, especially when it was told that no Serbians exist in Macedonia. And not to mention how

public opinion of the then Europe would have reacted, which blocked every decision made that was in favour of Serbia. It should never be forgotten that Macedonia is recognized in Serbia, and not in Yugoslavia and entered Yugoslavia as an integral and inseparable part of Serbia.” (p. 153)

The Yugoslav communist regime completely overlooked the fact that Yugoslavia was the legal successor of the Kingdom of Serbia. If the Kingdom of Serbia acquired anything illegally, it could not bring it to the Yugoslav state, so any such eventuality could be challenged with complete certainty and with an outcome in accordance with the elementary principles of international public law. “If they knew that sometime in the future Yugoslavia would have come into question and that Macedonia would have become part of Yugoslavia, then the Great Powers would have most likely been against this, and would also not have given it to Serbia. First Russia, then Italy and most of all Austria. Russia would never have given Macedonia, a religiously mixed country, especially to Bulgaria.

Italy did not like rival Yugoslavia becoming large. Austria saw its own demise in Yugoslavia. Austria, through Macedonia, wanted to turn Serbia’s direction towards the Aegean Sea away from the Adriatic. France knew only about Serbia. And so on. Never would there ever have been a People’s Republic of Macedonia, except through Serbia. This must be made very clear to everyone. Macedonia is recognized as belonging to Serbia based on ethnic principles... At least it is recognized bona fide to fight for its countrymen and to accept its countrymen under its own roof. But, suddenly today’s Yugoslav regime is claiming that the Macedonians were never Serbians, and that Serbia has lied to them and to the world, because Serbia wanted to conquer this alien world.” (p. 153-154)

In the twenties the Serbian (Yugoslav but not communist) government took Macedonia, a backwater, backward Ottoman province, which had suffered greatly economically under Ottoman rule, and on it developed a railway system, roads and industry. It modernized its cities to look more European, it civilized its social relations and it suppressed its rebels and brigandage. “The population of Macedonia progressed despite the wars and, at the

least, grew by one percent a year, without interruption. The Slav population progressed even more. They seized many properties from the Ottomans and from other Muslims who had left the country because the government was seized by infidels. The Serbians even spilled blood for Macedonia because the Serbians regarded the Macedonians as their own, as born Serbians.” (p. 155-156)...

Based on everything that had happened in the meantime, Kostich believes that we, the Serbians, cannot deny the ethnic particularity of Macedonia and their language as long as they insist on it. “We must not repeat the mistakes of our past; we must not let them take revenge on us again.” (p. 157) Macedonians have a right to collectively identify themselves as they wish. “We, the Serbs, must recognize the uniqueness of the ethnic Macedonians in the form of their convenience and, at the same time, let them and everyone in Macedonia and nationwide know that they can feel as they most intimately wish. In this will be the difference between the current and future condition, a difference that we must honour morally and politically. Today’s Macedonians must also remember this because it is not only freedom but also tyranny. We will uphold freedom and destroy tyranny, i.e. everyone can then say if they are or if they are not ‘Macedonian’ and that is real freedom.” (p. 157)

In this sense, Kostich assumed that the Slavic population of Macedonia would declare itself Macedonian, Serbian and Bulgarian, but without indulging in advance the assessment of percentages. “The big mistake was that the Bulgarians in Macedonia were not recognized earlier (then there would have been no question of a Macedonian nation, neither could it been assumed that the Serbians created it, there would have been no mistake made in this regard). But, if the Bulgarians were recognized, I believe that those people would have not amounted to more than one third of the total population in Macedonia and in time they would have completely vanished. And those who freely declared themselves Serbians would have continued to be Serbians.” (p. 158)

The basic principles that Lazo Kostich used to justify his assertions are expressed in their clearest form. “We can no longer prohibit anyone from determining as best as they can, as their hearts and minds tell them, their national sentiments. But we must protect, with



all our might, the rights of those people who feel they are Serbians and who declare themselves as such. In this regard the Macedonians will encounter an uncompromising stand from the Serbians. For as long as the Serbians are a minority in Macedonia, we must be satisfied with their minority status. The Macedonians will have to recognize the Serbian rights to schools, use of their language, free national expression, etc. However, with every denial or broken promise, particularly if their nationality is suppressed, there will be undesirable consequences. The Macedonians are a sober people who in time will understand.” (p. 158)

The rights of the Serbians under the communist regime were brutally shortened. “Exactly because of the imposed victimization, injustices and imported crimes which they did not commit and, finally, because of their natural mission to defend the Serbian identity wherever it is threatened and in danger, the Serbian people will never agree to the solution that exists today. The Serbian people can recognize the Macedonian nationality and all the consequences resulting from its uniqueness (special schools, special language, etc.), but they can never agree to prohibit the Serbians in Macedonia from feeling and being Serbians. No nation will allow that and neither will the Serbian nation... The Serbians will never, in no way, give up their stake in Macedonia and their rights to it. This should be made very clear to everyone. If it happens that there are three Slavic nationalities in Macedonia, it is not impossible to perform an amalgamation over a long period of historical development during which time one nationality will prevail. But, until that time, every side will favour its own countrymen.” (p. 158-159)

This kind of attitude implies that Macedonia has a special state-legal status. Macedonia must remain a federal unit in order for Yugoslavia to survive. If however Yugoslavia collapses, Macedonia should remain within Serbia as a separate, autonomous unit with broad powers and significant autonomy from the central government, which would guarantee all its cultural particularities and national identity to be freely formed and nurtured...

## **THE SERBIAN STATE IN THE PROGRAMS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF SERBIA TO THE DAYTON ACCORD**

### Note

Excerpts from Momchilo Subotich's works published in "Political Review", Belgrade in the year (XVIII), V, Vol.12, No. 4/2006, p. 809-828; only parts relating to several major parties were taken, i.e. the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party.

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was the dominant political force in Serbia in its ten years during the pluralist era. Its power and influence, particularly that of its president Slobodan Milosevic, strongly reflected on the other Serbian regions - in the Republic of Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska. At the "Congress of unification" of the SKS SSRNS (July 16, 1990), SPS won all multi-party elections in the said period: four times the republican parliament elections (1990, 1992, 1993 and 1997) and three times the federal Parliament elections (May 1992 and December 1992 and 1997).

In the SPS program fundamental provisions, from October 1990, the party advocated the preservation of the "idea for people's self-government of the Serbian people" to which, during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Serbian socialists gave new support, infusing it with the idea of socialism. Similarly: "It protects and expands anti-fascist and liberal NOB values and those from the Socialist Revolution, because they fit in the deepest and brightest Serbian mainstream historical tradition and those of the other Yugoslav peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence and in the continuation of the long struggle of the labour movement. The Socialists and Communists brought new social forces on the scene, liberated Yugoslavia and created a federal state and a socialist community." (Program Foundations of the Socialist Party of Serbia - Basic definitions, Belgrade, October 1990, p. 4.)

Bringing about libertarian traditions and universal human values to society, SPS, in its first document, "stands for a society in which people are free and equal to each other in all spheres of social life. In

this sense, socialism is just another term for the largest reach of democracy.” (Ibid, p. 6.)

In the area of national and state policy, SPS highlighted its political choices as follows: 1) United Serbia; 2) relation with the parts of the Serbian people outside of Serbia; 3) national equality, federalism; 4) resolve the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija.

Starting with a single Serbia, the document says that in Serbia “the inherent powers of the state should be carried out by the authorities of the Republic and the entire territory, which will provide equality to all citizens in the Republic and efficacy and rationality to the state government.” This means that “the autonomous provinces in Serbia cannot be states, but can have a form of territorial autonomy, for which the Serbian Constitution provides guarantees to those rights as autonomous expressions of specific national, historical and cultural characteristics of those regions.” (United Serbia. Ibid, p. 34.)

When it comes to the treatment of the Serbian people outside of Serbia, SPS stated that it will constantly monitor the conditions of life and the development of those Serbian people in the other republics and abroad and will liaise with their political, cultural and other organizations.

SPS is consistently advocating for national equality and federalism, in accordance with international and domestic law, and is of the belief that nations which are united in a common state must have the right to self-determination and secession, and that the new constitution should establish the possibility for forming autonomous provinces and territories that have their own special cultural and historical continuity. Here, it was thinking of the autonomy of the Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. SPS advocates that the Yugoslav state, as a modern federation, must have equal rights for all its citizens and federal units. The citizen Council of the Federal Assembly should be represented by all citizens of Yugoslavia and decided in accordance with the democratic principle of “one citizen - one vote”, and the Council of federal units is to be formed and decided by similar matching principles.

Regarding the issue of resolving the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, SPS sees it as a “national priority, an ethical, historical and national issue of the Serbian people and an inseparable part of Serbia.”

In determining the national equality and faster economic development in Kosovo and Metohija, SPS is committed to working to halt the evictions, to provide for the return of displaced Serbians and Montenegrins and to allow migration of citizens who want to live and work in Kosovo and Metohija. The SPS will “do everything in its power to make the full story about Kosovo and Metohija known to the world, including the consequences of the causes of Albanian chauvinists and separatists.” (Solving the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, p. 39.)

SPS, on September 28, 1990, adopted its program commitments into the Serbian Constitution in which the Republic of Serbia is defined as a “democratic state for all its citizens who live in it, based on human and citizen rights and freedoms, the rule of law and social justice” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 1) and for the autonomous provinces Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija “as forms of territorial autonomy” (Ibid, Article 6.) The Constitution stipulates that “the Republic of Serbia will maintain relationships with the Serbians living outside the Republic of Serbia for the sake of preserving their national and cultural-historical consciousness.” (Ibid, Article 72.)

In the course of 1990 and in the first half of 1991 - up until the separatist wars in Slovenia, and Croatia, the SPS consistently advocated for the survival of Yugoslavia as a “strong federation” and for the preservation of self-governing socialism. When the violent and anti-constitutional secession was started by the Slovenes and Croats, which started with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the SPS and Serbian leadership and the Presidency of Yugoslavia took the stand that it was a violent and unilateral secession. Slobodan Milosevic represented this thesis at The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia in September 1991 and insisted that this secession was not supported; neither by international law nor by internal Yugoslav law - the 1974 Constitution prohibited such secessions.

The European mediators “overlooked” the fact that the administrative republic lines had neither ethnic nor historical foundations, but were the product of political arrangements where almost a third of the Serbian people were left outside of the borders of their native republic. Also, the existing republic borders were not determined by any legal act. (See Miodrag Jovichich, The right of peoples to self-determination (the idea and its realization), in: The Serbian question today, Second Congress of Serbian intellectuals, editor Vasilie Krestich, 1995, p. 81.)

The Serbian delegation, headed by Slobodan Milosevic at The Hague Conference, advocated for a “principled stand that all peoples and citizens must be equal and have the right to self-determination. If the Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians decided to secede from Yugoslavia the Serbian people too must have the same right in the territories in which a majority of them live and may decide to stay in a joint Yugoslav state.” (See Miodrag Jovichich, the right of peoples to self-determination (idea and its realization), in: The Serbian question today, Second Congress of Serbian intellectuals, editor Vasilie Krestich, 1995, p. 81.) This political stance was confirmed by the SPS leadership during the creation of the third Yugoslavia - when Serbia and Montenegro established a common state - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to maintain continuity and international subjectivity of the previous Yugoslavia. It found its place in the upcoming SPS document.

In the basics of the SPS program, adopted at the Second SPS Congress, on October 23 and 24, 1992, in the changed political and geopolitical constellations after the recognition of the new states from the territory of Yugoslavia, two issues surfaced regarding the national and state policy in the public. These were: The world in which we live and Yugoslavia (Chapter 9) and a United Serbia (Chapter 10)...

This allows for a common community with the Montenegrin people. With the preservation of Yugoslavia, the home of the Serbian people is preserved, which is an important guarantee for the protection of all other parts of the Serbian people. Presented here is a legitimate concern for the Serbians outside of Serbia to create an institutional

opportunity for a future Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which will join Krajina, the Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina... The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a free federal republic... its federative character means that the united state retains all those features necessary to be a state, not just an association of sovereign states.” (Program basics of the Socialist Party of Serbia. Yugoslavia, a free, federal republic, Belgrade, October 1992, p. 35-36.) When we are talking about the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SPS stands for a political solution with “direct negotiations with the people’s representatives in the conflict and, primarily, through direct expression of the citizens living in the disputed territories.” (International politics. *ibid.*, p. 36.)

In the second part the commitment to a single Serbia is repeated, encompassing the provinces with a form of territorial autonomy. Here we can see the attitude taken towards the part of the Serbian people who live outside Serbia, and for that reason we emphasize that “the Socialist Party of Serbia is certain that there have been violations of the principles of international law when the Serbians from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who spent seven decades united with their brothers, were prevented from remaining in a joint Yugoslav state under the right of self-determination of peoples. The Socialists in Serbia will continue to support their rights and give them moral and material support. As for the remaining Serbians who were left with minority status throughout the big cities and isolated areas of the breakaway Yugoslav republics, as well as those who live as minorities in neighbouring countries... we will help them nurture their own cultural tradition to preserve their national identity, to become citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia and to engage in the social life of their mother country.” (Attitude in the parts where Serbian people live outside of Serbia. *Ibid.*, p. 39-40.)

Along with the establishment of the SRY, the Republic of Srpska Krajina and the Republic of Srpska are constituted, as a kind of battle of the Serbs west of the Drina for exercising the right to self-determination and statehood in their ethnic and historical space.

Because of its existence, Serbia has been exposed to ruthless sanctions. It is well-known that Serbia alone advocated for a democratic and political solution to the Serb-Croat-Muslim conflict.

However, Slobodan Milosevic, with the blockade on the Drina (August 1994) significantly weakened our bargaining and geopolitical position, which prevented the realization of all Serbians to exist and live in a single state. Participating in the defeat: Republika Srpska Krajina was left with Croatia because it was believed that it was a pledge to keep Kosovo and Metohija, and the establishment of the Republic of Srpska as an equal entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, representing an achievement of national geopolitical optimum in the existing constellations of international forces...

The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was established on February 23, 1991, with the unification of the Serbian Chetnik movement for most of the local board of the National Radical Party. Elected for President was Vojislav Shesheli with 489 out of 509 votes. In its Statute, SRS has emphasized that it is the “legal successor of the Serbian People’s Radical Party founded in 1881 and its activities are guided by its statute and program, adapted to change social circumstances.” (Statute of the SRS, Article 1, “Greater Serbia”, Belgrade, May 1991, p 8.)

In its electoral plan, Dr. Vojislav Shesheli’s party grew quickly into a political force present in all regions where Serbians lived. Given that the Serbian Chetnik movement did not “qualify” to be registered in the first multiparty elections, Dr. Vojislav Shesheli ran as an independent candidate in the presidential elections in December 1990 during which he received almost 100,000 votes. In just one year after that the SRS had become the second most important political party in Serbia. During the first parliamentary elections in the FRY, held on May 31, 1992, the SRS received 30 percent of the vote...

In the program declaration of 1991, as its main target of action, the SRS said that “it will recover a free, independent and democratic Serbian state in the Balkans which will include the entire Serbian population and Serbian lands, meaning that, within its borders it will contain the current Serbian federal units, Serbian Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Bania, Serbian Slavonia and Serbian Barania.” (Program

Declaration of SRS “Greater Serbia”, no. 9, Belgrade, May 1991, p. 7-8.) 32) The Declaration was a kind of complement to the first radical program that dealt with a broader explanation of the Serbian political and national issue and insisted that it was part of a modified program of the 1881, Nikola Pasich’s Serbian People’s Radical Party and that it was going to be supplemented each year with a program declaration.

The SRS confirmed its program goals in subsequent programs enacted in 1994 and 1996. This was the only political party in Serbia which, since its establishment, kept the same political views regarding the resolution of the Serbian national question in various regions in the former Yugoslav state. When it came to the structure of the state, the SRS called for a national referendum to resolve that matter. It also called for the repatriation of various members of royal families including the Karadzordzevich, Petrovich and Obrenovich families...

Special attention was paid to the Kosovo and Metohija Declaration, with aims that this part of the Serbian state be kept in Serbia in order to save it from Albanian separatists and secessionists. In accordance with its program commitments, the SRS sacrificially supported the Serbians in Krajina and Republika Srpska in their struggle for autonomy and statehood.

Dr. Vojislav Shesheli has repeatedly pointed out that there are two possible scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina: either it will be preserved and will enter into the composition of a truncated Yugoslavia, or it will split up. Every other solution, as was pointed out, would lead to war. The Republic of Srpska Krajina must enter into the composition of a truncated Yugoslavia, and never again be part of Croatia, because this would flagrantly violate the right to self-determination for the Serbian people and they again would be subjected to massacre and persecution, which would be a continuation of the 1941 genocide. The leader of the radicals was reluctant to recognize the independence of Macedonia which, before the creation of the first Yugoslavia, was part of the Serbian state and he thought, considering claims made by its neighbours towards the Macedonian territory, the optimal solution for Macedonia was to be one of the units of the Yugoslav Federation. Shesheli later accepted



the Macedonian people's ethnic distinctiveness and repeatedly stated that he would strive to include them in a common federal state of Serbians and Macedonians. In 1993, when Serbians in RSK and RS reached the maximum territorial-state, Shesheli proposed a state union that would be called Western Serbia...

SRS will not change its position when it comes to organization of the state government; consistently advocating for a unitary Serbian state; abolishing the autonomous provinces in Serbia's territory; requiring Kosovo and Metohija to declare martial law, suspending any political activities and introducing a military administration which would last at least ten years; establishing a 20-50 kilometre wide belt at the Albanian border and requiring the population to move out of that space with just compensation and for that area to be declared an area of strategic national importance...

The SRS political program stipulates the organization of a territorial principle; which is represented in all Serbian lands, in the Republic of Srpska Krajina the government in 1994 served in coalition with the Serbian Democratic Party. The February 2, 1994 agreement for the formation of the coalition, again mentions its strategic goal - the creation of a single Serbian state.

The Serbian Radical Party opposed the Bosnia and Herzegovina peace plan because it thought it was unfair to Serbian interests. In the spring of 1993, when Slobodan Milosevic supported the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SRS distanced itself from the current regime and called for the resignation of the Republic of Serbia government headed by Nikola Shainovich.

The SRS was the only political party from Serbia that did not accept the agreement... The SRS never accepted Croatia, which perpetrated a genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Serbian people in that country. It considers the occupation of RKS temporary. The liberation of Serbian Krajina is tied to the changes in the geopolitical constellations, primarily to the strengthening of Russia and other Orthodox countries. This is why these radicals refuse to accept the Dayton agreement for resolving the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In terms of the mentioned changes, with respect to international rights - above all the provision of the right of peoples

to self-determination - these radicals insist that the Serbian question be resolved with the entire Serbian ethnic space being under a single Serbian state.

## **THE BALKAN MEGA-ETHNOS -National doctrines of Macedonian neighbors**

### **A Summary**

This book consists of a collection of ten texts presenting modern national doctrines of Macedonian neighbors, selected, edited and mainly translated into Macedonian by the author. A few of them are presented in their original form, while several, due to their length, are presented in brief version or given in fragments relevant to Macedonia, but with clear indication about of the original version of the text. Texts are listed in alphabetic order of countries and include: “The Platform for Resolution of 7 National Question”, published by the Albanian Academy of Sciences, Skenza, Tirana, 1998, and then, a short text by Arben Dzaferi, presented by the Albanian-American Civil League (<http://aacl.com>, October 1998) in New York. Three Bulgarian texts follow: Prof. G. Velev (Resp. editor et all.)- 1997. Bulgarian National Doctrine. First part. Fundament of the Bulgarian National Doctrine. Sofia: Znanie Publishers EOOD and Bulgarian National Doctrine. Second part. National Strategic Programs. Program No.1. Protection and Spiritual Union of Bulgarians All Over the World. (the same editor, authors, publisher, published in 1998 ). The third text is: Ivanov, Lj. et all. 2008. Bulgarian Policy Towards the Republic of Macedonia. Recommendations for Development of Good Neighbourly Relations After the Accession of Bulgaria into EU... Sofia: Foundation Manfred Werner.

The Greek national doctrine is presented by two texts: The Macedonian Question. Review of the Attempts to Create an Artificial Nation. 09 February 1993. New York: Publifax, UN. Published in Athens, Greece, by the Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies (Iketa and Tolemey, 11 104 42 Athene); Sfetas, S. and Kointros, K.. 1994. Skopje in Search for Identity and International Recognition. Salonique: Institute for Balkan Studies. No.257. Three sources exemplified the Serbian national doctrines: The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade (SANU), 1986, published 1989-Zagreb, Nashe Teme, No-33, Vol.1-2, pp.128-163; Sheshelj, V. 2002. The Ideology of Serbian Nationalism. Scientific and

Publicistic Work of Prof. Lazo M. Kostic. Belgrade: Velika Srbia, AD. Subotic, M. The Serbian State in the Programs of Political Parties in Serbia till the Dayton Agreement. Belgrade. Politicka Revija. Year XVIII/V, Vol.12, No-4 (2006), pp.809-828. A few of these sources have been published in and translated from English, the rest translated from national languages.

The author exposes these sources to conceptual and critical analysis, taking as a starting point the fact that all the doctrines, regardless of their academic ground and association mainly with academies and institutes of sciences, have played and are still playing a considerable role in politics, foreign policies and current events in the Balkan region. Some of them have had a direct impact on the political forces and governmental policies that led to the dynamics, disputes and conflicts in the region over the last few decades, including the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the wars and violence on the soil of the former federation, the Kosovo conflict, the dispute over the name of Macedonia, the actual state of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina etc. This analysis is presented in the rather extensive introductory part of the book titled "The Balkan Mega-Ethnos. From Ethno-Romanticism to Ethno-Violence".

Doctrines presented in this volume are a second generation of ethnic or national programs of Macedonian neighbors. The first generation of doctrines had been formulated during the national "Risorgimento" process in the mid 19th century, with strong national liberation and national emancipation focus. Nevertheless, when these countries achieved their independence and established or envisaged their statehood, the doctrines were reshaped and provided by expansionist, claiming towards others elements in territorial, population, historical, ethno-cultural sense. The author mentions here- the Serbian Draft ("Nachertanija") of I. Garashanin and the Greek "Megali-Idea" of Colitis, both published in 1844, then the Bulgarian Program and Order of 1869 published in Bucharest, The Program of the Albanian Prizren League from 1878 etc. There is no doubt that these doctrinaire programs, including the ethno-political programs of other Balkan countries, had played a crucial role in decisive historical periods and conflicts, like the Great Eastern crisis (1877-78), the Macedonian Ilinden Uprising (1903), the two Balkan wars (1912-13), the two World wars etc. Meanwhile the national

doctrines have been framed and dependant on the bi-polar international relations after the WW II, but the interests for their revival and reactualization appeared again at the threshold and at the birth given to nationalism in the Balkans, during the great transformation in the early 1990-s.

This set of programmatic texts is a result of that interest, ambitions, aspirations for expansion, hegemony, avoiding human rights, rules of democracy, reconciliation and good-will or beneficial neighborly relations. Regardless of their “academic” character, at least some of them have obviously influenced the course of the political events in the neighborhood over the last two decades, often featured by disputes, pretensions, conflicts and open policies of “great states”.

Macedonians have not produced such documents. Historically, their independent state was established during the WW II and has immediately joined the Yugoslav federation; this means there has not been a state as an instrument of national or nationalistic policies. A few attempts at formulation of doctrinaire documents were present after the year 1990, but without substantial results.. This was due to the predominance of the civic factor in the newly established political order of the country and its multicultural composition as well as due to its specific international position.

The author nevertheless, examines the nature of the conflicts in the Balkans, most of which are on inter-ethnic, inter-religious, intercultural basis and absence of dialogue, tolerance or democratic political culture and traditions. A corpus of research studies, publications, comments, particularly by western authors, describes the region in dark colors, attributing to its populations, ethnicities, leading circles, unfavorable value systems, historical traditions, even anthropological distinctions: inclinations to fragmentation, conflictualisation, intolerance, rigid conduct, ethno-centric and ego-centric patterns etc.; even the notion of Balkanism and balkanization is often defined as fragmentation into small quarrelsome states, entities, groups. However, scholars like Marija Todorova, Roberta Guerrina and others wrote on the unfair and inadequate image produced for the Balkans as a necessary counter-point and “Other” relating to “Us” attributed by modern and highly civilized values

etc. V. Friedman even defines Balkanization as association and cohabitation of different cultures and languages.

Sociological research gives deeper insight into the ground and possible reasons for inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-group tensions and conflicts in the region or among or within individual countries.

The basic conclusion is that the Balkan region, regardless of the recent changes, systems' transformation, progress and development, regardless of processes of integration into EU, altogether is in a development delay in terms of socio-economic dynamics, noticeably behind the levels of the Union or of the continent. Uneven and slow development, development and living standard gaps in the region as well as in most individual countries, this is a visible phenomenon connected with the socio-economic position of ethnic and other minorities, groups or communities. As a rule,, the typical patterns identified by the author, are as follows: minorities live in backward or less developed areas and this fact makes a ground for social groups differences and patterns of differentiation or dissatisfaction. This is the objective basis on which ethnic or other factional interests are politisized and sometimes even conflictualized. Not less, in addition, such a social basis is a ground for massive involvement of populations in ethnic, religious and other disputes, tensions and even conflicts. Authors of doctrines rely significantly on this social basis. The essential solution is then- to accelerate the socio-economic development of the region as well as of each individual country, in addition to effective policies of balanced, sustainable, non-discriminative development.

Along these lines, theoretically and conceptually, in the following part of his analysis, the author examines particularly the correlation of the social context, the ideas and actions in the rise and expression of nationalism today. He takes as a starting point the conclusion of the American political scientist S. Bronner (1999) that "Nationalism is still ideology of our time. The petrified bureaucrats of nation-state still have an interest to reproduce that type of nationalism. The old fashioned notions of national sovereignty and self-determination, the atavistic traditions and habits still have the power of self-adduction". It was sixty and more years earlier when the German sociologist, H.

Kohn wrote in the same sense that on the periphery (in Europe) the intelligentsia, in the circumstances of lacking of self-confidence of the middle class to secure its own way to sustainable rise, had to create a mythical feeling of “different” destiny of the entire community, by paving the way for national culture, based upon folklore elements and mobilization of masses. This is where the power of idealistic and subjectivist components of peripheral nationalism come from...” In this context, theories and concepts of nation, nationhood, ethnos and ethnicity, relevant in modern academic and political discourse are presented and discussed. This is due to the attempts of authors of most texts on national doctrines included here, to appeal to and associate with some of the important theoretical sources of modernity.

The author takes as a point that no single theory in this area is predominant, that many of them are still functioning but that several are, nevertheless considered as- out of date in contemporary social sciences. For instance, there is still a significant legacy of ethnoromanticism, influential in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in the period of building and accomplishing the great etatist and imperial entities in Europe.

This stream of thought had emphasized and affirmed ethnic and ethnolinguistic determination as well as the “organic” and ethnogenetic nature of nations as a ground for “voluntaristic” and “organicistic” definitions of nation and nationalism, projected even in modernity. The cult of the past and historical past of “predecessors and heroes” as well as that of collective “political will” of the nation is the focus of that notion, having often dramatic effects even nowadays.

Marxism was and still is another source of understanding and defining the pattern of nation and ethnicity, despite of its “cosmopolitan and universalist” ideology and criticism of nationalism as an expression of “capitalist slavery” and prevention of “liberation of labour”.

Nevertheless, communism had to conceptually and practically as well solve the issues of “world revolution” which was taking place within “nation states”, just like communist policies to be

implemented in nation-states' framework. In this connection, at the beginning of the 20th century, one of the Marxist schools, the Austro-Marxism of O. Bauer, defined the nation as "entity of people, associated by a common destiny and common communication, which mediator is the language, creating so- a cultural community". This definition is not far from contemporary understandings of the nature of ethnic/national communities.

However, later on, Marxism, in the course of the rise of the Soviet political and imperial power, had reinterpreted the nation in the words of Stalin- as "a historically established stable community of people, based upon a communion of language, territory, economic life and political constitution, manifested in a community of culture". These features had been founded and strengthened by capitalism, implanting in such communities class inequalities, contrasts, exploitation, hegemony.

This definition has not been forgotten even today, sometimes is fully utilized and instrumentalized as in the case of the Balkans. It particularly involves the component of the "class and labor liberation", which now, like in the recent history comprises a variety of forms of political intervention in "national and ethnic issues". The additional product of this concept is the "historical" gradation of national "growth", from ethno-tribes and states through ethnic grouped population and ethnicities to- nations establishing their own states on their own, ethnically determined territories.

Under Yugoslav circumstances, E. Kardelj, in the late 1950-s would determine the nation as "specific people's community, formed on the basis of the division of labor in the epochs of capitalism, on a compact territory, in the framework of common language, having altogether close ethnic and cultural communications". Capitalism was a creator of differences among nations, while the labor liberation would give a rise to full equity and cultural equality of all nations...

By Marxist/Stalinist interpretation, nationhood is a real community, historical, linguistic, economic, territorial, cultural etc., while inequalities among nations are a product of capitalist reproduction, which would be resolved by the revolution, even "world's



revolution”, overcoming all social groups’ inequalities. However, at the same time, Stalinism had introduced severe instruments of intervention and “political engineering” in resolving national/ethnic issues. Nevertheless, the Macedonian national issue was not affected by such methods of resolution.

Modern thought and notions of nations and nationalism are primarily considering the dilemma whether nations are primogenial, eternal, historically determined creations, or creations of modern era, society, political development. The primordialist stream in theory defines nations as almost bio-social groups, having ethno-genetic, race, organic and even blood-relation character. That is the basis of formation and existence of cultural, language, religious and other “natural” group features and self-perception of a nation or ethnicity. As Shils, Gertz and others, explained, such groups are a root of social organization as they have organic and organic-evolutionary nature. Political and state institutions are mainly civil and secular coverage and protectors of nations... Ethnic territory is a natural space of free expression of nations and ethnicities and is protected by state apparatus.

The Modernist stream in theory of nation, although one cannot speak of homogeneous theory, generally considers that nations are not creations rooted in ancient or antique times but are a fruit of modern history and not so distant past. Most of nations in the world have been encompassed only recently and there is no sociological or historical evidence that they have been “pre-modern” collectivities. Most of the evidence indicates that their history was mainly based upon mythology and myths, not on bio-genetic, ethno-genetic or natural linkages. They are even “invented or imagined” communities and a result of modern socio-political developments which created prerequisites for rational sometimes “scheduled” activities of nation-building. These processes have been particularly visible during and after the French revolution and other civil revolutions. Authors like R. Bendix, L. Pie, E. Hobsbaum, D. Lerner, G. Allmond, E. Gellner, E. Kedourie, B. Anderson and many others have offered a deep insight in the essence of these developments, explaining in the first instance the knot correlation of the nation-building, the role of the state and politics and the requirements of industrialism and capitalism: large and single markets, mass production, massive

education and application of common standards, cultural and linguistic patterns.

Exchange and mobility of capital, labour force and goods require these common standards and destroy the traditional forms of association of populations on feudal, local, religious, ethnic, even family and primary groups' levels. States and political institutions greatly facilitate this dynamics. However, it is pointed out that building of modern nations and nation-states is also connected to and implemented by the advancements of human rights, civil liberties and democratic order, something which is not considered as relevant in many newly established states introducing allegedly modern nation-building models.

Balkan countries, at least many of them, belong to this group of "democratic" systems. In some national doctrines of Macedonian neighbors, nationalism is defined as good (nationalism of "Western" type) and bad (of primitive type, repudiating the rights of others).

In fact, this is a distinction of nationalism perceived as patriotism and nationalism as a form of depriving "others", ethnic minorities first of all of their natural and legal rights of self-expression. The distinction of civic patriotism and ethnic nationalism is a relevant problem in policies of many Balkan states. Even when Balkan nationalisms declare themselves as nationalism of Western type, when they refer to "citizenship of a nation-state", they are in fact ethnic nationalisms.

It is interesting how this type of nationalism penetrates into politics and mass consciousness. The author quotes here the well known German sociologist H. Kohn, who, writing 60 years ago, said that intellectuals play a pillar role in the periphery, in East-European countries, where the petty bourgeoisie lacks the necessary confidence to pave its road to self-sustained growth. Instead, intellectuals should provide the mythical feeling of different destiny of the entire community, by nourishing a national culture based upon folklore elements and mobilization of masses. This is where the source of power of idealistic and subjectivist components of peripheral nationalisms, derives from.

Much later, in the mid 80s of the last century, the Czech sociologist M. Hroch would conclude his research on nationalism in Eastern Europe, detecting the common matrix of nationalistic movements in the region; they usually begin with small caucuses of intellectuals, writers, artists who elaborate the idea of a threatened nation, then that idea is spreading into larger circles of patriots-agitators, teachers and journalists, to come to an end in a largest body of lower and middle strata as well as to- massive movement.

Ethno-symbolist school of thought, represented in the book through analysis of the works of A. Smith, Hutchinson, Burt, Gounot, Held and McGrew and others, is close to the modernists; nevertheless it is not burdened by rigid definitions, requirements and categorical determinations of what an ethnos or nation is or is not. To say in simplified words, it assumes that if a part or a group of a population feels differently from the others, particularly from the majority, if it declares itself as an ethnically or in terms of nationhood –distinctive, it has the right to do it so.

What remains as essence of this doctrine, as Kedourie would formulate, is the fact that people have the right to endure on differences that distinct then from others, no matter whether differences are real or imagined, important or not; they have the right to make these differences their first political principle...

Moreover, such a group or entity of the population does not have any obligation or duty to prove why it so feels or self-identify as a distinctive group. Identity, self-identity and self-identification are basic concepts of theorizing in this context. The well known Croatian cultural theoretician Z. Kramaric, develops further this way of thinking, elaborating in more details the issues of group identification, particularly in situations of unfavourable conditions for nation-building, absence of own state or political forces as well as in presence of what is usually called “dual identity”, a phenomenon often seen in Balkan cultures. Kramaric applies this analysis to the phenomenon visible in Macedonian literature and nation-genesis.

At this point, the author tries to relate this theory to the international legal order and already adopted and functioning acts and treaties,

providing human rights and civil liberties relating to ethnic and minorities' rights as a substantial part of this order. Both at individual level and subsequently at collective level, ethnic self-identification and self-determination have been incorporated in the corpus of international law and legal order. As a matter of fact, the right of self-identification is an inclusive part of the new generation of human rights and liberties. Not everywhere this has been understood and respected.

Conceptual analysis gives a ground for a presentation and critical examination of the texts of modern national doctrines of Macedonian neighbors. The author comes to a set of analytical observations relating to most of these doctrinal documents. First of all, they present a continuation of the lines of reasoning, demands, ambitions and aspirations of their founders and ideological fathers in the mid-19th century. That was a period of national "Risorgimento" of many Balkan ethnicities, a period of ethno-romanticism, of creation of new statehoods, nationhoods, a period of formation of policies of expansion, conquests, enlargements of influence, claims to neighboring territories and populations.

In most texts, ethno-romanticism and ethno-centric interpretations of history are present nowadays, together with complains that "their" nation was a historical victim or object of victimization, of suffering and being deprived of some historical rights, first of all of living together in one single state. This was, allegedly due to the interferences and interventions of great powers and their interests in Balkan affairs, due to specific balance of forces in the Balkan politics and inter-state affairs, not less because of domestic and internal weaknesses of the "national forces".

The analysis of the author indicates that theoretically, the doctrines are a product of ecclesiastic methods of thinking and concluding, of a combination and discriminative selection of arguments and theses of Ethno-romanticism, Primordialism, Marxism and to certain measure Modernism. As a matter of fact, many of them draw out from these concepts- the most rigid and for them- rather instrumental definitions and conceptions of nation and ethnicity. Consequently, they try to shape the imagined paradigm of a "great nation", historically and ethno-genetically rooted in ancient times, a

nation historically deprived of its natural rights, reduced in its ethnic territory and population by its neighbors, a nation suffering of space and resources' limitations, a nation rich of its geno-funds and intellect but denied in rights by the present political arrangements. The claims for expanding to the entire mentally determined ethnic territory is present in most doctrinal texts, sometimes even clearly and programmatically.

Most of the doctrines deny the existence of any ethnic diversity in their own states, deny the existence of ethnic minorities and declare one-nation states; if, because of international acts and obligations they should recognize some undisputable ethnicities, they recognize their ethnic rights on individual basis only; even this is followed by active stimulation of members of these ethnicities to join the citizenship of the nation-state and become nationals of that state, preserving their language or group identity “for home and family”.

Most of the documents also emphasize the right of expansion to and appropriation of Macedonian territory and other territories in the neighborhood. This is on “ethno-historical”, ethno-genetic, economic, linguistic and cultural basis. An enormous and carefully selected evidence of statistical, historiographic, economic, demographic etc., basis, has been utilized to prove these claims and hypotheses. Several documents openly deny the existence of the Macedonian nation, of Macedonian minorities in their countries, of Macedonian national identity, language, history and culture. Selected lists of geographical maps, statistical censuses evidence from the past are attached to demonstrate that Macedonians are just an invented nation, an amorphous mass of population ethnically belonging to other nations. Consequently, Macedonian ethnic communities in neighboring countries do not exist, with exception of small groups of individuals conducting “destructively”.

Another approach in the documents is the criticism of the present day authorities of Macedonia for repression of ethnic rights of minorities, despite the fact that the country is well known by its full respect and practical implementation of inter-ethnic democracy and human rights. At this point, some documents not only appeal to European standards but also formulate policies offered to their governments for how to press upon the country to abandon its own

national identity and sovereignty. Dreams are converted into ideology, ideology into policies, policies into conflicts, concludes the author.

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