

*Clio in the Balkans*

**THE POLITICS  
OF HISTORY EDUCATION**

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND RECONCILIATION  
IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE





**CLIO IN THE BALKANS**

**The Politics  
of History Education**

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CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND RECONCILIATION IN  
SOUTHEAST EUROPE

## **CLIO IN THE BALKANS**

### **The Politics of History Education**

EDITED BY  
CHRISTINA KOULOURI

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## PREFACE

COSTA CARRAS

***E**VEN BEFORE the official foundation of the Center for Democracy & Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, its Greek associate, the Association for Democracy in the Balkans, had organized a conference in July 1997 under the title «Culture and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe», which included a session on history textbooks. Later that year, our Chairman, Matt Nimetz, made the suggestion we follow up on this conference by initiating a «Southeast European Joint History Project» (hereafter JHP) as the Center's first programme. By autumn 1998, mainly as a result of inspired work by Professor Maria Todorova, who had agreed to chair its Academic Committee, the first outline plan had been prepared. Meanwhile, I had been asked by the Board to act as Rapporteur and oversee the JHP's development, which I continue to do.*

*The first important event was the Halki Conference of June 1999 where, once again, Maria Todorova was responsible for the academic planning. The conference was noteworthy for its high quality and a book of essays based on contributions at the conference is due to be published within a few months.*

*When the Halki Conference was planned, it represented an act of faith. Adequate financing only became available in March 1999. When it did become available however it came mainly in the form of an extremely generous donation by the British Government, for which the Center is most grateful. This covered the Halki Conference, most of the activities of the Academic Committee until September 2001 and all those of the History Education Committee in respect of textbooks which were successfully concluded in March 2001. There was also an important contribution from the Austrian Government which, in addition, together with the Governments of Switzerland and Norway, supported the second set of workshops devoted to history teaching rather than to history textbooks. These draw to a close at the end of 2001.*

*From the private sector, we gratefully acknowledge a donation*

*from the Winston Foundation which covered the first seminar organized by the Academic Committee in May 2000, while the Cyprus Federation of America made a generous donation to help cover the costs of activity that concerned Cyprus. We are grateful also to those private donors, anonymous and named, who have provided the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe with all its core finance to date. These include the Hellenic Bottling Corporation, Mr Alex Spanos and Mr Stacey Politis.*

*Finally, generous support from the US State Department has covered the work of the Senior Scholars, whose core is made up of members of the JHP's Academic Committee. This has enabled even more young historians in the region to gain valuable experience at two conferences attended by senior and by younger historians both from within the region and outside it.*

*It was at Halki in June 1999 that the leadership of the other JHP committee, namely that of the Textbook Committee, now renamed the History Education Committee, was elected by those participants at the Conference who had an interest in this area of work. Professor Christina Koulouri was elected as chair, with Dubravka Stojanovic as vice-chair. Soon, Professor Halil Berktaç, who had not been in Halki, became a second vice-chair, and within a short period of time every country in the region was represented by at least one member on the Committee. Some more were elected at the Committee's second full meeting in September 2000, and there is now a total of seventeen. Collaboration between members has been marked by a genuine sense of a shared enterprise aiming to give expression to a common interest and common ideals of people in all the countries of the region.*

*The fifth textbook workshop, in two connected parts, was held in September 2000 in Istanbul, and the interest of television stations and newspapers was a clear proof that public opinion well beyond the Center has become aware of the significance of our work. There was also a Board Meeting in Istanbul, which decided to extend the Joint History Project into a third phase. This will, we hope, involve the formation of committees in each country to argue for the adoption of those changes in approach, whether in textbooks or in teaching methods, that the History Education Committee will be proposing after the end of 2001, when it will have completed its program of seven textbook and seven teacher training workshops. It also now proposes to create a series of*

*four teachers' «packs» on subjects of crucial importance in regional history, namely on the Ottoman Empire, the Creation of Balkan Nation-States, the Balkan Wars, and World War II.*

*Also in Istanbul, the History Education Committee itself decided to produce an Interim Report, which was published in February 2001, and this Final Report, after all the Textbook and History Teaching Workshops would have been completed. Unlike the Interim Report, the present one contains essays that go into some depth in their particular areas of concern. Professor Christina Koulouri has coordinated the whole effort with an admirable combination of personal warmth, diplomatic skill and wide knowledge of the history of history textbooks.*

*The JHP is a long-term project. It is not about replacing an accurate picture of the past with one that is less accurate but more friendly to traditional adversaries. Nor is it about replacing an inaccurate picture of the past hostile to other countries with an equally inaccurate picture of the past friendly to them. The commitment to truth comes above all else, but it is combined with an acknowledgement that whereas particular events may be established or disproven, there will always be room for differences in the interpretation of whatever has in fact occurred. Hence, to learn historical method, one must acquire both a respect for the rigour necessary to establish truth and the combination of sympathy and subtlety required to appreciate but also critically to evaluate differing interpretations of events.*

*Most of the textbooks and history teaching in Southeastern Europe, as elsewhere, have been developed as part of the enterprise of creating nation states. Since the nation represents such an important focus of identity in our region, and indeed in most of today's world, it would be both undesirable and unrealistic to try and deprive it of its place as the centre of the history curriculum. There is however a need, explored and illustrated by the articles in this Report, to combat stereotyping, which is the result of omitting less admirable episodes in one's own past and stressing those in the past of others, while omitting their achievements. There is certainly a need to give greater prominence to cultural history, which tends to be less divisive. Finally, there is no reason that history of nation-states should not be balanced by the teaching of histories focused on other potential focuses of identity as, for instance, local or regional. Even more radically, one might envisage a history of such institutions and concepts as citizenship, the rule*

*of law, liberty and democracy, which would no longer be geographically focused but would bring together communities of differing time and place which remain however part of one intelligible «story». Radical though this may seem, it is not so different from what many histories of religion must do already.*

*In the alternating mood of hope and despair that has characterized Southeast Europe in recent years, it is important to remember that our task is not easy. Nor yet is it impossible. It will require years, if not decades, of dedicated work to combat the damage done by historical stereotyping, to establish the values of democracy, tolerance and open-minded historical enquiry, and to achieve reconciliation in those places where today hostility and misunderstanding prevail. We can at least say with confidence, on the basis of the achievements both of the Academic and the History Education Committees to date, that it has begun more energetically, enthusiastically and effectively than we could ever have anticipated.*

## INTRODUCTION

CHRISTINA KOULOURI

*We confront one another armored in identities  
whose likenesses we ignore or disown  
and whose differences we distort or invent  
to emphasize our own superior worth.*

D. LOWENTHAL<sup>1</sup>

EVERY BOOK is a product of its time, at the same time enclosing a 'history' – its own story. These traits are even more pronounced in a book on history, as its chief –although not always explicit– aim is to rouse historical consciousness. *Clio in the Balkans* is the fruit of a two-year collective endeavour to make an in-depth, sober assessment of historical education in the Balkans. A fundamental condition in this teamwork study was that all countries in the region, from Slovenia to Cyprus, would have equal parts, while all participants had expressed the determination to be sincere and self-critical. The subjects selected for the seven workshops constitute sensitive regional questions arising from current controversies and having an impact on the interpretation of the past and on the teaching of history.

In the last decade, the concept of a new Balkan community emerged as a counterweight to new aggressive and defensive nationalisms. The consequent idea to promote a common history of the region was also launched in political and intellectual environments. However, this new history should not be a new construction which would replace the national histories. It would rather be a new interpretation of the national pasts based on a common Balkan cultural and institutional heritage. And it implies the introduction in history teaching of supra-national elements as a counterweight to ethnocentric or even nationalistic historical narratives.

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<sup>1</sup> D. Lowenthal, «Identity, Heritage, and History», in J. R. Gillis, *Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996 (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), p. 41.

The success of this endeavour is not sufficiently reflected in this volume. This is necessarily a selective presentation of papers delivered and discussions conducted as part of seven very vigorous workshops<sup>2</sup>. Specifically, this edition comprises four kinds of texts: (a) general information on educational systems in the Balkan countries, the system of textbook authorisation and production and the position of history in the syllabus –teaching hours, the subject matter taught in each grade, the proportions of national, Balkan, European and international history, the subject's compulsory or optional status (Appendix); (b) papers analysing history textbooks on the basis of a standard questionnaire for each workshop, or presenting other aspects of national historiography, identity formation and the role of education; (c) reports on each workshop, with the discussions and conclusions arrived at by the participants, and (d) responses to specific questions in the questionnaires, from a comparative viewpoint (i.e. answers given to the same question in different countries). The selection criterion was representativeness, with the aim of forming an overview of the situation in all countries and providing a comprehensive picture of all issues discussed in the workshops. It is also obvious that the selection was necessary for practical reasons: if we were to publish the entire content of these workshops we would need at least seven volumes.

Yet the most difficult aspect to render in print and capture in a book is the experience of communication. More than merely an academic meeting, this was a venue for inter-Balkan communication and the formation of friendships. Getting to know the 'other' was as important as the scientific discourse recorded in this book. It was demonstrated that the dynamic of human contact is much more powerful than scientific findings, and any changes in the teaching of history will come

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<sup>2</sup> Workshop I (Budapest, 17-18 December 1999): «Hungarian Legacy in South-east Europe»; Workshop II (Pyla, Cyprus, 28-29 February 2000): «Teaching Cyprus: in search of tolerance and understanding»; Workshop III (Skopje, 16-18 April 2000): «The Macedonian Identity: complementarities, conflicts, denials»; Workshop IV (Athens, 15-16 June 2000): «Albanians and their Neighbours»; Workshop V (Istanbul, 20-23 September 2000): Part A, «Greeks and Turks: the Janus of a Common History,» and Part B, «The Balkan Empires: common heritage, different heirs»; Workshop VI (Ljubljana, 2-5 November 2000): «Yugoslavia: a look in the broken mirror – Who is the 'Other'»; Workshop VII (Thessaloniki, 10-12 March 2001): «Religious Education and the view of the 'Others'».

from motivated individuals rather than impersonal institutions. This became more evident in the second cycle of workshops for the training of history teachers<sup>3</sup>, to be completed by February 2002. The enthusiastic participation of history teachers in primary and secondary education attested to the existence in the Balkans today of a critical mass of people with shared concerns and visions who, for all their linguistic differences, can speak the same 'language'. Although there are different opinions, there does exist a Balkan *koine*: the scientific language of history.

In the following pages I shall attempt to discuss the parameters of the ongoing revision of history in the Balkan countries, the ways in which a 'new' history of the Balkans fits into European history, the possibilities and the difficulties of writing such a history and, finally, the educational strategy which should be followed by the individual histories of the Balkan national states as well as by a common history of the Balkans. This general overview will be followed by a synopsis of the contributions to this volume, whose specific conclusions illustrate the individual aspects of history teaching, the traditions of history writing, the formation of national, religious and cultural identities and the use of history in contemporary problems and conflicts.

\* \* \*

### **The return of the Balkans**

Following the dramatic changes of the last decade in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, many people talked of a 'return' of the Balkans to Europe. Forty years of cold war had isolated most of the Balkans from the geo-cultural domain of Western Europe and led to a different political, social and economic course determined by the Soviet model. According to F. Braudel's *Grammar of civilisations* of 1963 the Bal-

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<sup>3</sup> The teachers' training workshops are the following: 1) «The Balkan Wars» 14-17 December 2000, Thessaloniki, 2) «The First World War and the Creation of Yugoslavia», 26-29 January 2001, Thessaloniki, Greece, 3) «The Second World War. Collaboration and Resistance», 8-10 March 2001, Thessaloniki, 4) «The Balkan Wars and the Creation of the Albanian State» 11-13 May 2001, Tirana, 5) «The Ottoman Empire and the Creation of Nation-States», 1-3 June 2001, Bucharest, 6) «The Balkan Wars», 14-15 December 2001, Skopje, 7) «The Republic of Cyprus: investigating a common history», London, February 2002.

kans were not a distinct ‘world’ but a mixture of two worlds – Western and Soviet<sup>4</sup>. In the eyes of Westerners the ‘iron curtain’ confirmed a cultural difference of Eastern Europe –often defined in terms of ‘backwardness’– which was being constructed since the age of the Enlightenment<sup>5</sup>. The collapse of the ‘curtain’ automatically opened the way for a psychological return to the European cultural realm; to the union –or reunion, to most people– with a shared European past. This homecoming of the Balkans was, in fact, at the expense of their own common historical past. Ethnocentric or overtly nationalistic histories were developed as parts of the overall European aggregate, fragmenting and subverting the history of the region. Each national Balkan history was thus connected directly to European history, without any regional stages in between. So the return of the Balkans to their European ‘home’ did not lead to the reinforcement of their unity, although its prerequisite was the elimination of their internal political division (between the Communist northern Balkans and the NATO countries of Greece and Turkey). On the contrary, the Balkan peoples embarked on an extraordinary competition as to their degree of ‘Europeanness’ and their consequent cultural prestige.

Similarly, Europe also ‘returned’ to the Balkans, both literally and metaphorically. The institutions of Western parliamentary democracy as well as Western corporations, cultural products, non-governmental organisations and armies entered the Balkans with different objectives, actions and results. The European presence, sometimes uninvited, was not always welcome by the local populations who had been trained for decades to mistrust the West and reject its political and economic system. Although they had come to reject their own social model and were trying to align their future course with Western culture and the Western standards of development, they displayed an ambivalent attitude towards Western Europe.

At the same time the concept of European identity –hitherto clearly Western-oriented– gradually expanded to include the Eastern

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<sup>4</sup> F. Braudel, *Grammaire des civilisations*, tr. in Greek by A. Alexakis, Athens 2001. Braudel distinguishes six ‘worlds’: Western, Soviet, Far eastern, SE Asian and Black African (p. 23). Greece is described as «Aegean civilisation, from Thrace to Crete» rather than a civilisation of the Balkans (p. 32).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

and Southeastern parts of the continent. This psychological return of Europe to the Balkans was difficult and required new constructs for Europe's cultural borders to meet the physical ones; for history to coincide with geography. What had been established, after many generalisations and simplifications, as the ingredients of Europeanness –Christianity, rationalism, liberalism– now had to be relativised to accommodate cultural 'otherness'– the Eastern version of Christianity and Islam, the Byzantine and Ottoman political and economic systems. This meant, in fact, the coexistence of opposite pairs: West and East, Europe and Asia. For the expansion of Europeanness up to the geographical borders of Europe would include Russia, with a powerful and extensive Asian section, and Turkey, which saw central Asia as its cradle and Anatolia as its backbone.

There is no question that in the new geopolitical reality in South-eastern Europe the Balkans represent the new frontier of Europe and European civilisation<sup>6</sup>. Yet after the fall of Eastern European regimes the very concept of frontier, as perceived by W. Europe, seems to have changed: the impermeability of a dark curtain as symbolised by the Berlin Wall has been superseded by the fluid, osmotic borderline of cultural exchange, even within a single State. Western societies themselves, at a time of crisis for the concept of the national state, have come to realise their multiculturalism as a result of economic immigration and the end of colonialism. Thus the Balkans –with their multicultural past and present of different religious, linguistic and cultural traditions, an interface of the Slavic, Islamic, Mediterranean and central-European worlds– stand as a most eloquent delineation of the new Europeanness.

This is why I think we had better use the term 'Balkans', for all its fluid, contradictory and controversial content. It is one of those geographical designations which point to geopolitical and cultural divisions. Indeed, 'Southeastern Europe'<sup>7</sup> does not indicate a subdivision of 'Europe', since the latter has long had a meaning of cultural entity

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<sup>6</sup> About the 'liminality' of the Balkans see also K. E. Fleming, «*Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography*», *American Historical Review* 105/4, 2000, pp. 1231-2.

<sup>7</sup> About the term «*Südosteuropa Halbinsel*» which failed to prevail as more 'neutral' during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 27.

and conscious identity in addition to its original geographic sense, whereas the former is an exclusively geographical term. This is not the case with 'Balkans', which stands as the corresponding term to 'Europe'. It should be reminded that during the Cold War the northern Balkans were never described as 'Southeastern Europe', being mostly considered as part of Eastern Europe.

A widespread preference for the term Southeastern Europe is due to the fact that it is more 'neutral' than Balkans and, perhaps subconsciously, facilitates the region's incorporation into Europe from a linguistic point of view<sup>8</sup>. Yet one cannot fight negative stereotypes by suppressing them. The choice of the negatively charged term 'Balkans' constitutes a challenge against this kind of 'orientalism' imposed on the region from inside as well as outside, albeit on different grounds and for different ends. On the one hand, there is the negative view of the Balkans, widely held in W. Europe, which presents the picture of a region where violence is almost endemic. On the other hand, an internal discourse is propagated on the 'special case' of the Balkans; this may reflect either the adoption of the rhetoric of Balkanism, which means self-stigmatisation<sup>9</sup>, or the instrumentalisation of Balkanness (centred around Orthodox Christianity, for example) for political ends<sup>10</sup>.

Maria Todorova has analysed in a definitive book the 'discovery' of the Balkans and the development of 'Balkanism' – the West's hegemonic rhetoric about its Eastern alter ego. In this rhetoric, initiated by Western travellers since the late 18th century, the Balkans are plainly 'different', in the sense of either exotic or 'uncivilised' and 'barbarian'. Although the term 'Balkan' partly overlaps with 'oriental', there are differences as to the traits attributed to each of them. Whereas the Orient is usually equated with passivity and superstition, the Balkans are further characterised by 'cruelty, boorishness, instability, and unpredictability'<sup>11</sup>. This stereotype, which led to the derogatory term 'Bal-

<sup>8</sup> Irimi Lagani, «Balkan Federation: the History of an Idea», in *Τα Βαλκάνια χτες-σήμερα* (Balkans yesterday-today), Athens: Etaireia Spoudon Neoellinikou Politismou kai Genikis Paideias, 2000, pp. 77-78 (in Greek).

<sup>9</sup> Maria Todorova, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>10</sup> Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, «Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics», *Slavic Review* 51 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-15.

<sup>11</sup> Maria Todorova, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

kanisation' in the early 20th century (Balkan Wars and World War I), was revived and reinforced in the last decade as a result of the war in Yugoslavia. Once again, this was used as a pretext for translating the essentialised cultural differences into political messages<sup>12</sup>.

Nevertheless, despite the obviously reductive, simplistic and Manichaestic aspects of this hegemonic, Western-oriented rhetoric, there is no doubt that the Balkan peninsula is criss-crossed by many more internal boundaries than the rest of Europe: cultural, ethnic, religious as well as political/territorial boundaries. Indeed, the current trend is to keep adding miles to state borders. At the same time, the memories of war had remained alive in the minds of people and were revived in the last decade. War images were rapidly communicated by the modern media and imprinted on the minds of people who were not first-hand witnesses. The experience from war extended a lot further than the event itself. The relations with neighbouring peoples were seen as hostile even in peace, the most prominent example being the time of peace termed 'cold war'. The traumatic memories of uprooting and emigration, armed conflicts, the loss of beloved persons and property, of all kinds of violence were fused into a history of friction whose authors are always the victims and the only ones to fight for a just cause.

### **The return of History**

The many ruptures and changes that took place in the Balkans over the last decade –and whose dynamic seems still to be active– changed the perceptions of the past and the ways of writing history. The major historical breach as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe had an inevitable effect on the societies' daily life and self-definitions. The ensuing economic crisis, the dramatic demographic changes due to migration and the feelings of uncertainty and insecurity were reflected in a rhetoric of nostalgia for bygone 'golden ages' and reappraisal of the collective past. History in the Balkans is rewritten, and the process is an open one.

On the other hand, this change –given its dependence on the wider historical rupture of 1989– cannot be seen in isolation from the overall European context or the international developments in the science of History. Moreover, the 1989 change could not leave Western

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

historiography unaffected, either. In fact, this is a multiple return of History – a revision of historiography itself in opposing directions: from the post-modern questioning of the validity of historical writing to the narcissistic confidence and dogmatism of nationalistic history.

The rewriting of Balkan history –and the region’s national histories– should be seen first of all in the context of changes in the writing of European history. «Where is Europe heading to?» is the oft-asked question after the fall of communist regimes, the rekindling of nationalism and racism, the expansion of the European community, Maastricht and the war in Yugoslavia. It reflects a deep concern about the future of the continent, aggravated by the fact that Europe has long ceased to be the centre of the world and is increasingly delegated to the margin of economic and political developments. The American way of living, dressing, eating and entertainment is rapidly expanding as an international –and pan-European, in particular– phenomenon. Almost inevitably, this new reality reverses the original question about the future of Europe: «Where does Europe come from?»

The need to rewrite and re-teach European history sprang exactly from this new political juncture as a result of the collapsed East-West front within Europe. In fact, this front was historiographical as well as historical. The European histories of the West were clearly Western-oriented and sometimes anticommunist, meaning anti-Soviet. Similarly, history in the eastern countries was heavily politicised and historiography legitimised their regime, which was defined in contrast to the capitalist West. Nineteen eighty-nine may have marked the end of Europe’s historical but not historiographical division. Characteristically, the work of J. -B. Duroselle was widely criticised<sup>13</sup> for focusing historical analysis on Western Europe, excluding or depreciating other regions (Balkans, Scandinavia, etc.) or ignoring historical periods such as Byzantium.

The views of Duroselle –and other historians– as to the content of European history and the various reactions to them are, in fact, parts of the problem itself: How is Europe defined – under geographical, cul-tural or other criteria? Is there a European identity – and how does it

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<sup>13</sup> Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Europe. A History of its Peoples*, translated by Richard Mayne, London: Viking, 1990. Reactions were particularly vivid in Greece because Byzantium was left outside Europe.

link to individual national identities? What is the content of European history, and what are the objectives of teaching history to European students? These questions reflect, of course, the current juncture, and history –always ‘contemporary’– is called upon to answer the questions posed by the present. For centuries people in Europe had lived without a shared historical consciousness, while in the last two centuries their national identities were clearly more important, as evidenced by the various wars, local or global. Yet over the last decade the European continent tends to be perceived as a single ‘community’ while all individual countries, particularly Eastern ones, wish to acquire the veneer of European-ness and join the new community on an equal basis. Besides, the new community demands its own legitimising past, its own mythology. The history of New Europe should no longer be the sum of national histories but the history of «a nation consisting of nations»<sup>14</sup>.

However, the European dimension has yet to gain a significant place in school history, even in member-states of the European Community. As demonstrated by two studies conducted by Falk Pingel at the Georg-Eckert Institute (Braunschweig, Germany)<sup>15</sup>, for all the differences in the school textbooks of the various countries there are some common traits in all cases: there is no clear definition of Europe; national identity prevails as a way of self-definition; (Western) Europe is only shown as a unified whole during the Middle Ages, while its picture is fragmented in modern and contemporary times to form the histories of national states; references to Europe are mainly confined to

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<sup>14</sup> The ex officio agent of a European perception of history, since its inception in 1949, has been the Council of Europe. According to the various «directives» (recommendations) on history teaching the Council has issued from time to time, a European perception of history does not entail a sense of superiority or contempt for non-European nations nor is it an end in itself; it is meant as a stage between an exclusively national perception of history and a universal approach. Moreover, since the 1980s the Council’s publications have associated the role of history with the promotion of intercultural understanding and democratic citizenship. Students are therefore called upon to understand and accept cultural diversity.

<sup>15</sup> Falk Pingel (ed.), *L’immagine dell’Europa nei manuali scolastici di Germania, Francia, Spagna, Gran Bretagna e Italia*, Turin 1994 and German edition: *Macht Europa Schule? Die Darstellung Europas in Schulbüchern der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, Frankfurt/Main, 1995; idem (ed.), *The European home: representations of 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe in history textbooks*, Council of Europe Publishing, 2000.

Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia or the USSR for as long as she was considered to be a European power.

The return of History to the Balkans is reflected mainly in the national histories, and only at a second level in the connection with European history. In Communist countries before 1989 the prevailing combination was one of a Marxian analysis of the overall historical development with the emphasis on political and military history, and national themes<sup>16</sup>. In Turkey the official history adopted the «history theses» established by Kemalism in the 1930s, enriched in the 1970s with the so-called «Turkish-Islamic synthesis» which incorporated Islam into the definition of the nation. Greece saw a renewal of its historiography in the 1970s, after the fall of the colonels' dictatorship which had imposed an acutely nationalistic and anticommunist discourse. The 'new' Greek historiography of the 1970s and 1980s followed the French *Annales* School, focusing its research mainly on economic and social history and the history of mentalities. The rewriting of history in Greece had an ideological as well as a scientific dimension. The new historians wished to cleanse historical writing from the ideological constructs and political exploitation by the dominant socio-political groups after the civil war<sup>17</sup>.

The collapse of communism in the northern Balkans took with it the Marxist historiography which had determined for decades the accounts and interpretations of the past. Yet this official historiography, produced by state institutions (universities and research institutes) and taught in the schools as the dominant scientific discourse was not in line with social memory and the perception of the past as they were communicated through the family. Written and oral history would often encounter and contradict each other. The existence of parallel narratives meant that the change of the dominant narrative did not take place in vacuum nor without strong resistance. So the 'old' official history

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<sup>16</sup> Angeliki Konstantakopoulou, «Balkan Historiography yesterday-today» in *Τα Βαλκάνια χτες-σήμερα*, op. cit., p. 115 (in Greek).

<sup>17</sup> The communists' defeat in the Greek civil war (1946-1949) led to the formation of an authoritarian, heavily nationalistic and anticommunist State. Moreover, the official version of history excluded those defeated in the Civil War, who preserved their own version of the events through oral tradition. The Left's version of World War II, the Resistance and the Civil War was expressed in historiography after the socialist party (PASOK) came into power in 1981.

gave way to a 'new' history. What were the features of this new history? How much of a break and how much of a sequel to the 'old' history was it? To what extent could whole generations of historians and teachers, trained under one way of thinking, write and teach a truly 'new' history?

Indeed, a revision of history requires a political and intellectual elite ready, adequate and willing to undertake such a task, and has to be accompanied by a series of other changes upon collective memory. The institutional, normative memory of the 'new' past, which codifies and homogenises collective memory, is achieved through historical monuments, museums, national feasts, epic poetry and the national 'canon' of literature, the invention and dissemination of myths, the worship of heroes and, of course, through the national historiography as epitomised also in textbooks.

Besides, during this transitional period when the collective past was revised, the old myths were replaced either by new or by older ones from the time when the Balkan national states were established. At the same time, the mythology about the past was broadcast and converted into political tool. The dominance of myths in the way the past was described and perceived served as the foundation for ethnocentrism and the lack of tolerance. The power of myths lies in the fact that, contrary to science, they furnish global and categorical interpretations and address the emotions. Yet can a society exist without myths? Who controls myths and their uses? Can we fight myths by science? Can rationalism compete against the mythicised, mystical rhetoric of nationalism?

The Balkan experience does not leave much room for optimistic answers. Although the topoi of national imagination differ from one country to the next (for instance, it is a battle in Serbia, a series of political events in Romania, an emblematic figure for Turkey and the classical past for Greece), many structural components of the national narratives are the same. The worship of memory but also the oblivion of painful events, the exaltation as well as the victimisation of the nation, the particular projection of the past onto the mirrors of the present and the future are features common in most Balkan countries. In ex-communist countries in particular, the rewriting of history after 1989 follows multiple and contradictory paths, from historical relativism to the anatomy of the national stigma. In former Yugoslavia, the elements

which united its peoples are now suppressed in favour of their conflicts and dissent, under a logic of dissolution. Contemporary conflicts are projected onto the past to appear as constant and unchanging throughout history. Thus they are perceived as inevitable, 'endemic' and therefore meant to resurface *ad infinitum*.

### **Which Balkan History?**

The divisive historical discourse propounded by antagonistic nationalisms, usually in pairs, certainly does not promote a supranational history – in this case, Balkan history. Memory also plays a divisive role in a region of wars and uprooting. Peter Burke claims that history is forgotten by the victors but not by the vanquished, citing the example of the English «structural amnesia» and the Irish hypertrophied memory. He also observes that uprooted peoples, such as the Polish, seem «obsessed by their past»<sup>18</sup>. Both points apply to the Balkans. The south-eastern end of Europe is only inhabited by vanquished and uprooted people. This is reflected in the national historiography of all Balkan states and confirmed by the weighty shadow of History on the public life of Balkan societies.

Yet the duty of remembering, in the way it is defined, is not entirely honest. Memory –selective, by definition– is accompanied by the parallel process of oblivion which often assumes the form of an official censorship of embarrassing memories. It is what Paul Connerton calls «organised oblivion»<sup>19</sup>. Of course, censorship is a feature of both individual and collective memory (in the way individuals compose their autobiography, or in cases of deliberate, unofficial suppression, such as Germany after WWII and France after Vichy). In such cases social memory does not repudiate the official history; on the contrary, their silences complement each other and society learns to 'remember' its past in a particular way.

Under similar processes the Balkan societies of the post-communist era gradually 'remembered' their 'new', unforeseen past<sup>20</sup>. The communist period went into a parenthesis of oblivion or rejection, and

<sup>18</sup> P. Burke, *Varieties of Cultural History*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, pp. 53-54.

<sup>19</sup> P. Connerton, *How societies remember*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

<sup>20</sup> «The future is certain, the past is unpredictable». Cited by Angeliki Konstantakopoulou, *op.cit.*

the new course was called «de-ideologisation» of history. Symbols and monuments were torn down in cathartic violence and theatrical rituals, and new topoi of memory were (re)discovered. Some countries, like Romania, changed all national symbols – flag, national anthem, national emblem, national holidays. This change of national holidays was observed in all countries, and demonstrates in the most patent way the new way of self-definition selected by each national state<sup>21</sup>. In any case the anniversaries were chosen carefully to serve as stimuli of national unity and social cohesion rather than pretexts for new internal divisions. The negative side of this revision of national holidays is that most Balkan states now commemorate conflicts with their neighbours, especially the Turks.

The fact that the Turk is the ‘favourite enemy’ of Balkan peoples is neither new nor unexpected. The Balkan nationalisms which led to the formation of national states in the region were developed against the crumbling Ottoman empire and in opposition to everything the Turks stood for in the Western mind. The Ottoman Empire, associated with the Orient and all its negative connotations, constituted a negative example and was held to be the main cause for the ‘backwardness’ of the other Balkan peoples<sup>22</sup>. Although the Turks remained in the Balkans for half a millennium, they were always considered as outsiders and their presence was seen as temporary<sup>23</sup>.

This view, although the dominant one, has its opposite. A historiographical trend of Turkish origin claims that the Ottoman Empire was a ‘golden age’ for the Balkans – a heaven of religious tolerance and harmonious coexistence of the peoples. According to this view, the emergence of Balkan nationalisms was a sign of ingratitude towards the Ottomans which destroyed the conditions of order and peace in the region and triggered a period of disorder and war. In fact, this revisionary

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<sup>21</sup> On the occasion of the Greek national day of March 25, the *Vima* newspaper published a special feature on the national holidays in the Balkans, written by Christina Koulouri, Etienne Copeaux, Valery Kolev, Mirela-Luminita Murgescu, Nikola Jordanovski, Bozo Repe, and Dubravka Stojanovic: *To Vima*, Sunday 25 March 2001, pp. A53-56.

<sup>22</sup> Interestingly, even the Turkish nationalism was based on the rejection of the Ottoman past.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Elli Skopetea, «Turks and the Balkans», in *Τα Βαλκάνια χτες-σήμερα*, op. cit., p. 144 (in Greek).

historiography of the Ottoman period has fed in part the new trends for a shared Balkan history which would attempt to promote the uniting elements of Balkan peoples as the heritage of a common past. In such a history the Ottoman Empire would have to have a leading role – and of course this would not be accepted only by those who idealise the Balkan experience of the Ottomans.

Indeed, although not considered a Balkan people the Turks are the main *sine qua non* of the Balkan-ness<sup>24</sup>. The Balkan peoples may have rejected their Ottoman heritage in the context of their Western orientation, but they carry this heritage in their everyday life. In fact, in many aspects –such as cuisine– this heritage has been assimilated so fully as to be perceived and projected as a special national feature.

The example of Turkish coffee is indicative of how an element of the shared culture of the Ottoman Balkans was appropriated as a national symbol. In Greece, for instance, this coffee had long been called after its origin (Turkish) with no particular problems. Yet in the last twenty years its ‘Greekness’ has been increasingly promoted, as evidenced in advertising («We call it Greek» was the characteristic slogan of a major coffee firm). The beverage is so completely renamed that waiters in coffee-shops would correct anyone who would inadvertently order «Turkish coffee». What used to be part of a Balkan and oriental koine –and where *baclava*, *dolmades* and *kefte* would also have a place– has now acquired a national character (not only in Greece). Shared experiences are thus felt to be exclusive, and the multiple is perceived as unique. This ‘we’ does not include others and does not share anything<sup>25</sup>.

Thus the tendency to fragment and distort shared memories is present even in areas of everyday life on which a common Balkan history could surely be founded. Yet food and language, «two privileged areas of daily life [...] on the one hand overturn the master-slave relations which remain intact in other aspects of the Ottoman presence, on the other hand they suggest specific fields of communication among Balkan peoples – a communication established originally via the Turks and embarrassingly surviving their departure»<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.

<sup>25</sup> Christina Koulouri, ‘This coffee is ours’, *To Vima*, 3 June 2001, p. B64.

<sup>26</sup> Elli Skopetea, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

So how could one go about writing a common Balkan history? Is there an imagined Balkan community to which this history would relate? If not, is there one being formed now? Can it be instrumentalised – and to what end? Who will determine the content of this new common history? And how can it be incorporated in an educational strategy which would help «decode and understand»<sup>27</sup> the Balkan world of today?

Scepticism about the feasibility of –and the need for– a supranational history has been expressed already in the case of a common European history, based on the efforts made so far. Doubts can be summarised in the following questions: Can we really speak of continuity in European history? Is there one European history which could be contained within one book? Would the writing of this history be based on the model of national histories? Might it be that we are witnessing a process of constructing Europe in the same way national states were formed?

Similarly, in the case of the Balkans, the writing of *one* history would require that each ethno-cultural community in the region acknowledge a minimum proportion of Balkanness as element of its *identity*, and also that there is both temporal and spatial *continuity*. Given that identity normally involves some territoriality, a definition of the Balkan territory is as important as the compilation of a Balkan history. The new holistic perception of Balkan history cannot but correspond to a new holistic perception of Balkan territory: to the acceptance of the relative and fluid character of frontiers and a description of the territorial structure in new terms. Yet in a region of constantly changing borderlines such an aspiration would seem at least utopian at this time.

The region's complex geography is largely due to the criss-cross of physical, political and cultural borders without a clear pattern<sup>28</sup>. It is also due to the multiple layers of place names – irrefutable evidence of internal mobility and intermingling. The geographical limits of the Balkans are vague, shifting from time to time to include or exclude certain states. This is due to the reluctance of Balkan states to be included in the Balkan geo-cultural group. The 'Balkans' are usually the others,

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<sup>27</sup> F. Braudel, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>28</sup> For a geopolitical study of the Balkans, see G.-S. N. Prevelakis, *The Balkans: Cultures and Geopolitics*, transl. in Greek by Maro Prevelaki, Athens, Libro, 2001.

the neighbours. Hence the limits of the peninsula are mental rather than physical. The Balkan case is one more proof that symbolic geography is more powerful than actual geography.

So the inner borders of the Balkans multiply while the external ones are vague. The recent increase of states in the Balkans does necessarily reflect a corresponding number of cultural entities. Taking into account the reservations we discussed about the delineation of the Balkans, we could consider Balkan history as unfolding in a continuum of space defined by physical and cultural borders. Moreover, the existence of overlaps in the area, as attested to by name-places and the minorities within national states, is in itself indicative of some aspects of the shared history. Macedonia and Constantinople/Istanbul, for example, could serve as *topoi* –literal and metaphorical– of the shared Balkan history.

If we were to use the concept of cultural borders in writing the Balkan history, we should accept *a priori* that cultural borders are never closed or impermeable. This means that the geographical area where a culture is established may be fixed, but it is not sealed<sup>29</sup>. In this way we can understand the endless interaction and mutual penetration among the different national/cultural entities which lead to new patterns.

As we saw, a shared Balkan history presupposes spatial continuity –a cultural continuum– but also, more importantly, temporal continuity. Indeed, the Balkans have experienced three different shared pasts: Byzantine, Ottoman and Communist. Of course, these historical experiences were neither exclusively Balkan nor evenly distributed throughout the region. Nevertheless, they left behind them an important heritage, such as Orthodoxy, Islam and elements of material culture. Even the communist period, for all its denigration by the post-communist Balkan societies, is still a shared historical experience whose vestiges are visible to an external observer.

These common historical pasts should be perceived as fields of cultural exchange and interaction rather than one-way influence of the dominant national/ cultural group in each case. The highest barrier for a shared Balkan history is to accept as equal the various cultural contributions and relativise the uniqueness of the nation. Each Balkan nation sees itself as unique, incomparable and superior, and employs history to prove it. Yet *supremacy has no history*, it is a-historical for all its dis-

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<sup>29</sup> F. Braudel, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

guise as historical. Qualifying uniqueness means making cross-cultural comparisons to highlight the common, unifying elements. In this respect, too, the trend is different: neighbouring nations vie for the exclusive use of national symbols and figures which are seen as essential to their own identity.

Despite widespread scepticism as to the feasibility of a shared regional history for the Balkans, there is an increasing number of those who believe in the expediency of a unifying teaching to promote a common historical consciousness, mutual understanding and tolerance among Balkan peoples and, ultimately, peace. Balkan history is thus seen in the context of a new educational approach rather than a novel method of historiography.

### **The role of education**

The basic idea is that a change in the teaching methods of history may have a long-term effect on the way neighbouring peoples see one another. Specifically, E. Kofos suggests that an improvement of school textbooks may function as a long duration Confidence Building Measure<sup>30</sup> – a tool for reconciliation. Of course, this intervention would be preceded by an evaluation of Balkan textbooks currently in use so as to identify any problematic points.

In recent years there has been increasing interest in schoolbooks, both as research objects and political tools. The two aspects are not unconnected, since in most cases the study of textbooks aims to demonstrate –and denounce– their political use. There is no doubt that once an educational system is established in a national state its resources are subject to political use. However, this is not to say that schoolbooks are invariably means of propaganda used deliberately and systematically by all central powers irrespective of political system. It is true that totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have attempted to control the education of the young, hence also schoolbooks; but it is also true that much more than effective means of propaganda and conscience manipulation, schoolbooks are a mirror of the society that produces them. They rarely contain stereotypes and values unacceptable to society. Therefore their

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<sup>30</sup> Evangelos Kofos, «Long Duration CBMs in the Balkans: Re-assessment of the Role of History and Geography School Textbooks», in *Culture and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe* (International Conference, Thessaloniki, Greece, June 26-29, 1997), Association for Democracy in the Balkans, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, pp. 85-97.

content may be a good guide as to a society's values; history books, in particular, may reflect the image a human society has of its past and, indirectly, the way it imagines its future.

This reasoning has been the basis for the recent spate of research projects and publications in the Balkan region. The underlying assumption behind this activity is that there is some connection –more or less direct– between the content of textbooks and the escalation of nationalism, whose extreme manifestation is armed conflict. Of course, already in the 1920s and 1930s schoolbooks had been judged and largely found 'guilty' of the wars in the 20th century. It was deemed necessary to revise them to eradicate negative stereotypes and prejudice against other peoples, and many efforts were made to this end in Europe (e.g. between France and Germany, Germany and Poland, etc.). The results are visible in Western European books, although ethnocentrism often seems hard to overcome.

Despite the shared European past as to the ideological use of history –school history, in particular– Balkan textbooks seem to be thought of as more 'guilty' of stereotypes and nationalism, judging from the results, one would say. The upsurge of violence and nationalism has rekindled in the last decade the old Western stereotype of the Balkans' cultural singularity, which was thought to be reflected in schoolbooks<sup>31</sup>. Of course, the comment about the Western-oriented way of treating Balkan textbooks does not alter the fact: Balkan textbooks on history (as well as geography books and readers) still contain ethnocentric accounts of the collective past and occasionally regress to nationalistic expressions and negative stereotypes about the neighbouring peoples<sup>32</sup>.

Nevertheless, Balkan schoolbooks cannot be treated as a uniform set. As in all similar cases, we can discern both common traits and de-

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<sup>31</sup> The title of a relatively recent publication of the Georg-Eckert Institute of Braunschweig seems to corroborate this view, although this was not the editor's intention: Wolfgang Höpken (ed.), *Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in South-Eastern Europe* (Hannover 1996).

<sup>32</sup> This was highlighted in a study by the Balkan Colleges Foundation, Sofia: *The image of the Other. Analysis of the high-school textbooks in History from the Balkan countries* (1998). This study corroborated what we knew or suspected on the basis of our everyday experience: events in Balkan history have two opposite facets, one for each of the parties involved. Thus one side's 'liberators' are the other side's 'conquerors', 'invasion' becomes 'liberation', 'victory' becomes 'devastation', and so on.

viations. Thus, although ethnocentrism appears prominent in the historical narrative it does not always assume the form of nationalism. Historical methods also differ as each country has its own tradition of history and historiography.

So for all the attempts to analyse –or sometimes over-analyse– school textbooks in the Balkans, the next step remains undecided: the method of reformation. There are, of course, many and diverse hazards: firstly, the quest for a ‘neutral’ history without prejudice and stereotypes may result either in silences and omissions or in a sterile, dull account of facts with no interpretation; secondly, we may come to the naïve conclusion that textbooks are a panacea and their revision alone can change the prevailing perceptions of other peoples. These «naïve expectations» arise from faith in the potential of «sound education» to intervene decisively and mould characters<sup>33</sup>.

Essentially, however, schoolbooks merely reflect the prevalent ideology –not necessarily the ‘official’ one– as it is diffused through the media, the family and other social institutions. If a ‘cold war’ is currently going on among textbooks in the Balkans, it is because there are strong feelings in society that also nurture another ‘cold war’ among the media, which reflect and shape mentalities as much as the school.

Yet the language of television hype, publicity, the violence of armed conflicts and the trauma of uprooting can be countered by the language of science and sobriety. And here lies the responsibility of historians – academics, researchers, textbook authors and schoolteachers. In the Balkans, scientific discourse on nationalism, the past, national identities and so on cannot have a strictly academic character. As A. Smith writes, without referring to the specific region, «in a world of competing states and would-be nations, these are no mere academic issues»<sup>34</sup>. Historians’ views may be deliberately enlisted to support claims with ‘scientific’ arguments, or exploited by others for political ends.

Therefore the responsibility of historians is a political one. Historical discourse cannot be used to justify past or present regimes; it must develop critical spirits and free citizens. Critical thinking acquired

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<sup>33</sup> Wolfgang Höpken, «Culture and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe», in *Culture and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe...*, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>34</sup> A. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, London: Blackwell, 1996, p. 1 (first published 1986).

through learning history is, after all, the future citizens' only protection against distortions, simplification and manipulation. This critical historical discourse is by definition ironic, since irony is «inherently self-critical, inherently dialectic», and promotes self-knowledge by liberating us from our illusions<sup>35</sup>.

So if history is rewritten in the Balkans, it cannot feign ignorance or innocence. Besides, the political developments in the Balkans and the revision of the past coincide with international developments in historiography: the re-evaluation of historical 'canons' and grand-narratives, the questioning of 'objective' historical knowledge, the emphasis on the subjective, the particular and the personal, the examination of the 'margins' and the 'discovery' of history's 'obscure' protagonists.

The new trends in academic history and the venture of compiling a Balkan history come together in school history. Indeed, the need for a supranational history calls for a renewal of content, methods and objectives of school histories in the Balkans. The new educational approach to Balkan history is summarised in the application of a comparative, multiperspective method, the focus on economic, social and cultural history and the development of students' analytical and interpretative skills to enable them to evaluate the information they receive<sup>36</sup>. Comparative history aims to acquaint students with both differences and similarities and abolish the dogmatic teaching of the 'objective' history of the one and only 'truth'. The move away from political and military history towards economic, social and cultural history is meant to teach historical experiences which are more familiar and interesting to children and de-emphasise war as an element of historical evolution, especially in terms of the relations with neighbouring states. It also aims at teaching conflicts from a new perspective, in terms of both content and method. Finally, the development of critical thinking is the main purpose of historical teaching, so that future citizens will be immune to attempts to manipulate them<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> Hayden White, «Interview. The Ironic Poetics of late Modernity», *Historein* 2 (2000), pp. 191-193.

<sup>36</sup> See R. Stradling, *Teaching 20<sup>th</sup>-century European history*, Council of Europe, 2001, p. 88. This book is a useful guide for history teachers in all European countries.

<sup>37</sup> The findings from the analysis of Balkan textbooks in the workshops organised

The ultimate goal of this concept of writing and teaching history is to promote mutual tolerance and understanding. Yet which kind of history would promote tolerance? A history that emphasises ‘similarities’ in the abstract, or one which does not conceal the differences? We usually think that tolerance towards the ‘Other’, the different, must come from the acknowledgement of our similarities. Sylviane Agacinski, however, puts forward a different view:

«It is the norm that we hold in high esteem the ‘universal’ humanistic value as expressed in the famous saying, *I reckon nothing human alien to me*. We are wrong, though: tolerance would be better founded on the opposite principle of accepting that the human is very often and very deeply alien. If we acknowledged that the human is alien most of the time yet we have to respect it and live with it in peace, we would all be better prepared to deal with sexism and racism. *Living together is founded on our ability to compromise, not on the hypothetical principle of a natural harmony*»<sup>38</sup>.

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In the seven workshops organised by CDRSEE we discussed the terms of our present and future coexistence in terms of history: the overlaps, actual or wished-for, and common heritage, experiences and memories. The first chapter, «Common Past, Shared History», refers to these common pasts which can form the basis of a shared history. It includes papers delivered in three workshops, namely workshop I on «Hungarian legacy in Southeastern Europe»; workshop V titled «The Balkan empires: common heritage, different heirs», part of which was workshop Va «Greeks and Turks: the Janus of a common history»; and workshop VI titled «Yugoslavia: A Look in the Broken Mirror. Who is the ‘other’?».

The heritage from the two Balkan empires, Byzantine and Otto-

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by the History Education Committee of the CDRSEE were first summarised in *Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe*, Thessaloniki 2001; see mainly pp. 22-23.

<sup>38</sup> Sylviane Agacinski, *Politique des sexes*, transl. into Greek by Mary Philippakopoulou, Athens: Polis, 2000, p.180. The author reminds us that we do not need a mythicised or beautified version of reality to instil tolerance towards the different. Similarly, P. Burke assigns to historians the ‘loathsome’ task of reminding people «of what they would have liked to forget»; P. Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

man, was divided among different heirs each of whom lays exclusive claim to some part of it. The main antagonism is between Turks and Greeks; between a 'Greek' Byzantium and a 'Turkish' Ottoman Empire. This discord goes beyond the temporal limits of the two empires. Greek and Turkish history represent the two faces of Janus: a shared history based on opposite myths. Each national history ascribes its own truth to the same historical events – a truth entirely different from that of the neighbour's.

Yasemin Soysal and Lilian Antoniou demonstrate this dipole as regards the definition of national evolution by Greeks and Turks, respectively. They examine the textbooks of lower secondary schools in Britain, Greece and Turkey to show that Turkish identity is a state identity with the main focus on national territory, while Greek identity is a cultural identity with the main focus on national time. The two national histories' relation to Europe is equally different: «Greece inside but outside, Turkey outside but inside». The irresolute European character of the Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire's clear identification with the Orient is also reflected in British schoolbooks which represent the viewpoint of an 'external' observer –Western Europe– as to the history of the eastern part of the continent.

According to Penelope Stathi, this kind of stereotype which is usual in school textbooks could easily be avoided if their authors sought original historical sources, and cites numerous examples from Greek chronicles of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries where the Ottomans are not portrayed with disdain but characterised under non national, moral criteria.

However, the situation is very different when it comes to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, an era of conflicting nationalisms and historiographical interpretations. Vangelis Kechriotis uses the example of the Young Turks Revolution to show how a 'controversial' issue has been dealt with by both the protagonists themselves and Greek historians since the seventies. Through a systematic deconstruction of the historiographical discourse, he concludes that the *leitmotiv* of a 'well-organised fraud' and the initial 'witch-hunting' have been replaced in contemporary Greek historiography by 'self-reflection' and an analysis of issues of language and terminology.

Sia Anagnostopoulou offers an example of such an approach analysing the use of the term 'Ottoman tyranny' by the representatives of the Enlightenment on the one hand and Greek national historiography

on the other hand. She points out that ‘Ottoman tyranny’ in the historical context of the era after the French Revolution implied an absolutist regime in political terms. However, later on, national historiography used this term to describe a discontinuity in Greek history represented by the Ottoman ‘yoke’ and the subsequent ‘slavery’ of the Greek nation. This case of shift of meanings may help us reflect upon the necessity to historicise terms which have been de-historicised by national historiographies.

This need is confirmed by the analysis of contemporary history textbooks in different Balkan countries which reinforces the picture of an ethnocentric approach to the past, where anachronisms prevail. Characteristically, in the textbooks of the FYR Macedonia, Byzantine rule is presented in the frame of national antagonisms and emphasis is put on the ‘slavisation’ of the Balkan Peninsula in the Middle Ages. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire is depicted as a ‘de-personalised anti-hero’ fighting against legitimate claims of ‘positive’ national movements. Nikola Jordanovski highlights different aspects of these - common to all Balkan peoples- ‘dubious theories about ethnogenetic lines and national struggles transferred on to the Middle Ages’.

In Bulgarian school textbooks, which show a gradual shift of focus towards economic and cultural history, the Byzantine and Ottoman empires are also evaluated by the criteria of the national ‘grand narrative’. According to the analysis of Alexei Kalionski and Valery Kolev, Bulgaria is shown to have had a leading role in the ‘Slavonic-Byzantine civilisation’. Given also that Orthodoxy is an ingredient of Bulgarian national identity, the Ottoman empire is negatively evaluated as ‘non-European’ and ‘Oriental’.

Similar circumstances are found in Romania. In her study of Romanian schoolbooks Codruta Matei finds that the Byzantine heritage, being identified with Orthodoxy, is seen as very important to Romanian history while the Ottoman empire is presented as an ‘extraneous’ element, although it is a major factor in national history. The textbooks place particular emphasis on the Romanian principalities’ relations with the Ottoman Empire, especially on the special administrative status of the principalities and Romanian resistance against the Ottomans. Matei also reports the classroom experience of her pupils as to their picture of the Ottoman Empire, and discovers stereotypes which are not found either in the books or in the teaching.

This useful finding leads us to seek and study other centres where historical consciousness is formed. One such source is the academic history produced in universities and research institutions. The relation between academic and school history may be more or less close, but it undoubtedly exists: on the one hand, academic history supplies historical knowledge as the raw material for school history; on the other hand, many academic historians are themselves authors of school textbooks or members of the committees which draft curricula or approve textbooks.

In the area of Byzantine and Ottoman studies each Balkan country follows its own tradition of historiography, which is not dictated by purely scientific criteria but is usually connected with political conditions. In the case of Romania, Bogdan Murgescu explains that the growth of Byzantine and Ottoman studies in the 1960s and 1970s –after the tradition created by N. Iorga and later by Mihai Maxim– functioned as an ‘escape’ from that time’s heavily politicised history. However, he points out that today there is considerably less interest as young people are not particularly attracted by an academic career, especially in fields which –in their eyes– do not seem to produce ‘socially significant’ knowledge.

The Hungarian heritage appears to be less important for Balkan schoolbooks. As Mirela-Luminita Murgescu explains, the world history taught in SE European countries is clearly Western-oriented and the history of SE Europe is presented through ‘bipartite’ relations with neighbouring countries rather than a unified whole. As one would expect, because of these very bilateral historical relations the Hungarians figure much more in Romanian, Serbian, Croatian or even Slovenian textbooks than other peoples of SE Europe. Of course, Hungary appears under the prism of each national history, and Hungarians figure in schoolbooks only inasmuch as they come into contact with the author’s own nation. Snjezana Koren confirms this hypothesis in her analysis of Croatian textbooks. In a historical narrative made up almost exclusively of wars and political events, there are elements of Hungarian history from the Middle Ages to 1918, always under the prism of Croato-Hungarian relations. There are references to Hungarian ‘domination’ and efforts to ‘hungarianise’ the Croatian population as well as negative connotations about the periods of the early Middle ages and the 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, in recent textbooks Koren finds an attempt at

higher 'objectivity' as well as some positive views, e.g. in the way the books present Hungarian resistance to Hapsburg despotism and Soviet dominance.

Yet if despite the different interpretations the Austro-Hungarian, Byzantine and Ottoman empires are recognised as constituting a common historical past for SE Europe, this is not the case with former Yugoslavia. Paradoxically, the same thing seems to be happening here as with the Ottoman Empire shortly after its collapse: the national states which succeeded it, even Turkey itself, renounced its heritage and held it responsible for their own 'underdevelopment'. In the 'broken mirror' of former Yugoslavia the other's face is hard to discern. Sometimes it appears as part of the self; at other times it is multiplied on every shard of glass.

The memory gaps brought about by the war in Yugoslavia correspond to ruptures in history. The common Yugoslavian history, which was taught until 1990 and comprised units on general history, national history and the history of individual nations, was replaced by rival ethnocentric histories. In most countries national history takes up about half of the content; the other half, general history, is clearly Western-oriented. In her report on workshop VI Snježana Koren concludes that «de-ideologisation», i.e. the removal of a Marxist approach, is not advancing at the same pace in all countries, and despite the improvements in aspect and quality there are often problems remaining with the content. In some books the description of interethnic violence is strongly emotional, with even some too graphic accounts of the crimes committed. The greatest part of shared history has been removed from the textbooks, and its evaluation is negative. The first Yugoslavia (1918) is described as a «prison of nations», in yet another interesting analogy with the description of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the time of its demise. The second Yugoslavia, although presented in a more positive light, is also seen to have functioned as a context of 'injustice' for each democracy compared to the rest.

The disparities among the national histories of the countries of former Yugoslavia become more evident in the way they present specific historical periods – specifically, World War II, 'resistance' and 'collaboration' with the Fascist forces, Socialist Yugoslavia, its collapse in 1991 and the wars of 1991-1995. The more 'objective' and sober account of Slovenian textbooks, as analysed by Dragan Potočnik

and Jelka Razpotnik, contrasts with the ethnocentric and nationalistic approaches of Croatian and Serbian textbooks. As demonstrated by Dubravka Stojanovic, Serbian schoolbooks present the Serbs as the most active fighters of fascism, whereas the opposite is the case with Croatian textbooks, according to the analysis of Magdalena Najbar-Agicic. The Serbian Chetniks and the Croatian Ustashas are subject to the most contradictory interpretations in Serbian and Croatian textbooks, respectively, although the latter –possibly because of the variety made possible by the free market– contain diverse views and more aspects to their presentation. However, both Croatian and Serbian books emphasise religious differences; the latter, in particular, present them as the fundamental reason of war and use them as the key which oversimplifies and interprets all historical developments. Much closer to the writing of history in previous periods seem to be the textbooks used in the schools of the FYR Macedonia. As Nikola Jordanovski shows, both the vocabulary and the historiographical interpretation repeat a more or less Marxist analysis where the ‘bourgeoisie’, the Communist Party and the foreign ‘occupiers’ play an eminent role.

The picture of Europe as geographical and political entity and the position of SE Europe within it is inevitably informed by the ethnocentrism of the specific narratives in the textbooks of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Yugoslavia, Croatia and FYR Macedonia. Heike Karge demonstrates the complex relationship with the West which differs from one country to another, the perception of the ‘European-ness’ of the Balkans as well as the particular European and Balkan character of countries whose entry to the European Union is not visible in the near future. Thus the slogan ‘return to Europe’ and the acceptance of market economy as the only model and norm coexist with the stereotypes of the ‘uncivilised Balkans’ and the ‘guilty European superpowers’.

The variety of friction in the Balkans and the mutually exclusive narratives are outlined in the second chapter – «National and Religious Identities Co-existing or Conflicting?» This chapter comprises papers delivered in workshop III, «The Macedonian Identity: complementarities, conflicts, denials» and in workshop VII, «Religious Education and the view of the ‘others’». » The example of Macedonia –a field of nationalist conflict in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, as the Ottoman empire was falling– is probably the most divisive issue for the national histories of the countries which include (or used to include) some part of it. The

term «Macedonia» itself is defined differently by the inhabitants of Greek Macedonia, FYR Macedonia and Bulgarian Macedonia. Similarly, the content of «Macedonian identity» is not definite, as it is exclusively claimed by different ethnic groups. Nikola Jordanovski analyses the elements of Macedonian nationalism (perception of the past, myths, historiography) and claims that the native Macedonian identity, «a modern product par excellence», is a clear case of «self-definition by exclusion»<sup>39</sup>. In today's FYR Macedonia, «a territory of overlapping historical heritages», the name Macedonia itself is «the only really functional myth».

A confusion between Macedonians and Bulgarians is pointed out by Alexei Kalionski and Tzvetan Tzvetanski in their analysis of school textbooks and the attitudes of Bulgarian students in secondary education, respectively. Kalionski finds that until the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, history textbooks present Macedonia as part of the Bulgarian ethnic, cultural and geographical territory, while some 'heroes' of the Bulgarian renaissance come from Macedonia. Even when reference is made to the multinational character of Macedonia (in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century), the region is still cited as Bulgarian ethnic and historical land. Finally, the emergence of a distinct contemporary Macedonian identity is mentioned sporadically, without constituting a central theme. This analysis of textbooks is confirmed by the findings of a sociological study conducted by T. Tzvetanski in 1997 with pupils in secondary education and first-year university students. A negative image was found to be held of all neighbours, but more notably of Greeks and Macedonians. As far as Macedonia is concerned, a contradictory attitude was noted: the respondents considered the Macedonians as Bulgarians, at the same time accepting the contemporary geopolitical reality of the existence of a distinct state of Macedonia.

Yet the Serbs also treat Macedonia as their own. According to Serbian schoolbooks, analysed by Bojan Dimitrijevic, Macedonia is seen as «Serbian historical land» against which only the Bulgarians are shown to have had aggressive and conquering intentions. Although the

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<sup>39</sup> The terms «Macedonia» and «Macedonians» in the texts of N. Jordanovski, A. Kalionski, T. Tzvetanski, and B. Dimitrijevic refer to the contemporary Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the national group the Greek side calls «Slavo-Macedonians» to distinguish them from the Greeks in Greek Macedonia.

attitude towards Macedonians is not negative on the whole, they are negatively presented and seen as 'others' when they seek independence from Yugoslavia (during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in 1992).

Greek textbooks, analysed by Despina Karakatsani, display a similar attitude. The Macedonian Question is associated exclusively with the national integration of Greece, and the emphasis is on Greek Macedonians and their role in Greek national history. No reference is made to Slav-Macedonians, except in an optional textbook which has never been taught in any school. Other history textbooks, while making reference to the multinational character of the Greek part of Macedonia which became Greek territory after the Balkan wars, present the conflict over Macedonia as an exclusively Greco-Bulgarian affair. This is corroborated by the school celebrations held in Greek Macedonia, presented by Vlassis Vlassidis. The Macedonian Struggle, officially commemorated on October 30 each year, refers exclusively to the Greek victory over the Bulgarians, although there is a clear effort towards a more sober and balanced approach and against fostering feelings of enmity and intolerance.

At any rate, the case of Macedonia demonstrates the relative importance of religious differences in ethnic conflicts, as all parties are Orthodox Christians. The authority is thus repudiated of the oversimplified pattern which equates the conflict between nations or 'cultures' with religious clashes. Of course, this pattern was reinforced after the events of September 11, 2001 and was frequently translated, explicitly or implicitly, into a 'conflict of civilisation versus barbarity' where the West is, once again, synonym to civilisation and where religions are evaluated according to their 'degree of civilisation'.

The Balkans had been subjected to the same arguments by Western observers at a much earlier stage. Thus the section on religious identities becomes doubly topical as it deals with issues of correlating religious differences with ethnic conflicts and religious education with tolerance. The paper of Mirela-Luminita Murgescu, which is also the report on workshop VII, presents all parameters of religious education in a multi-religious region such as SE Europe where the relation between national and religious identity is a central matter. Moreover, the identification of 'Europeanness' with Christianity at a time when the presence of Islam in Europe is increasingly prominent raises, in the Balkan region as well, more general issues about the mental barriers

this kind of identification erects and their political consequences. Summarising the main points discussed in the workshop, Murgescu observes that the absence of official religious education does not preclude the abuse of religion, as demonstrated in the case of former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, however, the unchecked introduction of religion in the teaching of history –a ‘fashionable’ trend in ex-communist countries– entails many dangers.

Etienne Copeaux points out the dangers of dressing up national conflicts in a religious guise; when nationalism exploits religion. In his analysis of Turkish textbooks he finds that for all the secular character of the state, Turks are identified as Muslims and the Turkish identity connotes the Muslim religion. In the Turkish historical narrative Christians have the role of enemies, culminating in the time of the Crusades. In the case of Turkey the narration of the history of Islam is extremely complicated: as a non-Arabic country, it strives for a delicate balance between Muslim identity and Arab ‘otherness’.

In Muslim Turkey religious classes have been obligatory since 1981. In Orthodox Serbia, on the other hand, a great public debate is currently on about the introduction of religious education in the school. Milan Vukomanovic presents the various arguments in relation with other European examples (as to the compulsory/optional teaching of religion) and considers the various prerequisites – educational, political/legal and psychological – for the introduction of religious classes.

In Romania the restitution of religion was quite dynamic, despite some Marxist stereotypes which have survived in school textbooks. As shown by Ecaterina Lung, Christianity is seen as a major constituent of Romanian national identity while the Christian religion and the Orthodox Church are advanced as the main supports of this identity against hostile neighbours – Catholics (Hungarians, Poles) and Muslim (Ottomans). Indeed, the return of religion to education has two sides: the introduction of religious classes in the form of catechism, and religion as part of the teaching of history, where it is shown as a social and cultural phenomenon. Moreover, the historical investigation of the role of the Church is associated with the second of these aspects.

Smail Balic deals with religious classes and their content in two countries, a European Islamic state –Bosnia– and a Catholic country with an immigrant Muslim community – Austria. In the case of Austria he finds religious teaching to be inadequate, and the existing pro-

gramme may cause confusion among young pupils. Also inadequate is the presentation of another of the region's minority religions, Judaism, according to the analysis by Ivo Goldstein. An analysis of textbooks in post-communist states of central and eastern Europe reveals ignorance, errors, suppression and distortion as regards Jews, Judaism, Israel and the Holocaust.

So should religion be taught in the schools of a secular state? What should be the content of such teaching? In his article, C. Carras disputes the views that (a) there should be no religious teaching in a secular state, (b) the only form of religious teaching permissible today is teaching *about* religions, and (c) religious education is partly responsible for the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. He contends that an «opened type of religious education» is necessary to foster in children a «positive religious commitment» as a basis for tolerance. On his part Hanna Kassis, with a long academic experience of teaching religion, proposes a teaching method without catechism in secular institutions such as universities or schools. The study of religion within a school system must be, according to Kassis, the basis for reaching across and getting to know the 'other', the means «to build bridges over valleys of separation».

These «valleys» remain unbridged in many areas of SE Europe. The example of Cyprus seems to be the most traumatic. The third chapter, «The Past in the Mirror of the Present», deals with the two issues in SE Europe which remain open, at least at the time this Introduction was written. The articles in this chapter were presented in an initial form in workshop II, «Teaching Cyprus: in search of tolerance and understanding» and workshop IV «Albanians and their neighbours: the future's past».

In Cyprus the division of the island translates into a deep rupture in historical narrative and the attachment of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot identities to those of Greece and Turkey, respectively. Nergis Canefe confirms this breach on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot community where she finds a «crisis of citizenship». This crisis she associates with the fact that there was never a feeling of «common, civic Cypriot identity», either before independence (1955-1960) or during the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1974). The strange situation on northern Cyprus after 1974 –«a state of conditional independence and semi-colonisation»– most certainly affects the sense of belonging and the

concept of citizenship. The induction of Turkish Cypriots into the Turkish nation is reflected in the Turkish schoolbooks, studied by Etienne Copeaux. His minute analysis of the books' verbal, pictorial and mapping language demonstrates that N. Cyprus is represented as a Turkish province. Starting from this finding, he analyses the Turkish national narrative which is built on Greeks as the 'others' and employs a retrospective teleology to prove the Turkish nation's precedence and superiority.

If the Turkish-Cypriot community belongs to Mother Turkey, the Greek-Cypriot community belongs to Mother Greece. Indeed, as pointed out by L. Koullapis, the Greek-Cypriot community may be seen «as an imagined sub-community or as an imagined subset of the Greek nation». In addition to the entire model, content and schedule of history teaching being Greek, the textbooks used in Cypriot schools are actually Greek; only local history textbooks are printed in Cyprus, and they cover only part of the material. The history of the island is presented as part of Greek national history, while the terms «Greek» and «Cypriot» are used alternately or as synonyms. The historical narrative on the island's division is emotionally charged and places great emphasis on refugees.

In the Turkish-Cypriot community the commemoration of the island's division follows a similar path, albeit with a greater emphasis on a picture of violence. Neshe Yashin performs a semantic analysis of school rituals, photographs of atrocities, poetic discourse in the schools and the «Museum of Barbarity». She points to the use of those symbols which reinforce the Turkish-Cypriots' links with the Turkish nation (statue of Atatürk, flag) and the emphasis on Greek-Cypriot violence, with the aim of increasing emotional involvement and nurturing the model of conflict.

Thus both sides, whose frequent clashes culminated in 1974, emphasise the errors and the violence of the other side. Ulus Irkad demonstrates the way the events of 7-9 March 1964 in Paphos were described and distorted in subsequent books. Both sides suppressed and distorted the facts in order to describe and interpret the events in such a way as to put the blame on the other side and present themselves as victims.

So there is a kind of dialectic relation between the two nationalisms if we consider their discursive strategies and the use of the past. Niyazi Kizilyurek presents the similarities in the ways national memory

is built and instrumentalised by both sides, with examples from Turkish-Cypriot textbooks. The slogan *I won't forget*, common to both sides, points to a selective memory which remembers what happened to 'us' and forgets what happened to the 'others'.

The history of Cyprus is thus taught in a divisive way: the splitting of the island is retrospectively projected onto the past, on the turmoil of Greek-Turkish conflicts, while the picture of the future does not seem to provide a way out of this divisive model. The case of Albania and Albanian populations outside the national state is certainly different; yet analogies exist in the sense that there are recent traumatic memories – war, death, refugees. Moreover, it is another 'open' matter of national integration in the Balkans –as shown by events in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia– whose ultimate outcome we cannot predict. The fluid state of this issue, combined with the transitional phase in most countries in the region, is reflected in the way history is taught.

Ideological contradictions, a heritage of the dictatorship of the proletariat, are traced in Albanian schoolbooks in their account of recent history (World War II, Albanian «resistance», the role of Communists and Xoxha, etc.). Erind Pajo analyses the cosmology of Albanian textbooks in the context of the societal transformations currently taking place in the country. These transformations –in other words, the *sub-text*– partly determine the meanings produced by the textbooks – the *text*. The Albanians' picture of the past and self-definition are therefore influenced by the transitional, fluid present and their will to adopt the Western model of development in the future. In the textbooks the cultivation of 'inferiority complexes' to the students is combined with the ranking of countries on the basis of economic power and the heavily politicised interpretation of the past.

In the current Greek schoolbooks the presence of Albanians and Albania is rather limited. This 'silence' –a common treatment of the history of other Balkan nations in the textbooks of each country in the region– becomes more eloquent when compared to the extensive references found in pre-1974 Greek textbooks. Despina Karakatsani examines the Greek textbooks on civic education of the 1950-1974 period, when the subject was an instrument of 'political indoctrination' in the prevailing anticommunist atmosphere of the time. Especially during the dictatorship (1967-1974), when civic education was clearly used as political propaganda, the failure to annex S. Albania (N. Epirus) in the

Greek national state was presented as a problem of national integration (along with the issues of Cyprus and Macedonia). Of course, these irredentist claims of Greek textbooks have been abandoned for decades. At the same time, the entry of large numbers of economic immigrants from Albania to Greece over the last decade – a major proportion of whom came from the Greek minority in Albania – has changed relations between the two peoples, although this has yet to be reflected in the accounts of the past.

The relations between Albanians and Serbs are certainly more antagonistic. In summarising the discussions and presentations in the fourth workshop, the report of Dubravka Stojanovic points out many aspects of these relations, from history textbooks and the name used for Albanians (Shqiptar) to the education of the Albanian population in Kosovo. Yet the mutually negative image between Albanians and Serbs is not in any way a paradox: all workshops discovered similarities in the structure of national histories and the construction of identities.

The contrast of national narratives is therefore a typical trait in many ‘rival’ histories – for example, between the Greek and Turkish or the Serbian and Croatian national histories. Historical events and figures, political systems and religious doctrines make up two opposing views of the same history. It seems, therefore, that the generation of contrasting pairs of interpretations of the past is a common ‘malady’ of nationalism; and these pairs can proliferate according to the number of neighbours. Thus a national history can form antagonistic pairs with more than one bordering national histories.

No matter how different and mutually exclusive national histories may appear at first sight, they share the same structure, which is revealed by the use of common or equivalent conceptual tools, the same ends and a normative discourse. Their main common trait is that they are one-sided, dogmatic interpretations of history where the voice of the other has no place.

The texts included in this publication articulate many ideas and proposals of ways to do away with this dogmatic, ethnocentric narrative in the writing and teaching of history<sup>40</sup>. Amidst a landscape of change

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<sup>40</sup> For some initial conclusions and recommendations see *Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe*, op.cit..

and ruptures we seek to understand the conflicts and identify the standard elements and the continuities. At the same time we put together this common 'language' which will allow us to converse with our past, recent or distant, as well as with one another.

ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΓΙΑ      ( )      ΊΣΟΤΗΣ

ΘΟΥΡΙΟΣ,

Ἦτοι Ὀρμητικὸς Πατριωτικὸς Ὑμνος ἄρῳτος εἰς τὸν ἦχον

ΜΙΑ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΓΗ, ΜΕΓΑΛΗ.



*Ὡς πότε, παλικάρια, να ζούμεν στα στενά,  
μονάχοι σαν λιοντάρια, στες ράχες, στα βουνά,  
σπηλιές να κατοικούμεν, να βλέπομεν κλαδιά,  
να φεύγομ' απ' τον κόσμον, για την πικρή σκλαβιά·  
να χάνομεν αδέρφια, πατρίδα και γονείς,  
τους φίλους, τα παιδιά μας κι όλους τους συγγενείς.  
Κάλλιο 'ναι μίας ώρας ελεύθερη ζωή,  
παρά σαράντα χρόνια σκλαβιά και φυλακή.*

Στα Νεότερα χρόνια. *Ιστορία Στ' Δημοτικού*,  
Athens Ministry of Education, 1998, p. 83

### Uzroci Prvog svjetskog rata

Ukratko, uzrok Prvog svjetskog rata bila je nepomirljivost interesa velikih sila. Kako su se njihovi interesi podudarali i isprepletali, s vremenom je prevladalo uvjerenje kako se nesuglasice mogu riješiti samo ratom.

Da bismo shvatili uzroke Prvog svjetskog rata, moramo se prisjetiti ujedinjenja Italije odnosno Njemačke. Mijenjanjem političke karte Europe pojavili su se i novi sukobi interesa. Novonastale države tražile su preraspodjelu kolonija pa su se njihovi interesi sukobili s interesima dviju najjačih kolonijalnih sila - Engleske i Francuske. Interesi Rusije i Austro-Ugarske sukobljavali su se na području Balkana (*prisjeti se istočnog pitanja*). Države čiji se interesi međusobno nisu sukobljavali povezale su se u saveze (*prisjeti se zemalja članica dvaju saveza - Antante i Trojnog saveza*). S vremenom su se nespozumirane produbljivale, a europske su se sile pomirile s nemogućnošću političkog dogovora i nagomilane nespozumirane odlučile riješiti ratom.



Objasni uzroke Prvog svjetskog rata.



Corfujska luka. Opisi je. Prepoznajes li jedrenjake i parobrode? Kojih je brodova više?

Ivan Dukic-Kresimir Erdelja-Igor Stojakovic, *Povijest 7 udzbenik za sedmi razred osnovne skole*, Zagreb, Skolska knjiga, 2000, p. 129

# STUDIU de CAZ


## A. PENINSULA BALCANICĂ

În 1912, o coaliție balcanică (Bulgaria, Serbia, Muntenegru, Grecia) a declarat război Imperiului otoman. Scopul era eliberarea etnicilor balcanici aflați încă sub stăpânire otomană. Înfrângerea turcilor și posibila lor eliminare din zonă au determinat puterile să intervină și să impună încheierea păcii (Londra, 1913).

Bulgaria, care avea pretenții de supremație în Balcani, susținută de Austro-Ungaria, nemulțumită de prevederile păcii, a declanșat al doilea război balcanic. Armata bulgară și-a atacat foștii aliați.

Modificarea echilibrului în peninsulă contravenea intereselor României. După cucerirea independenței, în 1877, și proclamarea regatului, în 1881, statul român făcuse însemnate progrese în direcția modernizării. Pentru continuarea lor avea nevoie de stabilitate în regiune. În plus, România nu putea aproba politica Vienei de slăbire a Serbiei (susținută de Rusia) și de consolidare artificială a Bulgariei. De aceea, factorii politici au decis intervenția în război, armata română primind ordin să înainteze spre Sofia. Inferioritatea evidentă a obligat guvernul bulgar să ceară pace. Tratatul s-a semnat la București, în 1913. Oferindu-și capitala pentru negocieri, România își consolida prestigiul în zonă, încercând, în același timp, să limiteze intervenția directă a puterilor concurente, Austro-Ungaria și Rusia. Participarea României la al doilea război balcanic a fost o evidentă acțiune de opoziție față de politica Vienei și a marcat îndepărtarea țării de Puterile Centrale.

Care au fost cauzele intervenției României în război?




### EVOLUȚIA FRONTIERELOR ÎN BALCANI

- I. LA ÎNCEPUTUL SECOLULUI AL XX-LEA
- II. ÎN 1909
- III. DUPĂ RĂZBOAIELE BALCANICE

1. Ce modificări de frontieră observați?
2. De ce Balcanii au fost considerați „butoiul cu pulbere” al Europei?
3. Argumentați implicarea fiecărei mari puteri în conflictele balcanice.

# ИСТОРИЯ И ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИЯ

УЧЕБНИК ЗА ЗАДЪЛЖИТЕЛНА И ПРОФИЛИРАНА ПОДГОТОВКА



**10.** клас

Костадин Грозев  
Валери Колев  
Тодор Зарков

**СЪВРЕМЕНОСТ**


Sofia 2001

БРАНКО ПАНОВ  
АНДОН ЃОРЧЕВСКИ  
МИРОСЛАВ БОШКОВИЌ




# ИСТОРИЈА

ЗА VI ОДДЕЛЕНИЕ



† ВІ ННШТІЧАНСІ  
ННАЖТАГО ДОУХА  
УСАМОНИТІА СЪ  
ОРАГА ПНАТИ  
УНИТЕРННЕІАТ  
А СЪСТЪУ СЪ  
НМЕРА СЪ ПЪ  
І СОУА СЪ  
† АВА ПНАТИ  
А СЪОТІ СЪ  
У СЪННІА

Skopje 2001



Kufijtë e cunuar të shtetit shqiptar të cakëruar nga Konferenca e Ambasadorëve në Londër, më 1913

dalje tregtare në det nëpërmjet një skele shqiptare. Por çështja e kaktimit të kufijve të Shqipërisë u diskutua për një kohë të gjatë në Konferencë. Aleatët ballkanikë, në kundërshtim me parimin e kombësisë, i paraqitën Konferencës së Ambasadorëve në fund të vitit 1912 dhe në fillim të 1913 pretendime të mëdha territoriale që preknin në radhë të parë toka të banuara nga popullsi shqiptare. Edhe qeveria e Vlorës dërgoi në Londër një delegacion, i cili në fillim të janarit 1913 i paraqiti Konferencës një memorandum me anën e të cilit kërkohet që brenda kufijve të Shqipërisë të përfshiheshin të gjitha viset me popullsi shqiptare.

Në Konferencën e Ambasadorëve u zhvillua një luftë e ashpër diplomatike për kufijtë e Shqipërisë, sidomos ndërmjet përfaqësuesve të Austro-Hungarisë dhe të Rusisë. Diskutimi i Konferencës u përqendrua në dy projekttharta të Shqipërisë të paraqitura nga Austro-Hungaria dhe nga Rusia. Projekttharta e Austro-Hungarisë përfshinte

një pjesë të mirë të trojeve shqiptare, ndër të cilat edhe Pejën, Gjakovën, Prizrenin, Dibërën, Ohërën etj., por linte jashtë Prishtinën, Mitrovicën, Ferizajin, Gjilanin, Kumanovën, Tetovën, Gostivarin etj.

Projekti rus parashikonte një copëtim të madh të tokave shqiptare. Sipas tij, vija kufitare në veri dhe në lindje të Shqipërisë do të ishte lumi i Drinit dhe Drini i Zi, kurse në jug linte jashtë Shqipërisë Korçën, Delvinën, Sarandan, Çamërinë etj.

Në fillim u shqyrtua kufiri verior dhe verilindor. Më në fund, më 22 mars 1913, Konferenca e Ambasadorëve vendosi të copëtonte rëndë trojet shqiptare duke shpëputur nga Shqipëria gjithë Kosovën dhe vise të tjera shqiptare, si Tetovën, Dibërën, Gostivarin, Kërçovën, Strugën etj., të cilat duhej të kalonin nga zgjedha osmane në zgjedhen e re serbe-malazeze.

Pas shumë diskutimesh të tjera, më 11 gusht 1913 Konferenca vendosi për kufirin jugor e juglindor të Shqipërisë. Sipas këtij vendimi, Korça përfshihej brenda Shqipërisë dhe në bregdet kufiri do të dilte në kepin Stillo, përballë Korfuzit. Në këtë mënyrë pjesa më e madhe e Çamërisë dhe vise të tjera shqiptare në jug mbeteshin jashtë kufijve të Shqipërisë. Po kështu mbetej i papërcaktuar fati i Gjirokastrës. Për këtë do të vendosej gjatë përcaktimit në vend të vijës së kufirit, që do të bëhej nga dy komisione ndërkombëtare që krijoi Konferenca; njëri për kufijtë e Shqipërisë me Malin e Zi e Serbinë, dhe tjetri për kufirin me Greqinë.

Duket qartë se Konferenca e Ambasadorëve nuk përfilloi as parimin e kombësisë dhe as interesat kombëtare të popullit

Манастир  
Грчаница



Десно: катедрала  
св. Марка  
на Корчули

ској верској заједници у Краљевини Југославији, којим је њен поглавар постао сарајевски **реис-ул-улема**, а значајан положај добио је и београдски **муфтија**.

Односи међу припадницима различитих вероисповести у међуратној југословенској држави били су обележени узајамним неповерењем и сукобима. **Верске поделе**, које су се продубиле током Другог светског рата, имале су трагичне последице.

Џамија у Почитељу  
(Херцеговина)



Десно:  
Сремски Карловци

**ПОДЕМ НА БАЛКАНСКИТЕ ЗЕМЈИ**

**ПРЕТВОРАЊЕ НА СРПСКАТА ДРЖАВА ВО МОКНА БАЛКАНСКА СИЛА И НЕЈЗИНОТО ПРОГЛАСУВАЊЕ ЗА ЦАРСТВО**

Во 1261 година дефинитивно била ликвидирани Латинската Империја и повторно била обновена Византиската Империја. Меѓутоа, таа била само сенка на некогашната силна византиска држава. Нејзината слабост ја искористиле Србија и Бугарија за освојување на балканските владенија.

Од 1282 година српскиот крал Милутин почнал да ги освојува византиските владенија во Македонија и Албанија. Српската војска навлегла во Северозападна Македонија и освоила повеќе

градови и области. До крајот на XIII век кралот Милутин освоил и голем дел од територијата на Северна Албанија, заедно со градот Драч. Меѓутоа, Драч под српска власт останал кратко време. Во почетокот на XIV век градот повторно потпаднал под византиска власт.

Српските завладувања во Македонија продолжиле и за време на владеењето на Стефан Дечански, кој ги проширил границите на Србија се до одбранбениот појас: Охрид–Струмица–Мелник.

Со уште позасилен интензитет се одвивале српските освојувања на одделните македонски и албански области за време на владеењето на Стефан Душан (1331–1355). Тој ги проширил



▲ Сл. 2. Кралот Милутин со модел на црквата Св. Јоаким и Ана, фрескоживопис од црквата Студеница

▲ Сл. 1. Српската држава за време на владеењето на цар Душан

# 32



## От Сталин до Горбачов Съветският съюз (1945–1989)

### ИСТОРИЧЕСКИ БЕЛЕЖНИК XX ВЕК

1. **Последните години на Сталин (1945–1953)**
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- септември 1949 ••• СССР създава свое атомно оръжие
- юли-септ. 1953 ••• Берия е арестуван и екзекутиран; Никита Хрущов е избран за първи секретар на КПСС
- 19-25 февр. 1956 ••• XX конгрес на КПСС; секретният доклад на Хрущов за култа към личността на Сталин
- 30 юни 1956 ••••• Постановление на ЦК на КПСС „За преодоляването на култа...“
- есента на 1956 ••••• Съветските танкове потушават народното недоволство в Будапеща
- 3-4 юни 1961 ••••• Среща на Кенеди и Хрущов във Виена
- октомври 1961 ••••• XXII конгрес на КПСС – влошаване на отношенията с Китай и ККП
- октомври 1964 ••••• Брежнев е избран за първи секретар на ЦК на КПСС
- 21 август 1968 ••••• Войските на Варшавския договор навлизат в Чехословакия
- май 1972 ••••••••• Посещението на президента Никсън в Москва
- декември 1979 ••••• Съветски войски окупират Афганистан
- 10 ноември 1982 •• Умира Леонид Брежнев, наследен е от Юрий Андропов
- 8 март 1983 ••••• Роналд Рейгън нарича СССР „империя на злото“
- 9 февруари 1984 •• Умира Юрий Андропов, наследен е от Константин Черненко
- 11 март 1985 ••••• Умира Константин Черненко и Михаил Горбачов оглавява КПСС
- 10 декември 1987 ••• Срещата на Роналд Рейгън и Михаил Горбачов
- 7 декември 1988 ••• Горбачов съобщава, че ще изтегли съветските войски от Източна Европа

• Какво спечели и какво загуби Съветският съюз през Втората световна война?

### 1 Последните години на Сталин (1945–1953)



Разрушаването на храма „Христос Спасител“ в центъра на Москва, 5 декември 1931 г. Десетилетие по-късно войната принуждава ВКП (б) и Сталин отново да се върнат към вековните ценности на православие, да залагат на патриотизма и жертвоготовността на обикновения руснак. Днес храмът е възстановен.

от сравнително **БЪРЗОТО ВЪЗСТАНОВЯВАНЕ** – през 1947 г. съветската индустрия достига предвоенното равнище, а през 1950 г. го надминава с 40 %. Въпреки това по-голямата част от икономическото планиране на Сталин е нерационално по своя замисъл.

Войната повлиява върху социалната структура и психоклимата в съветското общество. Мобилизацията на всички усилия в името на победата е позволила слабо либерализиране на режима, което засилва страха на управляващите за техните позиции. Акцентът върху патриотизма и идеалите на „Матушка Русь“ е изиграл своята роля, но той ражда и надеждите, че „Големият терор“ от 30-те години не ще се възроди. Много руснаци са воювали в Централна и Западна Европа, в страната са включени територии с милионно население, не преминало през комунистическото „възпитание“.

Победата на Съветския съюз като част от антихитлеристката коалиция във Втората световна война е факт с огромно значение за следвоенната история на човечеството. През 1945 г. от Сталин като върховен ръководител на една от двете свръхсили зависят световният мир и бъдещето устройство на света. Тогава съветските войски са най-голямата военна сила в Европа, окупирани са цяла Източна Европа, включително по-голямата част от Балканите, и са близо до Рейн. В Далечния изток след капитулацията на Япония Москва получава реванши за изгубените позиции в началото на века. Реализирани са дълго преследваните цели на руската външна политика за установяване на преобладаващо влияние на Балканите и в Централна Европа и за стабилни позиции в Близкия изток и край Проливите. Никога по-рано перспективите за експанзия на комунистическата идея не са били така благоприятни и Сталин се възползва от тях.

В първите години СССР е военна свръхсила, но в икономическо отношение тя е в **РАЗРУХА**. Изисква се мобилизирането на колосални усилия за преодоляване на кризата.




Йосип Броз Тито подписва Договор за дружба, взаимомощ и следовено сътрудничество между СССР и Югославия, 11 април 1948 г. Аналогични договори са подписани с всички съветски сателити в Източна Европа.




Antisemitski plakat iz 1937., na kojem su Židovi prikazani kao komunisti, lihvari i gonici robova. Cilj ovakvih plakata bio je raspirivanje predrasuda prema Židovima. Što bi ti učinio/la da se danas pojave ovakvi posteri?

Uspjeh nacista na izborima za Reichstag 1924.-33. (u %)



Broj nezaposlenih (u milijunima)



U gospodarstvu je došlo do određenog napretka. Još u doba krize Njemačka je prestala plaćati ratnu odštetu (1932.). Velikim javnim radovima i razvojem vojne industrije smanjen je broj nezaposlenih. Većini radnika standard je porastao (bolji uvjeti rada, veće plaće), ali su zato imali manje prava (sindikati su bili zabranjeni, a štrajkovi proglašeni nezakonitima).

Tako su do sredine 30-tih godina nacisti uredili državu po svojoj zamisli. Nakon toga, bili su spremni na obračun s versajskim poretkom.

**Upamti:** Nürnberški zakoni, potpuna nacistička kontrola cjelokupnog javnog života – totalitarizam.

**PROČITAJ**

Slijedeći tekstovi govore o odnosu nacista prema mladima:

❏ Ulomak iz čitanke za mladu djecu: *Kad Führer ima rođendan, to je također poseban dan za nas. Kod kuće stavljamo cvijeće pokraj njegove slike. Nosimo cvijeće i u školu. Ondje imamo veliku sliku Führera u boji. Postavljena je tako da je svi možemo vidjeti... Kad škola počinje, svi uspravno stojimo pred slikom i pjevamo pjesmu Führeru. Jedan dječak drži govor, a naš učitelj priča nam neke rođendanske priče. Tada pozdravljamo Hitlera sa Sieg-Heil [nacistički pozdrav].* (22)

❏ Tekst *Moj Voda* iz njemačkog udžbenika: *Dijete govori: Poznajem Te dobro i volim Te kao oca i majku. Želim Te uvijek slušati kao oca i majku. A kad odrastem, pomoći ću Ti kao ocu i majci. I Ti ćeš se ponositi sa mnom, kao otac i majka.* (22)

❏ Hitler je jednom izjavio: *Kad mi protivnik kaže 'Neću vam se pridružiti', ja mirno odgovaram: 'Vaša djeca nam već pripadaju.'... jer kroz kratko vrijeme ona neće poznavati ništa drugo do ove nove zajednice.* (49)

❏ Američki novinar William Shirer, koji je u to vrijeme bio dopisnik iz Berlina, ovako je opisao tu organizaciju *Hitlerove mladeži*: *"Od svoje desete do osamnaeste godine dječaci i djevojke morali su pripadati različitim organizacijama Hitler-Jugenda. Ako su roditelji pokušali djetetu braniti da stupi u organizaciju, mogli su biti osuđeni na zatvor... Svako dijete dobilo je knjižicu u koju se bilježilo njegov napredak i ideološki razvoj za cijelo vrijeme njegova članstva u nacističkom pokretu. S deset godina, ako je položio određene testove iz atletike, logorovanja i nacističke povijesti, dječak je... polagao slijedeću zakletvu: 'Kunem se pred ovom zastavom, koja predstavlja Führera, da ću sve svoje snage i energiju posvetiti spasitelju naše zemlje Adolfu Hitleru. Spreman sam i voljan da za njega žrtvujem svoj život, tako mi Bog pomogao!'... Hitlerov pokret za mladež nije zanemarivao ni djevojke... [One su], kao i dječaci, nosile uniformu: bijelu bluzu, plavu suknju, dokoljenice i teške cipele. Izobrazba im je bila slična kao u dječaka iste dobi i obuhvaćala potkraj tjedna duge marševe s teškim naprtnjačama i uobičajenu indoktrinaciju. Ali se isticala i uloga žene u Trećem Reichu – da prvenstveno postaju zdrave majke zdrave djece."* (49)




Pripadnici Hitlerove mladeži na skupu u Nürnbergu 1935.

④ La 18 aprilie 1942, 16 bombardiere americane B-25 au atacat Tokyo sub comanda colonelului J.H. Doolittle.  
„Contrar legendei, noi am stat mult mai mult de 30 de secunde deasupra orașului Tokyo... în jur de 6 minute... Obiectivul meu, deși nu era situat în cartierul comercial, se găsea aproape în centrul orașului.”  
(J.H. Doolittle, *Pentru a răzbuna Pearl Harbour*)



⑦ Prizonier australian executat de japonezi.



⑥ „Niciodată într-un conflict, un număr atât de mare de oameni nu au datorat așa de mult unui număr atât de mic de semeni ai lor.”  
(Formulă celebră a lui W. Churchill, pentru a omagia rolul piloților aviației de vânătoare care au câștigat Bătălia Angliei, înfrângând aviația germană - Luftwaffe)

③ 7 decembrie 1941, numită de F.D. Roosevelt „ziua infamiei”: atacul japonez la Pearl Harbour a determinat intrarea SUA în război.

**VOCABULAR**

- **Contraofensivă:** trecerea la ofensivă, imediat după respingerea ofensivei adversarului.
- **Genocid:** politică de exterminare a populației după criterii etnice sau religioase.
- **Ultimatum:** cerere adresată de un stat altuia, solicitându-i, de regulă sub amenințarea folosirii forței, satisfacerea ei imediată.



⑧ Soldat german surprins de iarnă în apropierea Moscovei. Forța combativă a Armatei Roșii a fost ajutată de trei „generali” valoroși: „generalul Distanță”, „generalul Noroi” și „generalul Iarnă”.

**AUTOEVALUARE**

1. Ce înseamnă „Război-fulger” și care sunt factorii care l-au generat?
2. De ce a intrat România în război?
3. Ce urmări a avut intrarea SUA în război?
4. Care au fost principalele evenimente militare din anii 1939-1941?

⑨ **CAMPANIA GERMANĂ ÎMPOTRIVA URSS ÎN ANII 1941-1942**

- linia frontului la sfârșitul anului 1941
- ..... linia frontului în ianuarie 1942 în regiunea Moscovei
- - - - - limita pătrunderii germane la sfârșitul anului 1942
- locul principalelor lupte
- contraofensiva sovietică în bătălia pentru Moscova în iarna 1941-1942
- direcția atacurilor germane și ale aliaților Germaniei în 1941
- atacurile germane și ale aliaților Germaniei în 1942

νέου Κυβερνήτη της Κύπρου στρατάρχη Χάρντιγκ και του Αρχιεπισκόπου Μακαρίου, οι οποίοι συμφώνησαν να επεξεργαστούν ένα σχέδιο εσωτερικής αυτοκυβέρνησης. Οι διαφορές, ωστόσο, που προέκυψαν ήταν τέτοιες που τελικά οδήγησαν τις συνομιλίες σε αδιέξοδο.

Μετά την αποτυχία των συνομιλιών ο Μακάριος εξορίστηκε στις Σεύχελ-λες (9 Μαρτίου 1956) μαζί με το μητροπολίτη Κυρηνείας Κυπριανό, τον Παπασταύρο Παπαγαθαγγέλου, πρωθιερέα του ιερού ναού Φανερωμένης, και το γραμματέα της Μητρόπολης Κυρηνείας, Πολύκαρπο Ιωαννίδη. Εκεί παρέμειναν μέχρι το Μάρτη του 1957. Ο Μακάριος επέστρεψε στην Κύπρο την 1η Μαρτίου 1959, μετά την υπογραφή των συμφωνιών Ζυρίχης – Λονδίνου.



Ο Ηντεν προς το Μακάριο: "Το Σύνταγμά σας είναι έτοιμο, Σεβασμιότατε.  
(Γελοιογραφία του Φωκ. Δημητριάδη)

Στις Σεύχελλες γνωστοποιήθηκε στο Μακάριο το **Σύνταγμα Ράνκλιφ**, το οποίο για πρώτη φορά εισήγαγε την αρχή της διχοτόμησης. Το ενδεχόμενο αυτό αποτελούσε, και μέχρι σήμερα αποτελεί, εφιαλτική λύση για κάθε Ελληνοκύπριο.

Ακολούθησε το **σχέδιο Μακμίλλαν**, που κι αυτό απορρίφθηκε με σφοδρότητα για τα διαιρετικά στοιχεία που περιείχε και γιατί καθιστούσε την Τουρκία συγκυρίαρχο στην Κύπρο. Προς ενίσχυση της τουρκοβρετανικής θέσης ότι η διχοτόμηση είναι λύση ανάγκης, η τουρκοκυπριακή πλευρά προκάλεσε τις διακοινοτικές ταραχές του 1958.

*Στροφή προς  
τη λύση της  
Ανεξαρτησίας*

Ο κίνδυνος να επιβληθεί το διχοτομικό σχέδιο Μακμίλλαν και η αποτυχία εξασφάλισης στον ΟΗΕ ψηφίσματος συμφώνου με τους εθνικούς πόθους των Κυπρίων ώθησαν τον Αρχιεπίσκοπο Μακάριο να διαφοροποιήσει την κυπριακή διεκδίκηση και να μελετά λύση του προβλήματος με στόχο την Ανεξαρτησία. Η ανεξαρτησία αποτελούσε λύση που τύχανε της υπο-

*Ιστορία της Κύπρου Μεσαιωνική - Νεότερη (1192-1974), Nicosia  
Ministry of Education and Culture, 2001 (4<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 242*



Η κατοχή από τους Τούρκους του βόρειου τμήματος της Κύπρου δημιούργησε στο νησί τεράστιο προσφυγικό πρόβλημα. 250.000 Κύπριοι υποχρεώθηκαν να εγκαταλείψουν τα σπίτια τους και να ζήσουν σε καταυλισμούς.


- Κυπριακό έδαφος υπό τουρκική κατοχή
- Ελεύθερο κυπριακό έδαφος
- Απόβαση τουρκικών δυνάμεων**
- Θέσεις τουρκικών δυνάμεων εισβολής στις 22/7/1974
- Θέσεις τουρκικών δυνάμεων εισβολής στις 30/7/1974
- Θέσεις τουρκικών δυνάμεων εισβολής στις 8/8/1974
- Θέσεις τουρκικών δυνάμεων εισβολής στις 16/8/1974




Πηγή: Χάρτης Department of Lands and Surveys, Cyprus, 1974

Β. Σκουλάτος - Ν. Δημακόπουλος - Σ. Κόνδης, *Ιστορία Νεότερη και Σύγχρονη*, Τεύχος Γ'. Γ' Λυκείου, Athens, Ministry of Education, Pedagogical Institute, 1998 (11<sup>th</sup> ed.), p. 403

# HRVATSKA U DRUGOJ POLOVICI 19.



Ivan Dukic - Kresimir Erdelja - Igor Stojakovic, *Povijest 7 udzbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne skole*, Zagreb, Skolska knjiga, 2000, p. 126.



Na začetku ...




Britanci odganjajo burske družine v koncentracijska taborišča med bursko vojno (1899–1902).

in na koncu stoletja



Bosansko prebivalstvo v koncentracijskih taboriščih med vojno v Bosni in Hercegovini (1992–97)




Ford Lizzy iz leta 1908



Renault Tingo iz leta 1998




Casopis Slovenec iz leta 1900



Satelitske antene v Raistingu v Nemčiji v devetdesetih letih



Razglednica, odposlana leta 1901.



Mobilni telefon s konca devetdesetih let

Bozo Repe, *Sodobna Zgodovina. Zgodovina za 4. letnik gimnazij*,  
Ljubljana, Modrijan, 1998, p. 237



CHAPTER I

**Common Past, Shared History**



## **A. THE MULTI-ETHNIC EMPIRES**



## 1. THE BYZANTINE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRES

### A Common Regional Past?

### Portrayals of the Byzantine and Ottoman Heritages from Within and Without \*

YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL - VASILIA LILIAN ANTONIOU

**H**OW MUCH of a common past should southeastern Europe claim? The Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, which over the course of more than fourteen hundred years covered the geography of the Balkans and cultivated the relics of commonality, clearly left their imprint on the region. Their bequest is evident in the monumentality of imperial edifices scattered throughout the landscape and in the familiarity of everyday words spoken in diverse languages. Their legacy, however, endows different heirs in the region and underwrites mutual conflicts in the national time. As the nation-states of the region are adjusting to the new Europe in the making, the contentious history of the region confounds their connection to Europe. Not coincidentally, with the intensification of the idea of Europe and the institutional expansion of the European Union, efforts are in place to revise national histories in the Balkan countries. To what extent, then, do the Balkan empires serve as a basis for a common history? How plausible is it to construct and teach regionally informed histories as nations encounter

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\* Acknowledgements: This paper was presented at the 5<sup>th</sup> workshop of the Southeast European Joint History Project Textbook Committee on «Teaching Sensitive and Controversial Issues in the History of South-East Europe», held in Istanbul, on 21-23 September 2000. Data and arguments presented in this paper draw upon Vasilias Antoniou's PhD thesis «Why Does History Matter? Portrayals of National Identity in Greek Elementary History Textbooks» and Yasemin Soysal's ongoing ESRC project «Rethinking Nation-state Identities in the New Europe». The project has received further funding from the Fuller Bequest Fund, the University of Essex, Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy. We are grateful to Ayca Ergun for her invaluable assistance in locating and collecting data for the Turkish case. Vasilias Antoniou would like to thank both Gella Varnava-Skouras and Laura Mamakos for their essential assistance in locating and gathering data for the Greek case.

Europe? The ambiguous position of the region vis-à-vis the idea of Europe creates a fruitful starting point in addressing the tensions and possibilities promised by shared topographies and common heritages.

We set ourselves a limited goal in this paper. Our goal is to explore the ways in which the Ottoman and Byzantine Empires are portrayed in recent lower secondary school history textbooks. Our choice of country cases, Britain, Greece and Turkey, may strike one as odd at first glance. This choice however reflects our interest in understanding how the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires figure into the teaching of national and European histories from within and without. For contemporary Turkey and Greece the Ottoman Empire represents a quandary for historical continuity. The narration of the national histories in both countries involves a recovery from the Ottoman past-Turkey having had to incorporate it into its national history and Greece having had to break away from it. Byzantium, on the other hand, does not figure into the national histories of Greece and Turkey as a period of contention – naturally incorporated into the national canon in the case of Greece and conveniently ignored as yet another dying and conquered Empire in the case of Turkey. This, we contrast with the portrayals of the Byzantine and Ottoman histories in ‘western’ accounts, that of the British, and thus from without. Our decision to include Britain derives from her strong involvement in the ‘birth’ of both the Turkish and Greek nations, namely as the nemesis of the first and the patron of the second.

We contend that the construction of the particular national histories in Greek and Turkish textbooks is a good place to start for understanding the position and importance of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires in these countries’ history teaching. Greek textbooks define the national evolution principally in terms of a national time, while Turkish textbooks give primacy to the national territory. Our analysis suggests that the salient disparity in the emphasis attributed to the national time and the national territory in conceptualising the national evolution locates the Byzantine and Ottoman periods differently in the flow of both the national histories and the history of the region.

In the Turkish case, at one level, there is a seemingly continuous history of the nation, originating with the Turkic tribes of central Asia, migrating to Anatolia and the founding of the Ottoman Empire and, finally, the creation of the new Republic of Turkey. However, the national time proceeds with breaks as the territories of the nation change

–from central Asia, to the large expanse of the Ottoman Empire and to the Anatolia of the Turkish Republic. Thus, the national territory becomes the defining signifier of nationness, each territory identifying a qualitatively different national past. These different heritages –pagan origins, Muslim Empire and secular Republic– are not necessarily reconciled into one seamless history and remain more or less discrete in textbooks. When it comes to the history of the Republic, the nation proper, the national time begins anew and a new identity is forged around the space represented by the territorial boundaries of the Republic. The new national time does not incorporate Islam as a heritage proper, despite Islam’s visible position in the most recent textbooks, thus, giving way to an uneasy affiliation with the Ottoman past. The result is less of a synthetic and more of a ‘disjointed’ national history and identity, with many possible and contested inheritances and multiple others (Greek, Kurdish, Armenian, Arab), who also advance claims to the same territory as their ‘own’.

Greek national history in textbooks, on the other hand, strives, and achieves, to follow a national narrative that is continuous in time, beginning with the ancient Greeks, proceeding into Byzantium and culminating with the construction of the modern Greek nation-state. In spite of the territorial losses and claims, this chronology remains complete in the national time-frame. The difficult but successful reconciliation of the pagan past with Byzantine Christianity produces a rather ‘synthetic’ national history and identity, referred to as the ‘Hellenic-Christian Tradition’. This tradition is based upon an assumed continuity of culture over time, turning the Greek nation into a cultural community travelling through time. Furthermore, this fusion between the Hellenic and the Christian worlds allows the Greek Orthodox Religion to become a defining characteristic of the Greek people. However, the ‘black periods’ of Muslim conquest and Ottoman Rule, historically represented by the loss and capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans, brings Greek culture to a temporary halt and provides Greece with a persistent Turkish ‘other’ regardless of her location in Europe.

The position of both countries vis-à-vis Europe, however, retains a degree of ambiguity<sup>1</sup>. With its Hellenic past, Greece claims, and is

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<sup>1</sup> For the ambiguous place of Greece and Turkey in Europe see Herzfeld (1986, 1987, 1992) and L. Soysal (1992).

accorded with, the origin story of Europe –the cradle of civilisation and democracy– and as such is located properly in Europe. Yet, its Romeic past –the past of the Eastern Roman Empire, of Orthodox Christianity and of Ottoman Rule– and its geographical location keeps Greece in the margins of Europe, tainting her modernity and character with Easternness. Turkey, on the other hand, with a history of nation-making practised and expressed as Europeanisation (modernisation), claims a formal place in Europe but is located beyond the cultural and political boundaries of European modernity proper. In other words, located in the margins of Europe –Greece inside but outside, Turkey outside but inside– both Greece and Turkey differentially persist as ‘others’ in/of Europe while their exercise in incorporating and distancing the Ottoman legacy reveals an uneasy existence with the ‘common’ Balkan heritage.

The task and aspiration of achieving the prerequisite Europeaness makes it difficult for both countries to focus on their common regional past (which includes the experiences of Byzantium and Ottoman Rule), particularly when one considers the ambiguities involved in locating the Balkans and the marginalisation that this region experiences vis-à-vis Europe. Yet, it is precisely their ‘common’ Balkan heritage that provides the only opportunity for both countries to make a ‘proper’ and ‘uncontaminated’ entry into Europe’s past and future.

Against this account from within, we trace the treatment of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires from without in English history textbooks. In English textbooks, it is within the civilisational narratives of the east and west and when these Empires come into contact with British (European) history that they are discussed and recounted. The Byzantine Empire appears primarily in the textbooks that deal with ‘The Crusades’. While the textbooks stress the ‘barbaric’ nature of the Crusaders and the ‘Christian’ nature of Byzantium, the Byzantine Empire nevertheless appears as distinctly different from western Europe. The Greek Orthodox nature of the Empire and its geographical location licence the textbooks to conceptualise the Byzantines as dissimilar to other (western) European peoples, although they are not necessarily presented as the ‘other’. Paradoxically, however, the Crusades also allow the English textbooks to unite the different branches of Christianity against a common Muslim ‘other’. This Muslim other surfaces principally in the form of the generic Turk in the textbooks.

The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, is found in the references to Islamic civilisations. Its presence in textbooks that focus on the evolution of Islam emphasises the religious nature of this Empire and overlooks the multi-religious character of the region that it covered. Although the religious element occupies a larger space, partly as a marker of difference and point of comparison with the West, nonetheless, the civilisational achievements (social, cultural and political) of the Ottoman Empire get explicit coverage and its influence on the western world is increasingly acknowledged.

Our focus is on the history textbooks of lower secondary school education. In Greece, the lower secondary school is called the 'gymnasium' and includes grades 7-9 (comprising ages 11-14). Elementary school and gymnasium constitute compulsory education in Greece (1-9 grades). The Ministry for National Education and Religion produces one history textbook for each grade, which is usually re-written every five years although minor changes are made on a yearly basis. In Turkey, it was as recently as 1997 that the lower secondary school became part of compulsory education, and comprises grades 6-8 (ages 12-15). Similar to Greece, the Ministry of National Education produces textbooks for each grade, with revisions being made every five years. Since 1997, a number of privately produced textbooks have been published in Turkey, however, the strict state imposed guidelines and the obligatory following of the national curriculum means that they differ only marginally from the state-produced textbooks.

In the English educational system lower secondary school includes grades 7-9 and is considered part of mandatory education<sup>2</sup>. Yet, the textbooks available in England are all privately manufactured by numerous publishing houses. Minor and major revisions are made almost every year. Unlike Greece and Turkey, one core textbook for each corresponding grade is not produced. History teachers in England must complete the four compulsory and core parts of the curriculum<sup>3</sup>. How-

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<sup>2</sup> One should note that in Britain education is regionally organised. The three educational systems, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and England and Wales, all have their separate curricula and educational requirements. Textbook production is also regionally based. Although a few of the larger publishing houses (such as Cambridge University Press and Heinemann Educational Publishing) produce textbooks for all regions, no textbook is produced for general and compulsory use in all the regions.

<sup>3</sup> The core subjects of the curriculum are: medieval realms (Britain 1066-1500);

ever, they are at liberty to select four other units for study. These other elective study units include Roman Britain, the Crusades, Islamic civilisation, slavery, the Americas etc. It is primarily in the textbooks on the Crusades and Islamic civilisations that portrayals of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires appear.

The compulsory nature of lower secondary school education in the case countries reflects the more mass aspect of education and, as a result, we hope to expose the dominant historical narratives taught in schools. Our main data (for this paper) comes from the recent history textbooks, however we also attempt to illustrate significant changes over time.

### **The ‘Byzantine’ and ‘Ottoman’ Heritage in the Conceptualisations of the ‘Nation’ and the ‘Other’**

It is through the notions of time and space that the unitary location of the nation(-state) and its heritage and culture are narrated. The territory of the nation signifies the boundaries of the nation while the national time-frame describes the evolution of the nation. Both notions validate and legitimate the nation’s existence (as both a geographical and a cultural entity) over time and in space.

Greek and Turkish textbooks are littered with examples of the nation being conceptualised and defined through the notions of ‘time’ and ‘space’. However, due to the differing historical processes of nation and state making, we observe a different emphasis given to time and space in textbook history writing. While the Turkish textbooks stress the notion of ‘space’ in conceptualising and defining their nation, the Greek textbooks highlight the notion of ‘time’. This contrast in emphasis reflects that nation’s presumed historical evolution. For example, the Greek textbooks perceive the ancient Greek world as the early history of the nation and hence give great importance to the notion of ‘time’ in any subsequent definition of the nation. Yet, such an understanding exposes not only the conceptualisation of the nation in textbooks but also the value-judgements made about other nations whose own national

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the making of the United Kingdom (crowns, parliaments and peoples 1500-1750); expansion, trade and industry (Britain 1750-1990); and the era of the Second World War (the 20<sup>th</sup> Century World). Until the Dearing Report of 1993 ‘Roman Britain’ also appeared as a core curriculum subject.

time-frames do not boast such a distinguished and distant ancestry. Whereas the significance attached to the 'territory of the nation' in Turkish textbooks sanctions against defining a continuous Turkish identity as well as promotes the nation's greatest accomplishment and success, that of conqueror.

The valorisation of the national ancestry is very clear in both cases, but with a different twist. Greek textbooks represent their ancestry as the origins of the modern, civilised European world. This is of particular significance since it is to the western European world that the recent textbooks aim to locate Greece as a member and not to the Balkan world (where historically Greece has been one of the most important actors). The veneration of the ancient Greek civilisation in textbooks also serves the purpose of promoting the idea of a cultural continuity over time. It is this idea of a cultural continuity that underlines the textbooks' representations of national identity. This presumed continuity excludes the 'Ottoman heritage'. In fact, it is only through the exclusion of the Ottoman legacy that this continuity can be maintained:

The Greeks maintained their customs and traditions [from the ancient and Byzantine times] as well as creating new ones. They organised their life significantly differently from those that enslaved them [that is, the Ottomans]. It is through this method that they differentiated themselves and maintained their national consciousness. (G6 1996:59)

Moreover, by excluding the Ottoman period Greek textbooks can give a position of great significance to the Byzantine period. Byzantium comes to represent both an era of 'Greek glory' and the most recent experience of Greekness before the enslavement:

The year 1453, when the Turks conquered Constantinople, represents the end of the political life of Byzantium. However, its cultural life continued. After the decline of the Byzantine State, Hellenism in its new form, the neo-Hellenic, continued its traditions. It preserved the precious inheritance, namely the unification of the ancient Greek world with the Christian spirit that Byzantium had created, and found the strength not only to preserve itself but also to flourish and continue. (G8 1998:340)

The emphasis on the Byzantine heritage also allows the textbooks to include Greek Orthodoxy as a defining characteristic of the Greeks, both throughout the ages and in the modern period. Yet, it is precisely with the inclusion of Orthodoxy as a defining national characteristic that the textbooks expose their most notable contradiction, namely the disparity between a pagan Hellenic past and a Christian Greek present. The textbooks do state that the adoption of Orthodoxy represented a rupture between the 'old' and the 'new' world:

In the beginning, Christianity and Hellenism came into conflict because they represented two different worlds. (G8 1999:91)

Nevertheless, the textbook goes on to illustrate how these two worlds became united:

Slowly, however, they came nearer as a result of the important role played by the Fathers of the Church [the Patriarchs], they had studied the ancient Greek works and understood their value. Hence, with the passing of time, the different components [which made up the two different worlds] united and created the distinctive and unique appearance of Byzantium, that is, its simultaneous Hellenic and Christian character. (G8 1999:91)

By fusing together the Hellenic and the Christian periods Greek textbooks succeed in transfiguring the past into one complete seamless history. Moreover, this fusion allows them to conceptualise and claim the modern Greek nation-state as the culmination and desired state of Greek national evolution as well as omitting the role of the Ottoman period in this evolution and hence distancing Greek history from the common Balkan history.

In contrast to the continuity of the nation in Greek textbooks, the Turkish national time-frame appears somewhat disjointed. The sense of continuity appears primarily through the idea of territorial conquering. The Turkish nation starts from the 'steps of central Asia' and triumphs in Anatolia. The central Asian origins of Turkish culture and identity are celebrated in the great character and military successes of the Ottoman Beys who conquered the Middle East and Anatolia. As the 6<sup>th</sup> Grade history book claims, through a wave of migrations and conquests, Turks contributed to the prospering of the Middle Eastern and Aegean civilisations:

Turks from Central Asia migrated to various parts of the world and helped the natives who still lived in the Palaeolithic Age to move into the Neolithic Age. They learned from the Turks how to cultivate the earth and how to work metals. In these new countries the Turks made further advances, building big cities and founding strong states. Important centres of civilisation were thus created in Mesopotamia, in Anatolia, in Syria and around the Aegean Sea. (T6a 1991:25, quoted in Millas 1991)

In textbooks the progress of Turkish history is often represented by the invasion and conquest of other lands, the rise and fall of Turkish dynasties and the consecutive building of the state. The structure of the textbook follows the historical periods identified with the governing family, clan and dynasty as well as the subsequent states founded by these. Central Asia remains the 'first motherland of Turks' but not the focus of the cultural/national identity. The 'glory' of the Turkish nation stems from her military achievements and successful state experiences. The cultural continuity is only presented in the assumed characteristics (such as, the ability to rule, competence in warship, fairness), military achievements and statesmanship of the leaders but not in collective cultural representations. This can be seen in both the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Grade textbooks:

Our ancestors, Bumin Kagan and Istemi Kagan, formed and protected the state and the customs of the Turkish nation. They had enemies all around. But the Kagans were knowledgeable and brave. They managed to take all the other nations under their sovereignty. (From the Orhun inscriptions, T6b 1996:16)

Atilla is the unforgettable Turkish Emperor for Europeans. (T6b 1996:30).

Sultan Mehmet II is the best example of the greatness and of the humane approach of the Turkish nation, he allowed the non-Muslim inhabitants of Istanbul to keep their religions and traditions. (T7a 1991:19, quoted in Millas 1991)

The Turkish identity, as revealed in these examples, is a state identity (rather than a cultural one), closely connected to territory and to those leaders that have helped to actualise the territory. The emphasis on territory is the principle reason why past leaders of the state and their military successes have a central position in textbooks, along with

the inestimable civilising role they play in subjugated realms. Although culture has an important position in textbooks it is treated in rather a schizophrenic manner. Turkish textbooks simultaneously embrace and dispute the cultural influences upon Turkish identity (e.g. the Arabic civilisation and the Ottoman period) as well as downplaying, at least until the 1980s, the Islamic heritage. Indeed, even after the 1980s, the emphasis is on the Turkish Islamic states and their successes. The efforts of each *sultan* to build mosques and *medrese* (schools) in the newly conquered lands are mentioned in the chapters on ‘Art’ and ‘Civilisation’. The respect for religion (not only Islam but also Christianity and Judaism) is also represented as a characteristic of Turkish rulers. Nevertheless, the main cultural continuity appears via continuity in the language:

When the Islamic state was flourishing, Arabic became widespread in the invaded territories. But because Turkish is a strong language Turks managed to maintain their national consciousness, even after converting to Islam. (T7b 1996:55)

The Byzantine Empire figures into Turkish history textbooks only marginally and as an Empire on the verge of collapse. In fact, the space devoted to the Byzantine reign and its exchanges with the respective Seljuk Sultanates and the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia is substantially minimal. The three major encounters between the Turks and the Byzantines, namely the Battle of Malazgirt, the conquest of western Anatolia and the Balkans and, finally, the capture of Istanbul, narrate the arrival of the Turks in Anatolia and mark their adoption and domination of the new territory as their motherland. In these encounters, the Byzantine rulers are depicted as corrupt and cruel hegemony, exploiting the inhabitants of the region, Christian or otherwise, and thus validates the benevolence and righteousness of the conquerors. The peasants, priests, merchants, the poor and the rich all accept the rule and providence of the Turk as their salvation and road to prosperity. Consequently, the new realm rightfully becomes the homeland and the territorial claims are effectively justified. Byzantium in these narratives is not a Greek state but merely a ‘dying’ Christian Empire<sup>4</sup>. Hence, Byzantium conveniently remains outside of

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<sup>4</sup> Curiously, in the historical maps provided in the textbooks, the Pontic Empire in Trabzon (Trebizond) is identified as a Greek Empire. Perhaps Byzantium’s connec

the domain of the Turkish national identity, even as an ‘other’, and its collapse leads the way to a territorial belonging in Anatolia, the motherland of the modern Republic of Turkey.

In Turkish textbooks, the problematic relationship between the Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire gets peculiarly amplified in the presentations of the ‘other’. Given the Ottoman Empire’s contentious history with Eastern and European empires, at different historical time points a number of states (China, Iran, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France) have appeared as the nation’s other. This is different from the Greek case, where a clear sense of ‘otherness’ is bestowed upon the Turks and, less so, upon the Roman Catholic West. The Greek nation-state was a direct outcome of independence from the Ottoman Empire, it is understandable then that the Ottoman, but in particular the Turkish elements of the Ottoman, represents the other of the Greek nation. What is more perplexing is that once we move to the Turkish Republic’s history the Ottoman also becomes the Turkish national ‘other’, since the Turkish Republic’s own history can only be written as a clean break from the Ottoman Empire and what it represents. At the end of the First World War, the defeatist Ottoman leaders and the Empire becomes the ‘enemy’ to fight against.<sup>5</sup> The history of the Turkish Republic is taught separately (in the 8<sup>th</sup> Grade) from Ottoman history (6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Grades). This topical –and seemingly technical– breakdown of history teaching intensifies the effect of cultural discontinuity in the evolution of the Turkish identity and in turn naturalises the overly narrated histories of leaders and states with proper beginnings and ends<sup>6</sup>.

The commonality in the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire as the Greek and Turkish nation-states’ other within the context of the modernity of nation-stateness is most striking. On the other hand, the manner in which this historical period and this other is conceptualised and presented differs greatly in the textbooks of the two countries. This difference is

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tion to Istanbul and western Anatolia, and the contested nature of this territory between Turkey and Greece are the reasons for this significant oversight.

<sup>5</sup> One should note, and this may be rather symbolic, that there is no reference to the Empire until the narration of the history of the Turkish Republic in textbooks. Until that point the term Ottoman state is used.

<sup>6</sup> Note that after the introduction of the 1985 Curriculum, there has been a visible change in the textbooks, with a pronounced emphasis on the Ottoman legacy and its Islamic cultural content. Still, the cultural discontinuity in the Turkish identity’s evolution is not resolved in the textbooks.

most visible in the amount of textbook space given to the Ottoman period. In Turkish textbooks, Grades 6 and 7 deal exclusively with Ottoman history. Evidently, the Ottoman period makes up an important, albeit confused, part of Turkish national history. The Ottoman past represents the ancestry of the Turkish nation yet, paradoxically, its demise represents the birth of a new nation. It is for this reason that the Ottoman period occupies such a large proportion yet procures such an unclear role in Turkish history textbooks. In contrast, Greek textbooks, although according the Ottoman period with significantly less textbook space than their Turkish counter-parts, bestow a very precise role to this historical period. In the 8<sup>th</sup> Grade textbook only two sections are dedicated to the Ottomans, namely the conquering of Constantinople and the creation of the Ottoman state. This translates into about three percent of the total textbook. In the 9<sup>th</sup> Grade textbook the space given to the Ottoman period is marginally more, with an entire chapter about life under Ottoman Rule and another chapter about the process of liberation. However, all references to the Ottoman period relate to the experience of the Ottoman occupation of Greece.

The Ottoman period of history represents the ‘black period’ of Greek history, and, consequently, the Ottoman Turk is accorded with the role of the other in the textbooks. Greek textbooks, as previously stated, do not neglect the period of Ottoman Rule, for this period lasted over 400 years. Yet, it is conceptualised as a significant period in the ‘History of Greece’ but as having no relevance for the ‘History of Greeks’. It is via this distinction that the Ottoman Turk becomes the Greek’s other. Moreover, this distinction also allows the textbooks to maintain that Greek national identity was not affected by the presence of this other. In fact, the textbooks uphold that the presence of this other helped to further unite the Greeks. An example of this appears in the 8<sup>th</sup> Grade textbook:

The Greeks never believed that the Turkish conquest [of Greece] also ended the life of Hellenism. There is further proof that shows that the Tourkokratia [Ottoman Rule] coincides with the reshaping of Hellenism. During the darkness of slavery with tremendous tenacity the neo-Hellenic consciousness was united and in 1821 they took the reactionaries in Europe by surprise [with their liberation struggle against Ottoman Rule]. (G8 1999:347)

The Ottoman period in Greek history is then conceptualised as a disturbing element in the national evolution and, similar to that seen in Turkish textbooks, the period of national rebirth. But, not so surprisingly, this conceptualisation influences the manner in which the Ottomans and Greece as well as Greeks appear in textbooks. The aggressive and uncivilised behaviour of the Ottomans during the capturing of Constantinople and the ‘reality’ of Ottoman Rule further warrants their depiction as an other of the worst possible kind. However, the capture of the ‘Great City’ by the Ottomans also permits the textbooks to move the spatial reference point of Greek history back to mainland Greece and the Greek islands. This area corresponds to both the present-day boundaries of the modern Greek nation-state and the glorious period of Greek antiquity. Furthermore, it also represents an area within Europe, albeit a peripheral one. The Greek desire in textbooks to illustrate the Europeanness of the Greeks sanctions that the Ottomans are attributed with the role of removing Greece from the path of western European development and tainting the modern Greeks with ‘Easternness’. In turn, this reinforces the permanence of the Ottoman/Turk as an other in the national narrative.

Greek textbooks, however, do not only singularly differentiate the Ottoman/Turk as the other. The Roman Catholic West also enters into the historical narrative of the Greeks as an other. The Roman Catholic other, though, is not a historical and a permanent other, as is the case for the Ottoman/Turk; it is a temporary other connected to a distinctive historical period. Hence, it is conceptualised and presented as the other in specific contexts and only then—namely, when discussing the Crusades and the division between the two Christian churches:

The idea for the [fourth] crusade came from Pope Innocent III and his aim was to attack the Muslims in Egypt, who after the death of Saladdin were engaged in civil war. From there, according to his calculations, he believed it would be easy to liberate Palestine. Simultaneously, the Venetians, who were thinking about their own economic gains, convinced the Pope to incorporate their aims, namely to both loot and attack Byzantium. Pope Innocent believed that this was the perfect moment to capture the Eastern Church and bring it back under Roman Catholic control. (G8 1999:265)

The Crusades strangely unite Greek and Turkish textbooks creating a common temporary other, represented by Western Europe. In that the Crusades were launched not only against the Orthodox Church but also against Islam. More importantly, they were launched against Constantinople/Istanbul. The Turkish textbook states:

The Crusaders, under Peter the Hermit, ravaged every place they passed through and did the worst they could do to the people... They ruined Istanbul and plundered monuments and burned part of the city. (T6b 1996:86)

In Turkish textbooks, the terms ‘Crusader’, ‘Christians’ and ‘Europeans’ are used interchangeably. Here, through a common ‘Easternness’, Greek and Turkish textbooks converge. In the narratives of desolation and destruction, the Crusaders as the western other curtails the national distance between the Greeks and the Turks. Constantinople/Istanbul, the ‘Great City’ in both the national narratives, connects the diverging paths of the national histories and renders visible the shared legacies and spaces.

### **The Western Accounts of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires**

The narration of the Crusades is also an apt point of departure for delineating the depictions of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires in British history textbooks. For the Crusades differentiates the Eastern other within and without Europe and situates the flow of European British history with respect to the Empires of the East. The treatment of the Crusades in English textbooks displays certain similarities with both the Greek and the Turkish textbooks. Akin to the conceptualisation found in Turkish textbooks, Christian Crusaders are synonymous with Europeans. The Crusaders are also depicted as Western European and Catholic, corresponding to the image that we detect in Greek textbooks. Yet, it is precisely this conceptualisation of the Crusaders as Western European Catholics that influences the manner in which both the Byzantine Empire and the Muslim Turk are portrayed in the textbooks.

The Byzantine Empire is presented simultaneously as both Greek and non-European. It is portrayed as non-European because of its geographical location but it is the Greekness and, particularly, the Orthodox nature of the Empire that principally influences its non-European representation:

The Roman Empire collapsed in Europe in about 450. But the eastern half of the Empire survived. Its capital, Constantinople, was built on the site of an old Greek village called Byzantium. Because of this, the Eastern Empire is often called Byzantium or the **Byzantine Empire**. The people were Christians, but they were not Roman Catholics like the Christians in Europe. They were **Greek Orthodox** Christians. (E1 1997:11 Bold text in original)

The textbooks also attempt to portray a sense of unity between the Byzantines and the Crusaders as a result of their common Christian beliefs. However, this sense of commonality is coupled, as the examples below illustrate, with a far more pronounced sense of distrust and rivalry between the two:

Some of the Crusaders said that attacking Constantinople was wrong. Others pointed out how useful the Greek forces would be. The Venetians were delighted at the new idea. Their biggest trade rival was Constantinople and they had valuable trade arrangements with Egypt! A change of plan to attack the city and not Egypt would suit them nicely. (E1 1997:32)

In 1147 the two kings [The Holy Roman Emperor Conrad III and Louis VII of France] set off along the route taken by the First Crusaders. Conrad was the first to arrive in Constantinople in September 1147. Louis arrived one month later. The Eastern Emperor, Manuel, was not particularly pleased to see them—especially as he knew the trouble the Crusaders of 1096 had caused. Manuel helped the Crusaders cross into Asia Minor, but both the Germans and the French soon met with disaster. (E1 1997:22)

The common Christian nature of both Byzantium and the Crusaders of ‘Europe’ is further validated in the textbooks when faced with the mutual Turkish other that threatens both Byzantium and Christianity:

The Emperor [of Byzantium] was also worried about the warlike Turks on his borders. (E1 1997:10)

The Turkish Muslims did not agree with Christian pilgrims visiting the **Holy Land** and treated them badly, often robbing and sometimes murdering them... Pope Urban thought that it would be a good idea

to get men from all parts of the [western] Christian world to travel to the east and fight the Turks. (E1 1977:13 Bold text in original)

Hence, in the subject of Crusades, the 'true' other, namely the Turkish Muslim other, of the English textbooks comes to correspond with the portrayals observed in Greek textbooks. Although the Crusaders are depicted as barbaric/aggressive and Byzantium is presented as not exactly European in nature, the figure of the 'Muslim Turk' unites Greek and English textbooks.

The analysis of the textbooks on Islamic Civilisations, however, suggests manifestations of a broader conceptualisation of Europe which includes, albeit minimally, the Byzantine Empire and projects Muslim Turks, and particularly the Ottomans, still as others but one from whom Europeans also learn. In these textbooks, Europe emerges as a geographical entity that comprises both western and eastern regions. The Byzantine Empire is included in the geographical design of Europe yet again it remains decidedly non-European in cultural terms. The civilisational foundations of the Europe of that time are firmly based in ancient Greece and in Western Europe – thus the Europeanness of the Greeks is promoted in English textbooks but at the expense of Byzantium. Moreover, Europe emerges as a Christian landscape but one that is essentially Catholic in nature – thus marginalising (Orthodox) Greeks vis-à-vis Europe proper.

When addressing the Ottoman Empire and the Ottomans the English textbooks once again display many similarities with the Greek textbooks. The most significant of these can be seen in the portrayal of the Ottomans as both Turks and Muslims:

Later, Arab control weakened. From about 1050 the Muslims around the Mediterranean fell under the control of new rulers, the **Turks**. They were also Muslims and spread Islam even further. At first, this was also a splendid Empire, but from 1700 the Turkish Empire became weak and started to break up. For all this time Islam was the main religion in the area. (E2 1991:5 Bold text in original)

The emphasis upon the Islamic nature of both the Empire and its expanse is quite interesting. By focusing on Islam the textbooks effectively distance the Empire from the common European history and

hence exclude not only the Ottomans but also the experience of many Balkan countries from the pan-European historical narrative.

While the Islamic character of life under Ottoman Rule underwrites the otherness of the Ottomans (as in polygamy or Koranic justifications of punishments, for instance), the Empire nonetheless comes across as a system of governance and law – a harsh system but not one without its logic and conventions:

Away from the capital, there was a network of judges, called qadis. These were ulema, respected Muslims who had studied the laws of Islam. The Koran was their guide. No one could be punished without their permission, although non-Muslims were tried and punished by their own leaders. Ottoman punishments were very harsh; amputation of the hand for horse stealing, for example. But the Koran allowed harsh punishments. The Ottomans had no police force to keep order so they had to rely on fear. (E2 1991:53)

What is striking is that in narrating the history of the Ottoman Empire the English textbooks detail a conventional chronology of great rulers and dynasties, conquests and defeats, and rise and fall very much like the Turkish textbooks. A series of great sultans lead the ‘splendid’ Empire from one triumphant conquest to another until it becomes ‘weak’ and stops at the gates of Vienna, fortunately for Europe:

But the greatest Ottoman was still to come. Selim’s son, Suleiman, became sultan in 1520. He captured Belgrade in 1521, Rhodes in 1522, then the whole of the north coast of Africa. In 1529 Suleiman seemed set to capture Vienna in the heart of Europe. But bad weather reduced the food for his men and horses and made the roads impassable for his cannon. He turned back and again Europe was spared. (E2 1991:51)

When it comes to presenting the cultural inventory of this ‘splendid’ Empire, amidst customary references to otherness, a picture of civilisational achievements matching, and even surpassing, Europe finds its way into the textbooks:

This was the time of the Renaissance in Europe, when learning and art flourished. But no European capital could match the thriving city of Istanbul for learning and culture. (E2 1991:55)

The palace schools also produced artists, poets and architects.

Many of these craftsmen were used to convert the Christian churches of Constantinople into mosques. Their changes were sometimes simple, but often they added splendid decoration. (E2 1991:55)

The Venetian painter Bellini spent a year in Istanbul. (E2 1991:55)

The move from the images of the Ottomans as the barbaric Muslim other of Europe in the textbooks on the Crusades to the accounts of their cultural achievements and artistic parity with the Renaissance in the textbooks on the Islamic civilisation is no coincidence and relates to the recent trends in history teaching. In Britain, as well as in other European countries, history is increasingly becoming a chronicle of world civilisations and cultural inventories. In the shift from history as a destructive contest between others to history as civilisational exploits and heritages, more and more the rivalries and disputations give way to achievements and shared legacies. Hence, once the Ottoman Empire is normalised as a civilisation, its cultural accomplishments and connections to Europe take precedence and it is on a par with the Europe of its time.

### **Conclusion**

In this essay, we set ourselves the task of delineating and analysing the representations of the Balkan Empires –Ottoman and Byzantine– from within, in the national narratives present in Turkish and Greek history textbooks, and from without, in the civilisational narratives of the East and West in British textbooks. In the Turkish and Greek cases, the most salient factor that differentiates the constructions of the national histories and others, we argued, is the emphasis placed on the national territory and the national time. Following a chronicle of nearly uninterrupted Greekness from the ancient Hellenes to the contemporary Greeks, history textbooks in Greece establish a cultural continuum, albeit tarnished by Easternness as a result of Ottoman Rule, and embrace Byzantium as Christian, while identifying the Ottomans/Turks as the primary other. The Turkish textbooks locate national history in a procession of state-building ventures, each with its discrete territorial –and cultural– dominion, and with precise beginnings and ends. In this narrative, while Byzantium is neglected as yet another collapsing Empire, the Ottoman state is simultaneously celebrated as an example

of successful state-building and rendered as an other when it comes to the story of the contemporary Turkish nation-state. For British textbooks, Byzantium exposes the Easternness of an otherwise European Greece of Hellenic heritage and distances Greece from a British history that is European. The Ottoman Empire, despite recognition of its civilisational achievements, solidly resides in the East and epitomises the other of Europe.

The national narratives that we outlined here are of course neither uniform nor consistent. The conflictual accounts are abound and conceptualisations of harmonious national identities and singular others are hard to maintain. The national pasts converge in mutually occupied territories and by way of mutually experienced events, and inadvertently reveal shared legacies and produce common representations.

Moreover, textbooks are continually revised and the narratives of the national pasts and others are recast as the trajectories of nation shifts. In recent years, there have been uneasy but steady changes in the relations between Greece and Turkey (perhaps prompted and facilitated by the crises in the Balkans, but more importantly by Turkey's formal advancement toward European Union membership and the Greek Government's decision to not blockade this). One of the important consequences of this thawing of the strained relations has been the attempts to clean the textbooks from disparaging depictions of the national others. In particular, as Europe has increasingly become an official reference point, with Greece's actual and Turkey's potential membership, these attempts have become more pronounced. On the one hand, the aspirations for a 'proper European' status have fostered (local and regional) intellectual debate on the validity of the historical assumptions and approaches that underlie history education in both countries, which has already resulted in the incorporation and implementation of some significant changes in textbooks. On the other hand, the more marginal status of both countries vis-à-vis Europe creates possibilities for accentuating common heritages in the Balkan and Mediterranean margins of Europe. Britain is not immune from the effects of Europeanisation either. While increasing the national content of history education in the name of reacting to the infringements of Europe (as displayed in the recent curricular changes introduced), Britain, following a more global trend in history teaching (towards a humanist, world history), nonetheless normalises its national canon and turns its others into civilisational counterparts.

No doubt, the realisation of a sensible, not-nationally biased history education will require a strong (political) will on both the Eastern and the Western sides of Europe, and will take more than random, dis-united rapprochements between countries. Nevertheless, it seems that the road to reform and improvements has been opened.

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## Dealing with Ottoman past in Greek Chronicles

PINELOPI STATHI

IT IS COMMON PRACTICE to complain about history textbooks and the effect they have on young schoolchildren, written in an old-fashioned, unchangeable monotonous way<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps the time has come to search for reasons even in front of history textbook writers.

The scientific formation of history textbook writers depends mostly on reading and evaluating the so-called source books. While composing history textbooks, writers have a great number of source material in front of them, thus they should be able to select the material which can offer them subjective information in order to write books which will be both instructive and challenging. They have to research older source material and not repeat the same stereotypes about neighbouring countries that can be found in book after book.

Since the Ottoman past is common for both Greek and Turkish people, our main topic here is the Ottoman-Greek relations during the years of the Ottoman rule. Manuscripts and printed books referring to the common past in Greek-Turkish history give excellent knowledge of historical events and can serve as a solid basis for school history textbook writing. It is in these books that we can trace the way the Ottoman past was treated.

In the catalogues of Greek manuscripts, we often find manuscripts entitled *History from the beginning of the world*, *History of the Ottoman sultans, starting from Osman*, *History of Mehmet the second*, *History of Suleiman the magnificent* etc. The texts of these manuscripts are historical and are included in the so-called chronicles, or as they are known by the special term *εφημερίδες*, i.e. gazettes. The practice of the gazettes starts from the 17th c. and is widely spread in the 18th c. when they can be placed among chronicles and memoirs or we could even

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<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps necessary to say that history textbooks in Greece are produced according to the one book system approved by the Ministry of Education.

say that they are very similar to journalists' reports. These texts, together with the correspondence<sup>2</sup>, could help us understand the thoughts and the psychology of the scholars of the 17th and 18th c.

The writers usually start the historical narrative from the ancient years and they focus their interest on the events of their time. The events are given chronologically and sometimes day by day. The writer often keeps himself at bay and relates the events without making any comments, like a professional, impartial narrator. So, we find ourselves in front of a reporters text without emotionally loaded epithets and characterising expressions.

The interesting thing about this type of text is that the writers were usually high dignitaries of the church, or even of the palace, and described the events of the empire, that is to say the political intrigues, the changes in the throne of the Sultans, the battle campaigns etc.

Greek historiography is rich in these kinds of texts and in this short presentation I will try to refer to the most important of them selecting those which are considered most accurate.

Ioannis Karyofyllis<sup>3</sup>, official of the Great Church in Istanbul, wrote his *Ephemerides* about the events of the years 1676 to 1689. (I give a short example, which reports the ascension to the throne of Suleiman the Second 1687-1691).

*October 29.* The padishah sultan Mehmet<sup>4</sup> was captured by the ocağas, and his place was overtaken by his brother Suleiman who became Padishah, and this was announced by messengers all over the town, and so peace was established. It was said that the former padishah was put into the old palace; others say that the same day on which he was enthroned on the so called taht, he wrote with his own hand a hat-i sherif according to which he (the former padishah) should live in the tower together with their other brother, in this same tower where he himself had lived during the thirty-nine years of Mehmet's reign.

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<sup>2</sup> This refers to the numerous selections of letters written by and to the scholars and dignitaries of that time.

<sup>3</sup> Ioannis Karyofyllis was born in Constantinople in 1610 and died in 1693 in Bucharest. He was a teacher in the patriarchal school in Constantinople and high dignitary of the Greek Church. He also served in several high positions in the court of the prince of Wallachia.

<sup>4</sup> Mehmet IV, 1648-1687.

*November 2.* They brought his wives in the old palace and they sent his female slaves out of the palace so that they could get married.

They strangled the kaimakam named Redgep pasha and they threw him out in the yard of the palace, after cutting his fingers, and his nose and his ears.

The fleet arrived from the White Sea<sup>5</sup>

In a time when even in Greek writing the printed periodicals were unknown<sup>6</sup>, the circulation of short news stories of that kind was a very important matter, although it is true that sometimes the Ephemerides presented the image of a local newspaper with a variety of picturesque news stories.

Almost the same period is related by another dignitary of the Ottoman court and the Greek patriarchal court, the famous and very learned Alexandros Mavrokordatos<sup>7</sup>, who was a witness for most of the events during the years 1682-1687 which he relates. The text is entitled «Stories by Alexandros Mavrokordatos» it is written in the form of a diary and contains chronologically the diplomatic, political and military events of the Ottoman Porte with many details. However, the writer mostly describes the two campaigns to Austria in which he participated as a translator, and the events before and after them.

In 1682, April 1, the internuncio of Austria Albitros Kaprara, entered Constantinople and he was welcomed by Mehmet efendi, together with some sergeants. He went down to Aivansaray and

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<sup>5</sup> Ioannis Karyofyllis, "Ephemerides", *Deltion tis Istorikis ke Ethnologikis Etai-reias*, 3 (1890-1891), pp. 275-315 (in Greek).

<sup>6</sup> The first printed newspaper in the Greek world is the one edited by the brothers Markides Pouliou from the city of Kozani in northern Greece, entitled *I Ephemeris*, and published in 1791 in Vienna. (In the year 1784 a small newspaper had dared to appear by the publishing house of Vendotis in Vienna but was shut down after two months): *Ephemeris*, Vienna 1791-1797, Akadimia Athinon Kentron Erevnis tou Mesaionikou kai Neou Ellinismou, v.1-6, Athens 1995.

<sup>7</sup> Alexandros Mavrokordatos, 1641-1709. Mostly learned dignitary of the Great Church in Constantinople. Doctor of medicine and philosophy, teacher in the patriarchal school in Constantinople, due to his great knowledge of many languages he became the official translator of the Ottoman Court. He took active part in the negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and Austria during the reign of *Suleiman III*. His diplomatic skills gave him the title of *muharrem esrar* (the secret secretary).

embarked in small ships that were ordered by the residente and they came to Kurucheshme, where they took residence in the house of Georgios Kantakouzinios. They gave him a support of four thousand silver coins <sup>8</sup> [...]

On Monday 23<sup>rd</sup> August, during the whole night, the Germans were strongly attacking the walls of Budin, thus they destroyed those walls in some places and in other they caused underground explosions and destroyed them as well. They flocked to the city from everywhere, and those who were inside struggled with all their forces to drive them out throwing them off over the walls, pushing them back with any kind of tools or instruments they had at hand[...]

The narrative is very vivid and detailed and it ends with a list of viziers and pashas who were lost in the German-Venetian and Polish war.

The chronicle written by Athanasios Komnenos Ypsilantis is entitled *Twelve books about the ecclesiastical and the Political affairs, i.e. The events after the Siege of Constantinople*, commonly known as "The events after the Siege" (*Τα μετά την Αλωσιν*). Komnenos Ypsilantis, born in Trebizond, was an official in the court of the vizier Ragip Mehmet Pasha and a rival to translator Grigorios Ghika; he was also the personal physician of Ragip Pasha. With his high knowledge he contributed to many important state affairs. The manuscript of this work was found in the Monastery of St. Catherine in Sinai. From the twelve books, nine are unpublished and we learn that those books were written while he was serving Ragip Pasha in Aydin, Edessa, Halep and Istanbul. His chronicle is very detailed and contains initially the events which have interest for the Greek orthodox people of the empire (that is to say there are news stories about the dignitaries of the Great Church, and the clergymen) and secondly the events of the Empire and its officials. The whole work starts from the very beginning of the world, i.e. the creation but books 8, 9 and 10 contain the events of the years between 1453-1789. These three books were published in Istanbul in 1870 and are considered by some scholars as real Ottoman chronicles

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<sup>8</sup> A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Documente Privitoare Istoria Romanilor*, v.XIII, Bucharest 1909, p. 3.

since the narration is very detailed, vivid and long-lasting. Hereunder I submit a passage concerning the rebellion of Patrona Halil<sup>9</sup>.

Sultan Mahmut abolishes the bedaat tax after the request of Patrona. Mehmet pasha, who was Sultan Ahmet's former silahtar, now occupies the post of the vizier. Patrona sends a request to the commissioner for his friend butcher Iannakis, in order to promote him to the post of prince of Wallach, and that was done. But soon after, Patrona himself killed him because he didn't pay him the promised sum of money in time. Inside the palace, they - Patrona, Muslu and Ali - were killed together with all the people who entered the palace with them and all the people who were standing in the inner yard, because the doors of the imperial palace had been closed. And those who were zorbas were caught and killed day and night, daily. They say that the method of killing the zorbas was initiated by Kabakulak who was brought here from Egypt<sup>10</sup>.

Constantinos Karatzas, being a secretary in the court of the princes in Wallachia thus had the opportunity to watch the events from up close, so he undertook the role of the official chronicler of the court and kept a kind of diary for a rather long period of time, between 1777-1811. In the following passage from the year 1780, the narration is about the deeds of the vizier and the sultan of the time.

During that time the commissioner was the famous and very well known Kara-vizier<sup>11</sup>, who was prior to that, the All Mighty Sultan Hamit's<sup>12</sup> silahtar. He kept the reins of the government, in that time beautifully, and started putting order in everything, and the laws ruled the whole state. All the people had to be obedient to the sultans; commandments and plundering and injustice had almost disappeared. All that happened because he himself took care of all the state affairs and he elaborated them carefully. He had

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<sup>9</sup> Patrona Halil, an Albanian Janissary caused the rebellion in the Ottoman State, which marked the end of the Tulip Period in 1730. Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire 1208-1808*, Cambridge 1976, p. 240.

<sup>10</sup> Athanasios Komnenos Ypsilantis, *Ta Meta tin Alosin*, (1453-1789), Constantinople 1870, p. 330

<sup>11</sup> It is about grand vizier Izzet Mehmet who had occupied the same post before, namely in 1774.

<sup>12</sup> Abd, lhamit I, 1774-1789.

lawful and trustworthy spies everywhere from which he was informed of the truth<sup>13</sup>.

Another group of chronicles from the same years is the chronicles written by monks, priests and bishops or patriarchs. These texts mostly deal with the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Church, but at the same time they report the chief events of the Empire. In this group, we can include the *History of the Patriarchs of Jerusalem* written by the patriarch of Jerusalem Dositheos<sup>14</sup>. This very important work is composed by twelve books; it starts in the years of Iakovos, a disciple of Jesus, who is said to be the founder of the patriarchal throne of Jerusalem, and continues until the days of the writer i.e. the first years of the 18th c. The whole work was published in 1715 by his nephew and heir Chry-santhos, who succeeded him on the patriarchal throne (1707-1730). The content of this chronicle is mostly about the different Christian nations, their controversies, and their struggle to gain supremacy over the Holy Sepulchre and the shrines in Jerusalem; still, as the writer deals with the events within the Ottoman territory, we find information about the sultans and the Ottoman dignitaries. An example of this is given below.

You must know that when bishop Païsios was in Iberia (...) In the kingdom of the Ottomans defterdar was Ibrahim Pasha (who became latter official of Egypt) his younger brother named Velli (whom Köprülü killed, because when he was pasha in Sivas he was very unjust), was official in Jerusalem, but he was barbarian in the manners and idiot, and he was so unjust both towards Ottomans and Christians that since the Ottomans had conquered Jerusalem and even before, no one has appeared being so unjust<sup>15</sup>.

The narrative continues with the deeds of Velli pasha, who was often drunk describing the way he hanged some monks, and the sacrilege he committed in the Orthodox Church by not venerating the sanctities.

In this work we can observe something which gives an idea of

<sup>13</sup> A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Documente Privitoare Istoria Romanilor*, v.XIII, Bucharest 1909, p. 114.

<sup>14</sup> Dositheos 1641-1709, patriarch of Jerusalem, known for his strong anti-Catholic struggle and his activity for the better maintenance of the Holy places.

<sup>15</sup> *Istoria peri ton en Ierosolymois patriarheusanton*, (History of the patriarchs in Jerusalem), b. 11-12, Thessaloniki 1983, p. 131 (in Greek).

how the Greek scholars composed their books. In the 11th book of this work, the writer treats the historical events, which are related to the state of Greek Orthodox after the fall of Constantinople. When this work was published in 1715, the publisher Archbishop of Jerusalem Chrysanthos found it more convenient to omit some passages, like the one we read above, as being offensive and harsh for the Ottomans.

In this same group of religious chronicles we find the *History of religious world* of Nektarios, patriarch of Jerusalem, which apart from the detailed account of the affairs of the Church of Jerusalem he deals with the time of Selim, in the 16th c. (1512-1520). In the fifth chapter of this book we read a rather astonishing subtitle: "About the confirmation of peace which Selim sent to the Christian Sovereigns and the extermination of five little children and his brother Horouth for whom he always had suspicions".

In the meantime, in order to keep peace with all the Western countries and not have any trace of suspicion left behind him in passing through Anatolia, and marching against his brother, he sent messengers to the Venetians confirming the peace, which his father had established with them. He even sent messengers to the king of Hungary, Vladislau, and the king of Poland, Sigismund, and all of them gladly accepted his expression of fondness. Later, in order to avoid trouble with the Ottomans, he ordered to kill the five little children of his dead brothers...<sup>16</sup>

The enumeration of chronicles could take a rather long time; therefore, I tried to present those which are most important and representative of different kinds of writing in order to come to some conclusions.

In the chronicles of the 17th and 18th c. Ottomans, namely sultans, pashas and high officials are presented without any contempt, the evaluation of their personality is done under ethical criteria, in the same manner as Greek Orthodox officials and dignitaries are evaluated. The different historical events are recorded with the impartial reporters way without any analysis. The writers try to give a truthful image of the period and the people involved in the different state affairs. Though it

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<sup>16</sup> *Epitomi Ierokosmikis Istorias*, Patriarhou Ierosolymon Nektariou, Athens 1980, p. 354.

seems that everything is perfect, subjective, impartial etc., we have to keep in mind that most of the writers, as I mentioned above, were officials of the Ottoman court, servants of their masters, *rayas*. It is nearly impossible to expect a free expression of their feelings in their writings, a critical attitude against the acts of several persons. The feeling of survival guided their hands in writing the events without making any comments. This form of narrative changed after the French revolution and in the 19th c., when the Greeks began to gain national consciousness and the texts were reflecting the negative attitude towards the ruler.

‘Tyranny’ and ‘Despotism’  
as National and Historical Terms  
in Greek Historiography

SIA ANAGNOSTOPOULOU

THE TERMS AND EXPRESSIONS, used to shape the collective view of a nation and sometimes of the entire world, always constitute an important historical problem. This is due to the fact that, while these terms are historical, i.e. their content is defined in the context of a particular historical space and time, they nevertheless acquire a national function in the context of the re-organisation of the past, according to the needs of a nation. The historical words and expressions are hence deprived of their historicity.

Their content is not defined in the context of a historical space but rather in the context of a national time or immemorial time. As a result, the nation and its values are not shaped through a dialectical relationship with the historical time but exist from immemorial time in an immobile time. A nation and its values are not political phenomena, but notions that remain unchanged through time.

I shall take Greek historiography as an example of this and attempt to follow the development of historical terms such as ‘tyranny’, ‘tyrant’, ‘despot’, ‘despotism’, ‘freedom’ etc. during the Ottoman era. I will try to illustrate how these terms are completely deprived of their historicity when activated in a national context or even in the broader context of ‘the world of the East’. The reason why I am focusing on these terms is because they are of enormous significance to Greek history. Their national use, which is in opposition to historical reality, has resulted in a construction that has given rise to a Greek nation, which is not a political phenomenon but a sacred creation. In Greek national historiography the Ottoman era has been regarded as a period of tyranny and slavery for the Greek nation. It has been a period of vicious and inhumane slavery, which lasted for four centuries, during which the

Greeks lost every sense of civilisation, as they were subjugated to brutality. The greatest moment in Greek history is, certainly, the Revolution of 1821, when the Greeks revolted against the rulers to win their freedom. Thus, in the context of the national history of the Greek nation from antiquity to the present, we can notice the presence of a gap, a discontinuity, which is the result of the Ottoman tyranny. The characteristic expression often used to refer to this period, not only in school-books, but even in scholarly books, is ‘under the Turkish yoke’.

The question that arises in relation to the Ottoman era and the way it is presented in Greek national historiography is twofold. On the one hand, it concerns when and why the Ottoman era was considered as a tyranny. In other words, which was the historical reality in the context of which the Ottoman Empire was defined as a tyrannical regime, from which the Greeks had to liberate themselves? On the other hand, is the same content always attached to the terms ‘tyranny’, ‘despotism’ etc. irrespectively of time and space, or is there a historical period during which their content changes resulting in a reversal and giving a different course to the history of the region? Surely the words exist in the Greek language from immemorial time. What we are interested in, however, is the historical content of the words and their function in the context of the different historical periods and different regions. We know that the terms ‘tyranny’, and, especially, ‘despotism’ acquire the Aristotelian sense in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century and mainly in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Through this sense they define a political regime where the social and political slavery co-exist under the rule of a tyrant or despot. With his work *L’Esprit des Lois* (1748), Montesquieu establishes the term despotism in the European political thought attaching the Aristotelian sense to it. The Ottoman Empire is hence defined as a despotic authority *par excellence*.

Since these terms acquire this particular content in the European context at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it is worth considering how they have developed in the course of the Greek history. ‘The Great Ruler’, ‘despot’ or better yet ‘tyrant’ are some of the terms used by Greeks to refer to Ottomans in general during the Ottoman era. But who exactly were the Greeks we are referring to and in which sense were they using these terms? To begin, the patriarchal circles, the church hierarchy which becomes incorporated in the mechanisms of the Ottoman power after the Fall of Constantinople (1453), almost exclu-

sively uses in official documents the expression 'the Great Ruler' and sometimes the word 'Despot' to refer to the Ottoman ruler. These words do not in any case have the same content as that in the era of the Enlightenment. In contrast, in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century these words are more neutral, reflecting the divine order on earth. They are therefore words with a rather sacred content. It is for this reason that the same words, 'Ruler' and 'Despot' are used to refer to the patriarch. 'Our ruler and despot, the ecumenical Patriarch' are expressions frequently occurring in the texts of the Ottoman era.<sup>1</sup> The reason why these terms have an almost sacred content is because the church circles, consisting not only of hierarchs but also of several secular people who are also incorporated into the Ottoman rule, saw in the Ottomans the existence of a divine order. In a theocratic world, where order on earth constituted a reflection of the divine order, this group of Greeks considered the subjugation of the Christian Orthodox to the Ottomans as God's Will.

For this theocratic world, in which the struggle of good against evil prevails, the devil is not represented by the Ottomans but by the Latins. As far as the Christian Orthodox people are concerned, the Catholics represent absolute evil. The Patriarch of Jerusalem, quoting Frantzis the Logothetis, holds in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century<sup>2</sup> that «popery constitutes the worst cause for the Fall of Constantinople» since the Orthodox people wished to unite with the Catholics. In this view, the Ottomans are the lesser of two evils and even represent the good, since God sent them in order for the Orthodox faith to be saved. Alexander Mavrokordatos, grand drogman of the Ottoman Porte during the 17<sup>th</sup> century, describes the situation as follows:

the interests of the Orthodox people can be served by the Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that voluntary slavery is a major evil, sometimes this evil can transform into a major benefit, which is synonymous with autonomy.<sup>3</sup>

This perception of good versus evil, in theocratic terms, amongst the Greeks who were incorporated in the Ottoman rule forces them to

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<sup>1</sup> N. Tomadakis, *Byzantina kai Metabyzantina*, Athens 1978, p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Dositheos, Patriarch of Jerusalem, *About the Patriarchs of Jerusalem*, book XI, Athens 1983, p. 10, (1<sup>st</sup> ed.: Bucharest, 1715).

<sup>3</sup> C. Amantos, «Alexander Mavrokordatos (1641-1709)», *Ellinika*, v. 5(1932), pp. 335-350, p. 342.

consider the Ottoman order as a reflection of divine order on earth. In this context, the expressions used to describe the Great Sultan acquire a content that reflects God's wisdom, which arranges the Ottoman order. The Greek words 'despot' and 'ruler' correspond to this perception. It is a perception that is formulated during the Enlightenment through an ideological movement represented by this church and secular circles placed under the Ottoman authority. This ideology is in direct opposition with another, which is inspired from a different world view.

Extracts are following from a patriarchal text, entitled «Patriki Didaskalia» (Fatherly Exhortation), written by the Patriarchates and published in 1798 among the Orthodox population in order to save them from the 'infecting' ideas of the French Revolution. Through this text we follow the formulation of this world view that seeks to legitimise its struggle against the principles of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution through the Orthodox past, a past which legitimises the subjugation of the Orthodox people to the Ottoman state. According to the text:

Ever since his Fall from Paradise, the Devil has not ceased to lure people towards sin and illusion. Hence, aiming at the loss of the Orthodox people, he presented in the West a new heresy, that of Catholicism. [...] Through this heresy he managed to charm the West [...]. Nevertheless, God has shown His endless love to us, the Orthodox people and He has wisely prepared our salvation. He elevated in this way the kingdom of the Ottomans, replacing ours, the Roman, which has sinned against the Orthodox faith. Therefore God placed the kingdom of the Ottomans above the rest, on the one hand, in order to show that this kingdom is the result of God's will, rather than human power and, on the other hand, to confirm that in this way He wishes to save His chosen people. He therefore placed this higher kingdom above us so that it may constitute a barrier for the people of the West and a salvation for us, the Eastern people. <sup>4</sup>

During the Ottoman period an ideology under construction makes its appearance, through which several values are expressed. The most

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<sup>4</sup> Ad. Koraes, *Adelphiki Didaskalia (Brotherly Exhortation)*, and *Patriki Didaskalia (Fatherly Exhortation)*, Constantinople 1789, edited by G. Valetas: *Adelphiki Didaskalia (Brotherly Exhortation)*, Athens 1949, pp. 28-29.

prominent are the following: there is no conception of a Greek nation which is defined in secular terms and in relation to a secular time and space. In contrast, the concept of a flock does exist, the authority of which rests outside this world, in heaven. The sultan, as Despot or Ruler, guarantees the divine order on earth.

Apart from this first ideology, another one, which also takes shape in the Ottoman era, can be found. This will take its shape during the 18<sup>th</sup> century and especially in the period of the Enlightenment. It is represented mainly by Greeks who live in Italy and especially in Venice during the 15<sup>th</sup>–16<sup>th</sup> century and later on in Europe and in particular in Paris, Amsterdam etc. From as early as the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Greeks of Venice mostly use the terms ‘tyrant’ and ‘tyranny’ to refer to the Ottomans, while reference is also made to the slavery of Greeks. Is it possible that the terms this group of Greeks use from as early as the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century have the Aristotelian content that will be attached to them in the 18<sup>th</sup> century? In other words, is it possible that these Greeks recognise the existence of a Greek nation, which will be politically shaped and will lose its political freedom because of the Ottoman tyranny? A careful study of the texts in light of the historical period in which they were written leads us to the conclusion that the expressions ‘tyranny’ and ‘tyrant’ do not have the same content as that of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. They rather refer to a regime and a monarch who possesses authority in an arbitrary way, in the sense that this regime presents some «propriétés distinctives», as Montesquieu later described them. These «distinctive features» appear as elements of a system that is foreign to the values and beliefs governing the system of the world of Venice. The latter constitutes a model in the eyes of the Greeks. The Greeks of Italy, having lived under an aristocratic regime in Italy in the period of the Renaissance and the period of the discovery of Ancient Greece, see in the Ottoman system the expression of an anomaly. This anomaly concerns firstly the political level since the Ottoman system is foreign to that of the Italian cities. The latter constitute the rebirth of Athens. In the «Hymn to Plato,»<sup>5</sup> Markos Mousouros encourages the ancient philosopher to visit Rome where he could meet «many of his followers, intellectual people with many virtues. » For the Greeks of Italy,

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<sup>5</sup> E. Voutieridis, *History of the Neohellenic Literature from the mid 15<sup>th</sup> century to the contemporary years* (in Greek), vol. 1, Athens, 1924, pp. 284 ff.

Rome and Venice constitute the precursors of their own New Rome.

The second anomaly of the Ottoman system according to the Greeks of Italy occurs at the level of order on earth. The Ottoman rule is tyrannical because it occupies Greece, which is inhabited by Orthodox people. The term 'Greece' refers to a geographical space, not a political entity. When referring to Greece, we are talking about the land of Ancient Greece. Therefore the Ottomans have neither the political nor the religious right to occupy this land. It is not surprising that Marikos Mousouros in the «Hymn to Plato» visualises a European Crusade which will send an army «against the lawless nations, those vicious wolves who have occupied the land of Achaia and now seek to occupy the Iapygia land, in order to enslave all Christians and thus erase Virgin Mary's name [...]»<sup>6</sup> The union of Ancient Greece and Christianity is prominent in the texts of the Greeks of Italy. Inspired by those texts in the late 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Greeks refer to a tyrannical Ottoman rule in the sense of a barbarian, uncivilised authority which keeps the Christian Orthodox people under its power. According to another excerpt «[...] the Greek people, today under slavery, need to be reminded of the ancient virtues and strike the enemy from within, in order to gain freedom.»<sup>7</sup> The Greeks thus recognise an order on earth, in which the absolute evil is represented by the Ottomans, while the good is represented by the civilised, Christian West.

This ideology takes shape during the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century but it will take its final shape in the period of the Enlightenment. It is in this period that the words 'tyrant' and 'tyranny' will acquire their modern, political content. In the same way that Europe rediscovered Aristotle, even though it had been suffering for years from religious and political conflicts, the Greeks similarly rediscover Aristotle through engaging in a continuous dialogue with the ideological and philosophical movements of Europe. While the adjective 'despotic' (*δεσποτικός*) already exists defining nouns such as *governo*, *dominio*, *autorita*, it is not until the late 17<sup>th</sup> century that despotism is invented. Therefore, the European political thought inscribes in its vocabulary the word 'despotism' in the Aristotelian sense in order to define contemporary rather than ancient regimes.

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

The historical period during which the Ottoman Sultan was defined by the Greeks as a despot is that of the Enlightenment. The word used in Greek is 'tyrant' (*τύραννος*). The first important texts using the term 'Ottoman Tyranny' and urging the Greeks to revolt against it are «Nea Politiki Dioekisi» (New Political Regimen), written by Rhigas Pheraios, who was sentenced to death in 1798, «Adelfiki Didaskalia» (Brotherly Exhortation), written by Adamantios Koraes in 1798 and «Elliniki Nomarchia» (Hellenic Regime), written in 1809 by an anonymous writer. The Greek representatives of the Enlightenment, who were clearly influenced by the spirit and the beliefs of the French Revolution, have attempted through their writings to set the foundations of a new nation. This was the Greek nation, which would shape its system of values, on the one hand, through opposition to the Ottoman rule and, on the other hand, by engaging in a dialogue with the European values of the Enlightenment. Thus, the values of this national entity are defined through the struggle against tyranny and through a dialectical relationship with the European values. These are the products of a particular historical reality. The Ottoman regime is tyrannical because it is not founded, according to those texts, on the Constitution and the Laws. As Koraes maintains, «the laws are nothing but the unanimous public opinion of the people, and the opinion of the people represents the Will of God.»<sup>8</sup> From the moment the Ottoman regime is defined as tyrannical «the Greeks have the inalienable right to break the chains of tyranny and enjoy the great gift of freedom.»<sup>9</sup> In this context the Ottoman regime is tyrannical because it does not recognise political freedom: «True freedom exists only in the power every citizen has [...] to act as he wanted to act when he first united with his co-citizens in a political society.»<sup>10</sup> In sum, according to the representatives of the Enlightenment, in order for the Greeks to exist as a nation, they would first need to obtain political freedom. Only political freedom would guide them to national freedom. The revolution was synonymous with overthrowing tyranny, synonymous with equality, as well as with political and hence national freedom. In the light of these principles of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the Greek representatives of the Enlightenment define the absolutist, theocratic Ottoman regime as tyranny. It is in this context that they urge the Greeks to revolt against

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<sup>8</sup> Ad. Koraes, *Adelphiki Didaskalia*, op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

those who legitimise the Ottoman absolutism. They urge them to revolt against the hierarchy of the church, in other words, against the Patriarchate. A short extract is following from the countless writings of the representatives of the Enlightenment, through which they attack the Hierarchy of the Orthodox Church.

You, Hierarchs of the Holy Synod of Constantinople, do you not know that tyranny is despised by God and by humans? How can you present it to Greeks as a benefit? You are neither shepherds, nor leaders to the light; you are but wolves, you are nothing but the source of darkness. Liars and hypocrites, that is what you are (Elliniki Nomarchia).

The opposite ideology, which opposes the principles of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, describes freedom as follows:

In our times the devil has come up with another deception, the concept of Freedom which is an alluring plan of the devil, so that nations are led to destruction and disorder.<sup>11</sup>

It is precisely for this reason that the Patriarchate publishes some texts among the Orthodox circles, which state the following, among other things: «Brothers, close your ears to these foolish hopes of freedom. Keep firmly the traditional faith to Christ and the submission to the Ottoman political administration.»<sup>12</sup> Apart from this, in a Patriarchal letter of 1798, the Patriarch does not hesitate to state that the believers in Greece deserve death through the Turkish sword, while the demand for freedom equals rebellion against God and blatant atheism.

What we realise then through the study of such texts, which were written in the age of the Enlightenment, is that the term tyranny acquired a political and national function in the context of a world which was about to be overthrown. We find ourselves at the crossing over from the theocratic age to modernity. This is the transition from ethno-religious entities, subjugated under a theocratic rule, to national entities, characterised by political freedom. The term tyranny thus emerges out of the conflict between the old and the new world.

As a result, the term ‘Ottoman tyranny’ primarily responds to the

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<sup>11</sup> *Patriki Didaskalia*, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

demands of the age of the Enlightenment. During this period, the Greek nation had to gather its strength against all representatives of tyranny (both the Ottoman rule and the leaders of the Orthodox Church), so as to shape its values in the light of the revolution for liberty. The term 'Ottoman tyranny' however was and still is reproduced nowadays in an entirely different manner in the writing of the national history. It has been deprived of its historical roots, its sources and the historical reality from which it emerged and is reproduced as a term that lies outside time and history. Hence, the Ottoman Empire is presented as a tyrannical regime from its inception, for which Greeks had always been aware of its tyranny and slavery. This implies that the Greeks have always existed as a nation; their conscience had always been revolting against the Ottoman tyranny, but it was not until 1821, when the conditions were right, that they managed to liberate themselves. Furthermore, according to the national historiography, since the Greeks had always been conscious of the Ottoman tyranny and their identity as a nation, and since the leaders of the Church (and thus of the Greek nation) have always opposed tyranny, it is the latter who are responsible for preserving the Greekness of Greeks.

It would be useful at this point to consider just a few of the contradictions upon which the national historiography is founded in order to realise how bluntly history has been abused by the national historiography. If the term 'Ottoman tyranny' is historically priceless for the age of the Enlightenment, this is precisely because the representatives of the Enlightenment attempt to define a nation in a historical time and space through this very term. In this attempt, they try to overthrow the old world. Therefore, from the point of view of the representatives of the Enlightenment, the Greek nation is defined and defines its values according to the relationship that begins to develop between the Greek nation and its existence in a historical time and space. For the representatives of the Enlightenment, the Greek nation is historically defined: there was a point in the past when the nation had not been aware of its existence and there came a point in the future when the nation became aware of it through its struggle with the Ottoman Empire. The Greek Revolution of 1821 is a major event precisely because it is inscribed as part of this process. Greek historiography, however, uses the term 'Ottoman tyranny' in such a way that it repeals the essence of the Greek Revolution, and thus eventually repealing the essence of the Greek his-

tory itself. Instead of being born through a revolution, the Greek nation is considered as a divine nation that exists outside time and space. While for the representatives of the Enlightenment, the Greeks are those who came and will come to *the Greek territory to fight or dwell* there, for the national historiography the Greeks are those who have always had the same values, i.e. those who are Orthodox and have from immemorial time regarded Turks as national enemies. It is needless to refer to other contradictions that undermine history, such as the claim that the Patriarchate helped to preserve the Greekness of Greeks, which overlooks the fact that the Patriarchate was an Ottoman institution etc.

What we eventually realise with regard to the use of the term ‘Ottoman tyranny’ and many other similar terms is that in the national historiography, this term has become autonomous from the historical period during which it was used. It is completely dissociated from its historical context and has ended up being a term that bears absolutely no relation to history. It does not respond to the needs of a particular period, but to the ideological needs of the eternal nation. The conclusion is not that some of the terms used in the national historiography should be eradicated, but that it is essential for Greek national historiography to bear a close relation to history.

From Trauma to Self-Reflection:

Greek Historiography meets the Young Turks  
"Bizarre" Revolution\*

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## VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

THE IMAGES ILLUSTRATING the enthusiasm and hope following the Young Turks movement are well known. In the urban centers, in particular, the parades involving not only the Muslim community, but also the Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish ones, have been the central theme in the accounts describing the events of that period. A corpus of similar texts which were produced later, sometimes much later, by individuals who participated in those developments, take as their starting point those celebrations. However, this happy period did not last for long. The cheerful colors were succeeded by dark ones and the dream turned into a nightmare.

The aim of this paper is, firstly, to follow the major themes in narratives produced by figures of that period which, even if not *stricto sensu* historiographical, provide a framework of meaning through which later generations will find their path. The second part will be a brief account of the historiographical reconstruction of the period in the academic field, today. The focus will be mainly on the last decade, during which we can trace a shift of paradigm.

**i. Who is to blame?**

The people who described the events of 1908 and the aftermath had

been, in most cases, personally involved in the political controversies, often by taking different sides. The texts we have found are those of Ap. Alexandris, *Πολιτικά Αναμνήσεις* (Political Memoirs), Patrai, 1940, A. Benaroya, *Η πρώτη σταδιοδρομία του Ελληνικού προλεταριάτου* (The first career of the Greek proletariat), Athens 1977, Em. Emmanoulidis, *Τα τελευταία έτη της Αυτοκρατορίας*, (The last years of the Ottoman Empire), Athens, 1924, A. Ch. Chamoudopoulos, *Ελληνισμός και Νεότουρκοι* (Hellenism and the Young Turks) Salonica, 1926, and, *Η Νέα Φιλική Εταιρεία* (The New 'Philiki Etaireia'), Athens, 1946, M. Christodoulidis, *Το Σύνταγμα εν Τουρκία και τα προνόμια του Ελληνισμού* (The Constitution in Turkey and the Privileges of Hellenism), Athens 1908, Ion Dragoumis, *Όσοι ζωντανοί* (Those who were left alive), Athens, 1926, Dimitrios Georgiadis, *La regeneration de la Turquie, est-elle possible?*, Paris, 1909, Neoklis Kazazis, *Les Gres sous le Nouveau Régime Ottoman*, Paris, 1908, Pavlos Karolidis, *Λόγοι και Υπομνήματα* (Speeches and memoranda), Athens, 1913, Spyridon Mariolopoulos, *Οθωμανοί και Έλληνες* (Ottomans and Greeks), Athens, 1908, Athanassios Souliotis-Nicolaidis, *Οργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (Society of Constantinople) edited by C. Boura & T. Veremis, Athens, 1984, and *Σημειωματάριον* (Notebook), 1971, George Cléanthe Skalieris, *La Décentralisation et la Réforme Administrative*, Constantinople, 1911.

The attitude and the choices made by the different parts of the Greek-Orthodox community concerning of the politics Young Turks were not unanimous. However, this is not always mirrored in contemporary accounts. The agents, as it is usually the case in similar events, had a full picture of what followed the Revolution through the Balkan Wars and WWI up to the tragic conclusion of 1922. Therefore, they could impose on the events a meaning and an interpretation heavily influenced by its long term consequences. Furthermore, for them, remembering those events was a painful task, since a similar account constituted more or less the description of a defeat. The contextual time was, therefore, open only towards the past. The circle of events they described had been already concluded. Therefore, the textual time was similarly transformed in order to correspond in this *post factum* reorganisation of memory. The approach of the authors tended to be 'anachronistic'.

There is no doubt, in their view, that a lot of things went wrong.

What is at stake, though, is who was to blame. In that sense, the texts have an apologetic character and at the same time contribute to a preliminary investigation with historiographical claims but mainly with didactic purposes and, certainly, without any academic sensitivity. The accusations were partly addressed to opponents within the Greek-Orthodox community. However, the main attack targeted the Committee of Union and Progress.

Three points are worth mentioning here. Firstly, the major events or the main figures of the movement are only described in relation to either the author's activity or at least, as a background for the activity of the Greek-Orthodox community. Very often, one has the impression that the center of action and decision making is or should be the Greek-Orthodox community. The historical subject of these narrations could never have been the Unionist agents or the movement itself.

The second relative point is that, in most cases either by arrogance, or through the need of self-reassessment or both, the authors describe the aims of the Greek-Orthodox community quite bluntly. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine how they could expect that every other community, especially the Turkish Muslim one would sympathize with their expectations. As a matter of fact, the Unionist leadership strongly opposed the claims of the Greek-Orthodox community, which felt deeply frustrated and reacted abruptly.

However –and this is the third point– very soon, almost everybody in the community was convinced that all non-Muslim communities –the Greek-Orthodox "par excellence"– were victims of a vicious game, a fraud. The Young Turks had in their mind, from the very beginning, to eliminate every other community in the Empire by turcifying them and, in order to avoid immediate resistance, they used "Ottomanism" as a pretext. They could, that way, paralyse the inner structure of the communities and easily deprive them from their vigor. In this plot, all the good guys are only on the one side. Certainly, there are also some evil ones among 'us', but they are the ones who co-operated with the enemy.

## ii. Celebrating a defeat

In order to illustrate the points mentioned above, we will use as an example the study *Ελληνισμός και Νεότουρκοι, εθνική δράσις του υπόδουλου Ελληνισμού κατά την Νεοτουρκική περίοδον 1908-1912* (*Hellenism and Young Turks, national activity of the enslaved Hellen-*

*ism during the Young Turks era*) written by A. Ch. Chamoudopoulos, and published in Salonica, in 1926.

One of the main concerns of the writer is to defend the support given by the community to the CUP, not only at the outbreak of the movement, but also later during crucial debates in the Ottoman Parliament. He points out that Christians had many reasons to trust this movement, since the CUP included all liberal elements. The revolutionaries invited all nationalities, calling them to work together for the creation of an Eastern Empire. Common action was necessary in order to prevent intervention by the Great Powers, Russia and Austria in particular, who did not only threaten the integrity of Turkey, but also put in danger the status of its Christian communities. Towards that purpose, the Young Turks promised to protect all liberties of the non-Muslim communities:

Those were the promises given by the Young Turks, who managed to mislead the non-Turkish nationalities, the Greeks in particular, who being a Royal nation (βασιλείον γένος), in the areas of their national heritage, imagined that it would be possible to prevent a dismemberment of Turkey, which would be harmful for Hellenism, and to contribute to the creation of an Eastern State in which they would play a prominent role, due to their intellectual superiority and their economic and commercial prosperity. The developments proved they were wrong, but the future generations should not accuse them of being naïve, since when they (the Greeks) realised the danger, they revolted. This had as a result the initiation of understanding among the Christians of Turkey, which led to the turnover of the CUP and later to the Balkan coalition and the Balkan-Turkish War<sup>1</sup>.

Concerning the compulsory conscription policy, the writer defends the deputies who voted for the bill when the Unionists brought it to Parliament. They acted according to instructions of 'well-informed' circles. Moreover, the very existence of Christian soldiers within the Turkish army, contributed to its easier collapse during the Balkan War<sup>2</sup>.

The overt way in which the writer defends Greek choices, ends up

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<sup>1</sup> A. Ch. Chamoudopoulos *Ελληνισμός και Νεότουρκοι, εθνική δράσις του υπόδουλου Ελληνισμού κατά την Νεοτουρκική περίοδον 1908-1912* (Hellenism and Young Turks, national activity of the enslaved Hellenism during the Young Turks era), Salonica, 1926, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

justifying any activity to the benefit of the Greek side, projecting the warlike atmosphere of the Balkan Wars to the previous period. This is how, for instance, he describes Vassileio Gkika Mousouro, Minister of Post Offices in the Ottoman government during WWI.

An ideal Greek. The services he offered in the struggle were precious. Through his presence in the Turkish government, there was a Greek eye. Nothing could be done, no decision was taken in the Porte, unless the Greeks were informed about it and acted accordingly<sup>3</sup>.

Yet, it was not only the CUP to blame. There were also Greeks who followed the CUP, and they have no excuse for that:

Hence, the numerous Greeks, who followed the Committee cannot justify themselves towards History and the Nation. Even their claim that it was the attitude of the nationalities which irritated Young Turks, is abolished by the course of events. The nationalities only defended themselves against this or that action of the Unionists, who aimed at applying the program they had conceived long before, and there was nobody who could convince them to reconsider<sup>4</sup>.

But what is most important is the unity of the nation. Later on, the "numerous" collaborators are totally marginalised. The 'cowards and amphoterics' are not supposed to be more than a handful<sup>5</sup>.

However, the diversion of attitudes within the Greek-Orthodox community, was already mentioned in some of the texts of that period. A picture of this multitude of views is given, for instance, by Apostolos Alexandris, envoy of the Greek government, in his memoirs.

a chaos of opinions concerning the issues related to Hellenism. Most of the Istanbulites shaped their opinions, carried away by the friendly attitudes and democratic views of Prince Sabaheddin, others in an enthusiastically naïve manner, praised the real equality of the new state. I. Dragoumis, on the other hand, believed that the intellectual and material superiority of Hellenism would soon

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

impose itself on the reborn Empire. Bousios ended up supporting that Turkey, through the dispersion in the parliament of Greek views and political principles, would turn into a New Byzance<sup>6</sup>.

At the same time, the attitude towards Muslim Turks in general is ambiguous. On the one hand, the collaboration with the Party "Freedom and Understanding" directed by Prince Sabaheddin, creates the necessity of a more politically and less ethnically minded behavior. Accusations do not regard Turks in general, they are only addressed to Young Turks.

The rising resentment on the part of Christians against the Committee had repercussions among the Turkish people, who having with a lot of difficulty digested the newly appeared theories of Young Turks, could very well realise to which step the state was driven by its 'pro machina' saviors. Turk, even if illiterate, had developed a philosophy of the 'simple people' and could see where the situation would lead us. And he started reacting against his new masters<sup>7</sup>.

On the other hand, talking about the 'Freedom and Understanding' party, he cannot dissociate himself from stereotypes:

We do not know what would be the behavior of this new party towards Christians, if it dominated. Turks are always Turks<sup>8</sup>.

In any case, the outcome of the struggle is not presented at all as a defeat. The Christians, even if they did not manage to achieve the creation of a powerful Eastern State, contributed to the dissolution of European Turkey, according to the aspirations of their brotherly Balkan states, and not along the lines drawn by the Great Powers<sup>9</sup>.

It seems that the Young Turks Revolution and what followed has been a story of great misunderstanding. Different communities and social groups could only see in the movement the liberation from the autarchy of Abdulhamid and the fulfilment of all their aspirations. That's how Pavlos Karolidis<sup>10</sup>, a Greek deputy and at the same time History

<sup>6</sup> Apostolos Alexandris, *Πολιτικά αναμνήσεις*, (Political Memoirs), Patrai, 1940, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> Chamoudopoulos, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>10</sup> On Karolidis see more in Ch. Exertzoglou, «Shifting boundaries, language,

professor at the University of Athens described his own vision:

The new regime of the Ottoman state, outcome of the July Revolution opened the way for sincere cooperation between not only the peoples but also the states of the East and the Turks. This cooperation meant, in my view, the respect on the part of the Turks of all the rights and interests of Hellenism in Turkey, which would be for the benefit of the Turks themselves and the sincere and lawful behavior of the Ottoman Greeks. At the end, it meant the collaboration of the Greek and Turkish element against the Slavic one and at the same time the collaboration of the Greek and Turkish state for the protection of common interests<sup>11</sup>.

### iii. Dealing with stereotypes

The first more systematic historiographical approach coincides with the publication of the well-known 16th volume collective work *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους* (History of the Greek Nation) (the 17th volume was published last year). This publication was initiated in 1971 and aimed at creating a new, more elaborate and sophisticated ‘canon’ of Greek historiography, following the narrative of Paparrigopoulos, the ‘national historian’ of 19th c. The author of the part referring to the developments before the Balkan wars (the volume was published in 1977) was Thanos Veremis. Even if the framework provided for the understanding of the developments within Ottoman history is well presented, the author seems to follow certain of the themes already established. Two typical examples:

The Young Turks, even if they attacked initially all the backward institutions and thus religion itself, ended up by merging Muslim identity with Turkish national identity<sup>12</sup>.

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community and the non-Greek speaking Greeks», *Historiein*, 1999, pp. 75-92, and in Vangelis Kechriotis, ‘Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman-Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turks Revolution’, in the volume *New Approaches in Balkan Studies*, by the Kokalis Program on South-Eastern Europe Studies in Harvard University, to be published soon by Brassey’s.

<sup>11</sup> P. Karolidis, *Λόγοι και Υπομνήματα*, (Speeches and memoranda), Athens, 1913, p. 16.

<sup>12</sup> *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους*, (History of the Greek Nation), Ekdotikh Athinvn, 1977, v. XIV, p. 255.

And:

The real aims, however, of the Young Turks were finally revealed. The Turkish military, who had imposed themselves to the movement, were not interested either in political liberties nor in decentralization plans and free development of the ethnicities, but in the preservation of the integrity of the Empire and the privileges of 'Turkish ruling race' over the other ethnicities<sup>13</sup>.

The leitmotiv of a well-organised fraud still prevails and the question of how Turkish nationalism managed to merge with religion is not even raised. However, one of the major features of Unionist policy was secularism and this was the reason which turned against them all religious elements who felt, and very rightly so, that their traditionally privileged position was in danger. Now, whether the Unionists used religion as a vehicle in order to attract the support of Muslim populations is an issue we cannot address here<sup>14</sup>.

However, Veremis was one the first Greek historians who worked systematically on the *Society of Constantinople* (Οργάνωση Κωνσταντινουπόλεως), which had been founded in 1907, before the Revolution and, initially, aimed at coordinating Greek activity against the Bulgarian threat. With the break up of the movement it turned into one of the major vehicles of Greek views inside or outside the Ottoman Parliament. In 1984, together with Caterina Boura, Veremis published the manuscript of Athanassios Souliotis-Nicolaidis, the leading figure of the Society. This text, written in the 50s, proved a very rich source of information on the period. We will refer to this work, later. At this point, it is enough to point out that Boura, in her introduction, opens the spectrum of diverse views existing within the community. By that means, she successfully deconstructs the stereotype of national unanimity against the Revolution, which had been perpetuated, as we have seen, mostly by the protagonists themselves:

A considerable part of Greeks opposed the Society of Constantin-

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> This is the how Sükrü Hanioglu describes the use of religion by the Young Turks in Sükrü Hanioglu *The Young Turks in Opposition*, Oxford 1995. Exertzoglou strongly criticises this distinction between political aims and political discourse (see below).

ople and collaborated with the Unionists. This attitude expressed the will of many Greek Ottomans to remain within the Ottoman Empire and participate into the creation of the Young Turkish state... This attitude also echoed the official policy of the Greek state which initially favored a strategic cooperation with the authorities. However, the national policy, as formulated by the national center would later aim at the inclusion of Greeks to a powerful state, as envisined by Venizelos<sup>15</sup>.

However this line of argumentation as far as the Greek state's ambiguous policy is concerned has been already articulated. A few years earlier, A.J. Panayotopoulos, had published his article «Early relations Between Greeks and the Young Turks», in *Balkan Studies*, 1980, 21 (1980), 87-95. This account provides us with an elaborate picture of the relations between Greeks and Young Turks, especially for the period before the movement. However, the movement itself still remains in the background. The role of protagonists is kept again for the Greeks. What is new, however, in Panayotopoulos' account, is a thorough investigation of the way the Greek state but also other Greek agents tried to take advantage and manipulate the movement during the formative period, having different views of the benefits or the threats that a change of regime could bring for the Greek-Orthodox communities of the Empire. It is here that the debate over the role of the Greek state in this period is initiated and will be broadened later by Thanos Veremis and Caterina Boura. The main argument will be that the Greek state was very cautious, and had in fact no clear policy, which prevented it from benefiting from the new developments<sup>16</sup>.

In 1990, in the collection *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, edited by Martin Blickhorn and Thanos Veremis, published by SAGE-ELIAMEP, 1990, Veremis published his article 'From the National State to Stateless Nation, 1821-1910'. Unlike his previous accounts, the stereotype of Unionist fraud is being challenged here and the discourse employed is more analytical:

Ottoman Greeks who backed the Young Turks CUP were moved

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<sup>15</sup> Thanos Veremis-Katerina Boura (eds), Αθην. Σουλιώτης-Νικολαΐδης, *Οργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (Society of Constantinople), Dodoni, Athens 1984, p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

by its initial promise to grant political rights to all Ottoman subjects....Adherence to the principles expounded by the CUP amounted to abandoning the privileges as well as the handicaps of the millet system. The liberal wing of the Young Turk movement, which developed into a full-fledged liberal party, attracted most Greek support because it combined the promise of liberalisation with the preservation of the millet's cultural identities<sup>17</sup>.

At the same time, Veremis challenges the full identification of the Patriarchate's views with the policy of Society of Constantinople<sup>18</sup> and he accuses Feroz Ahmad of dealing with the Greek-Orthodox community in a monolithic way<sup>19</sup>. It's worth mentioning that it is the first time, that a Greek historian involves himself in the debates concerning this period, held by his Turkish colleagues.

#### iv. The Bizarre Revolution

However, it is only in 1992 that we have the first study of the Revolution itself as a major event and not in the context for Greek activity. Elli Skopetea in her book *Η Δύση της Ανατολής, Εικόνες από το τέλος της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας* (The Sunset of the East. Images from the End of the Ottoman Empire) includes a chapter on the Young Turks Revolution under the title 'Μια Παράξενη Επανάσταση' (A strange / bizarre Revolution). In her book, through literature, diplomatic correspondence and the press, she traces the stereotypes which articulate the western discourses about the East and at the same time the eastern discourses about the West. Through the same path, she approaches the Revolution bringing forward the ambivalent response of the Europeans, a mixture of surprise, enthusiasm and anxiety. She places the study of the Revolution in a broader analytical framework of revolutionary events and focuses on the distance between the «claims» and the «re-

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<sup>17</sup> Thanos Veremis, 'From the National State to Stateless Nation, 1821-1910' in Martin Blickhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds), *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, SAGE- ELIAMEP, 1990, p. 18.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> Feroz Ahmad, 'Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1919' in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, v. I, New York 1983, pp. 401-434.

sults», since no agent can visualise in advance the kind of potentials to be launched during the course of a revolution:

The unusual in the particular case has to do, on the one hand with the proportion of this discrepancy, the huge distance between the happy take off and the end which was dominated by mutual hatred. On the other hand, with the fact that the immediate co-protagonist, the West participates both in 'claims' and 'results' in the traditional ambiguous way, it conceives the Revolution... as a triumph of western influence, ...but at the same time, it seeks to prevent the logical outcome... which would be the restriction of this influence<sup>20</sup>.

Moreover, in her account, deeply influenced by the debate on 'Orientalism'- in her introduction she criticises Said for his monolithic view of the West- the Revolution is described within the framework of the 'awakening' of the East, within which it ceases to be a strictly Ottoman affair and gains a comparative perspective<sup>21</sup>.

On the nature of the Young Turks Revolution, she seems to follow Ahmad's view that the CUP deliberately established the peculiar regime of controlling from the backstage, without bearing any responsibility for long-term politics, which she calls a «peculiar double authority»<sup>22</sup>.

However, the way she elaborates on the aims of the Young Turks is significantly different from what had prevailed until then. She describes how they:

were obliged to proceed to the Revolution with an incomplete program. Since they aspired to gain the support of all the Ottoman national groups,... the only comprehensible solution of the time, the national state, the 'national unity', could be put forward only in a covered way,<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Elli Skopetea, *H Λύση της Ανατολής* (The Sunset of the East), Themelio, Athens, 1992, pp. 158-159.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>22</sup> This view has been strongly criticised by Kansu Aykut Kansu, *Politics in Post-revolutionary Turkey, 1908-1913*, Brill, 2000. The author suggests that the Unionists were not strong enough to take hold of the government, so it was not so much political handling which dictated their choices, but rather it was a matter of necessity.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

and elsewhere she is attributing to them the use of a double language which in the end punished them<sup>24</sup>. The Young Turks are not accused of fraud any more, but basically of political short-sightedness.

However, her analysis is dominated by the modernisation discourse, according to which the actual developments were inevitable and followed a path determined by the course of history. In her view,

It was an unstable balance of anachronisms within a modern, however, Revolution. In the case of the revolutionaries the anachronism lay at the starting point: ...the maintenance of the Empire as a vision for 20th c.,... in the case of western powers the anachronism was the target, a parliamentary western state which would leave intact the regime of Capitulations.

And she concludes that the most direct 'modern' result of this 'modern' Revolution, was the acceleration of the circle of nationalist movement in the Empire, which was what the revolutionaries had tried to avoid.<sup>25</sup>

And elsewhere:

The Turkish army prevailed, in a deterministic way, in the same deterministic way Turkish nationalism prevailed<sup>26</sup>.

The Greek responses to the new regime are only hinted at here. Skopetea suggests that it was just natural for them to see in these developments the great opportunity for Hellenism<sup>27</sup>. But on this issue, she elaborates much more in her chapter 'Οι Έλληνες και οι εχθροί τους' (The Greeks and their enemies), 10-35, in *Ιστορία της Ελλάδος του 20ου αι.* (History of Greece in 20th c.), Vivliorama, Athens, 1999.

She deals, in particular, with the concept of 'misunderstanding', which seems to prevail around the new regime, by attributing misconceptions to structural features of the Ottoman society. In other words, the fact that the identity elements which were officially recognised-language and education- were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, which could not be considered as a western institution. In that sense, the Greeks could not participate through their institutions in the west-

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

ern reforms taking place, even if they considered the developments favorable for them. And she concludes:

What, initially can be taken as a huge misunderstanding (modernisation with an anachronistic view), reveals the only shape that Greek nationalism could take within the Ottoman state<sup>28</sup>.

The problem with this analysis, despite its value for the understanding of power relations during that period, lies at the fact that it eliminates the multiplicity of views which coexisted for quite some time. Moreover, as already mentioned, it takes the outcome of the struggle for granted, projecting it to the events themselves. However, the agents of the period, who ignored the end of the story, could negotiate on several possible courses of action.

#### v. Between social reality and political discourse

In 1997, Sia Anagnostopoulou published her book *Asia Minor, 19c-1919, the Greek-Orthodox communities, From Millet of Rum to the Greek nation*.

In her chapter under the title 'The Young Turks Revolution: The new 'Ottoman' framework of authority: 1908-1914', she raises the issue:

But what were the real aims of the Young Turks? To abolish once and for all the privileges of the Patriarch in secular issues, such as education, or abolish completely the liberties of non-Muslim communities, as pointed out by most accounts, contemporary and later ones? The answer to the question is difficult and complex, as complex as the period itself<sup>29</sup>.

The answer she is offering reveries the existing analytical framework.

It is certain that neither Turkish nationalism constitutes from the very beginning the major element of the policy of Young Turks nor Greek nationalism constitutes the main element of the policy of Greek deputies. On the contrary, we can trace the mutual rein-

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<sup>28</sup> Elli Skopetea, 'Οι Έλληνες και οι εχθροί τους' (Greeks and their enemies), 10-35 in *Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20ου αι.* (History of Greece in 20th c.), Vivliorama, Athens, 1999, p. 27.

<sup>29</sup> Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία 19ος αι-1919, Οι Ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες. Από το Μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος*, (Asia Minor, The Greek-Orthodox Communities. From Rum Millet to the Greek Nation), Athens, 1998, p. 462.

forcement of all nationalisms rising during this period and mainly of the mechanisms of legitimization<sup>30</sup>.

In this account, the Young Turks movement on the one side and the developments within the Greek-Orthodox community on the other, are studied in a comparative perspective. The problem of identity formation is treated through the interrelation of 'heterodoxies' which are built simultaneously. At the same time, the author gives at least two elements of the Revolution which she therefore uses as key-notions in order to understand the attitudes and conflicts within the Greek-Orthodox community. These elements are: i) the gradual development of a modernizing radicalisation and ii) the restructuring of the social platform from above, due to the 'alliance' of the state elites with certain elites of the 'social periphery'<sup>31</sup>. In that sense, she also opens her scope to the study of a revolutionary procedure as such, without taking for granted the outcome and trying to reflect on the possible alternatives. She elaborates on the aims of the Revolution and points out that their attempt was not to destroy the different groups, but to abolish the religious *milli* way of legitimization. Therefore, she focuses mainly on the distinction between the Patriarch and the secular elements of the Greek-Orthodox community, which probably make dimmer other social groupings which, in due time, took sides along the main lines.

However, unlike Skopetea, she does not build her argument on Young Turks' 'double language' as something established from the beginning but she is trying to follow this language as the outcome of a procedure. She also definitely differentiates herself from Veremis on the issue of the 'merging between national and religious identity', by bringing forward the secular element on both sides.

The problem with this approach is that it carries an essentialist overtone, since, even if it tries to deconstruct historiographical misconceptions, it does not place itself within the framework of analysis but carries claims on reinstating the truth.

In 1999, Princeton University Press published a new volume entitled *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*, edited by Dimitris Gondicas and Charles Issawi. In this volume, we find an article by Caterina Boura entitled «The Greek millet in Turkish Politics: Greeks in the Ottoman Par-

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 458.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

liament (1908-1918)». The author had already published a version of the article in Greek<sup>32</sup>. The new element she brings forward here is that the turn of political developments had found the Greeks unprepared to face the electoral challenge. It is important that, despite the conflicts within the movement itself, the Young Turks are described as a well organized group with clear targets –which is certainly not the case- while the Greeks are presented as not prepared and divided, trying to reassure their presence in the parliament. Consequently, in this case, it is the Greeks themselves to blame for their failure to achieve a strong representation. We can safely talk here about an evolution which has brought the debate from witch-hunting to self-reflection. As a matter of fact, Boura had already followed, in the introduction for the publication of Souliotis-Nicolaidis' manuscript, in 1984, the argument on the cautious attitude of the Greek government.

Initially, the relations of Young Turks with the Greeks of Macedonia were determined by mutual interests. The Greek notables aspired at an improvement of their position against the Bulgarians. The Greek government kept a cautious attitude and so it lost the chance to develop contacts with the new regime<sup>33</sup>.

These arguments seem to formulate an alternative explanatory framework which at the same time, implicitly urges for a more coherent foreign policy nowadays.

However, there is a point of difference between the 1984 and 1990 texts and it has to do with the defensive role Boura attributes to the *Society of Constantinople*.

Today, a policy which seeks to consolidate the nationalities (*millet*) seems contradictory to the cultural prevailing of the 'East ideal' which could more probably be achieved through the regime of equality among nationalities. The Society shifted to a policy of supporting the privileges of nationalities as a retreat under the threat of Young Turks nationalism<sup>34</sup>.

It is more probable, though, that the defence of privileges, was not

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<sup>32</sup> Katerina Boura, «Οι βουλευτικές εκλογές στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία. Οι Έλληνες βουλευτές 1908-1918, (Parliamentary elections in the Ottoman Empire. The Greek delegates),» *Deltion tou Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon*, 4, pp. 69-85.

<sup>33</sup> Thanos Veremis-Katerina Boura, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

something the *Society* and the Patriarchate would negotiate at all, from the very beginning. We do not need to take the description of the leading figures at face value. The arsenal of the political struggle could not possibly be considered as only a product of Young Turks' aggressiveness.

A new picture concerning the different stages of the movement seems to be established in her later article:

The Young Turks' early principles had been those of the French revolution. They had sought to reconcile the peoples of the Empire, aiming at maintaining its integrity. But now, any national ambitions that non-Muslim and non-Turkish people might have nourished were incompatible with the new conception of state and had to be abandoned<sup>35</sup>.

The different periods are mentioned and the description tends to be more reflective than before.

Along the line of Skopeta and Veremis, she will describe Young Turks' policy as sincere but short-sighted:

The Young Turks aimed at a constitutional government that would soon remove all elements of internal strife and fuse the various nationalities into an Ottoman nation. Bestowing equal rights to all subject peoples, they expected from them, in return to abandon their communal traditions and....offer their allegiance to the Ottoman government.<sup>36</sup>

A parenthesis at this point is necessary. The volume *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*, consists of the procedures of a conference which took place in 1989. In fact, it was the first time that Greeks and Turkish colleagues came together to discuss on such issues. The outcome in most of the accounts bears the influence of such an atmosphere where academic debate can overcome language of hostility and controversy. The same could be said about the present meeting organised by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East

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<sup>35</sup> Caterina Boura, «The Greek millet in Turkish Politics: Greeks in the Ottoman Parliament (1908-1918)» Dimitris Gondicas and Charles Issawi (eds), *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 201.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

Europe and Sabanci University which brings again around the same table Greek and Turkish academics to contribute their thoughts on national stereotypes on textbooks and historiography.

In 1999, Charis Exertzoglou published a book review article about three influential works on the Young Turks<sup>37</sup> in the review "Σύγχρονα Θέματα" (Contemporary Issues). The author of the review gives a different account on the issue. In his view:

it is more significant to try to understand the Revolution not through its causes but through the new dynamics it brought forward and which cannot just be attributed to its causes<sup>38</sup>.

He thus elaborates more on the argument supported by Skopetea about the discrepancy between the 'claims' and the 'results' of a revolution. However, he is trying to overcome the major bipolar which dominates almost all accounts, that is 'centralisation' vs 'decentralisation' and the way it is transformed under the influence of the ethno-religious interests. He suggests that those trends should not be presented as concrete ideologies. They contribute to the articulation of political discourses the same way as nationalism or religion.

At the same time, Exertzoglou challenges the mechanistic approach which disconnects political action from the political discourse. The political discourse, in his view, as an intermediary, has an active role and it should not be considered as a mere tool of the acting subject.

These discourses do not act as veils covering real aims or real social interest but contribute on their turn to the restructuring of the political and social environment, provide new positions to the social agents and create a new landscape which does not correspond to the respective aims<sup>39</sup>.

The influence of the 'linguistic turn' in this account is apparent

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<sup>37</sup> Sükrü M. Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, Oxford 1995; Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, Leiden, 1997; Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks, Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*, University of California Press, 1997.

<sup>38</sup> Charis Exertzoglou, *Οι Νεότουρκοι Βιβλιοκριτικό σημείωμα*, 'The Young Turks' (Review article), *Σύγχρονα Θέματα*, 71-72, Dec. 1999, 223-228.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

and it seems that the distance covered from the representation of the trauma from the protagonists themselves up to the reflection on issues of language and terminology is a considerable one. It goes without saying that this development was not a monolinear one and it evolved around the influence of not only internal alterations of collective identity but also through its contact with broader intellectual trends. What is still a desideratum is a more systematic involvement of Turkish and Greek historians in debates over this controversial period.

## Medieval and Modern Macedonia as Part of a National ‘Grand Narrative’

NIKOLA JORDANOVSKI

**I**N THE TEXTBOOK used in the schools of the Republic of Macedonia to teach the Byzantine era, the first relevant chapter is titled «Eastern Roman Empire from 4th to 12th century». This period is described as a realm of Greco-Roman culture and Christianity. It is especially underlined that: «Until 7th century for all inhabitants of Byzantium the Latin language was in official usage, later replaced by the Greek language». However, apart from the basic foundations of the Byzantine culture (Greco-Roman and Christian), other elements that contributed to its specific character are mentioned, such as influences of Asiatic peoples (sic), especially Armenians, then also «Slavs and others», with whom Byzantium was «connected directly or indirectly».

The Ottoman State is depicted as clearly Turkish in its beginnings, and continuously unacceptable throughout the centuries, since the narrative shows the constant uprisings and all possible forms of resistance. The conclusion would be that the Christian subjects never recognised it as a state that embodied their interests of any kind.

In this sense, in the case of Byzantium the stress is on the migration of Slavs, and on the «slavisation» of most of the Balkan Peninsula, followed later by the coming of Bulgarians. The mentioned «slavisation» encompasses not only the toponyms and the linguistic realm of the Balkans, but also the remnants of the autochthonous population, especially descendents of the ancient Macedonians. Both Byzantine and later Bulgarian authority over the territory of Macedonia are described as «foreign, or alien» authorities. Samuel’s empire is presented as an expression of autochthonous «Macedonian» strives, and here the creation of the «Macedonian people» is located. So, the multiethnicity of the empire is somewhat problematic, since it is not presented as harmonious, but rather as a field of unsettled interests going in different directions, and producing confrontations.

This is even more stressed in the case of the Ottoman rule, since through numerous examples it is depicted as 'misfortunate' for the century and the population. Ottomans are mere conquerors, which gain control over most of the Balkans by consecutive wars or using the discord and fragility of the small Christian realms. Later on the Ottoman authorities are described as prone to changing the nature of the subjected lands by forced colonisations, islamisations, changing of toponyms and so on... Relations between different ethnic groups become cooperative in the early stage of the liberation struggle, but obstructive and hostile in the period of 'competing propaganda on the territory of Macedonia'.

In general, both Byzantium and the Ottoman empire are described as frameworks where different ethnic groups were bound to parallel lives (national and to some extent even cultural), with substantial permanent conflicts of interests, and where rulers were always more rather than less oppressors of legitimate strivings.

The Byzantine Empire is definitely integrated in Macedonian national history, taking into account that it represents a substantial portion of the narrative on all levels of teaching and writing history. The problem of how this is done is already a more complicated one. For instance, one undoubtedly positive feature of this common history would be the baptism of the Slavs (in Macedonia) by the brothers St Cyrilus and Method. Nevertheless, this is taken out of some more joint context, almost as if the mission was a private enterprise of the Thessaloniki brothers. Also, the founding of the Slav literacy and culture is exclusively presented as the main consequence of this enterprise, while the elements of becoming part of a certain community are missing. Once founded, the same Slav culture immediately takes its own course, generally apart (if not opposed) to the other effects derived from belonging to the same cultural pattern. This is visible in the texts about the medieval culture in Macedonia. For instance, painting of icons is presented as being part of the 'Macedonian art school', out of the context of the common Byzantine art. The Byzantine influence is given somewhat more credit in the field of music. The most illuminative example is chosen to be Joan Kukuzel, a 14<sup>th</sup> century composer and musician. His origin from western Macedonia (Debar) is emphasized, but he is also described as the founder of the «note-alphabet in the Eastern church, i.e. reformator of the Byzantine music». To finish with let's mention

the bold statement in the textbook for the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade of high school claiming that «Macedonia is rightfully considered by science as a fatherland of the Slav literacy and literature».

To some extent rightfully so, the main moment of the period covered by the Byzantine Empire is the coming and settling of the Slavs in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia. Also very special attention is given to the Samuel's empire, with all accompanying elements of building national myths connected with it.

Since the obvious attitude is that only autochthonous states are desirable ones, and lacking a real example of such a kingdom on the territory of Macedonia in the Middle Ages, Samuel's empire is described in details as the only one responding to the wishes and interests of the population of Macedonia. This implies that there was something like definitely shaped specific interest of the inhabitants of the geographic territory of Macedonia, apart from similar ones in the other countries. As a result, 11<sup>th</sup> century uprisings are given a meaning of national struggles of the 'Macedonian people' against the Byzantine authority, or in other words «mass national liberating uprisings». The ultimate impression would be that the Byzantines (since they are never names as Greeks) were enemies of the Slavs, and especially of the Slavs in Macedonia, making the whole Byzantium detached of any idea of common interests. This idea is definitely casted out by antagonism of races and cultures, with the Byzantine Empire as oppressive and assimilating. This goes equally for its role in a broader context of other medieval kingdoms in the Balkans; Byzantium is again only a key player in the game for domination, a game that in essence is unjust and expansionistic. This expansion is always on the account of the 'other', and the 'other' being in Macedonian textbooks simply the «Macedonian people», for whatever that means from this distance now, or meant back in the concrete time.

As for controversial topics during the Byzantine period, as such one might consider the explanations dealing with the nature of the contact between the Slav invaders in Macedonia and its existing inhabitants – 'the heleno-romanised descendants of the ancient Macedonians', as they are referred to. According to the authors, the dramatic contact was partly, violent partly based on cohabitation, but the main conclusion offered should be that by the 10<sup>th</sup> century the process of mutual absorption of Slavs and Macedonians had been finished, giving the ba-

sic ethnic substance of what was to become later the new Macedonian Slav people. 'Ancient Macedonians' input in this ethnogenetic combination, besides the name, would be the culture and certain traditions. Such ethnogenetic approaches are very dear to pretty much all authors of Balkan history textbooks. There is a common methodology of creating assumptions about the past based on factual starting points of much more recent chronological descent.

Also it is a bit of controversy when in the period of the early Slav migration and their settling down in what is now known as Macedonia, we find references for 'enemy troops invading Macedonia' (when the Sklavines would be attacked), Macedonia being 'subjected under Byzantine (or other) authority', someone's 'aspirations for certain parts of Macedonia... ', although it is well known that in the related epoch the Slavs did not accomplish any higher level of political consciousness than the one of temporal tribal alliances with limited geographic area (Sklavines) and even more limited political aspirations. «Macedonia» as a name or symbol of certain political notion simply did not exist amongst scattered Slav settlements divided into tribes and clans.

Another controversial point might be the constant nomination of the Samuel's empire as 'Macedonian' one. Apart from not existing as such in the historical moment that the text tends to reveal, such nomination always provokes going from one problem to another, producing finally a whole chain of dubious interpretations which are later difficult to be explained. Thus, dubious theories about ethnogenetic lines and national struggles transferred into the Middle Ages by the usage of primordial outlooks deprive the readers of more realistic explanations connected with the question of the identification of the subjects with the ruler's ethnicity or the crown's titulation, the ways of conducting warfare, dynastic clashes, social movements, not to mention the question of race, ethnicity and language and how much (or how little) they actually mattered in the Middle Ages. Instead, the authors of textbooks choose another 'way around', implanting retrospective national feelings and strivings, not known at all in the period under consideration. Thus, with the old chronicles speaking about Samuel's state as Bulgarian one, and having Basil the Second's nickname «killer of Bulgarians», himself being one of the 'Macedonian dynasty', the whole issue becomes hazy, and a future source of misunderstandings.

After the small feudal states in Macedonia had fallen under Turk-

ish control in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, and the town of Thessaloniki in 1430, «the long lasting Ottoman reign started». Reprisals and atrocities in those early stages of the conquest are not forgotten. Details of this process of gradual subjection of the Balkan peoples by the Turks (unlike the case of the Byzantines, the Ottomans are more often nominated as Turks, or parallelly Turks-Ottomans) are presented for every separate national kingdom. Not many values to be shared with the new rulers, so the narrative mainly concentrates on the description of the Ottoman feudal system, administrative divisions and so on. However, there is a deliberate 'distance' in the discourse, as if those administrative and social measures were happening either only on paper or were used only by the rulers, not really affecting miserable and unhappy (consequently rebellious) ancestors. The spirit is clearly the one of total alienation of the Ottoman State and its Christian subjects. This is even more visible in chapters dealing with the 19th century, where the Ottoman empire disappears as a substance, becoming something like 'doomed' domain, something to get rid of, to leave, abandon, chase out, so the story is all about how it was accomplished. Nothing to be shared anymore.

As important event situated in the period of the Ottoman rule is presented the abolition of the Ochrid archbishopric (1767). This unfortunate outcome is considered to be a result of the persistent action of the Patriarch in Constantinople, as the main carrier of the Greek efforts to suppress Slav emancipation, combined with the corrupted Ottoman authorities.

The other, more recent main events are basically the liberation movements and uprisings. They are all presented as autochthonous, legitimate and heroic, vis à vis a confused but cruel enemy. The input of the Great Powers is minimised, which in a century of empires and congress politics of shaping European political geography (very much including the Balkan one), is unpardonable. Also, the nationalism deserves better elaboration, both as European phenomenon and its Balkan echo.

Finally, the treatment of the Young Turks revolution deserves to be mentioned. From the textbook for the third year of high school one might get the impression that the Macedonian revolutionaries made the greatest and most important (definitely most heroic) contribution to the constitutional cause in Turkey. The whole event is described in such a

manner that the only dignified moment seemed to have been the decision of the komitadjis to ‘pardon’ the Turks and come down from their mountainous shelters and participate in the reconstruction of the State (as if it was a gift, and not a normal interest to take part in the affairs regarding the common country); but ultimately it happened that the Young Turks ‘betrayed their own promises and corrupted the whole idea’.

The notion of the common past of the region during the Ottoman rule is rejected similarly in different countries. There seems to be a certain inclination for describing the details of the Ottoman policy of punishment by public mutilations and executions. The list of features left behind by the centuries of the Turkish presence in Macedonia, apart from anarchy, injustice, violence, colonisation and islamisation, contains also positive moments (if one is benevolent enough to interpret them that way), such as «oriental appearance» (or ‘character’) given to the ‘Macedonian towns’ by intensive incorporation of Moslem architecture.

Of the Byzantine Emperors only Constantine I can be described as hero, in the sense that he did not do anything bad to ‘Macedonians’ in the fourth century, but instead he was the protector of Christianity. Clear examples of heroes are of course the Slav enlighteners St Cyrilus and Method, together with their pupil St Naum and Kliment. Their lives and deeds are thoroughly depicted in the textbooks. However, there is a strong stress on the fact of founding of the Slav literacy and culture, while the civilisational dimensions of the baptismation are rather left behind, or let’s just say insufficiently elaborated. Of the other heroes from the Byzantine period, we have also Samuel and all his family members, on whom much information is available in maybe unnecessary quantities. With the name of «Tzar Samuel» everything is correct – Macedonian statehood, Macedonian army, Macedonian Church, Macedonian people and the introduction of the Slav alphabet – Cyrillic as official one.

Directly connected with Samuel is the only clear case of anti-hero –his opponent, that is the emperor Basil II. His mutilation of the Samuel’s captured soldiers is a well known story. The first phase of the Ottoman rule in Macedonia (until 18th century) offers only two potential heroes, integrated in national history. First is King Marko, whom we see in the texts deprived of his legendary skills and powers, and left

with his vassal relation towards the Sultan, in whose service he is reported to have died.

The foggy figure of Karposh, leader of an uprising in 1689, could be the other hero of this first period. Unfortunately, his rebellious efforts with limited success are shadowed by his torturous execution on the Vardar stone bridge in Skopje, a description also not lacking details.

The later period of liberation movements offers a whole variety of national heroes – usually heads of uprisings, members of secret committees, people's tribunes and enlighteners. Not only heroes are incorporated in national history, but also they found the myths of the respective states (including especially Macedonia). No real anti-hero figure appears in this period, since the Ottoman Turks are mostly conceived in plural form, depersonalised. We could say that the whole empire took the pitiful and formal model-role of a giant anti-hero, a colossal negative force in the structure of historical discourse (as it is in the history textbooks), standing on the way of the positive movements of legitimate national strivings.

Analysed history textbooks do not really cherish negative stereotypes for other Balkan peoples. In the case of the Ottoman empire there is a tendency to present cases of cruelty, which might be considered as possible source of developing a negative stereotype, but the stress usually goes on the authorities and soldiers in times of crisis or uprisings, and not in the form of a constant terror. But since in such textbooks everyday life is usually missing, not much else is left except for presenting series of troubles and misfortunes, rebellions and following atrocities.

Still, a more scrupulous analysis would find elements that could be described as 'stimulating negative stereotypes'. One such could be the depiction of the Albanians as the biggest brigands and main source of the general feeling of anarchy and disorder, especially in the peripheric parts of the empire. In the unit about the «Situation in Macedonia under the rule of the Ottoman State» there is even a subtitle 'The terror of the Krdjalij and of the Albanian pillaging bands'. Albanians are also guilty when they just move to live in Macedonia 'in masses', like in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, or during the Second World War.

Another possible source of stereotypes appears when talking about the «Macedonian ecclesiastical question». There the Greek assimilatory tendencies come across in the text more than once, just like the 'hated pa-

triarchy in Constantinople' and the «opening of Greek schools to spread the Greek culture, education and influence in Macedonia», with the subtext that this was a process of implantation of alien culture with hegemonic and assimilatory tendencies. There is even a picture in this unit, showing a Greek priest standing next to a canon, together with Turkish officers, with the text below: «In the struggle against the Macedonian people's revival Greek priests collaborated with the Ottoman authorities». In the next educational level's history textbooks a similar atmosphere appears regarding the Greeks, mainly referring to their activities towards 'denationalisation and assimilation of Macedonians'. Of course, in the later development of the subject, all three neighbouring states (Bulgaria and Serbia joining Greece) become sources for exporting 'alien propaganda', meaning alien for Macedonian interests. As usual, the accent goes on the bourgeoisies of the respective countries. There is a map in the unit titled 'The armed propaganda of the Balkan states' which shows three hands reaching from inside the three neighboring countries towards the geographic territory of Macedonia, of course presented as an integral part of European Turkey. The anti-neighboring discourse takes its heights when talking about the Balkan wars. The outcome is «catastrophic», the country torn apart.

Taken all into account, there is not too much stress on the role of both religions on the respective empires. One might even say that the approach is 'over-secular'. Regarding Byzantium, the unit dealing with Christianity spreads in time from the Milan edict to the Schism of the churches –a whole little ecclesiastic medieval history, with a special notice that «Christianity became a state religion in the Roman Empire». Bogomil movement hereby is given special attention, as an anti-clerical and social movement, but this attention owes more to its origin from the territory of Macedonia, then in the frame of the Bulgarian Empire.

More about it is said in the textbook for the second grade of high school (gymnasium) where Christianity is presented as the substance of the whole cultural life of Byzantium influencing mainly education, science, art. It is emphasized that it began as a religion of the oppressed; later it became dominant religion with «aspiration for ecclesiastic mastery».

In somewhat similar tone, Islam is thought to be a «... mastering religion in the Ottoman state», and that «... all state organs had to follow the laws based on Islam». There is a certain discrepancy between the mentioned autonomies of the Christian churches under the Otto-

mans (stress on the Ochrid archbishopic), and the frequent passages about Turkish efforts for islamisation in Macedonia, especially in the light of the fact that the Christian population of Macedonia never suffered real massive pressure for conversion. The significant and indicative distinction between Albania and Bosnia and the other Balkan lands (including Macedonia) should impose a rather different story than that of harsh Ottoman religious policy. But in high school textbooks Islam has not been too lucky with the qualifications it got. In the first grade Islam is described as an aggressive religion preaching holy war against the unfaithful ones, demanding their conversion to the only true religion. Similarly in the next (second grade) textbook Islam's main ideal is to struggle against 'infidels' and to conquer their lands. The ultimate impression is that of a partial approach very much in favour of Christianity.

### Multiethnic Empires, National Rivalry and Religion in Bulgarian History Textbooks

ALEXEI KALIONSKI - VALERY KOLEV

**T**HIS BRIEF ANALYSIS will focus on several main topics, which were already put into discussion during the workshops - the current Bulgarian history textbooks, Byzantine and Ottoman empires, the Macedonian question and religion. They reflect some important phenomena such as the image of the «other» (in terms of ethnicity, religion and nation) and the national and common Balkan past as presented in history textbooks. That is why we shall follow our own observations made according to the questionnaires offered by the History Education Committee.

#### **The history textbooks**

The changes in Bulgarian society during the last twelve years have strongly influenced the way history textbooks are written, authorized and distributed. Some surveys recently carried out by teams of sociologists among pupils and teachers clearly show that the role of the mass media, family and social environment is crucial in shaping the young generations' attitudes and stereotypes concerning national history. Still,

the role of the school textbook remains a very important one and the changing Bulgarian society – quite historically minded.

The textbooks that appeared from 1989 up to now are definitely marked by an underlined drive towards de-ideologization and modernization. This is achieved mainly by considerable enlargement of the volume of cultural and economic history and integration of some «new» issues such as religion, historical demography, everyday life, etc. With few exceptions, the adapted narratives follow the traditions of the national historiography (mainly positivist, Marxist and post-Marxist). The history textbook is still a specific and conservative genre with its established constructions for continuity and change, development and stag-

nation, space and time, fixed chronological schemes and practically unchanged (or very difficult to be changed) general vision of national history. Political history strongly predominates in volume and in details. It constructs not only the factological and chronological backbone of the respective units and sections, but also the very idea of history - national, regional and world.

In contrast to the textbooks issued before 1989, the illustrations included in the present ones (with very few exceptions) belong to the respective epoch. They are quite representative. All the textbooks contain quotations from written sources. As far as polygraphy is concerned, the quality of illustrations, schemes and maps is much better than that of many illustrated scientific editions.

In Bulgarian secondary schools history is taught according to the following curriculum:

- 5-th class - Bulgarian history, 15th -19th c. (Ottoman period) - 2 hours / week
- 6-th class - Modern Bulgarian history (after 1878) - 2 hours / week
- 7-th class - Ancient history (European and Bulgarian) - 2 hours / week
- 8-th class - Medieval history (World and Bulgarian) - 2 hours / week
- 9-th class - Modern history (World and Bulgarian) - 2 hours / week
- 10-th class - Contemporary history (World and Bulgarian) - 2 hours / week
- 11-th class - Bulgarian history (7th - 20th c.) - 3 hours / week

Actually, some lessons in Bulgarian history, together with geography and other nature disciplines are presented to the 3th and 4th grades pupils (in the frames of the subjects called «Roden kraj» –«Native Land» and «*Rodinoznanie*»– «Studying About Motherland»). The history units included in the textbooks for the 3th and 4th grades are very brief and, normally, adapted to the age of the pupils (9 and 10 years, respectively) with a stress upon Bulgarian national heroes. The teaching of history as a separate school subject starts with the Ottoman period in the 5th class.

What predominates in the lower course of education (the 5th and the 6th grades) is national history with a definite correspondence of the European influence upon the events and processes of Bulgarian development. Between the 7th and the 10th grades the percentage of World and European history is about 80-90 % as a whole, but European history dominates over world history. National history is about 10-20 %. In the last 11th year only national history (with underlined European

influences) is taught. However, that depends upon the estimate of the authors of the different textbooks.

According to Bulgarian regulations for every grade there should be at least two official alternative textbooks. But for the 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th grade there is only one officially authorized textbook and for the 5th and 11th grades three textbooks are used. They are authorized by the Ministry of Education and Science after an open competition among different authors or teams of authors. The textbook drafts are estimated by independent experts-university lecturers, teachers and/or scientific researchers. However, the ministerial administration controls the administrative side of the process. Fortunately (or may be unfortunately), for most of the last ten years the ministers of education in Bulgaria were historians, experts in Modern Bulgarian history and that is supposed to have influenced the whole process of authorization.

The textbooks are published, with only two exceptions, by private publishing houses. Their distribution is based upon the principles of free market economy. It should be mentioned that most of the teachers strongly oppose the system of alternative textbooks, while the university professors, who are in the teams of authors, admire it. The authors and co-authors are professional historians from different generations, academic positions, methodological and emotional affiliations, preferences, etc. Choosing one or another textbook is in the prerogatives of every teacher.

### **Bulgarians and the two great empires Byzantine and Ottoman**

The general tendency of enlarging the volume and the spectrum of non-political issues and subjects influences the history of the two empires taught in school. Although presented very fragmentarily in some textbooks, there are always at least some sentences (facts/special terminology) about culture and religion, economy and society. In the textbooks dedicated to Bulgarian history, the Byzantine and the Ottoman background for the national past is constructed predominantly by political and military events, but there is also considerable volume in which the economic life of the Bulgarians is placed within the imperial system. In comparison to the Byzantine civilization and, of course Western Europe, the Ottomans are almost not presented in the field of culture. The only (but very important and never missing) exception is Islam. Its

historical role and influence are depicted in a quite large spectrum – between religious fanaticism and tolerance (the last attributed to a lower extent to the empire itself, but also to the everyday life and the cultural syncretism in the specific Balkan context of the «contact zone» with Christianity). The Ottoman institutions, military structures, social and fiscal regime are described and sometimes analyzed with by far more details than the Byzantine ones.

Bulgarian national history is presented by no means as something «quasi-Byzantine». It follows its own ways side by side with the empire, in a constant diplomatic and military conflict with Constantinople, but in the same time - under the strong influence of the great Byzantine culture. The cultural role of medieval Bulgaria in the «Slavonic-Byzantine civilization» is featured as almost equal and, in some historic moments, even leading among the Slavonic part of the Orthodox world. It goes without saying that Byzantium is evaluated as one of the two great medieval Christian civilizations, but less «dynamic» in comparison to the European West (especially in 12th-15th c.). The periods of disappearance of the Bulgarian state, the Byzantine (1018-1185) and especially the Ottoman domination (1354-1878; for Macedonia and Thrace up to 1913) interrupt the development of Bulgarian people. National statehood is almost a *conditio sine qua non* for the progress of the people (nation) and the culture. When it is missing from the historical scene, there are always social and religious institutions and forces, economic processes, ideas and revolts that project its inevitable restoration.

In the second case, although not presented as entirely «dark», the long five centuries of the Ottoman rule are in the context of tragic deviation from the mainstream of the European history. Under the Ottomans the development of Bulgarians and their Balkan neighbours is qualified as «delayed» and «anachronic» (in the «common European» context). The predominant attitude is negative, despite many nuances and «neutral» qualifications. The image of the empire is constructed in the terms of a «non-European», «Oriental» state, religion and civilization. The gradual economic progress, adoption of (West) European style and ideas, the national «awakening» and cultural «Renaissance» are the most important processes that mark the period between the end of 18th c. and 1878. The uprisings against the empire in 15th-17th c. and the liberation/revolutionary movements in 19th-beginning of 20th c. trace the way out of the «stagnation». The (re)appearance of Balkan national states

over the former Ottoman territories is presented as final and long desired exit, leading to «modern» and «dynamic» development.

If we exclude the numerous Bulgarian «national» heroes, there are many Byzantine, Ottoman and Balkan historic personages (emperors, empresses, sultans, kings, members of the ruling elites, patriarchs, men of letter, etc.) mentioned or even textually portrayed. They are usually qualified indirectly by their respective deeds in regard to the Bulgarian «national» (political, cultural, religious etc.) interests. Occasionally, some of the typical «anti-heroes» (in the common Bulgarian point of view) like the emperor Basil II («the Bulgar-Slayer») are portrayed quite realistic and are not necessarily deprived from their personal virtues. Important feature of Byzantium's image is the perfidity of the imperial court, rulers and aristocracy, diplomacy versus the heroic military efforts, achievements and losses of medieval Bulgarians. Although not directly, an underlined femininity is being attributed to Byzantium and Greeks, in sharp contrast to Bulgarian (as well as Ottoman and Turkish) masculinity. Not surprisingly, there exists a similarity to the more or less common Balkan ways of self-portraying in different historical epochs: heroization and victimization, national martyrology, «sacred» ethnic/national territory constantly endangered by alien invaders, total lack (or fragmentarity) of a common Balkan context. We may add here another basic paradigm. National history is narrated as a continuum not only in terms of space (Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia from Antiquity up to the 20th c.), but also of time. Chronologically the periods of foreign imperial rule over Bulgarian people still occupy exactly half of the «national» historical time (since the foundation of the medieval Bulgarian state in the 80s of the 7th c.). Those are times of cultural and religious survival, when, especially under the Ottomans, the preservation of the ethnic and religious traditions is viewed as one of the most important historical achievements.

There are no negative stereotypes directly addressed to other Balkan peoples, but there are many negative qualifications of, or hints for «aggressive», «greedy», «egoistic», «alien», «repressive», «assimilatory» and «exploiting» imperial (and Balkan states') policy and interests. In many cases they could be associated with the dominant or protagonist «people»/«nation». This could be traced out both for earlier and later historical periods. With few exceptions, the Byzantine «Greekness» is evident in many cases. On the other hand, during con-

siderable periods Byzantine empire encompasses the Balkan ethnic complexity, which indirectly portrays it as multicultural (but not as multireligious). The Ottoman empire is presented strictly (and occasionally detailed enough) as multiethnic, multicultural and multireligious not only in its Balkan domains. Here all the textbooks follow the academic distinction between the Ottoman elite and the «common Turk». A more complex Balkan ethnic picture appears when different groups are presented either as neighbors or as minorities within Bulgarian state borders/«Bulgarian ethnic territories» (Moesia, Macedonia and Thrace). Here we see an important and almost everlasting distinction: between the official state policy (external or internal) on one hand, and peaceful cohabitation between the different ethnic and religious groups/peoples on the other. It is most typical for the Ottoman times, when Balkan Christians, Turks and Muslims equally «suffer» from the imperial regime (its taxes, wars, changes and disorders).

Maybe the most controversial events chosen from the Byzantine history are the Great Schism and the relations with the Western world. They are presented in a general «civilizational» context, but usually with an underlined progressist and «Eurocentrist» vision of history. Among the many controversies of the Ottoman past, the Islamization of a certain part of Bulgarian and Balkan Christian population is one of the most important ones. It results in a tragic partition of the respective «national» body into religiously different, yet somehow not completely alienated groups of compatriots (by language, customs, common plight under the empire, etc.). Orthodox Christianity and Islam are simply inseparable from the images of the two empires. In both cases the relations between state, religion (religions) and society are presented in its historical complexity.

The composition of the separate units and the place of certain subjects, events, historic portrays, illustrations, maps, quotations from the sources, apparatus, etc. vary considerably in the different textbooks. Sometimes the formal distinction between some common «Balkan», «European», imperial («Byzantine», «Ottoman»), «national» and «world», issues is difficult to be made. It appears especially in the less «conservative» textbooks (as composition, style and balance between political and non-political history) and when the respective units or parts deal with «civilization», «culture», «religion», «modernity», greater conflicts, diplomacy etc. On the other hand, if we follow only the text-

books, it is much easier to construct a European or world background for the national history than a regional Balkan one.

The maps referring to the two empires are usually not very detailed, yet representative (displaying all the domains or their Balkan parts). There are two kinds of maps: showing the Ottoman or Byzantine state and general - Europe and/or the World during a certain period. Quite more detailed maps could be found in the separate editions of old school historical atlases which still can be found in the bookstores. Illustrations are usually reproductions (in colour) displaying portraits, artifacts, documents, icons and other drawings, traditional (official) architecture, armament etc., together with occasional court scenes, images of the everyday life, traditional attires and costumes (Muslims, Christians, aristocrats, military men, peasants, merchants etc.). They are quite useful even for the professional historians' vision of the «imperial» - both Byzantine and Ottoman.

But the «imperial» remains «alien», strongly opposed to the national (Bulgarian), politically and socially oppressive rather than unifying in terms of region, religion and civilization. That is true especially for the Ottoman period. At the same time, the common plight of the other Balkan peoples, as marked in some textbooks, somehow constructs a regional context which is usually not that clear (or is simply missing) for most of the periods and the events.

### **Macedonia in Bulgarian school textbooks**

The case of Macedonia offers a good illustration of the predominant vision of the national past through the lens of military and religious conflicts and ethnic rivalry. The history of the region is completely integrated within Bulgarian national history and in the last 10 years Bulgarian society became far more sensitive concerning this issue. Many of the Bulgarian national heroes come from Macedonia starting from the Middle ages with St Kliment of Ohrid and St Naum. The majority however are from the national revival period (like Paisij of Hilendar and the Mladinovi brothers) and from the revolutionary movement in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> c.

In the prehistoric times Macedonia is presented as a geographic region, part of the general picture of the Balkans. In Antiquity there appears a dichotomy between the Ancient Macedonian state as a political organization and the area inhabited not only by the ancient Macedonians, but

also by Thracians, Illyrians and with numerous Greek colonies. In Roman times it is mentioned as an ordinary province with similar structure and organization to the other Balkan provinces of the empire.

In the Middle ages Macedonia becomes battlefield between the Byzantines and the Slavs. The impact is placed upon the Slavization of the region, which is a prelude to its integration within the medieval Bulgarian state. A second point is the process of infiltration of the Pro-bulgarians of Kuber which takes place at the same time and in the same manner as in the eastern parts of the Balkan peninsula. This is how Macedonia becomes quite similar to the other two classical provinces, Moesia and Thrace, part and parcel of the Bulgarian ethnic territory. The unity of this «sacred» national space is never lost: it is ethnogenetic before the foundation and the expansion of the medieval Bulgarian kingdom, political and cultural in 9th-11th c. and under the most strong rulers of the Second Bulgarian kingdom (first half of 13th c.); ethnic, cultural and religious in the periods of Byzantine and Ottoman domination; national in 18th-beginning of 20th c. The history of the area appears as quite more Bulgarian than Balkan. Macedonia is at the same time cradle of the Bulgarian people and nation (medieval and modern Bulgarian culture) and main, real and symbolic, battlefield. This is precisely the place where one can trace out some of the most important paradigms of the established «grand narrative»: national unity and political partition, success and tragedy («national catastrophe»), survival and oppression («assimilation» and «denationalization»), heroism and historical fatum, legitimate «historical rights» and «pretentions» from other state (national) neighbours.

During the Byzantine rule Macedonia is a thema with a centre in Adrianople as Bulgaria is a thema encompassing the valleys of Vardar and Morava rivers. The emphasis is placed upon the autocephalus archbishopric of Ohrid as a descendant of the Bulgarian Patriarchate. After the restoration of the Bulgarian tzardom the area becomes once again a legitimate Bulgarian land up to the middle of the 13th c. Up to the middle of the 14th c. Macedonia is presented as a region dominated by the Serbian state and later by principalities ruled by Serbian aristocracy. That problem is vaguely marked on the eve of the Ottoman invasion. When the geographical area is politically divided, the general picture is far more complicated, but vague as a whole.

Macedonia is presented as a geographical entity which is multi-

cultural in Ottoman times, but predominantly Bulgarian in purely statistical (demographic) sense<sup>1</sup>. It is an integral part of the Bulgarian ethnical and cultural entity and the emphasis is put again upon the Ohrid archbishopric. The area is depicted as leading in the beginning of the Bulgarian national revival that started the process of formation of modern Bulgarian national identity.

After the Berlin treaty of 1878 Macedonia is presented as a part of the Bulgarian national territory and the whole cultural and social life in the region as a part of the Bulgarian cultural and social life, with an emphasis upon the processes connected with the Bulgarian Exarchate based in Constantinople and the activity of its local bishoprics. An important issue is the numerous and constantly growing immigration from the region that formed a strong lobby in Bulgarian political circles and in the army. The culmination of the Macedonian theme in the textbooks is the uprising in the summer of 1903 that took place not only in Macedonia, but also in Thrace. After World War I the aspect is more centered upon the diplomatic activities of Bulgarian governments for protection of the rights of the minorities within the policy of the League of Nations and the incorporation of the immigrants from the region.

The Macedonian question in modern and contemporary history is presented almost as an interior Bulgarian political problem with emphasis upon the immigrants from the region and the activity of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. The problem appears not earlier than the emergence of the modern Bulgarian state after the treaty of Berlin in 1878, followed by growing nationalist tensions, rivaling «propagandas» and irredentisms. With some exceptions, the main line of description of the Macedonian imbroglio in the textbooks follows the argumentation of the Bulgarian «historical rights» and legitimacy. A new approach in modern Bulgarian historiography is the process of enforced denationalization and Macedonization of the Bulgarian population by the Communist regime in the regions of Struma and Mesta during 1946 due to the impact of Communist ideology and to current Bulgarian foreign policy on the eve of the Paris peace conference of 1947.

In the respect of the «others» in Macedonian context as con-

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<sup>1</sup> About Macedonia during the Ottoman times in Bulgarian textbooks, see also here pp. 276-280.

structured in the textbooks for 18th-20th c., we can mark two separate periods. The first one lasts up to the end of World War I. There appear to be three distinct types of "others". The first one could be qualified as the "far away other", who is involved in the problem without direct national interests. Paradoxically enough, that concerns mainly the Ottoman empire which is anticipated as an important, but rather passive factor. Very close to that are the Great powers, who seem to be involved into the problem only because of the sophisticated relations between them. In that group one could place the Catholic and the Protestant propaganda. On the other hand the Greeks and the Serbs are presented as the main and the "close others" who rival the Bulgarian ethnic domination in the region. The distinction is that the Greeks somehow have legitimate rights in Macedonia, based upon the Patriarchate of Constantinople and upon the numerically and culturally significant population mainly in the coastal areas. The Serbs are presented as intruders into the region that later combine with the Greeks against the Bulgarians. That is reflected in the widely spread terms "Grekomans" and "Serbomans", attributed to Bulgarian speaking communities supporting the respective «alien» churches and propagandas. To that group we can add the Communist International and all the local Communist parties, as the result of their actions is directed against the Bulgarian interest and against the Bulgarian identity of the population. The «neutral others" are the Romanians, whose interests in Macedonia are not direct, although they are directed against the Bulgarian cause. The historical role of all those "others" is to prevent the national unification of the Bulgarians in a nation state for "selfish" reasons. The problems of the other sides are mentioned as "legitimate" only considering the Ottoman legacy. The beginning of the Second Balkan war is the only case where a Bulgarian action is qualified as an "injust action" and a serious mistake. In the post World War II period that can be applied to the temporary enforced Macedonization of the population in the regions of Struma and Mesta in 1946. After World War II the Macedonian theme is mentioned only up to the Paris peace conference, more in the diplomatic aspect. The modern relations between the two countries are totally ignored in the history textbooks.

The process of appearance and development of a separate Macedonian national identity and independent state as witnessed by several generations is something already accepted politically and in the society

after decades of a «Macedonian» trauma. That is how the young Bulgarians have some idea about the recently established «common sense» and «realistic» attitude towards this phenomenon. Near future will show whether the new history textbooks will participate in a more adequate way to the projections and explanations of the different historical and everyday life meanings of «Macedonia», «Macedonias» and «Macedonians» that circulate in the media and in Bulgarian public opinion. If it is true for Macedonia, the same could be said for the Balkan region as well.

### **Religion**

Here we shall not discuss religious education itself, its curriculum and the respective textbooks. In public schools religion is an optional subject from the first up to the eighth grade (with children from six to fourteen years old). According to the Bulgarian legislation every officially approved confession can create its own religious educational establishments. They exist separate from the state educational system and are of private character. Christian denominations have Sunday schools in the churches and similar is the organization in the Islamic and Jewish communities. The state has also created a possibility for education in the other world religions i.e. Judaism, Buddhism, etc., but there is no public need demonstrated yet. For example, Bulgarian Jews gave up the religious education of the pupils from their ethnic group after two years attempts in one of Sofia's secondary schools. Ethnic minorities enjoy equal rights in state schools and religious educational establishments as the Bulgarian majority. Teachers of all officially approved religious minorities use not only textbooks edited in Bulgaria, but also in other countries. The predominant situation is the use of the Holy Bible, the Koran, the Talmud and other holy texts directly in different editions and languages. The system of authorization, publication and distribution of religion textbooks strictly follows the general rules established for every official textbook.

The place of religion in the history textbooks depends on the chronological period and thematic. For instance, in the texts dedicated to the Middle Ages the volume and variety of the religious topics is quite more than in the lessons on Modern history. There are three separate texts about religion in the textbooks on Medieval history with a proportion of 2:1 in favor of the dominant Christianity as compared to

Islam. There are numerous mentions of different confessions throughout the whole textbook. As for the so called «Late Medieval Ages» (namely the Ottoman period) and Modern history, there are no separate units concerning religion. The only exception being one of the official textbooks with a comparative lesson on Christianity and Islam in the context of everyday life in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman empire. It is rather hard to estimate precisely the percentage of the religious items in the textbooks, but in Medieval history textbooks it varies between 15-20 %, while in the Modern history textbooks the percentage is a quite lower –5-10 %.

In the Ancient history textbooks there is one lesson dedicated to ancient Judaism in the context of its relations to the genesis of Christianity. Unfortunately there are no such lessons in the textbooks concerning later periods.

The illustrations on religious themes are of different character – portraits, icons and a lot of ecclesiastical architecture. The general approach is a strictly illustrative one, although in one of the textbooks there is a picture of a mosque with textual explanation of its architectural elements.

Orthodox Christianity is definitely presented as a basic element of Bulgarian national identity. From institutional point of view the historical role of the Bulgarian Orthodox church is sometimes stressed as even more important than the institutions of the Bulgarian state, which during quite long periods is missing from the historical stage. This is precisely the predominant tendency in the integration into national history. Once again the authors of the textbooks strictly follow the constant paradigms of the established historiographic «grand narratives». The place of the Bulgarian national church is underlined even when Bulgarians are compared to their Orthodox neighbours – Greeks, Serbs, Romanians.

When the texts deal with the Bulgarian speaking religious minorities, i.e. Pomaks, Unitarians, Catholics, Protestants etc. they invariably stress upon common language and culture. On the other hand, the Moslem religion of the Turks in Bulgaria is directly or indirectly presented as an important factor of ethnic identification. This presumption is never applied to the Gypsies, whether Christian, or Moslem.

All Bulgarian national heroes since the Christianization in mid 9th century are strictly Christian and Orthodox. The only exception are

the leaders of the Bulgarian Catholic uprising during the Austrian-Turkish war from the end of the 17th century. The same applies to the Bulgarian Catholic intellectuals and religious leaders during the late Ottoman period. In Bulgarian history textbooks the main logic is political, national and cultural. That is why religion is not important in portraying «heroes» and «anti-heroes».

In the predominant factological frame constructed by political events, the relations between the different religions are not presented as hostile or intolerant. In cases of forcible changes of confession and also competing proselytisms, the general explanation is with civilizational clashes, but also with cultural and religious syncretism. This approach is especially true for relations between Christianity and Islam during the Ottoman period.

The relation between Bulgarian society and Bulgarian church is presented as almost harmonious during all the historical periods with the exception of the Communist one (1944-1989). The predominant image of the Constantinople Patriarchate is a positive one until the beginning of the Bulgarian Exarchist movement in the 1830s. The final success of this movement is described as an important step to religious, but also political emancipation of the Bulgarian nation on the eve of the liberation from the Ottoman rule.

There are three historical periods or moments described through the lens of the conflict between state and religion. The first one is 10th-14th century, when the medieval Bogomils and other heresies opposed the established social status quo and the official religious dogmas. In the textbooks that appeared in the 1990s the image of the heresies is not any more a strictly positive one. The second one is the Ottoman period, when, according to the textbooks, the decisive role of the Orthodox church in the «survival» of the Bulgarian people and culture was performed in very difficult historical conditions. Although integrated in the Ottoman imperial system, Orthodox Christianity was in a constant opposition to the attempts at presumably forced Islamization of some communities and individuals. The occasional religious conflicts result in the appearance of «new» Bulgarian Saints or martyrs. The last period (1944-1989) is not characterized as a conflict between the Communist state and the main confessions, but as a period of negation and denial of Christianity and Islam, of restrictions and occasional repression (especially against the Catholics, Unitarians and Muslims in Bulgaria).

Although there are many forces and movements with religious identity such as the Crusaders, Ottoman invaders, «alien» religious institutions etc., the textbooks usually describe military, social and religious conflicts in political or «civilizational» context. As far as Modern history is concerned, the only ecclesiastical factor described as threatening the Bulgarian national identity and interest is the Constantinople Patriarchate, but only during the schism with the Bulgarian Exarchate and also in Ottoman Macedonia before the Balkan Wars.

As a whole, current history textbooks restore the integral place of religion in the historical processes, but, with few exceptions, there is still an inertia from the previous «atheistic» times. Religion, (faith, theosophy) is presented as even less autonomous sphere than culture, economic and social life and, last but not least - politics.

### **Conclusion**

The analysis of the present day history textbooks depicts a situation of gradual development and improvement presupposing the efforts to imply some new ideas and concepts in Bulgarian historiography and modernization of history teaching as a whole. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of this process are evident. On one hand they are based on the existing curriculum. The strict distinction between national and world history creates a dichotomy that is very difficult to be overcome within the existing official regulations. There are two possible outcomes. One of them is to follow the European pattern of merging national and world history for each grade. The other is to introduce regional (South - European/Balkan) history as a link between the Common European and the national context. On the other hand the predominant conservative way of textbook writing which follows the established academic traditions, could be modernized only if much more attention is paid to cultural, economic, demographic and other counteractions among the neighbouring states and nations in the region, thus replacing the prevailing political events and contradictions. Another basic problem is the history teaching itself where stereotypes play an important role. This problem is quite more complicated and is a question of time and, hopefully, of a new generation of school teachers.

There exists an evident danger that both the academic research and the educational process could lag behind the dynamics of modernity, thus living to media and other public factors vast space for sus-

taining the old negative stereotypes and creating new ones. This situation is only partially realized in the Ministry of Education and by the leading historians. In a more or less positive way it affects the revision of the current history curriculum for all grades and the new set of history textbooks that started to appear on the market this September.

D<sub>2</sub>

„P.C.R. consideră că teza privind o întoarcere la sistemul multipartit în socialism este complet greșită și dăunătoare pentru că netezește drumul pentru o revenire la formele anacronice ale sistemului politic capitalist. După cum subliniază Tezele celui de al XIV-lea Congres al P.C.R., în noile condiții create după dispariția claselor exploatare, existența unui singur partid al clasei muncitoare și consolidarea unității poporului în jurul partidului este o necesitate istorică obiectivă.”

*Scinteia*, 18 octombrie 1989

#### Evenimentele din decembrie 1989

Încă din martie 1989, postul de radio BBC a publicat o scrisoare deschisă semnată de șase foste personalități ale P.C.R. care criticau politica regimului și propuneau o democratizare în spiritul reformelor gorbacioviste. În aceeași lună, ziarul *Libération* a publicat un interviu cu poetul Mircea Dinescu, conținând aprecieri asemănătoare.

Replica lui Ceaușescu nu a întârziat. La Congresul al XIV-lea al P.C.R. din noiembrie 1989, el a acuzat violent pretinsul complot al marilor puteri, U.R.S.S. și S.U.A., împotriva statelor mici. Totodată, a anunțat că România va continua construirea socialismului pe baza valorilor marxist-leniniste [D<sub>2</sub>].

*Timișoara*

Revoluția anticomunistă a început la Timișoara pe 16 decembrie 1989. Protestul câtorva sute de credincioși reformati împotriva evacuării pastorului maghiar Lászlo Tökés din locuința sa s-a transformat într-un protest împotriva autorităților comuniste.

REVOLUȚIA DE LA TIMIȘOARA

D<sub>3</sub>

„Am convocat această teleconferință pentru ca, în perioada următoare, să fie luate măsuri corespunzătoare pentru asigurarea pazei stricte la sediile comitetelor județene de partid, unități economico-sociale, cămine studentești; se vor forma colective de lucrători ai aparatului de partid, de stat, gărzile patriotice, formațiunile de tineret. Se vor intensifica controalele mai ales pe timp de noapte. [...] Am convocat această conferință având în vedere unele evenimente care au avut loc ieri și azi la Timișoara [...]. Am dat ordin să se tragă [...]”

N. Ceaușescu,  
fragment din teleconferința  
din 17 decembrie 1989

Un lanț viu s-a format în jurul Bisericii reformate, și s-a cântat pentru prima dată după zeci de ani „Desteaptă-te, române!”, un cântec devenit ulterior imnul revoluției. S-a strigat „Jos Ceaușescu!” și „Jos comunismul!”. În noaptea de 16-17 decembrie, coloane de manifestanți s-au îndreptat către sediul P.C.R. apărat de trupe de ordine. Oamenii au aruncat cu pietre, dintr-o librărie au fost scoase și arse „operele” lui Ceaușescu. Autoritățile au ripostat cu gaze lacrimogene și jeturi de apă, operând totodată arestări.

Cu toate acestea, pe 17 decembrie pastorul Tökés a fost bătut până la sânge de agenții Securității și trimis ulterior la Zalău pentru a fi anchetat.

Nicoleta Dumitrescu-Mihai Manea-Cristian Nita-Adrian Pascu-Aurel Trandafir-Madalina Trandafir, *Istoria Romanilor, Manual pentru clasa a XII-a*, București, Humanitas, 1999, p. 195

## Between two Empires

CODRUȚA MATEI

**H**OW CAN ONE CREATE in a pupil's mind an image as truthful as possible of a human community in a certain moment of history? Usually, the teacher uses all his knowledge and talent to achieve this goal. The educator makes use of textbooks, readers, and carefully selected illustrations or, if the school is endowed with audio-video means, specific materials to these. He/she expects the best results when he/she evaluates the results of his/her efforts! Yet, finally, one observes that in the moment of evaluation, the representations filling the pupil's mind correspond only partially to the image to which he worked, helped by the textbook and the auxiliary materials. The teacher finds in the pupil's exposition old stereotypes and clichés that do not belong to him or her.

For example, I made an interesting experiment with 12 pupils from the 7<sup>th</sup> grade: 6 of them were asked to draw scenes from the Ottoman world, other 6 had to write short essays on the same topic. The drawings were mainly inspired by civilisation, reproducing daily life scenes such as spinning dervishes, Ottoman cortege, and eunuchs, Sultan on the throne, Mehmed II in a moment of meditation. A single drawing represented a cavalcade of the Ottoman troops, and we have to notice that it is not a fighting scene. On the other hand, the essays focused upon the idea that the «Ottomans were the ones who conquered, destroyed and oppressed, without taking into account the national feelings of peoples».

Where does this difference between essay and drawing, between the image constructed by the history teacher and the image that the pupil's story puts forward come from? The illustrations, especially in the world history textbooks, as well as the ones suggested by myself as a teacher, present most of all culture and civilisation scenes. By mimesis probably, the pupils recreate such scenes. On the other hand, the image appearing in the essays is one built up in time, and of which not only the history teacher is responsible, but also several other educative fac-

tors. This image may be founded already by the family during the early childhood, when the children might be told stories about the bravery of the Romanian people and the way it resisted villain enemies such as the Ottoman Turks. The primary school teacher goes along the same line, insisting on the heroic deeds of the Romanians. This is as well the style of the texts with historical subjects contained by the readers for primary schools or by the textbooks for literature in the gymnasium. The poems or the prose narratives depict the characters belonging to the Ottoman world either as cruel or weak, or described in a caricature manner, such as Pasha Hassan, who trembles like a leaf in front of the brave Romanian leader Michael the Brave. We consider that an important contribution in the process of the reproduction of the same mental stereotypical pattern has the religion teacher who overemphasizes the Christian martyrdom inflicted by the cruelty of Turkish «heathens». He insists upon the arrogance of the conqueror Mehmed II who had entered the St. Sofia church on his horse and left Constantinople as a prey to his soldiers. The historical programs to be seen at TV or other media also present the Ottomans in a schematic manner, mainly as cruel enemies of the Romanians and of all Christians, and therefore contribute to the image we could find in the written essays of my pupils. Such an image is thus the outcome of a more general cultural legacy, and not necessarily the result of the direct text of the history textbooks, or of the way the teacher presented the Ottomans (or the Byzantines) in class.

Taking into consideration these complex influences, let us now turn to textbooks and curricula.

### **The framework of the curricula**

Due to the fact that 80-85% of the curriculum is compulsory for the textbook authors, in schoolbooks we can find almost all the topics included in the curricula. Before listing the themes of Byzantine and Ottoman history included in the curricula, we have to take into consideration that in the Romanian school system World History is taught separately from Romanian History. So, World History is taught in the 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> grades, and Romanian History is taught in the 4<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup> grades.

## Topics regarding the history of the Byzantine Empire:

<i>Grade</i>	<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Topics (contents)</i>	<i>Key-words, concepts</i>	<i>Case-study</i>
5th	The decline of the Roman Empire	The persistence of the East Roman Empire		Constantinople
6th	Man and environment	The Medieval City		Constantinople (optional)
	The political map at the beginning of the 2nd millennium	State continuity		Byzantium
	The Medieval State	The organization of the state in medieval Europe		Byz. Empire (optional) (compulsory: France, England, Germany)
8th	Medieval Culture in the Romanian Space	The Byzantine Legacy in Medieval Culture	The influence of the Byzantine World	
9th	Christian Europe and the Islam	Byzantium, the Western Latin world and the Arabs; Byzantine and Arab influences in Western Europe	Papacy, imperial ideology, Orthodoxy, iconoclasm	
10th	Everyday life in Europe during the 17 <sup>th</sup> -18 <sup>th</sup> Centuries		Post-Byzantine Europe, Maritime Europe, Continental Europe (n.b. the curricula gives no explanation about what should be treated as post-Byzantine Europe)	
12th	Romanian Civilization in European context (15-17 <sup>th</sup> c.)		Byzantine influences, Western influences, cultural synthesis	

## Topics regarding the history of the Ottoman Empire:

<i>Grade</i>	<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Topics (contents)</i>	<i>Key-words, concepts</i>	<i>Case-study</i>
6th	Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire	The Formation of the Ottoman Empire	Sovereignty, tribute, Christian solidarity in the defence of Europe	The Conquest of Constantinople
		The relations between the Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire during the 15th century		
	Europe in expansion	The apogee of the Ottoman Empire (optional)		
7th	Restoration and Revolution (1815-1848)	The Romanian Principalities and the Russian-Ottoman relations;		Revolutionary movements: Greece (also Spain and optional Latin America)
	State and Nation in the second part of the 19th century		National movements in the Balkans	
	Conflicts and crises	The Political World Map at the end of the 19th century: main conflict areas		The Balkans
9th	Christian Europe and Islam (n. b. medieval Arab Civilization)		The Koran and prophet (referring to the Arab civilization)	

Between the various textbooks in use, the differences are less in the lists of lessons and more in the concrete way the various themes are treated; this feature is emphasized by the fact that the curricula do not contain indications about how to deal with specific topics, so the text-

books authors are practically free in this respect, or at least are bound only by what they perceive as being socially (or professionally) acceptable.

It is up to the textbook authors to assign more or less pages to the same topic. In this respect, the textbooks authors devote to the Byzantine Empire between 1 and 19 pages, or between 0.4% and 9% of the whole, and to the Ottoman Empire between 0.5 and 10 pages, that is 0.2-5% of the entire text. They also include drawings (Byzantine soldiers, Byzantine monks bringing silk worms from China, a naval battle representing «The Greek Fire», St. Sofia), miniatures (Bulgarian riders fighting Byzantine soldiers; The Council of Nicaea; The Conquest of Constantinople; The cortege of an Ottoman Sultan; Negotiation between Christians and Muslims; The Divan of an Ottoman Sultan; The Siege of Rhodes and the Siege of Vienna; Janissaries; The Topkapı Palace), a cartoon from «Le Petit Journal» («The Rebirth of the Ottoman Question»), pictures (Constantinople Walls; San Vitale from Ravenna; St. Sofia; The Funerary Monument of Osman I in Bursa) and some portraits (Justinian, Theodora, Basil II, Osman I, Mehmed II, Süleyman the Magnificent, Osman II). There are also some general maps of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire in different periods.

### **Byzantium after Byzantium**

This expression used for the first time by Nicolae Iorga (*Byzance après Byzance*, București, 1935), is the dominant idea in our textbooks as concerns Byzantine history. The Romanian textbooks insist on the significance of the Byzantine legacy to the Romanian Medieval states, and present these states as continuing the Byzantine tradition after the fall of the Byzantine Empire.

The presentation of Byzantine history is generally neutral and accurate. Most of the information concerns political (the formation and evolution of the Byzantine state, its administrative organisation) and military aspects (wars, organisation of the army, the use of the Greek Fire). The textbooks for the 9th grade also include special lessons on the Byzantine civilisation and the Byzantine influence in the Romanian territories. In the textbooks for the 5th and 6th grades, there are presented several wars and battles fought by the Byzantines. A special attention is paid to Justinian's efforts to re-establish the Roman Empire

by conquering Northern Africa and Italy, on the Arab siege of Constantinople (7<sup>th</sup> century), on Basil II and the re-conquest of the Balkans (11<sup>th</sup> century), on the crusader conquest of Constantinople (1204) and its gaining back by the Byzantines in 1261, and of course on the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. Some textbooks also mention the Nike rebellion in 532. In addition, the textbooks for the 9<sup>th</sup> grade include information on the Iconoclast struggle of the 8<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> centuries, on the religious Schism of 1054, and on the battle of Mantzikert (1071) and the Seljuk conquest of Asia Minor. One of the textbooks provides some details on the battle at Belasica (1014), and on the fact that Basil II blinded about 14000 Bulgarian prisoners (Oane, Ochescu, 9<sup>th</sup>, p.88), but there are no comments, and the episode is not treated as controversial.

The figures from the Byzantine history presented in the Romanian textbooks are the emperors Justinian and Theodora, Basil II, and Constantin Dragasses. Justinian is presented as a conqueror and lawgiver. Basil II appears in the episode of the blinding Bulgarian prisoners and Constantin Dragasses as a heroic defender of Constantinople.

Most of the textbook authors for high school consider that beginning with the 7<sup>th</sup> century the Byzantine Empire became a Greek Empire. Some of them stress (with bold characters in the text) that «already starting 395 AD, the European space has been gradually divided. The West would have Rome as political and spiritual centre, the East, turned Greek and reorganised, would have Constantinople as capital city (Oane, Ochescu, 9<sup>th</sup>, lesson «Western Romanity. Eastern Romanity», 64). Another textbook considers that «during the first decades of the 7<sup>th</sup> century, the loss of almost all the European territories determined the oblivion of the Latin language. There survived some military or institutional terms, and also the name *romaioi* (*romei*) the Byzantines employed to call themselves, although they spoke Greek. During the 7<sup>th</sup> century the Byzantine Empire became a Greek state. » (Căpiță et alia, 9<sup>th</sup>, 130). Also other authors stress that beginning with the 7<sup>th</sup> century, Greek became the official language in the Byzantine Empire and many of the institutions that preserved a Roman character, were given Greek names.

Only one author considers that one can talk about a «national Greek Empire» (a subtitle). He argues that beginning with the 7<sup>th</sup> century the Empire redesigned its identity and became a Greek «national»

state, making from Orthodoxy its supreme value (Brezeanu, 9<sup>th</sup>, 86). The author, although putting the label in quotation marks, does not bother to explain what really means «national» in this context, and this leaves place for plenty of confusions.

The problem of multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism is not a priority for the textbook authors. Even when they refer to the conflicts between the Byzantine Empire and Bulgarians, Vlachs, Serbs from the Empire, they do not convey the idea of a multiethnic or multicultural society; they only mention facts.

Here and there a number of heresies are mentioned from Egypt, Syria, Palestine, which cover, according to an author «extra-religious conflicts, i.e. ethnical, cultural and political». These heresies are interpreted as a resistance of the «Semitic populations with long cultural traditions» against «the domination and Hellenization tendencies from Constantinople», but there are no further comments (Brezeanu, 9<sup>th</sup>, 81).

All textbooks present Orthodox Christianity and Byzantium as closely connected. The adoption of (Orthodox) Christianity is presented as one of the main features that shaped the Byzantine Empire and its civilisation, and distinguished it from both the classical Roman Empire and the contemporary Western Europe. «The old Roman Empire was a state of religious pluralism, where the single obligation was to respect the imperial cult. In the Byzantine Empire Christianity was state religion. The Church generally obeyed to the Imperial will. In several occasions, emperors interfered in the theological disputes, defending the Orthodoxy or, sometimes, favouring various heresies. The bureaucratic centralism and the subordination of the Church towards the imperial power revealed the deep difference between the Byzantine Empire and the Western medieval states. (Madgearu, in Căpiță et alia, 9<sup>th</sup>, p. 131). The Orthodox religion is presented as an asset of the Byzantine civilisation, which influenced positively the culture and art of Byzantium and the Orthodox peoples.

The history of the Byzantine Empire is integrated in the Romanian history with respect to the situation of Dobroudja during the 4<sup>th</sup> - 6<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> centuries. Some textbooks mention the short-lived re-establishment of the Byzantine domination north of the Danube, but without further comments.

The Byzantine heritage seems to be very important for the Romanian history. Using Nicolae Iorga's «Byzantium after Byzantium» well-

known formula, the textbook authors try to underline the idea that the Romanian medieval civilisation was the successor of the Byzantine civilisation. The textbooks for Romanian history consider the Byzantine influences in the political and juridical organisation as well as in the cultural life of Wallachia and Moldavia.

Under the title *The Byzantine Heritage in Medieval Romanian Culture*, and providing a quotation from Nicolae Iorga's book, some authors stress that «Moldavia and Wallachia considered themselves the legitimate inheritors of Byzantium, and the Romanian princes, as we can see them represented in the frescos on the monastery walls, wore crowns and garments similar to those of the Byzantine emperors. The court ceremonial imitated almost entirely the Byzantine one [...]. The Byzantine influence is also evident in our ecclesiastical monuments» (Lazăr, Lupu, 8<sup>th</sup>, 91).

One of the textbook authors argues: «the Romanian medieval civilisation was born and defined its original features in the area of the Orthodox Byzantine civilisation, nearby the Southern and Eastern Slavs. The Byzantine influences did not make the Romanian civilisation a perfect copy of the New Rome's own civilisation. On the contrary, models from Constantinople found north of the Danube their expression in a synthesis differing in its meanings not only from the Byzantine [civilisation], but also from the creations of the Orthodox neighbours of the Romanians» (Brezeanu, 9<sup>th</sup>, p. 95).

The textbook authors emphasise the idea that Byzantium exerted a strong influence upon the whole European civilisation, which took over the juridical, political and cultural Byzantine model. «The Byzantine civilisation survived to the fall of Constantinople», influencing politically and culturally the entire Europe. The Ottoman State took over institutions and customs inspired from the Byzantine tradition. The Patriarch of Constantinople was considered the natural inheritor of the emperor and his residence, the Phanar, became a real centre of the Greek spirituality. Some regions, such as Mount Athos, enjoyed certain autonomy preserving intact the Byzantine structures. In the Slavic world the Byzantine influences were overwhelming: the spreading of the Orthodoxy, the Cyrillic alphabet, the state concept, the government forms, the education, the juridical system etc. The Byzantine literature was translated into Slavonic, supplying models for the national literatures. Between the Byzantine East and Western Europe there existed a continuous connection. Eastern mer-

chandise arrived in the most remote regions of the West, and professors of Byzantine extraction taught Greek in Venice and Florence. They brought manuscripts containing the masterpieces of Greek literature, which would help the European humanists to rediscover the Greek antiquity. Byzantine architects and mosaic masters were asked to build and to decorate religious monuments in Western countries. Representatives in this respect were the churches San Vitale in Ravenna, San Marco in Venice, the mosaics which adorn churches in Rome, the Byzantine frescoes in southern Italy» (Burlec, Rotundu, 9<sup>th</sup>, p. 76).

### **The Romanian Principalities in the shadow of the Half-moon**

Political and military aspects prevail also in the presentation of the Ottoman Empire. The organisation of the Ottoman State and army, and the Ottoman conquests are almost the sole aspects included in the textbooks for the 6<sup>th</sup> grade. The textbooks for the 10<sup>th</sup> grade include a lesson on the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the European states during the 17<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, and just mention that the failure of the Ottoman economy contributed to the decline of the empire. In all textbooks, a special attention is devoted to the relation of the Ottoman Empire with the Romanian Principalities, the authors insisting on the Romanian anti-Ottoman resistance, and on the fact that contrary to the Balkan lands and to Hungary, the Romanian Principalities were not subject to direct Ottoman administration, but continued to exist as vassal states.

The textbooks underline the conflictual relations between the Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire during the Middle Ages. One of the textbooks for 6<sup>th</sup> grade includes a paragraph entitled: *The Romanian Principalities – the Gateway of Christianity*. Generally, the textbooks insist on the defeats the Romanians inflicted to the Ottomans, especially on the battles of Rovine (1394 or 1395), Belgrade (1456), Vaslui (1475) and Călugăreni (1595). In one of the textbooks the authors even proudly report that «The few defeats suffered by Mehmed II were caused by the leaders of the Romanian States: Iancu of Hunedoara defeated him at Belgrade in 1456, Vlad the Impaler in the expedition of 1462, and Stephan the Great in 1476» (Vlad, Băluțoiu, 6<sup>th</sup>, p. 69). The fact that in 1462, in spite of the indecisive military result, the sultan obtained a political victory by replacing Vlad the Impaler with his brother

Radu the Handsome, and that in 1476 the single open battle was won by the Ottomans at Războieni seems to be forgotten.

The bias in presenting the military conflicts between the Ottomans and the Romanians puts the textbook authors in a difficult position when they have to explain why the Romanian Principalities became vassal states of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, all authors invoke the disproportion between the Romanian and Ottoman forces, and the limited help coming from other Christian states. Some authors prefer to change the line of discussion, and without detailing on the Ottoman superiority, insist on analysing why the Ottomans did not transform the Romanian Principalities into full Ottoman provinces (*paşalik*); of course, they argue that the main cause was the Romanian successful resistance, based on «the politics of the Romanian bloc promoted by Mircea the Elder and continued successfully by Iancu of Hunedoara and Stephan the Great» (Scurtu et alia, 12<sup>th</sup>, p. 33). All textbooks also insist on the difference between the autonomy of the Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman provinces in the Balkans or in Hungary, and present the persistence of the Romanian states as a great success. The textbooks of Romanian history go into details with respect to the Ottoman political and economic domination, insisting on its negative impact on the Romanian Principalities.

To conclude, the Ottoman Empire is an important factor for the Romanian history from the late 14<sup>th</sup> to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Yet, it is always presented as an «external» element, although a part of the Romanian territories and population (the Dobroudja, southern Bessarabia, the Banat, and several ports on the Danube) were for a long period of time under direct Ottoman administration.

The textbooks for the 6<sup>th</sup> grade mention several events of the Ottoman history: the battles of Kossovo (1389), Nicopolis (1396) and Ankara (1402), the conquest of Constantinople (1453), the siege of Vienna (1529), the battle of Lepanto (1571); a special attention is devoted to the battles fought by the Romanians against the Ottomans during the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Almost all these events are mentioned in a factual, non-controversial, manner. Some affective elements may be found in the description of the conquest of Constantinople, where the accent is put on the heroism of the defenders led by the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine Dragasses. Although the plundering of the city and the enslavement of the population are mentioned, using an excerpt from the

Byzantine historian Dukas, the authors of one of the textbooks insist on the fact that Mehmed II tried to stop the destruction of Constantinople in order to save the priceless values of the city.

The textbooks for the 9<sup>th</sup> grade only rarely include events of the Ottoman history, while those for the 10<sup>th</sup> grade mention the second siege of Vienna (1683) as the beginning of the Ottoman territorial decline, and also several peace treaties from Karlowitz (1699) to Bucharest (1812). The textbooks for the 7<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> grades present favourably the struggle of the Balkan peoples against the Ottomans and the creation of national states in South-Eastern Europe. The Ottoman Empire's taking part at World War I is barely mentioned, and the break-up of the empire is almost entirely neglected.

Generally, the presentation of the internal structure of the Ottoman Empire is rather sketchy. An exception is the textbook for the 6<sup>th</sup> grade signed by C. Vlad and V. Băluțoiu, which discusses the different titles of the Ottoman sovereign (*emir, sultan, caliph*), the Ottoman (Islamic) world-vision (The House of Islam, the House of War), and several Ottoman institutions ( *jihad, devşirme, janissaries, spahi, haraç*); their presentation is not devoid of several confusions and errors. Several terms and concepts of Muslim religion and civilisation are presented also in the textbooks for the 9<sup>th</sup> grade, but this occurs in the lessons devoted to the medieval Arab civilisation.

In textbooks, the term of *Ottoman* is not constantly employed. Frequently, the authors fluctuate between *Ottoman* and *Turk*. Only in one textbook does one find an attempt to explain the difference between the two terms, but the result makes things even less clear. With the subtitle *Ottomans and Turks*, one can read that: «Initially the term *Ottoman* defined the descendants of Osman. Later, it acquired a social significance, designating the elite of the society. Thus, the Ottomans were members of the ruling feudal class, with military and administrative functions. They were considered the Sultan's slaves, because they came from Christian children taken as blood tribute (*devşirme*). Converted to the Islamic law and having received a fine education, they were growing up to enjoy power and influence. The *Turks* were the Muslim population from Asia Minor (Anatolia), which had been settled here (colonised) after the Seljuk conquest in the 11<sup>th</sup> century. Most of them were poor, bound on the land and despised by the Ottomans» (Băluțoiu, Vlad, 6<sup>th</sup>, 67).

One textbook states that «In the Ottoman State all nationalities

(*neamuri*) co-operated. In fact, an important part of the ruling class was not made of Turks, but of renegades from the subjugated Christian peoples. In the same time, the Ottoman state was organised militarily and had a very good system of tax collection. The naval forces recruited their soldiers especially from the Greek population of the islands and harbours. The land army consisted of well-trained infantrymen and cavalry. The janissaries, pedestrian soldiers, were brought as children from the Balkan states to the empire's capital, raised in the religion of the Koran [...] In the Balkans, the political division of the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries favoured the setting up of the new rule. The natives, who were allowed to preserve their churches and to practice their own religion, agreed to live under the authority of the Porte. Anyhow, the Christians hoped that the Ottoman rule would not last long» (Pippidi et alia, 6<sup>th</sup>, 91). The dictionary provided in the lesson explains, «renegade means a person who abandons his country or his faith». To strengthen these ideas, the authors supply a quotation from J. Carpentier and F. Lebrun on the rule of Süleyman the Magnificent, stressing the idea that during that period of time «the Ottoman Empire, and especially the Balkans enjoyed internal peace and a relative prosperity». According to this information and combining it with a general assessment, placed at the beginning of the lesson and regarding both the Ottoman Empire and the Roman-German Empire («These empires ruled territories with different political traditions, whose inhabitants often upraised again the foreign domination» (Pippidi et alia, 6<sup>th</sup>, 90), the pupils are asked to answer: «We say that England and France were national monarchies. Explain why Charles V's Empire and the Ottoman Empire were multinational or universal monarchies» (Pippidi et alia, 6<sup>th</sup>, 91). This is a textbook for children between 12-13 years of age.

In a textbook for high school, there is inserted a small study-case about the *Influence of the Ottomans in the Balkans*. It is interesting to notice that on the same page, in the text of the lesson *The invasions of the Turkish-Mongol peoples*, there is a part devoted to the Turks and their early history. The authors did not consider it necessary to establish or to sign a connection between the two terms. It seemed obvious for them that all readers must know the significance and the synonymy of those two terms. «The new domination [in the Balkans] determined strong changes in the religious and social structure of the population in the region. The immigration of a great number of Muslims in an origin-

nally Christian region did not generate serious problems at that moment, because the Turkish political system did not impose an exclusive religious orientation. [...] The Ottomans tolerated the religion of their Balkan subjects and did not force them to become Muslims. In many territories, the Muslims did not absorb the Christians. They have adapted themselves to the life style of those [the Muslims], but maintaining, independently, their own customs. Instead, the Christians from outside the Ottoman Empire tried to put a limit and to isolate the Ottoman world by building up a chain of defensive fortresses» (Oane, Ochescu, 9<sup>th</sup>, 68).

Some textbooks do not pay any attention to the problems of the ethnic or religious relations in the Ottoman Empire. Another textbook states, without any further explanation, that in the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries the enriched Greeks conspired for the rebirth of Byzantium. «The Christians were a *tolerated* population, the only ones to pay tribute and taxes. The inter-ethnic conflicts undermined the unity of the empire» (Scurtu et alia, 10<sup>th</sup>, 105).

Generally there are no negative stereotypes regarding the Balkan peoples, the textbooks authors avoiding to label, or to make comments on the «others». Yet, in some of the textbooks, one does find the expression of a certain religious prejudiced thinking against the Muslims, for the Ottomans who are labelled as «unfaithful» or «enemies of the Cross» (Băluțoiu, Vlad, 6<sup>th</sup> p.70). An old direction perpetuated from the 19<sup>th</sup> century considers that the «*Turk*» is the bad guy who came to make slaves and to plunder, and the «*Phanariot*» ruler, who is especially «*Greek*», caused only troubles to the Romanian states.

For the Ottoman Empire, the most important figures presented in the textbooks are: Osman (only mentioned); Mehmed II – an active, cultivated and open-minded sultan (Băluțoiu, Vlad, 6<sup>th</sup>, p. 69), noble with the vanquished, he had guaranteed the confessional freedom of the Christians (Burlec et alia, 6<sup>th</sup> p. 55); Süleyman the Magnificent – as a reformer of the law system; Sinan-Pasha – in the context of the battle of Călugăreni (1595) (Oane, Ochescu, 8<sup>th</sup> p. 73)

Islam is presented as a determining feature of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, due to the fact that the details on the Muslim religion are provided in the lessons on the medieval Arab world, in the lessons dedicated to the Ottoman Empire the accent is put on the ideology of the Holy War (*jihād*), and on the concept that the world was divided into

the House of Islam and the House of War. These elements are also used as partial explanations for the Ottoman expansion during the 14<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> centuries. Generally the textbook authors do not insist on the impact Islam had on the internal structure of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, one of the textbooks «innovates» in this field: discussing the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries, the authors argue that «The crisis of the High Porte came from the lack of adjustment of the state's and society's structures (theocratic military system) to the imperatives of modernisation» (Scurtu et alia, 10<sup>th</sup>, p. 105). It is obvious that the authors have copied this mistake from somewhere else. The same authors believe that in the Ottoman Empire only the Christians paid «tribute and taxes» (Scurtu et alia, 10<sup>th</sup>, p. 105).

Another more general feature: most of the authors mention that the Christians had an inferior position in the Ottoman state, but do not find this abnormal, and do not discuss in detail this aspect. Still, there are also textbooks whose authors mention that the Ottomans allowed to the subject populations to maintain their religion and churches (Pippidi et alia, 6<sup>th</sup>, p. 91), and even praise Mehmed II for having been «generous with the vanquished, guaranteeing the religious freedom of the Christians... » (Burlec et alia, 6<sup>th</sup>, p. 55). Yet, here as well as in other parts of the textbooks, Islam is not a positive asset, and its role in the flourishing of the Ottoman culture is completely neglected.

If one analyses this comprehensive fresco offered by Romanian history textbooks, with its lights and shadows, one cannot ignore that the well-balanced discourse, the unbiased attitude and the endeavour to be as near as possible to truth are predominant. Some authors have tried to avoid stereotypes. One can only hope that this attitude will be prevailing and, over the time, the image impressed upon pupils' minds will be the most appropriate one.

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# Byzantine and Ottoman Studies in Romanian Historiography

## A Brief Overview

BOGDAN MURGESCU

THE BYZANTINE STUDIES have a rich tradition in Romania. A first period of important accomplishments began short before World War I and bore its fruits mainly during the interwar period. It was first of all a symptom of cultural maturity: Romanian intellectuals gradually escaped the cliché imported from the West in the 19th century that Byzantium had been a decaying civilization, unworthy to be scientifically dealt with. The increased interest towards Byzantium was connected both with the new vigor of Orthodoxy in the Romanian culture, and with influences coming from Western scholarship, where Byzantine studies were flourishing in the first part of the 20th century. The basic knowledge of old Greek, provided by the classical high schools in most Romanian towns, also favored the investment in Byzantine studies.

During the interwar period, Byzantine studies in Romania were dominated by Nicolae Iorga. Iorga's interest in Byzantine topics, rather indirect during his youth<sup>1</sup>, grew gradually, especially after his founding of the first Romanian Institute for South-East European studies in 1913<sup>2</sup>. In 1924 he organized in Bucharest an international congress of Byzantine studies, and in the 1930s he published his major contributions in this field of scholarship: *Histoire de la vie byzantine* (3 volumes, 1934) and *Byzance après Byzance* (1935).

Yet, Iorga was not alone in this endeavor. Besides him, several other distinguished scholars contributed significantly to the knowledge

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<sup>1</sup> An exception was the small and nowadays almost forgotten synthesis Nicolae Iorga, *The Byzantine Empire*, London, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> Andrei Pippidi, «Pour l'histoire du premier Institut des Etudes Sud-Est Européennes en Roumanie. I», *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, XVI, 1978, nr.1, especially pp. 146-156; see also the studies collected in Eugen Stănescu (ed.), *N. Iorga, istoric al Bizanțului*, București, 1971.

of Byzantine history and art, published extensively in French, and were recognized as peers by Western scholars.

Gheorghe Brătianu studied during his youth the Genoese trade in the Black Sea region in the late 13<sup>th</sup> century<sup>3</sup>, and opened thus a whole direction of research on the role of the Black Sea as a connection area between the Italians and the Mongol dominated East<sup>4</sup>. He also wrote several contributions on themes of purely Byzantine history, published them in major academic journals, such as «Byzantion» or «Byzantinische Zeitschrift», and/or in separate volumes<sup>5</sup>.

Other important scholars active in the interwar period were: Orest Tafrali, who wrote in Paris a thesis on Thessaloniki already before World War I and continued in the interwar period with studies on Byzantine art in the Romanian territories<sup>6</sup>; Nicolae Bănescu, who has studied especially the Byzantine politics and administration at the Lower Danube during the 10th-12th centuries<sup>7</sup>; Ion D. Ștefănescu, who investigated mainly the Byzantine and Romanian religious art<sup>8</sup>.

World War II and the Communist takeover practically destroyed this flourishing direction of scholarship. Iorga was killed by members of the right-wing Iron Guard, Brătianu died in a Communist prison, while N. Bănescu and I. D. Ștefănescu were ousted from the University

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<sup>3</sup> Gheorghe Brătianu, *Actes des notaires génois de Péra et de Caffa de la fin du treizième siècle (1281-1290)*, București, 1927; idem, *Recherches sur le commerce génois*, Paris, 1929.

<sup>4</sup> Idem, «La Mer Noire, plaque tournante du trafic international à la fin du Moyen Age», *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, XXI, 1944, pp. 36-69. Brătianu also wrote a huge synthesis on the history of the Black Sea up to the end of the 15th century, which includes important insights into the Byzantine history and which was published only after his death in the communist prison of Sighetul Marmăției (idem, *La Mer Noire: des origines à la conquête ottomane*, München, 1969).

<sup>5</sup> Idem, *Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'empire byzantin*, Paris, 1936; idem, *Études byzantines d'histoire économique et sociale*, Paris, 1938.

<sup>6</sup> Orest Tafrali, *Thessalonique des origines au XIV siècle*, Paris, 1919; idem, *Le siège de Constantinople dans les fresques des églises de Bucovine*, Paris, 1924.

<sup>7</sup> Nicolae Bănescu, *Les duchés byzantins de Paristrion (Paradounavon) et de Bulgarie*, București, 1946. Nicolae Bănescu wrote also a general synthesis of Byzantine history, which is now being published posthumously: Nicolae Bănescu, *Istoria Imperiului Bizantin. Vol.I. Imperiul creștin și asaltul invaziilor (313-610)*, Ed. Tudor Teoteoi, București, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Ion D. Ștefănescu, *L'illustration des liturgies dans l'art de Byzance et de l'Orient*, Bruxelles, 1936.

and from all academic facilities up to a late partial rehabilitation during the 1960s. Equally devastating was the termination of the teaching of Greek in high schools after the education reform in 1948.

Thus, the 1950s were completely unfavorable to Byzantine studies in Romania. Besides the political constraints, the forced isolation towards Western scholarship forced even scholars educated in the West before the Communist takeover (Vasile Grecu, Alexandru Elian, Ion Barnea) to avoid larger research themes and to be content when allowed to publish very concrete source studies.

In the 1960s the Communist leadership turned from obedience to Moscow to a certain opening to the West in foreign policy and to National-Communism in the ideological sphere. This move included strengthening the ties with other South-East European countries, and even asserting a specific identity for South-Eastern Europe, where the ideological division between East and West mattered less, and where Communist and non-Communist countries could use their common historical heritage for building new forms of cooperation. In connection with the reassessment of the interwar intellectual traditions, this context allowed to the Byzantine studies to regain their impetus in Romania. In 1962 was founded the Romanian Society for Byzantine Studies, and in 1963 the Institute for South-East European Studies. A new generation of scholars emerged, and with help from the new «Association Internationale des Études Sud-Est Européennes» they managed to establish scientific contacts abroad and to participate at the international development of scholarship. In fact, this generation of scholars educated in the 1960s still dominates the Byzantine studies in Romania.

This generation consists of about 20 significant scholars, based mainly in Bucharest; to these, one should add other scholars who indirectly contribute to the Byzantine studies, but whose main historical interests lie not in Byzantine history.

The main directions of the Byzantine studies in Romania since the 1960s are:

- Byzantine archeology and numismatics, with a special focus on the Lower Danube area during the 4<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> centuries and on the Byzantine impact on the Romanian civilization<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Ion Barnea, *Din istoria Dobrogei. II. Romanii la Dunărea de Jos*, București, 1968; Ion Barnea, Ștefan Ștefănescu, *Din istoria Dobrogei. III. Bizantini, români și bul*

- Edition of written sources. While during the 1950s-1960s the focus has been on late Byzantine chronicles<sup>10</sup>, during the late 1960s and 1970s there have been edited the Byzantine sources regarding the Romanians<sup>11</sup> and chronicles regarding earlier periods of Byzantine history<sup>12</sup>. Generally, the editors came from the older generation, while the scholars educated after World War II only rarely invested in editing sources<sup>13</sup>. A significant exception is the increased interest in Byzantine theological sources after 1990, which, besides several reprints of earlier editions, also brought some new translations<sup>14</sup>.
- Theology and church history. The main interest of the Romanian historians lies with the history of early Christianity in the Romanian territories, and with the influence of the Byzantine church on the Romanian medieval church, but some contributions are valuable also for the general religious history of the Byzantine Empire<sup>15</sup>.
- Ideological and institutional impact of Byzantium on the Romanian

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*gari la Dunărea de Jos*, București, 1971; Dan Gh. Teodor, *Romanitatea carpato-danubiană și Bizanțul în veacurile V-XI e.n.*, Iași, 1981; Alexandru Suceveanu, Alexandru Barnea, *La Dobroudja Roumaine*, București, 1991 (the part written by Alexandru Barnea covers the 4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> centuries). There has been published also a series of archeological monographs for late Roman and Byzantine sites in the Lower Danube area.

<sup>10</sup> See especially Vasile Grecu's critical editions of the late Byzantine chronicles: Ducas, *Istoria turco-bizantină (1341-1462)*, București, 1958; Critobul din Imbros, *Din domnia lui Mahomed al II-lea. Anii 1451-1467*, București, 1963; Georgios Sphrantzes, *Memorii 1401-1477*, București, 1968; Laonic Chalcocondil, *Expuneri istorice*, București, 1968.

<sup>11</sup> The series *Fontes Historiae Dacoromanae*. Three volumes of this series are dedicated to the Byzantine sources: vol.II (eds. H. Mihăescu, Gh. Ștefan, Vl. Iliescu et alia), București, 1970; vol.III (eds. Al. Elian and N.-Ș. Tanașoca), București, 1975; vol. IV (eds. H. Mihăescu, R. Lăzărescu, N.-Ș. Tanașoca and T. Teoteoi), București, 1982.

<sup>12</sup> See especially the editions published by Haralamb Mihăescu: Procopiu din Caesarea, *Războiul cu goții*, București, 1963; Procopiu din Caesarea, *Istoria secretă*, București, 1972; Mauriciu, *Arta militară*, București, 1970. Theophylact Symocatta, *Istorie bizantină. Domnia împăratului Mauricius, 582-602*, București, 1985.

<sup>13</sup> An important exception is Nicolae-Șerban Tanașoca, who, besides co-editing *Fontes Historiae Dacoromanae*, has also published a significant anthology of Byzantine literary sources (*Literatura Bizanțului*, București, 1971).

<sup>14</sup> See a list of these editions in Vasile Merticariu, *Études et recherches de byzantinologie dans les années 1991-1995*, in *Études Byzantines et Post-Byzantines*, III, București, 1997, pp. 236-238, 246-248.

<sup>15</sup> See especially Ion Barnea, *Les monuments paléochrétiens de Roumanie*, Citta del Vaticano, 1977.

Principalities (following especially Nicolae Iorga's idea about Byzantium after Byzantium). Besides the institutional monograph of late Valentin Al. Georgescu<sup>16</sup>, important books were published on this topic by Andrei Pippidi<sup>17</sup> and Daniel Barbu<sup>18</sup>.

There are also other directions of study, which are related with the Byzantine studies and which sometimes illuminate various aspects of the Byzantine history:

- Cultural and especially art history<sup>19</sup>.
- History of the Romanians living in the Balkans (Vlachs) during the Middle Ages, and the history of the second Bulgarian empire<sup>20</sup>.
- Black Sea studies, especially for the 13<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries, but focusing more on the Venetians, Genoese and Mongols than on the Byzantine, and continuing thus the direction designed in the interwar period by Gheorghe Brătianu<sup>21</sup>.

Other aspects of Byzantine history are almost completely neglected in Romanian scholarship. Interest has been particularly low for the more general aspects of Byzantine history and civilization<sup>22</sup>. The Romanian historians have been interested mainly in the imperial policy, and in the concrete Byzantine impact on the history of the Romanians, often neglecting thus the complexity, diversity, and dynamics of the Byzantine society. And, connected to this, the challenges to the imperial authority are often underestimated, the Romanian historians prefer-

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<sup>16</sup> Valentin Al. Georgescu, *Bizanțul și instituțiile românești pînă la mijlocul secolului al XVIII-lea*, București, 1980.

<sup>17</sup> Andrei Pippidi, *Tradiția politică bizantină în țările române în secolele XVI-XVIII*, București, 1983.

<sup>18</sup> Daniel Barbu, *Byzance, Rome et les Roumains. Essais sur la production politique de la foi au Moyen Âge*, București, 1998.

<sup>19</sup> Răzvan Theodorescu, *Bizanț, Balcani, Occident la începuturile culturii medievale românești (secolele X-XIV)*, București, 1974; idem, *Roumains et balkaniques dans la civilisation sud-est européenne*, Bucarest, 1999.

<sup>20</sup> E. Stănescu (coord.), *Răscoala și statul Asăneștilor. Culegere de studii*, București, 1989.

<sup>21</sup> Pontic studies were animated during the 1990s especially by Șerban Papacostea and his disciples. A major achievement was the publishing of the international journal «Il Mar Nero». See also the bibliography compiled by Ovidiu Cristea, *Bibliografia istorică românească a Mării Negre*, București, 1996.

<sup>22</sup> Illustrative is the fact that the most ambitious essay to capture these general aspects still is an annotated chronology (Stelian Brezeanu, *O istorie a Imperiului Bizantin*, București, 1981).

ring to believe the official version that the Byzantine emperor had undisputed absolute power over all his subjects, including the patriarch and the Orthodox church.

Yet, the main challenge for the Romanian Byzantine studies is not conceptual, but sociological. In spite of some efforts to animate the Byzantine studies<sup>23</sup>, the interest of the young generation of historians for Byzantine history is meager. While during the 1960s and 1970s it was fashionable, politically safe, and professionally rewarding to invest into Byzantine studies, after 1990 it is mainly contemporary history which is socially asked for. We have to take into consideration also the fact that the lack of basic knowledge of Greek implies the need to invest more time/energy during undergraduate and even postgraduate studies; due to the fact that young historians generally avoid such an investment, a good command of medieval Greek is achieved almost only by graduates in classical languages and/or theology. Therefore, excepting archeology/numismatics and theology, there are only few chances that there should be an equivalent replacement of generations in the Romanian Byzantine studies.

With Dimitrie Cantemir's early 18th century contributions<sup>24</sup>, the Ottoman studies have an even older tradition in Romania than the Byzantine studies. This interest in Ottoman problems is understandable if we consider the fact that for several centuries the Ottoman Empire was the dominant power, which determined in various respects the fate of the Romanian Principalities. Yet, during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Romanian historical studies expanded and became increasingly professional, the Ottoman influence in Romania was practically gone, and the Romanian historians were more interested in the relationship with the West and in the Romanian struggle with the Ottomans, than in understanding Ottoman history and realities.

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<sup>23</sup> For example, in Iași there has been initiated the publication of a specialized journal, «Byzantion. Revistă de arte bizantine».

<sup>24</sup> Dimitrie Cantemir (1673-1723) wrote his major contributions on Ottoman studies in Latin during his exile in Russia: *Incrementorum atque decrementorum Aulae Othomanicae libri tres*, and *De muhammedana religione, deque politico musulmanae gentis regimine*. The history of the Ottoman Empire has been published in English (1734), in French (1743), in German (1745) and in Romanian (1876). The book on the Muslim religious system has been published in Russian (1722) and in Romanian (1987). See also Alexandru Duțu, Paul Cernovodeanu (eds.), *Dimitrie Cantemir, Historian of South-Eastern Europe and Oriental Civilizations*, Bucharest, 1973.

An exception was Nicolae Iorga. Iorga published enormously, both volumes of documents and original studies. Chronologically, his contributions focused most on the late Middle Ages and the modern era, i.e. the period when the Ottoman Empire was the major political power in South-Eastern Europe and in the Middle East. Therefore, many of his studies on Romanian or European history were at the same time contributions to the knowledge of the Ottoman Empire<sup>25</sup>. Consequently, when Karl Lamprecht searched for a historian who should write a history of the Ottoman Empire for the series *Allgemeine Staatengeschichte*, he decided to ask Iorga, who was already writing for the same series a history of the Romanians, to take over also the Ottoman Empire. Iorga knew no Turkish; yet, he was able to use Ottoman sources translated into Western languages or into Romanian, and also a wide range of relevant European sources, which he combined with an extensive knowledge of secondary literature and with an acute perception of significant historical issues. The result was an impressive 5 volumes history of the Ottoman Empire, which remained for several decades the main reference book on this topic in Western scholarship<sup>26</sup>. Reactions in Turkey were rather bivalent, due to the interwar Turkish bivalent attitudes towards the Ottoman heritage. Iorga's insistence on historical continuities and/or on the common features shared by the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires generated a reply from Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, the most important Turkish historian of the 1930s<sup>27</sup>. Yet, in spite of Köprülü's criticism, Iorga's way of integrating Ottoman history into European history made his approach particularly attractive in Turkey, and a Turkish translation of the last volume of Iorga's Ottoman history was published in 1948.

As already mentioned, Iorga's interest for Ottoman history was an exception in the Romanian academic landscape of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The rejection of the Ottoman realities as non-European is just part of the explanation; equally important was the fact that, knowing no

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<sup>25</sup> A good example is the 6 volume series N. Iorga, *Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades du XV<sup>ème</sup> siècle*, Paris-București, 1899-1916.

<sup>26</sup> Nicolae Iorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, nach den Quellen dargestellt*, 5 volumes, Gotha, 1908-1913. See also the comments of Maria-Matilda Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, *Nicolae Iorga – a Romanian historian of the Ottoman Empire*, Bucharest, 1972.

<sup>27</sup> Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1935.

Turkish, the Romanian historians of that period had practically no direct access to Ottoman sources.

A first generation of Ottomanists was educated only in the 1930s and 1940s. From about 1932 some young historians had the opportunity to specialize in Ottoman studies abroad (e.g. Aurel Decei and Maria-Matilda Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru). Since 1933 Turkish began to be taught at the Superior School for Archival Studies by an Armenian refugee, Hagop Djalunian Siruni. In 1935 the well-known German scholar Franz Babinger was hired first by the University of Bucharest, and then by the University of Jassy. In Jassy Babinger founded in 1940 an Institute of Turcology<sup>28</sup>; although the Institute's activity was discontinued due to World War II, during the late 1930s and the 1940s several young scholars could acquire the basic competence of studying directly Ottoman sources (e.g. Mihail Guboglu, Ioan Matei, Nicoară Beldiceanu, Mustafa Ali Mehmed).

Some of the historians of this generation began to publish already in the late 1930s and in the early 1940s<sup>29</sup>. The late 1940s and the early 1950s were a particularly difficult period also for the Romanian Ottoman studies (Nicoară Beldiceanu emigrated and became a leading figure of Ottoman studies in France; Aurel Decei stayed several years in prison), but after the late 1950s conditions began to improve. The Romanian Association for Oriental Studies and its journal «*Studia et Acta Orientalia*» (published in foreign languages since 1957) hosted also important contributions to Ottoman history. Yet, the main effort was made in the field of translating into Romanian the Ottoman sources relevant for Romanian history<sup>30</sup>; Mihail Guboglu also published synchronic

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<sup>28</sup> Dan Prodan, *Din tradițiile orientalisticii române. Franz Babinger și Institutul de Turcologie de la Iași (1940-1945)*, «Caietele Laboratorului de Studii Otomane», 2, 1993, pp. 164-201.

<sup>29</sup> Maria-Matilda Alexandrescu-Dersca, *La campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402)*, București, 1943. See also the Ottoman studies included especially in the journal «Balcania» (1938-1945).

<sup>30</sup> Mihail Guboglu, *Catalogul documentelor turcești*, I-II, București, 1960, 1965; *Cronici turcești privind țările române. Extrase* (eds. Mihail Guboglu and Mustafa A. Mehmed), I-III, București, 1966-1980; Mustafa A. Mehmed, *Documente turcești privind istoria României*, I-III, București, 1976-1986; *Călători străini despre țările române*, I-X, București, 1968-2000 (one of the editors was Maria-Matilda Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, who included several Ottoman texts); Mihail Guboglu, *Crestomație turcă*, București, 1978.

tables for the Muslim chronology and an album of Ottoman paleography<sup>31</sup>, which were recognized as important scientific instruments not only in Romania, but also abroad. During the 1970s historians of this generation published also original, but only medium-value, general works on Ottoman history and civilization<sup>32</sup>.

A second generation of Romanian specialists in Ottoman studies was educated during the 1960s and early 1970s. Although the personal background of these specialists differed a lot, they generally could benefit from the increased opportunities to establish international contacts with major scholars in the field of Ottoman studies. And, even more important, as Romania had improved significantly its political relations with Turkey, the Romanians gained an easier access to Ottoman archives than most other Balkan scholars.

These scholars educated in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Mihai Maxim, Tahsin Gemil, Valeriu Veliman, Cristina Feneșan) continued to publish Ottoman sources relevant to the Romanian history<sup>33</sup>, but also engaged in more systematic studies on the Ottoman-Romanian relationship. Three directions of research were prevalent. First of all, there was the issue of the special political status of the Romanian Principalities towards the Ottoman Empire, particularly sensitive in a period when Romania asserted a special position between the Soviet bloc and the West. The Romanian specialists in Ottoman history of both generations already mentioned investigated the Muslim vision of the world, and argued that this special status was founded on the Muslim concept of ‘*ahd*’<sup>34</sup>. A second direction of research, inspired by the ear-

<sup>31</sup> Mihail Guboglu, *Tabela sincronice*, București, 1955; idem, *Paleografia și diplomatica turco-osmană. Studiu și album*, București, 1958.

<sup>32</sup> Mustafa A. Mehmed, *Istoria turcilor*, București, 1976; Aurel Decei, *Istoria Imperiului Otoman până la 1656*, București, 1978; Mehmed Ali Ekrem, *Civilizația turcă*, București, 1981.

<sup>33</sup> Mihai Maxim, *Culegere de texte otomane. Fasc.I. Izvoare documentare și juridice (sec.XV-XX)*, București, 1974; Tahsin Gemil, *Relațiile Țărilor Române cu Poarta Otomană în documente turcești (1601-1712)*, București, 1984; Valeriu Veliman, *Relațiile româno-otomane (1711-1821). Documente turcești*, București, 1984.

<sup>34</sup> Ion Matei, «Quelques problèmes concernant le régime de la domination otomane dans les pays roumains», *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, X., 1972, nr.1, pp. 65-81, and XI, 1973, nr.1, pp. 81-95; Mihai Maxim, *Țările Române și Înalta Poartă. Cadrul juridic al raporturilor româno-otomane în evul mediu*, București, 1993; idem, *L'Empire Ottoman au nord du Danube et l'autonomie des Principautés Roumaines au XVIIe siècle. Etudes et documents*, Istanbul, 1999 (which includes several studies published in the 1970s and 1980s).

lier research of Mihai Berza based on European sources<sup>35</sup>, investigated the Ottoman sources in order to indicate the magnitude and the fluctuations of the Romanian economic obligations towards the Ottoman Empire<sup>36</sup>. The Romanian historians of this generation also used their knowledge of Ottoman sources in order to contribute to the better understanding of the Ottoman impact of the political history of Romania and of East-Central Europe<sup>37</sup>.

The third generation of Romanian specialists in Ottoman history can be named «the school of Mihai Maxim». In the special context of the late 1970s and 1980s, when history was increasingly politicized by the Ceaușescu regime, the best students «fled in time» in order to avoid the political pressure. Mihai Maxim was one of the few professors of the History Department of the Bucharest University who devoted massively his time for helping students acquiring linguistic, paleographic and research skills, and provided thus a scholarly alternative to the dominant model imposed by the regime. He even managed to obtain the approval to found a Laboratory for Ottoman Studies (since 1993 the Center for Turkish-Ottoman Studies of the History Department of the Bucharest University), which organized in 1985-1989 monthly scientific sessions<sup>38</sup>, and especially non-paid seminars of Turkish language and Ottoman paleography for advanced students. Although enthusiasm was high, the general conditions were particularly unfavorable. During the 1980s the graduates were forced to go to teach for at least 3 years in

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<sup>35</sup> Mihai Berza, «Haraciul Moldovei și al Țării Românești în sec. XV-XIX», *Studii și materiale de istorie medie*, II, 1957, pp. 7-47; idem, «Die Schwankungen in der Ausbeutung der Walachei durch die türkische Pforte im XVI.-XVIII. Jh.», *Nouvelles études d'histoire*, II, 1960, pp. 253-269.

<sup>36</sup> Mihail Guboglu, «Le tribut des Principautés Roumaines payé à la Porte Ottomane jusqu'au XVIe siècle selon les sources turques», *Revue des études islamiques*, 1969, pp. 49-80; Mihai Maxim, «Regimul economic al dominației otomane în Moldova și Țara Românească în a doua jumătate a secolului al XVI-lea», *Revista de istorie*, 32, 1979, nr.9, pp. 1731-1765; Valeriu Veliman, «Cîteva considerații privind haraciul Moldovei la mijlocul secolului al XVI-lea», «Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie A.D. Xenopol», XIX, 1982, pp. 285-301; Tahsin Gemil, «Date noi privind haraciul țărilor române în secolul al XVII-lea», *Revista de istorie*, 30, 1977, nr.8, pp. 1433-1446.

<sup>37</sup> Tahsin Gemil, *Țările Române în contextul politic internațional 1621-1672*, București, 1979; idem, *Românii și otomanii în secolele XIV-XVI*, București, 1991; Cristina Feneșan, *Constituirea principatului autonom al Transilvaniei*, București, 1997.

<sup>38</sup> A part of the contributions presented in these scientific meetings have been published in «Caietele Laboratorului de Studii Otomane», I-II, 1990, 1993.

secondary schools in villages or small towns, Ph.D. places were practically nil, access to recent foreign literature became more and more difficult, and specializing abroad or even going to research in foreign archives or libraries was out of question for younger scholars. Therefore, it is not surprising that a significant part of the disciples of Mihai Maxim discontinued their preparation for Ottoman studies; nevertheless, a part persisted, and could use the unexpected opportunities of the 1990s.

Changes after the demise of the Communist rule in 1989 were manifold. First of all, several of Mihai Maxim's disciples got positions in universities and research institutes, were able to complete their Ph.D, and also to continue to study and to research both in Romania and abroad. At the same time, the representatives of the older generation were less present, either because of their age, or because they were attracted by jobs abroad (Mihai Maxim taught for several years in the United States and in Turkey; Tahsin Gemil represented the Tartar minority in Parliament, and afterwards became ambassador; the late Valeriu Veliman also joined the diplomatic service). And worse, the younger generation of historians, being now free to study the previously politicized and/or forbidden themes of contemporary history, are less attracted by the more difficult and austere Ottoman studies.

Thus, the situation today can be described as follows: there are about 10 scholars who can be labeled as 'Ottomanists'; besides, there are very many indirect contributors to the field of Ottoman studies, who do not use Turkish sources, but who are interested in Ottoman issues because of the Ottoman impact on Romanian history. Most of these Ottomanists are based in Bucharest, where the Center for Turkish-Ottoman Studies of the History Department of the Bucharest University, although no longer that active and enthusiastic as the Laboratory for Ottoman Studies in the late 1980s, still supplies an institutional stronghold. Besides the Bucharest University, courses of Ottoman history have been introduced in the curricula of the Universities of Cluj-Napoca and Constanța, but the most promising institutional development has been the program for Ottoman paleography of the Department for Archival Sciences.

The main directions of Ottoman studies in Romania are:

- Ottoman-Romanian political and juridical relations, with a special focus on the 15th-16th centuries. Although this direction is fully legitimate, it is also problematic, because of the too heavy accent on

the bilateral relationship at a time when the Principalities were just an issue among others for the Ottomans. There are some efforts from the younger generation of scholars to put these relations in a full Ottoman context, i.e. to see them not only from Walachia and/or Moldavia, but also from the perspective of the world-empire based in Istanbul<sup>39</sup>, but in this direction there is still very much to be done.

- Ottoman numismatics and monetary history. Due to the extensive study of hoards containing Ottoman coins and of the written sources, especially of the tribute receipts, the Romanian specialists were able to contribute to the knowledge of the money circulation patterns in the peripheral provinces of the Ottoman Empire and in the Romanian Principalities<sup>40</sup>.
- Trade history and the status of merchants in the Ottoman Empire. Besides studies dedicated to the very concrete merchandise traded between the Ottoman Empire and the Romanian Principalities, which are too numerous to be cited here, the Romanian historians

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<sup>39</sup> For a general reassessment, see Bogdan Murgescu, *Istorie românească – istorie universală (600-1800)*, 2nd edition, București, 1999, especially pp.121-198. A detailed analysis in Viorel Panaite, *Pace, război și comerț în Islam. Țările române și dreptul otoman al popoarelor. Secolele XV-XVII*, București, 1997 (a revised English version: idem, *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace. The Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers*, Boulder, New York, 2000). Here we have to mention also the efforts to enlighten the Ottoman-Romanian relationship by taking into consideration the other Turkish emirates of Asia Minor during the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries, the Mongols, and the Mamluks (e.g. Nagy Pienaru, «Les Pays Roumains et le Proche-Orient (1420-1429)», *Revue roumaine d'histoire*, 28, 1989, nr.2, pp. 189-207, and 29, 1990, nr.1-2, pp. 69-103; idem, «Relațiile lui Mircea cel Bătrân cu emiratul pontic Candar-ogullari», *Revista istorică*, 7, 1996, nr.7-8, pp. 483-510).

<sup>40</sup> See especially the earlier contributions of Mihai Maxim (e.g. «Considérations sur la circulation monétaire dans les Pays Roumains et l'Empire Ottoman dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle», *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, XIII, 1975, nr.3, pp. 407-415; «O luptă monetară în sec. al XVI-lea: padișahi contra aspru», *Cercetări numismatice*, 5, 1983, pp. 29-152), or my monograph on the money circulation in the Romanian Principalities during the 16th century, which contains several observations also on more general issues relating to the monetary history of the Ottoman Empire (Bogdan Murgescu, *Circulația monetară în Țările Române în secolul al XVI-lea*, București, 1996; a concrete aspect also in idem, «The Shahis in Walachia», *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, XXXII, 1994, nr.3-4, pp. 293-300). Nowadays, the most active Romanian specialist in Ottoman numismatics is certainly Eugen Nicolae, but his contributions are spread in various numismatic journals such as *Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române*, *Studii și cercetări de numismatică* etc.

were interested also in investigating the general mechanisms of trade in the area of the Lower Danube<sup>41</sup>. This direction is connected with the study of the Romanian territories which were under direct Ottoman rule (Dobrudja, Banat, Turnu, Giurgiu, Brăila, southern Bessarabia, for shorter periods Oradea and Hotin)<sup>42</sup>.

- The military conflicts and diplomatic relations between the Romanian Principalities, the Ottoman Empire, and the major Christian powers (i.e. Poland, Austria, Russia etc.), including the evolution of the Eastern Question during the 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries. On such topics the Romanian historians publish a huge number of contributions of diverse quality, but only some of them use Ottoman sources or try to investigate the issues also from the Ottoman perspective; on the contrary, often Romanian historians (mostly non-Ottomanists) insist that the Romanians have saved Christian Europe from the Ottoman danger, but the ungrateful West has forgotten the deeds of the valiant Romanians<sup>43</sup>.

In this landscape, there are also some almost neglected topics. Ottoman culture and civilization are practically absent, and there are almost no translations from Ottoman literature. Everyday life is also missing, and there is also a very poor perception of the social and po-

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<sup>41</sup> Bogdan Murgescu, «The Ottoman Military Demand and the Romanian Market. A Case-Study: 1672», *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, 25, 1987, nr.4, pp. 305-313; idem, «Comerț și politică în relațiile româno-otomane (secolele XVI-XVIII)», *Revista Istorică* (serie nouă), VIII, 1997, nr.9-10, pp. 573-590; Viorel Panaite, «Trade and Merchants in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century Ottoman-Polish Treaties», *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, 32, 1994, nr. 3-4, pp. 259-276; Anca Popescu, «Un centre commercial du Bas-Danube ottoman au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle: Brăila (Bra'il)», *Il Mar Nero*, III, 1997/98, pp. 209-257. Important contributions are to be expected also from the young scholars who, under the impetus of Olga Cicanci from the Faculty for Archival Studies, are now beginning to study Greek sources relevant for the trade of the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

<sup>42</sup> From the older generation Anca Ghiață has published data from Ottoman censuses (e.g. «Brăila și ținutul înconjurător într-un registru de recensământ inedit de la sfârșitul secolului al XVI-lea», *Caietul Seminarului special de științe auxiliare*, IV, 1993, pp. 126-143). Mihai Maxim has published a general overview about these territories («Teritorii românești sub administrație otomană în secolul al XVI-lea», *Revista de istorie*, 36, 1983, nr.8, pp. 802-817 and nr.9, pp. 879-890), and has a program of monographs for several of his Ph.D. candidates, who are now working on such topics.

<sup>43</sup> Symptomatic for such a paranoid historiography is the recent book of Constantin Rezachevici, *Rolul românilor în apărarea Europei de expansiunea otomană. Secolele XIV-XVI. Evoluția unui concept în contextul vremii*, București, 2001.

litical complexity and dynamics of the Ottoman Empire. In these latter fields, the Romanian historians working in Romania produced during the last decades practically no original contribution<sup>44</sup>; besides the strong social pressure to focus on issues directly relevant for the Romanian history, this deficiency can be explained also by the huge intellectual influence of Halil Inalcik's *The Ottoman Empire – The Classical Age (1300-1600)*<sup>45</sup>. Yet, some Ottomanists of the younger generation became aware during the 1990s also of the recent evolutions in Ottoman studies, which abandon the state fetishism, the idealization of the so-called «classical age» and the corresponding despise of the «decline period»<sup>46</sup>; therefore, it is to be expected that their contributions will reflect increasingly the shift towards a full-fledged social history<sup>47</sup>, which takes into consideration the complex inter-relation between state and society in Ottoman history.

Such a theoretical and historiographical updating, and the enlargement of the historical horizon of the Ottoman studies in Romania are perhaps easier to be done than finding ways to attract gifted students and to help them persist working on Ottoman themes. As in the case of Byzantine studies, Ottoman studies in Romania are threatened by the attraction of easier and socially more demanded topics of contemporary history; besides, for the students who have worked hard to learn Turkish, working for a Turkish enterprise based in Romania is

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<sup>44</sup> In contrast perhaps with the important contributions of the late Nicoară Beldiceanu, who lived mainly in France (e.g. *Le monde ottoman des Balkans (1402-1566). Institutions, société, économie*, London, 1976; *Le timar dans l'Etat Ottoman (début du XIVe-XVIIe siècle)*, Wiesbaden, 1980)

<sup>45</sup> This influence was especially strengthened by Mihai Maxim, who has had the opportunity to work with Inalcik, and who has orchestrated also the translation of his major work in Romanian: Halil Inalcik, *Imperiul Otoman. Epoca clasică 1300-1600*, București, 1996.

<sup>46</sup> For example Halil Berktaş, Suraiya Faroqhi (ed.), *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, London, 1992, or Suraiya Faroqhi, *Kultur und Alltag im Osmanischen Reich. Vom Mittelalter bis zum Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts*, München, 1995.

<sup>47</sup> Among the very young Ottomanists educated in the 1990s, there are even attempts to study gender relations in the Ottoman context (e.g. Silvana Rachieru, «În căutarea propriei identități: Femeia musulmană în Imperiul Otoman», in Mirela-Luminița Murgescu (coord.), *Identități colective și identitate națională. Percepții asupra identității în lumea medievală și modernă. In memoriam Alexandru Dușu*, București, 2000, pp. 205-212).

often more rewarding than continuing to study Ottoman issues in the academic field. Therefore, although in Ottoman studies the compact presence of the disciples of Mihai Maxim, who generally are now in their late thirties or early forties, makes the replacement of academic generations less urgent as in Byzantine studies, the problem of finding ways to make the academic career in Romania more attractive is crucial.

Integration in international academic networks can be a solution for Romanian scholars to overcome not only such practical problems, but also the prevailing parochial approaches to Byzantine and Ottoman topics. Yet, as well as for Western scholarship in such fields, the problem of making such scientific undertakings socially significant remains, and even grows.

## 2. THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

### Hungarian Legacy in Southeastern Europe

MIRELA-LUMINIȚA MURGESCU

THE FIRST WORKSHOP organised by the Center of Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (Budapest, 18-19 December 1999) focused on the Hungarian legacy in Southeastern Europe, a delicate task taking into account the long and intensive contacts between the countries in this region<sup>1</sup>. The discussions were prepared by the answers to a questionnaire previously distributed to the workshop participants<sup>2</sup>. The questionnaire aimed at reflecting both the image of the Hungarians in the schoolbooks of the surrounding countries, and the image of the Romanians, Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes in the Hungarian schoolbooks. The common questions included in the questionnaire were designed to allow comparisons and to help surpass ethnocentric perspectives. A critical perspective not only towards the others, but also towards one's own way of conceiving and teaching history, was stimulated.

The workshop began with a brief presentation of the current regulations and evolutions concerning history teaching and history schoolbooks in the various countries. In all participating countries except Serbia, there are several alternative history schoolbooks for each grade; in Serbia, the Ministry of Education approves just one schoolbook for each grade. In all countries except Romania, national history is included in the teaching of world history; in Romania in some grades the pupils are taught Romanian history, and in other grades they are taught world history. These general remarks provided a framework in which to better understand the par-

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<sup>122</sup> At the workshop were scholars from Croatia (Neven Budak, Snjezana Koren), Greece (Christina Koulouri), Hungary (Peter Bihari, Jozsef Laszlovsky), Romania (Codruta Matei, Mirela-Luminita Murgescu, Sorin Oane), Slovenia (Bozo Repe) and Yugoslavia (Kalman Kuntic, Srdjan Rajkovic, Biljana Simunovic, Dubravka Stojanovic). This presentation is a report of the workshop.

<sup>123</sup> See the questionnaire in Christina Koulouri (ed.), *Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 104.

ticular information elicited by the questionnaire. The participants insisted that the number of pages assigned to the study of the Hungarians/Romanians/ Croats/Serbians/Slovenes is relevant only if we take into consideration the way this information is displayed, and whether "the other" is studied as an autonomous entity, or just in relation with the author's own history. The preliminary remarks outlined that even in the cases where national histories are integrated into the general framework of world history, most of the information regarding neighbouring peoples is found in the lessons concerning national history. Or, as a participant from Croatia put it, «since Croatian and Hungarian history are closely related for centuries (...) a significant number of facts and data on Hungarian history are integrated in the lessons on Croatian history».

The first part of the discussions was dedicated to history teaching for minorities. The discussions showed a great variety of situations. Generally the minorities are expected to learn history according to the same curriculum as the majority. In some countries the schoolbooks are translated into the language of the more important minorities, in others the minorities learn in the official state language. Where there are no schoolbooks in the language of the minorities, there are attempts to use schoolbooks from the neighboring countries.

In the second part of the workshop the answers to the questionnaire were discussed, especially regarding some controversial periods of the history of the various peoples concerned in the analysis. The participants outlined that despite the common syllabi, there are significant differences between various schoolbooks published in the same country for the same grade. Therefore, it is often difficult to draw general conclusions. The participants also outlined the fact that the schoolbook authors are subject to influences not only from the scientific historiography, but also from the public opinion and various political forces; faced with the vastness of such a topic, they agreed that these complex interactions should be left for other scientific meetings.

The concrete discussions on the schoolbooks revealed that world history is heavily Western-centred, the history of the West being considered the normal path of evolution, the standard to which all other particular states or parts of the world are compared. When referring to Southeastern Europe, most of the interest is devoted to the bilateral relations of the various states and/or peoples with the author's own state (people). Thus, the place to which the history of the neighbours is

assigned depends on the intensity of bilateral relations during different periods. Quite interesting, there is more information about the neighbouring peoples during the Middle Ages than for more recent times.

With respect to the Hungarian legacy, the participants remarked that in Romania, Serbia, Croatia and even in Slovenia, Hungarian history receives more interest than the history of other Southeastern and East-Central European states. The schoolbooks contain only few outright negative qualifications, but the participants remarked that besides the text, there are also other elements (illustrations, maps, questions, homework themes, page set-up etc.) which suggest some features that characterise "the other. "

### **Conclusions and recommendations**

1. A first step might be the preparation of the public opinion to accept another discourse about history and to feel comfortable with a more balanced and serene way of treating national and world history. The participants insisted each society tries to instil its own vision of the world upon the young generation, to educate it according to its own ideology. Of course, when a political elite tries to change this vision of the world and of its history, it can more easily change the curricula and the schoolbooks; yet, the way that history teachers really teach the pupils in their classes remains essential to the whole process. If teachers are not prepared and willing to change their teaching, then the best schoolbook will prove useless. Taking into account the fact that in all countries there is a significant resistance to the change of the traditional nationalistic way of conceiving history, the participants emphasised that the professional historians must publicly take position with respect to the most controversial issues and thus help the public and the history teachers to accept the change of the historical discourse.
2. The participants insisted that teacher training is essential. Effective networks for in-service teacher training still are to be designed in all the participating countries. Such networks might work both at national and at regional levels, allowing history teachers to update their concrete historical knowledge, to learn new teaching methods and to discuss the practical problems raised by their teaching. The use of the existing history teachers associations as basis for such schemes is desirable, provided that they are willing to co-operate in the renewal

of the history teaching and that such a co-operation will enhance the effectiveness of teacher training.

3. The analysis of the contents of schoolbooks must be preceded by an assessment of their place and role in history education. Is the schoolbook just an auxiliary designed to help the pupils to systematise what the teacher told them in class? Or is it perceived as the final and sacred version of history, official and indisputable? Or to put it otherwise, do the teachers also use other materials in preparing their lessons, or do they limit themselves at summarising the textbook? The participants acknowledged that a general judgement might be misleading due to the great variety of concrete situations, but insisted that such an assessment is still needed in order to design a coherent strategy.
4. The participants urged to change the methods of teaching history, focusing on historical problems more than on recording long lists of historical facts and/or events. To help the pupils judge events and historical evidence, textbooks should present different opinions on the same historical topic, and this should be made in a balanced way in order to allow the pupils a fair and autonomous choice.
5. The participants recommended also that the share of East-Central and Southeast European history in the general economy of the history schoolbooks should grow. The participants insisted that the emphasis should be put not on dividing issues, but on what is common and/or similar in the history of these neighbouring nations. Yet, this recommendation opened a controversy. How much data should be supplied to the pupils, and among these, what should be emphasised? The participants admitted that the definition of a common heritage and legacy is a very delicate task, and that there is a significant risk that the greater place given to the history of this part of Europe would mean just adding some battles and conflicts to the already existing ones. This risk is especially great because conflicts are more present in the collective memory of the peoples in the region, and because a dichotomic presentation of a heroic past is easier to teach in school. But, as the discussions have stressed, this is a negative model, and such a self-centred temptation must be avoided. Taking into account that the political and military history of the region is particularly conflictual, the participants suggested that a greater emphasis should be put on everyday life and on cultural history, where common problems and mutual influences are easier to be found. Of course,

there is a risk that the cultural themes will encourage also a self-centered vision of the past, and even that some authors and/or teachers will develop a conflictual logic in trying to show that 'our' culture is 'better' than 'theirs', but this risk is smaller than in focusing on political issues.

6. A very concrete problem is that of names and/or ethnic classifications. Several places have changed their names and political affiliations throughout history, and there are also a lot of historical characters who are claimed by several nations. For example, Iancu de Hunedoara (Hunyady Janos) was the son of a Romanian nobleman, but acted like a magnate of the Hungarian Kingdom, and is claimed by both the Romanians and the Hungarians. Similar is the case of the Zrinyis, nobles of Croatian descent but of Hungarian political affiliation. The participants suggested that in such cases the complex identity of the historical characters should be presented in a balanced way, avoiding any competition in appropriating them and insisting that they are part of a truly common heritage. With respect to the names of the various places, the participants recommended that the schoolbooks should indicate and/or explain in brackets or in footnotes the alternative names. Such a method might generate public reactions accusing of excessive 'concessions', but it would also signal the need to take into account the perspective of 'the other.'
7. The discussions revealed that there is a considerable span between identifying the problems and solving them. Such workshops are just a first step in a long process, and active resistance, as well as social inertia, must be taken into account. Therefore, we must prepare for a long-term process. We have to fight on several fronts. We have to clarify a lot of problems at an academic level; we have to introduce a more balanced picture in the syllabi and in schoolbooks; we also have to develop forms of in-service training for history teachers in order to help them to implement an improved version of the past despite their initial deficient training. And, of course, we must take care about how we train future history teachers in our universities.

## Hungarians and Hungarian History in Croatian History Textbooks


SNJEŽANA KOREN

### **How many pages are devoted to Hungarians and Hungarian history in Croatian history textbooks?**

**I**N THE CROATIAN educational system, history is taught in the higher grades of elementary school (5<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> grade) and in secondary school. In elementary school, pupils acquire basic knowledge about the world and the Croatian history since the beginning of mankind up to the present. In secondary school, this knowledge is expanded. The syllabus is divided according to history periods. In the 5<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school and in the 1<sup>st</sup> grade of secondary school the subject of history deals with prehistory and antiquity, in the 6<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school and in the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade of secondary school – the period between the 5<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> century, in the 7<sup>th</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade respectively – the period from the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century to 1918, and in the last grades – the period after 1918. 60% of the syllabus is planned for the Croatian history and 40% for general history.

The Hungarians and the Hungarian history are dealt with mainly from the 6<sup>th</sup> to the 8<sup>th</sup> grade of the elementary school and from the 2<sup>nd</sup> to the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of the secondary school. Special attention is paid to Croatian-Hungarian relations, mainly considered from the aspect of the Croatian history. Pupils thus get to know mainly single events from the Hungarian history, but can hardly grasp the whole image. It might be interesting to note that the amount of Hungarian history is almost the same in elementary and secondary school textbooks. Although secondary school curricula include more data on Hungarian history, the amount of overall history material is bigger and therefore the percentage is lower (approximately 3-5% of the elementary school textbooks may be said to deal with Hungarian history, while this percentage in secondary school textbooks ranges from 2-4%).

There is not much mentioned specifically on the Hungarians and the Hungarian history in Croatian textbooks, on the average one to two pages in each textbook. However, since Croatian and Hungarian history were closely related for centuries (from 1102 to 1918 Croatia and Hungary had joint rulers), a significant number of facts and data on the Hungarian history are integrated in the lessons on the Croatian history. For that reason it is difficult to say exactly how many pages are dedicated to Hungarian history in Croatian history textbooks. Therefore I tried to make these estimates in a different way. I tried to answer the following question: How many times are certain nations (except Croats) mentioned in the textbooks? The criteria for the estimate were



the names of the states and nations, and personalities, places and events that belong to those certain nations. I analysed three elementary school textbooks, for the 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grades, which cover the period from the Middle Ages until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The 6<sup>th</sup> grade textbook<sup>1</sup> covers quite a long period of time: from the 5<sup>th</sup> century till the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Fifty one different nations are presented. Hungarians are the first on the list: they are mentioned 216 times or 14,9%. However, it has to be said that these data are quite different for certain periods. In the Middle Ages (5<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> century),

<sup>1</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998.

Hungarians are the first being mentioned among 39 nations (they are mentioned 144 times or 16,5%). In the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, they are the fourth among 30 different nations (they are mentioned 72 times or 12,4%).

The 7<sup>th</sup> grade textbook<sup>2</sup> speaks about the period from the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century to 1918. Among the 39 mentioned nations, the Hungarians are the third: they are mentioned 187 times in total or 12,3%. The textbook<sup>3</sup> for the 8<sup>th</sup> grade includes the period after 1918. As many as 78 different nations are included in that textbook (but, 53 nations are mentioned less than 10 times and 27 nations are mentioned just 1 to 3 times). the Hungarians are 14<sup>th</sup>: they are mentioned 30 times or 1,9%.

From those data it may be concluded that Croatian textbooks, from the Hungarian settlement in the 9<sup>th</sup> century to the collapse of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, pay quite a significant attention to the Hungarians and the Hungarian history. The Hungarians are always among the four most mentioned nations. However, after the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Croatian joining of the Yugoslav association in 1918, the participation of Hungarian history in Croatian textbooks has been greatly reduced, and especially in elementary school textbooks.

### **What are the qualifications of the Hungarians in Croatian history textbooks?**

The Hungarians are mostly described in texts dealing with the early Middle Ages. That period mainly describes the settling of Hungarians in the Pannonian plain and Croatian-Hungarian conflicts in the 10<sup>th</sup> century. Most textbooks describe raids by Hungarian troops. Hungarians are described as «warriors» and a «new danger» in Europe<sup>4</sup>. In one of the two textbooks for the 6<sup>th</sup> grade the Hungarians are mentioned as «dangerous neighbours». Starting from the Pannonian plain, their raids across Europe were characterised as «destructive» and «plundering»

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<sup>2</sup> Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Perić, *Povijest za VIII. razred osnovne škole*, Alfa, Zagreb 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Medić, Posavec, *Stvaranje europske civilizacije i kulture (V.-XVIII. st.)*, udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije, Profil, Zagreb 1997, 29.

and «they even surpassed the Huns by the horrors of their deeds»<sup>5</sup>. In his teachers' manual from 1987, the same author suggests to the teachers to analyse the poem by Vladimir Nazor, saying that it «leaves a strong impression». The poem describes the conversation between the Hungarian leader Árpád and the Croatian ruler Tomislav with the following verses: *Oh Árpád, thou art a strong wind that devastates, and I am the oak wood vigorous and age-old attacked by gale in vain. / You destroy in anger, and I build cheerfully anew. / You burst as a beast to kill and slaughter, and I defend from the evil, and heal the mortal wounds.*<sup>6</sup> The same poem is taught as part of the curriculum of the Croatian language. The pupils have to learn it by heart and unfortunately this is precisely the image that stays on in their minds.

In the other two textbooks for the same period, one for the elementary<sup>7</sup> and the other for the secondary school<sup>8</sup>, more moderate tone prevails. They mainly mention only facts known from sources. The elementary school textbook (the most recent one) presents Hungarians with much more objectivity, describing them as «nomadic people», «skilled horsemen» and «new Croatian neighbours in the North», whose «troops spread fear in Northern Italy, Germany and France»<sup>9</sup>.

Croatian-Hungarian relations again become important at the end of the 11th and the beginning of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. At the time of Croatian King Zvonimir, one secondary school textbook describes relations between the two dynasties as «being friends and relatives»<sup>10</sup>. However, in most textbooks, when dealing with struggle for power after the death of King Zvonimir, the sympathy is on the side of the Croatian candidates. Considering reign of kings of the Árpád dynasty in Croatia, the

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<sup>5</sup> Makek, *Povijest 6, udžbenik za VI. razred osnovne škole*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1998, 14-15.

<sup>6</sup> Makek, Siroglavić, Legan, *Metodički priručnik za nastavnika uz udžbenik povijesti Čovjek u svom vremenu 2*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1987, 149.

<sup>7</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998.

<sup>8</sup> Šanjek, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet od 5. do 18. stoljeća*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1994.

<sup>9</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 13 and 33.

<sup>10</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 79.

textbooks emphasise their important role in establishing of bishopric in Zagreb and founding and development of Croatian medieval towns. Among Croatian rulers of Hungarian origin, textbooks write in a particularly positive tone about Béla IV and Matthias Corvinus. The latter is described in textbooks as having «distinguished himself not only by military skills, but also by his interest in arts and sciences» and that «folk tradition remembers him as a rightful and good king», although «his cruelty in dealing with political opponents» is also mentioned.<sup>1112</sup>



*The campanile next to the Benedictine monastery of St. Maria in Zadar. It was built by Koloman after his victorious entry into Zadar in 1105 (6<sup>th</sup> grade text-book).*

For the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries Croatian textbooks include those topics from the Hungarian history that are common to the Croats and the Hungarians. These are primarily, the struggle for power after the battle at Mohács (Szapolyai was supported both by some Hungarian and Croatian nobles), the wars with the Turks (for example, joint defence of Szigetvár) and common resistance to attempts of the Habsburg rulers to impose absolutism and centralism. However, some textbooks, already from the 17<sup>th</sup> century onwards, warn about «illegal endeavours of the Hungarian parliament» which «tried to take advantage of the difficult position of Croatia» and impose the Hungarian rule.<sup>13</sup> That kind of tone and topics will prevail in textbooks about the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, textbooks primarily mention differences and problems in Croatian-Hungarian relations. All of them mention the Hungarian opposition to Habsburg absolutism, the problem common both to the Hungarians and the Croats. However, they also speak about the hegemonistic atti-

<sup>11</sup> Šanjek, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet od 5. do 18. stoljeća*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1994, 69.

<sup>12</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Radanje suvremene Hrvatske I Europe: povijest za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 42

<sup>13</sup> Šanjek, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet od 5. do 18. stoljeća*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1994, 274.

tude towards non-Hungarian nations to whom the Hungarian government denies their rights to their own language and national development. Precisely the words «hegemony» and «Hungarisation» are mostly used to describe the relation of the Hungarian government towards the Croats and other non-Hungarian nations in Hungary. However, one elementary school textbook emphasises that «current good relations between the Hungarians and the Croats serve as example how the old differences can be overcome. »<sup>14</sup>

Textbooks dealing with the 20<sup>th</sup> century mainly speak with sympathy about the Hungarian resistance to Soviet hegemony, particularly since Croatia as a part of socialist Yugoslavia was in the similar position.

#### **What kind of history in different periods is taught as far as Hungarian history is concerned?**

When Hungarian history is mentioned in Croatian textbooks, this mostly includes political and military events. Even when certain economic and social measures and reforms introduced by Hungarian rulers are mentioned, they mainly refer to Croatian regions.

In the Middle Ages, within the European early medieval history the only explicitly described topic is the migration of Hungarians. The following events are mentioned: settlement of Hungarians in the 9<sup>th</sup> century, conquering of the Lower Pannonia and Great Moravia, battle at Augsburg in 955, the conversion to Christianity, and founding of the Hungarian kingdom at the end of the 10<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century.

All the other events are mentioned within the topics of the Croatian history. In the early Middle Ages, the Croatian-Hungarian conflicts during the first half of the 10<sup>th</sup> century and accession of the Árpád dynasty to the Croatian throne in 1102 receive special attention. However, the approach in textbooks is different. Thus, one elementary school textbook, describing the fight between troops led by the Ban Petar Snačić and the Hungarian troops that were supposed to bring the Koloman's bride from South Italy, interprets the sources rather loosely.

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<sup>14</sup> Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 88.

With lots of *licentia poetica* it speaks about the «unfortunate fate and heroic death of the last Croatian King Petar», who «blocked the enemy's way with his rather small army».<sup>15</sup> The same event is presented with more objectivity in the other elementary school textbook: «However, the [Hungarian] army had to pass through Croatia, but Petar Snačić did not agree. He awaited the Hungarians on a mountain and provoked a fight in which the Croats were defeated, and Petar himself was killed»<sup>16, 17</sup>.



*King Béla IV founded a free and royal town on the hill of Gradec in the area of Zagreb. Here, he is shown on the golden seal from that document (6th grade textbook)*

Describing the accession of the Árpád dynasty to the Croatian throne, Croatian textbooks emphasise that Croatia continues to be a separate state, connected with Hungary only by common ruler, e.g. «By entering the union with Hungary, Croatia kept her constitutional individuality. Personal union is established. It is a form of government in which two separate states are connected only by the person of the common ruler. Thus a new state was established, the Hungarian-Croatian state ruled by the Árpád dynasty. Their accession to the Croatian throne did not mean any breakdown of the Croatian state, but this occurrence was common at that time in Europe. »<sup>18</sup>

During the ruling of the Árpád dynasty, those events from the Hungarian history are mentioned that had significance for the Croatian history as well. These are: Andrew II Golden Bula in 1222 and the Mongolian invasion in 1241. The textbooks also emphasise the role of the Árpád dynasty in the development of the Croatian medieval towns.

<sup>15</sup> Makek, *Povijest 6, udžbenik za VI. razred osnovne škole*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1998, 39.

<sup>16</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 41.

<sup>17</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 61.

<sup>18</sup> Medić, Posavec, *Stvaranje europske civilizacije i kulture (V.-XVIII. st.)*, udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije, Profil, Zagreb 1997, 93-94.

The change on the throne at the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century is described, as well as efforts by Angevins to strengthen the king's authority in Hungary. Struggle for the throne in the 15<sup>th</sup> century is mentioned, at the time when the dynasties of Luxembourg, Jagiellon, Habsburg, and Hunyadi took turns at the Hungarian throne. The texts speak about the first conflicts with the Turks (battles at Nikopolis and Varna) and the role of János Hunyadi is emphasised in stopping the Turks' attack and especially his defence of Belgrade in 1453. Also the strengthening and centralisation of the king's authority in Hungary at the time of Matthias Corvinus is described, as well as his conquering of Vienna and the attempt to conquer the regions along the Danube. Textbooks also emphasise his cultural activity: «Matthias Corvinus was also a very educated man... He supported the development of education, science, culture and art, and numerous Croatian architects, painters and philosophers were working at the king's court.»<sup>1920</sup>

There are two main topics concerning Hungarian history in the 16<sup>th</sup> century described in Croatian textbooks. The first one is the struggle for the Hungarian throne between János Szapolyai and Ferdinand of Habsburg after the battle at Mohács. The textbooks mention that Szapolyai was supported by numerous Hungarian and Croatian (mainly Slavonian) nobles. They also mention that he established contact with the Turks and later became the vassal of Suleiman the Magnificent. One elementary school textbook says that «most of Szapolyai supporters were disappointed by his friendship with the Turks and therefore took



*The crown of Saint Stephen  
(2nd grade textbook).*

<sup>19</sup> Šanjek, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet od 5. do 18. stoljeća*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1994, 157.

<sup>20</sup> Medić, Posavec, *Stvaranje europske civilizacije i kulture (V.-XVIII. st.)*, udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije, Profil, Zagreb 1997, 110.

side of Ferdinand Habsburg».<sup>21</sup> The agreement between Szapolyai and Ferdinand in 1538 is also mentioned.<sup>22</sup>

The second topic deals with the wars with Turks. The following events are mentioned: Turkish conquest of Belgrade in 1521, the battle at Mohács field in 1526, Suleiman's invasions of Hungary, and battles at Kőszeg and Szigetvár. Again, the approach in certain textbooks is different, and this can be seen in the example of the battle at Szigetvár.



*The portrait of Matthias Corvinus  
(6th grade textbook).*

Some textbooks emphasise first of all the significance of the battle for the Croatian history, and the role of Croatian historical figures. From those texts it can hardly be concluded that the battle took place on the Hungarian territory and that the role of Hungarians was also important: «In 1566 Suleiman, already very old, attempted to conquer Vienna for the last time. On his way, he attacked the fortified Szigetvár, which defended Croatia from the East. The commander of Szigetvár, Nikola Šubić Zrinski, with some 2,500 soldiers, resisted the Turkish army for a month... With the last of the defenders from the burning city, he attacked the Turks and was killed in a rarely seen heroic manner.»<sup>23</sup> The other textbook presents the same event

emphasising the role of the Hungarians as well: «The second invasion of the Turks against Vienna, was stopped at Szigetvár (in Southern Hungary) in 1566. The defence of the city was commanded by the then Croatian Ban Nikola Šubić Zrinski. When the last part of the fortress was caught by the fire, the Croatian and Hungarian defenders attempted

<sup>21</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 103.

<sup>22</sup> Makek, *Povijest 6. udžbenik za VI. razred osnovne škole*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1998, 93.

<sup>23</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 105.

a breach. Most of them, including Zrinski, were killed and some were captured and later ransomed. »<sup>24,25</sup>

In the 17th century the textbooks describe the discontent of the Hungarian (and the Croatian) nobility by the way in which the Habsburgs fought against the Turks, and their attempts of centralisation and absolutism. Within this context, the peace settlement in Vasvár in 1664 is mentioned, primarily as cause of organising the conspiracy by the Croatian and Hungarian nobility against the Habsburgs. The Croatian textbooks emphasise especially the act of conspiracy, stressing first of all its Croatian aspect. From the Hungarian part, only the nobility participating in the organisation of conspiracy is mentioned. Also the liberation of Hungary from the Turkish rule in the wars at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century is presented. Apart from military events, the secondary school textbooks mention the expansion of Protestantism in Hungary. Some elementary school textbooks emphasise the concerns of the Hungarian nobility for their religious freedom, because the Habsburgs wanted to suppress Protestantism in their lands.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the resistance of the Hungarian nobility against the absolutist rule of the Habsburgs continues to be emphasised, especially during the reign of Joseph II. Secondary school textbooks describe also the Hungarian acceptance of the Pragmatic sanction in 1722 recognising the right of the Habsburg to the throne through the female line.



*The Hungarian coat of arms, shown on the portrait of King Sigismund of Luxembourg, painted by Albrecht Dürer (6th grade textbook).*

<sup>24</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 78.

<sup>25</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole* Profil, Zagreb 1998, 72.

From the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, textbooks primarily emphasise Croatian-Hungarian relations and these topics permeate the presentation of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Croatian history. Thus textbooks mention the decision of the Croatian Parliament to transfer a part of its authority to Hungarian government, attempts of introducing the Hungarian language as official language in Croatia, Croatian-Hungarian relations in the 1848 Revolution, the Croatian-Hungarian agreement in 1868, the position of Croatia in Hungary after the dualism had been introduced, especially during the reign of the Ban Károly Khuen Héderváry, later the Hungarian Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the 1848 Revolution and the Austro-Hungarian agreement are specifically mentioned. Some secondary school textbooks also include activities of Independence party and of Ferenc Kossuth at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The role of Hungary in important international events at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (the making of the Triple Alliance, Congress of Berlin, World War I) is mentioned indirectly, through international activities of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

As already said, the participation of Hungarian history in Croatian textbooks that deal with the period after 1918 has been greatly reduced. Instead of Croatian-Hungarian relations, Croatian-Serbian relations become more important. Therefore, following 1918, the events from the Hungarian history are very briefly mentioned within other topics, for example the Treaty of Versailles, World War II, The Cold War, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The following events are mentioned for the period of 1920s: founding of independent Hungary after the collapse of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, Soviet Republic of Hungary and its breakdown (only in the secondary school textbooks), The Peace Settlement in Trianon in 1920 and the loss of territories. In 1930s, the annexation of the parts of Czechoslovakia after its occupation by German troops is mentioned. During World War II, textbooks speak of Hungary entering the Tripartite Pact in 1940, participating in invasion of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and in division of the latter. The occupation of Hungary by the Soviet Red Army at the end of the war is also described as well as imposing of the Communist regime. After World War II, the following events are mentioned: peace settlement in 1946, participation in the Warsaw Pact, events of 1956 (only in secondary school textbooks) and the collapse of Communism in Hungary. Finally, Hungary is mentioned as one of the

new members of NATO and one of the serious candidates for the European Union (mostly in the secondary school textbooks).

### How is the 1848 Revolution presented?<sup>26</sup>

In the textbooks for the 7<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school and the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade of secondary school, the 1848 Revolution receives special attention. In the two elementary school textbooks, 9 pages out of 123 (7,3%)<sup>27</sup> and 11 out of 111 (9,9%)<sup>28</sup> are dedicated respectively. In the secondary school textbooks this relation is 16 pages out of 211 (7,6%)<sup>29</sup> i.e. 12 pages out of 240 (5%)<sup>30</sup>. Apart from events in Croatia, the textbooks also cover the revolution in France, German and Italian lands and in the Habsburg Monarchy. The revolution in Hungary is treated in the context of the events in Austrian Empire.



*The battle at Mohacs (2nd grade textbook)*

The 1848 Revolution in Hungary is mentioned in a few different places in curricula and in textbooks: first, in the lesson that speaks about the 1848 Revolution in Europe in general, then in lessons about events in Croatia, with emphasis on Croatian-Hungarian relations, and finally in the lesson about Serbian -Hungarian war. As the main cause of the revolution, textbooks mention «opposition against absolutism and Austrian hegemony»<sup>31</sup>, and its goals such as «liberation from the

<sup>26</sup> Medić, Posavec, *Stvaranje europske civilizacije i kulture (V.-XVIII. st.)*, udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije, Profil, Zagreb, 1997, 111.

<sup>27</sup> Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998.

<sup>28</sup> Pavličević, Potrebica, *Povijest za VII. razred osnovne škole*, Alfa, Zagreb 1996.

<sup>29</sup> Mirošević, Mijatović, Macan, *Povijest za III. razred gimnazije*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1998.

<sup>30</sup> Pavličević, *Povijest za III. razred gimnazije*, Alfa, Zagreb 1997.

<sup>31</sup> Macan, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet u XVIII. i XIX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993, 82.

foreign government, abolition of feudalism and establishing of democracy»<sup>32</sup>. The basic events during revolution are also described: At the beginning, the Habsburgs had to permit establishing of the Hungarian government, which abolished feudalism. However, from the autumn of 1848 the conflict between the Hungarians and the royal army began. The royal army conquered considerable parts of Hungary, including Budapest. After the new Constitution had been proclaimed at the beginning of 1849, the dissatisfaction of Hungarians culminated by de-throning of the Habsburg dynasty. Finally, in summer of 1849 the royal army, helped by Russian troops, broke Hungarian resistance.

Croatian-Hungarian relations in the 1848 Revolution receive special attention in Croatian textbooks. This can also be concluded by the headlines: *Croatia breaks up the constitutional connections with Hungary, Resolute opposition to Hungarian hegemony, Jelačić negotiates with the Hungarians, Croatian-Hungarian war, Breakdown of the Hungarian revolution.*<sup>33</sup> Treatment of the Hungarian government against the Croats and all other non-Hungarian nations in Hungary is described as imposing of Hungarian rule. Textbooks mention that «Hungarian nobility fought against Austrian centralism, for the freedom of their own nation but, at the same time, by spreading hegemonistic ideas about Great Hungary from Carpathian Mountains to the Adriatic Sea... they didn't allow the freedom for the Croats and other non-Hungarian nations».<sup>34</sup> They also say that «prominent Hungarian politician and the leader of Hungarian revolution, Lajos Kossuth, denied even mere existence of the Croatian name and nationality».<sup>35</sup> Just one elementary school textbook mentions that «the Hungarian poet Sándor Petöfy didn't approve of the Hungarian hegemonistic politics» and that the cause of the conflict was «hegemonistic politics of the Hungarian government but not of the Hungarian people.»<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 25.

<sup>33</sup> Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 45-48.

<sup>34</sup> Pavličević, *Potrebica, Povijest za VII. razred osnovne škole*, Alfa, Zagreb 1996, 40.

<sup>35</sup> Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 43.

<sup>36</sup> Pavličević, *Potrebica, Povijest za VII. razred osnovne škole*, Alfa, Zagreb 1996, 40 and 44.

Textbooks state that this politics of the Hungarian government against non-Hungarian nations made impossible joint opposition against the Habsburgs, and finally led to their conflicts (Croatian-Hungarian war and Serbian-Hungarian war). These conflicts were consequently used by the Habsburgs to break the Hungarian revolution: «The King appointed Jelačić as Chief Commander of Army in Hungary. Thus, the Ban, at first as the defender of Croatia, turned into a fighter against Hungarian revolution and the uprising in Vienna. Rescuing the very existence of Croatia, he started to fight for the Habsburgs who were, even then, for absolutism and centralism.»<sup>37</sup> All textbooks conclude that the breakdown of the Hungarian revolution had one important and unwanted outcome: once again, the Habsburgs imposed absolutism on both the Croats and the Hungarians. Therefore, some Croatian politicians «lost confidence in Vienna and started to consider the alliance with the Hungarians, which was less dangerous for Croatia.»<sup>38</sup>

#### **How is the Versailles system presented?**

The Paris Peace Conference (1919-20) and its consequences are described in the textbooks for the 8<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school and the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of secondary school. Texts mostly present facts about participants of the Conference and decisions of the treaties with defeated countries, while controversies and problems, which resulted from these agreements are not mentioned. Secondary school textbooks generally mention that «victorious forces dictated terms of peace and established the «Versailles order», full of contradictions and stimuli for new conflicts.»<sup>39</sup> They also say that «Versailles order was very soon criticised by those countries... which lost parts of their territory» and its opponents «showed tendencies to change borders.»<sup>40</sup> Emphasis is mostly on German requests for a revision of treaties, while Hungarian demands are not explicitly mentioned.

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<sup>37</sup> Macan, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet u XVIII. i XIX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993, 109.

<sup>38</sup> Macan, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet u XVIII. i XIX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993, 113.

<sup>39</sup> Perić, *Hrvatska i svijet u XX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993, 54.

<sup>40</sup> Leček, Najbar-Agičić, Agičić, Jakovina, *Povijest 4: udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999, 71.

The Treaty with Hungary in Trianon is dealt with in the same way. The elementary school textbook and one of the two secondary school textbooks<sup>41</sup> present only the decisions of the Treaty, while difficulties (the loss of territories and the fact that now one third of all Hungarians lived in some foreign state) are not mentioned. However, the other secondary school textbook says that «national state of Hungary is founded on territory very reduced compared to the area that the Hungarian kingdom had included before» and that «Hungarians lost two thirds of their territory.»<sup>42</sup> The same textbook later, speaking about the Ustasha movement, mentions that «countries, which were opponents of Versailles order: Austria, Hungary and Italy» gave shelter to the members of the movement.<sup>43</sup>

Textbooks prior to 1990 mentioned the relation between Hungary and the states of so called 'Little Entente': «To insure herself from the danger of further penetration of Italy into Balkan, and Italian intentions to control our Adriatic coast, as well as attempts of Hungary to annex Vojvodina, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes made alliance with Rumania and Czechoslovakia.»<sup>44</sup> Current secondary school textbooks mention 'Little Entente' only as one of the alliances by which France tried to isolate Germany and the Soviet Union and preserve the Versailles order<sup>45</sup>, while elementary school textbooks do not mention it at all.

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<sup>41</sup> Both textbooks, for elementary and for secondary school, have the same author: Perić, *Hrvatska i svijet u XX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993; I. Perić, *Povijest za VIII. razred osnovne škole*, Alfa, Zagreb 1998, 15.

<sup>42</sup> Leček, Najbar-Agičić, Agičić, Jakovina, *Povijest 4: udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999, 70.

<sup>43</sup> Leček, Najbar-Agičić, Agičić, Jakovina, *Povijest 4: udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999, 120.

<sup>44</sup> Lovrenčić, Jelić, Vukadinović, Bilandžić, *Čovjek u svom vremenu 4*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1987, 57.

<sup>45</sup> Leček, Najbar-Agičić, Agičić, Jakovina, *Povijest 4: udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999, 97.

**Which Hungarian personalities and places in different periods are named and presented? <sup>46</sup>**

Most of Hungarians included in Croatian history textbooks are mentioned in relation with Croatian history. Three groups are mostly mentioned: kings, nobles and politicians. In the Middle Ages Stephen, the first Hungarian king, is included. All the other Hungarian rulers from the Árpád dynasty (Ladislav, Koloman, Béla III, Andrew, Béla IV) are mostly mentioned in relation to the events from the Croatian history. The number of rulers from dynasties of Angevins, Jagiellon, Habsburg and Luxembourg are included; they were not Hungarians, but they had important role in both Hungarian and Croatian history. Thus, speaking about Croatian history in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, textbooks mention the role of the Angevins in securing the king's centralist rule in Hungary. The members of Hunyadi family are especially mentioned in textbooks: János, the great military leader in wars against the Turks, his son Matthias Corvinus, the king of Hungary and Croatia, and his grandson János, the Croatian Ban which played an important role in defending Croatia from the Turks. Their role was described in more detail in the previous chapters.



*The portrait of Janos Szapolyai (2nd grade textbook)*

For the 16<sup>th</sup> century, textbooks mention : János Szapolyai, a candidate for the Hungarian and Croatian throne after the battle at Mohács (see previous chapters). For the 17<sup>th</sup> century, textbooks primarily include those personalities who participated in the conspiracy against the

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<sup>46</sup> Medić, Posavec, *Stvaranje europske civilizacije i kulture (V.-XVIII. st.)*, udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije, Profil, Zagreb 1997, 158.

Habsburgs: palatine administrator Ferenc Wesselény, chief justice Ferenc Nádasdy, archbishop of Ostrogon György Lippay, and Ferenc Rakoczy, Petar Zrinski's son-in-law. Their role in the conspiracy is explained only through the main causes: their dissatisfaction with the Habsburg politics towards wars with the Turks and the Habsburg attempts to impose absolutism and centralism. The Zrinski family is exclusively presented as part of Croatian history, while their role in Hungarian history is mostly suppressed. In the same sense, textbooks speak about Nikola Šubić Zrinski and his role in the wars against the Turks and Nikola Zrinski and his part in organising the conspiracy against the Habsburgs. However, one elementary school textbook mentions that «Zrinski had kinship and political connections with eminent noble families in Hungary» and that Nikola Zrinski «by writing his poem «The mermaid of the Adriatic Sea» in the Hungarian language, made foundations of modern Hungarian literature».<sup>47</sup>

For the 19<sup>th</sup> century, textbooks mostly mention Hungarian politicians and Prime ministers: Lajos Kossuth, Károly Khuen Hédervály, Ferenc Deák and Ferenc Kossuth (the last two only in the secondary school textbooks). Only one elementary school textbook mentions the role of the Hungarian poet Sándor Petöfi in the 1848 Revolution.<sup>48</sup> Two personalities receive special attention: Lajos Kossuth and Károly Khuen Hédervály. Kossuth is described as a Hungarian politician and the leader of Hungarian revolution, but textbooks mostly emphasise his attitude towards non-Hungarian nations in Hungary during the 1848 Revolution (see previous chapters). Concerning Hédervály, textbooks mostly cover his activities as the Ban of Croatia, and they render quite a negative opinion on his ruling.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, some personalities connected with the most important moments of Hungarian history of that century are mentioned, but mostly in secondary school textbooks. Béla Kun is presented as a leader of the Hungarian Communist party and the Soviet Republic of Hungary. Mihály Károly is mentioned as the Prime minister of Hungarian government after the collapse of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and

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<sup>47</sup> Budak, Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 113.

<sup>48</sup> Pavličević, *Potreblica, Povijest za VII. razred osnovne škole*, Alfa, Zagreb 1996, 40.

later as the President of the Hungarian Republic. One secondary school textbook describes Miklós Horthy as former Austro-Hungarian admiral «who established his absolute rule» after the breakdown of the Soviet Republic of Hungary.<sup>49</sup> Another mentions indirectly that during his regime Hungary led revisionist politics and gave shelter to the members of Ustasha movement.<sup>50</sup> Imre Nagy and his politics are described with sympathy, although, otherwise, the Croatian textbooks have a considerably negative attitude towards the Communists and Communist regimes. On the other hand, the role of János Kádár is described with negative connotations.<sup>51</sup>

The Croatian textbooks also mention some Croatified noble families of Hungarian origin who had important role in the Croatian history, even though they do not mention their Hungarian roots. For example, there are Thomas Erdödy, the Croatian Ban who led the army that defeated Turks at Sisak in 1593, Sofija Rubido Erdödy, a distinguished member of the Croatian Illyrian Movement, and the Croatian bans of the Rauch family who were members of pro-Hungarian Unionist Party in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The Croatian textbooks mention just a few Hungarian places, which have importance in the Croatian history as well: Bratislava (Pozsony), Budapest and Szekesfehervar. Some places, famous for battles, for example Kőszeg and Szigetvár, are also mentioned.



*Lajos Kossuth (3rd grade textbook)*

<sup>49</sup> Perić, *Hrvatska i svijet u XX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993, 51.

<sup>50</sup> Leček, Najbar-Agičić, Agičić, Jakovina, *Povijest 4: udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999, 71.

<sup>51</sup> Macan, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet u XVIII. i XIX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993, 82.

**What illustrations, maps and sources concerning Hungarian history are included?**

Most documents dealing with the Hungarian history are concerned with Croatian-Hungarian relations and are taken from Croatian sources. For example, there are passages from the work of the Split Archdeacon Thomas, who talks about King Ladislav's campaign against Croatia, Koloman's agreement with Croatian nobility and capturing of Dalmatian towns, and the fights between King Béla IV and the Mongols. The parts of the Hungarian chronicle by Simon Kézai considering Koloman's campaign in Croatia are included (for the secondary school). Also, the so-called Golden Bula is often included, the document by which King Bela IV founded a free and royal town on the hill of Gradec in the area of Zagreb. Quoted are some reports from the Venetian and papal ambassadors at the Hungarian court, which describe circumstances in Hungary before the battle at Mohács. The battle of Mohács is mostly presented from Croatian sources (the description of the Franciscan Ivan Tomašić). Finally, there are a few sources from the 17<sup>th</sup> century: the speech by Nikola Šubić Zrinski in Szigetvár and the conspiracy document by Ferenc Wesselényi, Ferenc Nádasdy, and Petar Zrinski.<sup>52</sup>

Most illustrations included in Croatian textbooks belong to the period of the Middle Ages, and most of them are related both to the Croatian and Hungarian history. Illustrations mostly show some important personalities or battles from Hungarian history. The texts under the illustrations sometimes bring further information about prominent Hungarians and the Hungarian history. There are no special maps of Hungary in Croatian textbooks. Hungary is mostly shown on the maps of Europe or as part of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The following illustrations from the Middle Ages are included: the arrow quiver of the Hungarian warriors; King Ladislav's mantle from the Zagreb Cathedral; the 11<sup>th</sup> century Gospel, brought to Zagreb by Hungarian priests and monks, after the foundation of the bishopric; a campanile next to the Benedictine monastery of St. Maria in Zadar, built by King Koloman; King Koloman's name on capitals at the mon-

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<sup>52</sup> All these historical sources have been mentioned in the so-called History Reading books as accompanying material to textbooks. Unfortunately, they are not obligatory material for pupils.

astery of St. Maria in Zadar; King Koloman's portrait; agreement between Koloman and the Croatian nobility – a painting by J. F. Mücke (it isn't a contemporary historical source, but a later artistic impression); the crown of St. Stephen; a portrait of King Bela IV on the golden seal from the so-called Golden Bula from 1242; Romanesque church in Ják in Hungary; the portrait of King Sigismund of Luxembourg, painted by Albrecht Dürer (this painting is often presented in Croatian history textbooks); illustration of the battle at Nikopolis; portrait of János Hunyadi (wood engraving); the portrait of King Mátyás Corvin; personal book of hours (missal) of Mátyás Corvin, kept today at the Vatican library.<sup>53</sup>

For the period of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries there are the following illustrations: the battle at Mohács; the portrait of János Szapolyai; the photograph of Ilok (Uylak), the residence of the Dukes of Ilok (although their connections with Hungary are not mentioned); the portrait of Nikola Zrinski; the battle at Szigetvár (engraving).<sup>54</sup>

Finally, there are several illustrations for the period of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: Austro-Hungarian coat of arms; coat of arms of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia with the crown of St. Stephen; the illustrations of Lajos Kossuth and Károly Khuen Héderváry; illustration of the Hungarian Parliament building in Budapest.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> These illustrations are taken from the following textbooks: Budak, Posavec, *Radanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998; Makek, *Povijest 6, udžbenik za VI. razred osnovne škole*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1998; Šanjek, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet od 5. do 18. stoljeća*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1994; Medić, Posavec, *Stvaranje europske civilizacije i kulture (V.-XVIII. st.), udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1997.

<sup>54</sup> These illustrations are taken from the following textbooks: Budak, Posavec, *Radanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998; Makek, *Povijest 6, udžbenik za VI. razred osnovne škole*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1998; Medić, Posavec, *Stvaranje europske civilizacije i kulture (V.-XVIII. st.), udžbenik za drugi razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1997.

<sup>55</sup> These illustrations are taken from the following textbooks: Leček, Najbar-Agičić, Agičić, Jakovina, *Povijest 4: udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999; Macan, Mirošević, *Hrvatska i svijet u XVIII. i XIX. st.*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1993; Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998.

## Conclusion

In Croatian history textbooks, the Hungarians and the Hungarian history are dealt with mainly from the 6th to the 8th grade of the elementary school and from the 2nd to the 4th grade of the secondary school. Curricula include most data on Hungarian history for the period from the



*Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1867  
(7th grade textbook).*

early Middle Ages to 1918. Textbooks present mostly politics and war, with a few exceptions (for example, the role of the Árpád dynasty in development of Croatian medieval towns, the cultural activity of King Matthias Corvinus and the expansion of Protestantism in Hungary).<sup>56</sup> Both curricula and textbooks pay special attention to Croatian-Hungarian relations. The role of the Hungarians in the Croatian history is presented differently for certain period of time. When dealing with the Hungarian history for the period of the high Middle Ages, the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries and the 20<sup>th</sup> century, in textbooks prevail more neutral tone. Some events are presented with sympathy, e.g. the Hungarian opposition to Habsburg absolutism and the Soviet hegemony. However, it may be said that for the period of the early Middle Ages and the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Hungarians are in the most textbooks presented with some negative connotations. Nevertheless, the most recent textbook for the 6<sup>th</sup> grade presents the Hungarians and the Hungarian history with much more objectivity and it is, by all means, a step in the right direction.

## Representative passages from textbooks

*Passages from the textbook for the 6<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school:*

- I. The Hungarians (or the Magyars) were nomadic people who

<sup>56</sup> Agičić, *Povijest 7: udžbenik povijesti za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 81.

migrated across the Carpathian Mountains into the Pannonian plain at the very end of the 9<sup>th</sup> century. There they came across the Slavs, with whom they mixed over time. The Hungarians were very skilful horsemen. They didn't stop in the Pannonian plain but marched on raiding even more remote regions. Their troops spread fear in northern Italy, Germany, and France. Numerous armies who tried to stop them were defeated. The only reliable defence consisted in building fortified castles on elevated ground or in swamps. After being defeated in 955 by German knights led by king Otto I, they stopped plundering and soon accepted Christianity. In the year 1000 their ruler Stephen of the Árpád dynasty was crowned thus founding the Hungarian kingdom.<sup>57</sup>

II. The Croatian nobility was for many decades dissatisfied with the conditions at the Military Frontier. A large part of their properties was lost and placed under the control of military authorities in Graz, and later in Vienna... Besides, the authorities of the Croatian Parliament and the Ban were constantly violated... Apart from Croatian nobility, the Hungarian nobles showed the same amount of discontent. Not only did they have the same concerns as the Croats, but they were also anxious about their religious freedom. The majority of the Hungarian nobles supported Protestantism, which the King wanted to suppress at any price. During the Thirty Years War, some Hungarians fought against the Habsburgs, on the side of the Protestant countries. Those nobles, whose properties were both in Croatia and in Hungary, were in a special position. Among them, Šubić Zrinski were the most prominent. From the time of the Thirty Years War, brothers Nikola and Petar Zrinski distinguished themselves by their military skills and general education. Although both of them were Croatian Bans, Nikola was, by his activity, more connected with Hungary, and Petar with Croatia.<sup>58</sup>

*A passage from the textbook for the 3rd grade of secondary school:*

The revolution in Hungary begins with the revolt in Budapest on March 15. Liberals come to power. The Hungarian parliament reaches a decision on abolishing serfdom. Austria and Hungary are connected only by the joint ruler. Liberal nobility and Lajos Kossuth lead the

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<sup>57</sup> Budak-Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 13.

<sup>58</sup> Budak-Posavec, *Rađanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe: povijest za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Profil, Zagreb 1998, 112.

Hungarian revolution. In the next stage of revolution the Hungarians come into conflict with interests of non-Hungarian nations (Croats, Slovaks, Romanians and Serbs), with whom they live in common state and to whom they deny their national rights. The narrow-mindedness of Hungarian liberals will provoke armed conflicts, which will be used by court in Vienna to suppress the Hungarian revolution.<sup>59</sup>

*A passage from the textbook for the 8<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school:*

The peace treaty with Hungary was concluded in 1920, in palace of Trianon near Versailles. Hungary had to recognise Slavonia, Croatia, Međimurje, Srijem, Baranja, Bačka, and Banat as part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Also, it had to recognise Transilvania and the most part of eastern Banat as part of Romania, Slovakia as part of Czechoslovakia and Burgenland as part of Austria.<sup>60</sup>

*A passage from the textbook for the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of secondary school:*

Despite its rhetoric, the West haven't got any intention to get involved in the dramatic events in Hungary in 1956. Hungarian leadership, even though it was composed from communists only, showed too much independence towards the Soviet Union. Hungarians even intended to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. The reaction of the Soviets was cruel. «Revolution» in Hungary was suppressed by intervention of the Red Army. The Hungarian president Imre Nagy, with some of his collaborators found shelter at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. The Soviet military authorities guaranteed his safety, so Nagy left the embassy. However, he was arrested and transported to Romania, where he was trialed in a political process. There he was executed. Thousands of Hungarian civilians and soldiers fled from the country. Many of them first sought refugee in Yugoslavia and Austria. Refugee camps were also organised near Varaždin.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Pavličević, *Povijest za III. razred gimnazije*, Alfa, Zagreb 1997, 97.

<sup>60</sup> Perić, *Povijest za VIII. razred osnovne škole*, Alfa, Zagreb 1998, 15.

<sup>61</sup> Leček, Najbar-Agičić, Agičić, Jakovina, *Povijest 4: udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999, 226.

## **B. THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**







## Yugoslavia: a Look in the Broken Mirror.

### Who is the 'Other'?<sup>1</sup>

SNJEŽANA KOREN

ALL TEXTBOOKS of former Yugoslavia followed more or less the same concept before 1990: all of them included separate sections on general history, national history and history of the «other Yugoslav nations» in certain periods of time. After the breakdown of Yugoslavia textbooks changed in a different degree: some countries of ex-Yugoslavia have kept that concept, while others have left it. There were two common tendencies at the beginning of the nineties. Firstly, in all countries measures were taken to rid the history curricula and textbooks of the Marxist approach, which was usually called «de-ideologisation».

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<sup>1</sup> The sixth CDRSEE workshop (Ljubljana, 2-4 November 2000) – «*Yugoslavia: a Look in the Broken Mirror – Who is the «other»?*» - gathered scholars and history teachers from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vera Katz), Croatia (Neven Budak, Snježana Koren, Magdalena Najbar-Agičić), FYR Macedonia (Mihajlo Minoski), Montenegro (Jasmina Đorđević), Slovenia (Božo Repe, Bojan Balkovec, Jelka Razpotnik, Peter Vodopivec, Andrea Zupan) and Yugoslavia (Dubravka Stojanović, Srđan Rajković, Radina Vučetić-Mladenović). CDRSEE was represented by Christina Koulouri. The workshop was also attended by Heike Karge from Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research. Božo Repe, Chair of History Department, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, greeted the participants of the workshop and Christina Koulouri, Chair of the Textbook Committee, gave a short introduction. The participants prepared answers to a questionnaire which aimed to investigate how ex-Yugoslav peoples are mutually presented in their respective history textbooks with regard to a shared and/or conflictual past and to find out the possibilities of a revised view of a common past for all ethnic groups of ex-Yugoslavia. In each of four sessions participants presented their answers to certain topics, which enabled critical comparison of textbooks and methods of history teaching in the countries of ex-Yugoslavia. Heike Karge presented her paper *Between euphoria, sober realisation and isolation – how Europe is presented in the history textbooks of former Yugoslavian countries*, which was a part of the analysis conducted for the international conference in Turin, Italy (May 2000). This presentation is a report describing the papers and the discussions held during the Ljubljana workshop.

This was done very quickly in Croatia, Slovenia and BiH, in Macedonia only in the last few years, while Marxist views on history are still partly present in Serbian textbooks. Secondly, «de-ideologisation» was in some countries partly used as a political instrument to achieve their own political aims and former interpretations were replaced by new, ethnocentric perspective. Some textbooks which date from that period clearly show influences from everyday politics and public opinion and they present data in a way which is close to political propaganda. This is a most obvious in some Serbian and Croatian textbooks from that period.

Nevertheless, there are lately some more positive developments in textbook production. The emergence of alternative and parallel textbooks in Slovenia and Croatia and competition among publishers helped to improve the quality of design and appearance of textbooks. Recent Croatian textbooks try to be more neutral in their interpretations of events, trying to change the approach which was present in the first textbooks after 1990. However, when curricula and content of textbooks are concerned, changes are much slower and more time-consuming.

In other countries of former Yugoslavia alternative textbooks still do not exist and everything is still under the control of the Ministries of Education. Somewhat separate case is Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are new Bosnian history textbooks dating from the mid-nineties but in many parts of the country textbooks from Serbia and Croatia with the supplements for the Bosnian history are still in use. However, many teachers cannot choose freely textbooks in their schools.

Most textbooks, however, still present quite an ethnocentric picture, where national history is in the centre of the historical development. In most textbooks there is still no multiperspective approach to events and people while in some of them the existence of the others is almost completely ignored or even negative picture of the other is created. On average, there is 50% of national history and 50% of general history, which is very western-oriented. The history of other Yugoslav peoples is in most of them represented in a very small degree. This approach is very dominant in Croatian and Serbian textbooks which lead the way in presenting events from the national perspective. In Bosnian and Macedonian textbooks this is present in somewhat less degree and they dedicate more space to Balkan region. In Slovenian textbooks

there is about 30% of national history, while to history of the Balkans 1-2 lessons per textbook are dedicated. Consequently the amount of illustrative materials and maps corresponds with such presentation: most illustrations and maps are dedicated to national history.

In most textbooks the history of the Balkans is given separately from chapters about European history as something different or even opposite to Europe. Croatian and Slovenian textbooks mostly present those historical processes which confirm their cultural, political and geographical connections with Western and Central Europe. On the other side, Serbian textbooks, although they except Western-European development as a frame for the presentation of events, emphasise «moments of splitting away from Europe». For such development, Ottomans and their conquest of the Balkans are to blame: as those textbooks point out, they condemned the people of SE Europe to trail behind the general European development in following centuries.

Even when they speak about SE Europe/ the Balkans/ former Yugoslavia, Serbian and Croatian textbooks primarily use these frames to present their own, national history. For example, although Serbian textbooks include titles as «History of the South Slav population», they mostly present the history of Serbs in their «ethnic and historical territory». Another example are Croatian textbooks about 20th century where in presentation of Yugoslavia almost everything is left out except Croatian history.

Macedonian textbooks concentrate on those parts of the Balkan region which are inhabited by ethnic Macedonians. Chapters about European history in general exist, but they lack connections with the history of SE Europe. Bosnian textbooks differ from others because, even though they speak about the Balkans in separate chapters, they often try to present connections of Europe and the Balkans. In Bosnian textbooks the Balkan region is explicitly mentioned as a part of Europe, linked with different cultural, political and economic connections. As one participant put it, «emphasis is placed not on differences but on the diversity of historical events».

It is clear from those answers that in recent years pupils learn much less history of the South Slavs than before 1990. There is a problem of replacing the previous Yugoslav framework of textbooks with the new one, but it seems that authors of the curricula and textbooks are not certain were to place this new perspective: on European Union, SE

Europe, etc. Participants mentioned some illogicalities that are heritage of the socialist period. For example, pupils in Serbia learn about coronation of the dukes of Carinthia but at the same time they learn very little about the Bulgarian Empire; similarly the number of pages in Croatian textbooks dedicated to history of Austria and Hungary is minimal.

However, the question is what data should be placed in textbooks about SE Europe. Many participants, especially teachers, emphasised that pupils are already overburdened with too many facts in their textbooks, and asked if it is reasonable to expect from them to learn in detail the history of all peoples from former Yugoslavia. It could have an opposite effect – they will remember nothing. On the other side, it was also emphasised that the lack of knowledge could be dangerous and it could incite prejudices. There were suggestions that everybody should learn at least so much history of their neighbours to enable them to understand better their own history i.e. Slovenes should learn more about Austrian history, Croats about Serbs and Hungarians, Serbs about Bulgarians, Greeks about Albanians etc. It was stressed that creation of a balanced picture is not easy to achieve and it demands a great deal of consideration.

Characteristic were also differences in presentation of certain topics, events and people, which were evident from the answers. Some persons or certain categories of people are in some textbooks presented as heroes and in others as anti-heroes (Tito, Karađorđević and Nemanjić dynasty, Alojzije Stepinac, Josip Jelačić, Vuk Karadžić, Nikola Pašić, JNA, partisans, Chetniks etc.). Certain territories are «arrogated» to different countries and contemporary borders are projected to the earlier periods. Majority of the textbooks try to impose the idea of the greatness of its own state in the past (Great Slovenia/ Great Serbia/ Great Croatia) and often try to create the image of the political and statehood continuity, which is not based on sources. There is also a tendency to show how historical misfortunes and wars changed borders exclusively at one's own expense; at the same time one's own territorial gains are failed to observe or treated as implicit. This is partly the consequence of the position of the subject of history in the educational systems, where curricula regularly emphasise building of the national identity and patriotism of the pupils as one of the important goals of the history teaching.

The answers to questions<sup>2</sup> dedicated to the history of the first and second Yugoslavia again show differences in interpretation of certain events. This is present from the time of the emergence of the Yugoslav idea in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which is presented positively in Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin (cultural and eventually political unification of the South Slavs) and Croatian textbooks (the creation of the Croatian standard language and modern Croatian nation), neutrally in Slovenian textbooks or with caution in Serbian textbooks (the Illyrian idea is presented as spreading of the Croatian influence among Serbs who already had their own national identity and culture and their two national states). The creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 is explained as the chain of events caused by the international situation (the breakdown of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italian occupation of the Adriatic coast, demonstration of interests of winner states in World War I), but also as a wish for unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Nevertheless, the first Yugoslavia is in most textbooks evaluated negatively as the «prison for nations» with many economic and social problems. This is a picture where everybody was a victim: Croatia and Slovenia of economic exploitation, political pressure and «Great-Serbian hegemony» (although Slovenian textbooks also point out that in their everyday affairs Slovenes enjoyed autonomy and made quick economic and cultural progress), Serbia of «Croatian separatism», Macedonia of denationalisation and assimilation, and Bosnia and Montenegro because they were so undeveloped and poor. However, it was emphasised that this negative presentation of the first Yugoslavia is not the heritage of the recent war, but of the period of the socialist Yugoslavia where the first Yugoslavia was also negatively described.

There are also different explanations for the decay of Yugoslavia in 1941: fascist conquest, betrayal, unsolved national tensions, collapse of the Yugoslav Army, etc. Partisans are in textbooks presented positively, as a part of the world anti-fascist movement who fought against occupying forces. For example, their role is presented as very important and very positive in Slovenian textbooks because the result of their fighting was the creation of unified Slovenia as one of the republics of federative Yugoslavia. Both Serbian and Croatian textbooks try to

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. the questionnaire which was answered by all participants in *Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe*, Thessaloniki 2001, p. 110.

prove that exactly Serbs / Croats played the most prominent role in the antifascist struggle. However, Serbian textbooks claim that there were two antifascist movements in Serbia –partisans and Chetniks– although partisans are estimated as more positive ones. Croatian textbooks try to present the complex character of the antifascist movement and participation of many esteemed intellectuals, artists and people who belonged to different political orientations but they also stress out partisan crimes against their political opponents at the end of the war.

Ustashas, Chetniks, the forces of Nedić and Ljotić, Slovenian Home Guard and some others are mentioned as collaborators and their role is generally presented as negative. Serbian textbooks, contrary to others, present religious differences as a cause of conflict and crimes against civilians, by emphasising the negative role of the Catholic Church which, as they put it, supported the collapse of Yugoslavia and approved persecutions of the Orthodox population. At the same time, Serbian Orthodox Church was for the defence of the country and against occupation. Croatian textbooks estimate the Independent State of Croatia negatively, as a collaborator of the Axis but make difference between Ustashas and those Croats who were not Ustashas but accepted NDH as a Croatian national state and majority of whom were later disappointed in it.

It was mentioned that interpretations in textbooks were also influenced by recent public controversies about the role of partisans/ Ustashas/ Chetniks during the war. For example, participants from Serbia stated that there is a public pressure to change the above-mentioned estimations and to emphasise that both movements –partisans and Chetniks– were used by different ideologies. The similar situation is mentioned by the participants from Croatia: although Croatian historiography has positive attitude towards partisans and negative towards Ustashas, public controversies about them have their echo in certain textbooks where Ustashas and NDH are not depicted as negative enough. In some textbooks there are lot of emotions in presentation of interethnic violence and even brutal descriptions of the crimes. Participants from Serbia pointed out that this is especially important for the relations between Serbs and Croats, because Ustasha crimes against Serbs in the Independent State of the Croatia are described in most extreme words. On the other hand, Serbian textbooks do not include crimes of the Chetnik forces against Muslims and Croats, which are

emphasised on a large scale in Croatian and Bosnian textbooks.

The renewal of Yugoslavia is estimated positively in all textbooks, which mostly emphasise rebuilding and industrialisation of the country, changes in government (introducing of federation is stressed as positive mostly in Slovenian, Croatian and Macedonian textbooks) and changes of border with Italy (Slovenian and Croatian textbooks). Slovenian textbooks emphasise that Slovenes had autonomous educational and cultural life, economic development was faster and GDP was above average. Macedonians emphasise that they gained their separate republic. Negative are centralisation of government in hands of the Communist leadership, planned economy, totalitarian regime and political repression after the war (this is most emphasised in Croatian textbooks, thus creating an impression that situation in Croatia was worse than in other Yugoslav republics). Later on, it seems that this negative picture prevails, and majority of textbooks insist that exactly their republic was at a disadvantage in relation to others: Slovenia and Croatia, as most developed republics, emphasise economic exploitation from undeveloped republics, Croatia is also putting a stress on her cultural displacing (by introducing of Croatian-Serbian language), Serbia on nationalistic and separatistic tendencies among Slovenes and Croats and Montenegro, Bosnia and Macedonia emphasise that they were undeveloped and poor. Characteristic is the treatment of the 1974 Constitution, which is estimated very negatively in Serbian textbooks (it was unjust for Serbia because it gave too big autonomy to provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo) but positively in Slovenian and Croatian textbooks (recognition of the sovereignty of the republics and their bigger autonomy in Yugoslav federation).

As a cause for the collapse of the second Yugoslavia, there are again a number of reasons which differ from textbook to textbook: secession of some Yugoslav republics which were helped by the international community (Serbian and Montenegrin textbooks), the crisis of the economic and political system of Yugoslavia (Macedonian textbooks), the death of the old political leaders, the collapse of totalitarian regime and introducing of multi-party system, interethnic and interstate conflicts caused by the economic crisis, Serbian nationalism and international situation marked by the collapse of communist regimes in Europe (Slovenian and Croatian textbooks).

The treatment of recent events is very different in certain text-

books, especially in Serbian and Croatian ones. Serbian textbooks point out that Serbia and Montenegro wanted to keep Yugoslavia, but others tried to break it down by destroying the two forces which kept Yugoslavia together – Communist Party and Yugoslav Army. Croatian textbooks dedicate more attention to wars than Serbian textbooks. War in 1991-2 is in Serbian textbooks treated as a civil war and in Croatian textbooks as a self-defence against aggression. Situation in Croatia in 1991 is in Serbian textbooks compared with situation in 1941: Serbs are tortured, expelled, killed, Serbian villages burned etc. Croatian textbooks differ in their interpretation of events: some of them include only crimes against Croats and mention only Croat-Muslim cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while others also present the exodus of the part of the Serbian population from Croatia in 1995 and Croatian-Muslim conflicts in Bosnia. Macedonian textbooks present the breakdown of Yugoslavia as implementation of right of the nations of former Yugoslavia on their full independence. The recent conflicts are not mentioned. Bosnian textbooks do not mention recent events; they include only few most important dates in last ten years without any explanation.

Participants of the workshop said that present image of Yugoslavia in textbooks could be compared with the image of Austro-Hungary in textbooks before 1990, which was quite negative. It was stressed that perhaps too much of the Yugoslav history was eliminated from textbooks, which consequently makes impossible the creating of the realistic picture of its historical development. The discussion also revealed that many problems and complex questions (and not only in recent history) are not solved in historiography, while at the same time curricula demand from authors to include them in textbooks or even bring attitudes and evaluations. Terminology is another serious issue but this is again more an academic question than a problem of teachers and textbook authors.

Inclusion of recent events in textbooks was another issue in discussion. It was pointed out that recent events are in many cases more controversial and more difficult to teach because they very often include strong emotions. Some participants said that this recent period is not researched properly, stressing out that any evaluation of recent events is not history, but politics. Participants from Bosnia were against inclusion of recent events in textbooks, emphasising that they were

painful for many pupils and therefore time-distance is necessary. However, they also mentioned that pupils nevertheless ask questions and everybody has his/ hers own explanation which sometimes leads to difficult situations in classrooms. Other participants asked if historians have time to wait for the results of the scientific research or if they have to act now because pupils are nevertheless exposed to influence of media, oral history etc.

The question was raised about efficiency of educational systems and their possibility to influence on pupils. Scholars emphasised that in former Yugoslavia school history was manipulated and pro-Yugoslav and pupils were educated to live in brotherhood and unity, but its effect on their opinion was obviously not so significant, considering everything that happened in last ten years. According to opinion of some of them, it proved that school history could not compete with family history, influences from media, newspapers etc. History (especially political and military) is boring for children and perhaps this is a reason why it is not effective. It was suggested that if school history could be more amusing or at least less serious, it could perhaps have more influence on pupils. Although some teachers accepted the fact that school history can be fun, it will certainly take time to spread among them, because such approach to major events and national heroes is for many others still hard to imagine.

Another question raised from discussion was the presentation of history through political events and wars, which prevails in many textbooks. Some participants suggested that perhaps the answer could be in abolishing of political history and wars from history textbooks altogether and putting stress on cultural history. However, others emphasised that it cannot be avoided completely because the picture is not complete and absolute silence about political history and wars is also not good because the lack of knowledge could be dangerous. There were suggestions to include in textbooks arguments of the other side, not necessary to agree with them, but to know them because it could be the first step to know each other better. Both scholars and history teachers should ask themselves what is actually the goal of the history teaching. Should children learn facts or perhaps it is more important to develop certain skills which could help them to develop understanding of historical processes and critical thinking? If we adopt the second approach, perhaps after such teaching pupils will be able to recognise

attempts of manipulation, propaganda and distortion of the truth?

Participants agreed that it is much easier to achieve agreement in academic circles or lead academic discussion than to teach in classroom or even to decide what to do next or how it is possible to change things. In that matter, the importance of both initial and in-service training of teachers was stressed out because it is sometimes easier to change curricula and textbooks than a way teachers are used to teach. The question was raised about the authors of the textbooks: who are they and is it possible to talk with them, to organise a discussion with them and among them. Is it possible to help people to develop alternative textbooks? Concerning that issue, it was mentioned that CDRSEE already started a new project, «*Southeast European History Teachers' Education Project*», primarily intended for the training of the history teachers. Heike Karge pointed out that Georg Eckert Institute offers scholarships for textbook research and announced that Institute started a new 2-years project whose goal is to co-ordinate textbook research and development in South East Europe.

# Between Euphoria, Sober Realisation and Isolation. 'Europe' in the History Textbooks of Former Yugoslavian Countries\*

HEIKE KARGE

## Introduction

**O**F ALL THE COUNTRIES reviewed in this paper, there is not one which would qualify as a likely candidate for entry into the European Community in the near future. Consequently, a study on how Europe is presented in the school history textbooks used in Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH), Yugoslavia, Croatia and Macedonia (FYROM)<sup>1</sup> requires a specific approach. For, unlike the majority of countries in Western Europe, these states have only recently, and only to a certain extent, been involved in the process of (West) European integration. The 'Europe of Institutions' has always been primarily Western in character.

Southeastern Europe and the Balkans are still located, at least in the minds of most Western Europeans, along the periphery of Europe – a fate this region has to share with a number of other countries in Eastern Europe. For, the real centre, or rather the heart of Europe, is still today Western Europe. The fact that the modern 'Centre' of Europe has a political dimension and has been shifted to the West explains, at least in part, why Eastern and Southeastern regions are felt to be on the outskirts.

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\* This text is based on my analysis of the history textbooks of former Yugoslavian countries, carried out for the international conference «The image of Europe between globalization and national consciousness: traditional concepts and recent developments in the teaching of history, geography and civic education in the countries of the European Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans» that took place in May 2000 in Turin/ Italy.

<sup>1</sup> Officially referred to as the: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

However, people, even in Southeastern Europe, are conscious of a certain distance to Europe. This was clearly evident in the euphoria which broke out shortly after the decline of various Socialist governments and is now remembered for its slogan of 'A Return to Europe'. This return was not only to shake off their heritage of centuries of foreign rule by the Ottomans (and partly the House of Habsburg, too), but also that of Communist rule in former Yugoslavia<sup>2</sup>. In the textbooks of the newly-founded states, both were held responsible for attempting to, and partly succeeding in, de-Europeanising the Balkan region or, in any event, their own country.

The euphoria of the 1990s, primarily because of the wars that spread across the territory of former Yugoslavia, was soon followed by sober realisation. Consequently, for some countries, the 'path to Europe' today, a decade later, seems to have become longer. In the last ten years, due to the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Kosovo (with the consequent isolation of Yugoslavia by the West) and following the authoritarian government of Croatia in the shape of the CDU<sup>3</sup> which has only at the beginning of the year 2000 come to an end, as well as in consequence of the recent inter-ethnic conflicts in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, all these countries have had to experience in different ways that Europe, in the form of the EU, is something in which one cannot as yet be accepted as a member.

On the other hand, with the emergence of the Stability Pact for

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<sup>2</sup> Compare also the analyses of Southeast European history textbooks mainly from the 1990s, which, in some parts, go beyond the geographical regions covered here: Wolfgang Höpken, pub., *Oil on Fire? Textbooks, Ethnic Stereotypes and Violence in Southeastern Europe* (Studies on International Textbook Research, Vol. 89), Hannover Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1996; Dijana Plut et al., pub., *Warfare, Patriotism, Patriarchy: The Analysis of Elementary School Textbooks*. Belgrade: Centre for Anti-War Action & Association, 1994; Heike Karge, "Images of history in post-Yugoslavia", in: *International Textbook Research 4* (1999): 315-37; Balkan Colleges Foundation, pub., *The image of the Other - Analysis of the High-School Textbooks in History from the Balkan Countries*. Sofia: Balkan Colleges Foundation, 1998; Association for Democracy in the Balkans, pub., *Culture and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe*. International Conference Thessaloniki, Greece, June 26-29, 1997, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) was until January 2000 the governing Party in Croatia and led by Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman, who died in December 1999.

Southeastern Europe in 1999, there are today new opportunities on the horizon; opportunities which could help to develop those institutional mechanisms which, having gone through the experiences of the last wars and crises, could bind the Southeastern parts of Europe in stable and lasting policies of integration. Even if there were already good evidence for real success in the political and economic stabilisation of the Balkans<sup>4</sup>, the issue at hand would, nevertheless, still be to encourage and help spread the sense of European consciousness (in whatever vague form it may already exist) to include a Southeastern dimension. For, the Balkan region is without a doubt an integral part of Europe; its links to Europe are rooted in a multitude of historical events interwoven with alliances and misalliances. The aim of this presentation is to take initial steps towards uncovering the varying influences and the development of these interrelationships.

The majority of the textbooks examined deal with the history of the Balkan region in a separate chapter from world or European history. The same approach applies to the way in which world or European history, as opposed to the history of one's own country, is presented. Hence, the chapters on 'European development' refer chronologically to developments primarily in Western Europe, followed by additional chapters on the Balkan region and the country's own history. Textbooks from BiH, Serbia and Macedonia follow this order fairly consistently. Croatian history textbooks, in contrast, and especially in the more recent editions, adhere to the principle of integrating European and national history<sup>5</sup>, thereby omitting Southeast European history to a large extent. The approach used in Macedonian textbooks seems at first sight to be an inspiring way to present both European and Macedonian history<sup>6</sup>. However, extensive study shows that the textbooks here deal

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<sup>4</sup> See the *Report of the Special Coordinator on the Implementation of the Quick Start Package, May 2001* at: <http://www.stabilitypact.org/qsp-report>.

<sup>5</sup> An older edition which looks at the history of the Middle Ages, although clearly divided into individual chapters on European and Croatian history, still manages to draw on the links and differences between Europe and Croatia by summarising the epoch of the Middle Ages. [Kro (3) pp. 103f.].

<sup>6</sup> In a book on the Middle Ages, there is a chapter which is headed «Europe and the Balkans in the Middle Ages». The following themes are presented in this same order and cover three pages each: the crusades, Serbian medieval kingdoms, sovereign Macedonian feudal lords, the Ottoman Empire and the subjugation of Macedonia and the Ottoman rule. [Maz (5) pp. 71ff.].

with the history of the Balkans in a way that can only offer an overall impression of European correlations.

These initial impressions already imply that the links between the Balkan region and Europe are presented in different ways. In order to pinpoint exactly what these links and differences are, two questions will be dealt with in this analysis.

1. How is Southeast Europe itself presented, and what methods have been used in the books to discuss this region in the overall European context?
2. How is the process of European Integration dealt with in the textbooks?

Both questions seem to be particularly important, since, by answering them, we can try to discuss the didactic function of the terms «Europe» and «nation». Focussing on the process of European integration allows additionally to discuss latest developments of textbook writing in some of the countries concerned.

This analysis will not discuss the question on the borders of the term «Europe» in textbooks as well as the relationship between European and World History in the textbooks<sup>7</sup>.

### **Geographical Perspectives: The Balkans and Europe**

When dealing with Balkan history, Croatian and Serb textbooks both concentrate on presenting the history of their own ethnic group or nation in the Southeast European region. Serbian textbooks often use the heading ‘History of the South Slav Population’ for these chapters, but still refer mainly to the history of the Serbs in their ‘ethnic and historic territory’. Croatian books have a similar approach at least as far as presenting the history of BiH is concerned, since they integrate the history of BiH into chapters on Croatian history.<sup>8</sup> In a textbook on 20<sup>th</sup>-century history, the presentations for Southeast Europe concentrate on

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<sup>7</sup> For these questions see my analysis in the conference reader (see footnote 1) to be published by Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli (forthcoming).

<sup>8</sup> There is a description covering Bosnian history of the Middle Ages in a chapter entitled: «The Adriatic Regions of Croatia» [Kro (3) pp. 151ff.]. In a chapter on Croatian history at the turn of the century we find the following sub-sections in another book «BiH falls under Austro-Hungarian rulership» as well as «The Croat Peoples in BiH at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century» [Kro (6) pp. 85ff.].

Croatian history, and anything that is not related to this is left out completely. Even the chapters which discuss the two Yugoslavian states (between the First and Second World War as well as thereafter), are reduced to an analysis here of Croatian history during this period.<sup>9</sup> With an approach like this, it is not possible to perceive Southeast Europe in all its diversity, nor is it possible to show overlapping developments.

Textbooks from BiH and Macedonia have a completely different approach. In their chapters dealing with developments in the Balkan region, there are more references to other peoples and nations than in Croatian or Serbian textbooks. In some parts, there are hints at comparisons that go beyond just a presentation of the history of each country. Textbooks from BiH stand out by virtue of their occasional references to aspects which these Balkan region countries have in common, as well as to distinctive aspects of historical development:

Between the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> century, significant cultural and religious developments took place as a result of ethnic shifting affecting the Slav peoples as well as other groups throughout the Balkans. Earlier differences, stemming from the differences in Eastern and Western civilisations, disappeared to a great extent in regions conquered by the Ottomans. It led indeed to growth in mutual traditions, lifestyles, clothing and so forth. [BiH (3) p. 165.]

In contrast, the more recent textbooks from Macedonia seem to place far less importance on such detailed information. For, while the two editions presented here for the history between the 18<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are structured in almost the same way, one cannot fail to notice that, in the more recent edition, the chapter on the cultural development of the Balkans has been omitted. Thus, although the history of the neighbouring countries is looked into in good detail, the presentations are mainly for describing political and historical correlations which reveal little of the complexity and diversity of developments in the Balkans.

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<sup>9</sup> What becomes obvious in this chapter, which refers to the period during Socialist Yugoslavia until 1971, is as follows; «Croatia between 1948 – 1971», no sign of a chapter as such for Yugoslavia during this period! [Kro (10) pp. 239ff.].

Even if state politics were not necessarily factors in the different approaches to discussing Southeast European history, the presentations still highlight the image each country has of itself historically and culturally speaking, as well as their political ambitions. This becomes more obvious in the textbooks when looking at how each country sees itself and the Balkan region within Europe. Two concepts – chosen by the author as analytical tools for ordering the answers systematically – can be distinguished here. The first defines the Balkans as diametrically opposed to Europe, as something ‘different’. Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian history textbooks employ this concept, without specifically saying so. Reasons here for separating the Balkans from Europe are completely different for all three countries, which is also why it is a worthwhile exercise to examine each different series of national textbooks individually. The second concept defines the location of the Balkans and, in doing so, does the same for its own country within Europe. This approach is applied in the history textbooks of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

#### IN OR OUT? THE BALKANS AND EUROPE

##### *Croatia: fleeing to Europe*

Among the countries included in this study, Croatia is, geographically speaking, furthest to the West, and feels least of all inclined to place its history in a Balkan context. The textbooks concentrate on showing historical processes to prove the country’s affinity with Europe. The current specifications for the curriculum are already a reminder of the actual aim of teaching history, i.e. to develop among the pupils a consciousness of the fact that ‘Croatia truly was and will remain a part of European culture’.<sup>10</sup> The textbooks not only fulfil this requirement by phasing out Southeast European history slowly but surely, but also by making references to parallels in European and Croat developments of the most varied nature. Consequently, Christianisation of the Croatian peoples during the Middle Ages is already seen here as evidence of the mutual paths taken by Croatia and Europe:

For the Croats, Christianisation was an important event in their history, since it meant that they could enter the European Christian community to which they still belong [Kro (3) p. 39].

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<sup>10</sup> *Prosvjetni vjesnik*. Special edition, No. 2, June 1999, p. 135.

The community at question here is already divided. For, the Church which «christianised the European peoples» comprised the «Western Church», which covered «Western and Central Europe», and the «Eastern Church» which christianised «Eastern Europe». [Ibid. p. 26.] Croatia's affiliation to the «Roman Catholic Church» and therefore to 'Western culture' is shown in the textbooks. In a 20<sup>th</sup>-century textbook, Croatia is correspondingly described as an «old European nation of Catholics». [Kro (2) p. 192.] Through this affiliation it is not only religious borders which are being defined but, broadly-speaking, also cultural ones to those regions which have no part in Western developments. The link with Europe is more to support the presentation of a normative borderline of hills which stretches from the West to the East or the Southeast. Real European developments are at present taking place on the 'Western side', which incorporates progress, political cultivation and civilisation. Hence, we find in one of the textbooks, in a chapter headed 'The World and Europe in the Second Half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century', how the workers' movement in the 19<sup>th</sup> century is used to symbolise the correlation between Capitalist development and Socialist issues: «In practice it becomes clear that Marx and the Marxists imposed a false view on the workers as to how they could improve their difficult material circumstances», which is then followed by a jump to the year 1989:

The power of the Communists was dictatorial and undemocratic. Marxist ideas as to the type of solution and the method needed for solving mankind's problems in society and social spheres were based on misconceptions. [...] All Communist states relied (and rely) on terror, the police, military, one opinion, lack of freedom, sham democracy, the persecution of the Right as well as those with different political convictions or religious leanings; they supported totalitarianism, collectivism and the suppression of human individuality and freedom [...] Practice shows that industrial development in countries has not led to general poverty of the proletariat or to a worsening of their social status (in contrast to what Marx had claimed), but rather the proletariat, living in a free economy with private initiatives (capitalism), have the chance of finding work (which was already the case at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century) with social benefits, have better education, better living and working conditions and are rewarded enough, in order to be able to live well (they can earn enough to nourish them-

selves and their families, to save and accrue private wealth) [Kro (8) S. 234f.]

The questions immediately following this, such as «How do the Social Democrats want to solve the issue of unemployment, perhaps like the Communists? Which opinion has stood the test of history?» [Ibid.], once again show that the democratic market economy of the West is seen as a model and the norm. It is thus a rule which has gained its prestige by virtue of its 'historical success', although internal social conflicts that also exist in the world of economic 'prosperity' are preferably not accentuated at this point. 'Historical failure', on the other hand, belonged to the other, the 'East Communist' side. It is described in a few sweeping statements which are meant to illustrate the entire repertoire of national Communist repression. However, in our context they serve more to illustrate the stereotyped perceptions of the West and East, of democracy and dictatorship, which sound like a song of praise for the world of Western capitalism.

Croatia continues to feel bound to this Westernised Europe even in the chapters concerned with history which is not related to Croatia. References are made to parallel developments in science, culture and sport, in national movements and in the emergence of a modern democratic constitution in the 19th century. [Kro (6) p. 74.]

On the other, or 'non-Western', side we find the Balkan region. This area, as already mentioned, is much less clearly defined as a region in its own right. Even so, there are indications in the presentations of more recent history, as well as in the presentations of the latest developments, that the region belongs culturally to a different system of values.<sup>11</sup> This is more than obvious in the depictions of the latest historical events. Consequently, the CDU's election victory in 1990 was a sign that the people had chosen a Party political programme which,

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<sup>11</sup> A Croatian textbook proposes that without the Croats, who lived in BiH during this period in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, there would not have been any culture at all: «Apart from the Muslim population and the Orthodox Vlachs who immigrated here mainly in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Croats have lived in what is known today as BiH since their migration here in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> centuries. By preserving their Roman Catholic faith and Croatian identity, the Franciscan monks achieved the most. As in earlier times, they (the Franciscans, author's annotation) were the only ones to uphold education and culture in BiH in the 18<sup>th</sup> century» [Kro (4) p. 177.].

among other things, plans «an intensified and lasting effort on behalf of Croatia to join the Western European civilisation, to which it has always belonged, anyway.»[Kro (1) p. 143.]<sup>12</sup>

It is evident that these evaluations are politically motivated and often are extreme as a consequence of the war in the 1990s. The conception underlying all Croat textbooks<sup>13</sup> shows that Croatia's cultural, political and geographical leanings are on the whole firmly lodged more in Western and Central Europe than in the Balkan region. The most recent war obviously only served to 'prove' that the Southeast can only manage to disqualify itself continually in the race for Europe – a race in which Croatia has long since made its decision in favour of the West.

#### *Macedonia: forgoing Europe*

The contrast between Croatian and Macedonian textbooks in how they see Europe could not be greater. Macedonian textbooks do not concentrate on presenting history in terms of correlations throughout Europe, but concentrate on the Balkan region, or rather on those parts of the Balkans inhabited by ethnic Macedonians. Although chapters on European and world history do in fact exist, the books still leave an impression of a lack of interest as far as European interrelationships are concerned. This is especially obvious in the presentations of recent history and events leading up to the present day. Hence, the more recent edition of a textbook covering history from the 18<sup>th</sup> century to the early 1900s leaves out chapters which, in an earlier 1992 edition, had been included and had referred to shared European developments. Is this because the new interpretations, which no longer follow a Marxist line of argumentation, have not as yet been developed for certain historical themes? Have chapters been left out, for instance those concerning the period of 1848 - the height of revolutions in Europe - because the 1992 edition included an evaluation which is too out of date or now seems unscientific?<sup>14</sup> Or were they taken out in order to allow more room for

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<sup>12</sup> More recent Croatian textbooks deviate slightly from the books cited here. Compare here the chapter on «The process of European integration».

<sup>13</sup> Programmatic here is also the title of a textbook for the Middle Ages: «The birth of modern Croatia and Europe. From migration to absolutism» [Kro (9)].

<sup>14</sup> The textbook thus interprets the 1848s as a period of revolutionary civil movement in Western and Central Europe. The masses, the book explains, wanted to

Macedonian history? Breaking links with Europe is once again strongly encouraged in the textbooks on 20<sup>th</sup>-century history. Certain chapters have therefore been left out in the more recent edition Maz (7).], - such as those which, in 1992, had at least included a list of economic and technical developments in a global and European context. [Maz (1) S. 122ff.]

These chapters which, in particular, cover international history seem like additional information which has been inserted or added to the original presentation of history. <sup>15</sup> A feeling of having firm historical roots in Europe, or a sense of a modern European identity based on this, is only touched on. When regarded as a theme in its own right, Europe is shown as a mere accumulation of dates and special jargon, both of which have to be learnt, or merely as a series of facts which only have little, if anything at all, to do with Macedonia. The history textbooks instead focus clearly on their own ethnic national history. To do this at the expense of having to forgo an analysis of European interrelationships in all their entirety and complexity probably has to be ascribed to recent efforts which support applications for sovereignty, based in turn on an identity firmly anchored in history. In addition, the fact that Macedonia stands little chance of being accepted into the European Union in the near future, is a contributing factor to its tendency to isolate itself from Europe.

*Serbia: disappointment with Europe and consequent withdrawal*

Like Croatian authors, Serbians work with the same thought at the back of their minds, namely, that similarly directed or parallel developments in their own country and in Western Europe can strengthen a sense of belonging to a common European structure. In other words, both series of textbooks implicitly accept a 'normal case' of European develop-

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put an end to what remained of feudalism and fought for their rights as free citizens in countries such as Italy and Germany, where there was no political unity, as well as in the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the masses strove for attaining not only national unity, but also equal rights. During the revolutions there was an «intensified class struggle between the working classes and the bourgeoisie» [Maz (3) p. 27].

<sup>15</sup> The (only!) chapter on world history after the Second World War is covered in 6 pages in this textbook. It lists a) international relations, which include the Paris Peace Conference, the Chinese Revolution, the Cold War as well as the founding of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, b) the new international world order, the impact of the UNO, de-colonisation, OCSE and the founding of the EU. [Maz (7) pp. 95ff.]

ment, defined primarily in a Western European historical context. Croatian books insert their own history here, while Serbian writers tend more to emphasise the moment of splitting away or deviating from Europe. This is generally attributed to the Ottomans and their advance in the Balkans during the Middle Ages. The books claim that this condemned the people of Southeast Europe to limp along behind the 'general European' development for centuries to follow:

The Ottoman conquests had a grievous effect on the cultural development of the repressed Christian population. The continual wars [...] hindered nearly all cultural activity. [Serb (5) p. 90.]

One after another our countries were to lose their independence, while the West was experiencing an economic rise and the discovery of the New World. The lengthy wars of conquest and the resulting destruction had a negative effect on economic activity. [...] The primitive Turkish feudal system severely retarded the economic and social development of the conquered people. [Serb (7) p. 128]

This is a depiction of the cultural and economic effect of uncoupling the Balkans (and thereby Serbia) from Europe. The descriptions of recent and contemporary history complete this by adding a further political aspect: for, with the coming of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it was the European Great Powers themselves who came to regard Southeast Europe simply as the 'plaything' of their own imperial ambitions<sup>16</sup>. Thus, it was doubly excluded from Europe: initially through the Ottomans, who were defined as non-European, and then through the European Great Powers.

But where exclusion is experienced and described, there must also be an effective consciousness of a country's 'real' membership within Europe. This is frequently shown in the books, e.g. as a result of contri-

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<sup>16</sup> Thus, for example, for the period immediately preceding the founding of the 1st Yugoslavia, it is recorded that the Entente powers did not take into consideration the rights of the composite people living in the monarchy, when they were deliberating whether or not to retain the Austro-Hungarian Empire. [Serb (4) p. 96] This point of view persisted until very recently: «[...] that the SFRY (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, author's annotation) was, until the collapse of the USSR [...] only interesting to the two super- powers (USSR,USA) as a buffer zone.» [Ibid. p. 240.].

butions made to the process of spreading Christian civilisation in medieval Europe. Apart from this, attention is often drawn to parallel developments in culture, science or politics.

However, is this actually a first expression of European identity? Does it not rather reflect the still unfulfilled wish for recognition today? While, on the one hand, the books indicate efforts to be a part of Europe, they cement, on the other hand, the picture of a guilty Europe of the Great Powers, unwilling to allow little countries political independence and development. From this perspective, the wall dividing Europe and non-Europe, but actually running through the middle of Europe, was erected exclusively by the Western side because of its imperialist ambitions and is still guarded distrustfully today.

Above all, the idea of 'real' membership is expressed in presentations of current affairs as disappointing and wanting to find distance to Europe. Thus, for instance, in alluding to the EU's policy of sanctions against Yugoslavia, it is indicated that Europe has always disregarded Socialist Yugoslavia's world-political achievements and that is why it imposed unjustified sanctions after 1991.

As a member of the UNO, Yugoslavia always opposed war and supported co-operation between countries. Yugoslavia's unyielding insistence on the policy of not belonging to a bloc, followed particularly by the African and Asian countries, led to a reversal of its relationship and connection with the European countries and their economic and political organisations. That had long-term consequences for Yugoslavia, as was seen in 1991, when nearly all the European countries supported its disintegration. [Serb (6) p. 152.]

*Bosnia and Hercegovina: the Balkans in Europe*

The Balkan people in the epoch of developed feudalism: at that time, the socio-economic and political development of the Balkan people mainly displayed the same tendencies which determined the development of West European feudal society. This development did not run evenly with or parallel to that of Western Europe in all areas of economic and political life, but the direction was the same. It was influenced by both the West and the East, but this did not remove it essentially from the common development of Europe. [BiH (3) p. 107.]

Like most of the other books, textbooks from Bosnia and Hercegovina deal with Balkan history in separate chapters. Even so, frequent attempts are made to present a common European connection which includes the Balkans. Southeast Europe is explicitly counted as part of Europe, bound to it by various cultural, political and economic overlapping. However, in contrast to, say, the Serbian books, Balkan history is less seen as a 'special case' or deviation from general European development, but rather in the light of specific developments in Southeast Europe which spring from the essence of European historical paths - their multiplicity. Emphasis is placed not on differences, but on the diversity of historical events.

These tendencies appear, in particular, in the depiction of the Southeast's cultural development. Reference is made not only to links between everyday life and the cultural life of the Balkan people,<sup>17</sup> but also to its enrichment through the diverse influences from the Western European<sup>18</sup> and Ottoman areas. In a chapter on the expansionist moves of the Ottomans in the Balkans, we read:

With the arrival of the Ottomans a new era began in this part of Europe, which was to affect its culture, too. From now on, one can discover elements of Islamic culture in the Balkan area, which will influence the varied religious and lay life of many generations. [Ibid. p. 131.]

The descriptions concerning the occupation of the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1878 are particularly

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<sup>17</sup> In a chapter on the meaning of the 11<sup>th</sup> century schism in the Christian church, it is stated that, although this deepened the cultural differences between the Southern Slavs, many connecting elements were retained, e.g. in the written language. [BiH (3) p. 45].

<sup>18</sup> In the evaluation of the medieval Bosnian culture, it is stated that it was "varied and rich" because of the mixture of Italian, West European, Southern Slav and Bosnian elements. [Ibid. p. 104f.] On the cultural developments up to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in BiH: "Cultural and scientific activity in the area of present BiH was enriched by the arrival of the Jews, particularly in Sarajevo and Travnik [...] In addition to already existing traditions, developed mainly in Spain, from where the Sephardim were expelled at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, creative Jews incorporated Bosnian elements in their work. They can be identified by these when compared to their fellow religionists in other countries." [Ibid. p. 183].

interesting. We read that the occupation was «the most significant occurrence in the history (of BiH) since the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century». Because then, «with the inclusion of the oriental-Islamic culture, a basis was created for the formation of a new society.» [BiH (1) p. 156.] In contrast to some Croatian depictions, [Cro (8) p. 325.] which describe the occupation as the beginning of a return to Western civilisation, of BiH's renewed approach to Europe, the books from BiH imply a sense of having belonged to the European area even during the era of Ottoman domination. However, there is no attempt to hide the fact that, through its long attachment to the Ottoman Empire, the area of Bosnia and Hercegovina was influenced in a very specific way, perceived by Central and West European countries as rather 'orientally exotic.'<sup>19</sup> The tension arising from its geographical position between Europe, the Slav and the Arabic-Turkish oriental world could not be free of conflict, but had a clear inner-European dimension:

With the 1878 occupation BiH was faced with an important cultural crossroad. This was particularly important for the Muslim-Bosniacs, separated from their cultural home after more than 400 years of being linked with an oriental-Islamic civilisation. That was why they had the most difficulty in accustoming themselves to the new conditions. The new government refused to acknowledge oriental script as an official language. Thus Bosniacs were faced with the choice of accepting intellectual integration with Europe or being condemned to isolation and cultural stagnation. [BiH (4) p. 167.]

### **Political Perspectives: The Process of European Integration**

The establishment of political and military alliances after World War II, namely, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, sealed the division of Europe for the Cold War period. The ideological, political and military division of Europe made it secondary, while the influences of the superpowers, the USA, and the USSR were the focus. The signing of the final segment of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Hel-

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<sup>19</sup> «Specific importance is attached to those works which were the result of foreigners interested in BiH. This interest was of very different kinds, ranging from official notice to the kind which was the result of 'opening up Bosnia' as an exotic country and even to serious scientific research of lasting importance». [BiH (4) p. 168.]

sinki in 1975 offered a new opportunity for politics in which the blocs seemed to become less important.

At this juncture, Serbian textbooks begin with the establishment of the processes of European integration. The basis of the CSCE was military non-proliferation motivated by fears of another world war. This general and positive aspect rapidly changes to the perspective that this process led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The most important result of the Helsinki Conference was the article guaranteeing the integrity of borders. Without a doubt, this decision was of utmost importance and crucial, yet it led to evidence of impartiality in, among others, the European Community (EC). Nonetheless, the 1990 European Council's Brussels Declaration, which declared support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, was followed by a European Council's decision in 1991, under pressure from a reunified Germany, which supported the secession of parts of Yugoslavia and led to the end of the SFRY. [Serb (4) pp. 213f.] The international community, especially Germany, then showed its 'true face' and that 'the appetite of the superpowers recognises no borders in its realisations of its goals' by deciding to send Blue Berets to the region.

Criticism of Europe and its modern political developments over the last decade is based on events in the territory which was once Socialist Yugoslavia. These explanations express the idea that the root of the conflicts in the 1990s lies in 'separatism and nationalism' of the newly independent republics as well as the international community. They thereby portray Serbia as entirely victimised by these forces.<sup>20</sup> From this perspective, the EC is viewed as yet another tool in the battle of the superpowers to subjugate smaller countries, especially against Serbian interests. Despite this negative evaluation of the EC, an explicit interest in participating in the economic integration of Europe is evident.<sup>21</sup> The motivation for establishing the EC is expressed therefore as a need for Western European countries (those which are most developed) to form an economic and military counterbalance to the danger facing Europe, namely that it becomes marginalised by the superpowers, the USA, the USSR and Japan. The EC, now a strong economic and

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<sup>20</sup> «The EC also tried to offer their 'good services' during the Yugoslavian conflict. Because the EC has biases, especially Germany which is the most influential and aggressive of all EC members, the fighting did not cease.»[Serb (6) p. 158.].

<sup>21</sup> In the following [Serb (4) pp. 230f.] also [Serb (2) p. 258.].

political power, intends to become, in the words of Mitterrand, completely unified. One of the first steps in this direction was realised by the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). The planned expansion of co-operation between EFTA and Yugoslavia and thereby the desired closer relationship with the EC was disrupted by events in 1991. The image of the political role of the EC, especially after 1990, is portrayed so that this does not correspond in any way to the vision of participation in the process of European economic integration.

In Macedonian textbooks, the CSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Economic Community (EEC) are explained in brief sections,<sup>22</sup> and the establishment of the Union, member states and the goals of the respective organisations are mentioned. Emphasis is placed on the ideal of the economic union of Europe and the eventual creation of a 'United States of Europe'. Except for the description of the CSCE, in which the participation of Socialist Yugoslavia is highlighted, all mention of the home country and its status within the process of European integration is lacking. The texts relate a lack of involvement in all these developments and no mention is made of inclusion or exclusion mechanisms within the process of European integration. The chapters which cover the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia make their disinterest in developments outside of Macedonia evident. The violent clashes of the 1990s are mentioned in one sentence in a textbook printed in 1992; in newer texts it is omitted entirely<sup>23</sup>. Macedonian history is kept separate from significant events and developments in Europe, and the latter is only presented in the most terse terms.

Textbooks from Bosnia and Hercegovina leave out the developments and the effects of the CSCE entirely. This is surprising since the idea of a political and economic European Union is, if although briefly, discussed in an animated fashion.<sup>24</sup> The steps towards establishing the EEC, the European Parliament and the expansion into what has become known as the 'The European 12' including the present fact further countries would like to join are covered. Today the EU is a significant economic factor, with the Common Market, and the underlying idea of European integration in which «renewal is only possible due to the col-

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<sup>22</sup> [Maz (1) p. 121.]; [Maz (2) pp.198f.]; and [Maz (7) p. 98.].

<sup>23</sup> [Maz (1) p. 132.].

<sup>24</sup> In the following [BiH (5) pp. 107f.] also [BiH (2) p. 116.].

lapse of Communism». What is meant by 'renewal' is not elaborated at this point. It could possibly (seen in the entire context of the book) refer to the re-establishment of the political and economic balance of power within Europe, which had been given to the non-European superpowers after World War I. The conflicts of European integration are portrayed through examples, i.e. the problems of agricultural price policies. The reference to the destruction of agricultural products by various EEC countries «only to keep prices from falling» is expressed with clear criticism and a lack of comprehension which can apply to a number of specific aspects of Western European policy.

The recent war in BiH is also discussed, so that criticism of Europe comes to the fore: although BiH was officially recognised by Europe, it was not defended militarily. Some European countries even support the aggressors, thereby throwing the principles of democracy, progress and culture in doubt, «on those, who at least say that the new Europe should expand». Beyond the economic and political dimensions of the process of European integration, a perspective is suggested here which perceives Europe as a negotiable community of cultural and moral values. Yet, in conclusion, 'Europe' is given a great part of the moral responsibility for the horrors of that war, without considering the responsibility of one's own people. There is thus little room for self-critical reflection.

Croatian textbooks published in 1994-95 provide equally little information about European institutions as do the books from Serbia or Bosnia and Hercegovina. A Croatian history published in 1995 refers to the CSCE in the context of the attempts to establish closer relationships between the East and the West, which were the result of a growing fear of the possibility of a new, nuclear war. The CSCE is also mentioned in connection with the Vatican's efforts towards peace. The CSCE as an institution, its origins and goals, however, are neither explained nor evaluated. Older Croatian textbooks do not even deal with the establishment and development of the EC either. The EC first appears in the context of the 1990s<sup>25</sup>, and expresses appreciation of the non-military effort that was made to solve the Yugoslav conflict (the Brijuni De-

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<sup>25</sup> «When the EC saw that the armed attacks and the suffering of the Croatian civilian population continued to increase, it carefully observed the events, because it was interested in preserving peace in this part of Europe, too» [Kro (2) p. 209.].

claratio and the Conference World Peace chaired by the EC). The recognition of Croatia as a sovereign state by EC countries is also given a mention as well.

Newer history books suggest a change of perspective today. The new textbook for the 20<sup>st</sup> century closes many gaps by describing connections between European and national development opportunities in a new manner. The detail with which various chapters deal with issues of European integration is much more expansive than any of the other textbooks examined. The military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are mentioned, just as in other books, as reflecting ideological and political divisions in the world. At this point we note an interesting reference to the unique position of Socialist Yugoslavia being between the blocs.

The first military agreement involving countries with different societal systems (Socialist and Capitalist) was the Balkan Pact. Socialist Yugoslavia signed an agreement to co-operate with two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey. This enabled the West to strengthen its southernmost flanks and gave Yugoslavia security in its relationship with the East. Tito's indirect entry into the Western defence system improved Yugoslavia's position in negotiations with the West. [Kro (10) p. 219.]

Extensive attention is given to the establishment of the Council of Europe<sup>26</sup> as well as the beginning of the process of European integration; the Eastern European programme of economic integration within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is, at least, mentioned. The establishment of the CSCE is thematically linked with the general easing of political tensions between the East and the West, and public demand for respecting human rights by the dissident movement in many Socialist countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which is also mentioned, put a temporary end to

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<sup>26</sup> «A large number of prominent personalities in many countries were at great pains, especially after the atrocious experiences of the previous two world wars, to establish institutions in which European countries would work together. The Council of Europe was established as early as the beginning of 1949; its members were from Western European democratic nations. The Council achieved a great deal, especially in issues of human rights and education, which were, however, based on recommendations» [Ibid. p. 219.].

this easing between the blocs, as the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, returned to the «rhetoric of the Cold War». These extracts already show, in contrast to most of the other books, that European integration and attempts at political détente are proving to be a longer term process. Not only institutions which are active on the political, economic and military fronts are visible. In addition to detonate and confrontations between the East and the West which were to determine the political arena of the post-war era, the book also focuses on global topics such as human rights, providing perspectives which go beyond the blocs.

In a chapter about developments after 1989, much attention is devoted to the process of European integration. This deals firstly with the problems<sup>27</sup> and discusses the tensions which arose within the European Community due to the national interests of member states<sup>28</sup>. The «strongest positive impulse towards further integration» in recent years is judged as being the dissolution of the Socialist governmental systems. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe began to participate in the process of European integration:

In the 1990s, some Central European countries became associated members of the European Union. This determined the first group to be included in the expansion of the EU. At the beginning of this century, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus will become members. Since 1989, the Council of Europe has aided Central and Eastern European countries in the process of transformation, helping to introduce democratic standards and economic reform. Croatia became the 40<sup>th</sup> member of the Council of Europe in 1996. After that, Georgia was also accepted into the Council of Europe. [Kro (11) p. 42.]

This perspective already has the inclusion of Croatia in modern

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<sup>27</sup> For instance, France's policies under Charles de Gaulle; another example, France and Great Britain's policies on the Middle East during the 1970s. [Ibid. p. 252.].

<sup>28</sup> «Just how serious the situation was within the European Community became obvious in their decision in 1982 not to celebrate the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of their founding. In that year, the newspapers reported that the Community resembled a heart patient, so weak that it couldn't risk the excitement of an official birthday party. That same year, Greenland, as an autonomous member of Danish territories, declared its decision to leave the European Community.» [Ibid. p. 252.].

European developments. Elements of European identity are being formed, whereby references are made to the efforts of the Council of Europe for standardisation and equality in economic, political and cultural sectors. Support and confirmation of this developing identity is evident in Europe through symbols-in-progress, such as European citizenship or the EURO, the European currency. European integration is described by aspects which make Europe come to life more than in any other book. Whether in discussion of holidays, the currency or the European passport, Europe is identified clearly with aspects of integration that are tangible in everyday life.

The chapter «Croatia and Western Integration» is unique among the books examined. It is unique not only because it deals with the responsibilities of its own country within the process of integration in Europe, which is utterly lacking in the other books, but also because the text includes critical reflections. The textbook was created –and this is significant– during a period of indirect political isolation of Croatia towards the rest of the world – the result of the governing CDU Party’s policies. This experience is probably the main reason, yet they describe the difficulties of joining (Western) European institutions as a slow process, which was also a theme of public discourse. The euphoria of the first few years of the post-Socialist era (even though they were also war years), and the self-assuredness present in older textbooks from the mid-1990s<sup>29</sup> which was encouraged by the new political situation, are not to be found in this book. Here is a large excerpt from a chapter in the newer book:

Western Europe, the US and Canada are relatively speaking the wealthiest and most stable regions on earth. Their military pact,

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<sup>29</sup> As a comparison, the following is an extract from an older edition published in 1994: «As a person whose lifelong task has been to strive for a free and sovereign Croatia, who has placed great efforts to achieve this for Croatia, and also suffered due to these efforts, who moreover is a highly educated man of immense experience as well as a man with an overriding personality, Dr Franjo Tudjman has steered a steady political course, without deviations or diversions. He is respected both at home and abroad for his authority. His speeches, press conferences and interviews have given information at the right time and in the right manner; his answers to the most pressing questions have been important in general for Croatia and its interests both in the short and long term.» [Kro (2) S. 213.]

NATO, and the political organisations of Western European countries in the EU are attractive to nearly all the European countries undergoing democratic development, with the former Socialist countries desiring change. The EU and NATO, however, require candidates for membership to fulfil certain conditions. Most Croatian politicians and citizens consider the acceptance of Croatia into Western political and military organisations to be a top government priority. Nonetheless, when the conditions which the Western alliance expect in terms of the development of democratic and economic institutions are considered, the process of integration for countries undergoing transformation into a unified, democratic Europe will take time and it will undoubtedly be complicated. On the other hand, Croatia is convinced that it belongs to Central and Mediterranean Europe and is therefore entitled to join central and Western European organisations. Croatia is disturbed by tendencies in Western Europe and the USA to identify it as part of Southern Europe or even as part of (the Western Balkan) region. The strengthening and development of good bilateral relations between Croatia and central European countries, as well as friendly relationships with its neighbours, is the most crucial task of Croatian foreign relations. [Kro (10) p. 284.]

A further basic contrast to other books is provided by this: Europe and European integration are handled as one theme without filtering it through a 'nationalist' lens, while still regularly referring to the home country. This theme is primarily seen as a modern phenomenon with its own problems and developments, which, at the same time is guided by the interaction mechanisms between the countries concerned. The conditions set by Western European organisations for accepting Eastern and Southeastern European countries is given special emphasis. Perhaps this is a sort of criticism, rightly questioning whether 'inner' development ought to be regulated by 'outsiders'? This is also part of the discussion about the process of European unification in Western countries and can and even must be discussed. The prospects of countries that do not now belong to the EU, but have applied to join, enhances this discussion. This would be possible if responsibility for defining inner and outer borders of Europe were not only projected outwards. It is essential in Europe today to reflect a wide range of links, overlapping

and differences between Western and Southeastern Europe, to filter out the specific reasons and origins thereof. This sort of analysis has the advantage that we can avoid the frequent stereotype of the ‘uncivilised Balkans’ or the ‘guilty European superpower’ by open and critical evaluation – especially due to what is bound to be a long-term international presence in the Balkans.

### LIST OF TEXTBOOKS USED

#### *Croatia*

- (1) Ivo Peric: *Povijest. Za osmi razred osnovne škole. III. izd.*, Skolska knjiga, Zagreb 1994. (history for the 8th year of elementary school)
- (2) Ivo Peric: *Hrvatska I svijet u XX. stoljeću. II izd.*, Skolska knjiga Zagreb, 1994. (Croatia and the World in the 20th Century)
- (3) Ivo Makek: *Povijest za 6. razred osnovne škole. IV. izd.*, Skolska knjiga, Zagreb 1995. (history for the 6th year of elementary school)
- (4) Franko Mirošević, Franjo Sanjek, Trpimir Macan, Ivo Peric: *Pregled povijesti hrvatskog naroda (od VI. st. do nasih dana)*. Skolska knjiga, Zagreb 1995.\* (Overview of the history of the Croatian people from the 6th century to the present day)
- (5) Josip Lucić, Branko Vidacek: *Hrvatski povijesni zemljovid. III. izd.* Kartografija-Učila Zagreb 1995. \*\* (Croatian historical-geographical aspects)
- (6) Damir Agićić: *Povijest. Za 7. razred osnovne škole. II. izd.*, Profil, Zagreb 1997. (history for the 7th year of elementary school)
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- (9) Neven Budak, Vladimir Posavec: *Radjanje suvremene Hrvatske i Europe. Od seobe naroda do absolutizma. Udžbenik povijesti za 6. razred osnovne škole. II. izd.*, Profil, Zagreb 1998. (The birth of modern Croatia and Europe. From migration to absolutism)
- (10) Suzana Leček, Magdalena Najbar-Agićić, Damir Agićić, Tvrtko Jakovina: *Povijest 4. Udžbenik povijesti za četvrti razred (opće) gimnazije*, Profil, Zagreb 1999. (history 4. Textbook for the 4th year of (general) grammar school)
- (11) Magdalena Najbar-Agićić, Ivica Rendulić, Damir Agićić: *Povijesni zemljovid 8. Hrvatska, Europa, Svijet. XX. stoljeće*, Profil, Zagreb 1999 \*\* (History atlas 8. Croatia, Europe, the World. The 20th century)

\* = additional material

\*\* = history atlas

*Serbia*

- (1) Nikola Gacesa, Ljiljana Mladenovic-Maksimovic, Dusan Zivkovic: *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne skole. II izd. Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva*, Beograd 1994. (history for the 8th year of elementary school)
- (2) Nikola Gacesa, Dusan Zivkovic, Ljubica Radovic: *Istorija za III. razred gimnazije prirodno-matematickog smera i IV. razred gimnazije opsteg i drustveno-jezickog smera. III. izd. Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva*, Beograd 1994. (history for the 3rd year of grammar school with scientific and mathematical orientation and the 4th year of grammar school with general and socio-linguistic orientation)
- (3) Milutin Perovic, Novica Bojovic: *Istorija za I. razred trogodisnjih strucnih skola. IV. izd. Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva*, Beograd 1995. (history for 1st year of 3-year course at vocational school)
- (4) Nikola Gacesa, Dusan Zivkovic, Ljubica Radovic: *Istorija za II. razred cetvorigodisnjih strucnih skola. VI. izd. Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva*, Beograd 1995. (history for 2nd year of 4-year course at vocational school)
- (5) Milutin Perovic, Relja Novakovic: *Istorija za III. razred gimnazije opsteg tipa i drustveno-jezickog smera i III. razred strucnih skola. IV. izd. Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva*, Beograd 1995. (history for the 3rd year of grammar school with general and socio-linguistic orientation and 3rd year of vocational school)
- (6) Nikola Gacesa, Ljiljana Mladenovic-Maksimovic, Dusan Zivkovic: *Istorija za 8. razred osnovne skole. III. izd. Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva*, Beograd 1995. (history for the 8th year of elementary school)
- (7) Rade Mihalcic: *Istorija za 6. razred osnovne skole. VIII. izd., Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva*, Beograd 1998. (history for the 6th year of elementary school)

*Bosnia and Hercegovina*

- (1) Ibrahim Tepic, Fahrudin Isakovic: *Historija. 7. razred osnovne skole*, Ministarstvo Obrazovanja, Nauke i Kulture, Sarajevo 1994. (history for the 7th year of elementary school)
- (2) M. Imamovic, M. Pelesic, M. Ganibegovic: *Historija. 8. razred osnovne skole*, Ministarstvo Obrazovanja, Nauke i Kulture, Sarajevo 1994. (history for the 8th year of elementary school)
- (3) Enes Pelidija, Fahrudin Isakovic: *Historija II. razred gimnazije*, Ministarstvo Obrazovanja, Nauke i Kulture, Sarajevo 1994. (history for the 2nd year of grammar school)
- (4) Ibrahim Tepic, Fahrudin Isakovic: *Historija. III. razred gimnazije. II. izd.*, Ministarstvo Obrazovanja, Nauke, Kulture i Sporta, Sarajevo 1996. (history for the 3rd year of grammar school)
- (5) Mustafa Imamovic, Muhidin Pelesic: *Historija. IV. razred gimnazije. II. izd.*, Ministarstvo Obrazovanja, Nauke, Kulture i Sporta, Sarajevo 1996. (history for the 4th year of grammar school)

- (6) Enes Pelidija, Fahrudin Isakovic: *Historija 6. razred osnovne škole. II. izd.*, Ministarstvo Obrazovanja, Nauke, Kulture i Sporta, Sarajevo 1996. (history for the 6th year of elementary school)

### *Macedonia*

- (1) Stojan Kiselinovski, Simo Mladenovski, Novica Veljanovski, Svetozar Naumovski: *Istorija. 8. oddelenije, Prosvetno delo*, Skopje 1992. (history for year 8)
- (2) Simo Mladenovski, Novica Veljanovski, Svetozar Naumovski, Stojan Kiselinovski: *Istorija za IV. klas gimnazija, Prosvetno delo*, Skopje 1992. (history for the 4th year of grammar school)
- (3) Aleksandar Trajanovski: *Istorija za 7. oddelenije, Prosvetno delo*, Skopje 1992. (history for year 7)
- (4) Branko Panov: *Istorija 6. oddelenije. IV. izd.*, Prosvetno delo, Skopje 1995. (history for year 6)
- (5) Branko Panov: *Istorija 6. oddelenije, Prosvetno delo* Skopje 1996. (history for year 6)
- (6) Aleksandar Trajanovski: *Istorija za 7. oddelenije. II. izd.*, Prosvetno delo, Skopje 1997. (history for year 7)
- (7) Stojan Kiselinovski, Simo Mladenovski, Novica Veljanovski, Svetozar Naumovski: *Istorija. 8. oddelenije. II. izd.*, Prosvetno delo, Skopje 1998. (history for year 8)

## The Second World War and Socialistic Yugoslavia in Slovenian Textbooks

DRAGAN POTOČNIK - JELKA RAZPOTNIK

THE BEGINNING of the Second World War in Slovenia and Yugoslavia meant the decay of the old regime and Yugoslavia because of the collapse of the Yugoslav Army. Every textbook of contemporary history in Slovenia dedicates quite a number of pages to the Second World War. In the lesson about the *Slovenes during the Second World War* several pages are given to the history of Yugoslavia. The entry into the Triple Pact and the attack by the occupiers in Yugoslavia are described with several illustrations. The texts on the collapse of the first Yugoslavia describe the reasons for the collapse (unsolved national tensions, collapse of the Yugoslav Army) and the conditions under the occupying regimes. The German Army in cooperation with the Italian and Hungarian Army attacked Yugoslavia and all three occupiers divided the territory among themselves. They all wanted to eliminate the Slovenian nation, the south became a part of Italy, the northeast part was connected to Hungary and the north of Slovenia was part of Germany. Germans were very severe in their genocid politics, they moved many Slovenes to the east in Serbia and the north in Germany into concentration camps. Most of the Slovenian cultural organisations were disbanded, Slovenian newspapers were forbidden and Slovenian books were demolished. The German language was forced in schools and in the public. The situation in the Hungarian and Italian part of Slovenia was the same.

The focus in the lesson about the Second World War is on the resistance, organized by the partisans. Their role is presented as a very important and positive one, because they decided to fight against the occupiers while the others (old political elites) decided to wait until the army of the Western Allies came. The focus is on the decisive battles in Slovenia (first actions of the Slovenian partisans in summer 1941, Ital-

ian offense in 1942). Two pages are dedicated to the resistance in the other parts of Yugoslavia with mention of the partisans' leader Tito, the liberated territory Užička republika, Foča, the battles of Neretva and Sutjeska in 1943, the battle at Drvar in 1944 and final war operations. Particularly the existence and importance of the liberated zones during the war are exposed in the texts and also the organization of numerous mobile shock brigades. According to the textbooks, the result of the partisan national liberation struggle was outwardly the creation of a United Slovenia (the Slovene partisan army liberated the whole Slovene ethnic territory with Trieste and Carinthia) and it led to the formation of a Slovene republic within the Yugoslav federation with the right to secession because during the war the Liberation Front in Slovenia decided, on the principles of self-determination, to include free Slovenia in the new federal Yugoslavia formed at the second session of Avnoj. The establishment of the Slovenian and Yugoslavian illegal political leadership (the Liberation Front in Slovenia, the first and second session of Avnoj, the highest political and authoritative body of the new Yugoslavia) are very well described and demonstrated with several pictures of the sessions and their leaders, also fragments of the documents from the sessions are often included which demonstrates the importance of Liberation Front and Avnoj during the war.

In the lesson about the Second World War in Slovenia and Yugoslavia the civil war is mentioned and the role of the collaborative groups (Independent State of Croatia, Chetniks in Serbia, anticommunist militia and the Home Guard in Slovenia) is presented objectively, taking into account the relevant historical context. Chetniks are described as soldiers of the Yugoslav army and their leader Draža Mihajlović as a minister of defence in the Yugoslav government. According to the textbooks, the Chetniks' Army was badly organized and very brutal in their relations towards the civilians. As collaborative groups in Serbia in textbooks there are briefly mentioned also the Group of Dimitrij Ljotić and the leader of a collaborative government in Serbia, general Milan Nedić. The Ustashas in Croatia are described as pro-fascist Croatian nationalists who proclaimed the whole territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the Independent State of Croatia. Originating as a part of the occupational system, this state immediately became a German-Italian protectorate. According to the textbooks the Anticommunist militia and the Home Guard, collaborative groups in

Slovenia, were the result of the anticommunist standpoint among the Right Wing parties and received a help from the occupier's authority. They claimed the partisans as communists, collaborators of the Red Army and the communist regime in Soviet Union. The role of the Catholic Church in Slovenia, which had a very positive attitude towards the Italians during the war, is also described.

In the lesson about the Second World War in Yugoslavia there is also a description of interethnic violence in the Independent State of Croatia. In the Independent State of Croatia the law like in Germany was nationalistic and racist against the orthodox inhabitants, Jews, Bohemians and communists. Violence against the orthodox and muslim inhabitants, Jews and their life in concentration camp (Jasenovac) is mentioned.

In the lesson about *the Slovenes in the second Yugoslavia* there is first one page on the state organization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia where there is also a map of Yugoslavia, divided into six republics. The renewal of Yugoslavia in 1945 is described as a very positive moment in Yugoslav history, when people accepted the partisan army with joy and built the country after the war with eagerness and enthusiasm. The hope for a better future was supported by the new Communist system, too. Several topics on the history of the second Yugoslavia are included in the lesson: internal political development, the reconstruction of the economy, revolutionary communist changes, the economical and social development in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s. One chapter is dedicated to the national relations and tensions in Yugoslavia in the 1960s, another one to the international relations of Yugoslavia and yet another one to the culture and art in Yugoslavia.

Development in Slovenia after 1945 proceeded according to laws passed by the central government in Belgrade, largely made to measure for the majority population in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The foundation of federal Yugoslavia was very important for the Slovenes because in 1945 Slovenes got their first national constitution. While in many respects from the social and economic viewpoints, Federal Yugoslavia was very centralistic, Slovenia, like other republics lived an autonomous educational and cultural life (new schools, importance of the national cultural and scientific institutions). Because the Slovene nation was generally more developed and had better work qualifications, it developed economically much faster even in the unified Yugoslav social and eco-

conomic system and its GNP and national income were far above average. In the beginning Slovenia was developing very rapidly and the development of industry was especially emphasized which is also shown in the pictures in the textbooks. Slovenia as the most developed republic in Yugoslavia had to pay the highest amount into the federal budget which at the end of 1960s when Stane Kavčič (a member of the group of 'liberal' Communists) was prime Minister resulted in a very strong belief in Slovenia that Slovenia was being used by Yugoslavia for the undeveloped republics. The situation was saved with the new Constitution in 1974, which gave greater autonomy to the nations and republics in the federation.

Several pages in textbooks are dedicated to the crises, the agony of Yugoslavia in the 1980s and the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The main reasons for the decay of Yugoslavia, described in the textbooks, are: the deaths of old political leaders and the lack of ability of the new leaders (pictures of Tito's funeral and Yugoslav premier Ante Marković are usually added to the text); the sharp interethnic and inter-republican conflicts (for example in Kosovo), caused by the economic crisis; the offense of the Serbian nationalism (a picture of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević is often added); proposals for greater centralization and uniformity of the state in the economic and cultural fields (e.g., a uniform school curriculum, which minimized national cultures); tensions between Slovenia, the Yugoslav leadership and the Army, and finally international conditions (the fall of socialism in the Soviet Union).

Three pages on average are devoted to the 1991–1995 wars in Yugoslavia in each textbook with focus on the war for independence in Slovenia which is connected with the text about the movement for its independence in the 1980s.

The description of the wars contains the description of the attack of the Yugoslav Army on Slovenia (the success of the Slovene Territorial Defence forces and spontaneous national resistance are mentioned) and Croatia (the Battle for Vukovar is often mentioned). The war spread to Bosnia, where three nations –Muslims, Serbs and Croats– were involved in interethnic fights. The reaction of the international community, especially of the European Community, was very indifferent. After the intervention of the USA, the peace agreement in Dayton was signed. Several illustrations are added to the topic: a picture of refugees from Vukovar and from Bosnia; the burned National Library in Sarajevo; the meeting of

Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman in Dayton.

Finally, we could conclude that Yugoslav history during and after the Second World War is well presented in Slovenian history textbooks through the texts, maps, tables and pictures. Yugoslav history is described in a very neutral way. Despite the interrepublican tensions which lead to the collapse of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav history in Slovenian textbooks is still presented as a positive and important moment in Slovene history when the Slovene nation made very significant progress in the cultural, educational and economic fields.

### TEXTBOOKS ANALYSED

#### *Primary schools*

Branimir Nešović, Janko Prunk: *20. stoletje* (The 20th Century, DZS, Ljubljana, 1996 – Eighth Form).

Ervin Dolenc, Aleš Gabrič, Marjan Rode: *Koraki v času* (Steps in time, DZS, Ljubljana, 1997 – Eighth Form).

Ana Nuša Kern, Dušan Nečak, Božo Repe: *Naše stoletje* (Our Century, Modrijan, Ljubljana, 1997 – Eighth Form).

#### *Secondary schools*

Božo Repe: *Sodobna zgodovina* (Contemporary history, Modrijan, 1999) – history for the fourth year in the grammar school.

Božo Repe: *Naša doba* (Our time, DZS, Ljubljana, 1995) – history for the fourth year in the grammar school.

Stane Berzelak: *Zgodovina 2 za tehniške in druge strokovne šole* (History 2 for Technical and vocational schools, Modrijan, Ljubljana, 2000).

## The Yugoslav History in Croatian Textbooks

MAGDALENA NAJBAR-AGIČIĆ

### **The First Yugoslavia\***

**T**HE PROGRAM DEDICATES a total of 13 lecture units to the history of Croatia/Yugoslavia between the World Wars. Of those 4 deal with the creation of the Kingdom of SHS, 2 with the political parties in Croatia at the start of the period, 6 with the period from the St. Vid's Day Constitution to the creation of Banovina Croatia, and one with the culture, science and sport in Croatia.

Four units are dealing with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 (according to the teaching program). The first one deals with the creation of the SHS State, the second one deals with the entrance of Croatia in the SHS Kingdom, the third one deals with the territorial losses on the Adriatic, while the fourth should bear the title «First expressions of dissatisfaction of Croats in the SHS Kingdom».

The creation of the SHS Kingdom is according to the program itself presented as a more-or-less logical chain of events caused by the foreign political situation (mostly by the process of dissolution of the Austro-Hungary and the danger from Italian claims on the Adriatic coast) and the inner difficulties in the country. The alternative solutions are not mentioned at all.

The position of the Serbian government and its endeavours to allocate to Serbia a privileged position in the new common state are judged negatively. As the main subjects of such a policy, the radicals and «Great Serbs» are mentioned. The speed with which the uniting process was enacted is judged negatively (or left without a judgement). The role of S. Pribicevic in the process is judged negatively, although it

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\* This chapter includes the answers to questions 7 and 8 of the Questionnaire: «How is the creation of Yugoslavia 1918 described and evaluated?» and «How is the position of your people in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia described? What are the positive and what are the negative evaluations?».

is partly justified in the most textbooks by his unitaristic beliefs i.e. the belief in «one nation of three tribes»<sup>1</sup>. Only Peric describes his motives as «personal ambitions». The negative judgement is present in all the textbooks regarding the fact the unification was never certified by the Croatian Sabor, which is a way to negate the legitimacy of the act itself. On the other hand, most textbooks (Peric, Matkovic, Djuric) mention the «loss of statehood» as a negative consequence of the unification.

The loss of parts of the coast is mentioned objectively. In that context no accusations of the Belgrade authorities are mentioned. The pressure of France and Great Britain is mentioned. Moreover, in S.Koren we find out from the original text that the matter was left to Croatian politicians. There are no negative judgements, but nowhere is it stated clearly that the keeping of a large part of the territories promised to Italy by the London Agreement is a positive consequence of the creation of the SHS kingdom.

According to the teaching program the dissatisfaction of Croats immediately after the unification is discussed (the proclamation of the Party of Rights is mentioned, as well as the «December victims» - the events of December 5th in Zagreb, the marking of bills and changing of money, the beatings in the army and cattle branding). Some textbooks differ in giving attention to those problems. Most attention is given in the S. Koren textbooks and the Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic team textbooks, plenty in the H. Matkovic, V. Djuric and I. Peric. All of those have in common the emphasising that the process of marking and exchanging the money was unsuitable, even «unfair» (in Djuric) for the populace in «over-river parts», with the explicit mention mostly just of the Croats, while the instances of army beatings and the cattle branding can from the Peric textbook be understood as some sort of a special punishment just for Croats. In other textbooks it is explained by the establishing of Serbian laws in Croatia (Matkovic, Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic) or the attention is drawn to the fact that punitive measurements of such a kind were not present in Croatia for a long time (Djuric).

All the textbooks point out Stjepan Radic as the main opponent to unconditional uniting (his sentence «Do not rush like geese into a fog»

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<sup>1</sup> In the V. Djuric textbook the going of the delegation to Belgrade is ascribed to a kind of Pribicevic's state coup (using the fact that the state president was often abroad).

is the most quoted; the Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic one even has a pictorial representation in the shape of a drawing which depicts a goose in a tri-colour hat carrying a crown –the statehood symbol?– to Belgrade) and emphasise his republican standings.

Out of 6 teaching units dedicated to the 1921-1939 period, 5 of them according to the teaching program insist on the unequal position of the Croats in the new state, the problems, repression and suffering of the Croats (the lessons are titled: «The attack on Croatian representatives in the state parliament in Belgrade», «The anti-regime demonstrations in Croatia after the bloodshed in the People's Assembly», «The Croatian people in resistance to the 6th-of-January dictatorship», «The position of Croatia in the chains of centralism and the greater-Serbian hegemonism», «The Croatian issue demands a solution»). The program requires not just the assassination to be discussed, but also the «protest demonstrations» after it, the funeral of the murdered deputies, «death-bed farewell» to Stjepan Radic, «the repression over Croats during the 6th-of-January dictatorship», the change of the state's name and the new territorial division, «the Greater-Serb hegemony, the economic exploitation of Croatia, the small number of Croats in the higher level of state services» and «emigration of Croats» and «the cruelty of regime's anti-Croatian actions». Inside the framework of such a teaching program, the different approach by various author can be noted.

The key moment certainly is the attack on Croatian representatives in the People's Assembly in Belgrade on June 20th 1928. All the textbooks give much attention to that, and some textbooks explicitly mention the involvement of the authorities and the court in the shooting<sup>2</sup>, while others suggest<sup>3</sup> or just allow<sup>4</sup> such a possibility. Speaking

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<sup>2</sup> Peric retells the story of the assassination and in the tale says: «It was obvious that the criminal was just an executor of the crime thought out in advance.» From the previous sentence about him being close with the king's court and the government it can be concluded that they were the inspiration for the act.

<sup>3</sup> Matkovic in his textbook also suggests that the masterminds of the Assembly assassination were the king and the radicals, since - it is stated - they «decided to have a sharp showdown» with the HSS. That is followed by the description of the assassination. Vesna Djuric looks for the masterminds of the assassination in the circles closely tied to «the regime». This thesis is underlined by the information in the illustration caption that P. Racic has calmly left the parliament and later - although sentenced to prison - was confined in the villa of the prison manager.

<sup>4</sup> In S. Koren the assassination itself is briefly described. The author further il-

of the funeral of Stjepan Radic –and the others assassinated in the Assembly– all the textbooks point out the patriotism and patriotic fervour of the Croats. The textbooks are full of the pictures of the funerals, the artistic depiction of the sorrow of the people (painting by Ljubo Babic «Street of Ilica in Zagreb on the day of Stjepan Radic’s funeral» is reproduced in 3 of 5 textbooks). In the description of the funeral, Peric is again the most prominent, stating the numbers of the participants in the procession and the number of wreaths. Regarding every event (demonstrations and similar), Peric insists on stating the number of victims (wounded and killed).

The teaching unit «Position of Croatia in the chains of centralism and greater-Serb hegemonism» (i.e. the lessons on the 6th-of-January dictatorship and the Serbian prominence –«the great-Serb hegemony»– in other textbooks) is especially dedicated to the underlying position of Croats in the first Yugoslavia<sup>5</sup>, but the subject is repeated in almost every lesson. All the textbooks mention the suffering of well-known individuals (prison sentences of V. Macek and other politicians, but also the murder of Milan Sufflay) and the repression (beatings and torture) of the anonymous «Croatian patriots» for expressing their patriotic feelings (for example, the singing of songs). Neither Peric nor Matkovic write about the involvement of Ustasha in the assassination of king Alexander in 1934, which the other three textbooks mention.

The unfavourable economic position of Croatia (and Slovenia) in

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illustrates it by quotes (reactions of eyewitnesses). In those relations the suspicions that the assassination was planned appear, but alongside the argumentation of the court which judged P. Radic after the event. The questions direct the pupils to make their own conclusions. Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic do not accuse anybody in particular for masterminding the Assembly assassination, linking the event to «overall increase of the tensions». In the teaching unit they quote the newspaper report of the assassination. Under the quote is the text: «Think: was the cause of the assassination just the Penar’s insult, or was he an executor of someone else’s orders.» It can be supposed that the authors rely in the question on the pupil’s foreknowledge since neither from the text of the book - as I have said - nor from the quote we do not find out anything about the instigators of the assassination.

<sup>5</sup> Peric says here among other things: «Since the king was a Serb and since all central institutions of power were made out of exclusively, mostly or in majority Serbs, the Serb overbearing was obvious... They have from the very start seen the common state, created in 1918, as a widened Serbia (i.e. the enlarged, greater Serbia) in which they have felt and acted as great-Serbs, supressing and repressing the other nations».

the Yugoslavia between the wars is emphasised. The examples of economic exploitation mentioned are the exchange of kroner for dinars, the inequality of the real estate taxes, Belgrade being privileged regarding Zagreb, the building of railways (the unequal extent of investments is stated). The unequal position of Croatia is noticeable through the data on representation –or non-representation– of Croatians in the state services, diplomacy and the army, and the occurrences of political emigration. The situation of the Catholic church is also discussed, wherein it is claimed that the «greatest privileges were had by the Orthodox church» (I. Peric). All the authors agree in the conclusion that the new territorial division into banovinas in 1929 was unfavourable to Croats<sup>6</sup>.

I. Peric mentions that the «conditions for creative work in the kingdom of Yugoslavia were unfavourable». In Matkovic, the lesson on culture also mentions the unfavourable position of the Croatian culture in the Yugoslavia between the wars; Matkovic writes: «Resisting the political limitations, the Croatian cultural workers have developed their activities and created worthy works». According to S. Koren, the culture and science were in Yugoslavia between the wars «developing slowly» because of «the unsettled economic and political circumstances». Unlike the others, Brkljacic –Ponos– Spelic characterise the period as «one of the most fruitful periods of the Croatian culture and science», without mentioning any special political limitations for the development of culture.

It is interesting that the position of other peoples in the Yugoslavia between the wars is discussed in the least or none at all. Mostly Slovenia is mentioned, as the second –with Croatia– economically exploited part of the state. Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic mention, along with the Zagreb ones,

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<sup>6</sup> It is emphasized as a special attack on Croatian interests by I. Peric, who writes in the caption under the map that the division «broke up even more the Croatian national space», and in the later question in the teaching unit on the «Creation of the Banovina Croatia» Peric asks: «How was the Croatian national territory crumbled by the establishing of the banovinas?». Matkovic also states that the new division into banovinas was unfavorable since «the shaping of the banovinas was done thus to provide a Serbian majority in most of them». The division into banovinas is by Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic called «the separation of the Croatian national territory». The new territorial division into banovinas, which «did not respect neither natural, nor historical or ethnic borders» provoked «bitterness and dissatisfaction of Croats». S. Koren gives a lot of attention to the division into banovinas in 1929 and the modifications of 1931. She includes working with historical maps.

the Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Novi Sad punctuation as the answer to Greater-Serb hegemony. Macedonians are not mentioned as those that Serbs do not acknowledge as someone having a right to be separate.

### **The Second World War and the renewal of Yugoslavia in 1945\***

According to the teaching program, the history of World War II on the area of Croatia and Yugoslavia is allocated four teaching units. The first one has the title «The Creation of the Independent State of Croatia», and according to the program contains a paragraph on the break-up of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The description of the conditions before Yugoslavia's joining of the Tripartite Pact, the state coup and finally the German attack ending in the break-up and occupation, is brief in all the textbooks and does not contain any special positive or negative evaluations. The division of the country and its occupation by occupying forces is also discussed very briefly. I. Peric disregards the existence of the Yugoslav government in exile in London. It is mentioned only in the context of the decisions of the Second AVNOJ session wherein the king is forbidden to return to the country, and in the last lesson regarding the war - in the context of the regime supported in the country by the chetniks (the title of the part is «Chetnik Terror in the Croatian Area») and later in the same lesson when the Tito-Subasic negotiations are discussed. H. Matkovic, Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic and V. Djuric in the context of the defeat of Kingdom of Yugoslavia just mention the king and government escaping to London, and the actions of the government in exile is discussed in the text on AVNOJ decisions and the context of chetniks, and the Tito-Subasic negotiations. A bit more attention to the existence of the government in London is given by S. Koren – a special part of the text in the second lesson dealing with the war is dedicated to the government's actions. The forgetting of the existence of the Yugoslav government in exile in the case of I. Peric seems not unintentional, but stems from the fact that this author considers

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\* This chapter includes the answers to questions 9, 10 and 11 of the Questionnaire: «How is the decay of Yugoslavia in 1941 and renewal in 1945 described (positive/negative evaluations); «How are the collaboration and resistance in the II WW evaluated? How is presented the role of partisans? How is presented the role of Independent State of Croatia, Nedic's regime, chetniks, and other collaborative groups?»; «Is the interethnic violence in the II WW described? How?».

Yugoslavia to be non-existing after the surrender in the April of 1941<sup>7</sup>.

The restitution of Yugoslavia in a new shape is described in detail according to the demands of the program in all the textbooks, beginning with the founding of AVNOJ in 1942. Parallel to that, the formation of the new Croatian statehood inside the People's Liberation movement, that culminated in the formation of the Federal State of Croatia in 1944, is represented<sup>8</sup>.

The restitution of Yugoslavia is depicted without any enthusiasm, but with a positive connotation. A large accent is put on the non-democracy of the state made thus - the forming of Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is discussed in the very first lesson dealing with the post-war period. Although «the republic was a real desire of the majority», «the FPRY has become a centralist state of the communist type with the inherited Serbian overbearing» (Peric) or «a centralised state where the Party decided on everything» (Matkovic). Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic speak of «establishing the revolutionary dictatorship of the KPJ», and V. Djuric speaks of the «totalitarian regime».

The teaching program dedicates relatively much attention to the ISC, but that creation is discussed in just one teaching unit (the first one relating to the war in the area of Croatia/Yugoslavia). Here the proclaiming of the Independent State of Croatia is discussed, along with the organisation of authorities in the ISC, the submission of that creation to occupying powers and the enforcing of their will, and specifically about the turning over of parts of the Adriatic coast to Italy and the economic exploitation of Croatia. In the same teaching unit one part of the teaching program is to be dedicated to the culture in the ISC, and another to «the Ustasha terror».

In the framework of the themes thus defined, separate textbooks emphasise different things. I. Peric starts his discourse on the proclamation of the ISC by stating the traditions of Croatian statehood from the

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<sup>7</sup> I. Peric states explicitly: «Those communist organizations (KPJ and SKOJ) kept in their names the name of Yugoslavia even after the breakup of the Yugoslav state, when that state no longer existed.» Although later he lets slip the statement: «Armed antifascist struggle happened on the whole area of the occupied Yugoslavia.» - which would mean that the state exists, although it is occupied.

<sup>8</sup> H. Matkovic considers that «the establishing of the new Croatian state.» S. Koren in the questions under the lesson asks: «Is the Croatian state of today the inheritor of FSC or ISC?»

Middle Ages onward. According to Peric, the Germans and Italians have used the desire of the Croatian people for a separate state by establishing a regime loyal to them. He says further: «Many Croatian who were not Ustasha, but just Croatian patriots and who, without active participation in politics, have regarded the creation of the ISC as their long-desired national state, were –after the Roman Contracts were made public– disappointed in the extreme.» Stating the negative things about the ISC Peric still warns: «Concerning the ISC, the Ustasha regime of the state should be regarded separately from the desire of Croats to have their own separate state.» Peric does not discuss the culture in the ISC.

The ISC is similarly depicted in other textbooks, too, with Peric, Matkovic and Djuric sharing the common thesis that Hitler and Mussolini have used the desire of Croats for a state. It is said that in the ISC a fascist dictatorship ruled, while the repression itself that was carried out by the Ustasha is discussed in textbooks to the extent of one quarter of a page (Peric), half a page (Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic, Djuric) to more than a page (Koren). Most textbooks warn about the need to separate the Ustasha from the rest of the Croats, i.e. the Croatian Home Guard<sup>9</sup>.

The Nedic group and other collaborationist groups in Yugoslavia are not mentioned at all in the Croatian elementary school textbooks. The Chetniks are discussed mainly in the context of their crimes against Croats (and Moslems), their connection to the government in London is mentioned and that in the beginning they were acknowledged by the Western allies as the forefront of the antifascist struggle in the area of Yugoslavia. However, it is mentioned that they were «collaborating most closely with the occupying forces», «attacking the anti-fascists», and that their goal was the restitution of the «kingdom of Yugoslavia» and the strengthening of the Serbian advantages. It is said that they «acted against the Croatian state», and that they connected themselves with the occupying forces, co-operating with them in the fight against the partisans (Matkovic). As a cooperant of Italians and

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<sup>9</sup> Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic for instance state: «It is, however, important to know that during the whole existence of the ISC there was a difference between the Ustasha Army, which was a party armed force, and the regular Croatian army - the home guard. While Ustasha relentlessly committed violence and killings, the home guard avoided conflicts and tried to help the populace and the victims.»

Germans, in a picture caption the Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic is characterised in the V. Djuric textbook. Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic use the phrase that the Chetniks did «avoid the conflicts with the fascist forces, and fought against the partisans». Beside the desire for the restitution of Serbian advantages in Yugoslavia, S. Koren states their «cruel treatment of the Croat and Moslem populaces». The same author also states that the Chetniks have –endeavouring to fight with the partisans which they soon understood to be the most dangerous opponents– «even co-operated with the Germans and Italians, and sometimes even with the Ustasha».

Much more space is allocated –according to the program– to the partisan movement. The communists are regarded as establishers of the partisan movement, but much attention is given to the HSS participation in the antifascist struggle. For the communists, Peric writes that «in the first phase of the occupation they were actually the only all-Yugoslav political formations». Some authors emphasise that the Communist party had a certain advantage over other political parties in organising the resistance, because before the war it was also working illegally, and had a developed undercover network (Djuric, Koren). The establishing of the Sisak Squad «established by the Croats in the surroundings of Sisak» (Peric) is regarded as the beginning of the partisan movement. Besides the communists, other antifascists –primarily the HSS members and so-called intellectuals– appear in the textbooks. In general, regarding the depiction of the partisans prevalent during the SFRY, the textbooks in the independent Croatia try to point out the complex character of the antifascist movement, the participation of people of different political orientations in it. As the goal of the communist, restitution of Yugoslavia is pointed out, with communists «pointing out the equality of all nations» (Matkovic). It is pointed out that the partisan movement is a part of the world's antifascist coalition. Although emphasising that the first partisan squad was founded by Croats, Matkovic admits that «the partisan squads were especially numerous in the Serb-populated areas, which were exposed to the Ustasha repression.» He also mentions Chetniks – albeit just in one sentence, but also as opponents of fascists. We can read similar statements in the S. Koren textbook, where she adds that «following the disappointment with the Ustasha regime, more and more Croats went to partisans,» so that «as early as 1943 the Croats were the most numerous participants in the antifascist movement.» Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic write that «the first or-

ganised partisan squads in Croatia appeared in the areas of Lika, Kor-dun and Banija where the Ustasha forces commenced great repression...» It is not explicitly stated that those are areas with Serb populace. The same authors state that the partisan movement was more and more joined by the writers, painters, musicians, cultural and educational workers (the going over to the partisan movement by artists and intellectuals is mentioned by other authors, too), but also state that «even during the war partisans committed crimes». In a lesson which depicts the circumstances in Croatia during the war, the «Tito's partisans» (Peric), or the Communist party and the partisans (Matkovic, Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic, Djuric, Koren) are mentioned as committing the crimes. The repression of the HSS people, who were in favour of democracy inside the partisan movement, by communists is also mentioned.

In the course of the lessons dealing with WWII the interethnic violence is discussed. The lessons on general history –according to the teaching program– the matter is not given special attention. The mention of the Holocaust is not even required (most of the authors correct that omission at their own initiative). Where the Yugoslav and Croatian history is concerned, it is established that «the Ustasha terror» is to be discussed in the lesson on the ISC, along with the «Chetnik crimes» and «partisans' crimes», especially in the immediate aftermath of the war. Different authors allocate different amounts of the text to those issues, and emphasise different matters.

I. Peric discusses the Ustasha crimes in the paragraph titled «The Ustasha regime», concerning the system of the Ustasha government. The «interethnic violence» itself is mentioned on less than one quarter of a page (one paragraph). There, the existence of prisons and concentration camps is mentioned, «among them the largest and most notorious was the one in Jasenovac». It says further: «The Ustashes have, following the example of the Nazi Germany, enforced terror against Jews, also against Gypsies and Serbs, as well as against those Croats that disagreed with their policies.» In such a way the crimes of the Ustasha against the members of other nationalities (completely disregarding the numbers of the victims) is put into the context of political repression of dissidents, while the ethnic component is forgotten. H. Matkovic gives just a bit more space to the Ustasha terror. He mentions «mass repression» over Serbs and Jews. He mentions other camps besides Jasenovac (Stara Gradiska, Jadovno), and says that they were called «death

camps». He states that the Ustashas «going along with the fascist and Nazi racial policies have murdered a lot of innocent people.» Among the victims of the camps he states the Serbs and Jews and Gypsies, but also «numerous Croats who disagreed with the Ustasha actions». He states the approximate number of Jasenovac victims –80 thousand («mostly Serbs and Jews»), and the total number of victims in Croatia–190 thousand. Prominent Croats imprisoned in Jasenovac are mentioned (like V. Macek).

Jews, Gypsies and Serbs are mentioned by Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic as the victims of the «law on purity of the Croatian nation», and they say that the goal of the Ustashas was the «creation of the ethnically clean Croatia». The attitude towards Jews is described. It is stated that the mass deportations of Jews and Serbs to death camps commenced (Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska are mentioned), as well as to the camps in Nazi Germany (Auschwitz and Buchenwald are mentioned). Regarding the Serbs, it is said that «the Serb populace was exposed to repression and mass murders, of which the most cruel were those in the areas of Glina and Pakrac». The segment is illustrated by a picture of the Auschwitz camp.

V. Djuric has in her book given to that segment the title «Ustasha reign of terror». In it the political repression is discussed first. In the context, filled jailhouses and the establishing of the concentration camps are mentioned. The racial laws against Jews and Gypsies are mentioned. As death camps, Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska are mentioned, and it is stated that in those camps Jews, Serbs, Gypsies and Croats of antifascist persuasion had suffered. In the question under the segment the author asks: «Can the ISC be called a totalitarian state?»

Relatively most space to the Ustasha crimes is given by S. Koren (including one large and three small direct-quote texts). Firstly she tells of the political repression (stating the examples of prominent people, writers and politicians). She speaks also about the racial laws made out against Jews and Gypsies and the «repression based on nationality» geared «especially against Serbs». She mentions the establishing of concentration camps where «tens of thousands of people from various nationalities lost their lives». Jasenovac is mentioned as the most notorious camp. In the same segment the author states examples of the disagreeing of Croats with the ethnic repression. As a person who disagreed with the Ustashas, and tried to help, the Zagreb archbishop Aloj-

zije Stepinac is mentioned. Under his picture S. Koren mentions in the captions the controversy over the issue «whether he was harsh and decisive enough in his actions against the Ustasha regime».

Much more space is being given to the repression where Croats were victims, i.e. the Ustasha and partisans' crimes. The latter are being described as repression based on a political, and not national or ethnic matters. S. Koren even states that among those captured at Bleiburg were also some Slovenes and «Serbian chetniks». The sole exception is the Peric claim that in the partisan army that took Srijem and Slavonia in the spring of 1945 there were a lot of former Chetniks who «kept in them the hate towards everything Croatian and Catholic», and so committed numerous crimes.

According to the teaching program the Chetnik crimes are discussed, although not until the last lesson concerning the war. The Chetniks themselves were discussed earlier. Just to add a few more things, we must mention that the Chetnik crimes are presented foremost as the crimes based on ethnicity, on the national basis. Peric states that Chetniks have «done terrible crimes of genocide against Croats and Moslems, wishing in some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to create ethnically clean Serb areas.» Their crimes are similarly depicted in the other textbooks: firstly they have a national/ethnic dimension, and than the political one where their conflicts with the partisans are concerned. In that issue there are no great differences between the textbooks. The sole large difference can be noted in S. Koren, who places the first information on Chetniks in the context of the groups fighting for the reconstitution of Yugoslavia (parallel to the government in exile and the partisans), while their crimes are discussed later in the segment titled «The Croatian Populace in the War».

### **The Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia \***

To the history of Yugoslavia from 1945 until its break-up just three lessons are –according to the teaching program– dedicated, along with a segment in the lesson from general history speaking about the break of Communist regimes in Europe. Although the creation of the socialist

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\* This chapter includes the answer to question 12 of the Questionnaire: «How is the position of your people in Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia described? Positive/negative evaluations? How are religious differences treated?».

Yugoslavia is described as the logical and legitimate aftermath of the war events and the antifascist movement, the undemocratic, totalitarian character of the government thus established is emphasised. The post-war elections are described, as is the voting by rubber balls for or against the People's Front, the non-existent possibility of choice etc. – the «(communist) party one-mindedness» (Peric) is mentioned – the abolition of private property and the introduction of the socialist system in the economy.

As we have already mentioned, some authors immediately state that in the state the «inherited Serbian advantage» (Peric) was prevalent. I. Peric and H. Matkovic emphasise the favouring of Serbs<sup>10</sup> and their easier access to public positions and the political and economic careers. The resistance in Croatia is especially mentioned and, in general, the focus is placed on the situation in Croatia. It can create the impression that the situation of Croatia was different (worse) from the other parts of the socialist Yugoslavia, and from the «Serbian advantage» it can be concluded that the position of Serbs in that state was better than the position of Croats.

Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic speak positively about the reconstruction and industrialisation of the country and the change of borders. The similar spirit is present in the discussion of the economy, the bettering of the living conditions and the advancement in the later periods of the socialist Yugoslavia. The workers self-management is mentioned in a positive context. The reconstruction and development of the country in the framework of Yugoslavia is given a mildly positive accent by S. Koren, who still regards the economic and political system of the state an obstacle to progress, so it could be concluded that the development happened to some extent «despite» the system. The negative influence of the planned economy and the so-called «wrong investments» are also noted by V. Djuric.

The segment on the repression of the religious communities states

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<sup>10</sup> I. Peric states: «In the FNRY, where national equality was guaranteed by the constitution, the Serbs were 'more equal' (favored). The favoring of Serbs in public services was noticeable all over Croatia, so the Croats, in the name of purported 'brotherhood and unity' had to suffer their own inequality.»; H. Matkovic states: «In Croatia the favoring of Serbs was strongly evident; they, as Party members, came to many high places and positions and in various ways suppressed the expression of Croatian national feelings.»

that the authorities were most brutal to the Catholic church, even to «the Catholic Church in Croatia» (Matkovic). It is claimed that the attacks on the Catholic church were meant to «suppress the spiritual strength of the Croatian people» (Djuric). All the textbooks (according to the demands of the program) depict the case of Alojzije Stepinac.

The negative effect of the agrarian reform and colonisation for the ethnic composition of the populace in Croatia is mentioned. By bringing in the Serbs «their number was intentionally increased» (Peric). V. Djuric also warns about the changes in the national structures of Slavonija and Vojvodina in favour of the Serbs.

In the description of the Tito's break with the Informburo the fall of Andrija Hebrang is pointed out; he is called «a Croatian patriot, who actively pursued the interests of Croatia, because of which he was 'undesirable' to the top of the Party» (Peric). Other words, but to the same meaning, are used by H. Matkovic and Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic. It is suggested that Hebrang was murdered from national motives. Different versions of the Hebrang case are presented by quotes from different sources by S. Koren, while V. Djuric calls him «a Croatian Communist», without stating any national reasons for dealing with him.

There is a separate issue of economic exploitation of Croatia (and Slovenia). «Their faster development was being slowed all the time, because by a decision of the federal authorities in Belgrade they had to pay much more than other republics into the Fund for the undeveloped parts of the SFRY» (Peric). Some things on the requests for the economic autonomy of the republics in the context of their unequal economic positions are said during the discussion of «the Croatian Spring» and the «clear accounts» policy (Matkovic, Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic, Djuric, Koren).

The unfavourable position of Croatia is also noted in the cultural matters. The singing of patriotic songs and popular heroes was forbidden (Peric, Djuric). Insisting on a common Serbo-Croatian language led to discrimination of the Croatian language. All the textbooks mention the Declaration on the Name and Position of the Croatian Language from 1967, which according to Matkovic marks the beginning of «the resistance to the cultural aggression».

The Croatian Spring is presented as a complex, multilayered national movement in favour of a greater autonomy of Croatia. Only according to Peric that movement was put down «under the pressure from anti-Croat (hegemonist-centralitarian and great-Serb) forces in the fed-

eral Party leadership», while in the other textbooks the putting down of the Croatian Spring has exclusively the political dimension, without a national one. The Constitution from 1974 is explained as the «acknowledgement of the republics' sovereignty» (Matkovic), it is said to «bring confederate elements into the Yugoslav union» (Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic), and it is mostly deemed positive.

According to the teaching program, the unfavourable position of Croats in the framework of the socialist Yugoslavia should be witnessed by the occurrence of political emigration. The descriptions of the emigration mention the murder of Bruno Busic. A special thing is the segment in H. Matkovic on «the Serb St. George's Day uprising», which is actually the sole example of the history of the ethnic minority in Croatia in the 20th century.

### **The decay of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavian wars\***

According to the curriculum two teaching units are dedicated to the history of independent Croatia. The curriculum suggests the following themes: the elections for the Croatian Sabor, the negotiations on a new form of the Yugoslav unity, the declaration of independence, the war against Croatia, the liberation of occupied parts of Croatia. They are preceded by the teaching unit on the breakdown of the communist regimes which also comprises the treatment of the last decade in the history of Yugoslavia.

The paragraph allocated to the history of Yugoslavia after Tito's death, which is about one page long in all the textbooks (in S. Koren it is comprised in the teaching unit on the Croatian history and has close to two pages including quoted texts on the matter), main groups of problems confronted by that state are mentioned. The main problems of the Yugoslav state are named as: the economic crisis (unemployment, low productivity, foreign debts and the inflation), the relations among nations in the SFRY or the political crisis «which Serbia caused by its demands» (Koren), and the breakdown of the totalitarian system and introduction of the multipartyism.

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\* This chapter includes the answer to question 13 of the Questionnaire: «How is the decay of Yugoslavia in 1991 and wars 1991-1995 described? What are the main reasons for decay: economic, authoritarian political system, other Yugoslav peoples, international community, others. How many pages are devoted to the wars?».

The relation of Serbs to Kosovo Albanians is also mentioned. It is stated that the Serbs were dissatisfied with the 1974 Constitution, and endeavoured to abolish the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which happened in 1988. As the cause of tension among the republics in Yugoslavia, the Serbia's efforts to strengthen «the centralism in the SFRY to realise through stronger centralism its hegemonistic, great-Serb interests and leanings» (Peric) is mentioned. Such efforts inside the Communist party have led to the break-up of the 14th Congress of the SKJ, and the leaving of the Slovene, Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina delegations. The authors agree that the «break-up of that Congress marked the break-up of the until-then-unified SKJ, and also the beginning of the break-up of the SFRY» (Peric, others also similarly). The need for democratisation has led to the first multiparty elections in the spring of 1990, which non-communist parties won everywhere except in Serbia and Montenegro.

The first teaching unit is dedicated mostly to political events, the first multiparty elections, the beginning of work of the Croatian Sabor and the making of the Constitution, and the negotiations on the future of the Yugoslav state. Further, the referendum and the proclamation of independence are discussed. The war in Croatia makes up the second teaching unit. The so-called 'log revolution' is mentioned, and the outbreak of war. Belgrade, i.e. Slobodan Milosevic is accused of instigating the Croatian Serbs to rebel against Croatia, while the JNA is blamed for aiding and arming the rebels. It is written that Milosevic decided to use the army to topple the «democratically elected governments» of Croatia and Slovenia (Matkovic). After the short war in Slovenia the war in Croatia began, in which the opposing side was 'rebel Serbs' aided by 'volunteers from Serbia' (Peric, Djuric) or 'chetnik terrorists coming from Belgrade' (Matkovic) and the JNA. It is stated that JNA had become the Serb army. In the first phase the war had led the occupation of parts of Croatian territory by 'rebel Serbs'. That part of the war (including the 'log revolution', war in Slovenia until the coming of the peacekeeping forces) is described in 24 lines (plus a lot of quoted texts) in Koren, 40 lines in V. Djuric, 45 (shorter) lines in Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic, 75 in Matkovic and 98 in Peric. The second phase of the war, i.e. Croatian actions to liberate the occupied areas take up 52 lines in Peric, 8 in Matkovic, 4 in Brkljacic-Ponos-Spelic, 18 in Djuric, 17 in Koren. A tendency is notable to give more attention to the enemy at-

tacks, with less attention being given to own side actions. Separately, but very briefly, the peaceful reintegration of the Danube area/Eastern Slavonia is mentioned. The larger amount of text in I. Peric comes from the detailed descriptions, and the fact that the material is being separated into three –not two, as required by the curriculum– units. It must be emphasised that Peric completely takes the position of protector and spokesman of the party that was then in power, the HDZ (to the extent of laying out the party programme, in the ideal form of course). The textbooks of I. Peric and H. Matkovic give a lot of space to the Serb crimes in Croatia<sup>11</sup>, which is somewhat less discussed by Brkljadic-Ponos-Spelic, V. Djuric and S. Koren, while just the S. Koren and Brkljadic-Ponos-Spelic mention that a large number of Serbs ran away during the Croatian army movements (no other civilian casualties in Croatia are mentioned). Brkljadic-Ponos-Spelic, V. Djuric and S. Koren (in the atlas that is given with the textbook) give a map of Croatia's occupied areas.

## TEXTBOOKS

### *Primary school (lower secondary school)*

1. Peric Ivo, *Povijest 8*, Alfa, Zagreb 1998.
2. Koren Snjezana, *Povijest 8*, Profil, Zagreb 2000.
3. Matkovic Hrvoje, *Povijest 8*. Skolska knjiga, Zagreb 2000.
4. Duric Vesna, *Povijest 8*, Profil 2000.
5. Brkljadic Maja, Ponos Tihomir, Spelic Dario, *Povijest 8*, *Skolska knjiga*, Zagreb 2000.

### *Secondary school (upper level)*

1. Peric Ivo, *Hrvatska i Svijet u XX. Stoljecu*, Alfa, Zagreb 1998.
2. Vujcic Ivan, *Povijest 4*, Birotehnika, Zagreb 1998.
3. Lecek Suzana, Agicic Damir, Jakovina Tvrtko, Najbar-Agicic Magdalena, *Povijest 4*, Profil, Zagreb 1999.

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<sup>11</sup> Peric states: "Driven by the hate towards everything Croatian and Catholic, the great-Serb aggressors have tortured, killed, slaughtered and chased Croatians and other non-Serbs..."

Yugoslavia in a Broken Mirror.  
The Serbian Textbooks

DUBRAVKA STOJANOVIC

**The Second World War**

**T**HE DECAY of Yugoslavia in 1941 is presented in Serbian textbooks as the result of the betrayal of different ex-Yugoslav peoples, especially Croats. Serbs are described as those who were protecting Yugoslavia and fighting against fascism. The whole interpretation strengthens the image of Serbs as a people always on the right side of history and, at the same time, in the centre of it. That is why Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia is described in the following way: «Hitler's reaction to this event (military coup in Belgrade as the reaction against signing the Tripartite treaty and demonstrations in Belgrade on March 27, 1941) was very violent. His judgement was that the Serbs were also guilty for the breaking out of WWI. The German attack started on April 6th 1941». The collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during that April war is presented as the consequence of the betrayal of Croat officers in the army: «In the April war, a betrayal was expressed fully, especially in Croatia. There were also rebellions (in Bjelovar). In the April war, about 375,000 Yugoslav officers and soldiers were captured in a short time, mostly from Serbia. Germans released Croatian members of the ex-Yugoslav army from captivity».

As far as the renewal of Yugoslavia during and after the war is concerned, the impression given by the textbook is that it was the result of political decisions and success in the battles of Tito's partisans. It is stressed that the contribution of Yugoslav peoples to the liberation war and battles against fascism were not equal: «The contribution of the Serbs and Montenegrins was the most important. The majority of the combat troops in partisan units consisted of them as well as Chetnic units. These nations were the only, beside the Jews and Gypsies that experienced genocide from Croatian Ustashes, that was later hushed up and hidden because of political reasons».

But, in spite of this contribution during the war the textbook authors want to show that the position of Serbs in the formation of communist Yugoslavia was not the same as the position of other peoples, leading to the conclusion that the second Yugoslavia had some anti-Serbian bases. There are insinuations that Serbia was not consulted at the second session of AVNOJ in Jajce, where the second Yugoslavia was proclaimed: «Delegates from Serbia were not elected, they were chosen by the General Headquarters of the partisan forces of Serbia. The delegates from Croatia were the most numerous».

According to the textbook, during the Second World War in Serbia there were two antifascist movements - Partisans and Chetnics. This is the most important change in the interpretation of WWII, because previously Chetnics were considered as collaborators. Although Chetnics are acknowledged as antifascist, the authors keep the distance and conclude: «We cannot equalise those movements in any case». As a positive role of the Partisans, it is stressed that they were fighting against occupying forces all the time and that they were the ones who liberated the country, while for Chetnics they stress that they were anti-fascist and that in 1944 they decided to support Yugoslavia as a monarchist federation. As a negative role of partisans it is underlined that they showed 'left radicalism' and made the sovietisation of the society, while Chetnics collaborated with occupying forces, attacked partisans and started the civil war in Serbia because their first aim was to destroy communists and not to liberate the country.

The Ustasha regime and the Independent State of Croatia were marked as most important collaborators during the Second World War in ex-Yugoslavia. As it is underlined in the textbook Ustasha organisation was typically fascist organisation: «As extreme nationalists, chauvinists and racists, they tried to build their country and its institutions following Hitler's model. They used all means to make ethnically clean Croatia. They emphasised as an important fact that Serbs were religiously and racially different from the Croats, so they liquidated them, expelled them and converted them to Catholics. The most severe genocide toward Serbs, Jews and Gypsies was made in NDH».

Interethnic violence, especially sufferings of the Serbian people are described with brutality that defies comprehension. It is specially important for the relation between Serbs and Croats because Croat crimes are described even in this way; «Jasenovac detainees were

slaughtered by knives, killed with carpenters' axes, hatches, hammers and iron bars, shot and burned in crematories, boiled in a cauldron while still alive, hanged, tortured by hunger, thirst and cold as there was neither food nor water in the camp». Almost all the other surrounding peoples were presented in the same way: «Ustashas, with some parts of Muslim population, without any cause, started to kill Serbs, to torture them and throw them into an abyss». About the situation in Kosovo it says: «In Kosovo and Metohia separatist and nationalist Albanian groups functioned terrorising Serbian people, burning villages and forcing Serbs to emigrate». Very similar for Bulgarians: «The Bulgarian occupier took men to camps, killed them, forbade the use of the Serbian language. Serbian surnames were bulgarised».

### **The Second Socialist Yugoslavia and its end**

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is shown in Serbian textbooks as a state, which was protected only by Serbs. All the other ex-Yugoslav peoples are shown as separatists who used Yugoslavia in order to obtain their own national states. That is why the beginning of disintegration of Yugoslavia is settled in 1964, during the Eight Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists when Aleksandar Rankovic, Serbian chief of the Federal police was expelled. According to the author «it was already then, that all conditions were provided for the operationalisation of the prepared and well-designed scenario (inspired and abetted by some foreign factors) for the breakdown of the Yugoslav community» as proven by the events in Kosovo in 1968, Croatia in 1967-1971, and Slovenia in 1969. «The crown of these events was the promulgation of the new Constitution of the SFRY in 1974», which was accepted «without reservation by the obsequious and bureaucratised structures on Serbia's political stage». Further, it says that «this constitution represented the victory of nationalist and separatist forces from the republics and provinces, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia started. By reforming the federation, Yugoslavia was split as a state union».

The authors of the textbook stressed that the injustice against Serbia in the 1974 Constitution was partly corrected by the change of the Serbian Constitution in March 1989, which gave sovereignty to Serbia on all its territory. But, the changes began in 1987. «The Eight Session of the CK SKJ (Communist Party Central Committee) marked the victory of the concept which advocated the democratisation of society,

review of the Constitution, protection of the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and Metohia and the establishment of integral Serbia throughout its territory. These four adopted amendments to the Constitution entitling Serbia to discharge sovereign state functions throughout its territory».

According to the authors of the textbook for the 8th grade, nationalism and separatism in Yugoslavia strengthened with time: «Slovenian leadership was taking the head, especially since 1989, inspiring the secession from Yugoslavia». The author of the textbook sees only two linking factors in Yugoslavia at that time: the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's Army. The enemies of Yugoslavia, therefore, «according to the already prepared plan decided to break fires the one (LCY) and then the other (YPA) factor of togetherness». Since these integrative factors disappeared, especially after the XIV Congress, the election took place in 1990, when «in some republics ultra rightist forces won. In many parts of the country one kind of monolithic thought was thus replaced by another, which, here and there, borders on the absence of thought».

The decay of Yugoslavia in 1991 is explained as the result of separatism of ex-Yugoslav republics: «Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia made a violent secession from Yugoslavia and became sovereign states, recognised by the OSCE and the UN. Serbia and Montenegro remained together and on April 27th 1992 declared the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Adopting a new Constitution, Yugoslav continuity created on December 1st 1918 remained».

The war is also explained as the result of the secession: «Because of the violent secession in 1991 of Slovenia, and then of Croatia, the war conflicts started. According to the new Croatian Constitution Serbs lost the rights of nation, but only got the status of national minority.» In those conflicts 'the West' had its role: «The European Community tried to do a 'good favour' in the Yugoslav conflict. Because of the partiality of the EC, especially Germany as the most influential and the most aggressive of its members, the battles couldn't stop». «An attempt to split Yugoslavia has been obviously confirmed by the fact that the great powers, especially economically powerful Germany, stopped at nothing to achieve their interests. Their blow was, first of all, against Serbia». The role of the Vatican policy is also marked as significant: «The Catholic Church and its fanatic believers have been constantly strug-

gling against orthodoxy and the Serbs. The situation was almost identical to the one in 1941. The Serbian population in Croatia is being violently expelled from their territory. Serbs are being tortured, and the brutality inflicted on innocent citizens is very much alike or even the same as those 50 years ago. Serbian villages are being plundered and burned down, orthodox churches are being destroyed while the graves and sanctuaries are desecrated».

The textbook declares that the sanctions against Serbia were introduced by the UN because Serbia and Montenegro didn't agree with the split of Yugoslavia: «After different threats, blackmails and unseen partiality, especially after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina had broken out (April 6th 1992, the Security Council of the UN brought the decision in May 1992 to impose the most severe sanctions against Yugoslavia. However, it turned out that after imposing the sanctions against Yugoslavia and Serbs, the civil and religious war didn't cease, but, on the contrary, heavier fighting was breaking out».

## The Common Yugoslav History and the Republic of Macedonia

NIKOLA JORDANOVSKI

THE ANALYSIS of the treatment of the common Yugoslav history in the school books was intended to show how some crucial questions of the recent history were addressed. For the purpose of this publication, we decided to present the findings relating to the Second World War and the postwar history until nowadays. Of course, we will present only the most interesting and indicative accents of these school books narratives.

To begin with, this is how the decay of Yugoslavia in 1941 is treated – the main reason is stated to be the incapability of the Royal Government. The governmental structures are described as hesitating, continually pro-fascist, interested only in preserving its position and interests, thus «... sacrificing the liberty and the independence of the Yugoslav peoples...». <sup>1</sup> Neither the after-military-coup-government (27.03.1941) «... did fulfil the expectations and demands of the people... nor did democratise the country nor took measures for protection of it...». <sup>2</sup> The conduct of the government during the short April war is described as shamefully inappropriate for the situation. The only force calling for resistance is said to had been the Communist Party, and the bitter defeat ensured by the Fifth Colon. With the words of the authors: «Everywhere ruled chaos, lack of organisation, betrayal. The King and the Government were not capable to organize the defence of the country. On 15 of April 1941 they fled abroad. The army fell apart. In 12 days a total collapse of the state occurred. More than 300,000 Yugoslav soldiers were captured, and the people remained on the mercy of the

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<sup>1</sup> Simo Mladenovski, Novica Veljanovski, Svetozar Naumovski, Stojan Kiselinovski, *Istorija za IV klas gimnazija –opsta i jazicna–*, 'Prosvetno delo', Skopje, 1992, p. 127.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 128.

fascist occupiers».<sup>3</sup> The vocabulary and the style are inherited from the old school books. Also the message has remained the same –a rotten state, betraying king's government detached from the people, the same people finding himself attached rather to the KPJ– the only resistance force. No analysis of circumstances, realities of Europe 1941's political and military conditions, the nature of the military coup, what were the reasons for popularity of the leftist outlook in the given moment in European context etc.

Another exceptionally important element of the schoolbooks narrative is the war itself, with all its cruelties, political implications, collaboration, interethnic relations... First impression is that there is a tendency to equalise the level of collaboration. The quisling regimes are given equal treatment in quantity and qualifications. Thus, Milan Nedić's regime is described as created by the Germans, relaying on the «... pro-fascist part of the Serbian bourgeoisie».<sup>4</sup> Respectively, there is a mention of the «... fascist created quisling formations...», called Nedicevci, Loticevci, Serbian state guard etc.

About the Independent Croatian State there is an explanation that after four years of its existence it became evident that it was actually under occupation of a special kind. «The leader of this artificial state Ante Pavelić as well as the whole state apparatus during the whole time of its existence were mere executors of the will of Germany and Italy».<sup>5</sup> The Ustasas are described as «... the most organized pro-fascist oriented force in NDH...» (Independent Croatian State, m.r.) and representatives of the «... most extremely-nationalistic part of the Croatian bourgeoisie». <sup>6</sup> As we can see, the word bourgeoisie is again a levelling device.

Such mentions of collaborative 'quisling' forces exist about Macedonia as well – Kontracheti formed by 'degenerated' (literal translation with the meaning renegades) Macedonians, Albanian Balists formed by the Italian occupier, White and Blue Guard formed in Slovenia again by the Italian occupier... Let us close this subject with another quotation –«All of them, together with the Chetnik formations of Draza

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

Mihajlovic– who were representatives of the Serbian bourgeoisie with great-serbian pretensions, were fighting against the People's Liberating Movement».<sup>7</sup> As a conclusion, we should say that all quislings were 'formed' by outsider occupiers and they were all representatives of the nationalistic bourgeoisies. Such a marginalisation of the role of collaboration is another legacy of the all-equalising-peace-amongst-brothers-promoting-nationalistic-tensions-diminishing doctrine, which is fine in terms of its political intentions within the former federation, but is simply an over-simplifying and marginalising approach which distorts the facts, offering identical (or similar) interpretations for phenomena with peculiar origins and hardly identical political, social and intellectual bases.

Let us now turn to the image of the Partisans (colloquial name for the guerilla fighters under command of the Communist Party and Tito). I will only say that their role has not suffered much in the schoolbooks - they are still «... anti fascists who by fighting create free territories, avoid destruction by the more powerful enemy, bound with the people's strivings and hopes...» (paraphrase). Here is a quotation about the partisans I could not resist to:

The proportion of the forces was 100,000 enemy soldiers (Germans, Chetniks, Ustashas, domobrans) against around 20,000 PLAY (People's Liberating Army of Yugoslavia) fighters. The night between 6 and 7 March 1943 the main part of the PLAY forces crossed the river Neretva, together with around 4,500 wounded and sick fighters, crashing along the way the Chetniks on the other side of the river Neretva and breaking their way in the direction of the three border-area between Eastern Herzegovina, Montenegro and Sandjak... By the midst of May 1943, the enemy undertook a new offensive in this area, aiming the distraction of the PLAY core. In order to obtain that, large military forces were used, around 120,000 (Germans, Italians, Ustashas, domobrans and Bulgarians), against 19,000 tired, exhausted and poorly armed PLAY fighters... In the Sutjeska battle, PLAY lost over 7,000 fighters, while the enemy had around 15,000 of his soldiers killed.<sup>8</sup>

The interethnic violence is a subject one might think would take

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

more space in the schoolbooks; actually there is only one passage on this issue in the school book for the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of gymnasium which will speak for itself when quoted in its totality:

Immediately after the occupation, the occupiers helped by the local traitors started a terrible terror through arrests, deportations, individual and group murders and massacres, mass exterminations of whole national collectivities, like for example the Jews etc. Especially suffering this terror were communists and other democratically and patriotically disposed citizens. With the aim to neutralise the resistance and to keep more easily the peoples in occupied Yugoslavia in obedience, the occupiers have burnt up the fire of international (sic) hatred in the international areas, especially amongst the Serbs, Croats, Moslems, which brought about catastrophic consequences in some parts of Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In parallel with the international, the religious hatred also increased.<sup>9</sup>

**Again the occupier is to be blamed for everything!**

As for the renewal of Yugoslavia in 1945, the whole chronology of that process is presented in the text-unit entitled «Creation and organization of the people's authority 1941-45,»<sup>10</sup> with the following (indicative) sub-titles: «The role of the KPJ in the organisation of the people's authority», «People's liberating Committees», «Focha regulations», «The first AVNOJ [acronym for Antifascist Assembly for People's Liberation of Yugoslavia] assembly», «The second AVNOJ assembly», «Constitution of the authority on federal bases and the solution of the national question», «Anti fascist assemblies of Yugoslav peoples and constitution of republics as sovereign states», «Creation of Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia and of the Federal People's republic of Yugoslavia». For the second assembly of AVNOJ it is said that «...Macedonian delegates did not take part in it, but nevertheless the decisions of AVNOJ had positive echo in Macedonia...». This positive evaluation is strengthened with the following explanations: «... for the first time Macedonia was recognised as a state-member of the Yugoslav federation.

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 146-150.

By this the authenticity of the Macedonian nation was recognised. These decisions were announced in Macedonian language». <sup>11</sup> It is also stated that «... All peoples included in an equal state got equal status». <sup>12</sup>

The complicated story about the formation of the Democratic Government composed by members of both the royal government and Communist party members (1945), recognised by the western powers, is given as clear as the authors thought it had been possible. It ends with the sentence: «Gradually, the representatives of the civil parties fell out of the government because they did not accept the new changes in Yugoslavia aiming towards establishing a socialistic order». <sup>13</sup> The sentence, being a final one, is rather ambiguous – what kind of opinion should we have about those 'representatives of the civil parties'? What is the role of Yalta conference in all this? (a cause that is not mentioned), were there any manipulations? what was the nature of the newly-established political system, the global political and military conditions etc.

The next set of points of interest refers to the period of the 'socialist reconstruction', and the position Macedonia enjoyed within the newly formed federation. It is immediately stated that with its first constitution (1946), the People's Republic of Macedonia was a state without a full sovereignty, because lots of jurisdictions were transferred to the federation. Nevertheless, «This Constitution has great importance. Macedonia for the first time got its own state's Constitution, meaning that it existed as a state». <sup>14</sup>

As for the economic development of the country in the afterwar Yugoslav period, the somewhat timid stress is given to the main features of the socialist development process –expropriation, nationalisation, (banning of the private ownership and promotion of the state's ownership is mentioned as a first condition sine qua non of the new system), also the land reforms– «... followed by certain troubles and justified resistance», <sup>15</sup> the failure with the collectivisation experiment

<sup>11</sup> Novica Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinoski, Svetozar Naumovski, *Istorija za VIII oddelenie*, 'Prosvetno delo', Skopje, 1996, p. 66.

<sup>12</sup> Simo Mladenovski, Novica Veljanovski, Svetozar Naumovski, Stojan Kiselinoski, *Istorija za IV klas gimnazija...*, op.cit., p. 149.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>14</sup> Novica Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinoski, Svetozar Naumovski, *Istorija za VIII oddelenie*, 'Prosvetno delo', Skopje, 1996, p. 107.

<sup>15</sup> Simo Mladenovski, Novica Veljanovski, Svetozar Naumovski, Stojan Kiselinoski,

(«...because it was not well enough planned»). In the text-units dealing with the modernisation, the renewal of the state after the war and the building up of the industry are described as 'dynamic', with the annual growth of production of more than 12,7%<sup>16</sup> (Same, 234). And in general, it is a short list of increasing numbers in different branches of industry, tourism and infrastructure building.

The 'legal-state development' of the country is said to have been determined by both the republic's and federation's Constitutions. An effort has been made to explain the errors of that period called administrative and centralist, with the Party as supreme authority. Again ambiguous judgement about the Workers Councils and the co-ordinating role of the Party in the process of the production. With the words of the authors – «The Party was regularly present on the work of the Workers Councils. It often praised or criticised them, thus giving certain directions for the development of the self-management. The work of the Workers Councils after their introduction gave certain results».<sup>17</sup>

Also a special attention is given to the renewal (the word used) of the Ohrid Archbishopric, in the light of the struggle for ecclesiastic supremacy between the Serbian Orthodox church ('bitter resistance') and the Macedonian bishops in the Initiative Committee ('not giving up the ancient rights'). The controversy is said to be lasting up to nowadays.<sup>18</sup>

In general, it is a chronological and thematic story about building up state's institutions and symbols, under the umbrella of the federation, but with the stress on the independence of the institutions. The tone is one of discrete praising, with a somewhat too distant critic for the system (if any substantial critic can be located), and altogether boring narrative. Sort of an observation from above. Most probably a consequence of the duplicity of the fact that the socialist and federation period was also a state founding one at the same time; a danger has been perceived that too harsh analysis/criticism of this part of the past might

put under question even unquestionable things, so the waves should rather be smaller.

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novski, *Istorija za IV klas gimnazija...*, op.cit., p. 233.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.

<sup>17</sup> Novica Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinovski, Svetozar Naumovski, *Istorija za VIII oddelenie*, op.cit., p. 108.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

Finally, a few words about the end of the joint federation. Altogether, the decay of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the wars 1991-1995 do not make part of the history textbooks. The final two sentences in the unit about Yugoslavia are as follows: «Because of the ongoing crisis, the republics which constituted the federal state SFRJ had no interest in remaining in it. So, by the end of the '80s and the beginning of '90s a dissolution of the federation took place and more sovereign and independent states were created».<sup>19</sup>

As for the preceding crisis itself, it is described as a combination of lack of results of the system of self-management, the critics against it, enterprises not being able to survive and pay salaries to the workers, all this provoking a general crisis of the state. This «... resulting with demands for changes of the political and the economic system...», or in other words – «pluralism in the political sphere and privatisation of the state owned property and introduction of market economy»<sup>20</sup>. With this the narrative about Yugoslavia actually ends.

#### TEXTBOOKS ANALYSED

1. Sixth grade of primary school (Branko Panov, *Istorija, 6 oddelenie*, 'Prosvetno delo', Skopje 1995).
2. 3rd grade of gymnasium (general and linguistic specialization – Aleksandar Trajanovski, *Istorija za III klas gimnazija (jazicna i opsta)*, 'Prosvetno delo', Skopje 1993).
3. The eighth grade textbook for primary school (Novica Veljanovski, Simo Mladenovski, Stojan Kiselinski, Svetozar Naumovski, *Istorija za VIII oddelenie*, 'Prosvetno delo', Skopje 1996).
4. The 4th grade history textbook for gymnasias (Simo Mladenovski, Novica Veljanovski, Svetozar Naumovski, Stojan Kiselinski, *Istorija za IV klas gimnazija-opsta i jazicna-*, 'Prosvetno delo', Skopje 1992).

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.102.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

CHAPTER II

**National and Religious Identities  
Co-existing or Conflicting?**



## A. MACEDONIAN IDENTITIES



## Between the Necessity and the Impossibility of a ‘National History’

NIKOLA JORDANOVSKI

**I**N MY TEXT I would like to explore the socio-historical and to a limited extend anthropological background of the ‘Macedonian question’, and the complications it causes to every Balkan historiography in principle, especially the one in the Republic of Macedonia. Let’s say immediately on the start that the Macedonian identity is a modern product par excellence, but thanks to special socio-historical circumstances the whole process underwent in quite a genuine way. Every example tends to be exceptional, so does this one, and yet some general paths and rules were followed.

What I hope to refer to would be how unusually difficult it is to explain in a typical history textbook the effect of nationalism(s) when they try to force ‘sacred rights’ on a disputed territory. Although elsewhere we can say that nationalism played an emancipating and progressive role, on a multicultural and multiethnic ground –such as Macedonia was (and still is)– it turned into a mere producer of both intra and inter-ethnic divisions, promoted unseen intolerance for ‘the other’ and degraded the socio-economic cohesion (as poor as it might had been before) of the country in the name of which it had arisen.

What has been written upon the ‘Macedonian question’ in the region is too much burdened with emotions derived from historicism. What we have is a vast production of 19th and 20th century Balkan historiography of mutual contradiction and denial, leaving behind an inheritance of apologetic thinking (and writing). In this sense, what we basically need is to accomplish some balance between the historical data and the sociological interpretations and analysis. The ultimate goal would be a better understanding of the questions about individual and collective identity, national ideologies and ethnocentric policies, and the results they produce when a number of them interact in a society

unprepared for any higher level (political, religious, linguistic) of homogeneity.

Starting point for every historiography should be to present the case of Macedonia as a territory of overlapping historical heritages, explaining why this territory belongs to everybody, thus giving 'legitimacy' to different claims. Centuries of Roman, Byzantine, Bulgarian, Serbian and finally Turkish rule left behind layers of specific cultural materials spread vertically and horizontally over the social strata. Linguistic interactions, combined customs, fatalistic mentality, oral traditions in the range from Alexander the Great to King Marko<sup>1</sup>, oriental life (nutrition, architecture, habits and values), all this going together with racial parallelism and social immobility, leading to preservation of archaisms of every kind. The weight of these pre-existing culture features has not been fully measured yet in order to understand better the pre-modern roots of modern nations in South Eastern Europe. This is especially important if we want to understand the 19<sup>th</sup> century anti-Ottoman nationalistic movements in the Balkans, which soon enough turned into ideologies of expansionism. This type of nationalism, unlike some western socio-economic nationalisms from the epoch<sup>2</sup>, derived its main strength and power from the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages. As Anthony Smith writes, '...these cultural and historical elements ... form the basis of competing claims to territory, patrimony and resources. Where there are clashing interpretations of ancestral homelands, and cultural heritages –as for example in Macedonia, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Palestine– normal conflicts of interest are turned into cultural wars, and moral and political crusades replace everyday politics. History and culture provide the motives for conflict as well as solidarity'.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> One of many representatives of the dispersed feudal infrastructure in what is now known as Macedonia left behind the collapse of the central power of the Serbian medieval state. Although during most of his rule he was actually a Turkish vassal (in 1394 he got killed in a battle fighting on Turkish side against Valachian feudals), he became the most present figure in the oral tradition of Balkan Slav peoples, especially in Serbia and Macedonia.

<sup>2</sup> Following Gellner's typology (Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell, London, 1983, pp. 88-101).

<sup>3</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 9.

Macedonia faced the 'Age of Nationalisms' fully unprepared, sort to say, lacking her myth of a medieval state under that name (the call of the past glory), consequently not possessing any potentially usable national idea or figure of a hero in the existing pre-culture (for instance the above mentioned King Marko in Macedonian folk tales version, unlike in Serbian, is totally deprived of any national aura or real and positive heroism). Additional disadvantage was the divergence of vernaculars in parallel circulation –Albanian, Greek, Vlach, Ladino and South Slav idiolects spread in the linguistic space between Bulgarian and Serbian– with the Turkish as the *lingua franca*, a situation sustained by the institutionalised channels for penetration of neighbouring influences through education and the Church.

A following horizontal and vertical analysis of the social groups within Macedonia in the period under consideration will help us to understand the complicated internal divisions in an agrarian and mostly illiterate society, in a broader frame of the Ottoman Empire's peculiar conditions. The only 'aristocracy' being the one of the Turkish chiflik-holders, the only bourgeoisie-like layer composed by Greeks –or Vlachs feeling themselves as Greeks– and to a lesser extent Jews and Slavs, reduced to the Levantin type of trade & business, all of them, together with the small hand craftsmen, making the 'urban' population. The peasantry was for the most part Slav and Orthodox. The superior status of the Greek-speaking people inside the *Rum Millet*<sup>4</sup> led to a kind of dominance of Greek culture over other Orthodox Christians. Men of wealth took pride in being called Greek; as for peasant – he felt himself first of all as a member of a family, a village community and his culturally distinguishable unit. Slav peasants called their vernacular just *ours* (speaking *ours*), and to direct questions about other affiliations *Christian* was the answer. This was the core of the existing pre-culture, with the religious identity as the paramount spiritual affiliation.

At this point I would like to point out the first feature of Balkan historiographies (including the Macedonian one) that leads us in wrong direction. That is the tendency to apply strictly and almost exclusively

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<sup>4</sup> Community of Orthodox subjects of the Sultans. The word *Rum* itself meant for the Turks then what historians would call now a Byzantine; the word *millet* goes for *people*. Turks did not bother to go any further in tracing the ethnic (or whatever other) differences within non-Moslem *millets*.

approaches like the primordial or the perennial one<sup>5</sup>. These approaches often lead to imposing a *retrospective* nationalism onto communities and cultures whose identities and loyalties were local, regional, and religious, but barely national. Claims that the core of what consists now the Macedonian nation was awoken in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, assumes that there was a sleeping Macedonian identity which only needed to be properly motivated and put on its feet. This is not true, for one thing, and for another, it leads to misunderstandings and disappointments when later faced with unexplained and systematically avoided basic historical data. For example, the evidences of existing of ‘Macedonians’ already in the early Middle Ages onward are rather thin, to say the least, and even the toponym *Macedonia* appears and disappears in the course of the centuries. And still, for example, in Macedonian historiography Samuel’s medieval state<sup>6</sup> is qualified as ‘Macedonian Kingdom/Empire’, although even one superficial reading of the sources will surprise the curious reader with the opposite story about a Byzantine Emperor Basil II of *Macedonian dynasty* who by defeating Samuel obtained the nickname *Killer of Bulgarians*<sup>7</sup>. In my opinion, literally reading of historical sources do not explain things too well, but ignoring them is not any better. Both methods are in the service of national myth making. The real, complicated story still waits to be cleared up, away from the schoolbooks. As for the motives for such ‘inventive’ history writing, they are to be found in the *unevenness* of nations’ historical foundations. Differences in the quality and quantity of a

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<sup>5</sup> The former conceiving nations (and nationalism) rooted in kinship, ethnicity, and the genetic bases of human existence; the latter excluding the unbroken genetic lines, but still insisting that nations ‘have always existed throughout recorded history’.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel was the ruler of a huge medieval state that arose on the political ruins of the Bulgarian Empire (Byzantium contributing largely to its collapse in 976 year), claiming continuity on most suspicious bases. Ruling between 976 and 1014 vast territories in the Balkans, Samuel had its political centre in the town of Ohrid (now situated in Republic of Macedonia), away from the traditional political centres of the previous Bulgarian medieval state.

<sup>7</sup> Almost as a malice of history, and to make things harder for Macedonian perennialists, the mortal enemy of Samuel’s state –the Byzantine Emperor Basil II– belonged to a ruling dynasty known as *Macedonian*, originating from another part of the Balkans known as Macedonia only in that époque (out of not yet entirely revealed reasons), and which is quite eastwards in terms of objective geography, close to the actual triple frontier between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey.

documented past are sources either of pride or of frustration for the 'cuisines of nationalism'. It happens almost regularly, as Smith remarked, that 'this unevenness of ethno-historical cultural resources is ... a source of national competition and conflict, as the less well endowed communities seek to attain cultural parity with the richer ones'<sup>8</sup>.

Let us now go back to the second and most problematic segment of the history of the region - the appearance of the preaching nationalism on the ground of Macedonia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, or the so called 'neighbouring propaganda' (Greek, Bulgarian, a bit later also Serbian) before its violent phase<sup>9</sup>. Macedonian historiography covers this period in its geographical totality, which is not the problem, taking into account that the territory was indeed one geographical and economic entity. What is not true is the assumption of its cultural entity. This it was not, and the mistake is derived from one basic historiographic mistake, so often manifested in the Balkans – plain and simple partialism. The same partialism that in the past century lead to adjusting the present for the purposes of the future, on second instance of writing history leads to adjusting the past for the purposes of the present.

In fact the neighbouring national propaganda, all starting from different socio-historic realms, put a difficult choice before the populations of Macedonia: people had to choose a national identity. That was a way of thinking foreign especially to the peasants. The preparatory work of 'nation-building' was undertaken according to the general rules – language, culture, race, faith, ethnology were used as arguments in the struggle of contesting nationalisms. Quickly afterwards two sets of historical completes appeared on the surface:

(a) the name *Macedonia* and the powerful reference to Alexander of

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<sup>8</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*...., op.cit., p. 17.

<sup>9</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the process of cultural emancipation of the Slavs was a political project started by new-formed Serbian and Bulgarian elites, directed entirely against the Greek control over the ecclesiastic and educational structures (virtually connected). The territory of Macedonia was the ground of the fiercest struggles between the two cultural-political concepts. The Bulgarian concept was stressing the Slavic element – the vernaculars from just *ours* had to become 'Bulgarian', which in Macedonian circumstances meant not only being given a name, but also being substantially rather than slightly changed into the newly formed standard Bulgarian language. The Hellenic argument, on the other side, rested on the greatness of its culture and on the loyalty to the 'eternal and natural' ecclesiastic order, i.e. the Greek-controlled Constantinople patriarchate.

Macedon, dating back from the ancient times and bearing Hellenic connotation (as emphasized by the Greek propaganda), and...

- (b) the term *Bulgars* as a synonymous to Slavs, supported on the ground by infrastructure of Bulgarian origin (not without some initial instructing and guidance by Pan-Slavic circles in Russia), even before the creation of the Bulgarian state in 1878. The later propaganda was emphasizing the role of the medieval enlighteners of the Slavs St. Cyrilus and Methodius, born in Thessalonica, the capital of Macedonia.

The adoption of both mythical concepts –instead of choosing one, for example– has inflicted much ambiguity and it is reflected even nowadays in the circulating syntagm *Slavo-Macedonians*.

But this duality is not fully shown in the Macedonian historiography. The bitter cultural struggle is depicted merely as a clash of hegemonic cultures, with confused Macedonians in between. The point has been to promote impostors acting on an essentially ‘Macedonian’ ground, without deeply analysing what had really been the context of this clash, and what this ‘Macedonian’ ground had really been like, without implanting nowadays realities back in time. The motivation for such a misbalanced narrative is of course the crisis of identity, the constant need to keep a clean line of supposed ethno-genesis. This is another legacy of adopting the perennial theory, in order to catch up with the ruling regional national ideologies and respective historiographies.

At this point, I think another moment is worth mentioning, and that would be the input of linguistic historiography. It cannot be avoided if we try to understand some divergences that occurred in this situation of splitting identity. Dealing with different resource material, it brought up some light on the ‘language problem’, which apparently dates back far beyond the latest political dispute between Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria. This type of historiography written by linguists revealed another ‘anomaly’ of the *Macedonian question* – the surprising loyalty to the Slav vernacular(s) spoken in Macedonia and the resistance, sometimes quite vigorous but also very theoretic in many cases, to the standard Bulgarian language introduced on the ground. At the same time the very usage of the name *Bulgarian* when referring to the same vernacular was not a problem. I believe that Macedonian historiography in its quest for all kinds of particularities

might have overdone this subject, but also that the Bulgarian historiography systematically neglects, if not consciously ignores or diminishes this phenomenon. I mention here briefly this issue only because it is widely accepted that the language is one of the key instruments in the national identity building process. As we know from Benedict Anderson, when certain dialect becomes raised to the level of ‘...*new politico-cultural eminence*’<sup>10</sup>, as it happened with one of the Bulgarian dialects in 19<sup>th</sup> century, later that same product feverishly defends itself, but also self-imposes as unificating dogma, a weapon for assimilation, ‘ironing’ of differences. Every attempt for new transcription prepared for some other of the regional dialects (another potential language?!, more or less closely related), which is in the sphere of political interests standing behind mentioned lingual eminence, is being proclaimed a major heresy. That is how same persons in one historiography are celebrated as enlighteners, cornerstones of identity, pioneers of national languages, while in the other they are depicted as lunatics, mercenaries, uneducated amateurs, dreamers etc.

The next, maybe the most interesting problem for the historiography(s), is the violent phase of the *Macedonian question*<sup>11</sup>. That is a segment in which our historiography lacks depth in the approach and even basic honesty in the scientific analysis, as well as a sense for proportions. This period of *Macedonian struggle* (to use the Greek term for it) is the main source of persons to be promoted into heroes, martyrs for the cause and consequently national myths. The symbol of this phase is the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, founded 1894). As it is more or less known, this secret organisation, by taking a paternalist attitude towards the peasants, also offered them a certain sort of illusion of alternative state within the state. Still, most of the population did not feel ready to risk, and a liberating mass uprising was unlikely to happen.

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<sup>10</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, 1983, p. 45.

<sup>11</sup> The period of the last three decades of the Ottoman rule in Macedonia (meaning until the Balkan wars 1912-13) is most inspiring for large history production in all three historiographies – the Greek, Bulgarian and the Macedonian one, also with very significant contribution by the Serbian history writing. Within this narrative not only armed anti-Ottoman resistance is the topic, but also the controversial and merciless mutual extermination of the adherents of different options for the future of Macedonia after the anticipated ‘liberation’ of the country from the Turks.

Soon things took another turn for more dangerous roads - 'The young, inexperienced, but eager leaders finally grasped that they were challenging the basis of a conservative and frightened society which lacked a collective identity and the means and will to fight back. In consequence, a new strategy was necessary, and one that already had currency in the Balkans evolved: terrorism!'<sup>12</sup>. At judging this point of the past the national historiographies start wandering around principles of basic subjectivity and established standards of impartiality. Thus, for instance, our national historiography went into promoting the leaders of the organisation into apostles of the people and to founders of the nation. To a large extent it was just a dramatic reinterpretation of what the Bulgarian historiography had already 'pedestalised'. Even when the selection of individuals and events to be worshiped was made according to rather ideological motives, there was also behind it an omnipresent active 'nation building' conscience of the youngest Balkan historiography. Consequently, there is a huge space for more accurate evaluation of IMRO's goals, methods, motives and hopes. Was-it really a national movement or just a revolutionary patriotism with more energy than political vision? How did-it affect the population, except of increasing its sufferings by performing planned provocations that history later calls mass people's uprisings? Did-they contribute to the process of separate Macedonian identity, by promoting the credo of strict political (but not national) separatism from the *Great Bulgaria* project? At the same time, there is an opinion that '... One can have nationalist movements and ideologies in a given unit of population, without any real diffusion of national sentiment in that population. Nationalist ideologies and movements frequently start out as ideologies and movements of small minorities of intellectuals...'<sup>13</sup>. Nevertheless, this organization, when compared to similar armed movements inspired directly by the neighbouring governments, remained undoubtedly the most authentic one on the ground, consequently the most respected by the population. And yet, by making strategic and tactical mistakes it lost control over its domain and was cast out by far more serious players – the governments of the neighbouring countries took the matters in their own hands. Have-we really estimated the benefits and the

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<sup>12</sup> Duncan Perry, *The politics of terror. The Macedonian revolutionary movements, 1893-1903*, Duke University Press, 1988, p. 168.

<sup>13</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* ..., op. cit., p. 101.

harms coming out of the *Macedonian struggle*? What ultimate impact the chain of murderous atrocities in the name of national projects had upon Macedonia? And finally, how many crimes had to be diminished or overstressed depending on to which national historiography we belong?

In my opinion this dangerous genocidal ambient expired the capacity of the people for absorption of any more sacrifices. The peasantry, the backbone of Macedonia's population, got exhausted and indifferent to national rivalries. The Balkan wars and the First World War, with Macedonians being recruited in the armies on the both sides of the frontline only to see a final division of their country, ruined what was left of their faith in the neighbours. The violence only increased the conviction that the 'politics' (term used with the meaning *national identification*) is dangerous and futile. The only incontestable, and consequently the least harmful identification, the one with the disputed territory's name (against which no one seemed to have anything), conquered the domain of the political folklore. New mythology blossomed about the *Mournful Mother Macedonia*, victim of the *Greedy Neighbours*. Thus an old-new nationalism was entering the political scene, still too embryonic to be considered anything more than 'proto-nationalistic', but irreversible in direction. Thus, the local ethno-history (oral tradition and the ethnic members' understanding of their communal past) suffered dynamic ongoing changes within only several generations after the interest in possessing their own history appeared in the first place<sup>14</sup>.

As for the Revolutionary Organization –it degenerated beyond recognition. It played for some time an important role on the Bulgarian political scene after the First World War, and extremely negative one. Despite the cruelty and firmness displayed by the remaining leaders and members, it lost the most important feature from the old days– the moral authority upon the Macedonians. Our historiography still tries to judge it, with all kinds of ideological qualifications in the range from 'being socialist in its early days' to 'pro-fascist' in the '20s and '30s, then we have 'progressive left stream', 'pro-Bulgarian right'-one, finally also martyrs and traitors, revolutionaries and assassins, freedom

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<sup>14</sup> 'The fund of ethnic elements, the ethno-historical heritage handed down through the generations, is always being reinterpreted and revised by various social groups in response to internal differences and external stimuli' (*Ibid.*, p. 17).

fighters or Mafiosi, terrorists or idealists..., all of them separated from their 'antipodes' by built up gaps of historical 'substance'.

At this point of speaking about different ideas derived from this period of the *Macedonian question*, ending with the breaking up of the Ottoman's possessions in Europe in 1913, a small but significant digression deserves to be mentioned – during all this time under consideration, the Turks were actually the majority population of the geographic territory of Macedonia. I suppose our 'orthodox' historiographies inherited the general diplomatic and academic European belief, dating back from the earliest stages of the Eastern Question, about the abnormality of the Turkish presence in Europe. This is projected as a form of indifference for the interests and political aspirations of the common Turkish population and its elite in European Turkey. A similar type of ethno-religious outlook actually has been ignoring the substantial presence of the Moslem Albanians in the regions out of Albania proper (Macedonia included), attributing them the role of a mere remnant of the Ottoman infrastructure, with all the negative connotations that go with it. This arrogance is to build up a ground for further clashes of opposed national myths overlapping on the same political scene.

At the end, in the light of all above said, I would draw out a few conclusions of mine:

- It is clear that the Macedonian nation is a specific construct in South Eastern Europe;
- There is more than one Macedonian nationalism, although in my opinion the divergence between irredentist and autonomist claims makes also a substantial difference in the quality of the various Macedonian-originated nationalisms (Bulgarian, Greek, Slav-Macedonian);
- The autochthonous Macedonian identity is a clear case of self-definition by exclusion; the differences that would otherwise be insufficient to create a separate nationality, in the given circumstances got crystallized and (after 1944 in Federal Yugoslavia) institutionalised;
- The only really functional myth in this case is the name *Macedonia* itself - it surpassed all other loyalties and identifications, as well as scientific and pseudo-scientific arguments (common history, eco-

conomic prospects, geo-strategic calculations). Obviously quite irrational, this conception emanates absurd disputes on semantic and symbolic level. Nevertheless it has all the ‘stubborn’ but stable features of every other Balkan nationalism!

#### УПРАВЛЕНИЕТО НА МУРАВНОВ

Разтурено е XXV ОНС, отменени са повечето репресивни закони, забранени са пронемските организации, дадена е политическа амнистия, възстановени са политическите права на гражданите, партийният живот и конституцията. На 5 септември е сключен съюзът с Германия и започва изтеглянето на българските войски от Македония и Беломорието. България обявява война на Германия и започва бойни действия срещу нея.

#### ОФ-ПРАВИТЕЛСТВА

След 9 септември 1944 г. България се управлява от кабинети на ОФ, в които комунистите постепенно изтласкват своите съюзници от изпълнителната власт и я овладяват. В първия кабинет начело е К. Георгиев влизат по четири комунисти, земеделци-платенци и звенари и по двама социалдемократи и независими. През март 1946 г. има вече 5-ма комунисти, по 4-ма земеделци и звенари, 2-ма социалдемократи, 1 радикал и 1 независим. През ноември 1946 г. министър-председател става Г. Димитров, а в кабинета има 10 комунисти, 5-ма земеделци, по 2-ма звенари и социалдемократи и 1 независим. На 10 декември 1947 г., в правителството влизат 14 комунисти, 5-ма земеделци и по двама звенари и социалдемократи. След 1948 г. в ОФ-правителствата са допускани само земеделци, подкрепящи комунистите.



„Голямата екокурция“ – контролно-пропускателен пункт на българско-турската граница (лялото на 1989 г.)

#### ВЪТРЕШНА ПОЛИТИКА МАСОВА ЧИСТКА

След 9 септември 1944 г. новият политически режим сменя за месец 35% от офицерите, 90% от ръководството на просветата, 25% от съдийския състав, 100% от кметовете. Чистката е съпроводена с масови репресии. По инициатива на ръководството на БРП (к) започва саморазправа, която на глава от населението взима повече жертви от всяка друга в Източна Европа. Според неофициални прецени числото на жертвите е между 30 000 и 100 000. Повечето от ликвидирани са противници на прогерманската политика, но и потенциални политически съперници на ОФ.

Едва след началото на Народния съд репресията постепенно стихват без да са напълно прекратени.



#### ПОРТРЕТ



**Петър Стоянов** – р. на 25 май 1952 г. в Пловдив. Завършва право в Софийския университет през 1976 г. и работи като адвокат в родния си град. През 1990 г. става говорител на СДС в Пловдив, а през 1992 г. е заместник-министър на правосъдието в кабинета на Филип Димитров. От 1995 г. е заместник-председател на СДС и депутат в 37 ОНС (1994–1997). През 1996 г. е избран за президент на републиката като кандидат на ОДС и на 22 януари 1997 г. встъпва в длъжност. Първите му стъпки са свързани с преодоляване на опасността от гражданска война. Основен приоритет в политиката му е сближаването с НАТО и Европейския съюз.

#### ПОЗИЦИЯ

## **Ottoman Macedonia in Bulgarian History Textbooks for Secondary School**

ALEXEI KALIONSKI

**T**HIS TEXT IS AN ATTEMPT to sketch out very briefly one of the possible images of the historical and geographical region of Macedonia during the period of the Ottoman rule (end of the 14th c. – 1912)<sup>1</sup>. It is based upon the three Bulgarian textbooks for the 11th grade of the secondary schools.<sup>2</sup> The main idea is to present some of the most characteristic postulates and (a very few) details that somehow construct that image. This is by no means the main task nor the main tool of the “grand historical narrative” adapted for the needs of Bulgarian secondary education.

### **Historiographic situation**

During the last ten years of radical and general transformations, the model of competing but officially approved by the Ministry of Education history textbooks was accepted in Bulgarian public space. The changes in the political situation and in the social climate predetermine the current attempts for at least a partial rethinking of the national history. These attempts are still far from the doubts about the functions of history as a basic educational and instructive training subject but result in enlarging of the chronological and thematical range and the content of the “grand narrative”. The three history textbooks for the 11th grade are not an exception from this rule. Although in a different way, these

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<sup>1</sup> See also here pp. 124-128.

<sup>2</sup> I. Гюзелев, В., К. Косев, М. Лалков, Л. Огнянов, М. Радева. История за XI клас на средните общобразователни училища. Изд. “Просвета”, С., 1996; II. Фол, А., Й. Андреев, В. Мутафчиева, Р. Гаврилова, И. Илчев. История на България за XI клас на СОУ. Изд. “Анубис”, С., 1996; III. Делев, П., П. Ангелов, Г. Бакалов, Ц. Георгиева, П. Митев, Ст. Трифонов, И. Баева, Б. Василева, Е. Калинова. История на България за XI клас. Изд. “Отворено общество”, С., 1996.

texts are detailed enough to allow some of the less accurate students in the History Department of the Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" to use them as a factological frame during their sessions. We must also consider another important circumstance - that these texts are basic for the university entrance exams for a number of humanitarian courses in most of the Bulgarian high schools.

These national history textbooks include the period from the most ancient times until the present day (1995). They reflect the present situation of subsequent appearances of a number of themes that were considered taboo, were less studied and/or researched until the end of the 80-ies. Among the first group we may point out the minority and ethnical problems in the last two centuries, the contradictory development of Bulgaria after World War II. The second group includes, among the other themes, the everyday life, the traditional/modern culture, the religion, demography, geopolitics and the ethno-religious cohabitation between Christianity and Islam in the specific "contact zone" of the Balkans (especially during the Ottoman period).

This is achieved without radical change in the methodology and in the principles of the narration which remains more or less in the frames of the "classical" historicism<sup>3</sup> combined with an underlined drive for deideologisation. The textbooks are results of collective efforts. The co-authors are historians from different generations and with different, some time obvious ideological, methodological and (seldom) emotional affiliations. As a whole the texts strictly follow the tradition of the classical positivistic view on history (and national history). They are influenced by some Marxist (post Marxist) ideas and also by some models, methods and strategies of the French "Les Annales" school and disciplines like historical demography, ethnography and to a less extent cultural anthropology (or culturology, as it is named in Bulgaria). The

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<sup>3</sup> As a necessary illustration I shall give a characteristic example. The postulated and almost absolute ethnic, cultural and territorial continuity according to the prevailing evolutionistic scheme "Medieval Bulgarian people" - "Bulgarian people/lands under the Ottoman rule" - "Renaissance and Modern Bulgarian nation" is disrupted only once. In one of the textbooks (II) a separate unit is dedicated to the genesis, the nature, the models and the influence of Modern European nationalism. In this case the term somehow differentiates from its otherwise widely spread negative connotations and from the typical opposition "own" patriotism - "alien" (Balkan/neighbouring) nationalism.

latter can be applied mainly to the general vision of the Ottoman period.

### **Macedonia during the Ottoman period (end of 14th c. - 1912)**

For the purposes of the present discussion we can outline the following most important features of the generalised concept of Macedonia:

1. During the entire period up to the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 Macedonia altogether with Moesia and Thrace is depicted as an integral part of the Bulgarian ethnic, cultural and geographical space that was “inherited” from the previous epoch. All or almost all historical processes and tendencies on the way leading to the cultural and national emancipation of the Bulgarian people develop rather synchronic during the so-called Revival period. That can easily be applied to a number of different historical heroes – “new” saints, men of letters, educators, *hajduks*, merchants, intellectuals and revolutionaries that originate from Macedonia.
2. Up to 1878 it is not easy to reveal substantial specific features in order to put the Macedonian lands in a characteristic regional, social, linguistic/dialectical, ethnic/polyethnic or economic context.<sup>4</sup> The predominant part of the population of the area is completely encompassed into the ups and downs of the common Bulgarian development. The Turks, Greeks, to some extent the “Grekomans”<sup>5</sup> and the Torbeshi, almost not at all the Albanians and definitely not the Serbs are distinguished in that situation. The different subperiods: 15th-17th c., the “Protorevival” and the “Revival” are presented in the large national frames. This concerns mainly the last period (in the course of the 19th c.) with its economic, spiritual and social advance which determines the “ecclesiastical-national” and the revolutionary struggles. For the period of the 15th-17th c. there is a more or less

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<sup>4</sup> The only case of mentioning a Slav population in any connection with Macedonia after the Middle ages is in the context of the processes of Islamization of the Balkans as a whole (II, 245): “The descendants of the Islamized Slavs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Macedonia and Bulgaria do not identify themselves neither as Serbs, nor as Macedonians or Bulgarians, but even less as Turks”.

<sup>5</sup> The presentation of the role of the Constantinople Patriarchate, the Hellenism and the influence of the Greek culture up to the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate is by no means one-sided or negative.

complete Ottoman imperial and less complete Balkan background. Both the Ottoman and the Balkan contexts or themes are subordinated to the interior Bulgarian processes. The Bulgarian "Revival" is, on its own turn, integrated in the general European historical development although with a certain delay.

3. The establishment of the two Bulgarian states - the Principality and Eastern Roumelia marks a specific "late Revival" and also the "logical" continuation of the liberation struggles in the territories, torn apart by the Berlin treaty. Macedonia between 1878 and 1912 is depicted in the context of quite more complicated and detailed events and processes. The general picture can be extracted as following two main trends. On one hand, Macedonia becomes an object of the competing Balkan national causes, that mark the separate Macedonian question. It represents the main goal of the young Bulgarian state altogether with the problems of Thrace, Dobrudja and in the Morava region. On the other hand, the internal state and development of the region of Macedonia before the Balkan wars has its clearly comprehensible specifics: more or less multi-ethnic population (although the Bulgarians are presented as "absolute majority" unlike in Thrace and in Northern Dobrudja<sup>6</sup>); economic stagnation, and high internal tensions due to IMRO, the Supreme Macedonian Committee, the Bulgarian Exarchate, the insurrections and repressions, the "alien" Greek and Serb "propagandas" and the beginning of the emigration waves that threaten the "Bulgarian national spirit". Despite all these Macedonia once again is included in the general problem of "Bulgarian historical and ethnic lands" (III, 273).
4. The emergence of a separate or contemporary Macedonian identity is not a central or detailed theme. It is only mentioned in three later episodes. The first one is the Manifesto of May 1924 placed in the context of the "national disasters", the repressive policy of Yugoslavia, the degradation of IMRO and the scheme of the USSR and of the Comintern. The second episode is the gradual disappointment of the Macedonian population in the Bulgarian "mistakes" and administra-

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<sup>6</sup> In two of the textbooks (I, III) altogether with some documentary material the entire statistics of Vasil Kančov is cited. As it is well known it presents all Macedonian minorities and includes in the general number of the Bulgarians (52%) the "Grekomans" and the Torbeshi.

tion during World War II (III, 387-388). The third one is the measures for “enforced denationalization “ in the Pirin area (1944-48) in the context of “an even more complicated period in the development of the Macedonian question” after the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia and the project for federation with Bulgaria (III, 389, 434, 496).

Of course, one can easily find many other details or nuances that may enrich the general picture but it will be hardly changed at all. In this respect the systematic narrative of the national history for educational purposes strictly follows the established historiographical traditions. If new changes should occur, how and to what extent, this is probably one of the future Bulgarian public debates.

## The Macedonian: Romanticism against Realism

### According to a Recent Sociological Survey\*

TZVETAN TZVETANSKI

**W**HAT IS THE PLACE of the Balkan neighbour in the whole mechanism of acknowledgement and interpretation of the problem of 'the other' in general? How far is it a part of the present knowledge database about the world as a whole? The student refers in a specific way to every one of the Balkan neighbours; he classifies them in a hidden mode through the opposition how near or how far he thinks they are.

Turkey is definitely acknowledged as a negative historical identity by the majority of Bulgarian students interviewed (74%), who shared the opinion that Turkey is «the country that spread its power over the whole of the Balkan Peninsula during the 15<sup>th</sup> century». At the same time an act of exclusion exists in the statement itself, which was adopted with such a consensus: Turkey is the country, which has appeared to be excluded from the community of the Balkan countries (it spread its power over the whole of the Balkan Peninsula).

Romania and Serbia follow on in the classification, where once again, although not so strongly, the dominating image is that they are countries that have historical guilt towards Bulgaria. Romania has al-

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\* The data quoted in the text are part of a sociological study, made by the Balkan Colleges Foundation in the frame of a research project "The Image of the 'Other', Analysis of the high-school textbooks in History from the Balkan countries", carried out in 1997 and financed by the European Community under PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme. The survey was held among sixth grade students from the secondary schools in Bulgaria (12 settlements, 224 students, age 12-13), among high school students (thus included gymnasium students and vocational high school students - 16 settlements, 381 students, age 16-17) and first year university students from 10 Bulgarian universities (114 students). The survey was conducted with a questionnaire. The collected data represents the aggregate of students graduating the general stage in secondary schools, humanitarian and language gymnasiums, high schools and technical high schools.

ways «pretended that Dobrudja is its own part»; Serbia «robbed Bulgarian lands in time of wars.» The negative image of Romania has been deepened by the statement that the country is «economically an underdeveloped one.» The attitude towards Serbia is far less well defined in the sense that one in five students thinks that the country is «our natural Slavic orthodox partner,» a positive «note» in the common negative image, while one in four students prefers the indefinite answers (evidence for the rather unclear image of our Serbian neighbour).

The first two places in the so named «rating» have been won by Greece and Macedonia. We cannot conclude, however, that their images are fixed, uni-dimensional and not controversial. More explicit (together with the image of Turkey), but far less fixed, is the image of Greece. According to the students, this country is a symbol of the cultural and historical, as well as of the geopolitical temptation of Bulgaria. There is a common way for stating that the Greek wins the first place in the «rating of the concrete and practical relations», he is the biographical temptation for the Bulgarian students as well. For half of the students who were interviewed, Greece is identified either as the «birthplace of the European civilisation», or as «a country where people are living in the best welfare», attitudes that are without doubt positively loaded. The denial of the way to the Greek part of the Mediterranean Sea or the policy of assimilation only can sophisticate the image of Greece in the attitudes of the students. The above does not change the basic character of the relations – a historical example that has to be followed. Or, to put it in another way: the positive side of the relation does not mean in any way a positive historical identity; it is a case of political and pragmatic positive attitude.


The most sophisticated image is that of the Macedonian. Here we have at first glance the well-known component of negative identity: Macedonia is looked upon under the light of Bulgarian history. But in fact the realities are far more interesting, mainly because in the student's mind the image of the Macedonian is not distinguished from the image of the Bulgarian. To say it with different words, the students do acknowledge the geopolitical reality, that is called the Republic of Macedonia: answering the question what territories they think could be included into Bulgarian territory (Northern Dobrudja, the Aegean Thrace, Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, the Western border lands) relatively less answers are positive for Macedonia – 32%, against 41% for

Aegean Thrace, where the answers are given by high school students, and respectively 32% against 43%, where students have answered the questions. On the other hand, 45% among high school students and 51% among the students think that «the Macedonians are in fact Bulgarians».

The teenagers believe in heroic and romantic characters, who are depicted by the media and by school textbooks when they talk about Macedonia. At the same time, they acknowledge the contemporary geopolitical realities. That set of opinions does not relatively become so controversial, only as far as the Macedonian, thinking of himself as being not a Bulgarian and defending his own particular identity, is not present in the teenager's everyday life. This specific association is well illustrated by the animal metaphor for the Macedonian: the most common metaphors amongst students are the bear and the donkey. The Macedonian is symbolised by a bear when he is thought to be a Bulgarian, but he is symbolised by a donkey when he is thought not to be a Bulgarian. At this point, we are tempted to quote once again an image, which was not met so often, but that is emblematic for the experience of that kind: while the Bulgarian is a lion, the Macedonian is a «small baby lion». The supremacy of Bulgarians is also underlined by the metaphor «when the Macedonian has a shirt, the Bulgarian has also a suit».

The historical texture of the image of Macedonia is of an heroic and romantic character: when they hear the word «Macedonia» 12% of the high school students and 23% of the total number of students remember the Ilinden - Preobrajen Rebellion. But the pairing of romanticism with the acceptance of the contemporary geopolitical reality is most strongly felt in the attitude towards the figures, who are associated with Macedonia - for the eleventh grade high school students these are: Alexander the Great (18%), Kiro Gligorov (6%) and Gotze Deltchev (4%); for the university students: Alexander the Great (22%), Yanne Sandanski (13%) and Kiro Gligorov (13%). The fact that Macedonia is an independent state means that historical arguments as well as all the historical characters that legitimize this state are mentioned. But this happens in parallel with the images of Yanne Sandanski and Gotze Deltchev, which are indivisible from Bulgarian history (at least in the students' conscience, in textbook narratives and in the public knowledge of history).

The most interesting data for the indivisible image of Macedonia and Bulgaria are the essays written by the sixth grade students. By the end of their interview card they were asked to write a short essay, short story, or if they preferred, a movie script with six main characters: Turkey, Serbia, Romania, Macedonia, Greece and Bulgaria. In the majority of the essays, Bulgaria and Macedonia are typical fairy tale characters, i.e. they do not act, and are, so to say, an object of the acting. They are described as being smart, kind, beautiful, tender and so on (for example maids, who are liked, married, kidnapped etc.) One of the most interesting stories says: «Bulgaria and Macedonia liked each other. But Macedonia cheated Bulgaria».



*Αριστερά: Ο βασιλιάς της Βουλγαρίας Φερδινάνδος φωτογραφιζόμενος στα ερείπια της Ακρόπολης της Καβάλας. Δεξιά: ο βασιλιάς της Ελλάδας Κωνσταντίνος στον ίδιο χώρο, οκτώ μήνες αργότερα.*

*Σπ. Β. Μαρκεζίνης, Πολιτική Ιστορία της Νεότερας Ελλάδος, Η μεγάλη εξόρμησις, "Πάμπρος", Αθήνα 1966, τ. 3, σ. 278-279*

(πλην της Αλβανίας). Για τη διανομή όμως αυτών των εδαφών δε συμφωνούσαν οι σύμμαχοι βαλκανικές χώρες. Το σκηνικό άλλαξε γρήγορα, αλλά και περιπλέχτηκε. Έλληνες και Σέρβοι συνασπίστηκαν εναντίον των έως τότε συμμάχων τους, των Βουλγάρων, επειδή οι τελευταίοι πρόβαλλαν υπερβολικές εδαφικές αξιώσεις. Ζητούσαν, για παράδειγμα, να περιορίσει η Ελλάδα τις αξιώσεις μόνο στην Κρήτη και στα νησιά του Ανατολικού Αιγαίου και να εγκαταλείψει τη Θεσσαλονίκη. Ανάλογη στάση κράτησαν οι Βούλγαροι και απέναντι στους Σέρβους. Έχοντας μάλιστα εμπιστοσύνη στο στρατό τους, που από πολλές δεκαετίες τον οργάνωναν συστηματικά, και με τη βεβαιότητα ότι θα συνέτριβαν στο πεδίο της μάχης τους Έλληνες και τους Σέρβους, επιτέθηκαν εναντίον των θέσεών τους. Τα πράγματα όμως δεν ήρθαν όπως τα περίμεναν και ηττήθηκαν. Την ήττα της Βουλγαρίας εκμεταλλεύτηκαν οι Ρουμάνοι και οι Τούρκοι, που εισέβαλαν στα εδάφη της.

Θ. Κατσουλάκος - Αναστασία Κυρκίνη - Γ. Μπαφούνης - Γ. Σμπιλίρης,  
*Ιστορία του Νεότερου και Σύγχρονου Κόσμου από το 1453 μ.Χ. έως σήμερα,*  
 Τεχνικά Επαγγελματικά Εκπαιδευτήρια, Β' τάξη - 1<sup>ου</sup> κύκλου,  
 Athens, Ministry of Education, Pedagogical Institute, 2000, p. 89

## School Celebrations in Greek Macedonia

VLASSIS VLASSIDIS

EVERY YEAR on the 30th October, the Macedonian Struggle is commemorated and celebrated in all the schools in Greece. The last three hours on the timetable are usually set aside for this purpose. The Greek literature teachers organise the event, which consists of a talk (usually brief and based on a leaflet produced by the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle in Thessaloniki) and sometimes a display of photographs or a film which the Ministry of Education has made available to most of the schools in the country.

The talk, the photographs, and the film focus on the Greek victory in the Greek-Bulgarian struggle for supremacy in Macedonia early in the twentieth century. More specifically, they describe the Bulgarians' efforts to wean the Christian population of Macedonia away from the Oecumenical Patriarchate to the Bulgarian Exarchate; to found Bulgarian schools everywhere; and to terrorise the local people by sending the *komitadjis* into the Macedonian hinterland. The upshot of all this was that the Greeks were roused, rallied against the Bulgarians' machinations, and by 1908 had reversed what had been, for them, a most unfavourable situation.

It should be noted that, although mention is made of Bulgarian terrorism and of the atrocities committed by the *komitadjis*, neither the photographs nor the films actually show atrocities, in order to avoid cultivating a spirit of hostility or intolerance. Indeed, it is frequently pointed out that the Greek forces resorted to the same methods in their determination to prevail in that unique rivalry. There is no suggestion of any modern expansionist policy, nor any notion that Greece could initially have expanded its influence and subsequently occupied territory further to the north. Naturally, there is no reference to the rivalries within Bulgaria, apart from the information that there were two Bulgarian *komitata*, nor to the existence of any Christian population group in the region other than the Greeks and the Bulgarians.

It must be said that there is markedly less enthusiasm for the preparation and conduct of the Macedonian Struggle Day celebrations in those parts of Greece that are not close to Macedonia. And since a number of teaching hours are usually lost at the start of the school year because the government has not managed to fill vacant teaching posts in time, school directors are often reluctant to set aside three hours for yet another celebration.

They are, however, considerably more willing to allow the children to visit museums that commemorate the Macedonian Struggle. There are two Museums of the Macedonian Struggle in Greece at present, one in Thessaloniki and the other in the village of Hromio, Kozani prefecture; and a third will soon be opening in Kastoria. Neither of the museums is run by the state, they belong to associations whose aim is to preserve historical memory and pass it on to future generations.

The Museum of the Macedonian Struggle in Thessaloniki was founded in 1981. It occupies a Neoclassical building that housed the Consulate General of Greece from 1893 to 1912. It is a private museum, run by an association named The Friends of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle.

The most important exhibits are the weapons, the uniforms, and the personalia of the leaders of the Macedonian Struggle (1904-8), a large number of other uniforms, and a collection of 1,350 contemporary photographs. All this is accompanied by explanatory maps, books, newspapers, and paintings of the Macedonian landscape in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

On the ground floor there are full-scale dioramas of scenes from the time of the Struggle, including an early twentieth-century school, the Patriarchists' efforts to save their churches from the assaults of the Exarchists, the activities of Greek troops on Yannitsa Lake, and a spy arriving in Florina. An audio-visual system on the first floor shows films of the history of Macedonia.

The museum offers pre-booked guided tours and educational games for the public, and also has a lending library of photographs and video films. There is also a research centre on the premises, which has a rich archive of microphotographic material from the period 1870-1912 and databases relating to the local history of Macedonia.

In 1998 the museum was visited by 22,636 schoolchildren and in 1999, by 17,424 respectively coming from Macedonia, Thrace, Thes-

saly and other regions of Greece. Both the museum's reputation and its distinctive identity make it a very popular place to visit, and organised visits have to be booked about a month in advance.

The other Museum of the Macedonian Struggle is in Hromio, a village 37km from Kozani. This was the seat of the first rebellion in Western Macedonia against Ottoman rule and the Bulgarian Exarchate. The Literature and Arts Association of Kozani Prefecture decided to honour this first uprising and the Macedonian freedom fighters in 1989 by setting up an open-air museum on the precise spot where the revolt was declared. The aim of the museum is to present the unbroken history of the Macedonian Greeks from the ancient period to 1912.

Visitors may walk around the site admiring the busts of twenty-one Macedonian freedom fighters, the museum of the fallen heroes, a monument composed of busts of Philip II, Aristotle, and Alexander the Great, bridges, springs, and the restored Church of St Nicholas, where the priest blessed the Greek fighters' weapons in 1878. Inside the museum building, there is a display of photographs, engravings, and mementoes of those who fought for Macedonian independence.

The fact that the museum is a long way away from the nearest town and much of it is in the open air means that the number of visitors is limited.

Schoolchildren and their teachers spend relatively little time studying the local history of Macedonia. In 1996, a plan to include local history in the curriculum was introduced on an experimental basis, starting in schools on Crete and in Thessaloniki prefecture in Macedonia. It made no progress, however, for various reasons: the Minister for Education was replaced in a cabinet reshuffle; the history adviser in Thessaloniki, who had had the original idea and was responsible for promoting the plan, retired; the teachers were not particularly keen to spend time on a new subject which took up only one teaching hour a day on the timetable; and there were no textbooks, so the teachers would have had to prepare all the material themselves, with uncertain results.

In 1997, however, the Environmental Education Programme was introduced into secondary education in Greece, a programme covering a much wider range of subject matter than its title suggests. More specifically, in each school there is a group of children who, together with one or two teachers, work on a project, which may relate to the modern

way of life (recycling, for instance, or environmental pollution) or explore and present the distinctive characteristics of their locality. At the end of the school year, the Environmental Education groups have to present an account of their work. These programmes are subsidised by European Union funding, which means that the children can go on trips, take photographs, and even publish their finished project. So quite a few schools have started to take an interest in local history.

## The Macedonian Question in Greek History Textbooks

DESPINA KARAKATSANI

THE ANALYSIS of the ‘Macedonian Question’ through the Greek history textbooks reveals the absence of some very important elements concerning this issue and a rather neutral description of the ‘others’. Three history textbooks are dealing with the ancient history of Macedonia, two textbooks with the Byzantine and four with the modern history of Macedonia.

The only Greek history textbook, which refers to the ‘Macedonian question’ is the one used as an optional subject in the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade of the Lyceum (16-17 years old)<sup>1</sup>. The ‘Macedonian Question’ in this textbook is analysed among other significant subjects of the Greek History as the relations between Greeks and Albanians, Greeks and Turks, the Cyprus Question, the relation between Greece and the European Union and the Greek Diaspora. The ‘Macedonian question’ is linked to the Eastern Question during the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> century and more precisely to the national integration of Balkan peoples, the claiming of some regions, the ethnological changes inside the Ottoman empire and the claims of the Great Powers.

In the above-mentioned history textbook the ‘Macedonian question’ is analysed in connection with four issues:

1. The effort of Greeks - from 1830 until the Balkan Wars- to liberate Macedonia.
2. The conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians over the Macedonian territory and the interests related to it.
3. The endeavours of Bulgarians to change the results of the Balkan

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<sup>1</sup> A.M. Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, E. Kofos, «Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα» (The Macedonian Question), in *Θέματα Ιστορίας* (Historical Issues), 2<sup>nd</sup> Grade of Lyceum, O.E.Δ.B, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Athens 1999, pp. 11-72.

Wars and of the First World War and the involvement of the Yugoslav policy in order to keep the Macedonian region under control.

The 'Macedonian Question' is analysed through four separate periods. In the first period (1821-1912: 'The way to the Liberation') the contribution of the Macedonians to the Greek War of Independence is underlined<sup>2</sup>. After 1878 mostly the Bulgarians and the Ottoman Turks –and less the Serbs– are presented as the 'others' for Greeks and the inhabitants of Greek Macedonia. The Great Powers are also presented as the 'others' but their entanglement is justified in the textbook. In the second period (1870-1913: 'The rivalry between Greeks and Bulgarians for the succession of the Ottomans in Macedonia') the conflict between Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs about national interests in the Macedonian region is stressed<sup>3</sup>. The third part about the Bulgarian policy concerning the revision of the Treaties reveals again the Bulgarians as the 'others', whose claim was the 'Great Bulgaria'<sup>4</sup>. However a specific mention is made about the new period of reconciliation, friendship and co-operation between the two countries<sup>5</sup>. In the last text about the Yugoslav policy concerning the Macedonian nation and the unified Macedonia, the Yugoslavs are presented as the others<sup>6</sup>.

In this history textbook there is a map, which shows the limits of the ancient Greek Macedonia (at the end of the reign of Alexander the 1<sup>st</sup> and after Philip's death) and one which presents Macedonia during the Roman domination. There are also other maps: one which shows the Balkans after the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin (1878), one which presents the Balkans before the Balkan Wars (1912-3) and one which gives the geographical limits of Macedonia after the treaty of Bucharest (1913). There is also a map, which shows the Bulgarian occupation in Macedonia, Thrace and Yugoslavia during 1941-1944.

Generally we can underline the fact that Macedonia is presented as a geographical unity but there is no reference to the boundaries nor

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<sup>2</sup> E. Kofos, «Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα κατά τους δύο τελευταίους αιώνες» (The Macedonian Question during the last two centuries), in *Θέματα Ιστορίας*, op.cit., pp. 41-44.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44-50.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 51-53.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 52-53.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 54-63.

to the ethnological substance of the current state of Macedonia<sup>7</sup>. The multinational character of this region is underlined only until the foundation of the Greek State in 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>8</sup>. The Slav Macedonians are absent in the content of this specific textbook and a confusion can be stressed concerning the name and the origins of the population of Macedonia. In most of the cases this population is considered to be a part of a certain entity with the Bulgarians. Macedonia is presented as part of the Greek history but there is no expression of irredentism.

This specific history textbook which deals with the Macedonian question was written at a time period when important political facts had occurred such as the collapse of the communist regimes and the war in Yugoslavia. The strong feelings of insecurity and uncertainty for the future, which possessed the population of the north part of Greece, had a rather strong impact on the way this subject was presented in this textbook. We must also underscore the very slight impact of this textbook generally because according to the data of the National Pedagogical Institute this specific optional history course is not chosen by the pupils.

It is a fact that the content of history textbooks very often changes as a result of political circumstances because educational policy follows in most of the cases the foreign policy of the State as well as the public opinion. So the way in which the most controversial subjects are presented in the textbooks mostly reflect the current political and social problems and the different controversies. The national identity is a question of self-definition and determination and the national past is very often invented and constructed, but this should not affect the relations between the neighbouring countries.

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<sup>7</sup> The Nation-State of Macedonia appears only in one textbook of Geography under the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

<sup>8</sup> The multinational character of Macedonia after the end of the Balkan Wars is however underlined in the history textbook of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Grade of Lyceum. It is written: «[...] A new problem appears (at the end of the Balkan Wars) the one which concerns the assimilation of the New Countries. Old Greece had an absolute national homogeneity. The New Countries (Crete, Epirus, Macedonia) were inhabited also from other nationalities (Turks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Jews), who had a lot of reservations towards the Greek State» in V. Skoulatos, N. Dimakopoulos, S. Kondis, *Ιστορία νεότερη και σύγχρονη*, (Modern and contemporary history), 3<sup>rd</sup> Grade of Lyceum, Ο.Ε.Δ.Β, Athens 2000, p. 49.



## The Macedonian Question in Serbian Textbooks

BOJAN DIMITRIJEVIC

**M**ACEDONIAN question is not separately presented in Serbian history textbooks. Although it is not openly stated, part of that land is considered to be «Serbian historical land» because it belonged to the Serbian medieval state before the Ottoman rule. That is why only Bulgarian aspiration on that land in 19th and 20th century were considered as aggressive. In the textbook for eight grade of elementary school it says explicitly «Bulgaria had conquering plans towards Macedonia. (...) Greece and Serbia confronted Bulgarian influence in Macedonia». This paragraph gives the impression that Greece and Serbia protected Macedonia from Bulgarian aggressive ambitions. Greek and Serbian propaganda and war aims in Macedonia are not mentioned. Balkan wars, specially the First one, is considered to be a liberation war because Vardar Macedonia which became a part of Serbian state was, as it says, «the first part of Serbian lands that came under the Turkish rule».

The role of the 'other' in Macedonian history changed. In the period 14<sup>th</sup> - 19<sup>th</sup> century the 'others' were Ottoman Turks. Albanians are also mentioned, in the context of their national movement in 19th century. As it is already said the Bulgarians are considered as the 'other' at the end of 19th century and in all the wars of 20th century (Balkan wars, First World War, Second World War). Unlike 'our' side the 'other' always had pretensions on Macedonian lands and therefore threatened 'our' interest, which was historically legitimate. The role of 'our' side is shown as positive, liberative and helpful. Although it is not explicitly said, Macedonians are treated as a particular nation and in their relation towards Serbs they were treated in textbooks as the 'other' in two cases: separatism movement in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in 1992 during the emergence of the Macedonian independent state, together with Croats and Slovenes.



## B. RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES

**МАКЕДОНИЈА ВО РАНИОТ  
СРЕДЕН ВЕК**



Skopje 2001, p. 45.

## Religious Education and the View of the Others in Southeast Europe\*

MIRELA-LUMINIȚA MURGESCU

THE CONFSSIONAL IDENTITY acted and still acts as one of the major pattern of cultural, social and/or political identification. The religious identity, primary and organic, offered during time models of behavior and systems of values, contributing thus significantly to the process of socialization. The strong and long-term prevalence of the confessional identity over other forms of solidarity is well known. Under the Ottoman dominion the population was classified according to confessional criteria; besides the Muslim, there existed thus a *millet* of the Orthodox, one of the Armenians and one of the Jews. Also, during the 17th century, when Catholic Bulgarian humanists struggled to overthrow the Ottoman 'yoke' and insisted on the historical tradition and on the Bulgarian ethnicity in order to overshadow the confessional criterion, which separated the Catholic enclaves from the Orthodox majority, the Orthodox mass continued to think in confessional terms and rejected any cooperation. The construction of national identities set up a complex relationship between the confessional identities and the new established ones. For more than two centuries the two types of solidarity built up a multifaceted liaison. But even recently, the Bosnian war of the 1990s proved strikingly the power and persistence of the confessional identity.

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\* This text is written as a report of the 7<sup>th</sup> Workshop (Thessaloniki, 11-12 March 2001) where scholars from Albania (Georgios Papadopoulos), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vera Katz), Bulgaria (Alexei Kalionski, Vasko Arnaudov, Valery Kolev), Croatia (Snjezana Koren, Ivo Goldstein), FYROM (Emilija Simoska, Nikola Jordanovski), Greece (Dimitrios Passakos, Triantafyllos Petridis), Romania (Mirela-Luminița Murgescu, Ecaterina Lung, Alexandru Stan), Slovenia (Bozo Repe), Turkey (Recep Kaymakcan), Yugoslavia (Dubravka Stojanovic, Srdjan Rajkovic, Milan Vukomanovic) together with Costa Carras, Christina Koulouri, Hanna Kassis, Etienne Copeaux, Smail Balic presented papers focused especially on particular cases related to the topic.

Taking into account the importance of the confessional solidarity, the 7<sup>th</sup> workshop organized by the Center of Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe focused on the problems of religious education and the view of the other in Southeast Europe. The organizers had from the beginning foreseen the considerable number of sensitive and difficult questions related to the relation between confession and identity, with special regard on the fiddly connection with the national identity.

In this respect, the aim of the workshop was to investigate:

1. The situation of religious education at school and outside school in Southeast Europe.
2. How religion is presented and how is the role of religious factor (and of the Churches) evaluated in history textbooks
3. The relationship between religious differences and interethnic conflicts, and how to teach tolerance between different religious communities.

The first part of the debate was devoted to the «Religion in history» and the second to «Religion in education». In this respect, the papers presented in the first section and the following discussions focused on the way the history textbooks cope with religious problems. From the beginning it was clear that textbooks analysis is only a first step, but has to be completed with a strong and clear educational concept regarding the use of the religious information in history teaching. The questions raised frequently were: «Why and how to introduce information about religion in history teaching?» and «How to maintain a right balance between the use and abuse of information?» We have to take into account that after the fall of the communist regime religion and the history of religions, previously almost taboo, became a fashionable subject in many countries. Many information, facts, and data entered in the textbooks without a previous reflection on the matter, and we can ask if the teachers are prepared to deal with them.

The purpose for introducing information about religion in history textbooks was also questioned. Usually the motivation is not explicitly exposed or explained; yet, we can take into consideration several motives, from the intention to shape group identities to the restitution of a significant part of human civilization. Crucial is the relation between the use of religious information to create or to reinforce an identity and the shaping of a cultural behavior. As Christina Koulouri pointed out, the religious identity is an exclusive one; usually it is unconceivable to

be half related to a confession and half to another. In a multi-religious space as South-Eastern Europe the relation between confessional and national identity gathered more and more importance in the way of defining or redefining the Self and the Other. In this respect, the style the information is presented in textbooks became more and more important. The presentations and the discussions emphasized the prevalence of information regarding religion and the history of religions for ancient and medieval times and a decrease of interest for the modern and contemporary period. It is significant that the trend of secularization is practically avoided in most South-East European school systems. At the same time the relation between the national identity and the religious one is central in many textbooks. History textbooks became thus one of the main tools of teaching and learning excluding others. Christianity, Orthodoxy or Islam became elements of national identification surmounting their initially confessional character.

The second aspect discussed during the workshop was the specific problem of religious education. The different situations existing in the South-Eastern area (compulsory religious education in Greece and Turkey, optional in Bulgaria and Romania, no religious education in Albania, Serbia and FYR Macedonia, a complex situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina) made the discussions more complex and sensitive. Taking into account the variety of situations existing in the Balkan countries, the participants have tried not only to underline the specific problems of religious education in each country, but also to point on the general aspects and questions raised by the teaching of religion. A hard issue discussed was the interest of the secular state in sustaining religious education, taking into account that during the last years many South-East European countries faced a bunch of controversial problems related to the introduction of religious education in school.

Another question frequently raised was why and how to teach the religious education? Is it supposed to inflict only general moral attitudes and to familiarize with the history of religions, or is it supposed to construct a strict religious identity and to prepare the child to become member of one specific confessional community? During the workshop the status of religious education in schools was also vividly discussed: should it be facultative/optional or compulsory? .

The papers and discussions disclosed the tendency of reducing the teaching of religion to very specific catechism hours. The case of Bosnia-

Herzegovina shows very expressively how religious education can build up mental borders and spiritual delimitations.

### **Conclusions and suggestions**

Taking into account the very different situations encountered in each South-East European country, it was difficult to suggest identical solutions for all countries. Yet, some general statements should be taken into consideration:

1. A first proposal was to reconsider the aims of using religious information in history textbook. It was recommended to choose information able to teach tolerance and reconciliation. Taking into account that usually the information included in history textbooks deals more with political and institutional aspects, and not with the way they have influenced everyday life, it is important to introduce in textbooks the social and cultural aspects of religious life.
2. Teaching religion and the information about the history of religions should help to educate multi-perspectivity. In the curriculum for history there can and should be integrated topics about the confessional minorities.
3. The problem of the curricula for religious education. Setting the curricula for religious education is a difficult issue throughout the region. Societies have to challenge different opinions about the contents of religious education, and the concept of a very strict confessional delimitation often prevailed. Nevertheless, each society should question as straight as possible the model envisaged by religious education. The proposal developed during the discussions foresees a curriculum based on the general moral values contained by every religious system, merged with elements of history of religions. The accent must be placed on the spirit of tolerance, understanding of the Otherness, forgiving and reconciling in order to prevent the construction of stereotypes and prejudices.
4. During the workshop there was raised the problem of training the teachers for religious education. The teachers –either they teach religion, history or literature– should be more and more aware on the sensitive potential of the information they deal with.
5. The relation between Europeanness and Christianity was also vividly discussed. It is well known that Western textbooks agree con-

sidering Christianity one of the main characteristics of European-ness. The same trend could be found in recent textbooks from South-Eastern Europe. Yet, when Islam becomes more and more present in Europe, how suitable is it on long term to link European-ness with Christianity? The question is even more sensitive in South-Eastern Europe where confessional diversity might put into a new light the concept of European-ness.

The participants stressed the idea that religious education should outrun the level of simple catechism and offer a comparative approach to religion. This comparative approach could become an efficient tool of putting students only together at the same religious class, and contribute thus to build the sense of community.

It is also important to prevent the exploitation of religion for political or national goals. The case of former Yugoslavia, where many years there was no official religious education and in the last years there has been experienced one of the most outrageous uses of religion in generating division and war, was often brought into discussion. The participants agreed that avoiding religious issues from institutional education does not diminish the risks of misusing religion. The correct solution is to develop the potential of religion to create and inflict tolerance and sensitivity towards the Other.

The two days of debates evidenced the complex and delicate questions raised by religious education in South Eastern Europe and the need of finding the proper way in transforming the confessional identity in a tool for understanding and cooperation. Religion should be transformed from an element able to divide and exclude into a tool to teach young people to live together in a common world.

## Religious Identities in Turkish Textbooks

ÉTIENNE COPEAUX

**I**N AN EDUCATION SYSTEM, there are several frames within which a religion can be taught. In certain schools, or in certain countries, the religion of the majority is taught as a catechism; the teacher is religious, or almost a believer, who does not conceal his own faith, and teaches in order to increase the religious feelings of his pupils. There is no distance between the addresser (the teacher), the addressee (the pupils), and the addressed discourse (the lesson), three elements encapsulated in a consensual whole.

But a religion is also an historical set of facts, and as such has to be taught in the frame of history courses by history teachers. If a religion is a set of subjective, emotional and very personal components, its dogma, then the social and political developments are objective; in sum, even belief itself is an objective fact when considered as public behaviour shared by a social group. As a result, religion is an important matter in education, and can be considered as a course to be taught either in an apologetic spirit, as one all-encompassing belief system, or as a social and historical phenomenon, interesting and important enough to lead to an understanding of history and mankind. But the mentality, the views and the objectives of the teachers are of course very different in both cases.

I will consider first how religion as such is taught in the frame of religious courses in Turkey, and then what is the place of religions in the historical discourse. In any case I will try to analyse how religion is used as a component of national identity, and how religious otherness is presented.

### **Building identity in religion textbooks**

Since Turkey, theoretically, is a secular state, religion was taught only in primary schools until 1980, and the course was optional. Religious

history was also taught in schools for imams and preachers, «İmamehatip liseleri.»<sup>1</sup> The textbooks of religious education were published by the state.<sup>2</sup>

In September 1980, a military coup occurred, and in order to block the road to so-called communist influence, a compulsory religion course was created in December 1981. According to the secular character of the state, in 1982 the course of religion was called «Religious culture and ethics.»<sup>3</sup> Until now (2001), the course remains compulsory in the last years of primary school and in every grade of secondary school generally for two hours a week.

The Ottoman Empire was a multicultural and multi-religious state, but the republic of Turkey de facto turned into a Muslim country following a process which lasted almost a century (1896-1963 or even until 1974 if we take into account the Cyprus issue). If state ideology is secularist, the education system always and openly addresses a Muslim population, and as I will show later, pupils are always invited to identify themselves with Islam. Despite secularism, the definition of Turkish identity is linked to the Muslim religion; this may be a reminiscence of the early definition of the word «millet,» which had the sense of religious community before being used for «nation» in the 20th century.

What is surprising in the official directives is that they firmly assert secular principles but do consider Islam as the religion of all readers. Linguistic signs show that every pupil is supposed not only to have been educated in a Muslim way, but to believe in Muslim faith. There is no place for disbelief, agnosticism or mere doubt. Finally, the whole is connected with the love of Atatürk and of the nation. As a result, the conditions for being a good Turkish patriot are not only to love Atatürk and the nation, but to believe in God, and especially to be Muslim.

If we examine the main principles of these religion courses as presented by official instructions, the first of them, paradoxically, is the defence of an intangible and inviolable secularism. But these references to secularism seem to be only a façade. The first ambiguity lies in the ambivalent sense of some terms related at present to nation, which for-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Aydın Mehmet, Cilacı Osman, *Dinler Tarihi*, Konya, Arı Basımevi, 1980.

<sup>2</sup> [An.] *Din Dersleri. İkokul Kitapları*, İstanbul, Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1978 (at least 30 editions).

<sup>3</sup> *Din Kültürü ve Ahlâk Bilgisi*; cf. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı, *Temel Eğitim Programı*, İstanbul, Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1982, pp. 93 sq.

merly had a religious meaning like millet (signifying both nation and religious community), şehit (martyrs, fallen for Islam and for the nation), and gazi (victorious soldiers in a religious and national sense). In order to recall that we are in what is supposed to be a secular country, it is necessary to refer constantly to Atatürk during this religion course.

The secular character of the instructions dies out in the second part of their presentation. In fact, the text is based upon some presuppositions showing that it addresses only Muslim pupils: such as the presupposition of the existence of God, the presupposition of the importance of faith in individual lives; the presupposition of Mohammed's and of the Koran's holiness are suggested by the use of some appreciative modalities as the qualifier of «Hazreti» (which, before a name, is used as the title of an exalted personage) preceding the name of Mohammed, the use of the expression «Kur'an-i Kerim» («the Holy Koran»), and, above all, the use of possessive forms.

### Identification to Islam

As I underlined in some other studies, the use of possessive pronouns and adjectives, as 'we' and 'our', in an educational discourse is a strong mark of identity. By using 'we' or 'our', the addresser asserts that he, together with the addressee, belong to a same community; the subject and referents of the discourse shape the community's character. In a discourse on religion, the use of any possessive form is exclusive: a non-believer, a secularist, or a believer of another faith feels ousted from the community created by such linguistic modalities, which might not be used in a secular discourse. For example, the official program in religious education, during the eighties, refers to «*our* duties towards God», or to «*our* Prophet»; «*our* book the Holy Koran»; «what faith –or what prayer– brings *us*». This kind of utterance excludes every non-Muslim, who would not consider the Koran as *his* holy book, who would not consider Mohammed as *his* prophet; it excludes every non-believer who does not pray, who does not believe in God.

As a whole, the principles adopted in 1982 were renewed in the nineties<sup>4</sup> and the religious character of the text has been slightly smoothed: the occurrences of possessive forms are less numerous; for

<sup>4</sup> Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı. İlköğretim Genel Müdürlüğü, *Ortaokul Programı*, Ankara, Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1995, pp. 341-358.

example, it is no longer told of *our* prophet, though the expressions «Hazreti Muhammed» (the Noble Mohammed) and «Kur'ân-i Kerîm» (the Holy Koran) are still used. However, possessive forms are still used to describe the duties of the pupils towards God, the prophet and the Koran, inferring that everybody is a believer.

Obviously, non-believing young pupils are probably very rare in Turkish schools, but I think that a true secular discourse might inform children about the mere existence of non-believers, and above all about the possibility of living according to ethic principles without believing in God. The most fallacious idea in fact is to infer that the one and only way to behave well in one's life lies in the frame of a religious faith, especially in the frame of Islam: though not explicitly, the discourse infers that a non-believer cannot be moral or good.

#### **Identification to the Nation**

In any case, religion is never the only subject of religion textbooks used in Turkey. The directives include always some chapters dealing with patriotism and/or with Atatürk's life, Atatürk's thoughts about religion, etc. In the books for secondary schools, there is a chapter related to «the duties towards the state» (national service, fiscal and electoral duties). Another chapter, more historical, is devoted to the role of the Turks in Islam's history, and a third one to «the love of the nation and motherland», where the sacred characters of some elements are explicitly stated: Atatürk, the nation, the martyrs, the flag and the anthem, the army... So the nation and its symbols are sacralized by the presence of these chapters in «religion textbooks», but conversely, religion is placed under the control of the nation, since, like in every textbook in Turkey, Atatürk, the flag, the anthem, Atatürk's speech addressed to Turkish youth, and the map of Turkey, open and close the book itself.

In Turkey, religion is controlled by the state, but Turkish identity and Muslim identity are linked to each other to form a Turkish-Muslim identity: «Can a non-Muslim be a true Turk?» The supporters of a nationalist ideology, now prevalent in Turkey, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, answer «No». After having analysed the state discourse, the concept of «national culture», and the contents of the textbooks, I found that this doctrine is now taken as official.

### **Christianity in religion textbooks**

The presentation of Christian otherness in religious education textbooks is a difficult subject. Even for a child brought up in a Christian family, some elements of the dogma are difficult to understand, like the Trinity, the Eucharist or original sin. But for a believer, understanding is not requested: to believe is enough; family and social context helps and urges the child to admit as true what he even cannot understand. But if you try to explain Christian dogmas to young Muslims, as it occurs often in France, you come up against doubt and often irony, even if everybody lives in a Christian background.

So I can easily imagine the difficulties to teach Christian beliefs in a Muslim country, because the necessary background is missing, and Muslim theology is much simpler than Christian. It is very difficult to make a Muslim pupil admit, for example, that Christianity is not a polytheistic religion, or to explain the Eucharist. Quite evidently, there is a theological obstacle for a Muslim to understand Christianity, an obstacle which lies in the Koran itself. The presence of Jesus and Mary in numerous verses is often considered as making easier mutual understanding between Muslims and Christians, but in fact it is not so easy. In the presentation of Jesus in the Koran, some central elements of Christian theology are lacking: above all, according to the Koran, Jesus is only a man and not the son of God; most importantly, Jesus' death on the cross, and his resurrection are not admitted by the Koran. A Muslim believer holds what the Koran says as the sacred word of God; thus he cannot accept as true the representations of Jesus according to the Gospels themselves. A Christian in turn cannot accept the Koranic representation of Jesus. So, both representations are unacceptable for «the other side».

A second problem lies in the presentation of Christianity in numerous textbooks of religious education. Compared to the Koran, which is considered to be the word of God transmitted through an angel, the Gospels seem very doubtful as 1) four versions exist; 2) many more versions existed before the Council of Nicaea; 3) the Gospels are not the word of God, but testimonies written by human beings, according oral sources, and often very late after Jesus' death.

As a result, there are two main representations of Christianity in religion textbooks in Turkey. The book published by the Ministry of Education is an example of the first type; its presentation is not polemic-

cal;<sup>5</sup> the authors insist on common elements of both faiths and very strikingly say «we» when speaking of these common beliefs. They insist on the universality of the values as taught by Jesus, and they point out the importance of the Passion and Resurrection for the Christian dogma. The open-mindedness shown in this lesson is surprising if one compares with the historical discourse, largely influenced by the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, as we will see later. This point of view is not exactly secular, but it is pluralist, as it does not present Christianity as a false religion opposed to the true faith, Islam.

The second type of lessons dealing with Christianity presents only the Koranic point of view.<sup>6</sup> In that case, the lesson is enamelled with quotations of the Koran; Jesus' life, the Gospels are presented in a way which cannot be accepted by Christian believers. The authors use the pronoun «we» to refer to the Muslims only, in such a way that the lessons address only Muslim believers. I must concede that the dogma is sometimes well exposed, and the lessons often insist on Christian moral values. Both types are admitted by the state control institutions, as they formally do not disparage either the Muslim or Christian pupil.

It is important to know that in Turkey three –and only three– religious minorities, protected by the treaty of Lausanne (1923), have the right to be taught in their own community schools: Orthodox, Gregorian Armenians and Jews. In principle, the Turkish religion textbooks are not to be used in these schools, which have their own teachers, books and programmes, using their own languages in the case of Armenians and Greek Orthodox. Such a double educational system, one for Muslim (i.e. «Turkish») pupils and the other for non-Muslims, seems to be respectful of other religious opinions. But one might regret that this system contributes to hinder the formation of a true Turkish citizenship regardless of religion, which is probably not wished by «minority» communities as well. I must underline here that in Turkey members of non-Muslim communities, though Turkish citizens, do not consider themselves as «Turks»: the confusion between religion and nation is widespread and deep-rooted.

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<sup>5</sup> Ayas Rami, Tümer Günay, *Liseler için Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*, vol. 1, Ankara, Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1996, pp. 39-45.

<sup>6</sup> Çelebi İlyas et al., *Liseler için Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*, vol. 1, İstanbul, Salan Yayınları, 1995, pp. 38-46.

### **Religions in history textbooks**

Presenting miracles in a secular mode is an interesting challenge for a history teacher. In history courses, a religious fact, a belief, a miracle are presented neither with appreciative modalities, identification of the addresser to the subject, linguistic signs showing that the addresser is a believer, nor with signs of rejection, irony, depreciative modalities, etc. But even when the faith of the majority, if not of the whole population, is presented in a history or even in a religious education textbook, the same precautions have to be carefully taken. The only way is to express a distance, and the means are rather numerous and easy to use. When presenting a faith, or miracles, like the resurrection of Jesus or the revelation of the Koran by an angel, the author and the teacher have to express their distance with precautions like: «The Christians (the Muslims) believe that...», «According to the Gospels (the Koran)», «According to Christian (Muslim) faith (or tradition, or texts)». There are more subtle ways like some verbal modes (the past in -miş in Turkish, the use of conditional mode in French, subjunctive in German, the use of turns like «according to», «reportedly», «it is said that», etc. Neutral, «colourless» words like «to say» have to be preferred to words like «to assert», «to claim», «to pretend». The teacher has to make clear in the pupils' minds that what is important in history is not to state if a miracle actually happened, but to explain a social, historical and objective fact: some social groups believe in the miracle.

### **How to identify with a religion:**

#### **Islam in history textbooks**

Let us consider now Islam's history as presented by Turkish textbooks. In a Muslim but non-Arabic country, history of Islam is a complex question because it involves both history of the self (Islam as a part of identity) and history of the otherness (Islam's history is a part of Arabs' history). On the one hand, a part of this history, the Koranic revelation, is sacred and has become set for centuries. On the other hand, in the case of Turkish narrative, the Arabs are the only people seen as treacherous, because of their support to the Allies in 1916. So the narrative has to zigzag along two poles, Muslim identity and Arab otherness. The way to preserve the difference between identity and otherness, to identify with Islam without identifying with Arab history is through linguistic distinctions. I cannot

go into details here, but the result is that Turkish pupils are clearly urged to identify themselves with Islam.

I have analysed this discourse in the textbooks published since 1931, and I would focus on an interesting evolution. In the first textbooks proceeding from the radical secularism of Atatürk (1931), every sign of distance as described before is used by the authors: every miraculous fact is introduced with clauses, such as «The Koran says», «According to the Muslim tradition»; in that spirit I would refer to the following sentence as a model of secular discourse:

In the Muslim tradition, it is admitted that these verses have been revealed, that is, inspired to Mohammed by God, through the medium of an angel named Gabriel.<sup>7</sup>

This sentence is three times open, first by the use of the verb «to be admitted», used in the passive form without agent, referring to the subjectivity of an indefinite subject; then, the group subject-verb acts in a definite space and time, the Muslim tradition, which seems to be vague, but deprives the discourse of every universal value; lastly, the existence and deeds of the true agent of the sentence, God, are fully submitted to all former conditions. In another textbook published in 1955, I found the following example: «According to the Koran, which is the sacred book of the Muslims». This sentence is based upon a fictional ignorance of the pupils, and the Koran is presented as a book which is deprived of any universal dimension.

There are more subtle signs too. There are in the Turkish language two different past tenses: on the one hand, the use of the past tense in *-di* infers that the author or the addresser was an eye-witness of what he describes; if used in an historical discourse, it infers that there is an historical consensus about the fact: it is a certifying perfect. On the other hand, the past tense in *-miş* is used to infer that there is a doubt: the addresser was not witness, cannot certify; in the case of an historical narrative, the use of that tense infers that there are several interpretations or that something has to be proved: it is a non-certifying perfect.

Until the fifties, these past tenses were correctly used, that is, the certifying perfect for historical events («Mohammed was born..., Mohammed believed the words of the angel, Mohammed declared he was

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<sup>7</sup> Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, *Lise II*, 1931, p. 90.

a Prophet.»); and the non-certifying perfect was used for matters of faith and miracles: the existence of the angel transmitting the word of God, etc..<sup>8</sup> Besides of that, in the textbooks of the thirties, there is no possessive form like «our prophet», and the expression «Hazret» for «saint» is not used.

But, about twenty years ago, all signs of secularism have been rejected. After 1976, the word, «hazret» (saint), is always placed before the name of Mohammed, and possessive forms like «our prophet» very often appear.<sup>9</sup> The certifying perfect is always used, so that the intervention of divinity into history is considered as a fact. Every careful precaution has been suppressed. God and the angels are objective agents in history. This is not exactly a religious discourse, but nor is it secular any more. It is an historical narrative uttered by believers to addressees who are supposed to be believers. This is a first step towards a compulsory identification with Islam.

The second step does not deal with miracles but with historical facts; the purpose is to urge the pupils to identify themselves with a camp in the narrative of a war: the camp of the first Muslims, under the leadership of Mohammed; and the camp of the Arab Muslims fighting for *djihad*. In order not to identify with an Arab identity, the word «Arab» itself is banned from the discourse, which deals only with Muslims. The word «Arab» is only used in very precise occasions like the time of the *djahiliya* and some historical events when Turks had to fight against Arabs, like when the Arabs conquered Central Asia or when they «betrayed» the Ottomans in 1916. The identification process to the camp of the Arab conquerors requires linguistic tools too. Among the most obvious ones are: the use of the possessive form like «our soldiers» to designate the Prophet's soldiers; the distinction between two kinds of death: dead enemies are merely dead, and Muslim dead are «martyrs»; the designation of the other camp by expressions like «the enemy» in absolute terms, instead of «the enemies of Mohammed»; lastly, massacres of Jews by the Muslims are considered as absolutely normal and legitimate, because the authors of textbooks have not taken any distance with the sources of Muslim historiography, which dates back to the 9th and 10th centuries.

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<sup>8</sup> Unat-Su, *İlkokul IV*, 1945, p. 93.

<sup>9</sup> T. E. Şahin, *Lise I*, 1992, p. 123.

### Representing the otherness: Christians as enemies

The representation of Christianity in history textbooks is characterised first by a lack; second, by a representation of enmity. The main feature of Turkish historical narrative is its ethnic point of view: what is taught is the history of the Turks –or of those who are supposed to be Turk– and not the history of a country; thus, the view is turned towards the origins and the peregrination of the Turks from Mongolia to Anatolia. As a consequence, the narrative of Anatolian past is very superficial, and the Christian past of Anatolia is very rarely mentioned, if at all. Likewise, the development of early Christianity in what later became Turkey is not described. I found only short considerations about Christianity's birth in the frame of the lesson on Islam's birth.<sup>10</sup>

Mostly, Christendom is presented as hostile. The Crusades are one of the main traumatism in Muslim history, and it became a historical myth which is nowadays one of the main political stereotypes. More generally, one must point out that in the Turkish narrative, all enemies of the Ottoman Empire have something in common: they all are Christian or supported by Christian powers, as were the Arabs in 1916. Christian minorities of the Empire are always presented as the puppets of Christian states like Russia, Austria, France, etc. As a consequence, history shows that Christendom in general is an outer or inner enemy:

From the Crusades until the Liberation War (1922) there were attempts to push us out of Anatolia, and this will is going on by political ways. The powers which try to divide our country, those who support them or try to hinder our economic development, help to revive the spirit of the Crusaders.<sup>11</sup>

Like in every nationalism, there is a strong trend to inlay historical elements into the political discourse, within which the metaphorical use of the word «Crusade» is enduring. So the Greek –or Rum–, Serbian othernesses are very often compared to new Crusaders when a crisis happens like in Cyprus and in former Yugoslavia. Moreover, history shows that the Turks, and only them, were able to put Islam's seal upon Europe: the Arabs failed in Andalusia, but the Turks were successful in

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<sup>10</sup> K. Y. Kopruman et al., *Tarih I*, Istanbul, M.E.B. Devlet Kitapları, 1994, p. 72

<sup>11</sup> Yildiz et al., *Lise II*, 1989, p. 156.

Bosnia and Albania, and this European Islam is considered as a Turkish invaluable heritage, to be protected and saved: Turkey is presented as having a legitimacy –which was not used until now– to intervene in the Balkans, and a historical right to enter European Union.

It is not surprising to observe, both in educational and political discourses, an opposition between «tolerant Muslim Turks» and «intolerant Christians». This idea is a stereotype too, constantly passed on to Turkish pupils. Precise facts are used in the narrative: the presence of a Christian population, all along the centuries, in the Ottoman Empire, the fact that the Turks did not compel Christians to embrace Islam, unlike the Arabs did according to this discourse, are again «proof» of Turkish tolerance. Conversely, the Christians showed their intolerance in Andalusia, in Crete, and more recently in Cyprus and Yugoslavia. Of course some historical facts are emphasised in order to prove Christian intolerance, like the Inquisition, the massacres of the Saint-Barthélémy or the colonisation. These historical themes appear in the press as well, when a crisis happens with the West, as shown recently when French Parliament «recognised» the Armenian genocide (Feb. 2001).

### **Two levels of otherness**

I would like to conclude with some remarks about appearance and reality, and about two different levels of otherness. The appearance lies in the fact that Turkey is the one and only secular Muslim country, where non-Muslim minorities are «protected», according to the Lausanne treaty, and have their own organisations, worship places and schools, can speak their own languages openly and live according to their own traditions. The reality is blurred: Turkey is secular, but during the state-building process, almost the entire non-Muslim population has been slaughtered or expelled, or incited to leave the country. As a consequence, in fact, the population of Turkey as a whole is much more Muslim than most other countries of the former Ottoman Empire.

Turkey protects its minorities, but the notion of citizenship is bound to one religion, Islam, since the ideology of *Türk-Islam sentezi* binds Turkish identity to this religion. Even if the Turkish army «protects» the secularism, even if the state represses islamist trends, this state has created, since 1980, a «soft» Islam, without shariat, djihad or headscarves, which is a very state religion - and this is most criticised

by Turkish islamist trends as well.<sup>12</sup> In fact Turkey is not secularist, since the state is not neutral: the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı or Chamber of Religious Affairs controls the nomination of every imam in the country and in the Turkish schools out of Turkey.

The religious character of the state is more and more clear, even if the cult of Atatürk has been turned into a true religion twenty years ago. Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers, high rank officers now don't hesitate to be represented by the press in a praying attitude, and, more importantly, the administrators (governors, kaymakam, vali, mayors) at the local level, have often a very Muslim policy. Turkish public opinion is not often aware of this phenomenon. For example, in March 1997, a head official, the kaymakam of Suruç, a small town near Urfa, found shocking that 61 male adult people of the village of Asağı Dolaş were not circumcized. This omission was promptly and collectively put right, under the control of the authorities of a secular state. What is interesting here is that 1) somebody judged the situation worth being denounced to the authorities; 2) the authorities considered the fact worthy of interest and immediately acted in order to put right the situation; 3) the newspapers reported the fact in a very neutral manner, without expressing any surprise, irony or scandal, as if the kaymakam's behaviour was absolutely normal and legitimate in a secular state.<sup>13</sup>

My second remark deals with the levels of otherness, regarding Christianity as seen by Islam. Paradoxically, the otherness of Christianity can be appreciated as «minor» when seen according to the Koranic point of view. Even if the theological views are irreconcilable, Islam is the only religion which admits the validity of a part of Christian dogma, and reveres its great figures. Objectively, the condition of dhimmi and the existence of the millet system made possible their coexistence for centuries. The Christian is a neighbour. I state this relationship to be a minor otherness, because religious personalities, theologians, intellectuals, even ordinary believers can communicate with each other.

The otherness is «major» when nationalism is mixed up with religion. Nationalist oppositions appear much more dangerous and irreconcil-

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<sup>12</sup> Abdurrahman Dilipak, *Bu Din Benim Dinim Değildir* [This religion is not my religion], Istanbul, Risale, 1990, pp. 52-67.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Sabah*, 31 March 1997 and the commentary of Oral Çalışlar, *Cumhuriyet*, 3 April 1997.

able than religious ones. There is a reminiscence of some historical facts like the Crusades and the colonisation, and we must admit that some components of what is called globalisation are almost partly the result of a cultural –if not religious– influence of Christianity. This major otherness is made more serious and dangerous by the creation of identities bound to religion, on both sides of the Aegean sea, in both parts of Cyprus. Given this confusion, when a clash happens, nationalist groups tend to attack religious targets (churches or mosques, cemeteries, etc.) as if they were national symbols and signs. Conversely, it is very worrying to see Greek flags waving on churches, and Turkish flags waving on mosques. Of course, the opposition is religious only in the appearances. National controversies have religious clothes, and what is worrying is that states –even secular states– do not discourage these opinions and ways of thinking. In fact, religious elements in one's life are much more bound to the inmost depth of identity than are national symbols, even those that are made sacred. Furthermore, nationalism, in order to be more effective, needs religious elements and it needs to add a religious dimension to the nation and the nation's aims.

## Religious Education in Serbia

MILAN VUKOMANOVIC

SOON AFTER the political changes of October 2000, an intensive debate was launched in Serbia regarding the proposal of the Serbian Orthodox Church Archbishops' Synod to introduce religious education, as a regular subject, in the public schools. On that occasion, a special church committee was established in order to create a curriculum that should have been completed by May 2001. Since November 2000, the Serbian press and electronic media have published, almost on the daily basis, various articles and contributions on whether religious education should be introduced in the public schools; who would teach this subject and how; would it be a confessional or non-confessional school subject, compulsory or optional, etc. As to these issues, one hears today different voices, statements, arguments, in an apparently confused public atmosphere and context. One might even say that the entire debate has reached a sort of dead end. Before discussing the usual aspects of this problem, one must, however, consider some important preconditions of the initiative to introduce religious education in Serbian public schools. These preconditions have not, unfortunately, merit enough attention in the public. At least tentatively, they could be summarized as follows:

### I. Political and legal presuppositions

1. *Church-State Relations.* Who are the partners in this relation? Which church (i.e. churches, religious communities), what state? What constitutional solutions are to be expected in the near future? Which state will establish its legal relation with religious communities? (I bear in mind the yet unresolved issue of Serbian-Montenegrin relations). Furthermore, introducing religious education into the school curricula should not depend on religious affiliation of a president or government members – be they atheists or firm believers; this should presuppose a much more stable, long-term relationship. The de-

mands of the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding religious education, as well as regarding other issues concerning church-state relations are quite legitimate, especially if we compare the new attitude towards religions in post-communist states and the solutions of other countries undergoing the transition. Of course, other religious communities could have made similar requests. However, Serbia needs a new, democratic law on the legal status of religious communities (the last one was annulled in 1993). It also needs legislation on religious freedoms, reimbursement of the church property, etc.

2. *Human Rights, Child's Rights.* In this context, let us recall the international Child's Rights Convention regarding the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as other international legal acts conducive to many countries and adapted in their own constitutions. One often hears an argument in Serbia that religious education is a fundamental human right. However, what is often overseen is that such a right may successfully be realized beyond public school, in religious communities, while the public school, in its essence and long tradition since the Enlightenment, is a lay, non-confessional institution. Furthermore, religious freedoms and rights mean both rights to believe and not to believe, attend religious classes, and not attend them. It is also the right to religious and non-religious (agnostic or atheist) worldview.
3. *The Problems of Minorities and Minor Religious Communities.* This is especially important in Serbia, because in the province of Vojvodina only, there are more than 30 different religious organizations! Religious pluralism is often a major challenge for religious liberties. One should only recall the restrictive Russian Law of 1997, whereby only four religious organizations were explicitly recognized as «historical» or domicile in this country – i.e. Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic, Jewish and Buddhist religious communities. Religious freedom, in fact, means the responsibility to protect freedoms and rights of others as one's own rights. Respect for the freedom of religion and authenticity of other religious traditions and readiness to protect their rights as one's own, is probably the ultimate test of tolerance for each religious community, the test of their true commitment to religious pluralism and co-existence with other communities. In other words, the extent to which religious communities are ready to support rights and freedoms of their sister-churches

and other religious communities indicates their awareness of their own rights and freedoms. On the other hand, the low level of awareness of one's own rights and freedoms most often results in ignoring, or even violating the rights of others.

In the Yugoslav context, one should also not forget the religious elements of the conflicts that took place during the past decade. The minority issue (both ethnic and religious minorities) was particularly important in this context. The question remains as to whether any further differentiation of school children into confessional groups is desirable, at least in the near future.

## II. Educational presuppositions

Let me mention only a few problems related to the introduction of religious education in public schools:

1. What kind of school system is to be expected in Serbia and FRY under the new, democratic conditions? What would be its features? Will the character of Serbian schools in the forthcoming period be changed, so that various private and confessional schools might also be established apart from public schools?
2. What are the previous experiences with religious education - both before the WW II and now, wherever religious education is provided for students or school children?
3. What are the results of empirical research? What are the attitudes of children and their parents? According to the polls made thus far, the vast majority of respondents are in favor of some form of religious education in public schools. Among them, the majority is also against the compulsory character of such an education. Now, what are the attitudes of other participants in this debate: schoolteachers, psychologists, pedagogues and other experienced public school workers?

Therefore, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no religious education is currently available in public schools (either elementary or high schools).<sup>1</sup> This education is now confined to religious communities only. Religion is only partially studied at the university within some specialized social sciences and humanities courses, such as Sociology of Relig-

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<sup>1</sup> The Serbian Orthodox religious education is, on the other hand, a compulsory subject in the public schools in Republika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina).

ion and Philosophy of Religion. However, there is no separate program in religious studies available at the Yugoslav universities.<sup>2</sup>

In contrast to the public education system, the churches and religious communities in Yugoslavia have their own, independent religious education, taught within the religious communities, their schools and establishments. Religious educational establishments in Yugoslavia are permitted by law. They are both parallel to the state educational system and belong to different religions and denominations. In the Christian churches (Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant) this education has the form of «Sunday schools», while in the Islamic community it is usually organized on Saturday mornings. Jewish community does not have any specialized classes of religious education, but summer camps with an emphasis on customs and ethnic features, as well as occasional lectures given by the chief rabbi for a smaller circle of students. The Rabbi of Yugoslavia himself was educated in Israel.

The situation with regard to hours, teachers, textbooks, etc., varies from community to community. Christian churches normally give 1. 5 - 2 hours of religious education per week. The age of those who attend these classes varies from the elementary school children to adults. This education is not considered compulsory, but regular and desirable. In the Roman Catholic Church, it is one of the requirements prior to the marriage in church. This education is occasionally organized in the form of panel discussions with various guest speakers. The professional profile of teachers in these schools is also different: in the Orthodox Church, they are priests and teachers of catechism (both male and female); in the Roman Catholic Church – priests and nuns; in the Protestant churches they also include lay persons; in the Islamic communities – imams, etc. They are educated at specialized catechetical schools related to their theological seminaries and faculties. Apart from several theological faculties and seminaries pertaining to the Serbian Orthodox Church (in Belgrade, Sremski Karlovci, Prizren, Sbinje, Cetinje), there is one Theological-Catechetical Institute of the Roman Catholic Church in Subotica. The Protestant seminaries are located in Belgrade and Novi Sad. There are also Islamic medressas in Novi Pazar and Pristina

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<sup>2</sup> In the FR Yugoslavia, the only non-confessional institution of higher education providing a rather systematic program in religious studies is the Center for Religious Studies (CIREL) of the Belgrade Open School. This program was established in 1999.

for both male and female students. The ones in Gnjilane and Prizren (Kosovo) are for male students only.

Concerning textbooks, most of religious communities in this country have a rather systematic, age-related selection of textbooks (from primers to the more complex readers). The Protestant churches organize their programs on their own. They usually do not have special textbooks, but use various other books and educational tools. The students (including children) in the Islamic community regularly attend the Koran classes and classes of Arabic language, in order to be able to recite from their sacred scripture. The Jewish community published a book «The Basic Concepts of Judaism», written by the former chief rabbi of Yugoslavia. The textbooks are normally prepared and published in the major religious centers of former Yugoslavia (e.g. Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Novi Pazar) and distributed to other regions and cities. The Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches have specialized bookstores for this kind of literature. Otherwise, they are sold at the religious communities' facilities, book fairs, etc.<sup>3</sup>

### III. Psychological presuppositions

Children are faced here with at least two serious problems:

1. What are the results of the *development psychology*? At what level can a child acquire certain knowledge (e.g. complex theological concepts)?
2. The problems concerning *child identity and process of individuation*. Will the children, in a multi-confessional society, where they have already been divided according to the national and ethnic lines, be separated into different classes according to their religious, confessional affiliations? How many of them must sit in the same class in order to be able to receive such an education (is the minimal number ten, five students, or only one?). Accordingly, what are the consequences for the psychological development of school children, especially for those pertaining to the minority religious organizations?

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<sup>3</sup> In Republika Srpska, the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Religions approve these textbooks. They are often edited and printed in Serbia, with reviewers from the Faculty of Theology in Belgrade. The Orthodox primer is a translation from Greek.

#### IV. Other countries' experiences

What are the experiences of other European and non-European countries with religious education in state schools? What are their unique features, and what are the Serbian specifics? Which models of religious education did other countries in transition adopt, provided that this education is offered in public schools? Concerning European countries, Greece and Germany do have a confessional religious education in schools, while Slovenia and France do not. Before one resorts to the examples of other countries, one should always ask first *why* is this so as it is, or on which presuppositions are their choices made, and what are our own premises? In the Yugoslav case, we have to be very sensitive to the cultural, ethnic and religious rights of the minority communities. This, of course, overlaps with other public sectors, because the ministry of religions and ministry of education are not the only institutions concerned about this. In the case of Serbia, the republic Ministry of Education is, however, the one to say the final word.

For the debate over religious education to be constructive, it is not sufficient that the public be divided into two opposing groups (*for* and *against*), without the possibility to communicate «from their trenches». This is especially so when we take into account strong antagonism between the religious communities and human rights organizations in Serbia. Representatives of academic community and NGOs should know that the demands of religious communities regarding religious education are quite legitimate. They should also hear what the churches propose. In a constructive way, the experts may point out the possible counterproductive consequences of such a plan, especially the ones concerning religious communities. Instead, they are often very critical towards their demands. The civil society proponents must also get used to these demands, and be able to hear and understand. Despite obvious differences, there are, indeed, some significant parallels between religious organizations and NGOs (e.g. spirit of philanthropy, institutions of volunteer work and endowments, etc.).

At any rate, all those who participate in this debate bear an enormous responsibility. What is needed here is a more flexible approach, avoiding extreme positions and simplifications (such as «The communists forbid religious education, let's return this situation back to the level of 1945!») - because we are in 2001 today, and secular states are

not necessarily communist; or, else, «Religion is only a private affair, it should not have its place in the public sphere» - which is something contrary to the examples of other democratic and secular countries that have religious education in public schools, with religion having its rightful place in the media).

Speaking of the most appropriate models of religious education, it is important, at least roughly, to pay attention to several things, in order to avoid counter-productive outcomes. The decision on this matter should be made only after a broad public debate, with the participation of both the majority and minority churches representatives, on the one hand, and the state representatives, on the other. Besides them, such a debate must include experts (lawyers, psychologists, pedagogues, religious studies scholars) and parents. However, prior to any decision, the extensive public opinion polls should be organized, with special attention to the multiethnic and multi-religious areas, such as Vojvodina. In a multi-confessional society, it is certainly desirable to consider the possibility of introducing several parallel models of religious education. If religious education is introduced in Serbian public schools, it need not be a compulsory, but an optional subject. It may also be a non-confessional subject, with a parallel possibility to attend Sunday schools within religious communities or attend special, private confessional schools that might also be supported by the state. In our country, where there are significant religious varieties, it would be normal, I think, to enable the work of various types of schools: from the public ones, to the private and confessional ones – more closely related to religious communities.

To conclude, it seems that it will be necessary to postpone the decision on introducing any form of religious education in public schools in Serbia for the next two or three years. This is the minimal period of time needed for establishing the most important preconditions for such an education and clarifying the current public confusion. During the same period, the authorities should intensively work on the legal and other preconditions, including the assessment and selection of the most appropriate models of religious education and training of teachers. These are the necessary requirements presupposing any successful solution of this matter in Serbia.

## The Ethnic and Religious Climate in Bulgaria after 1989

### Preliminary Notes for Discussion

ALEXEI KALIONSKI

**T**HIS TEXT WILL NOT concern the legislative frame since the new Constitution was approved in 1992, nor shall it discuss the various approaches to or definitions of ethnicity. It is based predominantly on ethnological and sociological surveys and studies, published during the last ten years. The main focus is on the ethnic and religious cohabitation in the current conditions of ongoing political and social changes, as well as in an acute economic crisis.

After the political changes that marked the autumn of 1989, the Bulgarian public opinion gradually began to reassume the ethnic and religious diversity of the country as something «natural». Today even the populist nationalist organisations, groups or politicians take it for granted when they discuss «ethnic» aspects of certain social or political issues. Nationalist or xenophobic views of that kind, fears from and denials of, the ethnic and religious realities were very loudly pronounced in the public space immediately after the beginning of the democratic changes. However, their political proponents did not enter the Parliament (remained far from being able to pass the 4% electoral barrier). The parties, organisations and leaders keeping to extreme nationalist orientation or populist nationalist slogans fell to the position of small, politically marginal groups (or clubs) of followers. Of course, among the leading political circles there are quite a few active political figures with a «moderate» nationalist agenda of various kinds.

One of the main consequences of the general liberalisation of the political and social life was the gradual restoration of the rights of the ethnic and religious minorities. It is a rather slow and controversial process, as the realisation of these rights on individual and group levels depends on the current social and economic conditions of deep eco-

nomic and financial crisis. Other less evident obstacles are the inherited prejudices, negative stereotypes and implications of past ethnic tensions. For instance, the National TV started a news emission in Turkish as late as October 2000.

Nowadays we may speak of political consensus on the ethnic and religious problems. It was established step by step by the leading parties and state institutions. One of the clear illustrations of this process is the presence of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in the Parliament. The very place of the «Turkish party» in political life and (on certain levels) in the government of the state is not yet a subject of denials, tensions and disputes (as it was in the Parliament and in the media 5-6 years ago). Still, the position of the MRF remains almost of an exclusively «ethnic» Turkish party also having a strong influence on the Pomaks/Muslim Bulgarians.

In the years of the Communist regime the gradual curtailing of the minority rights, especially those of the Muslims, was accompanied with official propaganda and putting the emphasis on the status of some «exemplary minorities» (according to the term used by Stefan Troebst) like Armenians and Jews. Today the leading political parties, figures and institutions pronounce (both internally and internationally) the idea of the unique «Bulgarian model» of peaceful ethnic and religious cohabitation, successfully realised against the background of the current Balkan conflicts. It appears to be one of the new mass media clichés that goes hand in hand with others: «the European / Euro-Atlantic choice», «democratisation», «economic liberalisation» etc. Both in the history textbooks and in some of the new academic writings, «the Bulgarian ethnic model» finds its projections deep in the past.

It is certain that the general liberalisation of this sphere is one of Bulgaria's major successes from 1989 on, especially if we take under consideration the last extreme state act –the so called «Revival process» (the campaign carried out by the Communist authorities in 1984-1989, aiming at thorough assimilation of Bulgarian Turks). The starting point of the democratic transition was very close to an open ethnic/ethno-religious conflict. The gradual receding from potential ethnic clashes and the final victory of «common sense» finds various explanations today: historical, political, sociological, ethnological.

However, the controversial historical heritage of Bulgarian state policy and Bulgarian nationalism as an idea and practice during the last

130 years still remains. It is especially true for the previous stage of its development –the Communist regime (1944-1989). Some of the scholarly attempts at rethinking the near past of the ethnic problems in Bulgaria rest upon the opposition: «bad» or «intolerant» state policy (in most of the cases) –«good» traditional relations between different communities (except in the cases of political inspirations and provocation «forged from outside»). A similar attitude can be felt towards the concrete ethnic neighbour (group, individual) in the frame of a mixed town or village, but in the context of existing and often politically coloured negative stereotypes of the «other» community as a whole.

Anyway, in comparison to the economic situation, the general ethnic and religious climate has changed considerably for the better. The tolerance as a political slogan shared by the leading parties somehow reflects the real tendency of improving the relations between the majority and the minorities. The traditional mechanisms of cultural contact and cohabitation have proved once again to be effective despite the deeply rooted mutual stereotypes and distrust. Of course, it is very difficult to generalise the situation between the two polar activities –the constant criticism of the different civil rights organisations and the occasional provocation of the newly appeared groups of skinheads. An academic or chance observer may easily detect various old or new fears and tensions. The ethnical and/or religious «other» has reappeared as a very well known yet stereotypically «alien». He is experiencing the same harsh social and economic conditions as the Bulgarian majority.

One of the most widespread anxieties, hidden as well as evident, can be easily traced both in private communication and in the media. It is related to negative demographic tendencies, which have resulted in considerable diminishing of the total population, and particularly the Bulgarian majority. The main factors that lead to rapid decreasing in number of the population were the economic shock and the large-scale emigration. According to some estimates, around 500,000, predominantly young and active people have emigrated to the USA, Canada and Western Europe during the last 10 years. We must add also the numerous Bulgarian Turks that have emigrated to Turkey. That is why it is rather difficult for the moment to estimate which of the two communities – the Turks or the Gypsies/Roma constitute the biggest ethnic minority in Bulgaria. Precisely in this context there are some pronounced fears of the changing «ethnic balance» due to the alleged high birth rate

of the Turks (despite their mass emigration), and especially of the Roma (despite the high infant mortality rate among this community).

Against the background of the hidden or pronounced nationalistic or xenophobic tensions, the open public discussion of the moral aspects of the «Revival process» is just about to begin. The traumatic and painful results of these events from the near past are more than obvious. The attempts at journalistic or academic reconstruction and introducing the problem into the public space clearly construct its context: the past political games; the current political games; the rethinking of a dangerous and senseless violence; the extent to which the Bulgarian majority itself was a victim of the former regime's manipulations.

In the 1980's the main zone of potential ethnic conflicts on a large scale was created by the official propaganda and forged by political violence more or less as an opposition: «the Bulgarians versus the Turks»/«the Christians versus the Muslims». Ideologically the state policy was presented, argued or hidden behind the oppositions «modernity – backwardness», «secular – religious fundamentalist», «Bulgarian socialist patriotism – Turkish nationalism» etc.

The current social changes and the economic crisis predetermine another sphere of potential ethnic tensions or conflicts: the miserable condition of the vast majority of the Roma makes them a marginal strata of very low social status. They have become even more isolated and disregarded by the others than before. Although far from being politically united, the Roma are probably the most significant socio-cultural and ethnic minority in present-day Bulgaria - and not only numerically. In this particular case we are facing a rapid negative development of the traditional prejudices and stereotypes which even result in underlined racist attitudes. For instance, the considerable growth of the criminal activity in post-Communist times has its peculiar «Gypsy» or «dusky brother» presentation in the media. In fact, the problem has not only ethnic and socio-cultural, but also humanitarian dimensions in the context of almost catastrophic state of most Roma people.

According to the last census carried out in 1992, the most numerous minorities in Bulgaria are the Turks, Gypsies/Roma (Christian and Muslim), Russians, Armenians, Karakachans, Arabs, Tatars, Greeks, Jews and Vlachs (Rumanians and Arumanians). The Bulgarians are circa 86% of the total population, as around 200,000 Pomaks/Bulgarian speaking Muslims are officially included in this number. There is also a

number of other, smaller ethnic and religious groups or sub-groups. The Orthodox Christians are circa 86%; Sunni Muslims –12%; Shi'a Muslims –1%; Catholics –0. 6% and Protestants –0. 3%.

It can be generalised for both of the two predominant religions –Orthodox Christianity and Islam– that they are gradually recovering from the recent past position of being officially half-banned, restricted or neglected. This process has various dimensions for the different generations, social, local and ethno-cultural groups. It applies to both the traditional and the institutional levels. The Bulgarian Patriarchy and the supreme Muslim religious institution – the *Muftijstvo*, experience the strong influence of the general politicisation of the society. There is a number of political, canonical, property, personal controversies and conflicts, which in the case of the Patriarchy resulted in the so-called «schism» («razkol»). This institution is in a state of crisis. One of its main reasons is the incapability of a considerable part of the Orthodox clergy to meet the necessity for modernisation and adaptation to the new social and cultural situation.

It is evident that some young Bulgarians and especially Roma demonstrate special interest or proselytism towards a spectrum of «new» or not traditional confessions and sects. This tendency reached its height several years ago, when the problem was widely discussed in the media and some restrictive measures were undertaken by the municipal authorities, accompanied by occasional protests from certain clerical and political circles. As far as the proselytism of some Roma are concerned to be outside of traditional Christianity and Islam, the predominant explanation offered by Bulgarian ethnologists and sociologists is that for certain groups or individuals this is a normal and quite expected reaction. It is actually a search for better social and cultural status.

On the other hand, those orientations or choices reflect and somehow fulfil an obvious cultural vacuum. The Bulgarian historian of literature Alexander Kjossev defines some of the aspects of the cultural situation as a «subcultural revolution», which started after the sudden retreat of the state from the direct patronage and centralised subsidies of the «high», but also very ideological and instructive culture. It does not matter whether we shall call «kitsch» the newly appeared and very popular genres such as the so-called musical «folk» («Bulgarian, «Serbian», «Turkish», «Gypsy»). It corresponds and also forms the mass

culture tastes in the current situation of a developing free market economy. At the same time, the quality of the state educational system is gradually changing, not for the better.

Together with the native language and cultural tradition, religion has always been and still is, one of the most important factors for self-identification of all distinctive communities in Bulgaria. It is one of the effective ethnic and cultural borders (according to the definition of Fredrik Bart). Its role is clearly demonstrated by many newly built Christian and Muslim temples and is quite evident at least during the biggest religious feasts. Because of the intimate and discrete nature of every fate, it is difficult to answer the question of the extent of religiousness in Bulgarian society as a whole. We must always take into consideration the heritage of the former Communist secular ideology and practice. The peculiar, often forcible, yet in many aspects effective, version of modernisation was carried out for several decades. Precisely because of the importance of religious affiliation as an ethnic and cultural marker, probably very few persons would declare themselves as atheists. At the same time, even the superficial knowledge of the holy texts and the strict following of the religious rituals, calendar and restrictions are more an exception than a rule in contemporary Bulgaria.

In the well-studied case of the Pomaks/Bulgarian speaking Muslims, Islam is inseparable from their archaic, in many aspects, and distinctive tradition. «Pomak» identity in the current Bulgarian social and national frame exists only on a communal and local level. Unlike many other groups, Pomaks usually easily assimilate themselves with Bulgarians and Turks outside their compact regions (the Rhodopes and Lovech areas).

In comparison, the traditional image of the «Gypsiness» is quite less related to the religious affiliation. Among the Roma community there exist not only religious, language and dialect, but also social, quasi-caste, and «professional» (according to traditional occupation and origin) groups and sub-groups. Due to the lower social status of this community, some of the Christian Roma usually declare themselves as Bulgarians, whereas some Muslim Roma – as Turks. This is the situation in all available official statistics, including the last census. On a local level there are many effective signs and markers of the Roma in general, but also of the traditional distinction between «Turkish», «Bulgarian», «Vlach» and other Gypsies (for instance, sedentary and wandering).

It is not possible here to trace out, even briefly, the studied tendencies of ethnic assimilation, acculturation, migration and cultural interaction, that predetermine the present state of the various communities and the dynamics of the Bulgaria's ethnic and religious picture. They develop side by side with the processes of «invention» of the tradition (following the term of Eric Hobsbawm). Together with the emigration these developments mark certain changes that will probably appear in the results of the new census that started just several days ago, on March 1.

From the results of the last census, as well as from a number of ethnological and sociological studies, it is quite clear that the assimilation with the bigger communities has drastically diminished the numbers of some small ethnic groups like the Gagauz (Turkish speaking Christians), Circassians, Tatars, Greeks. Many Jews have emigrated to Israel after 1992.

The ethnic identity of the Turks is in the state of constant growth, but this process has not only religious and traditionally cultural, but also political and Bulgarian civic dimensions. Among the Bulgarian speaking Muslims there are different options and choices: traditional Pomak, but also Bulgarian (secular, civic, «modern»). Unlike the Pomak community in Greece, in current Bulgarian political, ethnic and religious conditions the predominant tendency is not towards «Turcification» of the Bulgarian speaking Muslims despite the serious influence and position of the MRF. The small Karakachan community also demonstrates a very interesting re-defining, «inventing» of his own tradition, already radically transformed and threatened with extinction. Today different individuals, generations, local groups rediscover their historical, kinship and economic contacts with Greece, but also the normal compromise between the Bulgarian citizenship and the distinct Karakachan identity.

Without offering more examples or illustrations, the following general conclusions can be proposed for the purposes of our discussion:

1. The political wishful thinking and slogans somehow mirror the actual, real process of constant and gradual improvement of the ethnic and religious climate. The «ethnic peace» is an integral part of the existing political consensus. The role of the state in the economic and social life is still predominant, despite the considerable devel-

opment of a parallel civic sector. Unlike the situation of the 1980s, the state institutions and the leading political parties as a whole articulate the multiethnic and religious tolerance not only as inseparable from the processes of democratic transition, but also as deeply rooted in national history, as unique for the Bulgarian society. The state, religious institutions and political parties, textbooks and mass media emphasise particular past moments or periods of mutual solidarity and condemn ethnic and religious conflicts and intolerance.

2. Although not studied yet, the strong influence of the Yugoslav conflicts upon the Bulgarian society and public opinion is evident. Besides the international factors and implications of these events, they have their internal Bulgarian side effects or consequences, mainly as a negative and frightening example. Not only the traditional mechanisms of peaceful cultural and religious cohabitation, but also the established political status quo and even the current political games participate in the loosening of some of the existing ethnic tensions or potential conflicts. Of course, part of the explanation of the «Bulgarian ethnic model» can be as simple as that: during the last ten years the state has been trying, or in certain cases was forced to follow the European and international models, laws, regulations and advice. However, the withdrawal from the potential conflict on large scale in the early 1990s as a first step to the much-needed ethno-religious consensus was an entirely Bulgarian social and political achievement.
3. As a whole, the zones of potential ethnic and religious conflicts have new social and economic preconditions. The acute crisis that accompanies the processes of transition results in considerable social deterioration and common impoverishment of the predominant part of the Bulgarian citizens regardless of their ethnic identity or religious affiliation. It transforms some of the religious or ethnic tensions in the sphere of the economic stagnation and social inequality. The last is especially true for the Roma community.

The attitude towards the near or distant past has always been selective. Although historically not real or true, the politically pronounced idealisation of the ethnic relations has real chances to become part of ideologies or visions of various spectrum: «left», «right», «liberal», or even «moderate» nationalist. The future will show whether this new myth will participate in the creation of a new national tradition. As for the old ethnic and religious traditions –both in the Balkan

region as a whole and in Bulgaria– they bear not only mutual distrust, prejudices and negative stereotypes, conflicts, but also solidarity with, and respect for, the «other».

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## Religion, State and Society in Romanian History Textbooks\*

ECATERINA LUNG

**D**URING THE LAST DECADE, religious questions and issues became to be perceived by a significant part of the Romanian society as a fashionable subject. There are several reasons for this evolution. First of all, there is the need of a large part of the population to find a general reason for an erratically changing world. Then, there is the attempt of the Orthodox hierarchy to recuperate what it considers to have been years of political, social and cultural insignificance during Communism. In this context the Orthodox clergy keenly insisted for obtaining a compulsory statute for the religious education in schools and the right to monitor this discipline. But, besides the discipline religious education, information regarding religious problems began to abound also in textbooks and in syllabi of other disciplines.

It is obvious that many of the aspects related to religion caused serious difficulties to the textbook authors. In fact, most of the authors were not prepared to deal with such delicate topics. The literature on religious problems is huge, but very unequal and often unreliable. Much of this literature is unsophisticated and flatters the official church; what it worse, the reaction against the negative presentation of religion during Communism makes both textbook authors and teachers reluctant towards more balanced and/or critically reflected approaches regarding religious topics. The scarcity of the curricula, which does not supply any analytical suggestions besides a list of themes, notions, and case studies, also contributed to determine most textbook authors to remain at the level of general information and to avoid raising questions and/or solving dilemmas. This comfortable option of most text-

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\* A first version of this paper was presented by Mirela-Luminita Murgescu and me at the workshop « Religious education and the view of the others », Thessaloniki, 11-13 March 2001.

book authors is in sharp contrast with the sensitive and subtle character of the relationship between religion, state and society, which normally would have demanded a multifaceted analysis, and not mere descriptivism.

Besides the personal options of the authors, the age of the pupils to which the schoolbooks are dedicated also induces differences in the way religious topics are displayed in these schoolbooks. There are also chronological imbalances: the largest part of the information regarding religion is to be found for ancient and medieval history, while textbooks treating modern and contemporary history pay less attention to religious subjects. There is also a strong bias favoring Christianity; Islam and the Jewish faith are also presented, while other religions are more or less neglected.

One of the main problems is to establish how religion is perceived and then used as a didactic element in creating identities. It is already well known that religion is an important element in shaping convictions and loyalties among people, and in maintaining group integrity<sup>1</sup>. Consequently, religion has a public role, and the nature of its relations with the state determines whether it helps governments to assimilate various groups into a uniform identity, or it helps these groups to resist integrative attempts of a dominant state.

So, consciently or no, almost all textbook authors stress the positive role of religion in the development of human society, because in the name of religion people fortify and fight for their beliefs and rights<sup>2</sup>. In this respect, the Romanian textbook authors point out the good relations existing between state and religion, especially in the moment when the state used the services of the religious institutions for its own purposes. One of the most encountered examples is the religion in the Ancient East, which stressed that the king (emperor) is sent by one or another God on Earth<sup>3</sup>. This reflects the fact that in Eastern civilizations the prince was endowed with both secular and sacral power. The pagan Greek religion is seen more in its relationship with

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<sup>1</sup> D. A. Kerr (ed.), *Religion, State and Ethnic Groups*, New York University Press, Dartmouth, 1992, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Ted. J. Jelen, Clide Wilcox, *Public attitudes toward Church and State*, New York, London, 1995, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> 5th grade, Teora, p. 31.

society, especially with art<sup>4</sup>. Almost all illustrations provided for ancient Greece have a religious connotation: they are temples or statues of gods. We are informed also that theatre too has a religious origin, being born from the cult of Dionysus<sup>5</sup>. At Rome, the pagan religion is presented in its ties with society, because it stabilized family structures through the cult of familial gods (*lari*)<sup>6</sup>. The Roman religion has a political character too, because there was a relation between the respect for gods and the success of the state; pupils are also told that the Roman priests were magistrates of the Republic and of the pagan Empire<sup>7</sup>. So, we can find at Rome the same amalgam of secular and sacral power encountered in earlier civilizations.

While for antiquity the authors can more easily present the image of cooperating states and religious institutions (leaving into oblivion the episodes of disharmony), when it comes to the Middle Ages their task is more difficult.

Generally, the Romanian textbooks point on to the good relations existing through history between the State and the Christian Church. In this respect, in textbooks we can find mentions about the beginning of their collaboration in the moment when Constantine made Christianity an official religion of the Roman Empire<sup>8</sup>. Constantine is also seen as subordinating the Church and the religion to the state<sup>9</sup>. In the time of Theodosius, Christianity became the only accepted religion in the Roman Empire<sup>10</sup>. The relation between religion (Church) and state, including this subordination, is seen in the textbooks to be better in the East than in Western Europe<sup>11</sup>. The imperial Roman ideology, born in the East, has a religious basis: the universality of the Christianity<sup>12</sup>. Religion has thus a very important role in legitimating the political power through the ceremony of coronation, or through the belief in "les rois thaumaturges"<sup>13</sup>. The baptism of the rulers (e.g. Clovis) provides stabil-

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 83-85.

<sup>5</sup> 9th grade, Rao, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 50-51; 9th grade, All, p. 25.

<sup>8</sup> 5th grade, Teora, p. 146.

<sup>9</sup> 9th grade, All, p. 151

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 147.

<sup>11</sup> 6th grade, All, p. 38.

<sup>12</sup> 9th grade, Sigma, p. 62, 9th grade, Rao, p. 119; 9th grade, All, p. 56.

<sup>13</sup> 9th grade, Rao, p. 189.

ity and coherence to the state<sup>14</sup>. The textbooks present the European medieval monarchs as Christian monarchs, defenders of the faith and of the Church, as were Charlemagne, Otto I<sup>15</sup>. On the other hand, for this period of time, the Church is presented as an institution of the state, subordinated to the monarchy under the Carolingians and Ottonians<sup>16</sup>. But with the emergence of the Western Empire (Carolingian, Ottonian and later Holy Roman Empire), a different situation evolved. Since the Church had taken the initiative in the creation of this Western empire under Charlemagne, its relationship with it differed from those with the Roman and Byzantine empires. During the Middle Ages the Pope refused to be a subject of the Emperor and claimed to be superior. Although without entering into details, all textbooks present the evolution of the Papacy as a supreme authority in the medieval Western world.

When discussing the centralization of state power, the authors also mention the subordination of the church to the absolutist state, the monarchs limiting the papal control over the ecclesiastical hierarchy in their kingdoms<sup>17</sup>. This trend was strengthened after Reformation, when both in Catholic and in Protestant states there occurred a fusion of secular and religious power in the hands of the prince.

The curriculum for Romanian history (12th grade) links directly the medieval state and church, requesting a specific lesson on this topic. The authors present this relationship almost as an organic tie between the temporal and secular power. The textbooks mention the fact that in the medieval Romanian Principalities, like in the West, the title of the prince, containing the formula 'dei gratia', suggests the close relation between state and religion<sup>18</sup>, based on the idea of the divine right of the monarch. Here, the setting of the ecclesiastic hierarchy (*mitropoliile*) was an important contribution to the consolidation of the medieval Romanian states<sup>19</sup>. The textbook authors are aware of the crucial contribution of the church in legitimating state authority. The stability of political institutions and their performance throughout history de-

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<sup>14</sup> 9th grade, Sigma, p. 108; 9th grade, All, p. 62.

<sup>15</sup> 9th grade, All, pp. 77-78.

<sup>16</sup> 9th grade, Rao, p. 178.

<sup>17</sup> 9th grade, All, p. 153.

<sup>18</sup> 12th grade, Sigma, p. 122.

<sup>19</sup> 8th grade, Teora, p. 52.

pended upon their effectiveness and their legitimacy. So, the medieval Romanian religious institutions are presented mainly as providing legitimacy to the prince and to the state. In exchange, in Walachia and Moldavia the metropolitan bishop was, in order of his importance, the second person in the state<sup>20</sup>. According to the Eastern pattern of caesaro-papism, the church was under the prince's protection<sup>21</sup>. The church hierarchy remained always in close connection with the throne, a fact which helped it in influencing the flock. The textbooks provide images with Orthodox frescos, where the prince is always painted as presenting to God one of his religious foundations, which can be a church or a monastery. His attitude also signifies that he supported and protected the church, and in this respect we can find many examples of frescos in almost all textbooks.

Although Islam is one of the world's great religions, the Romanian textbook authors don't pay too much attention to it, because they tend to focus almost exclusively on Christianity. But there are some ideas about the intimate relation between religion and state in Islam. The textbooks point on the idea that in Islamic countries the religious law (shariat) is also the law of the state<sup>22</sup>. It is considered that the Arab states are a creation of the Islamic religion<sup>23</sup>. It is significant that the only portrait of a Muslim leader in one of the textbooks for 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century history is that of Ayatollah Khomeiny<sup>24</sup>. Prejudices against Islam and Islamic states are present, even not so evident, and this attitude seems to be grounded in the old Christian hatred and fear of Islam.

The textbook authors avoid to comment in depth the good or bad relations between state and Church. In most of the cases, they simply present the facts in the most neutral possible manner.

One of the first conflicts analyzed by the textbooks is the struggle for Investiture between the Papacy and the Roman-German Empire. The textbooks show the desire of the reforming Papacy in the 11th century to push back the influence of laity on the Church. This led to the struggle against the investiture of clerics by laymen, and to the conflict between

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 54.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 55.

<sup>22</sup> 6th grade, All, p. 31.

<sup>23</sup> 9th grade, Sigma, p. 83; Rao, p. 137.

<sup>24</sup> 7th grade, Humanitas, pp. 134-135.

the emperor Henry IV and the pope Gregory VII<sup>25</sup>. The tension between ecclesiastical and secular authorities led to another conflict, opposing archbishop Thomas Becket and king Henry II of England<sup>26</sup>. The conflict between king Henry VIII and the pope is seen as one of the main causes of the Reformation in England<sup>27</sup>. So, this long struggle between the two medieval powers ended with the division of the Western Christianity.

After the French Revolution, religion was often denied a public role, and many functions it had previously monopolized were removed from its control. So, for the 19th century, the textbooks mention the conflicts between church and state with respect to school and education (one of the textbook for the 11th grade provides a «funny» drawing showing a priest and a teacher fighting for a pupil)<sup>28</sup>.

The Romanian history textbooks say very few things about the relations between state, religion and church during the communist period. We all know that the ruling ideology of Communism was intrinsically hostile to religious beliefs as social phenomena, and varying degrees of tension characterized the relationship between the state and religion. After World War II, in Eastern countries under Soviet influence there was a comprehensive persecution of the church. The textbooks suggest that the persecution was directed against all religious and churches. In Romania, the Greek-Catholic Church was the main victim, being forbidden by the communists in 1948, in their attempt to sever all ties with the West and to assimilate all religious and ethnic groups into a uniform entity. Textbooks mention only few words about this subject, probably because of the prejudices of their authors against the Greek-Catholic religion, which is seen as an instrument of national disunity. The textbook authors insist that the Greek-Catholic Church had been created by the Habsburgs in order to facilitate the assimilation of the Romanians by the dominant groups in the Habsburg empire.

Usually, the Romanian textbooks stress the Christian influence on the development of European art and the culture, especially during the Middle Ages. Several textbooks for gymnasium point on the negative effects of the church and religion in the European medieval societies,

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<sup>25</sup> 6th grade, All, pp. 45-46; 9th grade, Rao, pp. 203-206; All, pp. 151-153.

<sup>26</sup> 9th grade, Sigma, p. 110.

<sup>27</sup> 10th grade, All, p.32; Corint, p. 22.

<sup>28</sup> 11th grade, Sigma, p. 33.

which shows that Marxist stereotypes if not whole concepts are still alive among the authors<sup>29</sup>. They mention the impact of the church on the education process, the monopoly of the priests and monks being perceived as a negative aspect<sup>30</sup>.

The textbooks for high school seem to be more optimistic in presenting the impact of the Christian religion on the European society<sup>31</sup>. Through the creation of universities, the role of the church is seen to be a positive one<sup>32</sup>. The pupils are told that the church offered a model for the organization of the feudal society<sup>33</sup>. The textbooks also show that in medieval Europe culture was an expression of a society essentially religious<sup>34</sup>. Romanic, Gothic and Baroque art are presented as expressions of the religious ideology<sup>35</sup>. Churches and cathedrals represent the most frequent option to illustrate the information related to religious matters, but to the cultural and artistic ones too. We can find also examples of mosques, as illustrations at the lessons about the Arab civilization, the Islam or on the Oriental artistic influence in Europe.

In the textbooks for Romanian history we can find clearly expressed the idea that all the Romanian medieval art is an ecclesiastical one. This idea is stressed by the fact that all illustrations are churches or miniatures from religious books. The most frequent is the picture of the Curtea de Arges church, from the first capital of Walachia. This church is seen to be significant both for the Romanian medieval art, and for the close relationship between state and church, being at the same time a princely necropolis and a metropolitan church.

For the Orthodox Romanians, Protestantism is seen having a positive role in the cultural area: as a consequence of the Reformation appear the first printed books in Romanian language<sup>36</sup>.

In modern Europe, religion is considered to have become a force opposing the progress of science and the freedom of thinking. The most

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<sup>29</sup> 5th grade, Teora, p. 155.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, p.185.

<sup>31</sup> 9th grade, Rao, p. 167; All, p. 117.

<sup>32</sup> 9th grade, Rao, pp. 167-170.

<sup>33</sup> 9th grade, All, p. 36.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 47.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 93-97; 88-91; 9th grade, Sigma, pp. 150-153; All, pp. 97-108; Rao, pp. 150-153.

<sup>36</sup> 9th grade, Corint, p. 25.

convincing example in this respect is the Index of forbidden books<sup>37</sup>. The actions and ideas of the church are seen to be opposed to the modernization of the society also during the 19th century<sup>38</sup>. In conclusion, for the authors of the Romanian history textbooks, the positive role of the church traditionally ended with the Renaissance and especially with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Yet, we have to mention that such critical insights are to be found only in textbooks for world history; in their presentation of Romanian history, the textbook authors generally avoid criticizing the church.

Political theory tells us that any political force that respects the interests of the church could receive the cooperation and often the support of the church<sup>39</sup>. For the Romanian authors, already during the early Middle Ages the European kings assumed a Christian identity. In the modern era, Protestantism gave birth to the first political parties, as in Germany or in England<sup>40</sup>. For the contemporary period, the authors insist on the religious dimension of the Islamic fundamentalism<sup>41</sup>, but I couldn't find in the Romanian history textbooks any information about the modern Christian democracy.

In Romanian textbooks, we can find some information about an extremist and anti-Semitic political party, the Iron Guard movement, which adopted an Orthodox ideology in the interwar period<sup>42</sup>. For the contemporary period, the authors provide very few remarks on the assumed Christian dimension of some Romanian political parties.

As a conclusion, Romanian history textbooks stress the importance of the church, and especially of the Orthodox Church, and the fact that Christianity became one of the main characteristics of the Romanian national identity. The most important Romanian political leaders are seen as heroes fighting for the Christian faith and for Christianity. This tendency is connected with the recent policy of the Orthodox Church to make saints medieval princes such as Stephen the Great, Constantin Brâncoveanu and lately Michael the Brave.

This strong national bias «saves» to a certain extent also the Greek-Catholic Church in Transylvania. Some authors acknowledge

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<sup>37</sup> 10th grade, All, p. 78; Corint, p. 23.

<sup>38</sup> 11th grade, Sigma, p. 34.

<sup>39</sup> Leslie Griffin, *Religion and politics in the American milieu*, New York, 1995, p. 3.

<sup>40</sup> 10th grade, Corin, pp. 21-23; All, p. 65.

<sup>41</sup> 7th grade, Humanitas, p. 134.

<sup>42</sup> 12th grade, Humanitas, p. 147; Sigma, p. 99.

that at least during the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Union with the Roman Church created new opportunities for the reinforcement of the Romanian national struggle. The political activity of some representative of the Greek-Catholic Church, e.g. Ioan Inochentie Micu Klein in the 18<sup>th</sup> century or Iuliu Hossu in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, is regarded as important, but this is not enough to grant to them the status of national heroes, because they are not Orthodox.

Finally, the Christian religion and the Orthodox Church are perceived as main elements that have preserved the political and national Romanian identity in confrontation with hostile neighbors, Catholics like the Hungarians or sometimes the Poles, or Muslims like the Ottomans.

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- 6th All = Valentin Balutoiu, Constantin Vlad, *Istorie*, Manual pentru clasa a VI-a, All, București, 1998.
- 7th Humanitas = Maria Ochescu, Sorin Oane, *Istorie*, Manual pentru clasa a VII-a, Humanitas, București, 1999.
- 8th Humanitas = Sorin Oane, Maria Ochescu, *Istorie*, Manual pentru clasa a VIII-a, Humanitas, București, 2000.
- 9th Sigma = Alexandru Vulpe (coord.), (Vlad Zirra, Ovidiu Cristea, Radu Bajenaru, Anisoara Budici), *Istorie*, Manual pentru clasa a IX-a, Sigma, București, 2000.
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## Islamic Religious Education in Bosnia

SMAIL BALIĆ

### How is Islam taught in Bosnian School?

ONE ENCOUNTERS about Islam in the Bosnian schoolbooks chiefly when they deal with history and literature. The authors of the schoolbooks come mainly from the Islamic tradition in the country, even though it has grown quite dim. They themselves do not understand themselves in any sense whatsoever as «Muslims», as they and their people are represented internationally by the mass media. In all schoolbooks the word *Bosniacs* is to be found exclusively as the people's name for the majority of the population. In looking at the representational educational material, one can recognize the tendency to awaken in the students understanding of sympathy for a multireligious and multicultural life. In opening sample texts from holy writings in the school readers it is obvious that a proportional key has been followed: because the majority of the population is Muslim, the Qur'an is thus more often in view than the Bible.

In distinction from the textbooks of the Muslim East, in Bosnian schoolbooks, aside from those that are used in the Medresse (theological seminaries), usual eulogies like «God's peace be with him» are not to be found when they mention great religious figures. The way of representing the genesis of religions is more positivist than religious. When, for example, a history textbook states that Muhammad frequently led trade caravans and thus became acquainted with the Arabian peninsula (Pelidija and Isaković, 1994, p. 23), this can encounter contradiction by religiously sensitive Muslims.

On the two dozen Bosnian schoolbooks, which are at my disposal for analyses, I have –as already mentioned– found Islam-related texts primarily in history and reading books for the higher grades for the eight years of elementary school and grammar schools. However, facts, events, and (intellectually creative) persons from Islamic cultural his-

tory appear also in other subjects, with the exception of geography, the natural sciences and computer science. For example, in two books of a structured representation of art written by Željko Filipović (Likovna kultura, 1994), one can encounter names of numerous painters, sculptors, graphic designers and other artists of the Islamic faith, who scarcely appear in such plenty in a country where the majority population is Muslim. An Islamic element is found even in sociology. In a special consideration of the authors, the famous Arab-Berber thinker Ibn Haldūn, (1332-1406) and the Bosnian Hasan Kāfī Pruščak (1564-1616), the «Bosnian Machiavelli», as Ludwig Thallóczy calls him, are mentioned.

Ibn Haldūn was the founder of a new teaching, the subject of which is the «Knowledge of the forms, the laws and developments of human society». He called this course 'the Science of Culture' ('ilm al-'umrān), in which the central place is taken by a theory of social dynamics. These dynamics express themselves in a «continuous cycle of growth, stagnation and decline as the essence of all human history» (Ronart, 1994, pp. 471-472). The scholar pursued the internal causes of the decline of Arabic-Islamic culture. His critique of the static concept of truth and Arab conservatism led to this being accused of being hostile to Arabism. Similarly like Ibn Haldūn, Hasan Pruščak revolted against the establishment: he was in the first instance a moralist.

The literature books for grammar school level are a sample of world literature. For the first time in the history of these schools in Bosnia the texts of the great writers of the Islamic world also appear. Even religious poets, chiefly mystics, are deliberately included, like Ibn al-Fārid (1182-1235), Sa'dī (1231-1292), 'Omar Hayyām (1030-1123), Rūmī (1207-1273) and Yunus Emre (14th century).

Of the many native lyricists, narrative writers, and dramatists, who are represented by samples of their works in educational materials, the following stand out because of the occasional Islamic-religious contemplation: Husein Lāmekanī (d. 1625), a Bosnian mystic with heretical inclinations<sup>1</sup>, Musa Ćazim Ćatić (1878-1915), a modern poet, Meša Selimović (d. 1982), the author of the novel *Derviš i smrt* (The Derwish

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<sup>1</sup> Samples of his religious poetry in German translation are contained in Balić, 1964.

and Death)<sup>2</sup>, and Dževad Karahasan (b. 1953), author of the novel *Der Östliche Diwan*, in which there is a strong mystical trace. The work obtains as a «significant contribution to the fanning out in recent years, also inspired by Islam, of literature in Bosnia: signs not only of a ‘land of hate’ (Ivo Andrić) but also of lively cultural plurality» (Karahasan, 1993)<sup>3</sup>.

### Islamic Religious Education

Religious education in the Bosnian elementary and higher schools (grammar schools) is optional. The parents have the right to exempt their children from religious education. The organization and implementation of religious education is the concern of the relevant religious community. But, in distinction from, for example, Austria, the churches and faith communities do not receive any kind of state support for the printing of the needed textbooks. Because of the present economic situation, the Islamic community has become even poorer than was the case during the Communist period. In the shaping of religious education, therefore, there must be frequent improvisation. Instead of textbooks writing pads must be used at times. The didactic level of education does not essentially differ from that in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941).

The teaching plans follow the customs of that time. There has been scarcely any change with respect to content, if also in the division of the accents and the exclusion of a certain legal concerns (such as in relation to the bank interest or the treatment of women) the effect of reform-minded struggles of Bosnian theologians is visible<sup>4</sup>.

Whereas the image of Islam offered in the schoolbooks on general subjects does not demonstrate any kind of mythological-magical so much as the more mystical characteristics, the image of Islam of the religious teacher is to a large extent adapted to the generally spread orthodox pattern. In history books, for example, the second article of faith, which makes faith in the angel obligatory, is passed over in si-

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<sup>2</sup> This work is a religious-contemplative novel, which takes up with a critical undertone the deepest problems of the existence of human being and his relationship of tension between morality and power and in accordance with the recognition of human weakness it finally leaves unresolved. The German translation, *Der Derwisch und der Tod*, appeared in 1972 published by Otto Müller in Salzburg.

<sup>3</sup> The citation in the introduction by the publisher taken from the cover.

<sup>4</sup> There is more concerning this in my article ‘Bosnian Reformism’ (1995).

lence; in religious education it is given great attention. Also in these books the Creator is most often-called God (Bog), seldom Allāh. New and unusual is the inclusion of non-Hanafitic interpretations in education - although not in hermeneutics (fiqh) but in moral doctrine and in philosophy. Thus in an anthology of ethical texts for the second year students of the Medresse and other secondary schools one can find authorities such as Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi (994-1064), one of the cofounders of the Zahiritic (exoteric) exegetical schools, the Hanbali Ibn Qayyim al-Gawziyya (1292-1350), Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 757), a writer of Persian descent who was accused of heresy and condemned to death, and Ibn Maskawayh (d. 1030), who harmoniously reconciled the ethical Philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and Galen with Islamic ethics. Džemaludin Latić, a poet and Islamic scholar (he has been earlier decreed as a fundamentalist) deals in his textbook *Islam i svjetske religije* (Islam and World Religions) with all major religions correctly and concisely. Additional knowledge on Islam mediates *Islamska čitanka* (Islamic Reader) written by Bilal Hasanović.

In consequence of the almost four years of aggression attempts to change the identity of the Bosniacs are increasing. The work of different sects and groups, who attempt to take full advantage of the need of human beings for their own benefit, is repulsive. The people want security, to be free of fear; the sects offer them narrow-mindedness. Not only do non-Muslim sects threaten the identity of the Bosniacs but Muslims as well, who have proved to be friends in need, are engaged in this. The propaganda and con tricks come from many help organizations. A regressive idea is gradually being smuggled into the country. In the mosques a new, until then unknown prayer ritual has suddenly emerged. Literature with a new view of Islam is being shared. Disputes and enmities are arising among the believers. The Bosniacs have slowly become aware of the danger of this activity. Thus a short time ago the supreme leadership of the Community of believers called for them to safeguard the tradition faithfully and to put in their place all those preachers who spread their views without being called to do so. The Islamic community of Bosnia, as it is called in this paper, wants to remain true to the Hanafitic school of interpretations of the Islam. This is *one of the four* generally recognized interpretations. It is relatively liberal. The school forces one to a free judgement and for that reason is still called *Ahl ar-ra'y* (adherents of one's own judgement).

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## LIST OF RELEVANT TEXTBOOKS

*2nd Grade of secondary schools*

- Pelidija Enes-Isacovic Fahrudin, *Historija. II razred gimnazija*, Sarajevo 1994, 192 pp.  
 Imamović Mustafa-Pešić Muhidin, *Historija. IV razred gimnazija*, Sarajevo 1994, 136 pp.

*History in religious schools*

- Latić Džemaludin, *Islam i svjetske religije* (Islam and World Religions), 1. 2., Sarajevo 2001.  
 Hasanović Bilal, *Islamska čitanka* (Islamic Reader), Sarajevo 2001.  
 Korkut Besim, *Istorija islama* (reprint: Zagreb 1995), Sarajevo 1935, 151 pp.

*Ethics*

- Hrestomatija etičkih tekstova. *Ahlak Za II razred učenika GH medrese*, Sarajevo 1990, 139 pp.  
 Šabeta Salih, *Islamski bonton*, Sarajevo 1996, 102 pp.

## Islam in Austrian Schools

SMAIL BALIĆ

AT A MEETING of Islamic activists held in Austria on 26<sup>th</sup> August 1991 at the Vienna Islamic Centre in the wake of an Imam-Seminar in the presence of Prof. A. Omar Naseef, the acting Secretary General of the Islamic World League with its seat in Mecca, one of the many speakers allegedly quoted the Pope in characterising the situation of the young Muslims growing up in Western Europe. The Head of the Catholic Christendom is alleged to have dispelled the misgivings of his co-operators regarding the growing number of mosques in the West by saying 'let the Muslims go on building their mosques; in the long run their children are in our hands'. Whether or not this was said, it does reflect accurately the growing misgivings on both sides regarding the future of the Islam in Western Europe. In most Western European countries, religious instruction for young Muslims, in so far as it exists at all, takes place in an unsatisfactory and amateurish manner. Only in England, Belgium and Austria is Islamic instruction endowed to some degree with system, pedagogical method and modern didactics accompanied by reflection. Notwithstanding their great empathic qualities and expertise, the projects launched on the initiative of German pedagogues in Soest, Nuremberg and Hamburg for modern Islamic religious instruction have so far not succeeded to extend beyond their regional sphere of influence<sup>1</sup>.

In England, a few elementary schools import Muslim religious instruction. In Belgium and Austria, where Islam is a recognised body corporate under public law, Islamic religious instruction, carried out under state control, must of necessity adapt to some extent to the cur-

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<sup>1</sup> On the positive reception of such a project of the curriculum for religious instruction of Muslim pupils in the Federal Republic drafted by the Landes Institut für Schule und Weiterbildung/Regional Institute for School and Further Education/at Soest, see the essay «In Kairo wurden Weichen für eine neue Erziehung gestellt» in «Islam und der Westen» (Vienna) 7/1987, number 1, p. 12.

rent western educational criteria governing religious instruction in general. Let the Austrian example illustrate to what extent this is effectively the case.

According to a not readily verifiable estimate by the Vienna Islamic Centre, there are at present about 180. 000 Muslims living in Austria<sup>2</sup>. This is almost 2% of the total population. In the Land of Vorarlberg, their number is almost 3% of the total population. In addition to the great mosque in Vienna, another 55 smaller prayer halls-the '*Masjids*', as is their technical term - are available for services and religious instruction outside the schools, with about 70 Imams, none of them of Austrian origin, available for officiating at these activities.

### **Double-tracking religious instruction**

As in the other two or three aforementioned diaspora regions, Islamic religious instruction is offered at two places independent of each other: in the Qur'an courses at the Masjids, and at the schools. The nature and pedagogical-educational qualities of the Qur'an courses have repeatedly been the subject of public discussions and publications, so that there is no need to go once more in depth into their effectiveness. Characteristic for the way in which they operate is that these courses concentrate on teaching their students to write Arabic and read the Qur'an mechanically. Any further religious knowledge and experience imparted often suffers from antiquated medievalism of the forefathers' generation. Very often the customs and traditions of the nomad shepherd are erroneously identified with Islam, and 'medieval deterioration in feudal states' are termed 'Islamic Law'<sup>3</sup>. There is virtually no demand for reflection, which in some such courses is even expressly repudiated. A positive side of the Qur'an courses is that they are orientated towards the indispensable Islamic orthopractice. Thereby they prove to be a welcome complement to the religious instruction conducted under the conditions of a state-run school system.

### **The Austrian Curriculum for Islamic religious instruction**

The outline of religious instruction for pupils of Islamic faith in Austria

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<sup>2</sup> The results of the census of 1990 have not been published.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Umar von Ehrenfels: Religiöse Erziehung Heute. In: «Islam und der Westen» 6/1986, number 4, p. 9.

are set out in the 'Curriculum for Islamic religious instruction at schools offering compulsory education programmes, secondary and higher schools'. Its integral text has been published in the federal law gazette of the Austrian Republic, volume 1983, number 421, as official announcement by the Federal Minister of Education and Art dated 29<sup>th</sup> July 1983. Contents and style of this Curriculum bear the hallmark of the first President of the Islamic community in Austria, elected 1979 and currently still in office, an Afghan Muslim of Sunnite tradition as found in the Iranian cultural sphere. The Iranian terminology used in this Curriculum (Moslem instead of Muslim, Sahra instead of Zehra, Tadjwid instead of Tedjwid, Ebne Madja instead of Ibni Madja, and many others) perplexes and irritates the majority of the Austrian Muslims and their children.

The broad educational aim of Islamic religious instruction as set out in the Curriculum is to impart an understanding of Islamic religion and ethical values, at the same time taking into consideration the universality of the teaching so imparted. Any indication that Islam sees itself as a religion founded by God expressing itself by devotion to God and dedication to the hereafter is completely missing. The teaching units and the observations regarding the didactic construction of the instruction give no indication of the basic ideas underlying the Islamic concepts of God, nature, Man and religion. The two questions as to the sense of life and suffering and the role of religion do not appear on the syllabus. As the individual articles of faith, dogmata, commandments, and historical facts are to be taught as articles of faith not to be questioned, without going into their causative background, the traditional answer to the question as to the sense may also be assumed valid here.

This traditional answer is: Man has been created to serve God and thus also nature. Man, as the vicar of God on earth and as the bearer of the responsible freedom is not explicitly addressed. On the contrary, it is said that the emotional and imitated religiousness the Curriculum aims at is to be strengthened voluntarily. In other words: divine will has, on the one hand, precedence over reason, and will, on the other hand, has precedence over the intellect. Understandably, with such a fundamental attitude, any teaching, albeit rationally founded (*ma'qûl*) yet seen as contradicting the Qur'an or Sunna, is to be shunned. Little wonder that such understanding of faith and education has a more negative than positive effect on Islamic religious instruction in Austria.

### **The legal initial position and the human dimensions of Islamic religious instruction in Austria**

Three years after the Islamic religious community was effectively recognised within the meaning of the law (1979), regular Islamic instruction was introduced in Austria's public state-run schools. Attendance is compulsory for Muslim pupils. However the parents may submit a written request to the school directorate, signed by both parents, within 15 days after the beginning of the school year, asking that their child or children be exempted from such religious instruction.

Currently 14. 000 to 15. 000 boys and girls attend these classes. More than two thirds of them are of Turkish origin. The rest are Yugoslav, Arab, Pakistani and Iranian children. The Curriculum provides that all schools of interpretation of Sunnite Islam including the twelve-imam shi'a be included in the programme. The teaching staff is composed of 60 male and 10 female teachers, all, of course, of Islamic faith; the majority of them originate from Turkey. Elementary grade instruction uses a few books of differing quality written for children. My critical comments on these books will appear in an omnibus volume to be published shortly and prepared by Johannes Lähnemann of the University of Nuremberg.

The instruction in secondary schools given by secondary school teachers –called 'Professors' in Austria– uses the two exhaustive treatises *The Islam/History, Religion, Culture* (Aachen 1973) by Muhammad Hamidullah, the Head of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique de Paris, and *Permitted and Banned in Islam* (Munich 1989) by the Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qardâwî.

The books used in the four-grade basic instruction make no mention of important theological concepts and controversial themes such as dialogue, conscience, human rights, love, ecumene, tolerance and environment. The higher educational programme devotes special attention only to tolerance and responsibility, as well as to Islamic charity and compassion, even towards animals, as propounded in al-Qardâwî's writings.

In addition to the aforementioned textbooks, a specially prepared edition of the Qur'an is used in the religious instruction. The edition comprises the Arabic text and an appendix consisting mainly in an introduction to the Qur'an in German, the translation of the initial surah

*al-Fātiha*, 19 additional translations into German of the last surah-complex, and a table of contents of the Qur'an arranged according to themes.

The seven-page introduction is not, as might be expected, written so that children will understand. It provides no information as to the nature of the Qur'an, which, after all, is an oral message, nor on the origins of its contents and their theological evaluation in the light of history (moments that sparked off individual revelations) and in the light of the alternating importance accorded to partly contradictory concepts of religious philosophy (created or not created, reasoned or unreasoned, and many others). Also missing is the explanation why the Qur'an lacks systematic treatment of themes, a presentation even children in this cultural region expect as a matter of course. This first impression, which, as is explicitly mentioned in the Introduction, Goethe describes with such shocking harshness, should at least be spared the Muslim children by appropriate enlightenment.

The anonymous author of the Introduction is of the opinion that any translation must, of necessity, be a falsification. This would explain why so many Muslims oppose the translation of the Qur'an. Analogously this would explain why, on the part of Islam, the genuineness of the more ancient revelation writings, virtually all of which exist in translation, is doubted. However, many Muslims will certainly not share the author's opinion in this respect.

The author cannot be spared the reproach that he does not refer the pupils to any usable Qur'an translation which would help them gain knowledge of the entire contents of the book. The pupils have to rely on translations, as the overwhelming majority of them have no command of Arabic. The religious instruction course imparts only less than modest knowledge of the Arabic language, and at best only helps the pupils understand a few sayings and prayers learnt by heart.

As for all other subjects taken at school, the textbooks for the Islamic religious classes are available free of charge, the costs being borne by the Federal Ministry of Education and Art.

Apart from the knowledge of dogmatics, ethics and duties, the current syllabus also provides for instruction in Islamic Law and the principles of the Islamic State. The Islamic teachings in this respect should be made clear on the basis of the 'strict observance of the Qur'an and the Sunnah'. The essence of the Islamic State and the secu-

rity and freedom it should grant, as well as their limits, are to be given room in this voluntarily orientated education. However, these themes are excluded from the course, because none of the books used deal with them, and this is fortunate, as otherwise teachers and pupils alike would be plunged in critical situations they would find hard to overcome. The highly debatable theory that Islam is religion and state in one, is alien to the European mind.

I feel that it will still require great effort to adapt the presentation of the Islam to the elite view which, in the context of European life, is alone meaningful and promising.

## The Treatment of Jewish History in Schools in Central and Eastern Europe

IVO GOLDSTEIN

THE PAPER IS FOCUSED on how the Jews, particularly their history, are treated in the school curriculum and textbooks on history, religion and other subjects in some countries that have recently emerged from Communist rule (primarily Croatia, then Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Russia and some others).

I did not have opportunity to analyse textbooks from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but I used results from the project which was organized by the American Jewish Committee (AJC). It is a series of reports about the treatment of the Jewish themes in schools prepared from ex-Communist countries. In this project I wrote the report from Croatia which will be published in the beginning of 2002.

Some of the questions which AJC project posed and I would like to emphasize are: how are Jews likely to fare in these postcommunist societies? One of the crucial elements is the educational system. What do children in the postcommunist countries of Central and East Europe learn about Judaism, Jewish history, the Holocaust, and Israel? Does school curriculum and textbooks stimulate understanding of Jews and their history and culture, or does it reinforce negative perception of Jews? Do students gain some sense of the richness of Jewish history, particularly as it relates to their own history? Do they come to appreciate Judaism as a religious phenomenon spanning the ages? Is both the enormity and uniqueness of the Nazi genocide against the Jews made clear to them? Do students become acquainted with the history of modern Israel and contemporary world Jewry in an objective manner?<sup>1</sup> The answers are far from being either only positive or negative.

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<sup>1</sup> As David Singer poses questions in «Executive summary» in each AJC publication of this series.

History of the Jews in a respective Central and Eastern European country is sometimes very different, not only in the period of the Holocaust. Such is also the importance of the Jewish presence: in the 17th and 18th centuries eastern Poland was the most important centre of the Jewish life in Europe – these regions gave birth of Messianic movement, it was the centre of Talmudic studies, the Hmelnicki uprising happened in this area, etc. On the other hand, in Croatia in this period there were no Jews at all, first Jews who settled in the country immigrated at the end of 18th century and the immigration was the most intensive hundred years after. In Poland before the Holocaust the Jews consisted 14% of the total population, while in Croatia they only represented 0,7%.

One should also take into account the burden of Communism. In Communist curricula emphasis was placed on the progressive character of the working class and «its scientific and progressive worldview» (i.e. atheism) as opposed to «reactionary and retrograde» religion (incl. Judaism). Therefore it ignored the Jewish religious and cultural heritage. For political reasons it also expressed open hostility toward Israel and «Zionists».

Although the situation has changed after the fall of Communism, it will be a long process to annihilate animosity and negligence. Ethnocentrism is also present – even in 2001. One can say that most school textbooks continue to ignore the multicultural character of Russia's past and present<sup>2</sup>. The majority of Central and Eastern European nations do not think of their societies as being pluralistic. Inevitably then, textbooks focus on events and personalities connected with their own nation, while largely ignoring others. Presenting history of the Jews, particularly the period of Holocaust, within the frame of a national history sometimes means confrontation with very painful facts about of the national past.

Some other improvements came after the fall of communism, as the one in the educational system: in communist times, the method of teaching in schools for nearly half of the century was based on a single Ministry of Education-approved system, with a fixed curriculum, and only one possible textbook for each grade and subject. In the last ten

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<sup>2</sup> Lev Krichevsky, *The Treatment of Jewish Themes in Russian Schools*, AJC, New York 2001, 1.

years many new textbooks were written, with variety of approaches.

The treatment of the Jewish history is very important because the attitude towards it shows the level of democracy and development of the civil society. The speed of change in these issues in the Central and Eastern European countries is in principle closely linked with the speed of the approach of the respective country to the European Union.

One of the crucial events for understanding position of the Jews in the European civil society was Dreyfus affair at the end of 19th and beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century. But only three of nineteen Czech textbooks mention it, and none in Croatia. On the other hand, there are some Russian textbooks (like this one written by A. A. Kreder) in which situation is described as it was not possible a decade before:

The fact that Jews lived in many countries of the world became the reason for the flourishing of the mythical threat of an international Jewish conspiracy. Dreyfus was one of the victims of anti-Semitic politics, that is to say, discrimination and persecution of the Jews<sup>3</sup>.

In Czech textbooks the sections dealing with the persecution of the Jews lack methodical approach. Little is written of the ideological sources of hatred of Jews as «murderers of Christ». On the other hand, most textbooks mention that Jews were forced to live in ghettos and that there were pogroms during the Crusades and in Prague in 1389<sup>4</sup>.

Some of the pupils in post-Communist countries do not come to appreciate Judaism as a religious phenomenon spanning the ages, because a Czech textbook says that Old Testament is the sacred book of the Christians<sup>5</sup>. Only one textbook, the one written by Chutko and Rodionova, unlike all other Russian textbooks, tells of the Jewish origin of the Ten Commandments. It even recounts how they were given to the Israelites through Moses on Mount Sinai<sup>6</sup>. On the other hand, a Russian textbook, the author I. N. Ionov demonstrates a vulgar understanding of the basic concepts of Judaism: «The main idea of Judaism is the idea of the status of Jews as the chosen people over all others...

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<sup>3</sup> Krichevsky, *The Treatment*, 17.

<sup>4</sup> Leo Pavlát, *The Treatment of Jewish Themes in Czech Schools*, AJC, New York 1998, 11.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Krichevsky, *The Treatment*, 7.

Because of this, Judaism established a moral double standard in relation to Jews as opposed to non-Jews that did not foster the unification of multinational societies»<sup>7</sup>.

Moreover, these pupils do not get a fair picture of Israel because in Slovak geography textbook Israel is still seen in negative terms – the question posed to the children is: «which neighbour of Israel do not have any of its territories occupied by Israel?»<sup>8</sup>

There are some textbooks which contain controversial, inadmissible formulations. The work by Andrzej Szczesniak unequivocally suggests that the growing Jewish community in Poland in 19<sup>th</sup> and first decades of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries posed a threat to Polish ethnicity<sup>9</sup>. In the list describing the structure of ethnic groups in interwar Poland author claims that there were 7,8 percent, but it was never so low: the percentage varied from 9,8 to 13,4 percent. An unusually tendentious citation was chosen concerning Polish Communist Party, in which the author suggests that its members were mainly Jews dependent on Moscow and involved in espionage activity<sup>10</sup>.

Some of the authors are ignorant about Jewish history and Judaism – for example, in a textbook for 1<sup>st</sup> grade of grammar school in Croatia one can read the following: «according to the Bible Abraham, the ancestor of the Jews, was at the head of the Semitic tribe of Hebrews who came from the southern steppes and the desert. When they came to the new country the Hebrews warred with the natives, and gradually subjected and assimilated them... in the 13<sup>th</sup> century BC the Hebrews left Egypt under the leadership of Moses and returned to the land of Canaan. Moses («drawn out of water») led the Israelites from Egyptian slavery, he gave them laws, was the first and the greatest prophet of the Jews and announced the Messiah (anointed, savior, king), i.e. Christ. On the journey across the Red Sea and Sinai into the promised land, on Mount Sinai Moses received from the God Yahweh the Torah or Pentateuch, i.e. the Decalogue or the Ten Commandments

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<sup>7</sup> Krichevsky, *The Treatment*, 25.

<sup>8</sup> Peter Salner and Eva Salnerová, *The Treatment of Jewish Themes in Slovak Schools*, AJC, New York 1999.

<sup>9</sup> Hanna Wêgrzynek, *The Treatment of Jewish Themes in Polish Schools*, AJC, New York 1998, 16.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

of God...»<sup>11</sup> The text incoherently combines legendary reports from the Bible and rational reports about past events. Did «Moses» really «receive the Ten Commandments from Yahweh» or is this only part of Judeo-Christian belief founded on the Biblical text? Is it permitted to say that Moses «announced the Messiah»? Of course not, because the concept of the Messiah was not created until the time of the kings! Is it allowed to identify the Messiah with Christ in this context, at the time of Moses and during the entire Old Testament period? Of course it is not. This is a Christological interpretation that is more suitable for Christian religious instruction than in a rational story about the past. Finally, it is an incredible blunder to identify the Torah and the Decalogue and say that Moses received the Torah on Mount Sinai!

Mistakes are also made in texts concerning the modern period: «there were three Israeli-Arab wars from 1948 to 1967. The problem of a peaceful solution of relations between Israel, the Palestinian Arabs and the neighbouring Arab countries has not yet been finally solved...»<sup>12</sup> It is not clear why a book published in 1997 does not mention the fourth Israeli-Arab war from 1973, the so-called Yom Kippur war, and the war in Lebanon in 1982? It is as if the author had stopped writing the textbook in spring 1968.

In some countries there is a problem of revisionism, i.e. specific way of the denial of the Holocaust. In Croatia, it is the case with Ustasha movement and his leader Ante Pavelic (1889-1959) who came to power after Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941 and created puppet state of Independent State of Croatia (NDH). The Ustasha regime took over Nazi racial laws together with the customary brutality and barbarism that accompanied them. They committed the genocide against the Gypsies, the Serbs and the Jews. After free elections in 1990 not very significant but aggressive extremist minority started publicly to express nostalgia for the Ustasha past, relativize Ustasha crimes, and even praise the Ustasha state and prominent Ustashes. Although most of those «Ustasha nostalgics» said that they had nothing against the Jews, that they felt for the Jewish victims, that the Ustashes' crime against the

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<sup>11</sup> V. Munic-Bauer, *Povijest staroga vijeka (za I. razred gimnazije)* (History of the Old Age, for 1<sup>st</sup> grade of grammar school), Zagreb, 1998, 49-51.

<sup>12</sup>I. Peric, *Povijest za IV razred gimnazije* (History for 4<sup>th</sup> Grade of Grammar School), Zagreb 1997, 194.

Jews had been a «grave mistake», all this does not ring true – these are insincere and false excuses. All this leaves a bitter impression on the democratic public opinion and the small Jewish community in Croatia. The excuses of people who will not acknowledge the criminal character of the Ustasha regime cannot be accepted. Ustasha genocide over the Jews cannot be evaluated separately from other activities of the Ustasha regime. Any relativizing of the criminal character of the Ustasha NDH means denying the Jewish people's right to their memories, denying them the right to mark with dignity the time when 80 per cent of the Jewish community in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina disappeared. This public phenomenon also left its mark in some Croatian textbooks.

Ivan Vujcic wrote several textbooks about twentieth century. He tries to lighten evaluations of the Ustasha regime, and at the same time presents Tito's Partisans as the side that committed crimes that were as bad, if not even greater. In this way he relativizes the evaluation of the Ustasha movement and regime. In the chapter «NDH subjection to occupying forces» he says: «The Ustasha regime was a dictatorship, headed by the poglavnik, to whom everyone was subjected... there were no elected political bodies... laws on national and racial exclusiveness were passed... The laws persecuted the Jews, Gypsies, Serbs and Croats (and Muslims) who were against the regime. Concentration camps and prisons were opened. The largest was the Jasenovac camp... Alojzije Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb, condemned Jasenovac as a great shame of the Croatian people...».<sup>13</sup> Moreover, Vujcic mentions the attempted coup against Pavelic in 1944 by two highly-placed state officials in the Ustasha government (the Vokic-Lorkovic coup). They allegedly wanted to «break off the agreement between the NDH and Germany, disband the Ustasha army, replace Pavelic, pass laws to introduce democracy, and join the NDH to the anti-Fascist coalition...» These probably were their plans, but it should also have been said that it was impossible for the Allies to accept the offer of the Ustasha conspirators – at that time Great Britain, the USA and the USSR were already closely linked with Tito's anti-Fascist movement.

In the NDH, says Vujcic, «during the war there was cultural and scholarly development to the measure that war conditions allowed. The Croatian encyclopaedia was started before the war... school books

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<sup>13</sup> I. Vujcic, *Hrvatska povijest, udžbenik za industrijske i obrtničke škole* (Croatian History, textbook for industrial and crafts schools), Zagreb 1998, 167.

were printed, musical editions, works in various fields: theology, law, history, sociology, philosophy, pedagogy, music and the fine arts...» After this «rosy» picture about reality in the NDH, the conclusion cannot be called anything but scandalous: «entire spiritual creativity was permeated by the spirit of democracy because it was free of any constraints imposed by the state bureaucracy...»<sup>14</sup> In fact, Jews and Serbs were dismissed from state service, and so were Croats who were in any way even slightly suspicious, books and other texts by «incorrect» authors were banned. The Ustasha attitude to culture was in no way different from that of the Nazis.

Not so drastic, but still very unpleasant is the situation in Slovakia<sup>15</sup>. There are some textbooks, as the one written by Letz, which expresses sympathy for Jozef Tiso (1887-1947), head of the German puppet state of independent Slovakia (1939-1945): the way it is done was to contrast president Tiso to radicals such as Prime Minister Tuka and Interior Minister Mach<sup>16</sup>. This is nothing new, because history textbooks in the Czechoslovak period avoided any general assessment of the independent Slovakia, presenting only a one-sided criticism of its clerical and anti-Communist character<sup>17</sup>. On the other hand, there are other textbooks which treat the subject fairly, as the one written by Kovac, Kamenec and Kratochvil: for example, questions such as «what reasons were given to justify the anti-Jewish measures? Why are these views false?» or «what restrictions on Jewish human rights were introduced in the Slovak Republic after 1939?» clearly shows the point of view of the authors<sup>18</sup>.

Specific is the case of Poland, in which under the Nazi occupation genocide has been committed against the Jews, Poles and Gypsies. Nevertheless, the Jews were the main victims. A fundamental problem is the presentation of these events in a full manner, considering the ideological causes (anti-Semitism and Nazism), the course of events (with an indication of the successive, increasingly drastic stages), and the results (not only the statistical data, but their meaning for the later fate of the Jewish community). In the Polish textbooks the Holocaust is

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>15</sup> Salner – Salnerová, *The Treatment...*, op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

most often discussed as a certain step in the policy of the extermination of the Polish people, not as a separate issue<sup>19</sup>. For example, in the textbook written by T. Siergiejczyk, which covers exclusively the Second World War, of 240 pages of text less than two pages are devoted to the fate of the Jewish people. Moreover, the book omits many important things: it presents the main goals of the politics of the Third Reich during World War II as «the extermination of particular ethnic groups ... Poles, Jews, Gypsies, and citizens of the USSR (mainly Slavs)». It enumerates the extermination camps, describing the deaths in the gas chambers but never indicating that the victims were mainly Jews. There is no separate section devoted to the Holocaust, nor does the term appear in the text. The book does not present the statistics that would create a picture of the tragedy of the Jewish people in Europe and particularly in Poland, whose more than 3 millions Jews were exterminated. On the other hand, Siergiejczyk's book contains many items about the fate of the Jews not encountered in other works; for example, it describes the shooting of exiled soldiers of the Polish army of Jewish origin, as well as the beginning of the Jewish underground in 1939<sup>20</sup>.

In the textbook written by E. Centkowska and J. Centkowski for 8<sup>th</sup> grade, there is a gross simplification in the sentence that «the Nazis prepared the biological extermination of the Polish people». <sup>21</sup> It is unclear whether this statement relates to the rationing of food, the execution of the population (especially the intelligentsia), or the existence of death camps; if it refers to this last subject, this concerns mostly not the Polish people but the Jews. The nature of the extermination camps and their tragic result are not discussed. It is difficult to evaluate whether such essential defects were caused by the belief that certain topics are unintelligible for students fourteen and fifteen years old, by an overloaded instruction plan, or simply by the incompetence of the authors<sup>22</sup>.

In a Russian textbook of the history of the twentieth century, written by Soroko-Tsoupa, unlike others, the tragedy of the Holocaust and the people of Europe during World War II is summed up in two sentences: «in Poland, the invaders built specialized *death camps* beforehand, where unde-

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<sup>19</sup> Węgrzynek, *The Treatment*, 37-38.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-32.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

*sirable* populations were to be annihilated, the Jews and Slavs first of all. During the war years, more than 11 million people were killed in these camps...»<sup>23</sup>.

Very similar attitude was in Czechoslovak textbooks written under Communist auspices. At most, Jewish victims of the Nazis were included in the overall number of people killed in the various countries in World War II. The concentration camps were described as places where antifascist fighters, particularly Communists, suffered<sup>24</sup>.

Educational systems in most of the post-communist countries pass through substantial changes. Jews are not longer enemies, and this is the major improvement. Despite that, there is no reason for satisfaction – there is no doubt that further curriculum reform and better textbooks are needed. Certainly, education should encourage intergroup understanding and not intergroup hostility<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> Krichevsky, *The Treatment*, 21.

<sup>24</sup> Salner – Salnerová, *The Treatment*, 7.

<sup>25</sup> As it is stated in David Singer's «Executive summary» in the each AJC publication.

## Religious Identity and Religious Education in Schools

COSTA CARRAS

**M**ANY PEOPLE TAKE IT almost for granted that it is a mark of the fully developed modern –and, broadly speaking, secular–state that there should be no religious education in schools, often on the ground that religious education is not far removed from catechetical instruction, organized by particular faiths. Others consider that the only permissible form of religious education in the modern age is education *about* religions, perhaps their history, but not instruction in any religion in particular.

The purpose of this brief paper is to challenge these views, without denying that they have some merit. Let me begin however by challenging another view, namely that religious education is undesirable because it is responsible in large part for the bitterness of such conflicts within our region as those in the former Yugoslavia or in Cyprus. This view at least is demonstrably untrue. Certainly all three parties to the Bosnian War made intensive use of religion in presenting their case internationally, and the adherents of all three all too frequently made the places of worship of the other two principle targets of their destructive wrath after the capture of any town or village. Yet the young men who carried out these horrors in the period from 1992 to 1995 had all grown up under a Communist regime, and it is scarcely necessary to add that, after 1945, there had been no religious education whatever in Yugoslav schools.

By contrast not only has there always been religious education in Greek and Greek-Cypriot schools, but the elected leader of the Greek-Cypriots between 1950 and 1977 was an Orthodox archbishop. Greek-Cypriots would scarcely argue that they have made no mistakes of presentation or of substance over the years, but it would be generally accepted that one error they never made was to present the Cyprus is-

sue as one of Christian versus Muslim. Indeed they did not do this even after 1974, when there had been substantial despoliation of church buildings in that part of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish army. It was indeed clear enough in Cyprus, as it was to be later in Yugoslavia, that religious buildings were ransacked not because they were religious but because they were symbols of communal or national opponents.

In short, the idea that there is some direct relationship between religious education in schools and prejudice against other, «outside», religious groups falls down at first examination. Similarly one might well enquire whether there is any evidence of greater religious prejudice in England, which has an established church and compulsory religious education in schools, and France, with neither. I am not aware of any such evidence, and very much doubt such exists.

It is through my own experience, and that of my children, all three of whom grew up as members of an Orthodox Christian community in England, that I would like to approach the issues I have raised at the beginning of this paper. Let me begin with my conclusion: English historical and religious education moved in the same direction, that of greater inclusivity and tolerance, between my generation and that of my children, with –in my view at least– contrary results, namely that they obtained a far better grounding in modern history, and a somewhat less good grounding in religion, so far as school education is concerned.

In the early fifties English history was still taught to some degree in that essentialist, idealized, self-absorbed manner that our investigations have discovered is common in Southeast Europe today. What connection there may perhaps have been between this type of history teaching, and the remarkable British shortsightedness in respect of the coming together of post-war Europe, remains a matter for investigation. The insular and, where not insular, imperial, but in any event self-privileging elements of British history as then taught were among the factors which led me to study primarily ancient rather than modern history. Ancient history teaching, being the history of «others» from a British point of view, was much freer of such elements – though not entirely free, because of a tendency to adopt ancient Greeks and Romans as an «alternative self».

By the 1980s and 1990s all this was past history as well as past history teaching. My children had a far better history education so far as British and modern European history went. There were inevitably some

occasions of creative tension between classroom and family attitudes to history, and I mention one as an example of occurrences that will always occur and should almost be welcomed. When studying Disraeli and Gladstone, one of our children was subjected, without any warrant from the textbook in use, to a parody of Gladstone and almost total admiration for Disraeli by the teacher, whose contemporary outlook was apparently more offended by some of Gladstone's private activities than by Disraeli's public imperialism. It was interesting however that at the next history lesson, one other set of parents, apart from ourselves, sent their child back to class with a sharply corrected account, and the teacher proved glad to discuss the very different balance of priorities in historical judgement thus brought to her attention.

In short, there comes a point at which a little bit of controversy in class actually sharpens children's critical faculties, provided only that over the years, history textbooks and teaching have worked in that same direction. The same is true where religious education is concerned. In my own experience at secondary school, vigorous argument led to the drawing of clear lines of controversy between Christian, non-Christian theist and agnostic views. Other religions however could be ignored, and regrettably were so, in a still imperial and all too self-confident Britain. Behind the otherwise free and broad debate in my own generation there lay however a rather sounder grounding in religious education at primary school than my children were to receive from their primary schools.

This is in a way surprising. After all Britain in the interval between my schooling and that of my children became a multireligious as well as a multicultural society, and the same gradual evaporation of exclusive confidence in one's own historical traditions naturally affected religion also. Why then was the inevitable transition handled less effectively here, in my view at least?

Religion, unlike history, is a subject which from the outset, requires an existential response as well as an intellectual one. This makes for a fundamental distinction with many, although by no means all, other subjects taught at school. Even if children of primary school age had the intellectual equipment to take an overall view of the history or the structure of alternative religions –which they do not– it would still be the wrong approach to attempt this. Where religion is concerned, commitment and experience are of the essence, and this is a valuable

lesson every child must learn, perhaps especially if, when they grow up, they choose to be agnostics or atheists.

Religious education thus seems to me to have three objects. First, contrary to the point I have just made, to teach children the particular religious traditions of the country in which they are living. We were taught scripture from the Authorized (King James I) Version of the Bible, and my children from more recent translations, unquestionably more accurate but with less of the linguistic magnificence or of the resonance of the Authorized Version in respect of later English literature.

A second object should be to give some understanding of what is involved in religious experience and commitment. This should include some experience of worship, and more of religious texts. Here it is important schools, whether primary or secondary, should not appear to be negative towards the phenomenon of worship in general. One of our children's schools, for instance, not only changed the traditional Christmas Carol Service to a Carol Concert, but produced a version of «Come All Ye Faithful» («Adeste Fideles») which informed the infant Christ that we were coming to him although we did not believe in him! (After the inevitable parents' protests, the following year we were given the hymn to sing in the original Latin!)

Most important of all however, although human sympathy is an important quality always to be cultivated as part of a Christian religious education at least, and valuable in itself, it is at primary school level far less from a developing attitude of tolerant interest and far more from a knowledge of one's own religious tradition in sufficient breadth and depth that the child's developing critical faculties will find something to engage with. Otherwise there is a danger of becoming simply confused by a medley of different world views hard enough for a fully formed adult to put in some sort of order, and impossible for a child.

Here, by far the most valuable element in my own later primary school education, which was of course at a Protestant school, was a teaching pack called «Search the Scriptures». Every week we were given about three quotations each from the Old and New Testaments, without any further indication of their origin, and instructed to find their reference.

I cannot imagine a better way to introduce ten- to twelve-year olds to the similarities –and differences– in the New Testament accounts of the life of Jesus, or to encourage them to read large sections

of the Old Testament they would otherwise never approach. I shall not forget one particular quotation: «And they said ‘sibboleth’». (I give no reference on purpose, in case any reader would like to carry out the same exercise as I did.) It was at once evident to me this was from a historical book of the Old Testament, rather than from the law or the prophets, but it still took me the whole available week, reading through every historical book of the Old Testament, to track it down. And when I did, it turned to feature in one of the more unedifying stories of the Old Testament, a real challenge to the critical faculties even of a twelve-year old.

Precisely such knowledge should serve as the meat on which the developing critical faculty of the secondary school pupil is exercised. Where secondary school education is concerned, there should be a progressive change in emphasis, with proper emphasis now given to other forms of religious commitment, forms of non-religious or anti-religious commitment, and intellectually based refusal to accept any commitment at all; and also with substantial opportunity for pupils to discuss existential, ethical and dogmatic issues.

With this background, which I trust sufficiently illustrates the point that the issues which have concerned us in the Joint History Project of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe are not unique to our region, I shall now approach the questions and the attitudes I mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

I would suggest that the modern democratic state has as its central thrust not an end, namely the inculcation of a particular world view, whether religious or more probably secular, but a means, namely the inculcation of a specific manner of operating in society. This combines elements of respect for law, respect for the other, respect for democratic and pluralistic methods of decision-making, and the maximum degree of freedom for each individual citizen while remaining within the other parameters just mentioned. There is nothing contradictory however in a democratic society also adhering by majority will to certain substantive positions, religious or political, and accepting that these will play some appropriate role in moulding that society’s further development.

Thus we have different models in for instance the US, in Britain and in France. The US is a constitutionally secular but religiously inclined state, where religion is not taught in schools and, perhaps partly

as a result, religious sects, including the weirdest, are stronger than in most other parts of the world. Britain is a religiously low-key country with a system of religious education that inculcates tolerance and with different established churches, in England and Scotland. These serve both to bring society together –most effectively– at moments of ceremonial emotion and –rather less effectively– to set the ethical tone of public life. France is an ideologically secular state, where religious bodies are consigned to the periphery, something which is not the case, at least to the same degree, in the US or Britain. These three examples surely demonstrate that there is no one single model generally acceptable in the modern democratic and liberal world. There is certainly no general principle that religion must necessarily be a purely private concern: quite clearly it is not even in a country as ideologically committed to the non-establishment of any religion as is the US.

What is clear however is that the manner of taking decisions in a modern democratic society at the very least demands an open-ended type of religious education that is totally different from the simple acceptance of a position inculcated by some authority. This has two implications of fundamental importance. The first is that religious education in schools should involve consultation with but should not be controlled by religious bodies. The second is that the state must more clearly recognize that religious identity –or the lack of it– is something of great significance in itself, and not just an appendage of national or communal identity. A moment's reflection will show that crucial as various national traditions have been in history, the chances are low that many of them may prove of general and eternal significance, yet that possibility is still very much open where at least three of the religions of Indian, and three of those of Near Eastern origin, are concerned. They cannot but play some role in a world where closer communications inevitably press us towards a search for shared bases of discourse.

In my view those states which deny their secondary school pupils the chance of making acquaintance with, for instance, the Psalms of David, the accounts of Jesus' life and mission in the Gospels or some suras on the majesty of God in the Qu'ran, to take examples but from religions of Near Eastern origin, are neither serving the ideal of liberty nor displaying a spirit of tolerance, but in fact depriving their pupils of a triple opportunity, for wider knowledge, for freer choice and for deeper experience. In short, they are failing their future citizens, and

laying some of them open to the exploitation of their religious ignorance and inexperience in later years.

Religious prejudice, as the tragedy of Yugoslavia has so graphically illustrated, does not require religious education in schools to transmit itself. Actually it does not even require an active religious commitment. It requires only the historical wounds, grudges and prejudices that are habitual between communal and national groups with distinctive histories. One of the tasks, by no means the only one, of religious education in schools is to make it possible for pupils to undertake a positive religious commitment, if they so choose, for exclusively positive reasons, not out of ignorance or prejudice.

Even within these parameters however the task of achieving a balance is not easy, nor will the same balance be appropriate in every country. Clearly some have a dominant religion, others a most varied religious history, and it would not be appropriate to have exactly the same system of religious education, for instance, in Britain, in Greece and in Germany. All the same, there are some general problems that will always be with us.

That section of religious education which concerns teaching children the particular religious traditions of the country in which they are growing up should ideally be taught to children of any religious background whatever, while, on the contrary, the experience of worship cannot cross the boundary of religion, though it may arguably cross lesser religious divides (such as that between the Orthodox, Protestant and Roman Catholic expressions of Christian faith, for example). The same is true of that segment of religious education which concerns the study of its basic texts.

This raises the dilemma that both those school systems which separate children according to religion for their religious education (e.g. Greece) are to some degree correct, but so also, to some degree, are those which keep them together. Furthermore the most suitable balance is likely to alter in the last years of secondary school, when more attention should be given to major ethical issues, and to the comparison between different religions or world views. The preferable balance may also change if and when a society becomes more or less multicultural over time.

A second issue concerns respect for the pupil as a fundamental characteristic of the democratic non-discriminatory state, even when a

particular religion is established. During the larger part of school education this cannot be met by treating the child prematurely as a grown-up, but by respecting, to a greater or a lesser degree, which must remain a matter of judgement, differences of family religious background. As the years pass, this respect should pass in slow stages to the individual pupils, as they gradually come to exercise their freedom and assert where they themselves choose to stand. That process only comes to an end of course with the finalization of secondary education and the assumption of citizenship.

Finally, and most important, religious identity, or the lack of it, should be acknowledged as significant in itself, not as a mere appendage of national or communal identity. This can serve as an equally strong force against religious prejudice as institutional tolerance, and certainly a far stronger force than anti-religious prejudice inculcated at school. It is also an important reason why, in my view, a properly thought out system of religious education is in principle a positive element in a modern and democratic society.

## Perceiving the Religious ‘Other’ in a Secular Educational Context

HANNA KASSIS

THE FOLLOWING REMARKS are not answers to the questions set by the organizers of the Workshop. Rather, they are random thoughts on the topic by an outsider, a non-Southeast European looking on the inside. It is not my intention either to pontificate or to attempt to pretend that I know more than I do. What I will say here in regard to religion and education, I would say in any other setting.

How do we or should we perceive the religious «other» in a secular educational context? To start, I believe that our view of the «we» in this question determines, in large measure, our perception of the «other». Let me cite some examples. Addressing his god, Aton, in ancient Egypt, maintained his vision of Egyptians and non-Egyptians, but saw them both as being equally in the care of his god. His ideas were rejected and he may have paid for them with his life. The Hebrew Bible (the Old Testament of the Christians) speaks of Israelite and Gentile. They see themselves addressed by God as being His people and He being their God. God will make the «other» subservient to them. «Thy neighbour» (the *qarôb*) in the commandment, «Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself», is the kin, the fellow-Israelite, or the stranger that «dwells among you». The Greeks spoke of Greek and Barbarian, the one whose language was incomprehensible to the Greek ear. There were those who were Roman citizens and others who were not. Islam speaks of two categories of the «other». First, there are *ahl al-dhimmah* (People of the Trust) or *ahl al-kitâb* (People of the Book), both largely in reference to Jews and Christians – particularly those living under the rule of Islam. Secondly, there are «the dwellers in *dâr al-harb*» («house of war»), those who are outside the realm of Islam and who thus form the potential of being an enemy. In the Gospel of the Christians, first the Biblical commandments, that appear separately in the Hebrew Bi-

ble, «to love God with all one's heart, etc.» (the Hebrew *shemâ'*) and «to love one's neighbour (*qarôb*) as oneself», were put on equal footing. Furthermore, the *qarôb* (the «other») is, perhaps unrealistically, identified with one's enemy.

This is not intended to suggest that, in a multi-religious environment, we should adopt the one definition to the exclusion of the others. My intention is to draw attention to the need for us to be cognizant of the problem of defining for ourselves what we mean by «we» and the «other», and of what criteria we employ in arriving at our definition.

I am confronted with further problems in the definition of terms. What do I mean by «religion», and what in fact is «secular»? Does «secular» imply a total separation of «church» and state? Are Great Britain, with an established church, or Greece, with a constitution based on Christian trinitarian dogma, secular states? Or does the term imply the non-interference of the «church» in the management of the affairs of the state? In this case, does not religion (not the «church») have an influence to bear on the shaping of society and –by extension– the management of its affairs, whether or not religion is mentioned in the documents that define and govern the state?

Similarly, questions should be asked regarding the use of the term «religion». Is it what Rudolf Otto (*The Idea of Holy*) meant when he described it as a human response to a power that lies beyond the human ability to define or describe, a power that shapes and governs human existence, by allegiance to which one finds security given the frailty of the human condition? But, is this not an individual, personal, religion? Or do we mean the set of ritual and liturgical practices that arise from and attempt to express doctrines and dogmas –at times incomprehensible– that are adhered to by a group: *ecclesia* or *jamâ'ah*? Or do we mean a sense of identity adopted by an individual or a group that willy-nilly defines the group as Christian, or Muslim, or Jewish, or any subgroup within any of these? And when asked, «What makes you what you are?» the honest answer would be, «I do not know, but I follow the religion of my ancestors». Or is religion a set of historical events held by a specific group of people to be pivotal in shaping their identity? It is important for me to define my terms before I can proceed to introduce religion into education.

The argument could be presented that, by its very nature, religion is divisive in that it is promoted by means of constructing fences around

itself. The argument could further be advanced that one of the greatest dangers confronted by religion and the religious community is that of assimilation and syncretism, that separation and containment are the best guarantees for the preservation of the religious and historical identity. In such an argument, the suggestion that a religion other than one's own can or should be studied is rapidly dismissed as an unproductive, if not altogether a dangerous exercise. I disagree with this conclusion. Permit me to advance a parable.

In one of his short stories, written towards the end of his literary career, the English novelist Graham Greene speaks of a small village tucked away in a valley after the great cataclysm of a nuclear war that all but destroyed life and the living on earth. The story focuses on the children of the village, victims of the futility of the generation of their parents. They were sweet children in spite of the physical deformities that afflicted their tender bodies as a result of the proliferation of nuclear fallout. They and their community lived in the isolation wrought by the destruction of the world around them. They were survivors of human madness. The children lived their innocent childhood and played happily together. One day they ventured deeper into the valley than ever before. Hearing noises and seeking their source, they encountered what they had never thought could exist: children like themselves, but from another village. They immediately reached for sticks and stones and began to fight against the others.

No one had cared to inform the children in this parable about the «other», and the lack of information posited the «other» as a source of danger. They conducted their lives peaceably and securely, but without reference to the «other», and when the inevitability of encountering the «other» became a reality, they were not prepared for the encounter. In a certain sense, those responsible for bringing them up into a world safer than that into which they were born, violated a principle eloquently advocated by the distinguished Latin American writer, Carlos Fuentes, who said, «Una cultura que se pretende 'pura', y que cierra sus fronteras a la invasión de otras culturas, es una cultura destinada a perecer... No somos lo que somos más que en el conocimiento de lo que no somos» – «A culture that attempts to remain pure and that shuts its borders to other cultures is one that is destined to perish... . We are not what we are without knowing what we are not» (*Diario 16*, Madrid, 22 June, 1991).

In my view, one of the main causes of social and national conflict is the inability or unwillingness of the individual or a society to compre-

hend those whose way of life, religious beliefs and customs, colour of skin or language are different from that which is perceived to be the norm. The point to be emphasized, is that it is not required of us to adopt the way of life of the Aother≡ and abandon our own. Rather, what a healthy society needs is to *accept* the simple fact that there *is* an Aother≡ X another person, another race, another set of customs and traditions, another language, another way of life X and that this Aotherness≡ is not only acceptable but enriching. To accept the Aother≡ is to be enriched by the Aother≡.

I do not know of an area of human activity that has as great an impact in shaping our identity and our relations with the «other» as do religion and history. Regrettably, our writing of history (which in large measure is framed by religion) is seen as either a record of our great achievements – largely in the battlefield, or of the nastiness of others towards us. We do not write history to analyse the nasty manner in which we may have treated the «other». If we write history as a record of our suffering at one time or another we should be mindful of the fact that no society whatsoever has a monopoly on suffering.

The case of religion in education, particularly in a secular context, is even more complex. For more than thirty years I taught at a university which was prohibited by law from teaching religion. And yet, I taught in a department that specialized in the study of religion. Rightly so, the intention of the law was to prohibit the use of the power of the teacher or the institution of learning from inculcating or teaching religious beliefs. Ours was not the task of teaching students how to be religious. Instead, ours was the contractual responsibility to make them deeply aware of the contents, beliefs and practices of various religions. None of the churches would trust us to train their candidates for the priesthood or religious ministry. But we were expected to be objective in presenting the ideas and ideals of a specific religion in a manner that would make its adherents identify with it – without anyone developing the sense that they were being preached to. Here is where the secret lies. How do we introduce the students, in an institution funded by a secular state, to the ideals of a religion without preaching it? What material do we choose? How do we select and convey the material?

Take the case of Islam, a religion not unknown in Southeast Europe and yet, not really known. Do we use the images generated in the Middle

Ages, negative as they were, to convey the religion? Would we be guided by the media and their selection of items worthy, for whatever reasons, of dissemination and diffusion? Do we reiterate the statements of authoritative bigots whose mission it is to present the religion and its adherents in as ugly a form as possible? What models of Islam and Muslim society do we use? And to what end?

As a student of history I am fully aware of the jolts brought about by the rise of Islam in the seventh century, and by the growth of the Muslim state in the succeeding centuries. Whether or not justified by what really occurred, the fact remains that there was (and, perhaps continues to be) a fear, in non-Muslim societies, resulting from the rise of Islam. Historically, the fear was generated by the rapid collapse of the heartland of Christianity and its major sacred centres: Palestine, Syria, Egypt, North Africa and Spain, and the threat to France and the rest of Europe. France in the west, and what was left of the Eastern Roman Empire, became frontiers for the defence of the Christian realm – a realm in a state of disarray in the seventh century – against the rise of the Islamic state. But it would be naïve to assess the concerns of the Christians only in terms of the loss of territory. It was more the doctrines of Islam that confounded the Christian: here was a religion that was so close to Christianity and yet so profoundly distant (please refer to the text, «An outline of the Doctrines of Islam»). John of Damascus saw it more as a schism than an abomination. This fear was exacerbated by raids for booty by individuals or groups, official agents of the rising Muslim state or individual brigands, into the realm where Christians lived. In other words, the fear was (and perhaps continues to be) genuine.

The simple fact is that much as we would like to do so, we cannot remake history and change the course of events that have already taken place. At the same time, however, we should not dwell on emphasizing the negative in the process of writing history and creating or defining our identity.

The face and human composition of Europe is changing rapidly due to immigration (as is the case as well in North America). There is an ever-growing presence of Muslims in countries that at one time or another were on the frontline of the defence of a Christian Europe against the incursion of the «infidel». In this regard, one cannot escape noticing not only the demographic change taking place in such European countries as France and Great Britain, among others, but also the positive re-

sponse –slow at times– to this change. Not unlike Spain and Portugal, Southeast Europe had a closer, first hand experience with Islamic power, an experience that sets them apart from northern and western European societies.

In talking about Islam and the Muslims in an educational context, the first thing that needs to be done, in my view, is to eliminate the clichés and stereotyping formulae that were developed and have been sustained since the Middle Ages. The Muslims are no more lovers of luxury, inclined to sexual activity, nor prone to warlike conduct than are their European counterparts. It is true that Islam mirrors the Biblical (Old Testament) tradition in respect to condoning war for religious purposes (see the brief reference to *jihād* in the «Outline of the Doctrines of Islam»). But it should be remembered that New Testament pacifism is not the canon by which Europe and Christian societies live. Islam did not preach its religious message by the sword in the fashion frequently regurgitated by many writers. I suggest that parallel to the study of the rise and conquests of Islam, one should also focus on studying its doctrines and ethical precepts. In addition, we should equally concentrate on its immense contribution to the development of Western civilization: in the fields of science and medicine, agriculture and irrigation, astronomy and mathematics, optics, music, philosophy, geography and commerce, and by preserving, augmenting, and transmitting the learning of the Greeks, Syriacs, Persians and Indians, among others. It would be advantageous to the learner to discover that the art of making paper (brought over from China), the technique of distillation, the establishment of libraries that are open to the lay researcher, the founding of universities (at Fés in Morocco and Cairo in Egypt), and the construction of hospitals, are among the contributions of Islam to human development.

Democracy is not simply a political system whereby we elect our representatives in the management of the affairs of state, or in have a free opposition that can keep a check on the government. Nor is democracy limited to freedom of speech and expression. In my view, democracy is a state of mind in which I recognize the full rights of the «other». And it goes without saying that I cannot recognize the «other's» rights until I have come to know that which makes the «other» an «other». I cannot speak of democracy and freedom if these are based on the affirmation that my way of life or X more important for my purposes X my beliefs are superior to those of the «other».

Let me conclude by reiterating my conviction that it is essential in a democratic society to develop a positive and accurate awareness of each and every group within that society. Pretending the non-existence of the religious «other» is a facet of escapism. Presenting the «other» in a manner that would perpetrate the notion that he is the enemy to watch out for is a recipe for hostility and self-destruction. For me, therefore, the study of religion in a school system –be that in Southeast Europe or elsewhere– is a requisite for developing the necessary means of meeting and recognizing the «other». This does not mean that the school (or other institution of learning) is the place for inculcating the religious beliefs of any segment of society, dominant or minority. But the school is certainly the place where, depending on the integrity of the teacher and the accuracy of the curriculum, the religions of all segments of society are studied positively and constructively. The aim of such a necessary educational exercise is to build bridges over the valleys of separation. Instead of reaching for sticks and stones, the children in the village of Graham Greene's creation would meet and greet the «other».

#### **An outline of the doctrines of Islam\***

Islâm is a state of total submission to God, whose majestic name in Arabic is Allâh (a name which is employed not only by Muslims but by Arabic-speaking Christians and Jews as well). Simply put, Islâm is a response (*talbiyah*) to the divine call (*da'wa*) for loving, unquestioning obedience to God. Such obedience can be achieved only through the discipline of abiding by God's Law (*sharî'a*) and the life-ethic (*sunna*) which He established for mankind.

According to Muslim doctrine, the first Muslim was Abraham, and the first act of islâm (or "submission") was his obedient response to God's command (*amr Allâh*) to offer his beloved (unnamed) son as a sacrifice (See Genesis 22) and the son's parallel willingness and cooperation:

*And We gave him the good tidings of  
a prudent boy;  
and when he had reached the age of  
running with him,*

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\* Extracted from Hanna Kassis, "Christian misconceptions of Islam", *The Ecumenist* (September-October, 1987), pp. 88-91.

*he said, 'My son, I see in a dream  
that I shall sacrifice thee; consider,  
what thinkest thou?'*  
*He said, 'My father, do as thou art  
bidden; thou shalt find me, God willing,  
one of the steadfast.*

The Qur'anic narrative, typically brief and evocative in style, differs from its Biblical counterpart in some details. Two of these (the call in a dream and the unnamed son) are minor; the third (the son's willing response) is quite significant and is highly emphasized by the Muslims. The response to God's command is not only that of him who is to sacrifice, but also of the son who is to be sacrificed. This entire act of father, obedient to God, and son, willing to abide by God's decree, must be seen as Islam's expression of God's relationship with Man: God's love for mankind is matched by mankind's loving obedience to God. This loving obedience of Abraham (who is known as "God's intimate friend" [*khalîl Allâh*]) and his son is Islam's archetypal or primary event (or Myth) and is celebrated as the highest feast (*'îd al-adhá*, "the feast of the sacrifice") in the Muslim calendar.

The Muslim is called upon to recollect this "primary event" and to realize it in his or her own life through the discipline of *action* and *belief*.

*Action:*

In obedience to God's Law (*sharî'a*), which is the primary law for individuals and society, and guided by the example of the Prophet, who epitomizes God's Law in his practice (*sunna*), a Muslim is required to fulfill two sets of obligations as a matter of discipline: ordinances of divine worship (*'ibâdât*) and acts of piety (*taqwâ*). Among the former, one is called upon to do the following:

- to restate the principles of faith by testifying (*shahâda*) that there is no god other than God and that Muhammad is His Apostle;
- to perform the ritual prayers (*salât*) five times daily;
- to pay the ritual tax (*zakât*) and give alms (*sadaqa*) to the needy;
- to fast (*sawm*) during the month of *Ramadân*, the month of the revelation of the Qur'ân;
- to make an effort to perform the Pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca at least once in one's lifetime.

*Acts of Piety:*

In addition, a Muslim is required to perform acts of piety which include the following:

- to do those things that are lawful (*halâl*) and to refrain from doing those things that are forbidden (*harâm*);
- to give of one's treasured substance to kinsmen, the orphan, the needy, the beggar, the traveller;
- to ransom the slave;
- to fulfill one's covenant, when one has engaged in a covenant;
- to perform the struggle (*jihâd*) within oneself to overcome the devil's temptation, and with the community against the enemies of God and of Islam; and to endure misfortune, hardship and peril with fortitude;
- to fulfill one's obligations in this world, without it becoming an end in itself, and to direct all of one's thoughts and actions toward obtaining God's pleasure and the rewards of the world to come;
- to seek to understand the Law of God; to expand his mind to the knowledge of all aspects of God's creation and to expand his heart to the grace of God;
- to ask God's forgiveness for all his sins, known and unknown;
- to mention the Name of God frequently as a self-reminder of His sovereignty, and to praise God and proclaim God's greatness and sovereignty in every circumstance and on all occasions.

A Muslim is further required to recognize that the human being (male or female) is God's supreme act of creation, superior even to the Angels. Consequently, every Muslim is a brother or sister to every other Muslim. Male and female are equal in the eyes of God; to each, however, is given a set of responsibilities and obligations (socially and economically) and hence differing privileges (economic and social). Moreover, in the community of faith (*umma*) no person of any class or race is superior to any other; superiority is measured only by God in terms of piety and obedience.

*Belief:*

The primary article of faith in Islam is to believe in the oneness and uniqueness of God (tawhîd) who is without associate or compeer (*lâ ilâha illâ Allâh wahdahu lâ sharîka lahu*), and that Muhammad is His Apostle (*rasûl Allâh*) and Prophet (*nabîy*). Equally important is the

belief that the Qur'ân is the uncreated speech of God revealed through Muhammad as the divine gift of Guidance (*al-hudá*) to mankind, and that it contains the basis of all that is needed to govern human existence and being. In addition, the Muslim is called upon to believe:

- that this world is finite and passing (*dâr al-fanâ'*) but that the world to come is the world of permanence (*dâr al-baqâ'*);
- that there is a Day of Resurrection (*yawm al-qiyâma*) and of Judgment (*yawm al-dîn*) on which the living and the dead shall answer for their thoughts and actions; that Paradise (*al-janna*) is the reward of those who abide by God's Law, and that Hell (*jahannam*) is the penalty for those who rebel against it. The Muslim is further called upon to believe in the existence of Angels, the *jinn* (guiding spirits that can lead man to either good or evil, depending on his will) and *Iblîs*, the fallen angel who disobeyed God and who tempts mankind to rebellion and disobedience.

Islam teaches that God revealed His Word through earlier Apostles and Prophets, notable among whom were:

- Moses (Mûsá), bearer of the Torah, who was succeeded by other Prophets bringing God's promise of deliverance to the Children of Israel and warning them as they swerved from obedience to God's Law;
- Jesus (‘*Îsá*), bearer of the Gospel, who, by God's command, was born of the Virgin Mary. By God's command, Jesus healed the sick, raised the dead and breathed life into formed clay (birds). He taught righteousness and the worship of the true God and foretold the coming of Muhammad. But contrary to the affirmation of the Christians, Jesus was neither divine nor the Son of God. According to Islam, God did not beget nor was He begotten and has no compeer (*lam yalid wa-lam yuwlad wa-lam yakun lahu kufu'an ahad*). Furthermore, according to Islam, although people thought otherwise, Jesus was neither crucified nor did he die. But he shall return at the initiation of the Day of Judgement. Nor is the vocabulary of the Trinity accepted by Islam.

But for profound and irreconcilable differences in matters of christology, Islam and Christianity are very similar. And not unlike Christianity, Islam sees its revelation as supplanting and superseding those that preceded it.

It goes without saying that the precepts here summarized constitute the ideal of Islam and that not all Muslims abide by them. As students of history, we must be aware of the fact that there is an abyss that separates our ideals from the reality of our life. This is true as much of Islam and the Muslims as it is of Christianity and the Christians, Judaism and the Jews. In terms of human relations the question remains: Do we concentrate on the mysterious that is beyond the full grasp of the human mind, and that separates? Or do we allow the mysterious to remain mysterious and dwell instead on the ethical dimension that affects human lives and that –in the case of Islam and Christianity– has the capacity to unite? Do I cease to love my neighbour as myself because my neighbour and I employ different vocabulary to express our respective love for God – the same God?





Β. Σκουλάτος - Ν. Δημακόπουλος - Σ. Κονδής, *Ιστορία Νεότερη και Σύγχρονη*, Τεύχος Γ'.  
Γ' Λυκείου, Athens, Ministry of Education, Pedagogical Institute, 1998, p. 405.

CHAPTER III

**The Past in the Mirror of the Present**



## A. CYPRUS

rak bildikleri kimselere çatılmakta ve örgütün, Rumları her bakımdan koruyacağı belirtilmekte idi Broşürde hem Makarios ve hem de Grivas'a müzaheret gösterilmekte ve her ikisi de övülmekteydi.

İkinci broşür ise, tam mânası ile Türkleri hedef almakta ve Türklere karşı iktisadi bir boykot ilân edilmekte, buna sebep olarak da Türk liderlerinin "Türkten Türk'e kampanyasını açık olarak yürüttükleri gösterilmek istenmekteydi. Bu tamamıyla yanlış bir ithamdı. Cumhuriyetin ilânından önce, böyle bir kampanyanın varlığı doğrudur. Fakat Cumhuriyet'in ilânından sonra Türk Liderlerinin böyle bir kampanyayı aleni olarak teşvik ettikleri doğru değildir.



**Resim 5 : Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin yıkıcısı ve Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun amansız düşmanı baştethişçi Makarios.**

Bu örgütün Rum siyasî Liderliğince yürütüldüğü ve esas hedefinin Türkler olduğu aşikârdı. Örgütün vazifesi ise, Akritas Plânı tahtinde siyasî ve askerî yönlerden çalışarak, Ada'yı Yunanistan'a bağlamaktı.



# Citizenship, History and Memory in Turkish Cypriot Society: Is there Room for Cypriotness?

NERGIS CANEFE

## Introduction

**I**N THIS ARTICLE, my aim is to reveal some of the continuous links between history writing, history education, and the sense of belonging in modern Turkish Cypriot society. Being a *defacto* divided society since 1974, Cyprus has long suffered from an inner hiatus in terms of national identification of its citizens. Examination of the way history is remembered, written and passed on, both at official and private levels, provides important clues about the sources of the lack of a coherent, solid anchor for claiming to be a Cypriot among Turkish Cypriots. Here, I discuss the normative basis of the political process that led to an extended ‘crisis of citizenship’ in modern Turkish Cypriot society. The resultant analysis primarily dwells on the socio-political repercussions of the predominance [or absence] of certain patterns and molds in the remembrance of the past.

On the issue of national citizenship, it is not quite possible to talk about an established principle that leads to a desired outcome or indeed to list institutions, political practices and social mechanisms that would yield a desired outcome. Contrary to the premises of liberal theories of justice, fairness or reasonable agreement which all assume a neutral and consensual beginning point for devising a harmonious social order, citizenship is a highly political phenomenon with a normative core. A citizenship contract that binds while protecting differences, which legitimises state-authority while never totally yielding to it, which makes historical sense while remaining open for change, is a peculiar product with no attached recipe. It is, however, one that a well-functioning, open society cannot do without in the age of post-Enlightenment.

Whether embodied as a practice or worked towards as an ideal, that kind of citizenship embraces many of the necessary conditions for social peace and political livelihood. If both the practice and the ideal of it are lacking, or severely suppressed, then the effected society is most likely to suffer from a dormant state of affairs in terms of social, economic and institutional change, an oppressing socio-political silence, and, a large degree of hopelessness regarding the future.

Meanwhile, citizenship cannot be discussed without its formative components. These include the state, the institutional order, civil society, dominant political culture and the premises of the social contract that aims at keeping a given society together. In this context, citizenship is to be defined as something much more complex than a standard mechanism utilised for the achievement of distributive justice in modern societies. Neither could it be reduced to an edifice of mutual advantage binding the society and the state together. Despite its universalist and impartial frame supported by the post-Westphalia system of nation-states and the principle of national sovereignty, citizenship is not a generic product of national politics, either. Its specific applications serve and create cultural demands, produce, accentuate or erode political practices, and, feed upon and are fed by particular readings of communal and national history. In the following pages, I look at both the conditions and some of the critical dimensions of the citizenship contract that came into effect during the post-1974 period of Turkish Cypriot history.

In order to achieve this task, I first outline the theory of citizenship I subscribe to. I then examine the historical specificities of the appropriation of citizenship in the post-Independence (post-1960) and post-1974 Turkish Cypriot societies. I conclude with observations about where the existing Turkish Cypriot citizenship contract fits in the larger spectrum.

### **Citizenship, Authority and Legitimacy: Strange Bedfellows?**

Every modern state claims authority over its citizens, but not all can claim legitimacy that encompasses the entire national polity. In other words, although authority needs to be legitimised in order to be more than a systematic exercise of brutal force, one does not necessarily or easily link with the other. This precarious bond between supreme authority and political legitimacy finds one of its best expressions in the

area of what may be called 'the citizenship contract' (Green 1988). Citizenship is a relationship between individuals and states, which simultaneously embraces rights and duties (Bauböck 1994). At the state level, it implies the classification of individuals into insiders and outsiders according to their membership status in a given state and the differential treatment of these two groups. At the individual level, it signifies both specific and general institutional guarantees, rights and obligations. And although a state without citizens would not be a state, existence of citizenry does not guarantee that the political power carried by the state and its institutions acquired a legitimate standing. This asymmetry is due to the fact that citizenship is not based upon an equally binding contract. The approval or denial of one's status as a citizen primarily lies in the hands of the state one claims the citizenship of. Furthermore, in view of the history of many of the modern nation-states, it is plausible to argue that citizenship cannot always be characterised as a matter of consent or socio-political negotiation. Rather, it has mostly been a situation-bound political arrangement<sup>1</sup>.

Citizenship, in this latter context, almost unilaterally symbolises the individual's consent to abide the sovereign state's authority. There may thus be a considerable degree of arbitrariness and force involved in the initial formulation of the 'citizenship contract'. Of course, there is an *ipso facto* remedy for the arbitrariness or indeed selectiveness of the original definition of citizenship.

The history of Western European nation-states proves that it is possible for a once-autocratic state to develop or embrace principles and practices of democratic citizenship. In a nutshell, if the state were structurally forced to act as a just authority and can avoid differential treatment of its citizens, the citizenship contract would eventually gain wide-

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<sup>1</sup> Leslie Green argues that «Even if one would perish outside a state or there is no via le exit route, it does not follow that one must accept its authority in order to live inside it. One always has the option of conditional submission without consent, of peaceful compliance. This will normally be enough to avoid sanctions. What of those exceptional times when oaths of allegiance are required and loyalty tests proliferate, when one must either 'love it or leave it?' In such circumstances, the options of consent or exile would obviously be extortionate.» (Green 1988, p.175) These are exactly the types of situations in which forced population exchanges take place, or communities move across borders *en masse* in search of another site of authority which would trust their loyalty as citizens. For an excellent debate on the relationship between citizenship and membership, see Walzer (1981).

spread legitimacy (Beitz 1979; *idem.* in Luper-Foy 1988). However, in and of itself, even what is defined as 'democratic citizenship' does not guarantee an equal or even reciprocal relationship between the state and the individual. The form itself does not entail a chosen content.

What I allude to by the 'content of the citizenship contract' concerns the dominant political culture in a given society. A focal point of the political cultures thriving in modern societies is the definition of a distinct national polity. Who is in, who is out, what inclusion entails, rules of exclusion or selective admission, the basis for rights, the minimum for duties, the limits of state intervention, the dangers of the absence of public authority, the conditions that apply to all and premises that concern only select groups, *et cetera*, constitute the bare bones of political debates across national societies. The nation is a specific kind of political community but like all political communities, its existence depends upon enclosure. It is the act of setting the boundaries that renders nation-state-based political cultures and thus national citizenship meaningful. Hence, here is one of the major dilemmas of nationalised political life: an affair –i.e. the content of the citizenship contract– which is so internal to the society concerned is dictated by system-wide, external criteria. In modern politics, the sovereign state is universalised as the basic unit of enclosure as a result of which the distance between 'the state' and 'the national polity' is reduced to a minimum. More specifically, as the sovereign nation-state model became an Archiemaedean point from which all 'sovereignties' are evaluated, nation-based citizenship got accepted as the ultimate contract between the state and the individual (Ruiz 1990 in Walker and Mendlovitz, p. 82)<sup>2</sup>. Once there is a sovereign state, the assumption is that a national polity would surface which is ready to fine-tune the general contours of the citizenship contract.

However, the basics are already expected to be there. Ironically, this unmediated or presumably already existent relationship between state and society framed by a categorical definition of national citizenship does not take into account the triadic balance between the people,

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<sup>2</sup> "[A]t the level of social and political practice, sovereignty is less a question of the 'right of a people to self-determination' and more a practice that gathers together fundamental presuppositions about the character of human dwelling, that is, about how peoples are constituted as historical and political communities." (*op. cit.*, p. 83)

governing institutions and the normative basis of the social contract that binds state and society together. Authority is not a prerogative of the 'ruler' but a relationship of participation, representation and legitimation. As such, despite the asymmetry of power I mentioned earlier, the authority bestowed upon the sovereign nation-state in matters concerning citizenship is not an independent variable capable of engendering a constitutive relationship between the state and the national polity. The dictum of self-determination may well provide a seamless narrative for the historical constitution of a legitimate political community. Meanwhile, the sovereign state model skips the question of 'deliberation' by the people that it appoints as the harbor of the state's legitimacy. There may well be one or two examples in European history where this model applies. And yet, in general terms, this saturated construction of peoplehood dangerously avoids the challenges posed by the variant historical dimensions of the emergence of different national polities<sup>3</sup>.

In summary, concerning theories of national citizenship, I believe the undue emphasis on the virtues of peoplehood and propositions concerning what comes after national self-determination lead to a profound misunderstanding of the cultural, historical and geopolitical determinants of the formation of national polities. An alternative approach is needed to provide a critical historical assessment of both the content and context of emergent nationalisms and new citizenship contracts. While national histories continue to be written or perpetuated from the perspective of 'national self-determination', national polities are constituted through or indeed after the process of self-determination. In the day-to-day reality of political life, there are no implicit reasons for the citizens of a sovereign state to give consent to that state's authority.

Concomitantly, unless acknowledged as an adequate expression of their loyalties and their expectations by the majority of the populace, self-determination can produce not social peace but widespread political and

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<sup>3</sup> The persistent primary attachment to the state has a lot to do with the perception of the sovereign state as the absolute and unconditional bastion for legitimacy and security in the international arena. In terms of crude geopolitics, all territory belongs to existing states, and the loss of territory is considered an unacceptable violation of the sovereignty of a given state. In other words, even the idea of deviations from the norm of state sovereignty ring the alarm bells for anarchy and destructive chaos. For further debate, see Alker and Shapiro (1996).

cultural discontent after the 'Independence Day'. In this regard, I opt for a 'historicised' understanding of citizenship rather than attempting to fit different examples in a trajectory signifying the development of democratic citizenship. One given is that in nation-state-based politics, citizenship potentially conveys a large array of rights, duties and guarantees regardless of the society under observation. However, whether and under which circumstances this potential is realised is a matter that is best dealt with historically rather than categorically.

In this general framework, in the next section, I look at some of the determinants of the Turkish Cypriot project of nation building and examine the content of the citizenship contract that emerged with the unilateral affair of Turkish Cypriot self-determination. I am fully aware that this particular instance does not fit into the international picture as an accepted case of sovereign nationhood. However, as far as the citizens of the Turkish Cypriot self-approved state are concerned, their state exists and their passports and pensions and military duties are as real as these would be in any other state. On these grounds, I believe there is enough justification to discuss the Turkish Cypriot case within the framework of national self-determination and configuration of a new citizenship contract. The Turkish military invasion of 1974 and the subsequent division and militarisation of the island should not blind us to the fact that Turkish Cypriot lives are not spent in some *terra incognita*. It is indeed necessary to have the courage to look inside the Turkish Cypriot society as it is today in order to make sense of both the current developments on the island and the variant appropriations of the Cypriot past. There is more than just an omnipresent foreign army across the Green Line in the North. In this shunned part of the island, there is a changing, living society trying to come to terms with its own past as well as its present conditions.

### **The Discontents of Turkish Cypriot Identity: Imperial Subjects, Colonial Messengers, Freedom Fighters and Loyal Citizens**

The course of events leading to the birth of an Independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960 is commonly interpreted in markedly different ways in British, Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Greek and Turkish societies. Meanwhile, one point that representatives of different debates tend to agree upon is that the Republic did not yield a common sense of Cypri-

otness or a solid basis for Cypriot citizenship. In other words, independence from British colonial rule did not bring forward a nation-building project capable of embracing different ethno-religious segments of Cypriot society. Instead, the model of consociational democracy legalised by the Cypriot Constitution was mainly devised as a buffer against the clash of different socio-political visions entertained in Turkish and Greek Cypriot societies. The standard expression of their original difference finds its best expression in the 'ENOSIS versus TAKSIM' postulate, revealing that each community had more interest in joining their respective motherlands than building a new, independent Cyprus for themselves. As the new state was founded upon the idea of a people consisting of two national communities, the institutional framework was geared towards preserving and safeguarding their differences rather than cultivating a common ground. It may be argued that this was perhaps the only way of keeping two communities together whose immediate common past entailed a civil war. In the meantime, the fact that the 1959 London and Zurich Agreements were not a result of a consultation or negotiation process involving significant sectors of Turkish and Cypriot societies made the resultant state a typical example of authority without internal legitimacy. In this sense, from the very beginning, the post-Independence Cypriot society lacked a substantial citizenship contract. The new framework offered by state sovereignty seemingly harboured a sense of Cypriot distinction by prohibiting the unification of Cyprus with any other state. However, in terms of a thriving new political culture that would render this prohibition meaningful, neither the terms of Cypriot Independence nor the short history of the new Republic did include the development of common ideals of civic unity, freedom or good governance.

Upon this basis, the years between 1960 and 1974 did not lead to the embrace of the idea of a united, Cypriot nation or a volitional Cypriot national polity except in limited circles such as the labour union movements or communist party membership. In turn, these select groups suffered unduly both in the hands of the Greek junta and also in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion (Papadakis 1993a, 1993b). Their vision of Cypriotness was reduced to the prophecy of a dangerous minority and it could not be accommodated in the passionate and violent atmosphere of the widespread civil turmoil of the Republican years. In trying to understand the history of this interim period, the influence of

both Turkish and Greek motherland ultranationalisms on the unfolding of the Cyprus problem has to be considered carefully (Ioannides 1991). Similarly, the divide-and-rule politics of British colonialism had a lot to do with the pre-Republican polarisation of ethno-religious identities (Pollis 1973, 1996) with long-term spillover effects.

However, overseeing the internal background to the crisis of citizenship in Cypriot society in the Republic itself would also be a gravely erroneous approach. External influences are absorbed in unique ways in each society, depending on the internal dynamics of already existent networks of relations, historical self-consciousness, power structures and the institutional framework. I call the totality of these elements the dominant political culture of an era in a given society. In the case of Cyprus, neither the pre-Independence struggle years of 1955-1960, nor the Republican years of 1960-1974 witnessed the successful harbouring of a politically articulate and socially viable sense of Cypriotness. Therefore, the dominant political culture of these critical decades was not conducive for the emergence of a widespread sentiment of civic belonging. Instead, whether in response to each other's extremism and outside influences or not, Cypriots of Greek and Turkish origin chose to embrace primarily an ethno-religious and militant vision of social unity and political viability.

Since the purpose of my paper is not to develop a comparative analysis of Cypriot citizenship in Greek and Turkish Cypriot societies, here I will only concentrate on the aspects of Republican Cypriot history that played a role in the subsequent formulation of a Turkish Cypriot citizenship contract. The lack of a sense of common will, common bonds and ultimately, a common institutional space to be shared in the new Republic laid the foundations for the establishment of separate Turkish Cypriot enclaves from very early on. The sense of total isolation, the felt necessity for absolute self-sufficiency, and, long-term endurance of socio-economic hardship then rendered life in the enclaves the basis upon which post-1974 generation of Turkish Cypriots authoritatively claim that co-existence with Greek Cypriots would be disastrous. In this claim, there is no space allowed for centuries-long complex networks of bi-communal existence under the Ottoman or British colonial reigns. In the Turkish Cypriot case, this omission is primarily due to the fact that national Turkish Cypriot history is seen as a totality in and of itself, severed of its ties with other forms of socio-political association prior to or along-

side the national one. In this context, the Ottoman reign in Cyprus is narrated as the opening chapter of Turkish Cypriot national history (Canefe 2001a). In other words, what is remembered and registered as recent or old history is guided by the current projection that Turkish Cypriots constitute a national polity on their own.

This projection has also been aided by the physical circumstances of Turkish Cypriot life during the Republican period. Since the 1963 constitutional breakdown, the militaristic administration of the enclaves and the extended condition of being sieged and therefore being always on the defense eradicated the memory of the positive aspects of the Republican experience or the pre-Republican history of bi-communal life. Similarly, the physical move to the enclaves and then to the North of the island erased the geography of bi-communal existence and ultimately the validity of thriving to live together again. In these respects, concerning the Republican period, Turkish Cypriot vision of the past is commonly marred with refuge, war, fear, isolation, bloodshed, minority-sentiments and injustice. In the new institutional framework of the unilaterally declared (1983) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, representations of the Republican past thus unequivocally depict the period as the bloodiest time in the struggle for Turkish Cypriot independence. Consequently, sections of the Republican history that witnessed the development of bi-communal ties or new relations are not included in the accounts pertaining to that period. Oral testimonies of individual Turkish Cypriots sometimes prove otherwise (Papadakis 1998; Canefe 2001b). However, the predominant form of remembrance of Republican history in Turkish Cypriot society is devoid of events, trends or even ideals about a common, civic Cypriot identity.

Tragically, what comes after the 1974 events of the officially celebrated Turkish Cypriot independence proved equally problematic for the formulation of a civic model of belonging in Turkish Cypriot society. Although there is now an 'independent' Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly, army, health and education services, *et cetera*, the very existence of this unrecognised state depends on the presence of the Turkish Army and the economical backing of the Turkish state. As a result, Turkish Cypriot society maintains a highly militaristic and dependent character. Independence, in this context, does not mean independent statehood and autonomous existence. The post-1974 history of the Turkish society reads more like a switch from isolation and a search

for a legitimate identity in a consociational Republic to a state of conditional independence and semi-colonisation. This phenomenon becomes all the more obvious at the citizenship front. The legal incorporation of several different categories of Turkish nationals into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as Turkish Cypriot citizens overdetermined the character of the new citizenship contract. Here, added to the equation are not only returning Turkish Cypriots and skilled technicians, professionals and guest workers 'imported' from Turkey (Ioannides 1991; Dodd 1993). The new arrivals from Turkey include civil servants and their families, former Turkish military personnel and their dependents and large communities of peasants and labourers from select Anatolian towns and villages (Ioannides, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30).

Here, I will give a very brief description of the 'settler problem' in Turkish Cypriot society. The data I rely on is mostly based on journalistic accounts, eyewitness narratives and critical scholarship produced by Greek Cypriot scholars. Needless to say, more work needs to be done in this area despite the difficulties involved in conducting research on such a politically volatile issue. Meanwhile, I think there is enough documentation to suggest that the settler issue is one of the biggest challenges that Turkish Cypriot society is faced with since the civil war of the Republican years. To start with, Turkish civil servants began to arrive shortly after the 1974 invasion, with a clearly stated mission to maintain the economic infrastructure and provide vital public services. In order to provide stability for the performance of the tasks they undertook, they were granted Turkish Cypriot citizenship and were allowed to bring their families to settle. This move may well be justifiable in the face of continuous waves of out-migration depleting the resources of the Turkish Cypriot society. However, the attribution of citizenship to the settlers in the second and third categories proves to be much more problem-laden. The second group, that of Turkish military personnel, includes families of the soldiers killed during the 1974 invasion, retired officers who were involved with either the Turkish [Cypriot] Resistance Organisation (TMT) or the invasion and its aftermath, and, demobilised soldiers and their families. These Turkish citizens were accepted to Turkish Cypriot citizenship based on a ministerial addition to the Turkish Cypriot Citizenship Law in 1975. Accordingly, not only were they given citizenship but also entitled to immovable property in the form of a house and land. The third and final category of settlers

–peasants and labourers migrating in large groups–, on the other hand, constitute a true exception even for the Turkish Cypriot Citizenship Law. They have been arriving on the island since 1975 mostly under the temporary label of labourers and seasonal workers. Their accommodation in Turkish Cypriot society caused and continues to cause both legal and socio-political problems. The majority of the settlers in the third group has either been brought to Cyprus via recruitment centers established in major Turkish cities or has been told that they have to move by Turkish state authorities. It is true that the final say for the attribution of Turkish Cypriot citizenship remains in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot government.

However, there seems to be a tacit general agreement between Turkish and self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot states about the selection and treatment of settlers. As a result, accepted settlers were promised and provided moving expenses, land, homes and resources to help them get settled on the island, a situation very much at odds with what Turkish Cypriots themselves were provided with after the military division of the island. Second, although a very large number of Turkish Cypriots born and raised in Cyprus but settled abroad cannot vote during the Turkish Cypriot elections, all the three categories of new settlers have voting rights due their newly acquired status as Turkish Cypriot citizens. Needless to say, this selective distribution of the right to vote severely undermines the representative mechanisms of political pluralism operating in Turkish Cypriot society. And thirdly, although Turkish settlers who accepted Turkish Cypriot citizenship can go back and live in Turkey, Turkish Cypriots who reside in Turkey without a Turkish passport are treated as aliens on Turkish soil and have to regularly come out of the country to extend their residency and work permits. Even more ironically, Turkish Cypriots who opted for a Turkish passport to live in Turkey [mostly due to the fact that they hold a Republican Cypriot passport] cannot purchase land or property in Cyprus and have to clear customs and immigration for their entry to the island. In short, regarding the treatment of each other's citizens, there is an obvious power imbalance between the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot and Turkish states. As I already argued, it is a relationship of dependency and hegemony rather than mutual benefits. Under such circumstances, it is hard to imagine a citizenship contract that embodies a reciprocal relationship between state and society in the northern part of Cyprus.

### **Conclusion**

I opened this discussion suggesting that central to theories of citizenship is the issue of membership to a political community, which comes with attached duties as well as rights and privileges. I then argued that the final configuration of a citizenship contract has as much to do with history as it does with politics. In this regard, attention has to be paid to three aspects of the history of a given society: remembrance of history, uses of history and differences in historical trends concerning the formation of a citizenship contract. I chose the theme of dominant political culture as the context within which these three aspects of history can be discussed.

In modern Turkish Cypriot society, history, memory and citizenship are intertwined in such a way that the end result is highly precarious. The current citizenship contract binding Turkish Cypriots still living on the island does not reflect their fundamental interests or their deliberate choice to be part of this very society. Instead, its normative core is determined by a semi-colonial, militaristic or at best highly dependent relationship with Turkey. This determination leads to a large degree of arbitrariness in the setting of the boundaries around the Turkish Cypriot national polity, as a result of which, whether one is in or out loses some of its substantive meaning. Belonging in Turkish Cypriot society thus assumes a rather contingent character. However, this is not the kind of contingency that provides impetus and structural openings for citizens to challenge the state in order to voice their needs and opinions. In order for a political community to articulate ideas and goals concerning its own definitions of what is good and valuable, there has to be a stable mechanism in place protecting the boundaries of it against arbitrary intrusions. There also has to be enough open political space for arbitration to take place between what has happened in the past and what is happening at present. Going back to my original postulate concerning the three aspects of history, a meaningful and morally defensible citizenship contract involves active involvement in the future of one's society. If the conditions are not present for critical reflections about the past and direct involvement in present developments, then the will and ability to imagine a future is most likely to be minimal.

The fact that there now exists a self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot state does not at all guarantee that the crisis of citizenship has come to

even a temporary end in Turkish Cypriot society. The 'original contract' and 'general will' approaches to sovereignty do presuppose an already-given consent justifying the state's authority over its citizens. However, unless the state in question exercises supreme authority on the basis of contractual agreements and recognizes the continuum of needs that emerge within the political community that it seeks legitimation from, it errs towards force rather than authority. Blind ethno-nationalisms may not be so troubled with the issue of consent since they are defined in terms of an original source of legitimacy provided by the presumed historical standing of a designated community (Anderson 1983; Smith 1986, 1996). The problem is that in reality, there is no neutral, uncommitted point of origin to which one could retreat and assess the validity of one's commitments to a political community (Green 1988, pp. 196-97). In this respect, the conditions of the attribution or denial of citizenship and the enjoyment or curtailment of equal rights of membership to the national polity indeed reveal the content of the most basic social contract that binds the state and the society<sup>4</sup>. Ultimately, these conditions also tell us a lot about the way in which societies face their histories.

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<sup>4</sup> One of the best illustrations of this linkage is in Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, particularly in the chapters on «Race-Thinking Before Racism», and «The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man».

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## Otherness in the Turkish Historical Discourse:

### General Considerations

ÉTIENNE COPEAUX

I WOULD LIKE to present here some general reflections about the Turkish account of history and the perception of Greek otherness as it is passed on to the pupils and Turkish population since several decades. Such considerations are useful for the present workshop on Cyprus, since Turkish textbooks are, of course, used in Northern Cyprus, and the present Turkish-Cypriot cultural policy –its conception of Turkish identity, too– is largely influenced by the Turkish one.<sup>1</sup>

To understand the conception of «otherness» in Turkish textbooks, I think the analysis of logic and rhetoric of the textbook's discourse to be more important than the search for prejudices, exaggerations and offending words. If taught repeatedly for years in the life of individuals, the rhetoric of a discourse, the account of history as a

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<sup>1</sup> Some of my publications about Turkish account of history: *Espaces et temps de la nation turque. Analyse d'une historiographie nationaliste, 1931-1993*, Paris, CNRS-Éditions, 1997, 369 p. ; *Une Vision turque du monde à travers les cartes, de 1931 à nos jours*, Paris, CNRS-Éditions, 2000, 240 p. ; «Les prédécesseurs médiévaux d'Atatürk. Bilge kaghan et le sultan Alp Arslan», *Revue d'Etude de la Méditerranée et du Monde Musulman*, n° 89-90, 2000, pp. 217-243 ; «La nation turque est musulmane: Histoire, islam et nationalisme», in Groc Gérard (dir.), *Formes nouvelles de l'islam en Turquie. Les Annales de l'autre islam*, n° 6, Inalco-Erism, Paris, 1999, pp. 327-342 ; «L'image brouillée du christianisme», in Günther Seufert et Jacques Waardenburg (éd.), *Turkish Islam and Europe, Beirut Texts and Studies*, vol. 82, Stuttgart-Istanbul, 1999, pp. 159-178 ; «Les mots de la mort dans les manuels d'histoire turcs», in Veinstein Gilles (dir.), *Les Ottomans et la mort. Permanences et mutations*, Leiden, New-York, Köln, Brill, 1996, pp. 303-324 ; «Hizmet: a Keyword in the Turkish Historical Narrative», *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 14, 1996, pp. 97-114 ; «De l'Adriatique à la mer de Chine: histoire turque et identité», *Internationale Schulbuchforschung - International Textbook Research*, vol. 3, n° 18, 1996, pp. 307-322 ; «L'image des Arabes et de l'islam dans les manuels d'histoire turcs depuis 1931», *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI)*, n° 12, 1991, pp. 195-212.

whole may shape the ways of thinking of a whole population and, in our concern, his way of seeing the «other side». In fact, openly hurtful remarks against the Greeks are rather rare in Turkish textbooks –though I have pointed out some striking examples– but what is important to be underlined is that a great part of the historical narrative in Turkey has been shaped by the existence of Greek otherness.

### **The ideological control on textbooks**

Turkey is a state where history is one of the cultural power's most important concerns. In Turkey, everybody knows Atatürk's sentence: «History writing is as important as historical deeds». During the thirties, the state, and Atatürk himself, put a strong control over history writing and teaching. The structure of the narrative, the account of history, the historical subjects to be taught, the fields of historical and archaeological research, were subjected to state decisions which formed what I consider as a coup *d'état* in history. The instrument was and remains the *Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu*, «Council for Instruction and Education», a state organization that controls everything in education. Until now, every textbook, in Turkey and in Northern Cyprus as well, has to be authorised by this institution. Periodically, directives are published to explain not only the contents of teaching, but also the political and ideological frame within which every teacher has to mould his lessons.

Although there are today a great deal of publishing houses and numerous textbooks series, there are few differences among them, regarding their discourse and their ideological leanings. To take an example, in textbooks used during the nineties, the titles and subtitles of the lessons are exactly identical, openly revealing the scheme imposed by the administration. Moreover, as Turkish state is coercive (to put it mildly), the account of history is now interiorised and is seen as «natural» and «objective» by the citizenry ; this account is taken up again by the medias and every official institution, and is widely accepted, except for by islamist trends and by certain academic and research circles, independent of central power.

### **The narrative is a plea**

In keeping with the features of the narrative, I deem very important the fact that the historical narrative, as imposed by Atatürk in 1931, was

conceived and institutionalised soon after Turkey had been threatened of death as a state, in 1919. Western powers were strongly anti-Turkish and philhellenic, and were convinced to be heirs of the ancient Greek civilisation and culture; the idea of the «Greek miracle», formulated by Ernest Renan in 1876<sup>2</sup>, was very popular among cultural circles in the West, and strongly irritated Turkish elite. Until now, some Turkish history textbooks openly challenge this philhellenic prejudice.

In fact, the historical discourse has been willingly conceived to give a response to these anti-Turkish feelings in Europe, a response to the formulation of the Greek miracle: a plea, in order to build on a proud Turkish national consciousness, and to rehabilitate the Turks in the minds of the West; in short, to state the existence of a «Turkish miracle» and to proclaim: «Our culture is at least as ancient and brilliant as the Greek one». This new discourse, which pervades the textbooks until now, is addressed to Turkish pupils and citizens in order to build on and preserve their national pride; but it is addressed, too, beyond the pupils, to the detractors of the Turks, the Greeks and the West which is the very «super-addressee» of the discourse. Hence, a great part of the narrative is tense with polemical character.

Shortly, the Turkish historical discourse has been almost entirely conceived in relation to the existence of an otherness, the Greeks, who lived together with the Turks during centuries but became twice unfriendly, in 1829 (independence war) and 1919 (invasion and occupation of Western Anatolia by the Greek Army).

Which are the effects of such a process in the framework of the historical discourse, how does it give its structure to Turkish identity? First, in the frame of this historical controversy, the Turks had to prove the antiquity and the high level of their own culture. This has been the function of what was called the «history thesis» (*Tarih Tezleri*), whose chief aim was to «prove» the absolute precedence of Turkish history, culture and language, and the decisive role of the Turks in the dawn of human civilisation. The Turks were supposed to be of a superior race, and, according to these views, all antique civilisations –among them the Greek one as well– owed their existence to the Turks.

Though these views were taught from 1931 until the beginning of

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *La Démocratie grecque vue d'ailleurs*, Paris, Flammarion, 1990, pp. 245-265.

the fifties, it was difficult enough to find archaeological or linguistic evidence of such statements. Moreover, such an account of history doubtfully was acceptable for Western historians and academics. Therefore, further explicit formulations of the «history thesis» disappeared later, but the idea of Turkish cultural superiority remained in the discourse as a presupposition; and, as you know, it is much more difficult to identify and to analyse a presupposition than an explicit, openly asserted exaggeration. This presupposition is now one of the bases of today's conception of what is called in Turkey «national culture» (*millî kültür*).

The second effect, later on, was and remains a particular view on ancient history, seen and taught according to what I call a retrospective teleology. In order to prove a Turkish presence in Anatolia before the Greeks, Turkish historians of the thirties alleged that the Hittites were of Turkish origin. Then, it was rewarding to infer that some Anatolian cultures, like the Ionian one, were influenced by the Hittites; consequently, the high level of civilisation reached by the Ionian cities – Milet, Ephesus, Phoea, Halikarnassos– was due to the vicinity of Hittite culture (which is probably true), that is to say to an alleged –though indirect– Turkish influence. Though, later, the supposedly Turkish origin of the Hittites was thrown away, and though the idea of a Turkish influence on Ionian culture was abandoned, the influence of Anatolian cultures on the Greek one was used to relativise and minimize the famous «Greek miracle». An «Anatolian identity» was created by some Turkish authors, an anachronistic «imagined community» including some civilisations of the Antiquity together with the Turks, who are supposed to be their heirs.

Consequently, the present account of ancient history is very deficient and incomplete; a set of selected chapters explain Hittite, Phrygian, Lydian, and Ionian cultures, but almost omit the Greek, and subsidiarily the Roman and Armenian ones. Turkish writers and novelists like Halikarnas Balıkcısı, Sebahattin Eyuboğlu, and at last Turgut Özal, when he was Prime Minister, developed such ideas<sup>3</sup>. According to their views,

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Halikarnas Balıkcısı, *Anadolu'nun sesi*, Istanbul, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971; Sabahattin Eyuboglu, «Bizim Anadolu», in *Mavi ve Kara*, Istanbul, 1973; Turgut Özal, *La Turquie en Europe*, Paris, Plon, 1988. About the latter publication, see the polemical critique by S. Vryonis, *The Turkish State and History. Clio Meets the Grey Wolf*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991.

the Ionian brilliant culture was the result of an Asian influence, not of a Greek one. Later, this Anatolian culture was transmitted to Athens, where it could but survive less than a century.

The third effect is a leap over Byzantine period, almost completely concealed, with generally one page only, or even less, for a history of thousand years. The Byzantine Empire appears only in the beginning of the chapter dealing with Islam history, to present the historical context of Islam's birth. The second opportunity, for the authors, to evoke Byzantium is the battle of Mantzikert, which opened Anatolia to the Seljuk Turks in 1071; this event is an opportunity to state that the Turks had to fight, during thousand years, against one and only enemy, hellenism. A coincidence of dates (the battle of Mantzikert and the Great Offensive of 1922 both took place on August 26) allows many parallels in the nationalist discourse, so that the Greek appears as a permanent enemy who gives the narrative its very structure. In addition, the unfolding of both battles are very often compared in order to state that the Turks display eternal virtues, in 1071 and in 1922 as well: they are brave and faithful, able to defeat powerful armies, even superior in numbers; and they are merciful towards their enemies: Alparslan has freed the Byzantine emperor Romanos Diogenes, exactly as Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) freed Greek general Trikoupis 900 years later.

### **The Greeks in the historical narrative**

Apart from ancient history, the Greeks mainly appear three times in the narrative: when they were incorporated in the Ottoman Empire (14<sup>th</sup>–15<sup>th</sup> century), when they fought for independence against the Turks (1829), and when the Greek army landed in Turkey, occupied Western Anatolia and was rejected by the troops of Mustafa Kemal (1919–1922). In general, the narrative of Balkan history is tense by the need, for Turkish authors, to state that local populations wished Ottoman presence; the discourse is enamelled by well-known stereotypes trying to put in evidence Turkish tolerance, Ottoman sense of justice, etc.

The Greeks are described as benefiting from freedom and justice, and from a very good economic and political situation under Ottoman domination. As the Greeks did live easily and quietly in the frame of the Empire, their revolt can only be interpreted as growing out of foreign influences. Hence, the revolt is understandable, and the narrative seems neutral, while the exaggerations or offending words remain rare.

The two main features of the Greeks' image are their ungratefulness and their propensity to seize opportunities: the Greeks rise up only if Ottoman army is already kept with another problem. But to be fair, the Turkish textbooks never describe the Greeks –like other Balkan peoples– as treacherous - unlike the Arabs.

The most severe judgments on the Greeks appear in the chapter dealing with the Turkish Liberation war (1919-1922). Once more, according to the narrative, the Greeks seized an opportunity, not for a revolt, but for an attack, in order to realize the *megali idea*. In turn, the defeat of the Greek army is described as the defeat of dangerous cowards, spreading death and slaughter during their retreat, an episode which probably gave birth to the stereotype of the coward evzone, very often used by Turkish satirical cartoonists:

The Greek soldiers showed that they were wonderful runners. Hoping to save their own lives, they ran so fast that even our cavalry could not catch them. A coward is dangerous. While fleeing, the Greek units burned the villages and towns where they passed through. They pierced even defenseless persons with their bayonets. The Greeks, always and everywhere, describe the Turks as Barbarians. When they launched soldiers to Anatolia, they said: «We are providing civilisation to the Turkish Barbarians». But, when they left our beautiful Anatolia, they spread blood and tears, they let behind them pierced corpses of babies and women, and ruins and ruins... This is the Greek conception of humanism and civilisation<sup>4</sup>.

### **Identity and otherness**

If we put aside the Greeks, generally speaking the place of otherness is very thin in the narrative, because of the main choices of the curriculum. Today, the proportion between national, European and World history reflects the choices of Turkish cultural power since seventy years. Due to the strong necessity to utter «We exist», as it was felt at the beginning of the Republic, the narrative is almost entirely devoted to the history of the Turks. The most important issue is the history of Turkish *ethnos*, so that the accent is not laid upon the history of a country –

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<sup>4</sup> Kalaycı Şenol, *İlkokullarda Atatürkçülük*, İstanbul, Servet, 1988, p. 34.

Anatolia –but the history of a nation– the Turks. Consequently, the narrative unfolds, along the centuries, from Innermost Asia to the Balkans, presenting the past of territories which lay very far from the present country of the Turks, and neglecting some important pages of Anatolian history. This is the history of Turkish identity as seen by the central power – the history of the Turkish «family».

Nevertheless, another part of the narrative is devoted to the history of ancient Anatolia, in this spirit of retrospective teleology described before; but this account of Anatolia's history is very deficient, neglecting such important issues as Byzantine Empire. I use to describe it as the history of the «in-laws», as far as the Turks have «married» this past and this land.

A third part of the narrative consists in Islam's history, the «family of adoption». As this history is intrinsically the past of the Arabs, this is, theoretically, the past of an otherness. Since nowadays, according to the idea of «national culture», Turkish identity is exclusively seen as Muslim, history of Islam, as a consequence, is mostly perceived as a part of the history of the Turkish identity<sup>5</sup>.

At last, history of Europe and of the world is very thin in Turkish narrative: only twenty or thirty pages for the whole European history in the two volumes for secondary schools. Moreover, recent history is not taught: World War II, Nazism, the Shoah, international and even Turkish events of the second half of the twentieth century remain unknown to Turkish pupils.

### **Cyprus in textbooks**

What I presented may be considered as a general view on history as moulded by the conception of «national culture» and the ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This is roughly what is shared by Turkish population, including Anatolian Turks established in Northern Cyprus, and Turkish Cypriots as well, because education, in Cyprus, has been taken into care, since decades, by the so-called motherlands, Greece and Turkey.

Surprisingly, and this is in contradiction with the importance of the Cyprus issue for Turkish policy, almost nothing is taught about Cyprus in Turkish textbooks; Cyprus is almost an unknown topic. This is

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<sup>5</sup> This point has been developed during the Thessaloniki workshop, March 2001; cf. the article on religious otherness, here pp. 300-312.

very paradoxical, as the Cypriot theme is very important in the nationalist discourse, and in the newspapers as well.

The name of the island appears only when conquered by the Ottomans, in a short paragraph; often, the loss of the island, in 1878, is omitted in the relevant lessons. And only recent geography textbooks, in the frame of the study of the «Turkish world» or of the «neighbouring countries of Turkey» (including the so-called «Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus») deal with recent history of Cyprus, including the Turkish intervention in 1974. But history of Cyprus, as a whole, is never the subject of a chapter.

In fact, this paradox is but in accordance with the weakness of Turkish academic research on that issue. There are few relevant books, too, in the bookshops, and the only journals dealing often with the subject are the nationalist ones, like *Türk Kültürü or Türk Dünyası*. But it is quite surprising to see that even propaganda is not very developed. As I often noticed, a lot of Turkish citizens are not very interested by the subject, and are very ignorant of the developments of the Cyprus concern.

But we must consider that verbal discourse is never the only one dealing with a given subject. In a history textbook, the discourse is generally expressed under three forms: verbal, iconographic, and cartographic. I am very interested with the latter, to which I use to give my whole attention when I analyse textbooks. Apparently, one could make the same observation as for the textual discourse: there is no map of Cyprus in history textbooks, and only very few in geography textbooks. But if one considers what I could call the para-discourse, the «margins» of the textbooks, what lies apart from the set of the lessons, one must analyse a set of elements, which are always included in every textbook since the middle of the eighties: a portrait of Atatürk, the national flag, three texts (the national anthem, a discourse of Atatürk delivered to the Turkish youth in 1933, the «Teachers' March»), and an administrative map of Turkey. The presence of Atatürk, of the flag and of the anthem gives this set a sacred character. So the map of the Republic of Turkey is not only a map, it is the representation of a hallowed ground, for which «many and many martyrs offered their blood», in 1915, in 1922, and since 1984 as well, against the Kurdish rebellion.

So what about Cyprus, for the «liberation» of which other «martyrs» gave their blood in 1974? In order to appreciate, I paid attention

to the frame of these maps: it appears in fact that until 1986, the limits of the map excluded Cyprus of their field. But four years after the proclamation of the «Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus», the Southern limit of the map shifts to the South, in order to include Cyprus. As a result, Cyprus, in the cartographic representations, has always been shown as a divided island, which has never been named «Republic of Cyprus», but divided in the denominations as well, into «TRNC» (*KKTC* in Turkish) and «Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus» (*Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi*).

A glance to the semiology used for these maps reveals the Turkish perception of the island. Until 1990, Turkish provinces were coloured, but the neighbouring countries were not represented and their territories remained in white, like the seas, without even names nor frontiers. But the Northern part of Cyprus was coloured and named. This semiology has slightly changed several times but generally speaking Northern Cyprus is *always* shown as if it was a Turkish province. So in the textbooks, Cyprus is represented as already annexed to Turkey. This cartographic treatment is spread everywhere, as a stereotype, even in the leftist press of Turkey.

To conclude, and to go back over our discussion about otherness in Turkish textbooks, Northern Cyprus is not presented as a territory of an otherness: Turkish Cypriots are supposed to share exactly the same identity with the Turks of the mainland. But the *Rum* (Greek Cypriot) otherness is rejected, exactly as it was expelled to the South of the island in 1974. Turkish pupils, anyway, are generally not able to appreciate what Greek otherness really is; they know few about Greek history; they imagine a very unfriendly, if not hostile and cruel otherness: they cannot be aware of the fact that Greek (*Rum*) and Turks have a lot in common, have lived in peace on the same territories, the same regions and often the same villages. Most of Turkish pupils cannot understand why there are so many churches in Istanbul and in many towns of Anatolia. So I deem that, in order to re-establish peace and confidence in Cyprus and on the banks of the Aegean Sea, the Turkish account of history –among other topics– must absolutely and quickly be modified in a sense of a better consideration of the Anatolian past of *Rum* –but also Armenian– otherness.

The Subject of History in the Greek Cypriot  
Education System.  
A Subset of the Greek Nation

LORIS KOULLAPIS

**I**N THE GREEK CYPRIOT education system history is taught in ten grades, i. e. in the last four grades of the elementary school (3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> grades), the three grades of the Gymnasium and the three ones of the Lycée. In all grades history is taught 2 hours per week. In the Lycée an additional hour per week in the first two grades and two additional hours per week in the third grade are devoted to the subject of history only for the ones attending humanistic studies.

Following the education system of the motherland, history is taught in Greek Cypriot schools from the New Stone Age up to the present three times: once in the last four grades of the elementary school, for second time at Gymnasium and for third time at Lycée. In the 3<sup>rd</sup> (half of the material taught concerns ancient Greek mythology and half of it the prehistoric period) and 4<sup>th</sup> grades of the elementary school ancient history is taught, in the 5<sup>th</sup> the medieval one and in the 6<sup>th</sup> modern history. Almost the same applies to the two levels of the secondary education following the traditional scheme of ancient, medieval and modern history, which is taught in the first, second, and third grade, respectively. There are some exceptions to this rule concerning the history textbooks imported from Greece used at Lycée.

In the primary education two books were published by private publishing houses in the second half of the 70s. Their writers (textbooks 1 and 2 of the above-mentioned list) were teachers, primary school inspectors or primary school directors. Soon these two books were authorized (but not published) by the Ministry of Education and they have been used for over twenty years with small changes. In the secondary education a slightly different authorization system was adopted. At the beginning of the 90s the Department of Secondary

Education of the Ministry of Education and Culture assigned a team of historians and teachers with the task of writing three history textbooks, one for each grade of the Lycée (numbers 4-6) one single textbook (number 4) was published by the same department and by the same writers for all three grades of the Gymnasium which is a mere summary of the three above-mentioned textbooks of the Lycée. The history textbooks published in Cyprus in the course of the last twenty years have dealt exclusively with the history of the island. There is *only one* textbook authorized or published for each grade and all of them are distributed free of charge, including the ones imported from Greece.

There are some differences in the use of the above-mentioned six history textbooks. In primary education and on the first level of the secondary education (Gymnasium) history is taught on the basis of the textbook imported from Greece. Only on the occasion of some very important events of the Cypriot history the local textbooks are used. On the second level of the secondary education (Lyceum) 20% of the material taught derives from the Cypriot textbooks and the rest from the Greek one.

The vast majority of the maps and illustrations in the analysed textbooks are related to the local history. There are only a few exceptions to this rule of minor importance: i.e. a map of the Byzantine Empire (Textbook 2, page 36), one of the Roman Empire (Textbook 1, page 121).

Generally speaking the history of the island is presented as part of the Greek national history. This does not concern only the way the two textbooks, the local and the Greek one, are used in each grade but it is attributed to the vocabulary used in the Greek-Cypriot textbooks. In the analysed material the terms «Greek» and «Cypriot» are used interchangeably or as synonyms. The writers of the textbooks 1 and 5 prefer strongly the term «Cypriot», and in the other ones (2,3,4 and 6) both terms are used interchangeably. The Greek Cypriot textbooks lay emphasis on the hellenization of the island in the 12<sup>th</sup> century BC and they construct an unbroken (hellenized) continuity from that time up to the present. Besides, the term «Hellenism» is used quite often with regard to last eight hundred years. Consequently, the Greek Cypriot textbooks manage quite easily to integrate the local history into the Greek national history as both provinces of the three big empires which had dominated in this part of the world for over two thousand years: the

Roman, the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empire. No «Cyprus identity» is mentioned or assumed.

After Greece's independence in 1830 the Greek historiography defined all periods of the Greek history characterized by foreign rule with the ending *-kratia* (domination). This ending in its historical context is connected à priori in the Greek collective consciousness with negative associations whenever the first component is a people. There are three big periods of this sort: The Romaiokratia, the Frangokratia and the Tourkokratia. The idea of the cultural superiority to the above-mentioned people, whose name composes a *-kratia*, was invented to counterbalance these «long nights» in the history of the Greeks. Needless to say, Greek Cypriot writers of history (text)books adopt as a rule the vocabulary and the manichaistic perceptions of the Greek nationalistic historiography.

Within this general framework of history interpretation the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71 is described as a quite negative event in the history of the island. In all textbooks emphasis is stressed on both the battles between Venetians and Turks and the massacres by the latter in Nicosia and Famagusta. These passages are characterized by emotionalism, auto- and heterostereotypes that are repeated on the occasion of the massacres in July 1821. The whole «Tourkokratia» is perceived as a struggle of survival by the Greek inhabitants of the island against the Ottoman administration, which falls in line with the perception of the Ottoman period in Greece. Greek Cypriot textbooks devote a lot of space to the positive role of the Church of Cyprus describing it quite paternalistically as a guardian of the cultural and national consciousness of the Greeks.

The transition from the Ottoman to the British rule is presented quite positively as the new masters were supposed to be more liberal compared to their predecessors, but the «Agglokratia» as a whole is overshadowed by the demand of the «Cypriots» for the union with Greece (*Enosis*). This period is characterized by an attempt of the British administration of the island to suppress through education the national consciousness of the Greeks whereas the Church of Cyprus is once more portrayed as its guardian. In all analysed textbooks the space devoted to the 50s is disproportionate to whole duration of the «Agglokratia» and thus little space remains for economic or social developments. Needless to say, the fifties, as presented in the Greek Cypriot

school textbooks, are strongly burdened with emotional passages, which are full of heroes and epic battles against the British army.

For the 1974 division of the island are held responsible Greece's military government and some of their supporters in Cyprus. This specific approach to this important event in the modern history of the island enables Makarios's depiction as a hero and on the other hand it gives the impression that the division of the island was an instant mistake made by some fanatics not the result of a long lasting process whose beginning is dated back to early fifties or may be even earlier. Little space is attributed to the military events themselves but emphasis is stressed on the (Greek Cypriot) refugees who had to abandon their homes as a result of the Turkish invasion. The question of the refugees and the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of the island are presented with sheer emotionalism determining present situation's perception. The foundation of a separate state in the north is mentioned in one textbook (number 3) emphasizing the fact that it is illegal and that it is not recognized by the international community with the exception of Turkey. However, little space is attributed to the above-mentioned issues, as in the analysed school textbooks narration stops in the mid-eighties or earlier. Besides in the last paragraphs of each textbook are mentioned in brief the positions of the Greek Cypriot side in the negotiations had been made since 1974. The present situation, including the negotiations, is presented as «struggle for justice» not as a try for the reunification of the island, as this vocabulary has been adopted by Greek Cypriot politicians since Germany's reunification and textbooks writers do not seem to have taken it into consideration. Nothing was found in the analysed material with regard to the role of the «World» or «Europe» with respect to the Cyprus question.

The spread of Christianity in Cyprus in the 1<sup>st</sup> century is depicted as something positive in the history of the island. The Cypriots are presented to have adopted the new religion of their own free will despite the reactions by the Jews and the idolaters of the island. In all textbooks there is a certain gap in narration between the first and the fifth century so that the reader has the impression that Christianity was adopted by the population in the first century (especially in primary education). In secondary education this change is described as a process lasting over three centuries but there is no information how this important change took place. As mentioned above, the Church of Cyprus is depicted as a

counterbalance to a certain threat presented in the textbook. Such quite emotional passages occur with respect to the «Tourkokratia», the «Agglokratia» and the Arabs raids of the 7<sup>th</sup> century. In such passages there is an indirect fusion of the religious and national identity as the Church of Cyprus seems to have been the protector of both.

The emergence and the spread of Islam in the 7<sup>th</sup> century are mentioned in a few pages within the framework of the Byzantine-Islamic conflict. With respect to this subject no prejudices are constructed but the Arab raids on Cyprus (not the emergence of Islam itself) are presented negatively. In one textbook of the primary education (number 1) there is an interesting paragraph promoting multicultural co-existence and respect for the islamic religion though this is the exception to the rule.

The formation of the Turkish Cypriot community is attributed to the late 16<sup>th</sup> century. According to the Greek Cypriot textbooks they compose a mixture of a part of the Ottoman army which remained in Cyprus after the conquest, of some emigrants (both Christian and Muslim) coming from Anatolia in the same period and of some Christian peasants who converted to Islam during the «Tourkokratia» in order to avoid heavy taxation imposed on non-Muslims. The textbooks of the secondary education mention that on the occasion of some revolts in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> or at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Christians and the Muslims cooperated against the administration of the island.

In both textbooks of the primary education the term «compatriots» was introduced with respect to the Turkish Cypriots. Though the use of this term in a Greek Cypriot textbook is a quite positive development, there is nothing else (especially in the textbook number 2, which deal with the Ottoman and colonial period) which would promote the «compatriots» in the consciousness of the Greek Cypriot pupil. Therefore, the use of this terms in this way lacks of an essential content.

With respect to the «Agglokratia» Turkish Cypriots' perception is quite negative because they are presented as an obstacle hindering in cooperation with the British administration of the island the union with Greece. This is true for the whole period of the «Agglokratia» but especially for the fifties, which take a lot of space in the history school textbooks. In the pages where the social and economic developments or the literary output of the period 1878-1960 are described there is nothing about them.

Turkish Cypriots' image is not much different from the above

mentioned for the period 1960-1974. The stance of the Turkish Cypriot leadership is blamed for «rebellion against the state» as it is called the civil war of 1963-64 in the Greek Cypriot political discourse and adopted by the textbooks' writers. The same applies to the period 1964-74: the other side is exclusively blamed for not reaching an agreement until 1974. However, it is clearly mentioned (textbook 6) that the Greek Cypriot side had regarded the Republic of Cyprus until 1968 as a transitional state, which would lead to the union with Greece. This specific self-criticism of the own positions of the past reveals a clear perception of the present: the (state) union with Greece is not regarded any more as a political goal of the Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand no other mistakes, unjust actions or shortcomings of the own side are mentioned in the Greek Cypriot textbooks.

Consequently, nowadays Turkish Cypriots' perception in the Greek Cypriot collective consciousness can be characterised as cyclo-thymic. It has undergone positive changes in the course of the last twenty years if we compare the contemporary textbooks with the ones published before 1974 where the Turkish Cypriots were absent or, if mentioned, their image was completely negative.

### **Conclusion**

If we accept Benedict Anderson's definition that a nation constitutes an imagined community or an imagined set of people sharing the same culture and education and having the same perception of past and present, the Greek Cypriot community can be described as an imagined subcommunity or as an imagined subset of the Greek nation. As far as I know the same is true for the relationship between the Turkish nation and the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Republic of Cyprus has been functioning since 1963 in ideological matters as a second Greek national state. Through the education system it has been receiving ideology and history perception emanating from Athens for the ideological needs of the Greek state.

The Greek historiography defined the Greek history as an eternal struggle for freedom and for the maintenance of the religious and national identity of nation against culturally inferior «others» who had been occupying their country in the past. These «others» can easily be recognized as their names are used for the naming of interlopers distributing the imagined continuity of the Greek nation. The same

manichaistic history perception manifest itself in the Greek Cypriot history school textbooks in the form of presenting Cyprus as a hellenized island since antiquity. Turkish Cypriots' perception is limited to the general framework set by the Greek national history and therefore only a marginal role is attributed to them in the history of the island. After all Greek Cypriot textbooks should not contradict the major ideas expressed in the imported textbooks from Greece as both textbooks are used simultaneously.

The population structure of a unified Cyprus requires the political coexistence of the Greek Cypriots with «others» who happen to be the «others» par excellence of the Greek national identity. This does not seem to be the easiest thing in the world if we take into account the specific content of this national identity. In addition, the Greek Cypriot approach to educational and ideological matters seems to have been an example for the Turkish Cypriot leadership of the last four or five decades. In other words, the Turkish Cypriot leadership with respect to its ideological relationship to Turkey has been copying in essence the Greek Cypriot behaviour in the same field. The specific relationship of the two Cypriot subsets with these two national ideologies has been creating political mistrust between them and seems to be an important problem in the building of political confidence between the two major communities of the island.

## ANALYSED TEXTBOOKS

*Primary Education*

1. «Team of the Ten», *History of Cyprus. For the 3rd and 4th grades. From the Stone Age to Christianity*, Nicosia 1980, 143 pp.
2. Andreas Polydorou, *History of Cyprus. For the 5th and 6th grades. From the Roman Period to 1984*, Nicosia 1992, 143 pp.

*Secondary Education*

3. *History of Cyprus. For the Gymnasium, Nicosia 1994*. Written by Aggeliki Pantelidou, Kalliopi Protopapa: *New Stone Age-Hellenistic Period*. Savvas Giallouridis: *Roman and Frankish Period*. Kalliopi Protopapa: *Venetian Rule-Republic of Cyprus*, 117 pp.
4. *History of Cyprus. For the 1st grade of the Lyceum*, Nicosia 1995. *From the New Stone Age to the Roman period*. Written by Aggeliki Pantelidou, Kalliopi Protopapa, 187 pp.
5. *History of Cyprus. For the 2nd grade of the Lyceum*, Nicosia 1996. *Byzantine Period*. Written by Aggeliki Pantelidou, Konstantina Chatzikosti, Iakovos Christou, 83 pp.
6. *History of Cyprus. For the 3rd grade of the Lyceum*, Nicosia 1994. *Middle Ages-Modern History (1192-1974)*. Written by Aggeliki Pantelidou, Konstantina Chatzikosti, 317 pp.

## School is a Textbook: Symbolism and Rituals in Turkish Cypriot Schools

NESHE YASHIN

**S**YMBOLS AND RITUALS play a very important role in socialising the student to a national identity and building an image of an enemy. They are strong ideological apparatuses in reproducing the system and making continuity. According to Comaroff and Comaroff «rituals become cultural means to preserve tradition and to reproduce ‘continuity’ in theoretically constructed bounded communities.» I will talk about several Turkish Cypriot school rituals which serve as a means to reproduce the paradigm of conflict and justify the status quo. I will also provide some semiotic readings about the photographs of atrocities and introduce some thoughts on their role in reproducing the paradigm of conflict. Symbolism coming through nationalist poetry is also an important means in building a collective consciousness; such symbolism is an important part of national ceremonies.

*Now we have become part of school  
And filled up the classes  
School is our home  
Long live our school*

This famous Turkish children’s song is a celebration of being part of the school. School is their home and school belongs to the nation and each student is given education, which is also called national education. A student is expected to be a productive and valuable member of the nation. School is a colourful place. It is decorated with flags, pictures and scripts on the walls.

Children have to declare that they are part of the nation with the morning prayer which starts with the words; «I am a Turk, I am right, I am hard-working» and it ends with these words «I give my whole existence as a present to the existence of Turkishness.» Then there is the

national anthem, which starts as «Don't fear! The red flag floating in these horizons will not extinguish.»

Remembering the poem of the famous Turkish poet, Can Yucel, regarding the first day experience of a school child makes me smile.

*Aneciğim  
Bugün okulda hiçbirşeyden korkmadım  
ama şu Korkma Sönmezden çok korktum*

*Mummy  
Today I feared nothing at school  
I only feared from  
'Don't fear'*

Fear has always been a strong element in Turkish education. In Islam, moral values are achieved through fear of God. It is believed that respect to the elder ones could be achieved through fear. This method is a means for discipline and the school environment has to provide this fear.

I want to start by taking you to a certain Turkish Cypriot school building with its two flags: the TRNC and the Turkish flags and a statue of Kemal Ataturk at the entrance. It is very probable that the school may be carrying the name of a martyr. The second strong probability is that the school is situated in a street which is also named after a martyr («Şehit» something «sokağı» and «Şehit» something «Okulu.»)

Probably the school building was a Greek Cypriot school building and is being used by the Turkish Cypriots after 1974. I don't think any teacher would give an assignment to the students about the history of the school building. Or even if she or he would talk about it the historical narrative would very probably justify the situation. Very probably it would be like this: «Our oppressed people were liberated one day thanks to the Turkish Army who gave us all these opportunities for the future.»

The evil persons (the bad 'other') of the narrative have to be known better by the students. The most important encounter with the enemy is realized through a visit to the Museum of Barbarism. The most important aspect about this Museum is that it is a place where history of violence persists to live.

For many children, the first visit to the Museum is when they attend the Elementary school. The museum is on the exact spot where violence took place. A Turkish Cypriot official Internet site describes the museum like this:

The date is the 24th December, 1963... The onslaught of the Greeks against the Turks, which started three days ago, has been going on with all its ferocity; and defenceless women, old men and children are being brutally killed by Greeks. And Kumsal Area of Lefkosa witnesses the worst example of the Greeks savage bloodshed...

The wife and the three infant children of Dr. Nihat Ilhan, a Major on duty at the camp of the Cyprus Turkish Army Contingent, are mercilessly and dastardly shot dead while hiding in the bathrooms of their house, by maddened Greeks who broke into their home. This incident is a glaring example of Greek barbarism.

The photograph of the dead children and their mother is like a stamp of Greek Cypriot violence to the Turkish Cypriot psyche. It is one of the best-known atrocity photographs in the world and has become the main tool for local propaganda and lobbying. It is a symbol for victimisation. The victims are mother and children. The most innocent subjects in life. They are killed in their own home while they just wanted to hide in the bathtub.

This horror story is lived by the visitors of the museum in the same location where the event happened. Everything is left untouched; the bloodstains; hair and parts of the dresses and shoes of the children are there. Other rooms of the Museum are also filled with photographs of dead bodies. One of the other striking things about this museum is that it is actually a habitat for one of the survivors of the incident. Yusuf Gudum is still living in one of the rooms of the museum. The building is his own property and he lost his wife during the incident. When visitors come he comes out of his room and narrates the event.

During one of my later visits to the Museum, I asked Yusuf Gudum if I could interview him, but he said that he cannot answer questions, he just has to start narrating and finish. But he answered one question that I asked him. I asked «Uncle Yusuf, why are you living here with all these bitter memories and with all this sad atmosphere?» and he replied:

I am living here because of the garden. I have to look after it. If I leave the trees would die!

Part of his narration is as follows:

On the night of the 24th of December, 1963 my wife Feride Hasan and I were paying a visit to the family of Major Dr. Nihat Ilhan. Our neighbours Mrs. Ayshe of Mora, her daughter Ishin and Mrs. Ayshe's sister Novber were also with us. We were all having supper. All of a sudden bullets from the Pedieos River direction started to riddle the house, sounding like heavy rain. Thinking that the dining-room where we were sitting was dangerous, we ran to the bathroom and toilet which we thought would be safer. Altogether we were nine persons. We all hid in the bathroom except my wife who took refuge in the toilet. We waited in fear. Mrs. Ilhan the wife of Major Doctor was standing in the bath with her three children Murat, Kutsi and Hakan in her arms. Suddenly with a great noise we heard the front door open. Greeks had come in and were combing every corner of the house with their machine gun bullets. During these moments, I heard a voice saying, In Greek "You want Taksim, eh!" and then bullets started flying in the bathroom. Mrs. Ilhan and her three children fell into the bath. They were shot. At this moment the Greeks, who broke into the bathroom, emptied their guns on us again. I heard one of the Major's children moan, then I fainted.

When I revived 2 or 3 hours later, I saw Mrs. Ilhan and her three children lying dead in the bath. I and the rest of the neighbours in the bathroom were all seriously wounded. But what had happened to my wife? Then I remembered and immediately ran to the toilet, where, in the doorway, I saw her body. She was brutally murdered.

The visit to the Museum is usually done at the martyrs week which starts on the 21<sup>st</sup> December, the anniversary of 1963 Bloody Noel events. In those days some displays with photographs and writings are prepared in the schools. These photographs are either photographs of dead people sometimes photographs of dead bodies and women and children crying.

Dogus Ertac, a Turkish Cypriot student now member of one of the bicomunal groups talks about his visit to the Museum as follows:

I visited the Museum of Barbarism: I was in the primary school and at that week (Sehitler haftasi) they (the teachers) took us to

that museum and it was really bad in my opinion because when we saw those things at those days we had the idea that «Greeks are bad people». But now I have the right idea; Only some Greek Cypriots did this so I don't say they are bad people...

The main theme of the Martyrs week is that these heroes died for us to have today's liberated atmosphere and the land we have today as our «vatan» (homeland) and State. In order to keep their memory we have to protect this land which is washed by their blood, making this is a holy place that you cannot give away even a single stone of it.

Another theme is to show the character of the enemy who is merciless and who did all these massacres to innocent people with the aim to terminate the existence of the ethnic group to which we belong on this island. Poems are read during the ceremonies. You can find a good collection of poems in Turkish Cypriot literature about Greek Cypriot atrocities. Poetry has always been a strong weapon for nationalism. Nationalism works a lot with the emotions and especially popular poetry can serve this function successfully. Here I want to quote some lines from an introductory letter Rauf Denktas wrote to a theme anthology compiled by Gulgun Serdar:

Through bringing together all these poets who stress our attachment to Turkey in terms of culture, our longing to Anatolia, to the flag. Our determination to own Cyprus which we believe is Turkish land then this book serves as a big guide in our search for an identity and character.<sup>1</sup>

Dogus talks about the effect of these poems on him:

The kind of poetry: Generally sensitive poems, which really affect all the Turkish Cypriots deeply, even me. They do this because they don't want us to be friends again. These days in my opinion are days to increase the malice that has slowly disappeared over the years.

Another theme of the week of Martyrs is revenge which has already been taken by the Turkish Army who saved all our lives and protected us from becoming like one of those photographs. We are re-

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<sup>1</sup> Serdar, Gulgun, *1571 den 1964 e Kibris Turk Edebiyati – Arastirma-Inceleme*, Lefkosa 1986.

minded that this enemy is living not very far and we have to watch and be careful.

Usually all the ceremonies start by placing the wreath at the statue of Ataturk. Many schools have one of these statues in their yards. Loyalty to Ataturk and his basic principles is connected with pride of being part of the wider Turkish nation. The loyalty and pride are embodied in the published aims for national education which require that:

Every member of the community have at heart the reforms of Ataturk and be a dedicated nationalist; and adopt, uphold, protect and improve nationalism, morals, human, spiritual values of the Turkish nation

Tanyel Cemal, another member of the bicomunal groups describes the activities of the Ataturk week like this:

At 10 Kasim we have a competition between classes, which is Ataturk Kosesi. Every class decorates their class with flags, poems about Ataturk, pictures of him and a lot more. A group of teacher go to each class and at the end choose the best one.

Ataturk is a strong symbol for the connection of Turkish Cypriots with Turkey. 10 Kasim-10<sup>th</sup> November ceremonies are a shared experience with the Mainland Turks. At 10th November of each year at 9. 05 life stops for one minute to pay respect to the memory of Ataturk. Ataturk is the father of the big Turkish nation and his struggle is a big inspiration for Turkish Cypriots. During his lifetime Ataturk has no words about Cyprus. On the contrary his Misak-i Milli policy was exclusive of the Turks living outside national borders. But in Turkish Cypriot nationalistic poetry we see him as a symbolic figure for the unification of Cyprus with Turkishness.

The treatment of his statues is almost totemic. Any kind of attack to his statues would be considered a big insult to the whole nation which was a case once in the Pyla school, very probably a provocative action. His photographs are everywhere in schools. He is the stamp of identity and a symbol of being proud of being part of a big nation.

A study to reveal how school children feel about these symbols would be very instructive. I think in their early years, they become attached to them but from my experience from one year's teaching in the secondary school, I can say that later they become objects of teenage

rebellion. «BetonMustafa» is one of the names given to Atatürk. The same criticism is given to numberless ugly statues. I witnessed students making fun of nationalistic poetry. I don't know why but another hero, the poet Namik Kemal, who was in exile in Cyprus is a subject of sex jokes.

### **What do the photographs of dead bodies signify?**

Repeatedly seeing the photographs of dead bodies has a tremendous effect on the human psyche.

Maybe it's necrophilia that is causing this widespread demonstration of dead bodies. The argument is that showing this brutality and violence will teach the younger generation the real face of the enemy. It is a means to strengthen the argument that we cannot live with them. When we say 'them' this implies a general category. They are the first person singular «Rum» (The name given to Greek Cypriots) which we hear everyday in political speeches. They are not differentiated, they are all the same and they are all together responsible for the killings. Seeing these photographs repeatedly evokes certain feelings. We stop seeing their details. They just become an obscure image that penetrates our unconscious. A generalised message about the enemy. These photographs capture those moments in history, a past that is embodied in our souls and imply our unavoidable separation from those generalised 'others' who are responsible for this.

Roland Barthes's perception of photography in general is as follows:

What the photograph reproduces to infinity has occurred only once: the photograph mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially. In the photograph the event is never transcended for the sake of something else: the photograph always leads the corpus I need back to the body I see; it is the absolute particular, the sovereign Contingency, matte and somehow stupid, the This (this photograph and not Photography), in short what Lacan calls the Tuche, the Occasion, the Encounter, the Real, in its infatigable expression<sup>2</sup>.

In the meantime, these photographs of atrocities transcend into a means of proving our thesis. They become a powerful tool for lobbying.

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<sup>2</sup> Barthes, Roland, *Camera Lucida*, Vintage 1993, p. 4.

The photographs themselves represent an attack. They are our attack and our reversed act of violence towards the enemy. And the missing part of our story is that they also have similar photographs like us and they use them in the same way. In their photographs they are the victims and we are the perpetrators.

It is very interesting that the symbolic photograph for peace builders in Cyprus is also a photograph of violence. It is the photograph of Dervis Ali Kavazoglu and Costas Misauli. (They were murdered in 1964 because of their struggle to bring the two communities of Cyprus together). What this photograph signifies is much different than the photographs of other dead bodies. It also reminds you of a killer and of injustice but the message coming through this photograph is not a message of one's hatred towards the other, but it is a message of love. It is not one against the other but it is 'both' being victims of violence. Perhaps there is another message coming from the creators of this scene captured by this photograph and «reproduced to infinity». It is fear. «If you think and act that way, this will be your end!» A kind of warning.

What I see as another difference in this photograph is that it doesn't attack me. It is a photograph of two with a strong connection. It is a scene of violence committed against acts of non-violence. It is a summary of all the photographs of atrocities on both sides. Their death is like a saga to all the other photographs, a death on the path of struggle to stop this blood.

### **How to deal with symbols?**

A lot of statues have been built in different places in Northern Cyprus after 1974. The common denominator of these statues is that they are related with death. They are erected to glorify the memories of those who died in their attempts to save our lives from the enemy. When you look at these statues they create in you again this feeling of attack, the similar feeling created by the photographs of atrocities. The figures are phallic and they carry the militaristic spirit.

Many years ago I went to interview the sculptor of a monument in Gonyeli erected in memory of those who died in the village. I asked him questions about what a martyr symbolises to him, what feelings martyrs evoke in him, and what is the best way to keep their memory alive and how he imagines this figure to represent his feelings.

He was startled with my questions and gave me the impression

that what he tried to create was a replica of the monuments done on these occasions. I asked different people in the streets what they think and how they feel about their monuments and their answers reflected this feeling of attack. I titled this newspaper article I wrote as «the monuments of death inside us».

These monuments still exist among us. In time we stop seeing them; they become part of the environment. We do not stop to think of their meaning but they convey a certain energy, a certain psychology to us. It is like living in Greek Cypriot houses and belongings – we forget that we are living inside them or using them but they give us this uneasiness, this feeling of guilt deep inside our unconscious. Deep inside we also know that the way we are accusing the others they are doing the same thing towards us. We don't live very far from them and we can feel this energy coming from them towards us. We know that each day we celebrate as a festivity is a mourning for them and we know the meaning of mourning very well because it is also part of our own experiences.

What makes us suffer is the paradigm of revenge. Revenge is a counter attack, which will generate another attack. It is the changing role game of the victims and perpetrators and there is no end to it. The prevalent feeling we have as Turkish Cypriots is that our «revenge is taken» but this immediately evokes that now they have a revenge to be taken.

To shift from this paradigm to a paradigm of empathy and a culture of peace requires a process where we have to deal with all these symbols and rituals. The best way is to see them altogether. If you see a display of all the photographs of atrocities that each side has suffered at the hand of the other, you will immediately transcend the feeling of vengeance. You will despise and reject all violence and wish to embrace the other who has a similar experience as you. As it is in the photograph of Kavazoglu and Misauli.

## Historical Distortions Biasing Books

ULUS IRKAD

**I**N 1964 WHEN I WAS a child of seven, an incident took place between 7 and 9 March. The way it was reflected in the media became a tool of official propaganda. Among those Turkish and Greek Cypriots who were mercilessly killed, there were a number whom I knew well. I have paid great attention to establish the facts by directly contacting people who actually took part or witnessed what happened.

As you may also know, 21st December 1963 is the date officially stated by the Turkish authorities as the one on which the Greek Cypriots put into action their plan to exterminate the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots are represented as «murderers» who attacked the Turkish Cypriots without any reason. They claim the Greeks had drafted the «Akritas Plan» in order to annihilate the Turkish Cypriot population. Until then, according to the official Turkish position, they had no plans to partition the island. According to this outlook, the Turkish Cypriots are the oppressed community. They tried to protect themselves against the Greek Cypriot attacks. The Turkish authorities never say anything about the existence of a Turkish plan known as the «Temporary Stage plan». No statement has been made to deny or accept the existence of such a plan. The Greek Cypriots believe the mirror opposite picture to be valid. They present themselves as the oppressed party.

The incident of 7 March 1964 shows that the leaders of both communities can reshape and paint what happened to turn their community against the other community. From December 1963, numerous provocations and incidents had taken place all over Cyprus but the incidents described here took place in Paphos. This then small town was to be dragged into the developments that started to unravel in 1963-64. Fanatics in both communities were making preparations to silence each other. Elements in both communities were making plans to provoke each other. The large scale clashes of the day arose as a result of an assertion that a Greek Cypriot, named Mavros, shot a Turkish Cypriot

postman named Cevdet. During my research I was given the name of another Greek Cypriot, known as the «candle-maker». Although the post office official had been warned to avoid the Greek Cypriot sector in order to stage acts of provocation. The shooting was a golden excuse for fanatics to stage their plans. And in no time their intentions unfolded.

The Greeks were preparing for a religious festival. The open market was full of shoppers and vendors for this occasion. According to the rumours that were circulating, the fanatic Turkish Cypriot elements planned to attack the market place to loot and kill as many people as possible. Off the record, the Turkish military chief did not approve of their intentions. So the fanatics threatened him not to try to stop them. Some people say that this threat to the commander was also part of the scenario. The attack originated and was planned by the very powerful central authority in Turkey. The objective of this plan was to prove to the world that the United Nations Security Council embargo on Turkey's intervention in Cyprus was wrong. The continuing atrocities and attacks by the Greek Cypriots would be a justified excuse for a military intervention.

The attack took place on the morning of 7 March 1964. In the confusion that followed, hundreds of Greek Cypriots were wounded, killed and taken hostage. About 600 prisoners of war were taken to the Turkish Quarter known as Muttallo. A bank and shops in the market were also looted. On 8 March the hostages were set free as a result of UN mediation. Mavros, the Greek Cypriot who was alleged to shoot Cevdet, the postman, was among the hostages and was killed by the fanatic Turkish Cypriots.

The Greek Cypriots did not waste any time and quickly organised a revenge attack on the Turkish Sector of Paphos. This started early on 9 March 1964 using heavy artillery and bulldozers turned into tanks. The number of the Turkish Cypriot fighters did not match that of the Greeks so they had to leave their forward positions and retreat into the Turkish compound of Muttallo. Fourteen Turkish Cypriot fighters, captured by Greek Cypriots in the Mavralli area, were tortured and killed. Those who were directly linked with the incident, faked sickness, and were transferred to Nicosia by UN helicopter.

In a nutshell, the distortion and reflection on the incident in the Official annals is completely different. Mr Vehbi Zeki, the historian

and member of the Turkish House of Representatives, is considered an authority on the official presentation of the Turkish Cypriot History. In his textbook used in the Turkish schools, aware that the Turkish Cypriots were to blame for the events of 7 March 1964, he completely disregards these and mentions 8 March 1964 as the date of happenings. In the 1973 edition of the textbook (*Cyprus History*, Dr. Vehbi Sertel, Nicosia, Halkin Sesi Ltd, pp. 140-141) he writes as follows:

The clashes that started at 11. 00 o'clock on 8 March 1964 continued for three days. Turks defended themselves against Greeks who attacked in overwhelming numbers and weapons.

Dr Vehbi Sertel, did not bother to amend the mistake he had made and continued giving 8 March 1964 as the date of the clashes in Paphos.

In another book entitled « The place of the resistance of the Paphos Turks in the Turkish struggle for Existence» (p. 7), published by the Turkish Information office, the date is given as 7 March but continues to reject the facts as in the passage below:

While the tension on the island was continuing as a result of shooting and critically injuring a postman by a Greek, named Mavros, civil turmoil started in the market place. Greeks commenced firing into the Turkish Sector from their positions, thereby starting an all-over fight in Ktima (Paphos). The Turks defended themselves against outnumbering Greek forces. The Greeks numbered more than 2000 of which 150 were Greek Nationals from mainland Greece, as was rumoured to be stated by the British soldiers who were serving in the UN forces at that time. New tombs were added to the already existing ones. The Turkish fighters kept to the truce negotiated by the British peace-keeping force, but the Greeks continued to fire at the minarets with bazookas and machine guns. The Turkish fighters had no option but to fire back. 300 Greeks who happened to be at the market place at the time were brought into the Turkish Quarter for their safety. Turks acted with sympathy towards these Greeks and did their best to provide them with their essential needs.

The Information Office did not touch on what the Turkish fanatics

did in the market, or the dramatic killing of Mavros when he was in captivity.

In another book entitled «The Place of Paphos Turks in the Turkish Struggle of Liberty» published on 28 January 1966, two years after the incident, Hikmet Canova wrote the following on page 32:

The Greek market place was crowded. The Turks could kill hundreds if they wanted to do so. But their conscience did not let them act in such a brutal manner. Instead they took those who were in open danger to safer places in the Turkish Sector. In the excitement at the beginning about 50-60 were shot.

For those who were killed by the Greek Cypriots at Mavralli Region the same writer wrote the following (p. 45):

Their ammunition ran out. The Greeks began closing in on them. When they saw that Turks stopped firing at them they rushed at the Turkish defences. All the fighters, innocent children, grandfathers and grandmothers were taken prisoners by the Greeks. The fighters were put to relentless tortures and killed.

Letters written by both sides to prove and justify the way they approached and acted during the events bring interesting aspects to light. A letter that was written to the UN Security Council by the Cyprus Republic UN ambassador shows the Greek Cypriot interpretation. It mentions the number of the Greek Cypriot deaths correctly but makes no reference to the 14 Turkish Cypriots killed by them on 9 March 1964.

In *Cyprus Today*, volume 1963-64, the letter dated 9 March 1964, reads:

In reference to the resolution (s/55/75) adopted by the Security Council on March 1964, I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. F. Erkin, on 6 March, in which, as reported by Reuters, he declared that «Turkey cannot accept any solution short of federalism» and that «Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities for the purpose must be regrouped in separate areas with ethnic autonomy.» That is partition expressed in other words. We do not intend on engaging in a discussion which at the present

stage properly falls within the province of the mediator to be appointed under the resolution.

I need only reaffirm our stand that partition in all its manifestations is completely ruled out and cannot be the subject of negotiation or discussion.

Regarding the recent deplorable events at Ktima, Paphos, I have the honour to give here below the text of a cable received from my Government on 8 March 1964:

Yesterdays onslaught on innocent Greek people at the market place of Ktima began when one Turkish rebel started firing on a crowd of Greeks in the heart of the market. Immediately afterwards, armed Turks came out of fortified positions and started firing with heavy weapons indiscriminately against Greeks. The time was just before midday when thousands of Greeks were making their weekend shopping.

Gangs of armed Turkish rebels rounded up hundred of Greeks. Some people sought shelter in shops but Turkish terrorists forced their doors open and took them away. From the top of a minaret Turkish rebels fired indiscriminately against the Greek population in the market.

The massacre of innocent Greek people at Paphos continued for some hours and resulted in seven Greeks dead and thirty wounded. Amongst those dead was a fifteen year old schoolgirl and a fifty year old housewife. At least two of the dead were shot at point blank by Turkish terrorists.

More than three hundred Greek men, women and children were taken as hostages. Later the Turkish rebels released about two hundred women and children and old men.

It is worth noting that the Paphos massacre began at the same time as the Greeks were handing over Turkish rebels held in custody in Nicosia. The Paphos onslaught created a very tense situation all over Cyprus but the security forces are acting with commendable restraint. Today Paphos is very tense but no firing is taking place. Minister Yiorkajis and General Gyani are visiting the area.

This premeditated onslaught and capture of new hostages by Turkish extremists, obviously drawing its inspiration from official statements in Ankara, is intended to counter and neutralise the

pacifying efforts of the President, Archbishop Makarios who called for the exercise of utmost restraint by all and for the release of all hostages.

Government forces reply to Turkish Provocations (*Cyprus Today*, volume 1963-64):

In reference to the resolution (S/5575) adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964 and the present situation in Cyprus, and further to my letter of yesterday I have the honour to give here below the text of a cable received from my Government today, which runs as follows:

Following last Saturday's unprovoked onslaught on the Greek population by Turkish rebels at Ktima and Paphos, and the cease-fire arrangements which followed, Turks again early on Monday morning initiated an unprovoked attack which was met by strong resistance of Government forces. Turkish rebels continued making use of minarets as machinegun posts. Government forces, though having to face heavy firing with long range heavy weapons by Turkish rebels, resolutely advanced, destroyed and captured the greatest part of fortified positions of rebels including the market, minaret and police station, which had been the stronghold of the rebels. The task of the Government forces was greatly hindered by British troops which took up positions covering Turkish rebels.

By nightfall, Government forces captured a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition and controlled the greater part of positions of Turkish rebels who concentrated in the centre of the Turkish quarter with several hundred women and children so that further advance of Government forces would jeopardise lives of these persons. After the relevant promise of Turkish rebels, Government forces halted their advance and a cease-fire is being negotiated on terms of surrender of rebel arms...

### **Conclusion**

The attitudes and interpretations of both communities reflect the official outlook and perspectives they harboured. Each of them has tried to

establish facts that prove their stand, which they present to their children accordingly. They do not give objective interpretations of the happenings. Both communities tried to prove how justified they were in acting in that manner. They blamed the other side for mistakes they had committed. For example, Turkish Cypriots were guilty in the happenings of the 7 March 1964, so they completely evade it and give the date for the happenings as 8 March 1964. The Turkish official outlook ensures that the Greek losses should not be mentioned in their history books.

The Greek Cypriots, likewise, try to hide the fact that the incidents of 9 March 1964 were retaliation to those of 7 March. They blame the Turkish Cypriots and do not refer to the Turkish Cypriots killed by them. It is necessary to rewrite history books either to eliminate one-sided interpretations or to present contemporary sources from both viewpoints so that children can see the bias for themselves and so we can as communities avoid the recurrence of similar mistakes. New generations need to be raised to respect their differences and their rights in an atmosphere of honesty, tolerance and democracy.

#### A SHORT STORY FROM A TURKISH-CYPRIOT TEXTBOOK

In the second section, I would like to quote a passage from a book that used to be read in the fifth grade of the elementary schools in the eighties. Those who followed it will remember it with a touch of nationalistic feeling although not openly preached.

*Source:* Törkçemiz (pp. 118-119) «Our Turkish», İlkokul 5. sınıf (Elementary V. Class», by İsmet Tunç, Ali Tunç, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Devlet Kitapları «State Books Of Ministry Of National education», Tifdruk Matbaası Sanayii A. Ş. – İstanbul 1976, The Writer: Ülkü Arman from Hürriyet Newspaper from Turkey).

*It is an Honour to be Captured by the Turks*

- Your name?
- Spiro Lalyotis.
- Your rank?
- A Captain.
- Your Company?

- 105. Artillery brigade.

- Now, explain us the details!

- We had attacked the Turks. My unit was all destroyed. Then I was captured.

But never mind, it is an honour to be captured by the Turks...

We went very near to the investigated Greek Captain and started to talk through the interpreter. «Don't be disappointed, to be captured belongs to the war reality.»

He answered us in a very low voice:

«It was crazy to fight against the Turks. But our politicians were very crazy. They had distributed medals to all the soldiers. On the medals you could have seen the symbol that Cyprus was annexed to Greece.»

He was afraid of talking much and paused.

We asked him:

«What do you think about the Turkish Operation?»

Pointing to the five finger mountains facing Kyrenia he didn't answer us.

«Have you been tortured, captain?»

He answered us with two words:

«No, thanks.»

«What would have you done if you had Turkish captured soldiers?»

In a very low voice again:

«I don't know,» he says. But while bowing his head, he proves that he knows lots of things. He knows how the Turks were killed, how they were massacred and how a cross was drawn on their chests.

Is he actually sorry? Is he actually ashamed?

«I wish one day you would go to your country and meet your family.» I said.

He moved as if he wanted to touch my hand, and in the last moment he gives up. Turning up and talking to the interpreter, I ask «What is he saying?»

«You have the right whatever you want. It's fair to kill us.»

«We are Turks,» I say. I am repeating: «We are Turks...»

## National Memory and Turkish-Cypriot Textbooks

NIYAZI KIZILYÜREK

NATIONAL MEMORY is the existential part of nations. Each nation-state or each nationalism creates its own national memory, which justifies the existence of the state in the particular territory and contributes to the unity of the nation. Therefore, the cult of history and the cult of nation cannot be separated. This turns the nation into a community of myths. The myths are symbolically influential structures, which help the permanent functions of legitimisation and regulation of the national being. In the myth, we find the past, the present and the future of the nation united. Therefore, national memory is impossible without myths. Cult of history and myths are the essential part of the national memory as the ideological system of the nation<sup>1</sup>.

It is a well-known phenomenon that national historiography reproduces national memory through the adaptation of the mechanisms of forgetting and remembrance in a selective way. The ultimate goal of such historiography is not an accurate account of the past but an effective and efficient contribution to national goals and unity. «History is always selective; in the same way that it describes the group, it also constructs it, ‘invents’ it. In recent history, nation-states have incorporated just such a unity, where acknowledging the significance of history was linked with a missionary consciousness regarding the future and affecting the actions of the present<sup>2</sup>.» History is not merely knowledge about the past. The conveying of such knowledge determines meaning for the present; it is constructed to give a particular direction for the future. Memory and forgetting refer to the past and construct a

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<sup>1</sup> Monika Flacke (Hrsg.), *Mythen der Nationen: Ein Europäisches Panorama*, Munich-Berlin 1998, pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup> Falk Pingel, *Historical Memories and Textbooks in a Multiethnic Context: Some Experiences*.

certain history. The views or aims of different groups concerning the future become of primary importance in articulating accounts of the past. In other words, when talking of the past, one implicitly talks of the future as well<sup>3</sup>.

National memory is a form of collective memory, which functions like a «theatre» of certain chosen events, and is only indirectly transmittable through media, education, and not directly through the individual participation. These events need to be reconstructed in such a symbolic way so that they can operate 'properly' in the national memory. There is no such a thing as the past as organic part of the memory, simply because there are no pure facts of the memory. Only after the symbolic reconstruction can 'these events' or 'facts' become functional for national consciousness. And this process of symbolic re-construction is not free of political interests and orientations of the nation in the given moment. Above all, national memory is an unavoidable condition for the construction and embodiment of national identity.

By looking into the national memory, identity, and the transmission of national memory in Cyprus, the crucial issue is that the points of reference for memory and identity do not refer to Cyprus itself but to factors outside: Greece, Turkey and Greek and Turkish nationalisms<sup>4</sup>. The reason for this is the fact that the ultimate aim to unite with 'mother Greece' and 'mother Turkey' respectively became the main goal of nationalisms in Cyprus. The result was the denial of the state-building within Cyprus and the development of two mutually exclusive ethno-cultural communities. Cyprus was not perceived as a self-contained territory, in which an independent state could be created but as a piece of territory, which assumes meaning only if it is a part of the 'supra-family' of the Greek and/or Turkish nation.

The construction and the transmission of national memories in Cyprus are to be understood in this context of nation building in Greece and Turkey. The development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus through the nineteenth century of Greek intellectual expansion politicized the local ethnological traditions in Cyprus and turned them into dynamic

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<sup>3</sup> Ioannis Papadakis, *Perceptions of History and Collective Identity: A Study of Contemporary Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Nationalism*, Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1993, p. 88.

<sup>4</sup> Falk Pingel, *op.cit.*

elements of political change. The growth of national consciousness and national assertion that culminated in a political vision of national emancipation through union with Greece was the determinant element in the construction and transmission of the national memory. The educational system was based solely on the justification and articulation of the policy for the union with Greece. A British colonial document of 1928 refers to the Greek-Cypriot education policy as follows:

All Greek-Cypriot elementary schools use the «Analytical Program» as published in Greece, definitely adopted by the Board of Education. No reading books are allowed in these schools, except those that have been approved by the «critical committee in Athens. The gymnasiums of each town and the Teacher Training School are recognised by the Greek Ministry of Education, and work under the regulations issued therefrom. Portraits of King Constantine and Queen Sophia, of Venizelos and other worthies adorn the walls of the classrooms together with elaborate maps of modern Greece, while that of Cyprus, if to be found at all, is as a rule small, out of date and frequently behind the black board<sup>5</sup>.

Indeed up to the de facto division of Cyprus by the intervention/invasion of Turkish army in 1974, the Greek-Cypriot official history and narrative is nothing but legitimisation of the demand for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. Therefore, one of the main characteristics of the Greek Cypriot Textbooks has been the construction of the concept of continuity of Hellenism in Cyprus since ancient Greeks. The emphasis of the influence of ancient Greeks on Cyprus underestimates all the political and cultural links with the other eastern Mediterranean countries.<sup>6</sup> Another remarkable point is the use of the concept of «Cypriots» exclusively for the Greek Cypriots. The impression one has is that all Cypriots are Greeks. For example one reads that: «... the ultimate goal of the Cypriots during the colonial period was nothing else but unification with Greece»<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> CO 67/2243/17. Ronald Storrs, Governor of Cyprus, 1928]. Co= Colonial Office, Public Record Office.

<sup>6</sup> Loris Koullapis, «Ιδεολογικοί προσανατολισμοί της ελληνοκυπριακής εκπαίδευσης με έμφαση στο μάθημα της ιστορίας» (Ideological orientations of the Greek Cypriot Education with emphasis on history teaching), in: *Σύγχρονα Θέματα*, July 1988-March 1999, p. 281.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 283.

The multi-ethnic structure of the population has been systematically ignored. The existence of Turkish Cypriots appears in the Greek Cypriot textbooks after the failure of the national aim of unification with Greece and the emergence of the independent Cypriot State, and then only in a prejudice and ambiguous way. It is interesting to note that the president of the bi-communal Cypriot state, Archbishop Makarios, used to refer to the Turkish Cypriot citizens as «the co-habitant element» (*το σύννοικον στοιχείον*). Between 1960 and 1974, there was no proper use of the word «Turkish Cypriots». The Greek Cypriot textbooks were speaking about the Turks who came to Cyprus during and after the Ottoman occupation (1571) and «basically were lazy and greedy». For example: «Life without hard work and suffering is not possible.... Unless we do injustice to the others and we live on their expenses. The Turks of Cyprus used to do so<sup>8</sup>.»

Room has been made for the Turkish Cypriots in the Greek Cypriot textbooks after the invasion/intervention of the Turkish army in 1974, which led to the division of Cyprus. Since then, the official Greek Cypriot policy is to establish the unity of the state and society. Therefore the international community must be convinced that co-existence with Turkish Cypriots is possible. However, the inability to move away from the nationalist paradigm hinders the Greek Cypriot community to develop a policy of recognition towards the Turkish Cypriots. In fact, the politics of denial continues. «All secondary school books after 1974 are referring to the Greek origins of the Turkish Cypriots. This has been never an issue before this period»<sup>9</sup>. The ethnic nationalism of the Greek Cypriots and their concept of belonging, which appeals to ethnicity, blood and ancestry, ignored totally the civic bonds and the citizenship. The politics of denial of the «other» is an expression and a result of the ethnic nationalism, which turned against the Cypriot state and rejected the recognition of the multi-culturalism of Cypriot society. The words of the Greek Cypriot Minister of Education in 1968 are a clear example for ethnic-nationalist perception of Cyprus: «Cyprus does not belong to the Cypriots but to the whole Hellenism».<sup>10</sup> The Turkish Cypriot argument follows a similar pattern on the premise: «Cyprus is Turkish»

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Niyazi Kizilyurek, *Ulus Ötesi Kıbrıs*, Nicosia 1993, p. 25.

Nationalism arrived in the Turkish-Cypriot community almost one century after it had arrived in the Greek-Cypriot community. The Turkish-Cypriots seem to have been affected by Turkish nationalism during and after the emergence of modern Turkey. However, the gradual transformation of the Muslim community into a dynamic Turkish ethnic community on the island, that saw itself as part of the Greater Turkish nation, is not to be understood independently of the raising of the Greek-Cypriot national consciousness. There is a close relationship, perhaps a dialectical one, between ethnic antagonism and the development of the Turkish-Cypriot national identity. The call on ethnicity, although influenced by Turkish nationalism and, in a way, encouraged by the British colonialism due to divide and rule, developed in reaction to the Greek-Cypriot national aspiration of *Enosis* (unification with Greece), which was perceived, partly for historical reasons, as a threat to the existence of Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus. It is not a coincidence that the spread of nationalist feelings among the Turkish-Cypriots gained momentum in the 1950's when the Greek-Cypriot demand for the unification with Greece reached its apex. This process of constant conflict has itself crystallised a Turkish-Cypriot sense of ethnic identity in what was before only a linguistic-religious category and it was during this process that the Turkish demand for the division of the island and unification with Turkey came to be pronounced.

The dreams of *Enosis* and partition were justified by the arguments that the Greek-Cypriots are culturally and spiritually one with the Greeks of Greece and the Turkish-Cypriots are one with the Turks of Turkey and they are part of the Turkish and Greek nations respectively.

In this nationalistic antagonism, each community tries to legitimise its own national goal and denies legitimacy to the other one. Accordingly, the existence of Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus is not of any historical political significance for the Greek-Cypriot national memory and «most of them are in fact Christians who converted to Islam». For the Turkish-Cypriot national memory, «Cyprus was never Greek» and «Greek-Cypriots are in fact not Greek but remains of different nations, who passed through Cyprus throughout history.» This gives us already a hint about the construction and instrumentalization of national memory in both Cypriot communities, which are not ready «to cross their memories» or «to exchange their memories» but are rather insisting on a mutual denial.

At this point, I would like to concentrate on how national memory is transmitted into the Turkish Cypriot textbooks. For this purpose I examined the following history textbooks:

1. Vehbi Zeki Sertel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* (The History of Cyprus), Nicosia 1999, approved for use in Secondary School.
2. Vehbi Zeki Sertel, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi* (The History of the Turkish Cypriot Struggle), 2 volumes, Nicosia 1978, in use in Lycée.

### «Kıbrıs Tarihi» (The History of Cyprus)

In the very first pages of the book, the author writes that Cyprus is a geographical extension of Anatolia and emphasises the importance of Cyprus for Turkey to demonstrate that Greece had no historical connections with Cyprus and that Greeks living in Cyprus are not Greeks. A comparison of the importance of Cyprus for Turkey and Greece reads as follows:

Cyprus controls the Southern ports of Turkey. In case of a Russian threat, the Turkish army can be attacked from three different fronts and can ask for help only from the Southern ports of Turkey. Cyprus for Turkey is from the point of history, also very important. Our ancestors conquered Cyprus in 1571 for the cost of 80,000 Martyrs' lives. The Turks ruled Cyprus until 1878, for three centuries, and treated the native population in a very good manner. They brought freedom and justice to the island. The Turks developed Cyprus and built so many monuments, which gave Cyprus the Turkish Character. In short, one can say that Cyprus is historically, geographically, strategically and economically tied to Anatolia and a part of Asia Minor. ( p. 7)

The author goes further to say that Cyprus has neither historical nor strategic importance for Greece. Greeks never ruled in Cyprus. The fact that they created in ancient times some colonies in Cyprus for economic reasons does not give them any rights over Cyprus.

Cyprus is 600 miles away from Greece. Therefore, Cyprus has neither geographic nor strategic importance for Greece. The Greeks, who exist today in Cyprus, are not Greeks. They are, as many foreign historians have accepted, remains, relics of different nations

that invaded Cyprus throughout history. Therefore, Greece has in this sense [the author probably means the ethnic sense] also nothing to do with Cyprus. But, as it is well known, Greece, dreaming of the Great Idea tries to possess Cyprus. This effort is continuing, since 1878, increasingly. But, let us say it right now, as long as the Great Turkish motherland exists, these dreams will never be materialised and will remain empty sweet dreams. (pp. 7-8)

In this rather long quotation, one can already read what the author tries to «prove» in his 160-page book: «Cyprus is Turkish», «Greeks never ruled Cyprus», and «Greeks living in Cyprus are not Greeks».

In the following pages, the author develops his theory by giving his own interpretation about Greek language and Orthodox-Christian religion in Cyprus. Specifically, he demonstrates that the establishment of the Greek language as the official language by the Byzantine Empire in the 6<sup>th</sup> century, resulted in the union of the mixed population of Cyprus under a common language and religion. That is how this mixed population, which has nothing to do with Greekness came to consider itself Greek. (p. 26)

Greeks in Cyprus are done away with, as are their rights. According to the author, Greek-Cypriots have no right to unify with Greece and Cyprus is Turkish because Ottomans –called Turks by the author– ruled Cyprus for three centuries and 80,000 Ottoman soldiers died and became martyrs during the conquest of the island in 1571. As a famous Turkish national poem describes «Land becomes patria only if there are people to die for its sake...»<sup>11</sup>

The «discursive strategy» of the author is evident through his emphasis on the «80,000 martyrs», in Turkish «sehit» – deriving from Jihad, holy war in Arabic – which signifies symbolically and attaches a «holy meaning» to the fact of Ottoman Conquest of Cyprus by utilising the political language of Islam<sup>12</sup>.

What we have here is an example of the capturing of history in the national interest. In Homi Bhabha's useful phrase, nations are like «narratives» which are told, along with other stories, about who they are and where they have come from<sup>13</sup>. History and nation are insepara-

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<sup>11</sup> Arif Nihat Asya, *Vatan*, Poetry on Homeland.

<sup>12</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, Chicago-London 1988.

<sup>13</sup> Homi K. Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London-NewYork 1990.

ble. The point about this mobilisation of history is that it is an exercise in legitimisation; it is not to be taken as a history lesson in the sense that it is an accurate account of the past. We might characterise it as «myth-history» in the sense that it sets out to celebrate identity and associated values, and to describe and explain the world in which such identity and values are experienced<sup>14</sup>.

Let us turn to the book, to the object of this study. According to the author, Cyprus under Ottoman rule is a country of equality and freedom but the «unthankful» Orthodox Church of Cyprus «exploited the tolerance and betrayed the Goodness of Turks and rebelled against Turkish administration. For this reason, the Archbishop and other Bishops were killed in 1821.» (pp. 70-71)

For the author, the British period in Cyprus is characterised by Greek rebellion for the union with Greece. In his words:

After the Ottoman Rule was replaced by Great Britain, the Greek Cypriots started a campaign for the unification of the Island with Greece. In 1955, the terrorist EOKA attacked the Greeks, who did not wish the unification of Cyprus with Greece, the British and the Turks. This led to the inter-communal fighting. (pp. 90-91)

When the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, the Greeks prepared a genocide plan to massacre all the Turks, in order to realise Enosis. (pp. 105 and 113)

At the end of 1963, the Greeks, for this aim, attacked the Turks, and gave examples of unique barbarism, which are rare to be found in the world. (p. 114)

In 1964, Turkey sent war planes to Cyprus. The coward Greeks and Greek-Cypriots disappeared. The 34 Turkish flagged war-planes made the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots to vomit blood. (pp. 118-119)

In 1967, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots attacked and looted two Turkish villages. The barbarous Greeks tortured and killed the Turks. Among the dead bodies, some were cut into pieces. (p. 123)

As Greeks tried to materialise Enosis in 1974, Turkey intervened to hinder Enosis. Greeks who once resisted against the Italians by

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<sup>14</sup> David Mc Crone, *The Sociology of Nationalism*, London 1998, p. 51.

saying 'OXI', tried to do the same, this time with Turks. However, they had forgotten a point: in front of them, there was not an Italian but a TURK. (Emphasis from the author of the textbook, written in capital letters) (p. 132)

After the Turkish operation had begun, the Greeks gave examples of unique barbarism in the defenceless Turkish villages. They buried alive, without exception, children, women, men, and elderly men. (p. 134)

The story, rather the tale, the author is telling us, finishes with a grand finale. The writer describes the «victory» of the Turkish army in Cyprus in July /August 1974, which brought about the de facto partition of Cyprus. Here is the grand finale in the words of the writer:

During the operations [of the Turkish army] towards East and West, the Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces knelt in front of MEHMETCIK'S [a word for sympathetic, smooth and humanist presentation of Turkish soldiers] sharp sword, diffused, and collapsed. These were coward Levant herds, what Grivas and Makarios called ankle-children of Greeks and considered undefeatable, who could kill only defenceless Turks. Were not thrown into the sea the grandfathers of the same nation on the 9th of September 1922 in Izmir? History is repeating itself. This time, the Turkish Armed Forces were defeating Hellenic imperialism in Turkish Cyprus. (p. 135)

All in all, the past is a powerful source of legitimacy for those who would change the present for a new future<sup>15</sup>. Partition of Cyprus, as «the new future», which is put forward as a national goal by Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, lead the author to «charge» history with connecting the past-present-future in a national narrative, in the most selective way, which in turn, serves the legitimisation of this «new future» of partition.

Before concluding, I would like to present in short some parts of the other book in two volumes of the same writer, which is also in use in Turkish-Cypriot schools as textbook, and is repetitive with the first one.

### **«History of The Turkish-Cypriot Struggle 1»**

The introduction starts by stating that «for every Greek who died for

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

the unification of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis), died a Turk to hinder Enosis». Further:

Cyprus was for 307 years under Turkish rule, but never under Greek rule. For the sake of Enosis and the Great Idea, there was a lot of bloodshed, because the small/insignificant Greece had supported the Greek-Cypriot struggle for Enosis. Turks of Cyprus were saved by their motherland Turkey. In the morning of the 20<sup>th</sup> July 1974, Turks of Cyprus united with their motherland, which they were missing passionately for all these years. Turks of Cyprus will continue their holy struggle on the path of Great Atatürk, until the end, with support of our motherland Turkey, and will succeed.

The very same arguments, as in the first book, are also here presented:

Cyprus is Turkish! The Greek-Cypriot struggle for Enosis is illegal and barbaric. The EOKA movement is merely a terrorist movement. However, Cyprus is and will remain Turkish. (p. 61)

The writer introduces quotations from statements of different Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot nationalist personalities as a response to the Greek demand for Enosis. An example:

I tell the Greeks, who are threatening world peace, that because of Cyprus someone will be bleeding. However, this will not be the Turks but the Greek nation, which once spoiled the fields of Izmir with their blood. (p. 63)

According to the writer, for the Turkish riots against the Greek inhabitants of Istanbul in 1955, the responsibility lies on the Greek side, because they created such hatred among the Turks. (p. 70) In regard to the inter-communal killings, the writer refers to the victimised Turks and the aggressive barbarous Greeks. (p. 73) The author does not hesitate to take political position in judging the events in a manichaistic way. He writes that «the establishment of an independent state of Cyprus in 1960 was wrong, [his] opinion is that the best solution for the Cyprus question is the partition of the island.» (p. 140)

### **«History of the Turkish-Cypriot Struggle 2»**

In the second book of the *History of the Turkish-Cypriot Struggle*, the

author deals with the years after independence and with the inter-communal fighting that broke out at the end of 1963 and continued in 1964. For the author, Greek-Cypriots had nothing in mind but to massacre the Turkish-Cypriots and for this purpose, they developed even a plan. The book is telling stories about the «spoiled Greeks» who were killing the Turks to achieve Enosis, and the «Turkish heroes», who were bravely resisting to Enosis. Here, Hollywood concept of «bad guys and good guys» achieved its apex. I quote:

Greeks are dreamers and liars because the Greek [in third person singular] throughout the history is asking for SOMETHING [emphasis by the textbook author]. He demands Dollars from America, and Pounds from England. He demands money, he demands territory. For example, from his neighbour Albania, he wants Epirus, from Bulgaria, he demands Macedonia. In the past, he wanted from Turkey the whole western Asia Minor. Now, he demands Cyprus. If he wants Egypt tomorrow because of some Greek element in Egypt, do not be surprised (...) In order to defend our rights and freedoms; we will resist to you. And, for this aim, if we don't find a piece of stick or stone, we will take in hand the bones of our 80,000 martyrs who died for this land, and resisted to you. (pp. 81-82)

Similar quotations or statements are often to be found in the book. The 80,000 martyrs are an evidence for the Turkishness of Cyprus. And, the Turkish struggle against Enosis takes its strength from these martyrs, but also the national struggle for partition of the island searches its legitimacy mainly in the Ottoman soldiers, who died during the conquest of Cyprus in 1571. The logic implied here is simple: «where the Turkish blood is spoiled there belongs to the Turkish nation». The 80,000 martyrs, who died in 1571, and the discourse around them leads to the denial of 80% of the population, which is Greek-Cypriot, and lives today on the island and since 1974 is not allowed to enjoy the northern part of Cyprus. Ernest Renan's reply to the German historian Dr. Strauss, who had argued that the Alsace and Lorraine are German because many German lived and died there, is well in place here: «let us respect the rights of the alive ones, as much as we respect the rights of the dead ones.»

## Epilogue

Walking along the line which divides Cyprus into two parts, one reads on both sides of the line the same slogans in Greek and Turkish:

«Δεν Ξεχνώ», «Unutmam», in English «I don't forget».

This insistence on remembrance refers to the national memories in Cyprus. Next to these slogans, Greek and Turkish flags are waving respectively and the walls are covered with the pictures of the national heroes of antagonising sides. This set-up serves the same scope as the textbooks in Cyprus: to remember selectively, to register what happened to «us», and forget what we did to «them», to legitimise our own nationalism and to condemn «theirs».


The main concern of this selective memory is not to remember what happened in the past, but to instrumentalise the past for the political aims of the present and the future. It is also hindering the emergence of empathy among the citizens on both sides, who are willing to indulge into *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, to cross their memories and establish communication. In fact, it distorts the communication between the two communities of Cyprus.

National memories in Cyprus seem to have two major functions. In regard to the «other», they lead the members of each ethnic group to the politics of denial, instead of recognition, and in regard to «us», they obstruct the development of critical thought and social critic. They create an artificial uniformity among the members of each ethnic group and postpone the accountability. No one is responsible for the misdoings to «them». Hence no one is accountable. «The evil is the other.» The most popular slogan in Cyprus, in both communities is «We don't forget!». But do we really remember?


## B. ALBANIA



Ismail Qemali dhe sekretar Luigj Gurakuqi. Në fjalën që mbajti, Ismail Qemali tha ndër të tjera se "e vetmja udhë shpëtimi ishte ndarja e Shqipërisë nga Turqia". Mendimi i I. Qemalit për pavarësinë e plotë përputhej me mendimin e delegatëve të tjerë dhe u miratua njëzëri prej tyre sepse shprehte aspiratën e gjithë popullit shqiptar. Duke qenë në unitet të plotë mendimi, Kuvendi vendosi Shpalljen e Pavarësisë së Shqipërisë dhe të gjithë delegatët nënshkruan aktin historik të kësaj ngjarjeje të madhe kombëtare. Pastaj Ismail Qemali me shokët e tij doli përpara një mitingu të madh popullor që ishte mbledhur pranë ndërtesës ku mbahej Kuvendi dhe ngriti flamurin kombëtar të Shqipërisë.



Ismail Qemali



Akti i Shpalljes së Pavarësisë

## PJESË LEXIMI

### 1. ISMAIL QEMALI

Ka qenë udhëheqës i shquar i Lëvizjes Kombëtare Shqiptare dhe kryeministër i parë i Shqipërisë së pavarur. Lindi në Vlorë më 1844 në një familje çifligare. Pasi kreu shkollën fillore në qytetin e lindjes dhe gjimnazin "Zosimea" në Janinë, më 1859 u vendos në Stamboll, ku mori pjesë në përpjekjet për caktimin e një alfabeti të përbashkët të gjuhës shqipe dhe për formimin e një shoqërie kulturore shqiptare. Pati funksione të rëndësishme administrative në Perandorinë Osmane dhe u shqua si personalitet me pikepamje liberale. Kërkesat e I. Qemalit për reforma demokratike e çuan në konflikt me rrethet konservatore të Stambollit. U denua nga Porta e Lartë me internim, të cilin e vuajti për 7 vjet. Për t'u shpëtuar ndjekjeve të sulltanit, u arratis nga Stambolli dhe qendroi në vise të ndryshme të Evropës, ku mbajti lidhje dhe bashkëpunoi me rrethet politike të Lëvizjes Kombëtare Shqiptare. Ai



## Albanian Schoolbooks in the Context of Societal Transformation: Review Notes\*

ERIND PAJO

### Introduction

I HAVE REVIEWED SCHOOLBOOKS that were approved for publication by the Albanian Ministry of Education and Science, either directly or through the Institute for Pedagogical Studies, for the subjects of Civics, History, Geography, Knowledge of Society, and Literature, and were printed recently, mostly in the year 1998. Although Math, the natural sciences, and some applied technical subjects are central to the first eight years of the Albanian curriculum, and subsequently in the non-vocational secondary education<sup>1</sup>, the schoolbooks for these subjects have not been considered relevant.

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\* The World Bank commissioned the initial version of this review in the summer of 1999, as part of an assessment of Albania's education. The task was to convey briefly how the Albanian schoolbooks of the late 1990s read, but by using as many examples as possible for elucidating specific topics of interest. This necessitated theoretically explicit discussions of various aspects of post-socialism as well as of other relevant frameworks. The format of the study and the time I had available ruled out such discussions, however. Hoping that although incomplete, these notes detail the need for investigating the topic further, I presented them in the summer of 2000 in the Athens workshop on Albanian schoolbooks that was sponsored by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe. It is with the same awareness of incompleteness, and with the hope that further study will thus be encouraged, that these review notes are included in the present collection. I thank Nora Dudwick, Helen Shahriari, Judith Schlick, Nikoleta Mita, Edmond Rapti, Theodori Karaj, Judith Maher, Bujar Basha, and Christina Koulouri for contributing to this writing in various ways. The World Bank, the CDRSE, and the individuals mentioned above cannot be associated with the information and the views presented here; any errors remain with the author.

<sup>1</sup> Algebra, Geometry, and in the senior year of high school also Logic, as well as Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Anatomy have traditionally been, and still are, separate subjects in the non-vocational / academic curriculum. This curriculum also includes such subjects of applied nature as Knowledge of Machines, Electrotechnics, and Technical Drawing and Blueprinting. In addition, Knowledge of Computers is introduced more recently as another separate subject. Not only were all of these subjects compulsory in the past, they even carried the same GPA weight as History or Literature. The continuously revised GPA calculation method however, has now finally adjusted/diminished the relative status of the applied technical subjects.

This review focuses on the contemporary Albanian schoolbook cosmology<sup>2</sup>, especially on the notions of Albanian nationness and political system, on the senses of a past, a present, and a surrounding world, and on understandings of material goods. Fitting such breadth in the present format has caused numerous omissions and simplifications. I have proceeded from the assumption that schoolbook cosmology ensues from the meanings that schoolbook texts gain in the context of Albania's myriad societal transformations<sup>3</sup>. Having thus assumed that an understanding of the values conveyed by the Albanian schoolbooks requires an inquiry into the dynamics text – larger transforming societal context, I have given presence to the latter by referring to it as «undertext». For the purposes of this review, undertext can be understood as that which is not-written but underlies what is written and provides the framework for the text to produce meanings. While compared to those of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the current schoolbooks generally mark improvements, this review suggests that the severity of their internal cosmological conflicts may negatively affect Albania's societal life well into the future. By providing today's students with the foundations upon which they will develop their own cosmologies, what today's schoolbooks say, and what they say without saying it, are shaping Albania's future<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Heuristically used, «cosmology» includes the entirety of the cultural understandings held in a society, or implied in a societal product such as Albanian schoolbooks, or held by an individual. Hence the national cosmology, the schoolbook cosmology, and the individual cosmology. The analytical edge over «ideology», especially in the case of a post-dictatorial Albania, is that cosmology sums together the entirety of cultural understandings, not only those that are of a direct political nature, or promoted by certain societal segments for specific political ends. While I have assumed that the concept implies plurality, one could argue for many cosmologies rather than a schoolbook cosmology.

<sup>3</sup> «Societal» could perhaps have been substituted by the more commonly used adjective «social» – admittedly there is some meaning overlap. While the differences cannot be detailed here, I have chosen to use «societal» for indicating the fractured nature of the post-socialist transformations in Albania, and their diverse meanings to differently situated groups.

<sup>4</sup> Schoolbooks cannot be solely held responsible for Albania's future, as a number of other factors will play crucial roles, including factors that are entirely extraneous to Albanian realities. It cannot be disputed, however, that the national cosmology will remain one of the major shapers of this future.

### **How Albanian Schoolbooks come about**

The Albanian schoolbooks of 1998 mark a moment in which both their text and the larger undertext are undergoing multiple transformations. By no means the product of systematic planning, these books call for an inquiry that is ontological in every step. I start with the matter-of-fact question of how Albanian schoolbooks come about. A formal procedure has been difficult to track down. An Albanian specialist explained to me that a number of formal rules do govern the process, but they allow for fairly unconstrained practices. The directive for replacing an existing book with a new one formally comes from the Ministry of Education through the Institute for Pedagogical Studies. Specialists in the respective field then write the text, but there are no formal rules for hiring these authors. Instead, the board that initiates the program of the subject and the team of text authors often overlap, making it difficult to establish a line of causality in the process of schoolbook production. According to the explanation I was provided, the boards themselves consist of ad hoc appointments of the Institute of Pedagogical Studies, which is a branch of the Ministry of Education. This makes it virtually impossible to establish at what point and by who it is decided to replace the existing books. Irregularities of funding greatly affect the process. While there appears to be no regular annual allocation, the emergence of the ad hoc boards for subject programs may be directly tied to the availability of funding. This can lead to two extreme situations: When there is money one can decide to change a given schoolbook for no other reason than treating colleagues to revision honoraria; In case that no money is allocated, however, a schoolbook cannot be changed regardless of the real need for change<sup>5</sup>. Especially important therefore is financing through occasional and charity monies. A number of the schoolbooks I reviewed, especially those of Civics, were marked on the front cover as «Donation of the Italian Government / Printed in Albania». This may imply that the Ministry of Education or the Institute of Pedagogical Studies accept or perhaps even actively seek funding for schoolbooks, at least from certain external sources. How this process is regulated, however, how the sources are selected, whose monies are solicited/accepted, and what kind of say they have over the content of

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<sup>5</sup> This information needs to be independently confirmed.

the schoolbooks they finance, are issues that remain to be inquired into. The «donation» statement leaves it unclear as to who these books are donated since students buy them at the full prices that are sometimes printed on the back covers<sup>6</sup>.

### **Cosmological Contradictions and Inconsistencies**

Not always self-consistent and/or referential to reality, the books reviewed are both part and a reflection of the state of transformations in which the Albanian society is entangled. Although a widely shared sentiment, opposition to the socialist past may not yet make for a point of unification or ordering of the schoolbook cosmology, especially when the societal practices necessitated by the one-party dictatorship have ceased to exist. Like the larger Albanian national cosmology, the text and undertext of Albanian schoolbooks seem to be in search for their next point of crystallization unguided by any clear principle. The dynamics text – undertext suggest that there are real pressures to change the schoolbooks at a time when Albania's socioeconomic condition may not allow a start from scratch. The *History of the Albanian People: For the High Schools*<sup>7</sup> can serve as an informative example. According to its foreword, this book is product of the cooperation among a variety of specialists of the subject, some of whom are Kosovar and Macedonia-Albanian scholars. The authors acknowledge the help of the «National Council of History»<sup>8</sup>, affiliated in ways yet to be explained with the Albanian Ministry of Education. The foreword explains that «[t]his new text offers to the high school in one single publication the history of the Albanians in all of their ethnic sites and in the Diaspora and for all the periods, from the old age to our days. It has been aimed that his-

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<sup>6</sup> In case that «donation» means a partial production subsidy, the spot for the message and the font size seem inappropriately selected. As it is presented, this statement resembles some sort of ideological advertisement. The subsidy must have been meager too: low-quality printed in tens of thousands (often over 60,000), the prices of these schoolbooks compare to those of books published commercially at small fractions of the print runs. One is even tempted to think that were the Albanian Ministry of Education to publicly tender advertising space for commercial rather than ideological messages, the print quality of the schoolbooks, at the very least, would have been better, and the books would perhaps sell for less.

<sup>7</sup> Tiranë 1996, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (first published in 1994).

<sup>8</sup> Largely unknown to the uninitiated in the politics of the Albanian educational institutions, including this reviewer.

tory is presented as re-conceptualized, in an objective manner and liberated from the politicization that characterized the former texts of history». While it is thus suggested that the pressures to change the previous text may have been related to its failure to cover all of the «Albanian people» in all of their «ethnic sites» and the «Diaspora», the current text does not substantiate a response to these concerns. The authors agree that «[a]ll the committed work notwithstanding, it is not pretended that the final word on all the problems is said with this text. No doubt, in the future the text will have additions and improvements, so we welcome remarks and suggestions from the history teachers, the scholars, and the many fans of the national history»<sup>9</sup>. Contradicting the first paragraph, this last paragraph of the foreword may be more than the usual modest disclaimer. It is implicitly admitted that the pressures out of which this text arose have not been eased, the authors even foresee that the current text will need to be changed again. More importantly, this last paragraph also indicates that the real pressures must have not come from the practitioners of the history as a school subject: it remains unclear how were «many» of them consulted while their «remarks» are welcome after the fact.

The conspicuously not-named legacies of the dictatorship of the proletariat may lay at the root of the pressures that necessitated the changes; that they are not mentioned hints that the ideological conflicts in Albanian cosmologies remain unresolved. These conflicts have made the preset *History of the Albanian People* a collection of accounts that generally contradict and exclude each other<sup>10</sup>. One important case in which this situation of conflict discloses itself is that part of the book that deals with WWII. While a makeshift name is coined for it, the «Liberating Antifascist War», the Albanian resistance during WWII is still largely presented as equaled by the «National Liberation War», the movement dominated by the Communist Party and labeled «national» for reasons that need to be dealt with in the text<sup>11</sup>. Paragraphs about the non-Communist and anti-Communist antifascist movements are scattered here and there, and there is talk even about elements of a «civil

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<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Compared to the schoolbooks for the history of Albania that were used during most of the dictatorial period, the current book marks earnest improvement.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 194-215.

war». But these remain piecemeal and only partial efforts of recognition that others besides the Communists were genuinely interested in ending Albania's invasions, and that the Communists eventually conquered them. The text exhibits little attempt to deal seriously and in a disinterested manner with the dynamics of the Albanian WWII resistance, and the cases of no resistance. Resembling practices of the Communist propaganda that silenced those historical facts that conflicted the official ideology, numerous facts are only superficially commented upon, even without ever being presented. Out of over 250 pages of the book, for example, only in one page<sup>12</sup> it is mentioned that in 1943 the German «invaders» «re-proclaimed» Albania's «independence». The very terms involve contradiction: how can invaders proclaim independence? The text does not discuss why did the Germans do so and what that meant for the Albanians<sup>13</sup>. Instead, it is noted that «the Nazis increased the economic exploitation of the country», but «some nationalists aspired to preserve the union of all the Albanian sites», and so «they hoped to exploit the policy of the German invaders in these sites»<sup>14</sup>. The verdict tone that requires from students no more than memorizing does not answer the questions that legitimately arise from reading this text. What does the economy «of» the country exactly mean? How was its exploitation increased? How was it (less) exploited before and by who? Where did the union of all the Albanian sites pop out from? What was the policy of the German invaders that some nationalists hoped to exploit? Who were these nationalists? Did they also happen to engage in any actual activity to exploit the German policy? If not, how do we know they hoped to exploit it in the first place? Finally, on the pedagogical side of the coin, if none of these questions receives answers, what happens if the students raise them in class<sup>15</sup>?

*History's* coverage of the WWII resistance illustrates how the Communists, the anti-Communists, and the nationalists are portrayed as

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>13</sup> I use here the shorthand references that are used in the schoolbooks, such as «the» Germans, «the» Albanians, and so forth, although the very construction of Germanness and Albianity requires analysis.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>15</sup> The issue of the assumptions about the students that the schoolbooks seem to maintain is discussed further in the subsection «Comments vs. Explanations / Interpretations».

static entities rather than as results of societal dynamics. While all resistance is in effect equaled with the *National Liberation War*, Enver Hoxha is depicted as its central leading figure from the beginning through end. The text includes a «reading part» on the persona of Enver Hoxha by the dissident Communist Nako Spiru. This short piece starts with the words «mediocre intelligence» to conclude «people are not convinced of [Hoxha's] capabilities»<sup>16</sup>. How then, did Mr Hoxha become chief of the Communists if «the people» were not convinced of his capabilities? Must he not have had some Machiavellian capabilities at the very least that allowed him to climb to the top? If so, which were these, how did they manifest themselves, and how did the internal dynamics of the Albanian society during and after WWII allow Mr Hoxha to become ruler of the country? The text does hint at the influence of the Yugoslav Communist Party in Mr Hoxha's central place in the Albanian Communist movement. But in the 1940s the Yugoslavs could not have been aware of Mr Hoxha's criminal deeds in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and put him at the head of the Albanian Communist movement in order to ensure that he would commit those crimes. The undertext reads that, by implication of their role in the apotheosis of Mr Hoxha, the Yugoslav Communists were the bad guys. The failing of the text, however, is their presentation as *being* the bad guys rather than *becoming* the bad guys at some point down the road, all the way not elaborating on the reasons<sup>17</sup>. Likewise, the presentation of Mr Hoxha as *being* rather than *becoming* both a leader and a bad guy, is one of this text's deficiencies that can have somber implications.

The examples of lack of internal consistency can be numerous. A lesson from the section of *The History of the Albanian People* that deals with the period of WWII and its end states in the hollowly triumphant style that Communism eradicated illiteracy in Albania, but continues that all the property of the «bourgeois» class was nationalized at no compensation<sup>18</sup>. Two related dimensions of inconsistency reveal

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<sup>16</sup> *History of the Albanian People: For the High Schools* (1996), p. 222.

<sup>17</sup> The Yugoslav Communists did in fact become nasty indeed. Or perhaps they were the nasty ones called into being by the historical circumstance in the WWII Balkans. Their crimes against humanity –against Kosovar Albanians after WWII, but by no means only against them– may have been an appropriate topic of analysis for the schoolbook *History of the Albanian People*.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 219-222.

themselves here. In the first, the inconsistency is patent and arises from the text having become an arena of interest clashes. Eradication of illiteracy in the late 1950s, generally accepted as a true achievement of the dictatorship of the proletarians, becomes moral capital to those school-book authors who mourn the collapse of the dictatorship in Albania. The discussion of this fact in the *History of the Albanian People* seems to be granted as a monopoly to this clan, who can now treat it however they may want. The Communist government on the other hand, stole the property of the ordinary Albanians once it came to power. This becomes the argument of those who take it upon themselves to represent what the anti-dictatorship movement has presently become. They can consider this as their victory in the cosmological conflict, and discuss it the way they want. The second inconsistency becomes discernible at this point. Because Albania never experienced capitalism, it cannot be capitalists whom this second clan derogatorily calls «the bourgeois». Instead «bourgeois» is used for those who owned enough to be target of the Communist government's raid, the middle class<sup>19</sup>. Derogatory reference to the middle class in an account that intends to denounce the theft of the Communist government after WWII indicates the magnitude of the internal contradictions in Albanian national cosmologies, and illustrates how the years of the dictatorship have affected these cosmologies to the degree of circumscribing the very faculties of perception. Politicized understandings seem to be the only understandings possible so that even the denunciation occurs in that past's own terms<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> In English, the case could perhaps be made that «bourgeois» refers to the middle class in an only slightly loaded way. During the years of the dictatorship of the proletarians in Albania, however, «bourgeois» became the standard official derogatory term of reference for those who exploited their fellow men in what was pictured as the system of man's exploitation of the fellow men. Negatively charged, it was used in disdain for those members of the Albanian middle class during WWII who did not join the Communist «National Liberation War». Western capitalism in general was also scorned by the propaganda as «the bourgeois system» or «the bourgeois world». By contrast, «middle strata,» used less often, referred to those who during WWII joined or at least sympathized with the «National Liberation War» but who were not peasants and could also not be considered city proletarians. The triadic class segregation, however, becomes applicable only when considering Albania in a global framework that would provide one class or strata above the middle class as well. But this consideration does not make capitalists or a «bourgeois class» out of the wealthier Albanians.

<sup>20</sup> The gravity of the internal contradictions in the Albanian cosmology is further revealed if one is to ask on what grounds is the past denounced, if the only channels of

### Cosmological Views

Although opposed to the past, Albania's practices of the present cannot be anything but its continuation. Schoolbooks are therefore intricately related to the socialist past despite conscious effort to have them depart from that legacy. They share assumptions about the students and the mission of education that are comparable to the assumptions of the schoolbooks of the socialist past. They do not address the issues that most concern the Albanian societal life and are generally out of touch with it and inculcate in students complexes of inferiority that are intrinsically and deeply related to one's very Albanian being. Finally, they tend to substitute comments for explanations or interpretations. I have listed in following a few schemas that appear to guide book picturings of the world<sup>21</sup>, and then briefly discussed these points.

- All the countries of the world we live in want to become like the West, especially like the United States, but they cannot.
- The United States and some Western European countries possess all the money that is. They are never going to let it slip off their hands.
- Albania is generally unimportant, but we are Albanian.
- Albania is never going to make it.
- There are no jobs in Albania, no opportunities, and one cannot earn real money here.
- All that matters is money, and money is a given. One can have money or not have it, but it does not seem like one can earn it or do much about one's money condition in any other way.
- There is only so much money and so many material goods: if one wins, that has to be at the cost of another who loses.
- Honor and money do not often go together.
- Albania's Communist regime was bad, but nobody knows why. Democracy must be good, but nobody knows why.

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perceiving the world are defined by its political ideology –a question which cannot be discussed any further in the present occasion.

<sup>21</sup> Like other elements of the societal life, these perspectives are also in transformation. The following is an attempt to map the most important schemas in the form in which they emerge most usually out of the schoolbooks' undertext. Although this mapping provides important reference points for understanding the internal architecture of the schoolbook cosmology at large, it cannot possibly be exhaustive.

- Like blue eyes, religion is something one can do nothing about, but it defines the way others think of you. It is good to have blue eyes and blond hair, and be Christian. Unfortunately most of us have brown eyes and grandparents with embarrassing-sounding names.
- We are white people, nevertheless, the pinnacle of the world civilization<sup>22</sup>.
- Individuals can be geniuses, even some Albanians can. The rest of the people do not matter, they would follow those great individuals.

### Being Albanian

Manifest nationalism does not appear to be amongst the ills of the Albanian national cosmology: the books reviewed here do generally not treat Albanian nationalism, or even the meanings of the nation as topics worth the attention<sup>23</sup>. A case could be made that, by and large, they do not contain much nationalistic sentiment either<sup>24</sup>. It would be difficult to determine reasons for this: Is the theme of Albanianness deliberately avoided, or does Albanianness constitute the taken-for-granted and per-

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<sup>22</sup> In an honest attempt to counter this cosmological understanding, the *Knowledge of Society* reads: «The people belonging to the white race are thought to have been and to be more successful in their life and activity. This impression is created because in today's civilization the presence and the achievements of the white people are more apparent than those of the people of the other races. But the cultural and social achievements of peoples depend on a number of factors: the geographic position, climate, the contacts and relations with other peoples, the level of technology and the capabilities of individuals who belong to different races, etc.» *Knowledge of Society 2*, (second re-edition (year of edition 1995)), Tiranë 1998, p. 75.

<sup>23</sup> With the exception of the history of the Albanian people that constitutes a separate subject taught every fourth year of school. In and by itself, however, this fact does not tell much about the Albanian nationalism. Out of the *History of the Albanian People: For the High Schools*, and *Let's Know the History of Our People 4* (for the 4<sup>th</sup> grade) that were reviewed here, the latter is composed as a divulgatory children's book, and only this one of all schoolbooks reviewed is written in a more explicitly nationalistic spirit. The schoolbooks for *Literature* also contain selected pieces from the writers of the 19<sup>th</sup> century «National Renaissance» that were often composed explicitly for nationalist and other political purposes.

<sup>24</sup> I found a 250 words *Civics* lesson on the national flag (*Social Upbringing: For the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of the 8-year-school*, fourth re-edition, Tiranë 1998 (first edition 1993), pp. 46-47), and the text of the national anthem in *Literature's* schoolbook for the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade (*Reading 3*, first re-edition (improved edition 1997, year of edition 1992), Tiranë 1998, p. 52).

haps even unspeakable condition<sup>25</sup>? It may as well be a combination of both, and perhaps of other additional elements<sup>26</sup>. The books present elements of awareness of being Albanian, but of a kind untypical for nationalism in the sense of a political movement or even sentiment. They convey a sense of inferiority about the self-perceived Albanian national identity. This may be well understood in the context of the store Albanian cosmologies appears to put on material values, at least in the present time. What often amounts to obsession with money creates the background for understanding the effect that the perception of Albania as a poor country has on the Albanian national cosmology. There must be a line of reasoning from rather individual perspectives: If you are poor you are worth nothing; Albania is a poor country, and we, as Albanians, are poor; therefore we are not worth much; being Albanian does not make us proud. The schoolbooks suggest that such a chain of cosmological reasoning must also be functioning the other way around: those countries that are considered wealthy and powerful also receive deferential text coverage. For example, there is not much in the way of any statement about and/or justification for the fact that many schoolbooks, especially those for Geography and History, have granted to certain countries, and especially to the United States, the status of some sort of a universal superiority compared to other countries, first among those to Albania<sup>27</sup>. At the textual level most everything said in the schoolbooks about these countries is said from a position of admiration, developed at times into obsequiousness. The situation may often seem inexplicable: why would Greece, for example, not be covered by the schoolbooks in a similar way as Italy, Germany, or France? Or, why are the cultures of India or China bypassed<sup>28</sup>? The ubiquitous monetary

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<sup>25</sup> Were it to be the case, however, this taken-for-grantedness can inform a perspective for understanding the exclusion of minorities, especially the Gypsies, in the Albanian cosmology.

<sup>26</sup> Among others, all what can be grouped under the nationally shared aspiration for migration.

<sup>27</sup> *History 3* contains the following justification: «The history of the Albanian people has been tightly tied to the history of the peoples of Europe, so the central place in the text is occupied by the contemporary history of the countries of Europe and the USA» (*History 3: For the High Schools*, Tiranë 1998, p. 3).

<sup>28</sup> This is not an issue of political correctness, or an attempt to import into the scene of Albanian schoolbooks the recent American academic/political battles over what is and/or should be canonical cultural heritage and what not. The point here is that the impact of several Eastern cultures in the contemporary world is simply too important to ignore.

dimension<sup>29</sup> in the schoolbook discussions of these countries suggests that this coverage itself is due to the meaning of wealth in the Albanian national cosmology.

### Comments vs. Explanations / Interpretations

In the Popperian metaphor, Albanian schoolbooks appear to consider knowledge as a matter of accumulation rather than the resultant of search. They seem to assume that students are little empty buckets waiting to be filled<sup>30</sup>. Accordingly, the books set themselves the task of providing not more than information students ought to memorize. During the socialist past this information was supposedly guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism à la Party of Labor of Albania. No principles seem to have claimed this position of guidance in the present, so the knowledge presented in the books has become «neutral» and «democratic»<sup>31</sup>. The nature of some subjects, say Geography, is such that at some point one has to simply memorize that Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. In the unfortunate case of Albanian schoolbooks equalizing between school knowledge and memorized data appears to extend to such subjects as History, the new Knowledge of Society, and so forth. Everything that is presented –including opinions on casual relations between phenomena as those quoted above in the discussion of WWII by *History of the Albanian People*– is presented as undisputable fact. Its neutral appearance and affirmative tone notwithstanding, the schoolbook text leaves questions about its internal conflicts unanswered and other issues unaddressed. A reason for the disconnect may be simply the entanglement in whirls of societal transformations. The Albanian society is far from a shared understanding and from coming to terms with its dictatorial past and the nature of its present transfor-

<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately not developed into economic understanding.

<sup>30</sup> The Albanian word for «pupil» may make the point more tangible: «nxënës» is thought to derive from the verb «nxλ» which may perhaps be best converted into English as «be fillable».

<sup>31</sup> In a few cases, such as *History of the Albanian People* and *Knowledge of Society I*, this is stated in the forewords. Although the other schoolbooks do not contain such explicit statements, their undertext's claim to neutrality and democratic perspectives are as strong. A position can be either «neutral» or not, however, not both neutral and democratic. This contradiction is generally not noticed, yet another indication that «neutrality» and «democracy» are simply buzz words that do not refer to anything specific in the Albanian practice.

mations. These prolonged and ongoing transformations<sup>32</sup> that often develop into chaos<sup>33</sup> are as of this point not sufficiently reflected upon or understood. A framework for understanding will first need to be developed<sup>34</sup> and gain credence before one can expect from the schoolbooks genuine reflection on the Albanian reality – a bridge, as it were, over the chasm that separates them today. The practice of substituting comments for explanations, and especially for interpretations<sup>35</sup> can be illustrated well with the case of religion, yet another topic that serves the sense of Albanianness-related inferiority. In the present Albanian cosmology, Christianity is linked to the West as such, while Islam is understood to be an intrinsic feature of backwardness associated with the Orient. The Albanians, therefore, appear to feel awkward about some outsiders' perception of Albania belonging to an Islamic cultural heritage<sup>36</sup>, and seem to envy those few of Christian descent amongst themselves. Instead of easing these feelings, the overrepresentation of the

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<sup>32</sup> Which between 1991 and 1995 was termed «transition» in the mainstream media, most probably metaphorically meaning «transition» from «socialism» to «democracy». This metaphor implies that the societal condition towards which Albania was «transiting» was a known condition before it was actually reached. The Albanian reality has shown, however, that this was not the case. As some scholars have pointed out in reference to other eastern European countries, it is more accurate to see Albania's condition in the last decade as «transformation» rather than «transition.»

<sup>33</sup> In addition to the implosion of 1996-1997, which received broader international media coverage as the «pyramid schemes» crisis, the Albanian society has experienced in the last decade numerous other less major and/or regional culminations of chaos. One can think here of a variety of cases in Vlorë, the southern hub of illegal international traffic of people and substance, spread all along the last decade, the crises in the southeastern town of Poliçan in the early 1990s, those in Lazarat that have continuously reoccurred until the late 1990s, or the more recent situations in the northwestern city of Shkodër, as well as in the entire northeastern region.

<sup>34</sup> Ideally, such understanding would ensue from disinterested scholarly research on the Albanian societal transformations. At present such research may not possibly originate in Albania, for a number of reasons that concern the politics of funding, the various conflicts of scholarly and personal interests, the public status of the academics, and ultimately the legitimacy of social research.

<sup>35</sup> My work-definition of the difference between comments and interpretations is that interpretations aim convincing and employ both references to facts and explanations. By contrast, comments are generally self-sufficient.

<sup>36</sup> On its own right, this understanding is rather inaccurate. The Albanian society, for reasons that cannot be discussed here, reveals itself as profoundly not religious. Albanian cosmologies cannot therefore be associated with any of the religious traditions.

clergy in the foreign presence in Albania may actually exacerbate the inaccurate understandings of the place of religion in the contemporary West<sup>37</sup>. The following paragraph from the schoolbook *Let's Know the History of Our People 4* illustrates how a commentary, instead of an explanation, serves the cosmological need for justifying religion.

But now [the Albanians] were sundered amongst three different religions. Quarrels between the Albanians of different religions and vendettas were promoted in churches and mosques. These served the internal and external enemies of Albania. Ruptured this way, the Albanians could be held longer under the Ottoman rule. Other than the union of the Albanians regardless of religion, there was no other way for the liberation of the fatherland from the foreign rule<sup>38</sup>.

Not for their own faults, the present schoolbooks may not have a consensual way for dealing with either the present or the past: the condition of maturity that is necessary for interpreting and explaining social phenomena is missing. Comments are therefore substituted for explanations. This is particularly obvious and consequential in the case of the History books. Perhaps in an attempt to reverse the condition of ignorance about the contemporary world, History books now heavily focus on the post-WWII United States and selected European countries. Unfortunately, sometimes this comes at the cost of insufficient coverage of other periods, and especially at the cost of a lack of analysis of the periods covered<sup>39</sup>. Another implication of the commentary style is

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<sup>37</sup> In fact, the differences in appearance and behavior between the foreign Christian and Muslim missionaries reinforce the stereotypes of the Albanian cosmology. The foreign Christian clergy (with the possible partial exception of the Greek Orthodox) and the numerous proselytizers are usually whites, dress Western, and in the Albanian context appear wealthy. The Islamic clergy on the other hand are not always whites, their dress codes are explicitly not Western, and some of their practices are thought of as not hygienic.

<sup>38</sup> *Let's Know the History of Our People 4: Part I*, sixth re-edition, Tiranë 1998 (first edition 1991), p. 108. The second question following this lesson reads: «What were the churches and the mosques?» The date of first edition notwithstanding, this question is a remnant of the time when, as religion was unconstitutional, Albanian children could have never seen a church or a mosque. By the age of 11 they needed to be explained *what* a church or a mosque was—task that, as this paragraph shows, used to be completed by telling them *how bad* a church or a mosque really was.

<sup>39</sup> The students can read about the life of François Mitterrand, but get very little analytic coverage of the French Revolution.

that the world is presented in the terms of Albanian cosmologies, rather than in its own terms. The goal seems to often be the making of one's narrowly political point. Select European and American political figures discussed in the schoolbooks of History, for instance, are generally pictured in their dimension of respective party leaders<sup>40</sup>. The texts do not discuss why those political parties popped up as and when they did, what interests they presented and manipulated, why, as well as how they did so.

Virtual absence of explanation and interpretation of history, as well as of societal realities that have actual bearing in the students' daily lives, makes for a picture of the world that lacks dynamics. In line with the traditional practice of organizing the text as a number of true statements to be memorized, current schoolbooks continue representing reality as static: according to the Albanian schoolbooks, the world is a world of things that are given, about which one can only comment. In this world of things given, it is a given, for instance, that money is a matter of crucial importance. The nature of value and the uses of the money are generally not discussed<sup>41</sup>. As figures of the gross national domestic product of a number of nations are frequently quoted, the books of Geography and History convey the unsayable that money, as a static abstract, is all that matters<sup>42</sup>. Sometimes these figures are presented in comparative tables and converted in the same – but still foreign – currency so as to draw a hierarchical power map of countries with the United States at the very top, Western Germany next, followed by Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and so forth<sup>43</sup>. At other times, in some form of money-worship, figures of different foreign currencies are presented together completely out of their contexts<sup>44</sup>. Although the

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<sup>40</sup> See *History 3: For the High Schools*, ((revision; year of edition 1997) Tiranë 1998), and *History 7*, Tiranë 1996.

<sup>41</sup> Except for in *Civics*, which, as discussed above, does briefly touch upon issues of personal uses of money and family expenditures.

<sup>42</sup> Especially in *History 7* (1996).

<sup>43</sup> See, for instance, *History 7* (Tiranë, 1996) p. 93 or *History 3* (Tiranë, 1998) p.205. *History 7*'s brief discussion of Nazism in Germany (p. 26), traces the exchange rate between the German Mark and the US Dollar for the period 1919-1931.

<sup>44</sup> One of the instances to illustrate this is on page 11 of *History 7*, where a «reading piece» titled «A historian on the economic development of the USA» starts a comment on the American exports by quoting a dollar figure to eventually end up the

text is explicitly pro-capitalism, capitalism is not explained as the system of individual rights to accumulation and freedom of action, including economic action, but rather as a given condition of simultaneous poverty and riches that are geographically segregated. It is unclear how students can be expected to morally identify with the side that the text authors appear to have chosen<sup>45</sup>.

### Conclusion

Albanian schoolbooks have a tradition of implicitly being about the future as the schoolbooks of the dictatorship sought to make the future in the model of the present that they pretended to have already arrived. This pattern is still present in the reviewed books, although the motives may have changed. When present books deal with the past and other places, they are, in fact, about Albania's future<sup>46</sup>. While it is impossible to present an exhaustive outline of the cosmology conveyed by these schoolbooks, this review has discussed a number of issues that elucidate the dynamics of the schoolbook text and the larger Albanian societal context that has taken the form of undertext. As the Albanian society is undergoing transformation of a fundamental nature, in the present of an unconsolidated societal system the past remains largely a matter of multiple disputes that are reflected in several cosmological conflicts. As no understanding of either the past or the present has gained wide consensus, the current schoolbooks reflect the condition of societal and cosmological contradictions. Those who are to write the new texts can be either the same authors of the schoolbooks that need to be replaced, or others who have revolted against the socialist past or who are too young to have gotten involved. All of them cannot but share the same educational and ideological backgrounds that the books reflect<sup>47</sup>. Au-

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same paragraph with a quote in francs, not even explaining what kind of a franc is being discussed, or of which year.

<sup>45</sup> Schoolbook text for its part does not explain why it has chosen the side it proclaims. Unless money is widely, be that implicitly, accepted as an object of worship, possession of lots of money cannot be a reason to morally value a given country (e.g. the United States) or a given economic system (i.e. capitalism) over other ones.

<sup>46</sup> The current schoolbooks do not discuss those realities that are tangible to students. The location where the schoolbook text happens may be imagined as either the West, or the future of Albania imagined as West.

<sup>47</sup> The titles «Professor,» «Associate Professor,» and «Doctor,» suggest that the

thored this way, the current schoolbooks do not ease the pressures pronounced as a need for schoolbook replacement. The new books are either revisions of the books of the past, or, when meant to oppose them, still assembled in kindred ways.

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authors of the schoolbooks are mostly academic faculty –the only in Albania besides medical doctors who can use such titles. In almost all of the cases they also received their doctorates in Albania, although the academic system offered no formal opportunities for graduate education beyond the diploma (bachelor's/master's) level. Some of the names that show up here and there are those of senior scholars who invariably were involved in the ideological labors of the past regime. The younger authors –senior enough to be writing schoolbooks, however– could not possibly have had an educational and ideological background other than that of socialist Albania. In the best of scenarios, they have rebelled against it. But numerous cases, similar in nature to that of the use of «bourgeois» in an account that seeks to denounce the crimes of the dictatorship of the proletariat, suggest that even these scholars are usually not free from the ideological conceptualizations of the dictatorial propaganda.

## Albania and Northern Epirus in Greek Civic Schoolbooks since the 1970s

DESPINA KARAKATSANI

THE PERIOD 1950 to 1974 in Greece was characterised by a succession of right wing governments and a strong anti-Communist political discourse. The general orientation of educational theory and practice reflected these ideological orientations. There was an emphasis on the strengthening of national morale and national identity, at the core of which lay a combination of ethnocentric and Christian-Orthodox discourse. The civic education took on the character of political indoctrination, an orientation reinforced by the character of pedagogic practices adopted inside the Greek school.

In all the civic textbooks of the period after the Civil War (1949) there is a text about the 'National Questions' as part of the chapter entitled 'The most important contemporary events'. The subject of 'Northern Epirus' is not analysed among these national events, whilst the Struggle for the liberation of Cyprus and the Liberation of Northern Greece are developed in this specific chapter. There is a reference to Epirus in the text about 'The liberation of Northern Greece' where it is written: «Until 1912 the north boundaries of our Fatherland were Thessaly (Olympus) and the river Arachthos of Epirus. The very Greek regions, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, the islands of the Aegean and Crete, remained enslaved. On 5 October 1912, the Greek Army with crown prince Constantinos as Commander-in-Chief began the liberation war, which ended in the liberation of Epirus and Salonica»<sup>1</sup>. The only reference to Albania in all the civic textbooks of this period is that one, which considers it as the territory where the very cruel conflict between the Greeks and the Italian fascists (1940-1941) took place. «In the mountainous region of Albania, the Greek soldiers crushed the Italian

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<sup>1</sup> Giorgos Papaioannou: *Αγωγή του Πολίτου*, (Education of the citizen), 6<sup>th</sup> Grade of the Primary School, ed. Sideris, Athens 1962, p. 68.

fascists during the winter of 1940-1941. The Greek soul, the spirit of the Nation stood out against the enemy and fascism»<sup>2</sup>.

Social and political tensions created government instability and the conditions for a successful coup in 1967 by a junta of middle-level army officials. The political discourse of the military dictatorship was based on the protection of the Nation and the national elements against the communist danger. The 'New Democracy' could only be guaranteed by this regime as it was underlined by its protagonists and this could justify even the use of violence. Concern for territorial integrity and protection from the so called 'interior enemy' (communism) were used as justifications to outlaw all political parties and establish censorship. By its reference to Helleno-Christian civilisation the military regime aimed to reconcile the essentially contradictory values of Ancient Greece and Christian Byzantium.

Political education is the core of the whole educational policy during that period. It prescribes to the pupil a certain behaviour towards the state, the fatherland, the nation as well as the 'others' and becomes a real instrument of political propaganda. The analysis of the citizenship reveals an exaltation of the Greek Nation, the Greek past and the Greek-Christian civilisation, but also a hostile attitude towards anything, which could become a threat for the national identity.

The basic textbook of civic education during the military dictatorship was the one written by Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou, who expressed the ideological and political ideas of the military dictatorship. This textbook entitled *Political Education*<sup>3</sup> was considered as 'the political and ideological textbook of the military regime'. It was introduced as official textbook in 1970 and remained in use until 1974. In the beginning it was used only in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> Grade of the Gymnasium for pupils 15-17 years old and some years later as a compulsory item for students of all levels. In this specific textbook the 'Northern Epirus' question can be found among the 'National Issues', which constitutes a specific chapter<sup>4</sup>. The other national issues mentioned are the Cyprus question and the 'Macedonian myth'. In the Introduction of this

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. 69.

<sup>3</sup> Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou: *Πολιτική Αγωγή* (Political Education), 3<sup>rd</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Grade of Gymnasium, O.E.Δ.B (National Organisation for the Edition of School-books), 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Athens, 1972.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 304-308.

chapter it is underlined that Greece has a problem of national accomplishment due to those issues because they remain unsolved problems<sup>5</sup>. The only reference to Albania is related to the issue of 'Northern Epirus', to the failure of its integration into the Greek State and to the injustice inflicted by the Great Powers. Great emphasis is granted to the vindication of this region from Greece since 1828 and to the fact that «four times it was given to Greece and four times it was taken away from her»<sup>6</sup>. It is also underlined that «Northern Epirus must be given to Greece for different reasons: historical, ethnological, but also because of the international recognition of the rights of this country»<sup>7</sup>.

Four arguments are used to prove the above-mentioned thesis. According to the first argument, Epirus was considered in ancient times as a Greek region with boundaries Aaos River in the north and Ambrakikos gulf in the south and Dodoni as cultural centre. The textbook emphasises the fact that during the Byzantine period North and South Epirus were a part of the Greek East Empire. It is also mentioned that during the 17<sup>th</sup> century Epirus was presented in all the maps as a region of Greece whose limits were situated in the north of Avlona. It is also mentioned that Erik Kiepert, the 'greatest and more scientific geographer of the 19<sup>th</sup> century', considers the Skoubi River (Genoussos) as the north limit of Greece situating Epirus in the Greek territory. According to the same schoolbook the population of Epirus contributed to the struggle of the Greek Nation for independence and in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the entire region was 'the heart of Hellenism'. It is underlined that «All the important educational and cultural institutions of Greece were made thanks to the warm patriotism of the Epirotes»<sup>8</sup>. According to the second argument the right of Greece to Epirus was recognised several times by the Great Forces. In 1916 the Albanian National Committee accepted the Greek character of south Albania but also the special role of Greek schools considering it from the moral and national point of view. Another argument is based on the struggle of the Greek population for the conquest of this region four times in the past and the difficulties that it endured under the different regimes after 1912 especially under the communist regime.

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 300.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 305.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 305.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p. 306.

The thesis about the right to the vindication of Northern Epirus is based on the following points: the Greek character of this region, and the unfair attitude of the others towards the Greeks, which presents the Greek Nation as a victim. It is important to point out that all these arguments used by the author of this textbook as expression of irredentism are contradictory with the foreign policy of the military dictatorship. In fact in 1968 the military regime abandoned the idea of unification of the northern part of Epirus with Greece and all the territorial claims concerning that region because of the efforts for reconciliation and reestablishment of the diplomatic relations with the government in Tirana.

The formation of national identity and the transmission of knowledge about the national historical past remained fundamental elements of the political socialisation and the civic education after the fall of the dictatorship (1974). Homogeneity and civilisation were and still are used as symbols which condense the notions of nation and national identity, and around which the notions of nation and national identity are built. The representations of the Greek nation that appear in the civic textbooks emphasise its uniform and homogeneous character through time, neglecting to mention internal differentiation, such as the existence of minorities. There are no references to Albania nor to the 'Northern Epirus issue' in the civic textbooks after 1974.

## Albanians and Their Neighbours: the Future's Past

DUBRAVKA STOJANOVIC

THE FOURTH WORKSHOP organized by the Center of Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe focused on teaching of a sensitive and controversial issue in the Balkan history: «Albanians and Their Neighbours: the Future's Past»<sup>1</sup>. The work during the first morning was devoted to textbooks in Albania. In the first part of the session, Prof. Valentina Duka presented Albanian educational system, which had not been presented in previous workshops. History is taught in nine grades, from the fourth to the twelfth. National history occupies only somewhat more than half of the curriculum, while the other half is devoted to general, European and Balkan history. The authorization, publication and distribution of textbooks are official responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Science and its dependent institutions as the Institute of Pedagogical Studies and the Publishing House of the Schoolbooks. After the presentation of the main data about history teaching in Albania, Valentina Duka presented answers to the questionnaire compiled by the Albanian team.

In the second part of the morning session essays referring to Al-

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<sup>1</sup> Scholars from Albania (Ferit Duka, Valentina Duka, Eva Hyskaj, Thoma Murzaku); Greece (Thalia Dragonas, Anna Frangoudaki, Despina Karakatsani, Christina Koulouri); Yugoslavia and Kosovo (Srdjan Rajkovic, Dubravka Stojanović, Shkelzen Racaj) participated in the workshop. The workshop was attended by Erind Pajo from the University of California (Irvine, USA), while participants from FYR Macedonia did not come. Costa Carras, Member of the Board of Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, responsible for the Joint History Project, opened the workshop. He introduced the Center and the entire Joint History Project, their tasks, former and future activities. He also announced that upon the completion of all seven conferences that would discuss the teaching sensitive and controversial issues in Balkan history, the Textbook Committee will devote its attention to the work with history teachers and teacher training.

banian textbooks have been read. The essay by Erind Pajo entitled «Albanian Schoolbooks in the Context of Societal Transformation» pointed to changes that occurred in history teaching after the collapse of communism. The conclusion is that many views on the past have changed. That particularly refers to the relationship towards western countries, which are now presented as the most important model, and to the attempt of educational authorities to interpret history «politically correctly» («Albania's Communist regime was bad – democracy must be good»). Yet, many controversial issues remained unresolved. The textbooks have been assessed as the product of ideological tensions, both a part and a reflection of the state of transformation in Albania.

Prof. Ferit Duka read his essay entitled «The History of Balkans in the Textbooks of Pre-University Education in Albania». He presented in detail the share of Balkan history in every grade, from elementary till the end of secondary school. According to these findings, the Balkan history is presented in satisfactory manner and in adequate volume. Proceeding from the need that young generation leaves school with as extensive knowledge of the common Balkan history as possible, at the end of his essay he proposed a special course entitled «History of the Balkans» to be introduced into history curriculum.

The essay of Eva Hyskaj was devoted to the treatment of Balkan history and its place in university textbooks. Her essay was inspired by the fact that national problems in the Balkans have their own concrete territorial and political dimensions and that in addition to that purely historical aspect; the question also has contemporary political dimensions. Therefore, after a brief presentation of the literature and textbook on the history of the Balkans used in university education, she concluded: «Let us forget all the challenges, lies, pain, violence and we will see that the region will bright up with all its traditional values of culture, character and people's intelligence».

Problems in history teaching in Serbia and in Kosovo were presented during the afternoon session. In his essay entitled «Image of Albanians in the Middle Ages in Serbian Textbooks», Srdjan Rajković proposed several controversial points for discussion concerning the image of Albanians in the Middle Ages in Serbian history textbooks. These are: the origin and the name of Albanians; territory inhabited by Albanians; the notion of «spreading the Albanian ethnic character». In addition, he pointed out that the fact that Albanians in the Middle Ages

did not have their own state and that they did not have their own culture for a long time «because they were under foreign cultural influences» are particularly stressed in textbooks.

In her essay, Dubravka Stojanović spoke about the way the image of Albanians in Serbian textbooks affects the establishment of the main features of the Serbian identity. There are two desirable identity notions about one's own nation that were very important in Serbia during the last decade: the image of people-victim and the image of Serbian people as a historically sinless people. The image of Albanians that can be derived from the interpretation of historical events has the role to reinforce these two properties important for Serbian identity and historical consciousness.

The discussion that followed these two essays focused on two central issues: the name used to refer to Albanian people in the textbooks (Albanians–Shqiptar) and the development of national identity. Through the discussion the participants came to the conclusion that the name Shqiptar is not offensive, but the only way Albanians refer to themselves, but the term became a pejorative in Serbia. The second part of the discussion referred to pronounce similarity that exists in the way most Balkan peoples represents their past. The main similarity is that identities of all peoples are established as the opposition to another, neighboring nation, whereby the idea that their own people is the victim of all others and that someone else is always to blame dominates among them all.

After the first afternoon discussion, an essay of Denisa Kostovicova (Cambridge), who could not attend the workshop, was read. The topic of her essay was «Albanian Schooling in Kosovo 1992-1998: Liberty imprisoned». She presented the course of the Serbian–Albanian conflict over education that ended with the establishment of a parallel schooling system for Albanian students in Kosovo at all levels – from the primary school to university. She described the ways that education was organized and all problems relating to that process. She stressed that the establishment and survival of «parallel» education has been used by Albanian political actors as an important symbol and proof of Albanian statehood in Kosovo.

In his essay Shkelzen Racaj from Priština presented the development of Serbian–Albanian relations since the 1970s. He devoted particular attention to the period after mid-1980s, especially after the

Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. After the promulgation of the new Constitution of Serbia in 1990, Serbian schooling system was introduced in Kosovo that did not have separate Albanian history or mother tongue. That prompted Albanians to organize a parallel educational system. He also presented ongoing efforts in Kosovo to create a schooling system without hatred or violence.

In the discussion about the situation in education in Kosovo that followed, Racaj answered that new history textbooks for Kosovo are now being written and that he hopes they would be more impartial, because they are written with the participation of historians from Albania, whom Racaj considers to be more objective than their colleagues in Kosovo. As for the education of the remaining Serbian children, he said that there are several elementary schools that a secondary school operates only in Štrpce, while some forms of university education are carried out in Kosovska Mitrovica. Reacting to that discussion, Anna Frangoudaki said that situation in the Balkans cannot be resolved as long as history is viewed and evaluated from the national point of view, as long as history is called Serbian, Albanian, and Greek. She spoke in favor of a more objective approach to history, the aim of which would be searching for historical truth that could be achieved if history were taught in a more general way.

Essays referring to relationship between Greece and Albania were presented in the second part of the afternoon session. In the first essay Despina Karakatsani dealt with the treatment of Albania and Northern Epirus in Greek textbooks after 1970. In the first part of this essay she gave the review of treatment of «national issues» in Greek textbooks from the end of civil war to the beginning of dictatorship (1950-1967) and showed that in all of them there was an emphasis on the strengthening of national morale and national identity, which was overemphasized during the military dictatorship. During the dictatorship (1967-1974) strong emphasis in the textbooks was placed on the fact that Northern Epirus must be awarded to Greece for historical and ethnological reasons, as well as because Greece has international right to that. In the civic textbooks after 1974 there is no reference either to the national issues or to Albania and Northern Epirus.

In the presentation of situation in Greek textbooks, Anna Frangoudaki and Thalia Dragonas presented their conclusions about the position of Albanians in Greek textbooks. Their main conclusion was that

upon completion of their education Greek students would lack knowledge about other peoples in the Balkans. The reason for that, in their opinion, lies in the fact that Greek textbooks are ethnocentric and do not offer consistent data on any other nation. Besides, they stressed that more data are provided on certain European nations than on any Balkan people. They particularly focused on the textbook *Thematic History*, in which Albanians are presented as a people not autochthonous in Epirus and as a people with weak national consciousness that was often manifested in history through their cooperation with occupiers. Yet, at the end of the lesson it was stressed that Albania has recently accepted European standards, raising hopes that this change would lead to better relations between the two countries in the future.

In the discussion on the same topic, Christina Koulouri explained that the mentioned Greek textbook was published in the early 1990s and that it truly reflects the prevalent mood in Greece after the establishment of the FYR Macedonia – a mixture of paranoid fear and hope that the relations will improve. Further discussion focused on E. Pajo's proposal that when writing textbooks it would be necessary to take into consideration the theory of constructed nations (B. Anderson) and implement the method of deconstruction in the teaching. According to Anna Frangoudaki that method exceeds the knowledge level of school children. She proposed in turn to historicize history, to show the processes and changes that happened and thus muster historical opinion in which no truth is one and forever. Ferit Duka spoke in favor of a rational reinterpretation of history with an intention of creating a new atmosphere among the Balkan peoples.


All participants took part in the high-quality discussion on the last day of the workshop within the Round Table entitled «Albanian future, Albanian Past». The discussion mainly centered on the fact that the analyses of all textbooks show that they are based on the same pattern of historical philosophy, that is essentially authoritarian and patriarchal, with a tendency to offer the single authentic truth about history. Conclusions and proposals adopted at the end arose from such an assessment.

### Conclusions and proposals

1. It was proposed that historical events be interpreted through contradictions, showing that every historical period had different opinions about certain historical phenomena. In such a way historical truth will become more complex and will lose its aura of «sacredness».
2. It was also proposed that more influence on the ministries of education in the region should be exerted through civil society institutions, such as associations of teachers, historians, university professors or researchers, to release the textbook market, because as long as there is only one official textbook under the ministry's control there will be an impression that there is only one truth about history.
3. Teacher training was proposed as one of the safest ways, because new approaches to teaching can offset the flaws of the poorest textbook.
4. Participants commended the idea about thematic textbooks, in which one topic is treated in multidisciplinary way, from the point of different areas of human knowledge. Thus students get a more modern approach to education. If history is presented from all these angles, it will cease to be a myth and will be able to help students understand the evolution of human society and a man himself.
5. To place mutual contacts between Balkan peoples during history in a broader context, it was proposed that textbooks be also written from the point of social, cultural history, historical anthropology, history of everyday life, which will put warrior and heroic subjects in their realistic place.



İNSAN HAKLARI  
EVRENSEL BİLDİRGESİ



Ipek Gurkaynak - F. Dilek Gozutok - Sebnem Akipek - Melike Turkan Bağlı – Tufan  
Erhurman - Fatma Özdemir Uluc, *Yurttaş olmak için...*,  
İstanbul, Umud Vakfı, 1998, p. 1.



## APPENDIX

### **Educational System and History Teaching\***

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\* The texts of these chapters, except for the one on Turkey, answer to the following questions:

- 1.1. In which grades is history taught? How many hours per week? Which historical periods per grade?
- 1.2. Are other history subjects taught besides national history? What are the proportions between national, Balkan, European and world history?
- 1.3. What is the system of authorization, publication and distribution of textbooks?

About the Bulgarian educational system, history teaching and textbooks, see the article written by Alexei Kalionski and Valery Kolev in this volume, pp. 118-132.







## ALBANIA

by VALENTINA DUKA

**I**N ALBANIAN SCHOOLS, history is taught in 9 grades: from 4<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup>. In the 4<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup> grades of the Albanian pre-university educational system, only Albanian National History is taught. However, in all other grades (6 in total) General History (including Balkan, European and World History) is studied. Some main topics of Albanian History are also included into the teaching of the General (World) History in accordance with the historical periods that are studied at each level.

The teaching of history in the framework of the public pre-university education in Albania occupies a total of 599 hours, of which 304 are dedicated to General (World, European, Balkan, etc) History, while 295 hours to Albanian History. There is small difference in favour of General History.

The authorisation, publication and distribution of textbooks are the official responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Science and its dependent institutions i.e the Institute of Pedagogical Studies and the Publishing House of the School Books.

Analytically, the content of school history is distributed as follows:

*Fourth Grade:* In the fourth grade the History of Albanian People is taught. It takes 19 hours in total.

*Fifth Grade:* In the fifth grade, Ancient and Medieval History (general) is taught. It is studied in 33 weeks, 2 hours per week. Out of the total 66 hours, the teacher spends 54 hours on lessons about new material, and 12 hours for revision.

Ancient History teaching takes 29 hours distributes as following:

What is the study of history?	2 hours
Prehistory and the Ancient East	5 hours
Ancient Peoples of the Balkans	1 hours
Ancient Greece	6 hours
Ancient Macedonia	2 hours
Ancient Rome	6 hours
The Illyrians in Antiquity	7 hours

Medieval History takes 25 hours, divided as follows:

Early Middle Ages (coming of the Slavs into the Balkans, Byzantine Empire, the Albanians in the Byzantine Empire)	3 hours
Society in the Middle Ages	4 hours
Europe in the XI- XV centuries	5 hours
The Great Empires of the East	2 hours
Albania in the XI-XV centuries	6 hours
Culture in the XIV-XV centuries	2 hours

*Sixth Grade:* In the sixth grade, Modern History is studied (34 weeks, for 2 hours a week = 68 hours). The division of hours according to the topics is as following:

General topics	12 hours
Lessons on European states	20 hours
Lessons on U. S. A.	3 hours
Ottoman Empire	1 hours
Asia, Africa and Latin America	1 hours
Lessons on the History of the Albanian People	17 hours

*Seventh Grade:* In the seventh grade, Contemporary History (1918-1990) is taught.

It occupies 33 weeks, or 66 hours (2 hours per week) The subject is divided as follows:

General topics	11 hours
Lessons on the European States	19 hours
Lessons on the U. S. A.	4 hours
Lessons on Latin America	2 hours
Lessons on Asia and Africa	3 hours
Lessons on the Balkans	4 hours
Lessons on the Albanian People	10 hours

*Eighth Grade:* In the eighth grade, the History of Albanian People is taught for a total of 68 hours (34 weeks, for 2 hours per week). The division of hours is as follows:

Ancient History (Illyrians)	6 hours
Albania during the IV-XIV centuries	3 hours
Albania during the Ottoman Empire	4 hours
Ottoman feudal system	3 hours

Great Albanian Pachaliks	3 hours
Albanian National Awakening	9 hours
Albanian in the years 1912-1939	13 hours
The struggle of Albanian People against fascism (1939-1944)	7 hours
Albania in the totalitarian system	6 hours
The Albanians out of the borders of the state (1945-1990)	4 hours

*Ninth Grade:* In the first grade of High School, Ancient and Medieval History is taught for 70 hours (35 weeks for 2 hours per week).

Introduction and Prehistory	3 hours
Ancient East	4 hours
Ancient Peoples of the Balkans	1 hours
Ancient Greece	9 hours
Ancient Macedonia	1 hours
Ancient Rome	8 hours
Illyria	7 hours
Early Middle Ages	6 hours
Feudal Society in the XI-XIII centuries	5 hours
Late Middle Ages XI-XV centuries	7 hours
Albania during the XI-XV centuries	6 hours
Humanism and European Renaissance	2 hours

*Tenth Grade:* In the Second Grade of High School, Modern History (the end of XV and the beginning of XX centuries) is taught for a total of 70 hours.

General topics	7 hours
European States	37 hours
U. S. A.	4 hours
The Ottoman Empire and the Balkans	4 hours
Asia, Africa and Latin America	3 hours
The Albanian People during modern times	8 hours

*Eleventh Grade:* In the third grade of High School, Contemporary History is taught. The teaching takes 70 hours (35 weeks, for 2 hours per week).

The hours are divided as follows:

General topics	9 hours
Europeans States	25 hours

U. S. A.	5 hours
Balkans	5 hours
Asia, Africa and Latin America	6 hours
The History of the Albanian People	13 hours

*Twelfth Grade:* In the fourth grade of high school, the history of the Albanian People is studied for 102 hours (34 weeks, for 3 hours per week).

The hours are divided as follows:

Ancient History (Illyrians)	6 hours
Albania during the IV-XIV centuries	8 hours
Albania at Ottoman Empire	9 hours
Culture and religions in Albania	2 hours
The Great Albanian Pachaliks	3 hours
The Albanian National Awakening	9 hours
Albania in the years 1912-1939	22 hours
The struggle of Albanian People against fascism (1939-1944)	10 hours
Albania in the totalitarian system	11 hours
The Albanians out of the borders of the state (1945-1990)	4 hours

## CROATIA

by SNJEŽANA KOREN

ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT educational system in Croatia, history is compulsory subject in higher grades of elementary school (5<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> grade; age groups 11-14), in all grades of high school (1<sup>st</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup> grade; age groups 15-18) and in the first one or two grades of vocational schools (age groups 15-16). Average student receives two hours of history teaching per week; only in the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of high school there are 3 hours per week.

Both elementary and secondary school history teaching include knowledge about the world and the Croatian history since the beginning of mankind up to the present. In elementary school pupils acquire basic information and in secondary school this knowledge is expanded. The curriculum is divided according to history periods. In the 5<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school and in the 1<sup>st</sup> grade of secondary school the subject of history deals with prehistory and antiquity and in the 6<sup>th</sup> grade of elementary school and in the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade of secondary school with the period between the 5<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> century. However, there are some differences between the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grades and the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> grades curricula. The 7<sup>th</sup> grade curriculum deals with the period between the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century and 1918 and the 8<sup>th</sup> grade curriculum with the period after 1918. According to the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade curriculum, pupils study the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries and in the 4<sup>th</sup> grade the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century is covered.

The Croatian National Curriculum includes both national and world history in every grade. The 5<sup>th</sup> and the 1<sup>st</sup> grade deal with the prehistory and antiquity (the ancient civilisations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China, Persia, Greece and Rome) and the history of people living in Croatian territory at that time; from the 6<sup>th</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> grades onwards, the national history is also included.

The proportions between national, Balkan, European and world history in elementary school textbooks are as follows:

	<i>National history</i>	<i>Balkan history</i>	<i>European history</i>	<i>World history</i>
5 <sup>th</sup> grade – four text- books			from 60 to 80%	from 16 to 25 %
6 <sup>th</sup> grade – two text- books	from 44 to 50%	from 9 to 12,5%	from 27 to 30%	from 4 to 6%
7 <sup>th</sup> grade – three text- books	from 44 to 60%	from 12 to 14%	from 24 to 33%	from 4 to 11%
8 <sup>th</sup> grade – five text- books	from 41 to 53%	Balkan history is integral part of both Croatian and European history and in textbooks its share ranges from 12 to 17%.	from 22 to 31%	from 13 to 24%

The proportions between national, Balkan, European and world history in high school textbooks are as follows:

	<i>National history</i>	<i>Balkan history</i>	<i>European history</i>	<i>World history</i>
1 <sup>st</sup> grade – three text- books			from 66 to 69%	from 21 to 26 %
2 <sup>nd</sup> grade – two text- books	from 40 to 43,5%	from 5 to 7%	from 31 to 32%	from 6 to 7%
3 <sup>rd</sup> grade – three text- books	from 45 to 47%	from 5 to 9,6%	from 27 to 35%	from 7 to 8%
4th grade – three text- books	from 54 to 64%	Balkan history is integral part of both Croatian and European history and in textbooks its share ranges from 11 to 13%	from 24 to 26%	from 17 to 20,5%

However, it is important to note that both European and world history are western-oriented (e.g. they mostly deal with the history of Western Europe and the United States of America). Furthermore, there are no separate lessons on Balkan history in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> (of high school) grades: the history of Yugoslavia is integral part of the Croatian history and the history of other Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Turkey) is included in topics of European history (e.g. the Versailles treaties, World War II, the Cold War, the fall of Communism in Europe etc.).

In Croatia, there are several privately owned publishing houses dealing with publication and distribution of textbooks. When history textbooks are concerned, there are two major publishers and two smaller ones. The authors of textbooks are obliged to follow, more or less, the National Curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education. The same Ministry invites applications for textbooks, approves up to three alternative textbooks per grade and subsequently teachers are free to choose among them. Nevertheless, for the school-year 2000/2001 the Ministry approved as much as five alternative history textbooks in certain grades (for details see tables above). As a result, the textbook situation in Croatia this year is a bit chaotic: there are 32 different obligatory textbooks and 14 obligatory workbooks. There are also some 10 other books as accompanying material to textbooks that are not obligatory: so-called History Reading books which contain historical sources, and atlases which contain historical maps. Despite the common curricula, the approach and the selection of data in textbooks are different; therefore, when analysing those textbooks, it is often difficult to draw general conclusions.

## CYPRUS<sup>1</sup>

by Ulus Irkad

**A**S AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL teacher I would like to bring to your attention the history curriculum and lessons. Beside the books I will present, there are also books published in Turkey and used in schools.

In elementary schools the first chapter in history textbooks is usually situated around *Let's Learn Our Country* (Nurdan Yayinevi, Prof. Kazım İsmail Gürkan Cd. No: 13 kat 1 çağaloğlu İstanbul, published by a committee under The Ministry of Education and Culture) as from the third to the fifth grade history is concentrated on social science books. The main topic *Let's Learn Our Country* is taught one hour per week while in the 4<sup>th</sup> Grade *Social Science* (Nurdan Yayinevi, Çağaloğlu, İstanbul, Published by the committee under the Ministry of Education and Culture) is 3 hours per week. In the 5<sup>th</sup> Grade *Social Science* (Nurdan Yayinlari, Çağaloğlu, İstanbul, Published by the committee under The Ministry of Education and Culture) is taught 3 hours per week.

In secondary schools *History of Cyprus* (Orta 1-2-3, Kıbrıs Tarihi, Dr Vehbi Zeki Serter, Kema Matbaacılık sti. Ltd.) is dealt in the first grade 1 hour per week and the same topic in the second year 1 hour per week also. *Social science* (by Güler Senüver, Dr. Ezdihar Karabulut, H. Samim Kesim, Rifat Turgut, Nesime Ercan, Mustafa Küçükbaycan, Hasan Uslu, Aliye Akay, Devlet kitapları, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul,1999) is taught 4 hours per week in the first grade and 3 hours per week in the second grade (İlköğretim Sosyal Bilgiler, Güler Şenüver, Dr. Ezdihar Karabulut, H. Samim Kesim, Rifat Turgut, Nesime Ercan, Mustafa Küçükbaycan, Hasan Uslu, Aliye Akay, Devlet Kitapları, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul,1999).

In the third grade *History of Cyprus* is taught one hour per week (Orta 1-2-3, Kıbrıs Tarihi, Dr. Vehbi Zeki Serter, Kema Matbaacılık Şti.Ltd) while the *History of Turkish Reforms* (Ortaokullar için Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi, Atatürkçülük II, Güler Şenünver, H. Sam-

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<sup>1</sup> About the Greek Cypriot education system and textbooks, see L. Koullapis's article, here pp. 406-413.

im Turgut, Aliye Akay, Devlet Kitapları 9. Basılış, Milli Eğitim Basımevi-İstanbul, 1997) covers 4 hours.

In the higher secondary school, the *History of the Turkish Republic of Turkey* (by Güler Senünver, H. Samim Kesim, Rufat Turgut, Aliye Akay, altıncı basılışa ek, Milli Eğitim Basımevi-İstanbul 1994) is taught in the first grade likewise the same amount of time is dedicated to the same subject in the social department. The History of the Turkish Republic is taught 3 hours per week but only 1 hour is dedicated to the *History of Cyprus* (Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi, 1878-1981, Dr Vehbi Zeki Serter, Ozan Zeki Fikretoğlu, Lefkoşa).

The *History of Cyprus* is dealt with only 1 hour in the second grade. The higher secondary school is divided into Turkish literature and Maths sections. In these branches history (Tarih 2, by Prof Dr. M. Altay Köymen, Doç. Dr. Mehmet Öz, Mehmet Özgedik, Suat Akgül, Metin Anahtarcıoğlu, Ülke Yayın Haber Tic. Ltd. Şti, ankara Cad. Uygur Han, No: 41/A , sirkeci-İstanbul) is taught 2 hours weekly, and additionally 1 hour for the Turkish Revolution History.

In the third and the last grade of the social section of the higher secondary school, history (by Prof. Dr. Mehmet Altay Köymen, Doç. Dr. Adil Alpman, Mehmet Özgedik, Dr. Ali Güler, suat Akgül, Ülke Yayın Haber Tic. Ltd. Şti, Ankara Cad. Uygur Han, No: 41/A, sirkeci-İstanbul) is taught for 3 hours as *Turkish Reforms History* (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük, by Mükerrerrem şu, Prof Dr Ahmet Mumcu, Emel Matbaacılık).

In the Maths and Science classes history of Turkish Reforms is taught one hour per week. In addition, a 4 hours history lesson (per week) and a 3 hours lesson of Turkish Reforms History are taught.

### **Subjects and History Periods per Grade**

#### *Elementary schools*

Very short definitions on 1963 clashes, 1974 and declaration of 1963 clashes, 1974 and declaration of TRNC is given to the children in the 3rd grade of elementary school. History of Cyprus (Social Science, page 60) takes one page in the books for the fourth grade. The same topic takes again only one page (p. 96) for the chapter on Cyprus in History is dealt with as the first part (4 pages: 96-101). The part of Cyprus in History where Assyrians, Romans and Venetians are dealt is taken in the second part (pp. 102-111).

The history book for the fifth grade of elementary school deals with Ottoman Rule in seven pages, British Rule in eight pages and The Republic of Cyprus only in two pages.

The years 1963-1974 are mentioned as dark ages for the Turkish Cypriots and cover two pages. Respectively, the Greek Military Coup covers two pages and the Declaration of TRNC only one page. The emigration of the Turkish tribes from Central Asia up to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, is developed in 25 pages.

### *Secondary Schools*

In the first grade of secondary school, Turkish history covers Turkish History (Turkey's History, 32 pages, p. 67- 99) and the expansion of the Ottoman state (14 pages, pp. 151-164). The History of Cyprus is taught under the headings of:

- a) Geography of Cyprus
- b) Importance of Cyprus
- c) Prehistoric times (Neolithic age, etc)
- d) Egyptians in Cyprus (BC 1450-1320)
- e) Cyprus in Middle Ages
- f) Under British Rule
- g) Lusignans
- h) Venetians
- i) Ottomans
- j) British (1878-1960)
- k) Republic of Cyprus
- l) 1963 Clashes
- m) Greek Coup
- n) Turkish Operations
- o) TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus)

In the second grade of secondary schools:

1. The Ottoman Empire covers almost 100 pages.
2. Greece is only taught in the geography part of this book where a map of Greece is also included.

In the third grade, the history of Reforms of Turkish Republic of Turkey is mainly taught. The subjects in this book are:

1. The General View of the world before the First World War (p. 15)
2. The Condition of the Ottomans before The First World War (p. 18)

3. The Conclusion of the war (p. 28)
4. The Moudros Treaty (p. 33)
5. Organisations of Minorities against the Ottoman State (p. 37)
6. National Organisations during the Liberation War (p. 39)
7. The Position of the Ottoman State by the invasion of the allied forces (p. 41)
8. Ataturk's Biography (p. 43)
9. The Liberation War of the Turks (p. 63)
10. Ataturk's Reforms (p. 119)

The history of Cyprus is taught in the third grade.

#### *Higher Secondary School*

In the first grade, the topics are covered under the following headings:

1. The history of Turkish Cypriot Struggle
2. Unit 1- Cyprus under The Turks (pp. 1-8)
- Unit 2- Cyprus under the British (pp. 9-22)
- Unit 3- The 1956-1959 Period (pp. 23-36)
- Unit 4- Provisional Period (February 1959-August 1960, pp. 41-44)
- Unit 5- Cyprus Republic 1960-1963 (pp. 45-51)
- Unit 6- Intercommunal Clashes (pp. 52-60)
- Unit 7- The Fall of the Republic of Cyprus (pp. 65-84)
- Unit 8- Peace Operations (pp. 85-89)
- The Developments after The Operations (pp. 85-89)
- The Turkish Cypriot Community and Guaranties (pp. 99-101)

#### *History 1 (Another book for the first grade)*

- Unit 1-
- A. The Initiation of the History of Science (pp. 13-26)
  - B. The Classification of History (pp. 16-18)
- Unit 2-
- A. Turkey in Prehistoric Times (pp. 27-48)
  - B. Cultures and Civilisations around Turkey during the Prehistoric Times (pp. 43-48)
- Unit 3- The First Turkish States (pp. 49-89)
- Unit 4- Culture and Civilisation in the First Turkish States (pp. 75-89)
- Unit 5- The Turkish World (X-XIII. Centuries) (pp. 134-170)
- Unit 6- The Turkish World (XIII-XIX Centuries) (pp. 173-211)
- Unit 7- History of Turkey (XI-XIV Centuries)

In the second grade:

- Unit 1- Political History of the Ottoman Empire (pp. 13-50)
- Unit 2- European History (1300-1600) (pp. 54-67)
- Unit 3- Ottoman Political History (1600-1922) (pp. 70-108)
- Unit 4- European History (1600-1918) (pp. 113-128)
- Unit 5- The State Rule of the Ottomans (pp. 130-170)
- Unit 6- The Ottoman Community (p. 178-210)
- Unit 7- The Ottoman Economy (pp. 214-242)
- Unit 8- The Ottoman Culture and Art (pp. 247-281)
- Unit 9- The Ottoman Education (pp. 284-312)

Besides, the History of the Turkish Reforms of The Turkish Republic and the principles of Kemalism are taught in all grades.

In the third grade:

The Turkish Reforms of the Turkish Republic and the Principles of Kemalism

Contents:

- Introduction- The Ottoman Empire in the Beginning of the 20th Century
- Part 1: The First World War
- Part 2: The Biography of Ataturk
- Part 3: The Turkish Liberation War
- Part 4: The Period of the Republic
- Part 5: The Turkish Army and the Civil Defence
- Part 6: The Foreign Policy during Ataturk's Period
- Part 7: Kemalism and its Principles
- Part 8: The Death of Ataturk and Ismet Inonu Era

The gazettes of the Turkish Cypriot Information Office are distributed to the teachers and to the children. If we examine the history textbook followed in the 5<sup>th</sup> Grade of elementary school, we see that little importance is attributed to European history (pp. 67-68).

The textbooks are published or authorised by the Ministry of Education and then distributed to the schools.

## G R E E C E

by TRIANTAFYLLOS PETRIDIS and MARIA ZOGRAFAKI

GREEK PUPILS COME in touch with the subject of History in the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of primary school, at the age of about 10. Later on, History is an inseparable part of the school curriculum until graduation from Lyceum at the age of 18. According to the curriculum, history is a part of the school programme in the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade too, but it is not history as such, it is ancient Greek mythology.

A general assessment about the subject of History in all school levels (Primary school, Gymnasium, and Lyceum) is the fact that the teaching of Greek history, from antiquity until modern times, dominates the entire schedule. Other historical events are taught as supplementary, especially when they concern directly or indirectly the Greeks. Although in some textbooks there are units concerning European and world history, the units referring to Greek history are much more numerous. Pupils learn about the history of Hellenism during antiquity, Byzantium and modern times and this pattern is repeated in all three school levels. Greeks are considered as a kind of homogeneous whole with an uninterrupted continuity from ancient times until nowadays and their history is just distributed to the three classes for practical reasons.

History textbooks, like all other textbooks, are published by the National Office for the Publication of Textbooks (a state office dependent on the Ministry of Education) and distributed to all students. There is only one book per lesson and per grade, the same for all Greek students, published by the state.

Analytically, in the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of primary school (grades 1<sup>st</sup>-6<sup>th</sup>) pupils are taught Ancient Greek History, from pre-historic times to the Roman Era<sup>1</sup>. In the 5<sup>th</sup> grade, medieval history is taught with emphasis on the Byzantine Empire (from the recognition of Christianity by Constantine until the fall of Constantinople)<sup>2</sup>. In the 6<sup>th</sup> grade, pupils are

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<sup>1</sup> D. Aktypis, A. Velalidis, Th. Katsoulakos, C. Choreanthis, *In Ancient Times*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1999. Textbook's first publication: 1987. In 1997 this textbook was reviewed by Pedagogical Institute's section for History.

<sup>2</sup> B. Asimomitis, Maria Kaila, N. A. Nikolopoulos, G. Papagrigoriou, G. Salvaras, *In Byzantine Times*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1997. Textbook's first publication: 1988.

taught the Ottoman domination over the Greek people, the Greek revolution against the Ottomans (1821) and the history of the Greek State during the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>3</sup>. In this part there is a special emphasis on the efforts of the Greek State to expand over the Ottoman Empire, incorporating as many regions as it could, regions where the Greeks outnumbered the other ethnic groups of the Empire or consisted at least a very significant part of it. In the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there is an emphasis on the Second World War, the German occupation of Greece, the Resistance, the Civil War, which broke out after the liberation, the dictatorship of the Colonels (1967-1974) and the restoration of democracy in 1974 with special references to the Cyprus Question of this period. With the exception of a small chapter in the beginning of the textbook which refers briefly to the history of Europe (from the Great Discoveries to French Revolution), and of the chapter about Second World War, European and world history are not dealt with. There are some dispersed references to events from European or world history, events, which are always connected to Greek history, and prove the fragmentary presentation of European or world history. This choice reveals the general philosophy of the curriculum to proceed from national history (primary school) to European and world history (Lyceum).

*Gymnasium* (grades 7<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup>) is the first level of secondary education and the highest level of compulsory education. At the 7<sup>th</sup> grade the pupils learn about the history of people in ancient Middle East and Egypt<sup>4</sup>. The largest part of the book refers to the history of ancient Greece from the pre-historic times until the Roman period. The 8<sup>th</sup> grade continues with the history of Roman and Byzantine period, from the foundation of the Roman Empire until the invasion of Constantinople by the Ottomans, as well as the spreading of Christianity<sup>5</sup>. In this textbook parts of Arabic History (medieval period) as well as more

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<sup>3</sup> D. Aktypis, A. Velalidis, Maria Kaila, Th. Katsoulakos, J. Papagrigoriou, C. Choreanthis, *In the Modern Times*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1997. Textbook's first publication 1991. In 1997 this textbook reviewed by Pedagogical Institute's section for History.

<sup>4</sup> L. Tsaktsiras, M. Tiverios, *History of Ancient Times until 30 BC for the First Class of Gymnasium*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1999 (20<sup>th</sup> edition).

<sup>5</sup> L. Tsaktsiras, X. Orfanoudakis, Maria Theochari, *Roman and Byzantine History for the Second Class of Gymnasium*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1999. Textbook's first publication: 1978.

parts of Western European history (the «Barbaric» invasions, the formation of Western Europe from the 6<sup>th</sup> to the 14<sup>th</sup> century) are given. There are also references to the relations between the Byzantine, the Slavic Medieval World and Venice, to the Turkish Tribes and to Crusades.

In the 9<sup>th</sup> grade, Modern Greek and European History is taught for three (3) hours a week. The textbook includes 24 chapters, 14 of which are about European and world history and 10 about Greek history<sup>6</sup>. 185 pages concern European and world history and 190 Greek history. The Great Discoveries, Renaissance, Religious Reformation in Western Europe, social, political and economic developments which contributed to the building of European nation-states, developments in Sciences and Art, the American Independence, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, the Industrial Revolution, Europe during 19<sup>th</sup> century, colonialism, First World War, fascism and the Second World War are the main items of European and world history. On the other hand, Greeks under Ottoman domination, the Greek revolution against the Ottoman Empire (1821), the history of the Greek nation-state building during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, the expedition to Asia Minor, the Resistance against the Germans and the Civil War, the Cyprus Question and its consequences, the Dictatorship of 1967 and the Restoration of Democracy in 1974 are the main items of the Greek history. Because of the extended amount of contents, the teacher of this grade has to choose which chapters he/she will teach. Usually they choose the ones referring to Greek history.

At the second level of Greek secondary education, Lyceum (grades 10<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup>), history belongs as a compulsory subject to the basic common curriculum but students who decide to follow Human Studies at the university level are taught additional history units. Apart from the compulsory subjects of the curriculum, students may also choose optional subjects where history is also included.

In detail, in the 10<sup>th</sup> grade, the most recently written Greek history textbooks are taught<sup>7</sup>. It was first published and used in schools during

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<sup>6</sup> V. V. Sfyroeras, *History of Modern Times for the Third Class of Gymnasium*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1999. Textbook's first edition 1991.

<sup>7</sup> A. N. Mastrapas, *History of Ancient World*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 2000.

the school year 2000-2001. According to the curriculum, students of the 10<sup>th</sup> grade are taught ancient history: the period from the prehistoric civilisations in the Middle East until the end of 6<sup>th</sup> century AD<sup>8</sup>. The textbook includes units on the History of Middle East, the History of Greeks from the prehistoric period until the Romans, the History of Roman Empire as well as the evolution of the Roman State to Byzantine. Additionally, we must underline that this is the only textbook with special references to the history of South Asia (India) and Far East (China) during antiquity. Students of this grade may also choose as an optional subject European History (history concerning the formation of European Identity)<sup>9</sup>. We think that this textbook bears the most modern historical concepts and updated scientific information of all Greek history textbooks in use today<sup>10</sup>. The formation of European identity as a historical subject is opposed to ethnocentrism in history as expressed by an exclusively national history. On the other hand, the main object is teaching students that historical narrative is an invented/imaginary construction<sup>11</sup> and that there are many possible ways of narrating and interpreting the events and not only one 'truth'. In practice though, this textbook is in the margins. Only a few pupils are actually taught this subject. In the 1st grade of the Lyceum (10<sup>th</sup> grade), pupils have the right to choose one subject among the five available. For two of these subjects the pupils are not obliged to give written exams at the end of the year, so the majority prefer these subjects.

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<sup>8</sup> According to the curriculum this textbook is the first of three new textbooks, which integrate teaching ancient, medieval and modern history to Greek pupils in Lyceum. The second one, which will be taught next school year 2001-2002 to the pupils of the 11<sup>th</sup> grade, presents the history from the end of 6<sup>th</sup> century until the Vienna Conference (1815). The third one, for the pupils of the 12<sup>th</sup> grade, presents the period from 1815 until our times. Both of them are not yet published.

<sup>9</sup> A. Liakos, K. Gaganakis, E. Gazi, G. Kokkinos, I. Pentazou, G. Sbiliris, *The Formation of European Identity, The European Civilization and its Origins*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1998.

<sup>10</sup> A new series of history textbooks is being prepared since last year. The books will be gradually introduced in schools and will replace those in use.

<sup>11</sup> We can read in the Preface (p. 6): "We study the historical process through which European civilization was shaped, because we would like to inquire the way of its construction, its variations, contradictions, the complexity of the problems. This textbook is not a glorification of European civilization, nor an indictment bill. History is not a court. We want to understand what happened, why it happened this way and not differently, what are the consequences for us".

In the 11<sup>th</sup> grade, students are taught 19<sup>th</sup> century Greek and European History<sup>12</sup>. The textbook includes 8 chapters, 4 on European History (The period of the European Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution and Colonialism, the development of Science and Art in 19<sup>th</sup> century) and 4 on Greek history (The Greek Enlightenment movement and the «awakening» of Greek national conscience; the Greek Revolution and the War of Independence, the history of the Greek State in the 19<sup>th</sup> century)<sup>13</sup>. Each year pupils are taught only a part of all these chapters. At the 11<sup>th</sup> grade there are national examinations at the end of the year on nine subjects. History is one of them. In the beginning of the year the Greek Ministry of Education, specifies the chapters that all pupils must study for their exams. During the last three years we observe that chapters concerning European history are gradually omitted in order to give emphasis to Greek history<sup>14</sup>.

Apart from the compulsory history curriculum, an optional history subject is offered to pupils: they may study specific themes of Greek

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<sup>12</sup> V. Skoulatos, N. Dimakopoulos, S. Kondis, *History of Modern Times*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1999. This textbook includes 8 chapters of another textbook in three volumes, written by the same authors in 1984: *History of Modern Times*. The last one was the most ambitious effort teaching modern history in the Greek Lyceum. This textbook in three volumes was designed for all grades (each volume for each grade). The 1<sup>st</sup> volume presented the history from the Discoveries until the French Revolution, the 2<sup>nd</sup> the history of 19<sup>th</sup> century and the 3<sup>rd</sup> the history of 20<sup>th</sup> century, until the Cold-War period. In total, three volumes included 30 chapters, 20 for European and world history and 10 for Greek. In 1984 this textbook was considered very modern: It was the first Greek textbook introducing Marxist point of view of history as well as studying the world history. But, this textbook and its fortunes in the Greek Lyceum should be another separate study. It has never been taught totally and systematically; very soon new textbooks were added to the curriculum, such as *Historical Subjects* (a textbook about Ancient and Byzantine History); after that ancient Greek history (as well as Byzantine) was not totally absent from the Lyceum's curriculum.

<sup>13</sup> The textbook includes 320 pages, 150 of them (38,3%) are about European History and 170 (53%) about Greek.

<sup>14</sup> In the year 1998-1999, pupils had to study 128 pages for their written examinations, 49 of them (38,7%) on European history and 79 (61,3%) on Greek history. In the year 1999-2000, pupils had to study a total of 148 pages, 38 of them (26,7%) on European history and the rest, 104 pages (73,3%) on Greek history. In the year 2000-2001, they had to study a total of 106 pages, 17 of them (16%) on European history and the rest 89 (84%) on Greek History.

national history. For this non-compulsory subject, students are taught the textbook, *Historical Questions*<sup>15</sup>. The authors' intention, as we can read in the Preface, is: «to give special and responsible knowledge about the national problems we face during the last years in our country. When we talk about national Questions we mean some problems which concern: the territorial integrity and safety of our motherland, the presence of Hellenism (Greek nation) in the modern world, the relations between Greece and the European countries, especially the members of European Community»<sup>16</sup>. But in practice, this textbook, like the other non-compulsory ones at the 10<sup>th</sup> grade remains in the margins. Only a few pupils choose this subject for the same reasons.

In the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade of the Lyceum, students are taught world and Greek History of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>17</sup>. The textbook includes 11 chapters, 6 of them on world history (284 pages, 56,3%) and 5 on Greek History (181 pages, 43,7%). The chapters concerning world history are the following: The First World War, The Russian Revolution and the History of the Soviet Union until 1941, the Inter-war period, the Second World War, the Cold-War period and Political, Social and Cultural evolutions of the Globe in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The chapters on Greek History present the political history of the Greek nation-state as well as the evolution in Greek society of economy and art during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This textbook is the only one where world history numbers more pages than the Greek one. But in practice, pupils are taught only a part of all these chapters, only those that the Greek Ministry of Education specifies for the national examinations at the end of the year.

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<sup>15</sup> Maria Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, E. Kofos, C. Ailianos, A. Alexandris, P. Kitromilidis, I. Ioakeimidis, J. Chassiotis, *Historical Questions*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1998.

<sup>16</sup> These questions are: The Macedonian Question (p. 11-70), which is presented in two units: the first one concerns the history of Macedonia from antiquity to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, written by Maria Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, and the second one the relations between the Greek State and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), written by E. Kofos; The Question of North Epirus and the Greek - Albanian relations (p. 71-94), written by C. Ailianos; The Greek - Turkish Relations (p. 95-130), written by A. Alexandris; The Cyprus Question (p. 131-156), written by P. Kitromilidis; The relations between Greece and the European Community (p. 157-172), written by I. Ioakeimidis; The Greek Diaspora (p. 173-215), written by J. Chassiotis.

<sup>17</sup> V. Skoulatos, N. Dimakopoulos, S. Kondis, *History of Modern Times*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1999.

In this case, pages about Greek History are much more numerous than the ones on world history<sup>18</sup>.

Pupils who choose Human Studies are also taught compulsory subjects of Modern Greek History (19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century)<sup>19</sup>. In this case they study 4 subjects of Greek History: the evolution of Greek economy during the 19<sup>th</sup> century; the formation and history of Greek Political Parties in the years 1821-1940, the Refugees' Question during the period 1821-1922, the incorporation of Crete in the Greek nation-state. There is also an additional, optional, history subject for all the pupils: Art History.

Finally, we would like to make some remarks as well as to pose some questions.

- Teachers spend two hours a week on history at all school levels. There is an exception in the 3<sup>rd</sup> class of Gymnasium where history is taught for 3 hours per week.
- We think that it is very obvious that Greek history is strictly ethnocentric. There are only small parts of other peoples' history besides Greek national history; the history of the other nations is closely connected to the narrative concerning the national self. The textbooks for the Lyceum include several chapters for the others' history, but usually students are not taught them. The result of this kind of silence is poor knowledge and ignorance of the others' history.
- It is very interesting to mention that during the three years of the Lyceum, following the instructions of the Ministry, chapters concerning European history (i.e. European Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution) are gradually omitted and not taught (although included in the textbooks) in order to give an emphasis on the Greek War of Independence (1821) and the history of the Greek State.
- The ideology of the uninterrupted continuity of Hellenism during the three historical periods (ancient times, Byzantium, modern times) is very clear and repeated.

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<sup>18</sup> In the year 1999-2000, pupils of the 12<sup>th</sup> Grade had to study a total of 181 pages, 163 (90,5%) on Greek history and only 18 (9,5%) on European and world history. In the year 2000-2001, pupils had to study a total of 192 pages, 174 pages (90%) on Greek and 18 (10%) on European History.

<sup>19</sup> G. Margaritis, A. Azelis, N. Andriotis, Th. Detorakis, *Subjects of Modern Greek History*, Athens: National Office for the Publication of Textbooks 1999.

We wonder how many pupils have chosen the subject about European Identity, which is, in our opinion, very different to the others. It would be useful if we had the number of the pupils, their geographical distribution as well as the reasons for their choice.

## F Y R M A C E D O N I A

by EMILIJIA SIMOSKA

**H**ISTORY IS TAUGHT from grade V-VIII in primary schools and in all 4 grades of high school (except in the specialized vocational high schools), as following:

- *grade V* - 2 hours per week; 72 hours per year; *Subjects*: Prehistory; Old East; Balkans in the Old Age; Macedonia in the Old Age; Old Rome; Balkans during the Roman Empire.
- *grade VI* - 2 hours per week; 72 hours per year; *Subjects*: The World in the Middle Age; Balkans in the Middle Age; Macedonia in the Early Middle Age; World and Europe in the Later Middle Age; Balkans in the Later Middle Age; Macedonia in the Later Middle Age; Balkans and Macedonia in the Ottoman Empire.
- *grade VII*: 2 hours per week; 72 hours per year; *Subjects*: The World and Europe between the End of XVIII cent. and the I World War; The Balkans between the End of XVIII cent. and the I World War; Macedonia between the End of XVIII cent. and the I World War;
- *grade VIII* - 2 hours per week; 72 hours per year; *Subjects*: The World, Europe and the Balkans in the I World War; Macedonia in the I World War; World and Europe between the 2 World Wars; Balkans between the 2 World Wars; Macedonia between the 2 World Wars; World, Europe, Balkans and Macedonia in the II World War; World, Europe, Balkans and Macedonia after the II World War;
- *1<sup>st</sup> year high school*: 2 hours per week; 74 hours per year; *Subjects*: Prehistory; Old Age; Middle Age (early feudalism).
- *2<sup>nd</sup> year high school*: 2 hours per week; 74 hours per year; *Subjects*: Developed Feudalism; New Age.
- *3<sup>rd</sup> year high school*: 2 hours per week; 74 hours per year; *Subjects*: Early Capitalism; Revolutions; Balkans.
- *4<sup>th</sup> year high school*: 2 hours per week; 70 hours per year; *Subjects*: Modern History (World, Balkans, Macedonia).

National history is not a separate subject in any school. It is only taught as a part of the world history. From the above data it is evident

that equal proportions are devoted to: World History; Europe, Balkans and Macedonia. (The textbooks are almost symmetrically divided into 4 parts.)

The textbooks for the minorities who study on their mothers language (Albanian, Turkish), are different than the ones of the Macedonians. Their textbooks have a part related to the history of their country of origin (national heroes, special emphasis on the history of those countries). This segment is approximately of the same size as the part devoted to the Macedonian national history in those textbooks.

Political, military, cultural history are included in the designing of the contents of the textbooks. However, if a quantitative analysis is made, it would appear that the social and the cultural elements dominate. The approaches entirely depend upon the authors of the textbooks. They have so far been very similar (not only regarding the different periods, but the different books as well). The main method is based on pure presentation of historical information, with almost no evaluation and very little additional information, sometimes very difficult for the children to understand.

The Pedagogical Office, which is an expert body of the Ministry for Education approves of the books. They announce an open application for textbooks. Individual authors or groups apply. The applications are examined by a commission of experts in the particular field and the Pedagogical Board, which gives final approval. The Pedagogical Board consists of experts in all fields of sciences taught in the schools. The biggest problems appear regarding the fact that it is the same circle of people who write the textbooks and approve of them, making it difficult to break this relation in order to establish normal competition which would result in better quality.

Starting from this year (2000), with amendments to the Laws on primary and secondary education, each school has a right to use additional textbooks according to their choice. The books are sold in bookstores and bought by students with a subvention in the price. The Ministry provides the subvention.

## ROMANIA<sup>1</sup>

by MIRELA –LUMINIȚA MURGESCU

**I**N THE TURMOIL of the early 1990s, the Romanian society seemed to be more and more concerned about the historical memory spread by school during the Communist regime. The inkling of a perverted past «instilled» more or less efficiently to several generations brought into public attention a number of questions about the role and accuracy of history writing and teaching, especially in the case of Romanian history. Yet, scientific and academic debates about the contents, goals and finalities of teaching history were rather scarce. The changes experienced during the last 11 years on the history curricula mirror more the shifting intentions of the Ministry of Education than the results of an intense academic reflection on coping with history in school. And the public debate on Romanian history textbook/textbooks broken out in October 1999 suggests that national history is still an Achilles' heel of Romanian school. The dispute illustrates as well the number and magnitude of sensible and vulnerable historical aspects the Romanian society and historians are not yet prepared to deal with (e.g. World War II, Communist period).

For the last 10 years, we can notice the gap between the very generous and even grandiloquent political and media declarations about the role of national history and the position this discipline faced during this time by the reduction of the hours assigned to history in the school curricula. One of the main complains of history teachers is related to this diminution of the time allocated to history teaching.

History is taught in:

<i>Type of school</i>	<i>Grade</i>	<i>Type of History</i>	<i>Historical Period</i>	<i>H/week</i>
Primary	4 <sup>th</sup>	History of Romanians		1h
Gymnasium	5 <sup>th</sup>	World History	Antiquity till 10 <sup>th</sup> -11 <sup>th</sup> c.	1h

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<sup>1</sup> See also, Mirela-Luminița Murgescu, *Identity, History and History Teaching in Romania*, Euroclio Bulletin», 2001, 14, p. 22-25.

Gymnasium	6 <sup>th</sup>	World History	10 <sup>th</sup> -11 <sup>th</sup> c. till the beginning of the 19 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2 h
Gymnasium	7 <sup>th</sup>	World History	19 <sup>th</sup> -20 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2h
Gymnasium	8 <sup>th</sup>	History of Romanians		1-2h
High School	9 <sup>th</sup>	History of the European Civilization	From the Ancient Times till the 15 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2h
High School	10 <sup>th</sup>	World History	15 <sup>th</sup> C. till the beginning of the 19 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2h
High School	11 <sup>th</sup>	World History	19 <sup>th</sup> -20 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2h
High School	12 <sup>th</sup>	History of Romanians		1-2h

We can notice the distinction between World History and Romanian history. This situation should be understood as an effect of the persisting idea that the educational goals of national history can be fulfilled only if it is taught/learn as an individual entity. The integration of Romanian history into the history of the world was/is perceived by many history teachers and a large part of the public as a dissipation of the sacred values of national history into the huge flow of World history.

We can also observe that in gymnasium the accent is put on World (West European) History, and in high school on European (mainly Western) History, but there are also a few themes on other areas (Balkan or Extra-European History). It is obvious that the surrounding Southeast European reality is not a focus point, or even a worthy of note one. The old style conception that the major historical events, which have to be learn/known/memorized, generally occurred only in the Western part of Europe still prevails both in curricula and in textbooks.

### *History Textbooks*

Before the Communist period, the textbook system in Romania was characterized by the use of alternative schoolbooks. The Communist regime put an end to this system by endorsing the use of the unique and strictly overseen history textbooks. During the 1990s, the renewal of the history schoolbooks has passed through several stages.

At first, soon after December 1989, the Ministry of Education decided to reprint without any change the Romanian history schoolbook

written by Petre P. Panaitescu at the beginning of the 1940s. But it was an aborted experiment, the Panaitescu schoolbook was practically not used in schools. Few months later, it was accepted to use the schoolbooks of the late 1980s, avoiding the parts which had been too outrageously perverted by the official ideology of the Ceaușescu regime (for example the chapters about the Romanian Communist Party and the whole communist rule). Then, in 1991-1992 there were published a new series of schoolbooks for Romanian history. The third phase (after 1995) was that of the alternative schoolbooks authorized after an audit and an auction according to Western standards and co-financed by the World Bank. The process of evaluating the new textbooks is coordinated by the CNAM (The National Commission for the Schoolbook Approval), which appoints specialized evaluation teams consisting generally of secondary school teachers and by exception of university teachers. The CNAM selects according to quality/price criteria 3 history textbooks for each gymnasium grade, and approved up to this year (2001) an unlimited number of schoolbooks for high schools.

Theoretically, the main steps in the authorization, publication and distribution of textbooks are:

- The publication of the curricula, realized by a commission nominated by the Ministry of Education, and approved by the Ministry of Education. The members of the Commission are especially secondary school teachers, and one or two representatives from the University.
- The announcement of the public auction
- The offer of the publishing houses (the publishing houses are those who search the authors). The offer is anonymous for gymnasium, and has been free for high school, where we have had a free market.
- The selection and approval of the textbooks according to some criteria regarding the conformity with the curricula (a conformity of at least 80-85% is compulsory), the contents, the language level, the pedagogical method, the illustrations, the originality, the printing aspects and the quality of the paper.

Theoretically, samples of all textbooks must be sent in schools by the Ministry of Education and by the publishing houses in order to enable the teachers to choose the appropriate textbooks. The schools order the textbooks (the textbooks are free for the elementary schools). For elementary schools, a generation of textbooks must be in use for 5

years<sup>2</sup>. For high school there has been a free market; so there could be used as many textbooks as received the approval. Nevertheless, the policy of the Ministry is to extend the system of maximum 3 alternative textbooks also for the high school.

In spite of the general statements of the curricula, the textbook authors are generally free in coping with all the topics, the only limitations being marked by the own authors' conceptions/knowledge and/or by what they perceive as being social and cultural requirements. In this respect in the textbooks the information comes to be diverse, sundry and sometimes even controversial. In the same time, we have to mention the attempts of many authors and publishing houses (unfortunately not all of them) to change both the external aspect of the textbooks (more images, a more attractive expression of the pages), and the content by avoiding direct stereotypes and negative images.

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<sup>2</sup> See *Manualele alternative. Ce sânt, ce vor, cum se aleg?*, Iași, 1999.

## SLOVENIA

by BOŽO REPE

**O**N THE PRIMARY LEVEL (which at present lasts eight years) history is being taught from the sixth class on. The total number of hours available amounts to 210 in three years (two lessons a week, 35 weeks per year). At the moment a ninth year of compulsory primary education is being introduced which will bring additional hours of history. With 35 hours the subject is introduced in the new sixth class, to be then continued by two hours per week in the seventh, the eighth and the ninth class. Respectively, the total number of hours thus increasing to 245 for the primary level.

On the secondary level, the programme for history comprises 280 hours for grammar schools. 350 hours for the classical grammar school, 210 hours for secondary modern schools and 140 hours for vocational schools. For some classes of the primary level (i.e. for the eighth class) several alternative textbooks for history are available. Further, two competitive atlases and a series of other teaching materials (resource packs, transparencies, exercises, etc.). For the second grade in the grammar schools textbook will be published in the near forthcoming.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In Southeast European Joint History Project further materials were analysed:

Primary schools: Olga Janša Zorn, Darja Mihelič: *Stari in srednji vek* (The Ancient World and The Middle Ages, History for the Sixth Class of the Primary School, DZS Ljubljana) ; Maja Žvanut, Peter Vodopivec *Vzpon meščanstva* (The rise of the Middle Classes, Modrijan, Ljubljana–Seventh Class), Branimir Nešovič, Janko Prunk: *The 20<sup>th</sup> Century*; Ervin Dolenc, Aleš Gabrič, Marjan Rode: *Koraki v času* (Steps in time, DZS, Ljubljana), Ana Nuša Kern, Dušan Nečak, Božo Repe: *Our Century*, Modrijan, Ljubljana (all Eight Class).

Secondary schools: Vilma Brodnik, Robert A. Jernejčič, Zoran Radonjič, Tjaša Urankar-Dornik: *Zgodovina 1* (History 1, DZS, Ljubljana – first year), Andrej Hozjan, Dragan Potočnik: (History 2, DZS, Ljubljana, ; Stane Granda, Franc Rozman: *Zgodovina 3* (History 3, DZS, Ljubljana), Božo Repe: *Sodobna zgodovina* (Contemporary history, Modrijan – fourth Class)

Technical and vocational schools:

Stane Berzelak *Zgodovina 1 za tehniške in druge strokovne šole* (History 1 for technical and other Vocational Schools, Modrijan, Ljubljana)

Stane Berzelak: *Zgodovina 2 za tehniške in druge strokovne šole* (History 2 for technical and other Vocational Schools, Modrijan, Ljubljana)

Franci Novak, Janez Globočnik, Milena Globočnik: *Zgodovina – družboslovje* (History, DZS, Ljubljana, a textbook for teaching history within common subject social sciences in vocational schools).

There is no other subjects taught besides national history. Some history contents are included in civic education, sociology and geography. The proportion between national and other history is 60% to 40 % on the primary level and the opposite on secondary level. Balkan history is partially included in national history and partially in European history. In general there is approximately 30% of Balkan history (included Yugoslavia, whose part was Slovenia for 73 years).

Textbooks are authorized by the state council for education (usually for five years), publication and distribution of textbooks dependent of market. There are funds of textbooks in the schools, supported by the state in which scholars can borrow textbooks for low rent.

## TURKEY\*

by HAYRETTIN KAYA, MUTLU ÖZTÜRK  
DILARA KAHYAOĞLU, AYŞE ÇETİNER,

### The Structure of the Turkish Educational System

#### A. The Turkish National Education System

**I**N TURKEY education is performed under the supervision and control of the state. According to Article 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, everyone has the right to receive education. The objective of education, according Basic Law No. 1739 for National Education, is to educate individuals:

- Who adopt the values of the Turkish nation,
- Who know the duties and responsibilities to their country and have made them a part of their behaviour,
- Who can produce knowledge, can utilise the knowledge and technology produced, and
- Who are democratic citizens and respect human rights.

The school system, classed as formal education, is divided into four levels:

- Pre-school : 4-5
- Primary Education : 6-7
- High School : 15
- Higher Education : 18

In the 1999-2000 school year, a total of 15,727,929 students received education training in 65,905 formal and non-formal educational institutions and 532,595 teachers worked in these institutions<sup>1</sup>.

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\* This paper was written in the frames of the “*Project for the Improvement of Balkan History Textbooks*” coordinated by the Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey. The whole report can be found at the website: [www.tarihvakfi.org.tr/balkanhistorybooks](http://www.tarihvakfi.org.tr/balkanhistorybooks). Members of the team who worked for the project were also Nüket Eren and Cem Ertür. We would like to thank professor Halil Berktaş because our work with him on textbooks analysis and textbook writing has inspired significantly the writing of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> Source: [www.yok.gov.tr/webeng/outline.html](http://www.yok.gov.tr/webeng/outline.html); [www.byegm.gov.tr](http://www.byegm.gov.tr); [www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/cg/01.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/cg/01.htm)

*B. A Major Determinant: Nationwide Examinations for Colleges and Universities*

Since there exists a considerable gap of quality between high-schools and a limited capacity of students in the universities, each year a very great number of students enter to nationwide exams. For admission into higher educational institutions, one has to pass a nationwide examination administrated by the Student Selection and Placement Centre (ÖSYM) every year. And for high-quality colleges and lycees, one has to pass another one. These two examination have crucial influences on the classroom practices: since these are multiple-choice exams, teachers feel themselves obliged to focus on this kind of exams, pupils do not want to learn anything seeming to themselves irrelevant for these exams etc.

*C. Private Educational Institutions*

Private Education Institutions, especially private courses (Dershaneler, preparing students for the college and university entrance examinations) and every kind of private schools, are increasingly spreading all over the country. The activities of these institutions too, are controlled by the Ministry, but they have achieved to constitute a quite “autonomous” circle of education where it is relatively easy to try some reformist attempts.

*D. The System of Textbook Authorisation and Production*

*Curriculum:* The ministry asks for draft programs from the universities (it is said that they rarely send). Program development specialist, field specialists and advisers from universities prepare curricula on the basis of these draft programs. All the textbooks are strictly following the curriculum.

Textbook sector is said to be functioning according to free-market principles. Any publisher can have a textbook written (including Ministry's own publishing house). There is no restriction on that. Publishers should submit three ready-to-publish copy of their proposition/textbook to the Publication-Culture unit of the ministry for approval. The unit organises a commission. The commission should have at least two field specialists (teachers or bureaucrats), a language specialist, an art teacher, a pedagogue. The commission writes a report on the textbook submitted for approval. In case the textbook does not suit the curriculum it is sent back for revision. The commission can repeat this revision

process three times. After the approval of the commission the textbook is submitted to the related members of the Board of National Education and Training (*Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu*) for final approval. For supplementary books the approval of the Training Committee is not necessary. Any textbook approved by the Board of National Education and Training has the right to be used in the schools. The schools have the right to choose which textbook they will use.

Since the number of students is very high, the total volume of the textbook market is extremely great. According to some estimates, the revenue came from textbooks sales constitutes more than fifty per cent of the total revenue of book sales in Turkey.

The real problem on this issue is that, with the so detailed curriculum and criteria, it is almost impossible to find on this “free-market”, textbooks really different from one another: the curriculum is so strict that all the textbooks approved are repetitions of each other. There is almost no autonomy for the writers. What is also interesting, the textbooks of the same authors and publishers have been approved again and again for years.

There has been some attempt of writing alternative textbooks by Non-Governmental Organisations; but because of the problems of approval and, (if by chance, the book is approved), distribution of the books they have given up.

### **History Education in Primary and Secondary Schools of Turkey**

In Turkey, since the establishment of modern state education system which dates back to the late 19th century, history courses have been included in the curricula of primary and secondary education. To begin with curricula covered only the political history of the Ottoman Dynasty and Islamic History; the latter specifically focused on the life and achievements of the Prophet Mohammad and Four Caliphates Era in Islam. After the Young Turk Revolution of early 20th century, issues associated with world history increasingly had become one of the important part of history curricula. On the other hand, this period of time, under the effect of Young Turks’ gradual impact in state holding, marks a clear cut in state policies which in turn focused on the establishment of a Turkish Nation. The defeat of the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars crystallised and strengthened that trend. Thus, new themes and issues appeared in history curricula; History of the Turks or pre-Ottoman

Turkish tribes/tribal confederations. Eventually, Turkish Republic inherited these four components of history curriculum: Ottoman, Islam, World and Turkish history.

In the Republican Era, parallel to the mainstream policies of the state, these four components are issued as variable proportions. Initially, issues associated with Ottoman and Islamic history are decreased, accordingly World and Turkish history related issues are extended. This change inevitably refers to the anti-Ottoman, nationalist, west-oriented and secularist world view of the new regime. Hence, the universalist dimension went hand in hand with the nationalist one in the textbooks.

1930's witnessed a restructuring of the history curricula and textbooks on the basis of a newly formulated official history thesis, namely the Turkish History Thesis. The thesis argued that ancestors of the Turks had created a high culture in the Central Asia through pre-historic ages. After the Last Ice Age, the climate of the Central Asia deteriorated and the original inhabitants of the region, namely the Turks, were forced to immigrate all over the world. These immigrants brought their high culture with them and eventually created the well-known civilisations of Antiquity: Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China etc. In short, the thesis mainly claimed that the earliest civilisations had been created by the Turks and the Turks were the first civilised nation of the world. This new formulation aimed to show that Anatolia had been a Turkish homeland not only since 1071 but since Antiquity and, all early Anatolian civilisations of Hittites, Phrygians, Lydians, Greeks etc. were Turkish civilisations. Since all Antiquity civilisations of the world had been created by Turks, the modern western civilisations also had owed much to the Turks and there is no reason to exclude Turks from the West.

The Thesis did not bring a radical change in the proportion of the issues associated with the Turkish history but it rather altered the quality of them. World history, specifically European history, still occupied much of the content, but it was being taught as if it was a creation of the Turks. In the early years of the decade, a three-volume model book was written and new textbooks for each level were produced on the basis of the thesis. In 1930's history curriculum extended to cover the history of the Turkish Renovation. This was the introduction of a new history course, about the foundation of the republic, republican reforms and Mustafa Kemal's life.

The history courses kept this form with little changes until mid-1970's. By that time a new thesis began to be influential on history textbooks and curricula. The thesis called "Turkish-Islam Synthesis" was formulated by some right-wing academics in the 1950's. It took two decades to introduce it to the official history curriculum and textbooks. There is no doubt that the radicalised right-wing coalition governments made it possible in the second half of the 1970's. This new formulation did not totally conflicted with Turkish History Thesis. What it tried to do is first to make Islam an integral part of Turkishness and second to increase the proportion of Turkish, especially Central Asian Turkish history at the expense of world history, specifically ancient history. In short, this new thesis has brought about a much more ethno-centric approach to history teaching. However, the change in the content of books was restricted in the 1970's. The real change occurred after the 1980 military coup. The generals left the important seats in the Ministry of Education to the hands of the admirers of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Now, world history has reduced to 10 percent of the curriculum. Curriculum has become extremely "national" in terms of the ethnic sense. All narrative evolves around two "homelands": Central Asia and Anatolia. The focus is on the central Asia in ancient times and early Medieval Ages and on Anatolia in the late Medieval Ages and modern ages. Moreover all the "Turkish states" followed each other in a continuous manner. The others could be mentioned only if they were in contact with the Turks. Turkish History Thesis was not totally abandoned but restricted as a background knowledge. Another development was that the name of the course, "History of Turkish Renovation" became "Ataturk's Principles and History of Turkish Renovation" and its proportion in the curricula has increased tremendously.

There has been no considerable change in curricula and textbooks since then. The change worth mentioning occurred after the compulsory education had become 8 years instead of 5 in 1998. With this change, separate history and geography courses left their place into a single Humanity (Sosyal Bilgiler, Social Knowledge) course in 6th, 7th, and 8th grades. Therefore, the history content of the course had to be reduced. This reduction was made again at the expense of world history. Now, pupils start learning history at the 6th grade with the chapter on "Turkish settling in Anatolia".

### *A. History Curriculum Today*

History teaching begins at the 4<sup>th</sup> grade within the Social Knowledge course. Up to the 8<sup>th</sup> grade there is no separate history course; history shares Social Knowledge course with other social science disciplines, mainly geography. Before eight-year compulsory education, history was a separate course from the 6<sup>th</sup> grade on. At 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> grades it was integrated into the course called “Life Knowledge”. However, the change did not mean that the weight of history diminished. History courses were two hours a week, now social knowledge courses are four hours a week. What has little changed is the composition of the history themes at 4<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> grades. Before eight-year compulsory education the curriculum had a strictly repeating character. 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> grade contents are detailed repetition of successively 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grades. Now, 11<sup>th</sup> grade course content is still the repetition of the 8<sup>th</sup> but the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> grade history courses are the repetition of successively the combination of 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup>-first half of the 6<sup>th</sup> and second half of the 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> grades. In fact the repeating character continues in a different way. This can easily be seen from units and sub-units in the curricula.

#### *4<sup>th</sup> grade:*

#### IV UNIT: HISTORY, OUR FIRST HOMELAND AND ANATOLIA IN HISTORY

- A. Subject of History
- B. Why We Should Learn History?
- C. Time in History
- D. Calendar
- E. Beginning of History and Ages
- F. First Homeland of the Turks and First Turkish States
- G. Culture and Civilisation in First Turkish States
- H. The Place of Turkish Nation in History
- I. Anatolian Civilisations in Antiquity
- J. Culture and Civilisation in the States founded in Anatolia in Ancient Times
- K. Influence of Neighbouring Civilisations on Anatolia

#### *5<sup>th</sup> grade:*

#### II UNIT: HOW DID WE OBTAIN REPUBLIC?

- A. The Armistice of Mudros
- B. The War of Independence
- C. The War Period
- D. The Peace Period

- E. Turkish Revolution and its Importance
- F. Kemalist Thought System
- G. The Founder of Our Republic: Ataturk

#### IV UNIT: TURKS AND THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF ISLAM

- A. Arabs before Islam
- B. The Rise of Islam
- C. The Expansion of Islam
- D. Islamic Culture and Civilisation
- E. Turks and Islam
- F. Turkish States founded in the Central Asia and the Near East
- G. Culture and Civilisation in Turkish States founded in the Central Asia and the Near East

*6th grade:*

#### III UNIT: HISTORY OF TURKEY

- A. Turks make Anatolia their Homeland
- B. Anatolian Seljukid State
- C. Anatolian Turkish Beyliks
- D. Turkish Navy in the Period of Anatolian Seljukids and Beyliks
- E. Culture and Civilisation in the Period of Anatolian Seljukids and Beyliks

#### IV UNIT: MONGOLS AND OTHER TURKISH STATES

- A. Mongols
- B. Golden Horde State
- C. Timurid State
- D. The State of Babur Shah
- E. Akkoyunids
- F. Karakoyunids
- G. Culture and Civilisation

#### VI UNIT: THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

- A. The Political Situation of Anatolia and The Balkans in the Time of The Foundation of the Ottoman State
- B. The Foundation of the Ottoman State

*7th grade:*

#### II UNIT: THE CONQUEST OF ISTANBUL

- A. The Conquest of Istanbul, its Causes and Consequences
- B. Ottoman Expansion in the West
- C. Ottoman Expansion in Seas
- D. Ottoman Expansion in the East and the South

**III UNIT: NOVELTIES IN EUROPE**

- A. New Inventions and their Consequences
- B. Explorations and their Consequences
- C. Renaissance
- D. Reform
- E. Age of Enlightenment
- F. Industrial Revolution
- G. Rationalism and Science

**IV UNIT: OTTOMAN STATE IN THE 17<sup>TH</sup> AND 18<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES**

- A. Ottoman State in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century
- B. Ottoman State in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century

**V UNIT: OTTOMAN STATE IN THE 19<sup>TH</sup> AND 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES**

- A. Ottoman State in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century
- B. Ottoman State in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and its collapse

**VI UNIT: OTTOMAN CULTURE AND CIVILISATION**

- A. State Administration
- B. Legal System and Social and Economic Life
- C. Education, Science and Art

Note: The missing units in 4<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> grades are geography and civic education units.

*8th grade:*

**INDRODUCTION: GENERAL APPEARANCE OF THE WORLD BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

- A. General Situation before the First World War
- B. The Situation of the Ottoman Empire Before the First World War

**I UNIT: THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

- A. The Causes of the First World War and the Outbreak of the War
- B. Ottoman Empire's Entrance into the War and the Consequences of the War

**II UNIT: THE SITUATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE WAR**

- A. Implementation Of The Mudros Armistice And Occupations
- B. Organisations Aiming the Destruction of the State (Harmful Organisations)
- C. National Organisations (Useful Organisations)
- D. Attitude of the Ottoman Administration against Occupations
- E. Mustapha Kemal's Evaluation of the Situation against Occupations

**III UNIT: THE LIFE OF MUSTAPHA KEMAL ATATURK**

- A. The Life of Atatürk
- B. Personality and Peculiarities of Atatürk

## IV UNIT: THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

- A. Preparation Phase
- B. Revolts Against Great National Assembly
- C. The Treaty of Serves
- D. Formation of the Regular Army
- E. Period of War

## V UNIT: TURKISH REVOLUTION

- A. Modernisation and Civilisation
- B. Reform in Political Sphere
- C. Reform in Legal Sphere
- D. reform in Educational and Cultural Sphere
- E. Reform in Social Sphere
- F. Reform in Economic Sphere

## VI UNIT: TURKISH ARMY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

VII UNIT: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC  
( Foreign policy in 1920's and 30's)

## VIII UNIT: LAST DAYS OF ATATURK AND HIS DEATH

## IX UNIT: KEMALISM

- A. Factors affecting Atatürk in his Formulation of Kemalist Thought System.
- B. Kemalist Thought System
- C. Atatürk's Principles
- D. The Importance of Atatürk's Principles in the Formation of Modern Turkey
- E. Protecting and Living Atatürk's Principles

## X UNIT: SECOND WORLD WAR AND TURKEY

- A. Atatürk's considerations before the Second World War
- B. The Causes and Effects of the Second World War
- C. Turkey's Attitude in the Second World War

*9th grade:*

## I UNIT: INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

- A. Science of History
- B. Time and Calendar

## II UNIT: TURKEY AND NEIGHBOURING REGIONS IN ANTIQUITY

- A. Turkey in Antiquity
- B. Cultures and Civilisations around Turkey in Ancient Times (Mesopotamia, Egypt an other Eastern Mediterranean Civilisations

III UNIT: APPEARANCE OF THE TURKS IN HISTORICAL SCENE  
AND FIRST TURKISH STATES

- A. Appearance of Turks in History

- B. First Turkish States
- C. Other Turkish States and Peoples
- D. Culture and Civilisation in First Turkish States
- E. Relations of Turkish Culture with Neighbouring Cultures

#### IV ISLAMIC HISTORY AND CIVILISATION

- A. General Situation of The World in the Time of the Rise of Islam
- B. The Rise of Islam and its Expansion

#### V UNIT: TURKISH WORLD - I ( 10TH-13TH CENTURIES)

- A. Turkish Acceptance of Islam and their Service in Muslim States.
- B. Turkish-Islamic States
- C. Culture and Civilisation in Turkish-Islamic States

#### VI UNIT: TURKISH WORLD - II (13TH-19TH CENTURIES)

- A. Mongol Invasion and Aftermath
- B. Timurids
- C. Political developments after Timurids
- D. Culture and Civilisation

#### VII UNIT: HISTORY OF TURKEY (11TH-14TH CENTURIES)

- A. Conquest of Anatolia
- B. Turkification of Anatolia
- C. Life in Frontiers and Beyliks
- D. Other States founded in Turkey ( those emirates founded in central and eastern Anatolia)
- E. Culture and Civilisation

#### *10th grade:*

#### I UNIT: OTTOMAN POLITICAL HISTORY

- A. Near East and Europe in the Beginning of the 14th Century
- B. Kayı Tribe in Söğüt
- C. A New State is emerging
- D. Surrounding Byzantium from Rumelia and Early Contacts with Balkan Peoples
- E. Establishing Turkish Political Unity in Anatolia by Ottomans
- F. From the Battle of Ankara to the Conquest of Istanbul
- G. Mehmet the Conqueror and Conquests
- H. To the Leadership of Muslim World (Beyazıd II and Selim the Grim Periods)
- I. Apex of Ottomans (Suleyman the Lawmaker and Aftermath)

#### II UNIT: EUROPEAN HISTORY - I (1300-1600)

- A. Dissolution of Feodalism and Foundation of Centralised States

- B. Technological Developments
- C. Expansion of Europe
- D. Renaissance
- E. Reform

III UNIT: OTTOMAN POLITICAL HISTORY - II (1600-1922)

- A. Crises and Efforts to Keep Superiority( (1600-1774)
- B. Developments after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774-1839)
- C. Period of External Pressure (1839-1922)

IV UNIT: EUROPEAN HISTORY - II (1600-1918)

- A. From Absolute Monarchy to Parliamentarism
- B. Industrial Revolution and Colonisation
- C. The Age of Enlightenment

V UNIT: STATE ADMINISTRATION IN OTTOMANS

- A. State Concept in Ottomans
- B. Central Organisation
- C. Vakf System
- D. Provincial Organisation
- E. Changes in State Administration

VI UNIT: OTTOMAN SOCIETY

- A. Structure of Society
- B. Social Mobilisation in Ottoman Society
- C. Daily Life
- D. Changes in Ottoman Social Structure

VII UNIT: OTTOMAN ECONOMY

- A. Ottoman Concept of Economy
- B. Natural Sources of Ottoman Economy
- C. Production
- D. Trade and Commerce
- E. Public Economy ( Budget in Ottomans: State revenue and expenditure)
- F. Money and Price Movements in Ottomans
- G. Consumption
- H. Ottoman Economy Against the Changing Conditions of the World

VIII UNIT: CULTURE AND ART IN OTTOMANS

- A. Ottoman Cultural World and General Features of Turkish Culture in this Period
- B. Turkish Culture in the Ottoman Period

IX UNIT: EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN OTTOMANS

- A. Ottoman Concept of Education and Training
- B. Educational Institutions in Ottomans

*11th grade*INTRODUCTION: OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 20<sup>th</sup> CENTURY

- A. Second Constitutional Period
- B. Tripoli War
- C. Balkan Wars
- D. The First World War

## I UNIT: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

- A. Mudros Armistice and its Implementation
- B. Important Events from Mudros Armistice to May 19 of 1919
- C. Plans of the Partition of the Empire
- D. Wilson Principles and Paris Peace Conference
- E. Occupation of Symrna
- F. Internal Situation and Organisations

## II UNIT: LIFE OF MUSTAPHA KEMAL ATATURK

- A. Life of Atatürk
- B. Personal Peculiarities and Different Features of Atatürk

## III UNIT: WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

- A. Preparation Phase
- B. Struggle between Turkish Grand National Assembly and Istanbul Governments
- C. Treaty of Serves
- D. Formation of Regular Army
- E. Battles and Results

## IV UNIT: REPUBLICAN PERIOD

- A. Modernisation
- B. Proclamation of Republic and Abolishment of Caliphate
- C. Parties and experiences of transition to multi-party system
- D. Development of Revolution, Secularisation of State and Social Institutions
- E. Reform movements in Educational and Cultural Spheres
- F. Organising Social Life
- G. Developments in Economic Sphere

## V UNIT: TURKISH ARMY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

- A. Turkish Army and National Defense

## VI UNIT: FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKISH REPUBLIC IN ATATURK PERIOD

(National Foreign Policy, Exchange of Populations, Foreign Schools Problem, Iraqi Border and Problem of Mosul, League of Nations and Our entrance into League of Nations, Balkan Entente, Montreaux Convention , Sadabad Pact, Hatay Problem)

## VII UNIT: KEMALIST THOUGHT SYSTEM AND ATATURK'S PRINCIPLES

- A. Kemalist Thought System
- B. Atatürk's Thought System
- C. Protecting and Living Atatürk's Principles
- D. Internal and External Threats to Turkey

## VIII UNIT: THE DEATH OF ATATURK AND ELECTION OF ISMET INONU AS PRESIDENT

*B. Evaluation of the Current Curriculum*

As it is seen, history chronologically covers a time period between pre-history to the 1940's. It ends up with the Second World War. That means pupils in Turkey learn in schools nothing about post-Second World War period's national or universal history. Since the unit on the Second World War is too short and therefore makes impossible for a student to understand the war with all its consequences, it may well be argued that history ends up with the death of Atatürk.

Secondly, the dynamism and changing character of social, political, cultural institutions and the relation of it with political history are absent. The units on Ottoman history are typical in this sense. First four units are assigned to purely Ottoman political history (wars, conquests, losses, uprisings etc.) from the foundation to the end (1300-1922) together with two phases of European history but without establishing any meaningful connection between the two. Then the rest of the units are allotted to society, economy, culture etc. The worse is that the society, economy and culture of the Ottoman period are presented as static, frozen, shortly a-historical or supra-historical entities. The student using textbooks imagines these institutions had been unchanged from the beginning to the end. Moreover, it is impossible to make any cause-effect relation between political developments and socio-economic developments.

Thirdly, there is no means of comparison between Ottoman and European institutions, society, culture, political system etc. Two units on European history are placed between Ottoman political history units. Europe is depicted as completely a separate entity. Ottoman history is not a part of European history or European and Ottoman history are not parts of World history: two separate histories untouched each other. This presentation makes it impossible for the student to imagine his history as a part of the general history of humanity or to place it in a broader context of world history.

Fourthly, early history education disregards continuity in history. In the 4<sup>th</sup> grade history begins with pre-history and ancient Anatolian civilisations and then jumps up to the Republic, in other words from antiquity to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. All middle ages and modern era vanishes. More interestingly, it turns back again to Islam and Turkish-Islamic states, in other words to the middle ages.

Fifthly, an effort to turkify Anatolian history can easily be discerned. Anatolian history before the Turks, i.e. the 11<sup>th</sup> century is largely omitted. With regard to ancient Anatolia, only Hittites, Phrygians and Lydians are emphasised. The Greek Civilisation of Western Anatolia takes place in books in at most one page (but as Ionian civilisation and without any implication of their Greekness). Hellenistic and Roman and Byzantine Anatolia occupies not more than one page for each). Ottoman Anatolia's ethnic and religious diversity is totally omitted. The student thinks of Ottoman Anatolia as a purely Turkish land.

Sixthly, the curriculum envisages a highly ethnocentric history. Turkish history covers almost ninety per cent of the curriculum. Up to the 11<sup>th</sup> century (the time when the Turks begin to settle Anatolia) this Turkish history's geographical space is Asia and the Middle East, from the 11<sup>th</sup> century onwards Anatolia and the Balkans.

Seventhly, the disproportional weight of Atatürk era is another characteristic of the curriculum. History of the two decades (1920's and 1930's) covers a whole year in the curriculum (in other words, one third of the curriculum).

Lastly, with regard to Ottoman history the greater part of the textbook is assigned to socio-economic history. This is one of the few positive features of the curriculum. Until 1993, political history had covered more than at least eighty per cent of Ottoman history textbooks. After that date socio-economic history became dominant at least as far as Ottoman history is concerned. However, as it has been already stated, this socio-economic history is strictly static, unrelated with eventual history and has lack of comparative approach. Apart from Ottoman history, socio-economic dimension is totally omitted.

### *C. Some Basic Problems*

#### I. "IDEOLOGICALLY SENSITIVE COURSE"

History courses in Turkey have always been regarded an ideologically sensitive course. Therefore, its curricula and textbooks have been

prepared with ideological rather than pedagogical concerns. The below sentences from a widely used textbook reflect some of these ideological concerns.

## II. "EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ENEMIES..."

In order to grasp today's problems and find feasible solutions, we have to learn how Ataturk initiated his struggle, how he fought against the *internal* and *external enemies* and what was the *secret* of his success. We have to realise that it is *imperative* to work in line with his principles. All this requires us to learn our recent past, the deeds of Ataturk and his principles... "Revolutionary History of the Turkish Republic and Ataturk" is a course that explains which stages were gone through before reaching to the *current* level.<sup>2</sup>

Here the student is warned about internal and external enemies and is expected to classify historical actors (individuals, peoples etc.) as "we" and "our internal and external enemies". And he/she is also implicitly expected to find a connection between historical enemies and today's enemies. The authoritarian tone of the sentences, for instance, using the term, "*imperative*" closes the way for improving critical thinking faculties in the beginning. The textbook thus becomes a 'divine' book.

It is not right to argue that conflicting opinions are absent in textbooks. They present conflicting opinions but only with the aim of showing the wrong or unjustness of the "other's" opinion. It is not the conflicting opinion presented directly by the owner of the opinion but the interpretation of that opinion by the owner of the written opinion, the author. Here is an example about the Paris Conference of 1919. The author presents Ottoman and Greek opinions on Western Anatolia.

After World War I, Paris Peace Conference was organised by the Entente powers. The carving up of the Ottoman Empire has been

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<sup>2</sup> "...Bugünün sorunlarını iyice anlayabilmek ve onları sağlıklı çözüm yollarına götürebilmek için Atatürk'ün işe nasıl başladığını, iç ve dış düşmanlarla nasıl mücadele ettiğini, başarısının sırrını öğrenmek zorundayız. Onun ilkeleri doğrultusunda çalışmanın zorunlu olduğunu kavramalıyız. Bunun için de yakın geçmişimizin tarihini bilmeli, Atatürk'ün yaptıklarını ve ilkelerini öğrenmeliyiz... Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük dersi bugünkü düzeye hangi aşamalardan sonra geldiğini anlatan bir derstir." (Prof. Dr. Ahmet Mumcu, Mükerrerem K. Su, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İst., 2000, p. 16).

discussed at this conference. Being invited to this conference, Greece did not want to miss this opportunity. By falsified documents which do not correspond to any historical fact, she has claimed that the Western Anatolia belonged to her...<sup>3</sup>

The author could present documents from both sides and also from a third part and leave the judgement to the student.

### III. IDENTIFICATION WITH THE SUBJECT

In Turkish textbooks, the author identifies himself with the subject of the book. He generally uses the term “we”. Therefore all the narration becomes a story between “we” and “the others”. Here are some examples:

During the conference [i.e the Conference in London in December 1912], the Ottoman state accepted that it lost all the territories beyond the Midye-Enez line... The territories in the Balkans that belonged to us were carved up by the Balkan states.<sup>4</sup>

There was an intention to allocate debts of the Ottoman State accumulated until the World War I to the countries that were seceded from us... While we were claimed to pay war reparation for World War I, it was maintained that Greece should not pay us any reparations.<sup>5</sup>

While “we” means “the Turkish nation”, “the other” means “other nations”. Therefore, the authors generally use nation names instead of state names when they narrate acts of the states. Here are some examples:

British were not giving Mosoul. [...] Greeks were not willing to give [...] Dimetoka (Karaağaç) back... The treaty of Ankara signed between France and us.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> “I. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra, yenilen devletlerin durumlarını görüşmek üzere, İtilaf Devletlerince Paris Barış Konferansı toplandı. Bu konferansta, Osmanlı Devletinin nasıl paylaşılacağı da ele alındı. Toplantıya çağrılmış olan Yunanistan, bu fırsatı kaçırmak istemedi. Hiçbir tarihsel gerçeğe uymayan uydurma belgelerle, Batı Anadolu’nun kendisine ait olduğunu iddia etti...”(G. Şenünver, H.S. Kesim, R. Turgut, A. Akay, N. Ercan, *T.C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, p. 36)

<sup>4</sup> “Konferansta, (Aralık 1912 Londra Konferansı) Osmanlı Devleti Midye-Enez çizgisinin batısındaki tüm topraklarını kaybettiğini kabul etti...Balkanlarda *bizim* olan topraklar da Balkan Devletleri arasında paylaşıldı.” Mumcu, p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> “Osmanlı Devleti’nin yalnız Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan önceki borçlarının bizden ayrılan ülkelerce bölüşülmesi isteniyordu.” Mumcu, p. 169.

<sup>6</sup> Mumcu, p. 169.

Another by-product of identification is the double-standard in interpretations. A typical example is the ideology of nationalism and national movements. Nationalism is highly appreciated when “we” are concerned but condemned when “the other” is concerned. In other words, our nationalism is good, and the others’ bad for the authors.

The nationalist movement is one of the greatest novelties that the French Revolution has brought about. This tendency, which can be briefly described as “each nation should be free to found its own state and rule itself according to its own will”, had a devastating effect for the states that are composed of various ethnicities. The Ottoman Empire too was a multi-ethnic state. The Ottomans left free the nations living in the countries that they conquered, which allowed them to preserve and continue their ethnic being. Until the resurgence of the nationalist tendencies, these nations were content with their situation. But once the nationalist tendency started spreading out, these nations that used to live under Ottoman sovereignty began acting for their sovereignty. Uprisings broke up with the help and support of some states.<sup>7</sup>

#### IV. STEREOTYPES

Otherisation produces stereotypes. When the authors mention about national upheavals and ethnic conflicts, their language imply that those peoples who revolted against the state are traitors (without using the word, “traitor”). The most frequent evaluation of the national movements in the Balkans and Anatolia was that these people, while living ideal conditions in the Ottoman Empire, revolted with the aid of the enemies of the Empire.

Some of the uprisings were undertaken by minorities (non-Muslim people). The Ottoman state had granted many rights.

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<sup>7</sup> “Milliyetçilik akımı, Fransız İhtilalinin yarattığı en büyük yeniliklerdendir. “Her millet, kendi devletini kurup kendi isteğine göre kendisini yönetmelidir” biçiminde kısaca açıklanabilen bu akım, içlerinde birbirinden farklı uluslar barındıran devletler için bir yıkım olmuştur.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu da çok uluslu bir devlettir. Osmanlılar, ele geçirdikleri ülkelerde yaşayan milletleri serbest bırakmışlar, onlar da milli varlıklarını koruyup sürdürmüşlerdir. Milliyetçilik akımı ortaya çıkıncaya kadar bu uluslar durumlarından memnundular. Ama milliyetçilik akımı yayılmaya başlayınca, Osmanlı egemenliği altında yaşayan bu uluslar da bağımsız olmak için harekete geçtiler. Bazı devletlerin destek ve yardımlarıyla ayaklanmalar başgösterdi.”

They in turn were spoiled by taking advantage of this situation and tolerance. The collapse of the State at the end of the World War I and its exhaustion, allowed the minorities to organise certain uprisings. They undertook these revolts with the purpose of founding an independent state...<sup>8</sup>

The Greeks and Armenians, who for centuries had benefited from all the means of the State, took advantage of the bad condition in which the Ottoman state had fallen, and tried to carve up our territories by collaborating with the occupying forces.<sup>9</sup>

While the activities of the associations founded by the minorities were proceeding, parallel to these activities, there were also some others which were in conflict with our national interests and which harmed our national unity. These associations were established by some traitors among us, with the help and support of the occupying states.<sup>10</sup>

The minorities lived in peace of mind under the Ottoman sovereignty for centuries. The occupations gave them the courage and power to undertake divisive activities against the Turks. By collaborating with the Greeks and the Armenians, they desired to conquer a part of our lands. To this end, they established associations that were harmful to the existence of the Turk.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> “Ayaklanmaların bir kısmı azınlıklar (Müslüman olmayan halk) tarafından çıkarılmıştır. Osmanlı Devleti, kendi sınırları içindeki azınlıklara bir çok haklar tanımıştır. Onlar da bu durum ve hoşgörüden yararlanarak şımarmışlardır. Devletin, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonunda parçalanması ve yorgun bir duruma düşmesi, azınlıkların birtakım ayaklanmalar çıkarmalarına sebep olmuştur. Bunların, bağımsız devlet kurmak hevesiyle ayaklandıkları görüldü...” (A. Bekir Palazoğlu-Osman Bircan, *T.C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, p. 124).

<sup>9</sup> “Yüzlerce yıldan beri Türk vatandaşı olarak, huzur içinde yaşamış ve devletin her türlü imkanlarından yararlanmış olan Rumlar ve Ermeniler, Osmanlı devletinin içine düştüğü kötü durumu fırsat bilerek, topraklarımızı, işgal devletleriyle işbirliği yaparak paylaşmaya çalışmışlardır.” (A. Bekir Palazoğlu-Osman Bircan, *T.C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, p. 40).

<sup>10</sup> “Azınlıkların kurduğu cemiyetlerin çalışmaları devam ederken, bu çalışmalara paralel olarak milli çıkarlarımızla bağdaşmayan, milli birlik ve beraberliğimizi bozucu, işgalci devletlerin destek ve yardımlarıyla içimizdeki bir takım hain kimseler tarafından kurulan cemiyetler de vardı.” (A. Bekir Palazoğlu-Osman Bircan, *T.C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, p. 40).

<sup>11</sup> “Azınlıklar, Osmanlı egemenliğinde yüzlerce yıl huzur içinde yaşamışlardı. İşgaller, onlara, Türklere karşı bölücü çalışmalara girme cesaret ve gücünü verdi.

The Greeks were living in peace of mind under the rule of the Ottoman State. Besides, unlike other Christian groups, they were coming to important positions in the State administration. Moreover, they had a fairly high level of welfare. Despite all this, with the influence of the French Revolution, the separatist ideas started disseminating among the Greeks.<sup>12</sup>

Russia and Austria started provoking the Serbs. With the influence of the French Revolution, the idea of secession started gaining momentum.<sup>13</sup>

There is also a minority stereotype as it is seen in the extracts. First of all, it is not correct to use the term “minority” for the time of the Ottoman Empire, because minority status was non-existent in the Ottoman system. It was an empire not a nation-state. Therefore, it was not a state of a single nation. Minority status is only possible in nation states. Using the term for the Ottoman history is anachronistic. Leaving this problem aside, we may say that the authors’ depiction of minorities presents minority peoples not as components of the Ottoman society but as foreigners or agents of foreigners/enemies, in other words as “enemies within us”. Reflection of such a presentation on today’s Turkey is very dangerous. The student may easily apply this “enemy within us” approach to the present minorities.

#### V. SILENCE ON THE BALKANS: 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> Century Balkan History in TURKISH Textbooks

In Turkish textbooks 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century Balkans occupy a small place. Total pages about them do not exceed two or three. This is also true for Balkan peoples. Except Greeks there is little mention about them. And

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Rumlar ve Ermeniler, İtilaf Devletleri ile işbirliği yaparak, topraklarımızın bir kısmını ele geçirme hevesine kapıldılar. Bunu gerçekleştirmek için de Türk varlığına zarar verici cemiyetler kurdular.” (G. Şenünver, H. S. Kesim, R. Turgut, A. Akay, N. Ercan, *T.C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük 8*, M.E.B., İst, 2000, p. 37-38).

<sup>12</sup> “Rumlar Osmanlı devletinin yönetimi altında huzur içinde yaşıyorlardı. Ayrıca, diğer Hıristiyan gruplarından farklı olarak, devlet yönetiminde önemli görevlere getiriliyorlardı. Üstelik refah seviyeleri oldukça yüksekti. Bütün bunlara rağmen, Fransız ihtilalinin etkisiyle Rumlar arasında ayrılıkçı fikirler yayılmaya başladı.” (Prof. Dr. M.A. Köymen, Doç. Dr. M. Öz, M. Özgedik, M. Anahtarçioğlu, *Tarih 2*, Ülke Yay., İstanbul, 2000, p. 84).

<sup>13</sup> “Rusya ve Avusturya Sırları kışkırtmaya başladılar. Fransız İhtilalinin de etkisiyle Sırlarda ayrılma fikri ağırlık kazanmaya başladı.” (Prof. Dr. M.A. Köymen, Doç. Dr. M. Öz, M. Özgedik, M. Anahtarçioğlu, *Tarih 2*, Ülke Yay., İstanbul, 2000, p. 84).

the Greeks are mentioned mainly with regard to Anatolia. On the other hand the Balkans of the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries occupy much larger place. The reason is simple. 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century Balkan history is a story of success, i.e the conquest of the region, for the Ottomans, while the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century Balkan history is a story of defeat, i.e, the loss of the region.

Value judgements are rarely found in the narration of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century Balkan history. In fact a separate unit or sub-unit on the Balkans is non-existent in textbooks and there is nothing about history after the death of Atatürk. Therefore, we mean only the period 1800-1938 when we mention about 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century Balkan history. Sentences and passages about post-1938 Balkans (events, countries and peoples) can be found not in history but in Geography textbooks.

### **Didactics: Skills and Attitudes Encouraged**

#### *A. Preparation and Evaluation Questions*

The questions in the textbooks deserve attention in that they best reveal what kind of skills and attitudes are expected from the student. When we look at them, we see that a great majority aims to measure the *memorising* capability of the student. The author expects from the student to repeat what he wrote (information or interpretation) in that unit.

#### *Examples:*

Which treaty ended the First Balkan War? Explain.

Write the causes of the First World War. Explain.

Write the Consequences of the First World War. Explain<sup>14</sup>.

These “causes and effects” (!) questions are common in the textbooks. And the answers are strictly listed in the unit. What left to the student is to memorise.

Another capacity that the textbooks aim to generate is *strong national* (in fact, *nationalist*) feelings. The questions are formulated in a way that the student is asked to identify himself/herself with one side.

The Allies decided to carve up the Ottoman Empire with the treaties that they signed during World War I. Which regions of our country were claimed by these states?<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> A. Mumcu, p. 34.

<sup>15</sup> I. Dünya Savaşı sırasında yaptıkları anlaşmalarla Osmanlı Devletini paylaşmaya karar veren Anlaşma devletlerinin *yurdumuzun* hangi bölgelerini almak istediklerini anlatınız. (Mumcu, p. 52).

Explain Wilson's Principles and their decrees concerning the Ottoman State. How did the Greek get the permission to invade İzmir and its surroundings in *sheer violation* of these principles?<sup>16</sup>

The question does not let the student to relate Wilson principles with the occupation of İzmir by him/herself. A comment has already been made. The comment which is asked for, lies in the question.

Was it a *right* decision for the Ottoman State to join the War one year after the major defeat in the Balkan Wars and analyse why *we* lost the War ?<sup>17</sup>

Again the word "us" and identification of the student with the Ottoman State discourse. Besides the student is asked to judge the past. But the comment asked for is already available.

After the Mudros Armistice Treaty associations which were against the existence of the nation and which were in favour of the national cause were founded. Explain these associations and their aims?<sup>18</sup>

It is already decided that there exist some associations against and for the national interests; students are asked only to count them.

There are very few examples which encourage the student to search the information, compare different source materials and analyse them. Here are some examples about using graphic sources:

Examine map 1 and map 3 of your textbook. Pinpoint the changes that occurred at the end of the World War I. <sup>19</sup>

In your book, research the territories that *we* lost during the Bal-

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<sup>16</sup> Wilson İlkelerini ve bu ilkeler arasında Osmanlı devleti ile ilgili hükümleri, Yunanlıların bu ilkeleri *hiçe sayarak* Anlaşma devletlerinden İzmir ve yöresini işgal etme iznini nasıl aldıklarını anlatınız. (Mumcu, p. 52).

<sup>17</sup> Balkan Savaşlarında büyük bir yenilgiye uğrayan Osmanlı Devletinin bir yıl sonra yeni bir savaşa girmesinin *doğru* olup olmadığını ve neden *yenildiğimizi* araştırınız. (Mumcu, p. 37).

<sup>18</sup> Mondros Ateşkes anlaşmasından sonra kurulan milli varlığa düşman cemiyetlerle milli cemiyetleri ve bunların hangi amaçlarla kurulduklarını anlatınız. (Mumcu, p. 37).

<sup>19</sup> Kitabınızda harita 1 ve 3'ü inceleyiniz. I. Dünya Savaşı sonunda meydana gelen değişiklikleri belirleyiniz. G. Senünver, H. Samim Kesim, R. Turgut, A. Akay, N. Ercan, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* 8, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İst., 2000, p. 21.

kan War. Within which Balkan state borders did these territories remain? Search.<sup>20</sup>

The question is a good one as it lets the student evaluate a graphic. But the words "we lost" and "search" are quite problematic in terms of pedagogics. First, it repeats the word "us" once again, second it shows the lack of care while preparing the questions. And this time it's simply absurd. It's impossible to understand what exactly is asked from the student by *searching* the map in his/her book. Perhaps what is meant by search here is just finding the map in his/her book...

### B. Maps

Since print quality of the books is very low, the maps are barely readable. Especially it is very hard to see the details. The keys to the map are unclear, sometimes there is no key. Only political maps are available. There is no map on social, economic, cultural structures. Maps are static. It is impossible to follow changes from the maps. A historical map should above all show change. The maps of the Ottoman territory are characteristic in this sense. All Ottoman political maps show the Ottoman territory and a blank world beyond it. It makes comparison impossible. Moreover, the diversity of administrations (the changing status of different parts, i.e, those directly administrated by Istanbul, those autonomous and those nearly independent) is not clearly shown in Ottoman maps so that the student thinks of all this huge territory directly administrated by the central power just as it is in the modern nation states.

### C. Pictures

Textbooks and pictures are mostly colourless. The low print quality sometimes makes it impossible to discern what it is about. Pictures (photographs, paintings or gravures) are mainly about Turkish history. Very few examples about world history can be found. It is valid even with regard to the events such as the First World War. There is no picture (or map) showing what was going on in Europe during and after the war. No picture of Hitler, Mussolini or Lenin can be found.

Regarding the Balkan peoples, as it is stated above, there is almost no picture (except Venizelos).

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<sup>20</sup> Kitabımızdaki haritadan Balkan Savaşlarında *kaybettiğimiz* yerleri ve bu yerlerin hangi Balkan devletlerinin sınırları içinde kaldığını *araştırınız*. (Mumcu, p. 37).

### **Some Concluding Remarks on History Education in Turkey**

Even though there has been some small improvement on Turkish history textbooks over the last decade (especially about the elimination of “hate speech”, obvious, easy-to-catch bias and prejudices), there still exist a considerable amount of problem to be handled, as we have tried to show by some examples in our report. Let aside the problems in terms of pedagogic quality, there are still problems about content. Unlike other Balkan countries, in Turkey we still need a detailed and ‘scientific’ textbook analysis to support and shed light to reformist attempts towards Turkish history education. It is still on the agenda of us that current textbooks be evaluated, using a formal and validated system of evaluation based on a scholarly agreed set of criteria. Nevertheless, as preliminary remarks, even in the absence of such a detailed textbook analysis and more importantly, on history teaching/class practice, we think we can argue the relevancy of below listed problems on Turkish history education.

- A pluralist history education conception based on multiperspectivity is still needed; analysis and research capabilities of pupils are never encouraged. The overall aim of education seems to create not critical minds but believers. Just as written on a report on history education in one of the Balkan countries, “the main and underlying objective of the history education process focuses on the importance of pupils collecting information, learning by rote and demonstrating their capacity to repeat the same information on demand. And by definition, with the accent on knowledge gathering, there is little stress on understanding, almost none on skills and an absence of any reference to attitudes – in short promoting critical thinking is not at the forefront of authors’ minds when producing textbooks”, of *National* Ministry of Education authorities’ strategy when developing curriculum, of traditional teachers’ method when teaching in classrooms.
- History education is still conceived as a directly political issue and as a tool of ‘psychological war’. Indoctrination still prevails and Turkey is still conceived as ‘surrounded by enemies’ in history textbooks.
- History curriculum is entirely determined by the National Ministry of Education; moreover, it is so descriptive that there could be hardly any difference between any individual school, teacher and

textbook. There is not any involvement of teachers and other components of the educational practice on the curriculum and in the production of textbooks.

- Colourful diversity of Turkish society; its cultural, religious, social, ethnic, linguistic etc. components are never depicted in the textbooks. The contemporary principle of ‘respect for all kind of differences’ is never even mentioned and the existence of any kind of difference is conceived as a potential danger.
- Some intellectuals still believe that xenophobia is a tacit but strong element of ‘hidden curriculum’. There is not any stress on strengthening tolerant, peaceful, trusting relations with other nations and peoples.
- Local, regional, national, European and global dimensions of Turkey’s collective identity, its components from Balkan, Middle Eastern and Caucasian cultures are never mentioned in the textbooks and never discussed in the history classes.
- Controversial and sensitive issues, that are quite abundant in Turkey, are never handled through open debate based on multiperspectivity.
- Improvements achieved in the contemporary world and Turkish academic historiography are not yet in any rate transferred to school history.
- History textbooks talk scarcely about human rights and about common historical heritage of humankind.
- Though rarely and hidden, in the textbooks there still exist some other stereotypes. Curriculum is simply out of date; contemporary history has no place in the history textbooks.
- And, regarding our main subject of the project, it should be stated that, maybe due to a ‘fear of mirror’ and maybe as an escape from forgotten painful memories, school history textbooks do scarcely talk about and reserve a very short place to the history of the Balkans in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

On the other hand, it is a debt for us to mention that:

- a strong discontent about the quality of history education prevails in Turkey’s public opinion and,
- during the last twenty-five years in particular, intellectuals raised up history teaching and its problems in various academic

platforms as an issue of reference. Undoubtedly, these references should rather be evaluated as signs of 'loosely interwoven' individual initiatives in terms of their incapacity to represent systematic and organised studies.

Indeed, during this long period of time initiatives on the subject were restricted (except some NGO's brave but hopeless attempts) to the formal initiatives that were specifically conducted by various state organs, namely by the Board of Education (*Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu*) and the Ministry of Education. These initiatives proved far from being able to transform the vital components of history education (such as teaching methods and purposes, contents and discourse etc.) and their main objective was to hinder any possibility of a real reform.

However, as a result of some recent developments in Turkey, discussions and studies concerning the problems of history teaching underwent structural and qualitative changes. First of all, the monopoly of the state organs came to an end, to the benefit of the third sector institutions and autonomous initiatives that are based on loosely organised teacher circles. In some cases, these studies were initiated through the sponsorship of business circles. Secondly, these above-mentioned formations focused particularly on the basic aspects of the peculiar discourse on history textbooks. This discourse gave rise to an examination of the content, teaching methods and purposes of history education that are proposed in the curriculum. In the long run, this process may be considered as a first step towards reforming the history textbooks. The age-old question of 'what kind of an educated human being model do we want achieve?' constituted the underlying motive of these studies.

At this point, it is worth mentioning the circumstances that necessitate the transformation of history education in Turkey:

- (a) Recent conjunctural changes peculiar to the internal politics of the Turkish Republic and their effect on the international politics of the State made it possible/inevitable to focus on and to question the concept of state-holding in Turkey. Undoubtedly, the subject presents a multi-dimensional character and can be analysed at various levels, such as political, economic etc. Yet, we will simply underline the following conclusions:
  - i. For a long period of time, the concept of state-holding proved to be an unsuccessful 'crisis management' model.

- ii. This process went hand-in-hand with the absence of reliable and moderate discussion among various segments of the society.
- iii. There is a crucial problem in terms of finding ‘constructive’ solutions to the crucial problems of the society itself.

Inevitably, these series of conclusions gradually shifted the attention towards the ‘means of production’, i.e. human material itself. In this context, the means and methods of social science education in general and history education in particular gained importance.

- (b) Discussions about the process of integration to the European Union gave rise to the reform studies on history teaching. Integrationist, pro-western circles of the society are the basic driving force of these studies.

However, although almost everybody articulates the need for an educational reform and nobody, Ministry of Education included, is satisfied with the current system, there is still a considerable resistance towards a real restoration of the educational system. It can be predicted that, history education in particular would be one of the main controversial issues during the conflict between reformers and conservatives. Examples are already on the agenda: TÜSİAD, the strongest businessmen association of Turkey has prepared and proposed to the Ministry of Education a Human (and Historical) Geography textbook and a great reaction has come from ‘conservative’ wings of the state. But on the other hand, the head of the same ministry, the Minister of Education has recently stated that the current Turkish Literature textbooks in use in schools and its curricula would be reformed and affirmed that history as subject would be next in line for new textbooks.

Therefore, to add as a final but crucial point, just as it is the case in some other Balkan countries, Turkey is actually experiencing a process (and a struggle) of transition from one paradigm -based on the assumptions of the Cold War world- to another one, a new paradigm that is more suitable for and in harmony with the demands of contemporary world. We wish the conclusions of that struggle be useful for history education in Turkey, in order to develop a more democratic, peaceful, tolerant, creative, process-oriented history education.

## TURKEY REQUIRES A NEW MODEL IN HISTORY EDUCATION

### Main Results of the Studies of the History Foundation

by ORHAN SILIER

**I**N TURKEY, especially for the last 25 years, there has been widespread public dissatisfaction with history education. At the bottom of this dissatisfaction lies the fact that, while there have been fundamental changes in history education in the world at large and in Europe in particular, history education in Turkey has not kept pace. In fact, apart from some measures pertaining only to detail and form, it has gradually become less adequate and more insular, let alone being improved.

#### *A Radical Change in History Education in the World*

In many Western countries, during the last decades, the emphasis in history education has primarily shifted to a) improving the historical consciousness of the students, b) helping them develop a contemporary identity and, c) enhancing their capacities.

Due to the changes which started to take place after World War II and have gained speed for the last 25-30 years, these countries have come to implement a) a student-centred education rather than a teacher-centred one, b) an education improving the capacity of students to carry out research independently, rather than an education based on memorizing, c) an education based on multiple perspectives rather than a one-sided, chauvinistic-nationalist one, d) an education that attaches more importance to local history on the one hand, and to the world and regional (Europe) history on the other, rather than being exclusively centred on the history of the nation-state, e) an education that attributes greater emphasis to cultural history rather than political history, f) diversification of educational materials by keeping up with technological developments, g) an enriching education based on an instructional approach with museum trips, studies outside the classroom, games, role playing, critical readings, discussions, videos and CDs overcoming the limitations of teacher-lecture note-textbook approach, h) an education that takes into consideration the characteristics of the age-groups rather than repeating the same subjects over and over again for different age-groups, i) an education that has flexibility on school level rather than centrally inspected, detailed curricula.

The depth and breadth of the changes realised certainly differ significantly from one country to the other, even from one region to region or from one institution to another. However, in the last quarter of the century, the main function of history education in European countries has shown an inclination to shift from vulgar ideological control, towards providing opportunities for students to develop and improve their capacity to grasp the world around them which changes rapidly in time. This approach aims at educating young people as responsible, creative, active citizens who have multi-faceted identities.

*A Change in the Model Mandatory*

It is mandatory in all aspects that Turkey should go through the same process many Western countries have gone through regarding history education by not only guarding the essence summarized above, but also by enriching this with its own experiences. Going through such a process by coping with all of its problems will render Turkey not only less powerful and socially less harmonious, but also more powerful and socially more harmonious.

This necessity is being denied, citing the so-called geo-strategic reasons about structural characteristics of our society or by claiming that history education is in essence a chauvinistic-nationalist education based on memorizing. Nonetheless, no matter how it is justified, ignoring the necessity to implement a new model in the last analysis means trying to preserve a sphere of political influence which indeed relies on short term political advantages and based on the exploitation of national feelings and hindering development of a participatory democracy in Turkey.

By a new model of history education, we mean an educational approach which has the potential to create solidarity within the society, which does not impair feelings of national identity but endows them with a contemporary content respectful of human rights, against discrimination based on race, religion, culture or gender, sensitive to environment and peace. It is simply distorting the truth, to claim that without strategies of 'otherization' which foster hostility towards and contempt for other nations, no bonds of solidarity may be forged in a contemporary nation-state society. Today history education does not intend to annihilate the feelings of belonging but diversify, deepen and enrich them and encourage a more harmonious concurrence with other identities.

In the contemporary world, history education and textbooks appropriate for such an education incorporate short explanations and

summary knowledge based on a consensus in the society and academic milieu. The textbooks are prepared with many elaborately chosen visual materials. The principal aim is to assist students to carry out research, to discover the cause and effect relations and to improve their time consciousness. Education and the education materials in Turkey being far from this basic approach, necessitate a fundamental change.

*Failure of the Existing Approach is Apparent*

It is apparent that an isolationist education based upon praising and memorizing its own history and which is executed by antiquated methods can not build a developed identity or collective identities resistant to powerful ebbs and flows of an ever-globalizing world.

On the contrary, practice reveals that such an education encourages pessimism and primitive egoism and is more vulnerable to 'McDonald' culture, global fashions, and collective amnesia than other Western countries implementing a new model at history education. Various facts such as millions of people applying for citizenship in foreign countries, the erosion of the ancient cultural values of Anatolia, emigration as the most widespread choice of the young vis à vis economic crisis and the failure to protect our historical heritage leave us with any alternative but to discard the present system. It is painfully clear that in fact, it just consists of a empty rhetoric without any power to shape the actual course of contemporary life, and is only a crude means of political control.

It is not possible to counteract the effects of globalization on national culture and national solidarity by ignoring them, or repeating self-serving platitudes, rejecting different identities in our society, or by ignoring the history of Anatolia as long as possible and designing a policy resting on isolation and xenophobia.

Historical consciousness means, according to a widely accepted definition, the ability to establish connections between interpretations of the past, perception of the present and expectations from the future. Only an individual having a historical consciousness in this sense, is able to place her/himself within the flow of time and take her/his own place actively and creatively in social life, thanks to a definite and responsible behaviour acquired by having a designation of a common cultural heritage and a common project for the future.

The conservative approach that tries to use historical conscious-

ness not as an instrument of change but in order not to change, is an anachronism, a survival from a pre-modern history concept.

Only with a civilized approach making use of history to construct a just, scientific, honourable future, respectful of the natural and historical environment, it is possible to make history an enjoyable, creative and capacity building area that will attract the attention of clever students.

If it is intended to bring up responsible citizens, not submissive «subjects» or «mobs» ready to attack under the incitement of political demagoguery, it is necessary to implement a new model of history education.

The widespread identity crisis in the society originates not from the lack of memorized historical knowledge or breaking away from the past but because of not being able to produce projects bearing worldwide importance with respect to the future and taking into consideration the universal values. Nowadays, the main problem of Turkey, which was able to produce such projects in the 1920's and 1960's, is that it can not produce a great national project with a universal significance. Education is also trapped in a similar situation.

Turkey designating the necessary connections between its own experiences and universal processes, contributing to the world's present and future, researching and rewriting the history in Turkey by benefiting from the problematics of this contribution and announcing the results achieved is the main axis of improving historical consciousness.

A history education together with such an axis can be the basis of demanded contemporary solidarity. Realizing a contemporary development in history education and textbooks together with Middle East and Balkan countries can be a project where Turkey can take a significant initiative. The initiative started by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970's to improve the history textbooks in the countries once being a part of the Ottoman Empire can thus be completed and produce noteworthy results. Such a project has a real potential if it is not constrained by minor tactical reasons and if it is carried out by a partnership of state-non governmental organizations-private sector.

#### *Appropriate Policies should depend upon Concrete Research*

Tackling with the problems of history education in Turkey depends upon awareness of the fact that this subject has become a specialized area of research and decision making in the world and thus scholarly affiliation with history departments alone will not suffice.

'Youth and History' study realized by the coordination of Körber Foundation in 26 European countries including Turkey between 1993 and 1998 has indeed been beneficial by providing a detailed, comparative data on the subject of history education. This summary of the research on Turkey which was evaluated and published by Orhan Silier in English<sup>1</sup> and in book form by İlhan Tekeli<sup>2</sup> in Turkish has provided the main framework for comparative evaluation. Updating these data with a similar questionnaire in the near future would facilitate the comprehension of recent developments in this field. There is no specialized center, department or institute established to make research about the problems of history education in an international context and to publish the proceedings of these researches in Turkey. The international literature on this subject is not closely followed. To be aware of this gap and pursue studies in this direction is of utmost importance. Since its inception, History Foundation has made a serious effort to take an active role in this process, not only with its internal dynamism but also due to the continuous demands and pressure of its members and of the society in general.

When insufficiency of literature concerning methodological problems of history education is taken into consideration, significance of the results of several scientific meetings and projects organized in the recent past (initially by Turkey Philosophy Institution then by History Foundation, whose proceedings were published accordingly) becomes apparent. It is essential to benefit from the experiences of the persons who attended those activities.

On the other hand, it will be helpful to get the support of international institutions to improve history education and educational materials in particular. In this context, UNESCO, International Institute of Textbooks and EUROCLIO are the main institutions with which cooperation can be established within a larger framework. In addition, establishing a library including prominent books on methodology and practice and periodicals published in many countries on the subject of history education, organizing Turkey-Europe history teachers meetings, translating the main project books of European Commission and European Union into Turkish, and presenting summarized information on all

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<sup>1</sup> *Youth and history: a comparative european survey on historical consciousness and political attitudes among adolescents*, eds. M. Angvil and B. von Borries, Hamburg, Edition Körber-Stiftung, 1997, pp. 310-315.

<sup>2</sup> Tarih Bilinci ve Gençlik, *Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları*, İstanbul, 1998.

those subjects to the service of education and history circles by means of a web site, can be the initial steps which do not necessitate great resources but can take an initiative to benefit from the international experience. History Foundation has already prepared the projects of such initial steps.

*A New Generation of Teachers is Coming*

Especially for the last ten or fifteen years, there has been an important polarization between primary and secondary educational institutions, in terms of monetary and technical resources. Relatively few private primary schools, colleges, science high schools, Anatolian high schools, «super high schools» and some of the public high schools in metropolitan cities have established a developed technical infrastructure by employing considerably more resource and brought together more qualified educational cadres by paying relatively high salaries.

Despite some of the exceptions, young and promising teachers generally employed at those schools do follow the literature, carry out significant experiments regarding their lesson in their classes and attend the meetings of international organizations and present micro-projects to the Ministry of Education.

These young teachers who know at least one foreign language and follow the developments in the world regarding their areas of expertise and who put forth interesting and productive efforts, can be the locomotive of the studies on improving history education and textbooks. These teachers and the institutions employing them can present concrete and invaluable contributions to the meetings on the improvement of history education.

It would not be an exaggeration to argue that it is possible to rewrite in a few years (by consulting with scholars and specialists on linguistics, children-adolescent psychology, visual materials and taking into consideration the experiences-impressions and tendencies of the students and parents), all the history textbooks even teachers' books with small teams of aforementioned teachers.

*Prerequisites of the EU Membership in the Sphere of Education should be Considered Strictly*

Turkey has been struggling for membership to the European Union since 1960's. Since Helsinki decisions, those efforts of Turkey have become more momentous. In the process of improving history education and textbooks, an eagerness to develop a European identity and to

benefit from the experiences of European countries in this area are the necessary components of uniting with Europe.

The first necessity is to expand the space set aside for the history of Europe in history textbooks which is very limited compared to the textbooks written in 1920's. According to a research held by Prof. Zafer Toprak, the sections on Europe and the World in history textbooks of 1920's which was 80% is now decreased to 10%. In addition to restore this unacceptable quantitative regression, textbooks also need a change in content. Helping the young to improve their European identity as well as the national identities is one of the important targets of primary and secondary education.

Turkey can not be 'a part of the civilized world', open itself to world and realise the duties on which uniting with Europe lay, with a history conception dominated by a Turkish-Islamic version of 'the clash of civilizations' thesis. Since it would be fallacious to presume that our education system works against the general orientations of our country, restructuring history education should be handled as an important component of Turkey's short and middle term adaptation program to Europe.

*Problems of History Education should be considered in its own terms*

The problems related with history education are directly the problems of history and pedagogy. It is obvious that, like in many other areas, in the area of history education and in the process of preparing the textbooks there are some dimensions indirectly related with political choices, national security and international relations. However, this fact should never be a pretext for shaping the evaluation, discussion and decision platforms on education according to such political, geo-strategic or diplomatic worries.

The formation of history education at primary and secondary education according to the biased policies (which do not depend upon even the minimum consensus of the different segments of the society and which are also against the general objectives of contemporary education), leads to a series of results that impoverish the human capital unacceptably and endanger the social cohesion and consensus.

The principal aim of the regulations concerning history education is to help our children and youth to develop a contemporary identity appropriate to the requirements of our country both at present and in the future. Thus, even the basic principles that should be adopted in this

area stem from the liabilities of the international agreements Turkey has signed, studies on history education can not be established solely on the basis of the daily necessities of international relations or the reciprocity considerations of diplomatic relations or temporary tactical issues pertaining to national security.

Some habits and relationships which are extensions of the 1980 military *coup d'état* period and completely contradictory to the contemporary methods used to determine education policies and materials in the Western world, can not be the groundwork of an institutional structure in charge of discussing the problems of history education and making decisions. Historians and educators in this area, as every responsible citizens, will certainly evaluate and be sensitive to the indirect effects of history education on national security and foreign relations. It is necessary to have confidence in the specialists in this area and accept that the problems of education are primarily and above all, the problems of education.

*National Board of Education should be Reformed to Carry out an Autonomous and Scientific Function*

As has been mentioned in Atatürk's speech when founding this institution, the need for National Board of Education of the Ministry of Education to become an 'autonomous and scientific' institution, is in a key position to improve history education and to prepare textbooks able to contribute for a contemporary education.

Meetings and joint projects that bring together the history teachers, professors and public officials, such as the workshop on 'Reconstruction of History Education at Primary and Middle School Levels in Turkey'<sup>3</sup> organized by the History Foundation and whose proceedings were published in December 2000 with the participation of National Board of Education, can enhance this role of carrying out 'autonomous and scientific' study.

The projects such as 'Improvement of Balkan History Textbooks' carried out by the coordination of History Foundation with financial contribution of UNESCO, or 'Europe-Turkey History Educators Meetings' held with the support of European Union and 'Promoting Human

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<sup>3</sup> Tarih Öğretiminin Yeniden Yapılandırılması, *Tarih Vakfı Yayınları*, İstanbul, 2000.

Rights in Primary and Secondary School Textbooks' that will start in 2002 with the support of the European Union under the umbrella of Turkish Academy of Sciences can provide the necessary data for the National Board of Education. As a non-governmental organization, History Foundation provides a prominent human potential that brings together educators from different universities, from primary and secondary schools and parents of the students in order to produce concrete projects in the light of the world experiences.

### *Conclusion*

Above I tried to summarize main conclusions of the studies which History Foundation carried out during the last ten years on history education and textbooks at primary and secondary schools in Turkey.

The subject of a fundamental change at history education and textbooks in Turkey and implementing a completely new model has definitely become a current issue. There is the human potential in our country to realize such a change. There are also some institutions abroad from whose experiences we can benefit.

Accelerating this process above all is essential to provide children and youth in Turkey with a better education. In addition, the relations that we establish with Europe and the world inevitably point out to the same necessity. With the realization of the inevitable transformations, Turkey can turn into a country with a more developed historical consciousness, whose social solidarity is established upon a more reliable and rich groundwork and which attributes more importance to the responsibility and creativity in the education of future generations.



## YUGOSLAVIA

by DUBRAVKA STOJANOVIC

**H**ISTORY IN YUGOSLAV schools is taught from 5th to 8th grade of elementary school and from 1st to 4th grade of the secondary school. There are two hours per week. Antiquity is taught in 5th grade, middle ages in sixth, period between 15th and the end of 19th century is taught in seventh and from the end of 19th to 1992 in the eighth grade. The same scheme is followed in secondary school.

History taught in Serbian schools is predominantly national (about 70%). There are very few information about neighboring peoples and the Balkan history, while European and World history are taught with much more details. The Ministry of education is the one, which is in charge for authorization of textbooks, which are published and distributed by the Publishing House of the Schoolbooks, which is related to the Ministry. There are no alternative textbooks.



## Notes on contributors

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**Smail Balić** was born in Mostar in 1920. He studied in Germany and earned his doctorate at the University of Vienna. He lived in Vienna for many years, where he lectured Oriental languages at the Superior School of Commerce (presently the University for Economic Sciences). He simultaneously worked as an Expert for Linguistics and as State Librarian to the Austrian National Library. Among his publications the most important are: *Die Kultur der Bosniaken* (Vienna 1973), *Ruf vom Minarett* (Hamburg 1984), *Das unbekannte Bosnien* (Cologne 1992), *Der Islam im Spannungsfeld von Tradition und heutiger Zeit* (Würzburg 1993), and *Islam für Europa* (Cologne 2001).

**Nergis Canefe** studied history and sociology in Turkey, United States and Canada. Her Ph. D. dissertation was a comparative treatment of the idea of civilisation in Greek and Turkish national revolutions. She was the Past and Present post-doctoral fellow at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London between 1998 and 2000. Since then, she works as a Research Associate at the European Institute, London School of Economics. She published several articles on Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalism, history writing and nationalism with particular emphasis on the treatment of the Ottoman Empire, and, the legacy of forced population exchanges among Southeast European societies. At present, she is working on her first book manuscript on the culture of history in the early years of the Turkish Republic as well as edited book projects on Europe versus Turkey, and, Lost Cities of the Eastern Mediterranean. She is also the mother of two young children.

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**Ivo Goldstein** (Zagreb, 1958), graduated history at the Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy. He studied at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris and in Athens. He defended his «magisterium» *Historiographic criteria of Procopius of Caesarea* in 1984. In 1988 at the University of Belgrade he defended his thesis of doctorate *Byzantium on the Adriatic* (6th-9th c.). He is now Professor at the Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb. He lectures General Medieval History, occasionally also Croatian Early Medieval History as well as Methodology of Historical Science. He was the Director of the Institute for Croatian History at the University of Zagreb (1991-1996). He was collaborator for Croatia of *Lexikon des Mittelalters* which is published in Munich, Germany. He has published two books in Croatian *Byzantium on Adriatic* (1992) and *Croatian Early Middle Ages* (1995). He was editor in chief of the huge *Croatian and World Chronology* (1996) (in Croatian).

Together with Vladimir Anić he published *Dictionary of Foreign Words* (1472 pages) in 1999. In the same year he published *Croatia. A History* in London and Montreal (Mc Gill University Press), which is one of the rare histories of Croatia from Antiquity to nowadays published in foreign languages. His latest book is *Holocaust in Zagreb* (2001, in Croatian). Goldstein is active member of the Jewish Community of Zagreb. Since late eighties he is also active in the political life of the country, contributing regularly to some leading Croatian weeklies and magazines.

**Ulus Irkad** was born in Paphos in 1957. He continued his elementary and secondary education there until 1974. After 1974 he went to Famagusta with his family where he completed his education. In 1976 he succeeded at the examinations of Turkish Cypriot Teachers' College and started his higher education in this school. In 1979 he graduated from college and in 1981 he started to teach as an elementary school teacher in Famagusta. During his education he attended many political activities. This made him to read a lot and in the beginning of his occupation he started to write articles and essays in daily newspapers in Northern Cyprus. Besides he used to be a member of the elementary school teachers' union. He also wrote humour stories in the Turkish Cypriot Cartoonists' Organ of "Akrep". He published his own books and also translated lots of books from Greek and English. He is still writing in the Turkish Cypriot opposition newspapers. He is married with two children.

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1914). *Les manuels scolaires d'histoire et de géographie*, Francfort s. M., Studien zur Geschichte Südosteuropas 7, Peter Lang, 1991 (612 p.); *Sport et société bourgeoise. Les associations sportives en Grèce 1870-1922*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000.

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**Bogdan Murgescu**, born in 1963 in Bucharest, is professor at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest. He is also deputy director of the Romanian-German Interdisciplinary Research Institute, president of the Bucharest Branch of the Romanian Society for Historical Sciences, general secretary of the Foundation «Noua Istorie», national coordinator of the history research competition ISTORIA MEA - EUSTORY and member of the Executive Committee of the EUSTORY network. He was a «Roman Herzog» Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Berlin in 1998-2000, and was awarded the Prize "Constantin C. Giurescu" of the Cultural Foundation "Magazin Istoric", for the book *Istorie românească - istorie universală (600-1800)* [Romanian History – World History (600-1800)], București, 1994, 150 p. Second revised edition, București, 1999, 214 p. and the Prize "Nicolae Iorga" of the Romanian Academy for the book *Circulația monetară în Țările Române în secolul al XVI-lea*. [The Money Circulation in the Romanian Lands during the 16th Century], București, 1996, 376 p. He has also published the essay *A fi istoric în anul 2000* [Being a Historian in the Year 2000], București, 2000, 133 p., as well as numerous academic studies, and has coordinated 5 volumes, among which *Romania and Europe. Modernisation as Temptation, Modernisation as Threat*, București, 2000, 170 p. and *Istoria României în texte* [History of Romania in Texts], București, 2000, 410 p. His main fields of interest are: economic and social history, especially long-run economic

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**Jelka Razpotnik** was born in Ljubljana, Slovenia in 1969. After graduating in history from the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana (1994), she did her post-graduate studies in modern Slovene history and obtained her Master's Degree in 2001. She is a history teacher at Gymnasium Šentvid in Ljubljana and collaborates with the Board of Education in teacher training, giving lectures on historical and educational subjects for history teachers. She also cooperates with the History Department of the Faculty of Arts in the training of students for history teaching. Since 1999 she has been a chairperson of the Slovenian History Teachers' Association, and in 2001 she became a member of Board of Euroclio - European Standing Conference of History Teachers' Associations. She has participated in several of in-service training programmes for history teachers, organized by the Council of Europe. As a representative of the Slovenian history teachers she has participated at several annual conferences of Euroclio. She has published articles on the history teaching, history textbooks, the use of IT in history teaching, and several articles about courses and conferences, dealing with history teaching, organized by Council of Europe.

**Božo Repe** is an associate Professor of modern history at the University of Ljubljana. His research interests are 20th Century Slovene, Yugoslav and Central European History. Before his academic career at the University of Maribor (1992-1995) and University of Ljubljana (since 1995) he worked as history teacher in secondary schools. He published few textbooks: *Nasa doba* (Our Era- History of 20th Century, textbook for secondary schools) DZS 1995 (second edition 1996); *Nase stoletje* (Our Century,

textbook for elementary schools, co-author) Modrijan, 1997 (second edition 1998, third edition 1999); *Sodobna zgodovina* (Contemporary history, textbook for secondary schools), Modrijan 1998. He was a member of National curriculum council and he was leading a commission, which prepared new history curriculum for all levels of education in Slovenia.

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**Pinelopi Stathi**, born in Istanbul in 1947, studied at the University of Istanbul and the University of Lound (Sweden) and she received her PhD at the University of Thessaloniki. Since 1996 she is researcher of second level (associate professor) at the Institute for Medieval and Modern Hellenism of the Academy of Athens. She is a member of the editorial board for a collection of books dealing with the region of Istanbul and Asia Minor (five volumes of historical review and thirty books) and main editor of the book *The Presence of national minorities in Istanbul in the 19<sup>th</sup> c.* (Athens 1997, in Greek). She has participated in about thirty international conferences and has written about forty articles dealing with Greek-Turkish relations in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> c. in matters of culture and language. She has been teaching Turkish language and literature

in both learning centers and university departments. Her fields of research are source texts of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> c., cultural relations, education, printing activities and diffusion of manuscripts in the Ottoman empire. Her recent book *Chrysanthos Notaras, Patriarch of Jerusalem (1707-1730), precursor of the Greek Enlightenment* (Athens 2000, in Greek) deals with these issues.

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**Vlassis Vlassidis** has received a PhD in Modern and Contemporary History from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Since 1995 has been Head of the Documentation Department of the Macedonian Press Agency. He teaches history, propaganda and mass media at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty of Balkan Studies. Author of a number of articles published on scientific magazines and book-guides on Balkan countries. Is also responsible for compiling numerous historical and political Internet accounts of the most important events in modern Greek history

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