America’s Role in Macedonia’s Troubled Journey to International Recognition (1991 – 2013)

Second Edition

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Motive for writing a second edition

After the First Edition was released, there was an occurrence that deserves our attention.

On October 24, 2013 the Greek Foreign Ministry issued an official statement entitled “The Problem with the Name” using the offensive, demeaning and meaningless acronym (FYROM) from the UN reference. The document was interestingly loaded with lies, fabricated accusations and allegations regarding our account. Among other things, it reaffirmed the assertion that Tito “created” the Macedonian nation. There was also mention of The Hague verdict, de-emphasizing Greece’s conviction but greatly emphasizing a number of “violations” of the Interim Accord on our part...

There is a key part in this document, however, the intention of which is to justify Greece’s attitude towards Macedonia. Here is a quote:

“A State Department telegram, from December 1944, sent to various U.S. institutions, signed by the then Secretary of State Stettinius, among other things said: ‘The chatter about the Macedonian “nation”, the Macedonian “fatherland” and the Macedonian “national consciousness”, the U.S. government considers unjustified demagoguery which does not represent an ethnic or political reality, and in this current revival it sees a possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece’!!”

1.1. As usual, this Greek document, which was certainly distributed around the world, was completely ignored in Macedonia with the exception of being mentioned on Channel 5 television. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Macedonia did nothing. Our diplomats are more likely to be concerned about global warming than about Greeks claiming that we are a fabrication...

1.2. Looking at this another way, if we did not ask the Americans for clarification if they still hold the same position, as 70 years ago, the same State Department should have reacted. By not
reacting, it means that the U.S. today is following the same policy towards Macedonia and the Macedonian people that was followed in 1944. If the U.S. does feel the same way about Macedonia and the Macedonian people as it did in 1944, then that would explain why Greece has been so abusive. This definitely explains why Greece has never been punished, not even one time for the genocide, human rights abuses, land confiscation, exiling of Macedonians and a whole slew of other abuses it perpetrated against the Macedonian people over the years.

1.3. American silence on the subject, of course, has its own merit, which we must not underestimate. However, one should not forget that activities are intertwined in international diplomacy: Why should Washington “rush” to our rescue if we choose to constantly keep quiet? In other words, we should have sought an explanation from the U.S. the moment we became aware of the information in the telegram referenced by Greece. Now we don’t know if the telegram was indeed real or a Greek fabrication to manipulate us?

Again… it is still not too late to follow up on this issue. But will it be done?

2. It is undoubtedly satisfactory to know that this book is undergoing a second edition in Macedonia. The most important aspect about any book is to reach the reader. One time someone in America anonymously wrote a book and had it self-published but it would not sell. Searching for a solution, the author placed an advertisement in the “New York Times” stating that he was looking for a wife who fit the description of Anna, a character in his book! A second edition soon followed. This case was quoted in several books on marketing.

There were no such tricks done to promote this book. A strong impression prevails, however, that expressed assessments are being received with much interest. Let us hope that politicians too, especially in the international community, primarily in the U.S., will make an effort to read it. It is not only for Macedonia’s interest but also for its neighbours and as well for Washington and Brussels. No one should be left blind to the fact that: current
policies aimed at Macedonia have proven to be totally inadequate. They have solved nothing and have caused a lot of damage. This is because these policies were unrealistic, unnecessary and uncivilized... Mistakes are always inevitable but must not be repeated.

3. The puzzle offered in this book is certainly not perfect or complete. However, it does accurately represent the genesis of the invented problem with Macedonia’s name. Its essence, what is stated in the book, is undeniable. Has Washington managed and controlled 85 to 95 percent of the illegal process driven to annihilate the Macedonian nation and its country? - it is not important. Washington is in a position to help Macedonia in so many ways but has chosen not to. Worse than that is the fact that Washington is behind all the contention, blocking, blackmail and obscene and utterly unacceptable proposals and solutions. This is done with maximum coordination at the highest international level, using all available means, most of which are illegal, unauthorized and outside international law.

4. And, as a living wonder, despite all the ordeals and tribulations, over 20 years later all attempts at fraud, abuse, intrigue, public bullying... have not achieved any results; except for ruining the Macedonian state and pushing the Macedonian people into further destitution.

The military aggression against Macedonia in 2001 also failed. It was a limited and strictly controlled war that proved unsuccessful despite everything that was done to control it.

Time and time again the Macedonian people have proven to be indestructible.

5. The sad part about all this is that we, as witnesses of these events, have failed to sway Washington away from its failures. The U.S. has stubbornly continued to follow the same path with the same futile and medieval policies towards Macedonia. And Brussels has unconditionally and unwaveringly followed Washington.
How long will these so-called “democracies” use force against a small and poor nation? Unfortunately no one can tell us because these “democracies” say one thing and do another. They don’t seem to understand that they cannot bring about democratic and lasting solutions by using undemocratic means!

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6. The European Council in December (2013) definitely showed that Brussels has no intention of removing its blockades, stopping its blackmail and ultimatums, which are summarized in its anti-Macedonian politics… “First change your name and then membership!” And so it should be evident to everyone that the door to our country’s Euro-Atlantic integration stays closed and will remain permanently so until we accept losing our identity as a Macedonian people.

6.1. On the other hand, it is a fact that Nimetz’s mediation efforts have failed or have yielded no results. The past 20 years have shown that the mediation process is incapable of solving this case. We need to say this openly and take every necessary step to get out of this impasse.

6.2. We must add to this that we are faced with an “Athens” which has shown absolute indifference to all proposed solutions, even to their own erga omnes. The reason is not because Greece is experiencing a deep crisis and we need to wait for it to pass. This has been Greece’s general attitude and policy towards Macedonia and the Macedonian people for more than a century. Greece will not agree to any solution unless it calls for Macedonia and the Macedonian people to be wiped off the face of the earth! So, under such circumstances, no sane Greek politician would be willing to risk their neck and seek anything different! Greece has nothing to gain or lose by compromising on its current position, except of course The Hague verdict, which may cause it difficulties in the future. The best we can do for now is to keep going back to the Court each time Greece violates the Interim Accord obstructing Macedonia from joining international organizations such as NATO and the EU. Washington and Brussels too will feel the burden of ignoring the Court’s
judgment, since they are both supporting Greece’s violations of international law.

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7. This has been going on far too long! We have spent over two decades attempting to find a solution and have been coming up empty. In these two decades Macedonia has suffered immeasurable damage in every aspect of its economic, political and ethnic life. Today (at the start of 2014) it has become very clear that the blade has hit bone. It is high time that we become aware that we have been taken this far and left in the middle of a tunnel. And that we need to find the exit on our own.

After we were blocked from joining NATO in Bucharest in 2008 our position in the “dispute” has been weakening. Until 2008 we have received recognition from many countries which have strengthened our international standing. It is now high time we seek new solutions and take decisive action if we are to succeed.

8. We have a number of options but none are painless. Whatever route we take, our first confrontation will be with Washington. As manager of the issue, Washington will strongly resist any attempt to modify, let alone change, its intentions and plans that are embedded in its current procedures. We must be clear about that. Washington reacted the same way to our application to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and will react to anything different that we do. And thus we can only succeed if we are prepared to face Washington’s wrath. If we don’t build up enough courage, as soon as possible, to defend our country’s fundamental interests then we will end up in the abyss.

We must be on the move and may our Macedonia remain eternal!
Introduction

1. It should be obvious by now that the Albanians were and still are the main target of American policy in the Balkans. The violent breakup of Serbia and the creation of Kosovo, as a second Albanian state, is the best confirmation of that. When the Americans needed a loyal partner, the Albanians were there and ready to act. They were ready to settle their national issue and the Americans were willing to support them. Yugoslavia’s disintegration was seen as an opportunity for all Albanians to unite and, in their view, correct historical injustices, for which they were ready to plunge into a war. Thus, their greatest aspiration fit perfectly with American regional plans in the Balkans. The Americans needed a trusted partner for Milosevich’s overthrow, and they found that in the Albanians. The Americans were also involved in the creation of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and in its secret preparations for war. The Albanians were and still are a great asset to the United States not only because they are loyal partners but also because they are widespread over many countries in the region. The Albanian population in the Balkans is larger in number than that of the Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bosnians and Croatians and smaller than that of the Serbians, Greeks and Bulgarians. They also have the highest birth rate in Europe.

1.1 The Americans, as we all know, are involved in both Macedonia and Kosovo. So, it would be theoretically impossible for American policies towards Macedonia not to overlap with those towards Kosovo. We know that the Americans always follow their own interests and those interests should be, at least in theory, complementary to those of the countries in which they are involved. As a result, Macedonia and Kosovo are part of the same American regional policy formulated to make full use of a) over the border entanglements between the nations, b) historical mistrust and confrontation between the states, c) Albania’s eternal dream of achieving a Greater Albania, d) centuries claims and “pretensions” on Macedonia and on the Macedonian people by the neighbours, and e) all of the above combined with traditional deep divisions and confrontations among the Macedonian people...
2. Once we take into consideration that Macedonia and Kosovo are part of the same American regional policy and America’s involvement and partnering with the Albanians it is only logical then to substantiate that the KLA (in Kosovo) and the NLA (in Macedonia) (National Liberation Armies) are part of the same story. And how did this happen? Well, when Milosevich initiated a campaign to “deal” with irredentism in Kosovo, the Americans found their historic opportunity to penetrate the region and create conditions for a new strategic partnership. And since the Albanians were a “traditional” enemy of the Serbians, thanks to Milosevich’s “tough guy” policies, the Americans found a willing partner in the Albanians. Then, after Yugoslavia’s breakup Albanian-American interests became aligned to the maximum.

3. With American determination to create an independent Kosovo, two objectives were achieved. One, Milosevich (Serbia) was punished and two, the Albanians were rewarded for their involvement. While this process was coming to fruition, appetites became increasingly larger and attempts were made to separate Medvedja, Preshevo and Bujanovats from Serbia. These were three municipalities with a predominantly Albanian population which, the Albanians viewed as eastern Kosovo and not as southern Serbia. Albanian attempts, however, failed. It proved to be too much of a bite for them because they would have entered the valley of South Morava and taken part of Corridor 10, the main north-south Serbian communication link. Serbia would have retaliated harshly.

4. After their victory in Kosovo, naturally the next logical place for the Albanians to want to acquire lands was western Macedonia. And thus Macedonia became the next destination for Albanian expansionism which was to be achieved not only with American blessings but also with American help. Enter the 2001 war. The process by which the “Albanian national question” in Kosovo was resolved was an unexpected success which, theoretically, in their minds, could possibly work in Macedonia. But by then, this was nothing new. The process in Macedonia had already started soon after the breakup of Yugoslavia with the
Albanians boycotting the referendum for independence and the new Constitution, with “Illyrida” and with paramilitaries... in the early years when the modern independent Macedonian state was being formed. These, however, were only small tremours announcing serious political earthquakes which would follow.

4.1. There is no need to prove that Macedonia was both a target of American interests and Albanian chauvinism. All we have to do is look at every daily act perpetrated against it. Is there anyone who is not aware of Macedonia’s roots being systematically pruned? For years Macedonian lands have slowly, painstakingly and irreversibly been taken away from the Macedonian people. And now, more recently, just like it was done in Kosovo, it was about to be done in Macedonia with the war of 2001.

5. From what we know today, the NLA and the war of 2001 in Macedonia were a result of American regional policy. Nevertheless, with their success in Kosovo and having their own military capabilities, the Albanians developed appetites for expansionism into Macedonia as well. But even so, how could they have directed their military campaigns in Macedonia and started the 2001 war without a clear signal and direct support from the Americans? Supposedly being a “friend” of Macedonia, shouldn’t the United States have stepped in and said “NO!” to Albanian aggression in Macedonia? This unfortunately did not happen, which means, and this will be proven in later chapters, that the Albanians not only had clear permission from the Americans to attack Macedonia but enjoyed concrete and direct military support as well.

5.1. It was not hard for American planners in Washington to connect two exclusive opportunities that had emerged: one, Greece’s problem with Macedonia’s name and two, Albanian aspirations for establishing a Greater Albanian state. These opportunities were combined with American efforts to destroy Milosevich and spread American influence in the Balkans. After World War II the United States had no influence in this part of the Balkans because Albania was closed and not very attractive. Yugoslavia was uncommitted and alternated between East and
West. Bulgaria and Romania were Soviet allies and Greece was never a loyal and willing American ally...

5.2. What about Greece’s problem with Macedonia’s name? If the “name issue” was an exclusively Greek initiative, without the USA’s involvement, then there is no doubt that Washington would immediately latch onto this opportunity and manage the entire process in accordance with its own regional interests. Naturally, it did it to combine its interests with those of Greece. The best evidence that proves this is American involvement in minimizing Macedonia’s chances of joining the United Nations in 1992/1993. It would have been impossible to pre-empt Macedonia’s entry into the UN without active American involvement. No one in the Security Council, other than the Americans, could have ignored or disregarded the UN Charter the way it was done for Macedonia. No one would have dared to impose two new and never before seen conditions on Macedonia’s admission. No one could have suspended Macedonia and forced it to use an imposed reference for a name, but the USA. This was theoretically impossible for Greece to have done on its own. It had to have had outside help from a powerful supporter in the Security Council. And that supporter was the United States.

6. Christopher Hill, the first U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, was dispatched to Skopje in early July 1996. In the four years before that, since August 1992, his colleagues, the first U.S. ambassadors, already operated from Zagreb, Ljubljana and Sarajevo. In other words, Macedonia was completely forgotten, unrecognized and left stranded by Washington. Of course, this was not done by accident. American actions were dictated by American geopolitical interests in the Balkans.

Hill came after the wars in the former Yugoslav Republics had ended but at a time when the Kosovo scenario was being prepared, which would lead to substantial geopolitical changes in the region. His coming may not have been directly associated with this event, but at the same time it can’t be rejected as not being linked to it. In any case, it is worthwhile investigating it because it is an undisputed fact that, during the key years
1998/1999, when Hill was ambassador in Skopje, he was also a special envoy to Kosovo! That was the time when American interests centred in this part of the world and were focused in Kosovo. That was the time when the KLA operatives were being recruited and trained to lead the war in 1999. That was also the time when all the changes on the southern part of the Balkans, including Macedonia, were planned and would eventually lead to hardship and suffering in the wider region.

6.1. Hill however was “socializing” with the Albanians long before that. In the beginning of the 1990’s, during the dramatic communist regime collapse in Albania, Hill was working at the Embassy in Tirana. According to unofficial reports, coming from top Albanian politicians, Hill was the architect behind Berisha gaining power.

Hill was involved in the Rambouillet conference (along with Reeker!), when everything was done to prevent Serbia from signing the agreement with Kosovo in order to open the way for bombing it.

About that event, legendary Henry Kissinger said: “The text of the Rambouillet Agreement, which asked Serbia to allow NATO troops to freely enter Serbia, was a provocation, which was to pave the way for the bombing. It was a terrible diplomatic document, what must never again be presented in such a way!”

6.2. Hill was one of those people in the circle of American ambassadors who were sent to trouble spots. After his tour in Macedonia he was sent first to Poland (for a deserved break) and then to South Korea, to solve local hot issues. His next appointment was ambassador to volatile Iraq, where dozens of people were killed every day.

Hill was hired to serve as deputy to the famous American bulldozer, Holbrooke, during the preparation and signing of the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given his experience there, we can conclude that Hill was more than qualified for the events surrounding Macedonia, which were to follow – the war in 2001.
7. This has been only a small attempt to throw some light on actual policies implemented by the United States in Macedonia, in all its years of independence. More details will be given in later chapters.

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8. The United States is not only a military superpower; it is also an impressive innovator of cutting-edge information technologies; they are leading in the film industry, in music, literature, artistic and other works...

Through a system of competition, the USA has fostered a dynamic society that allows the best in each field of competition to rise to the top. The end result is high creativity. The United States of America, in essence, has been a leader in almost every sphere of human activity. This is indeed inspiring and deserves recognition from all of us. No one comes even close to what the U.S.A. is achieving, which serves as an example for all of us.

9. It is true that in the last 20 years or so, since Macedonia became independent, the United States has contributed significant assistance to its development, which some say exceeded a billion dollars, a practice which has continued to this day. The Americans have funded a number of extremely important projects for Macedonia for which the Macedonian people are very grateful.

10. It is therefore important at this point for us to mention that this write-up carries no malice towards the United States. It is only an attempt to clarify American policies towards Macedonia. It is a fact that American diplomacy has never been “flawless”. On the contrary, with a foreign policy like that of the United States, where many divergent interests intersect, it is impossible to have flawless diplomacy.

11. It is also important to mention that providing direct aid to Macedonia does not change the substance of America’s political attitude toward Macedonia. It could only sound controversial.
Providing aid has a broader purpose. First, it creates an image of “friendliness” giving the impression that the Americans are Macedonia’s friends. Second, it allows the Americans to penetrate deeply into Macedonia’s various segments of society. Third, the Macedonians who directly benefit from American aid tend to become strong supporters of American policies. Fourth, much of the aid provided by the U.S.A. is paid to American experts who are sent to Macedonia to manage it. Fifth, everything that the Americans invest is done for sustained and lasting influence, without regard for what happens to Macedonia and what is left of it...

America’s assistance to Macedonia is obscuring the true policies Washington is executing towards Macedonia. At the same time the aid is beneficial to the country, as well.
I – Yugoslavia’s breakup and the situation in Macedonia

1. Because Macedonia in the Yugoslav federation was a small country with limited resources, it found itself in the margins within that federation. The blame for that was in us and not in Belgrade. We made very little effort to change our situation. We felt as if we were bigger Yugoslavs than the rest and (consciously) neglected our Macedonian-ness. We read Belgrade’s “Politika” newspaper and watched TV Zagreb... We criticized and were ashamed of everything Macedonian. Then, and even today, we bought mostly imported products because we felt that ours, made in Macedonia, were not good enough. In other words, we thought we deserved better than what we could produce ourselves!

2. We had no experience in running a state because most of us avoided politics in the federation. At home we had no serious think - tanks that would research in-depth political and geo-strategic issues, economics, diplomacy, security... The other republics did have and, as a result, built expertise in those fields. In practice, we did not produce any specialists because our people refused to take them seriously. We did not want smarter people than ourselves among us. This may be a Macedonian trait? To most people the “Party” was more important than the state. Loyalty, not quality was the key criterion... The situation was the same in the other republics, but we were the most “disciplined” in this regard.

3. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia we found ourselves completely unprepared and surprised, even after it became clear to us that the process was irreversible. The Slovenians, for example, had elaborate plans for a post-Yugoslav period. They even had arrangements with Croatia to form a confederation...

We were last in everything. Almost no one was aware or cared about what was happening all around us. We refused to look at the evidence that the federation was disintegrating; even when it was clear that is was inevitable.
4. The then leadership failed to realize that the Macedonian people’s future lay in a fully independent Macedonian state. Unlike the other republics, Macedonia took no immediate measures to secure its future after the Yugoslav breakup. Macedonians were accustomed to not getting involved in essential matters regarding joint state affairs. The political dignitaries in Macedonia felt there was no need to manage the separation process so they left it alone. The institutions in Macedonia, responsible for taking steps for the separation, were not even informed, let alone ready to act. The citizens were involved even less. The largest part of our citizenry did not even know what to expect let alone what was waiting for them down the line. With regards to official propaganda, Yugoslavia was a solid state and something undeniable.

5. Events were unfolding so fast that it was difficult to follow them, let alone understand them. The former local system did not build experienced politicians, let alone statesmen, probably because they were not needed. Fortunately for us, Kiro Gligorov came back from Belgrade. Gligorov had spent many years close to Tito, one of the political geniuses of the 20th century, and had learned from him. Gligorov is criticized for what he did but, given the situation, had Gligorov not returned to lead Macedonia through the storm… who would have? Or, more accurately, any different solution would have been much more risky for the country’s future.

Today many people are saying that Gligorov worked very hard to preserve Yugoslavia and that he and Izetbegovich (Bosnia) remained loyal Yugoslav Musketeers to the end. Of course there is some truth to that. It is also true that the September 8, 1991 referendum question had a double meaning. But the fact is that Gligorov was always in favour of an independent Macedonia. That needs no proof. Gligorov was in favour of an independent Macedonia even during World War II when, through ANOK, he advocated for that.

5.1. At issue here are Gligorov’s wise tactics. Gligorov was well aware of the dangers that hung over Macedonia and was very careful not to create waves during Yugoslavia’s disintegration. In
addition to dealing with both politicians and the general public in Macedonia, Gligorov also had to deal with the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and its significant military capabilities. The JNA was in fact an overwhelmingly Serbian dominated army stationed in Macedonia. One short signal from Belgrade and, in just a few hours, the JNA could have taken down the government in Macedonia and dictated its own terms. The international community would have said little or next to nothing outside of condemning the takeover as a “barbaric act”. Gligorov also knew Milosevich’s intentions. We know today from Mitsotakis and Samaras’s talks with Milosevich that they were planning to divide the Republic of Macedonia between Greece and Serbia. This confirms Gligorov’s fears and justifies his restraint. The U.S.A. reacted as well because the danger for Macedonia was coming from Serbia. The result was; several hundred UNPREDEP troops were dispatched to Macedonia in December 1992. The purpose for this American intervention was not to “help” Macedonia but to prevent it from falling into Serbian hands so that eventually parts of it could become part of the “Greater Albania” project.

5.2. Gligorov, it appears, according to some experts, if indeed this was his idea, was not the first to ask the UN for peacekeeping troops. Izetbegovich had asked before him but his initiative was ignored. However, given the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the war breaking out, the UN decided not to repeat its mistake and responded positively to Gligorov. At least that was the official story. But then it is difficult to believe that the UN (an umbrella for the U.S.) actually waited for Gligorov to ask and then immediately sent troops to Macedonia. Where and how did Gligorov obtain this “secret information” telling him that Macedonia was in danger from Serbia; information which Washington couldn’t have gotten on its own? Yes, troops were sent to Macedonia at Gligorov’s request because without it there would have been no mission. However, it is likely that Gligorov acted on instructions from the Americans. The mission was certainly beneficial for Macedonia.

On the other hand, what kind of troops could Izetbegovich have been asking for and where was he going to place them? Around
Sarajevo? And what could have been achieved by that? The war was fought everywhere. In fact, if such forces were to be dispatched, without Serbian consent, it could have sparked more hostility.

5.3. If we are to look into Gligorov’s politics a little deeper, in the period from 1991 to 1995, we will find that a key point in his politics was revealed in a statement that he made in Kranj, on April 11, 1991, after the Yugoslav Republic presidents’ meeting ("Nova Makedonija" July 16, 2012, “President Gligorov and Vice President Georgievski”). Gligorov then said: “Macedonia is interested in being part of the Yugoslav community, but if any of the republics breaks away we will not remain in the Federation.” Maybe someone in his circle did not share this opinion and believed that Macedonia would remain with Serbia, but Gligorov was explicit: everyone in the federation or a federation without Macedonia.

5.4. Gligorov had what it takes in terms of wisdom and statesmanship. We have to give him credit for that. Macedonia did not initiate the Yugoslav dissolution, Gligorov made that very clear. Macedonia left because others left first. So, Serbia had no valid reason to take its anger out on Macedonia. Let us not forget, Macedonia was awarded to Serbia by the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest. Let us also keep in mind that Serbia would never have willingly given up its share of the Bucharest “booty” and allowed the creation of a modern Macedonian state if it were not for the communists in 1944. As strange as it may sound, it was communist ideology based on proletarian internationalism that made that possible. Let us also not forget that Serbia did agree to a partial revision of the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest in favour of creating a modern Macedonian state.

Serbia’s case proves and confirms that the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest is not cast in stone and can be changed but only with the consent of other interested parties. Is this possible when Bulgaria and Greece are on the other side, judge for yourself.

5.5. Of course it is also important to mention that Tito himself, for whatever reason, was a supporter of a federation with six
republics, which included Macedonia. The final step to formulating a policy regarding this federation was taken at the AVNOJ Second Session on November 29, 1943 during which time the seed for a modern Macedonian state began to germinate. This was an important date that marks an historic turning point for the Macedonian people.

Tito never did reveal his motive for supporting the creation of a Macedonian state. Some believe he did it because he feared Serbia. Serbia, being the largest, strongest and most dominant republic in the federation would have been even stronger with Macedonia being part of it, as before the Second World War. Serbia would have dominated all state functions and treated the other republics like minorities. That, however, was less of a possibility if Macedonia were to be separated from Serbia and given its own status as a republic. Tito’s reasons, for us are not important. What is important is that we were given a historic opportunity to fulfill an age-old desire to have our Macedonian state. Let us, once and for all, dump the “thesis” that “Tito fabricated” or “invented” the Macedonian people. All this is nonsense perpetrated by our enemies to keep the truth about Macedonia hidden!

5.6. Considering what was said above, we need to ask: had Macedonia been involved in the initial stages of the Yugoslav breakup, alongside Slovenia and Croatia, would Serbia have intervened in Macedonia? And would Serbia have demanded Macedonian lands being given back with references to the Bucharest and Versailles Treaties? Given that it would not have been totally legal, could the JNA military have taken control of the Macedonian government and installed a quisling government in Skopje, with pro-Serbian policies...? What would have happened to us then?

5.7. Would the question of the referendum in Macedonia, having no double meaning, have encouraged Belgrade to intervene? Gligorov was consistent regarding all these issues and the message was the same: we remain interested in Yugoslavia but, you know, only if it stays as it was. But of course, at that time it was clear to everybody that there was no turning back. Gligorov
made sure, however, that Macedonia was not going to lead the dance against Serbia.

5.8. Various interpretations by people that Gligorov, cooperating with Izetbegovich and using the double meaning referendum question in Macedonia, were in support of Yugoslavia first, and in support of an independent Macedonia second, are pure manipulations. Those two key moves that Gligorov made during the dramatic period when the Yugoslav federation was being dissolved were in no way symbolic of his personal and state priorities. At stake here was the ultimate and classic pragmatism: to avoid a war. He aimed to achieve his objectives without confrontation. The price of confrontation would have been much too high. And sure enough, Gligorov did exactly what he set out to do.

5.9. In the critical period, Milosevich did everything he could to drive Slovenia out of the federation but not together with Croatia. After a brief clash he ordered the JNA to withdraw from Slovenia and gave Ljubljana carte blanche to separate. Unlike in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia, he had no Serbians he could count on in Slovenia. So the steps that Gligorov took, when considering that Slovenia and Croatia were determined to oppose Milosevich when they were separating, reveal the true dimension of his genius. He achieved his objectives without unnecessary exposure and risk to Macedonia.

Perhaps Gligorov was not a good bluffer? Perhaps he never played poker, but he had the instinct for politics. Whatever he was, for Macedonia he was a good statesman with the nerves of a politician who had the ability to look far with regards to Macedonia’s interests, especially during the period from 1991 to 1995, and worked very well indeed for the country.

6. Today we can assess that Gligorov’s foreign policy, in the period from 1991 to 1993, had long played the Yugoslav card. This is because Gligorov was worried about the wars in the other Yugoslav Republics and did not want to rock the Serbian boat. However, given the circumstances, it was not possible, let alone easy, to predict how long his strategy was going to hold out. It
was very difficult to find the right time to tighten his policies while there was the real danger of the war spilling into Macedonia. There was also the internal problem with the Albanians, who, in the chaos, were seeking to exploit the situation in order to resolve their own national question. Gligorov was faced with maximum restraint and extreme caution in every political move he made. On top of that there was also the unwillingness of the international community to recognize Macedonia. Even though Macedonia did everything in its power to maintain peace and avoid war, the International Community left it in isolation and with very little room to manoeuvre. Facts and arguments listed in this write-up will clearly show that the main culprit for this was and remains the U.S.A.

6.1. Today we can still argue: had Gligorov taken a more forceful approach on Macedonia’s behalf towards Yugoslavia’s dissolution, would Macedonia’s position have been any stronger? Would it have speeded up Macedonia’s recognition? But in essence what we are doing, by arguing, is speculating and widening the gap in our own divide. Had Gligorov expedited the process, today we could have been re-occupied by Serbia and erased from the world map. The only thing that is safe to conclude is that even though we did everything “by the book” and demonstrated to the International Community that we managed the post Yugoslav crisis in the period from 1991 to 1993, without spilling a single drop of blood, it did not bring us the desired results. And, with regards to our position in the International Community, our “good will” and “cooperativeness” proved to be extremely unproductive.

6.2. In general, however, we must admit that Gligorov’s tactics in conducting Macedonia’s foreign policy, which in those years was totally in his hands, certainly contributed to Macedonia’s stability. In other words, no matter how much inside and outside pressure was put on it, Macedonia did not destabilize or become prey to an outside entity. Macedonia avoided all pitfalls and not only became independent but it accomplished that by preserving the peace at home. Gligorov made some very valuable contributions which will be well remembered by history.
7. If there were any errors to be attributed to Gligorov’s foreign policy they would have been that he was too tolerant. During the Greek embargo against Macedonia, for example, when Greece was attempting to extinguish the life out of Macedonia by not allowing anything, not even life-saving energy to cross the Macedonian-Greek border, Gligorov allowed Greeks to freely cross in and out of Macedonia at will. According to official data collected from customs, more than 100 Greek trucks and over 200 Greek wagons freely crossed the Macedonian borders on a daily basis, carrying a serious quantity of goods. If we were to stop them we would have caused a scandal and most likely the Greeks would have looked for some kind of solution. By allowing Greeks to go through our borders without obstruction, we in fact damaged our economy enormously. We don’t know exactly what would have happened had we reacted differently. But logic holds that had we shown our teeth to them, they would have acted differently. How differently we don’t know. However, it is sure that in such a situation the other side would have had an interest in finding an exit.

It is indisputable that our behaviour to not reciprocate gave the Greeks an advantage which they used to the maximum. Even though what we did may have not been appropriate in general terms, we must admit that this policy for tolerance proved to be successful because our state survived when expectations were that it would fall apart. Such behaviour out of Macedonia was not adequately valourized by the International Community because of other geopolitical interests, notably by the U.S.

8. In the beginning of the critical 1990’s, Stoian Andov, belonging to the leading Macedonian political class, also had some political pedigree. For many years he was a minister in Belgrade and had plenty of opportunity to learn the game of politics. There were also politicians from the “old school” that could have helped. Unfortunately some were not in the game, while others remained in Belgrade. Almost everyone else was inexperienced. The first two Prime Ministers (except for Nikola Kliuev, who led the technical government) were under the age of 30 and this was their first job! Instead of being trainees, which would have been normal in any other society, in Macedonia they
had to undertake the leadership of a country and at a time when
the country was faced with a wide range of unsolvable problems.
The results are visible...

9. While the Yugoslav federation was falling apart, Macedonia
was not sure what to do. The referendum for independence
produced great results despite the fact that the people were not
well enough informed concerning the time conditions and future
opportunities. One of the kinks in this exercise was the Albanian
boycott of both the referendum and the parliamentary vote on the
new constitution which, we must admit, had its drawbacks. Part
of the population did not undertake its obligations to do its stately
duty and thus reserved its options for the future. It was the first
strong indicator that building an independent Macedonia was not
going to be easy. Also, International Community plans and
intentions regarding Macedonia and the wider region were still
unknown and no one knew what dangers lurked in the future.
Unfortunately the situation is not much better today.

9.1. So, why did the Albanians boycott the referendum and the
parliamentary vote on the new constitution? Such acts cannot be
purely random, innocent, or domestically concocted. Macedonia
had no “such” problems, to speak of, with its Albanian
population especially like “Illyrida” and attempts to establish an
Albanian paramilitary... All of these occurrences had to be
connected and were part of a new scenario. In the meantime
strategic planners in Western capitals, particularly those of major
world powers, were exploring their options for a desired outcome
in Macedonia. And, naturally they did everything in their power
to influence the processes to go their way, in accordance with
their own long-term interests. So, at the time, Macedonia was
flooded with spies and secret agents who were fully engaged in
working for their country’s interests and certainly no money was
spared to achieve their goals. Unfortunately, much of what had
happened in that time is still unknown to us to this day (2013).

Looking at this problem from the inside out, the Albanians in
Macedonia had no real capacity for such geo-strategic planning
and coordinating steps for such boycotts, paramilitaries and
“Illyrida’s”. So, there is no doubt that their actions in Macedonia
were part of broader international logistics. Bombing Serbia and creating an independent Kosovo eliminates any doubt and confirms our suspicions that the Albanians were helped from the outside. Please read on.

9.2. Now, at the end of 2013, new and “most secret” information is emerging that the United States was present in Kosovo before the Yugoslav collapse. According to some sources, the reason was to monitor and, if possible, to influence the situation in Albania. If that is true, then it becomes possible that the U.S. did participate in the events that began to unfold in Kosovo during the 1960’s? All events that took place ending with Kosovo’s independence, through demonstrations and fictional propaganda of pupils’ poisoning... objectively speaking, were not possible without “foreign aid”. Was the U.S. involved in the “Kosovo Project” from the beginning, from 50 years ago? This needs to be further investigated.
II – The U.S.A. immediately recognized all new countries except Macedonia

1. Three federations broke up during the early 1990’s. They were the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. From their decomposition, a short time afterwards, 22 new fully independent states emerged and 20 of them sought to enter the international political scene. With the exception of Macedonia, they were all immediately recognized by the world’s major factors. No other new country was opposed except for Macedonia.

1.1. On December 25, 1991, the day the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States recognized the 14 new countries that emerged from it. About three months later, in March 1992, the U.S.A. opened embassies and sent ambassadors to the capitals of all of them. The Russian Federation, by agreement, secured status for the successor state of the USSR and as a result they did not need to be recognized. Moscow also assumed all the debt for the entire Soviet Union.

1.2. January 1, 1993, the day Czechoslovakia dissolved, Washington recognized both new emerging states, the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Very soon afterwards, Washington opened an embassy in Bratislava.

2. Because of the deep political crisis that the Yugoslav federation was experiencing during its breakup, and because there was confrontation between the republics regarding the future of that country, Yugoslavia’s breakup was much more complicated. Unlike Moscow and Prague, where the breakup was executed by agreement, nothing was harmonized in Belgrade. This naturally caused confrontation between the republics and resulted in wars breaking out. The ensuing wars produced many casualties, including millions of refugees and enormous destruction... The main culprit, of course, was Milosevich, followed closely by Croatian (Tudjman) nationalism and Slovenian selfishness (Kuchan), which certainly also played a role. The main victims were Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina still bear part of the blame for the war that followed. Montenegro fully supported Serbia’s
policy and remained with Serbia and because Serbia was the inheritor of Yugoslavia, it did not need or ask for recognition.

3. In late 1991, while Yugoslavia was disintegrating, the European Community (EC), (forerunner to the European Union), formed the so-called “Badenter Commission”, consisting of five presidents and judges of constitutional courts from European countries. Their task was to investigate each of the new countries and identify for the EC if they passed a certain set of criteria which would qualify them to be recognized by the EC. The Commission was led by Robert Badenter, President of the Constitutional Court of France. Also included in the Commission was Roman Herzog who later became president of Germany (1994 - 1999). Such a report was also compiled on Macedonia in which the Commission recommended that Macedonia be immediately recognized. In fact, from all the resultant countries from the Yugoslav breakup only Macedonia and Slovenia qualified and were recommended for recognition.

4. Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia early, in December 1991. This was contrary to the Badenter Commission’s proposal which was to be released at the beginning of January, 1992. There was an agreement reached in Brussels that recognition of post-Yugoslav states was to be done on January 15, 1992. But during a meeting, from extreme pressure from Germany (through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frantz Dietrich Genscher) the EC too recognized Slovenia and Croatia and immediately opened diplomatic relations with them. Brussels ignored the Badenter Commission’s recommendations and Macedonia was left out unrecognized and empty-handed.

5. Soon afterwards, on April 7, 1992, the United States recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then a few months later, in August 1992, the U.S. established diplomatic relations with all three countries and immediately dispatched its ambassadors. Because of the war, the American embassy for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the beginning was located in Vienna. Later it was moved to Sarajevo. Macedonia was not on the American list for countries to recognize.
In April, 1992, under pressure from the U.S., the EC recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6. It is important at this point for us to have a comparative look at American attitudes towards Bosnia and Herzegovina versus those towards Macedonia.

6.1. By any estimate the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extreme. The people of Bosnia, Muslims, Croats and Serbs, even though the Serbs were first to start causing problems, all must bear blame for the start of the war that followed. It is a fact that all political factors were deeply involved in confrontations with each other (on both ethnic and religious grounds) and that was the reason why the war was inevitable. Despite all this the U.S. still recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina and sent its ambassador.

6.2. But when it came to Macedonia, the U.S. did the opposite. It ignored all peaceful steps, compromises, cooperation, flexibility and all other valuable contributions the Macedonian government demonstrated in order to prevent a war at home and to avoid the escalation of conflict in the region. And what was Macedonia’s reward? Certain isolation! Isolation that began then and has continued to this day! Two decades later Washington still puts up obstacles, delivers ultimatums and uses blackmail to hinder Macedonia from functioning like a normal state. In parallel, the U.S. did everything in its power to bring down Milosevich’s forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, the Americans did everything in their power to make sure that Bosnia survived. In the meantime, they were doing everything in their power to push Macedonia down a slippery slope. Two quite different and opposing policies for two post Yugoslav republics! Why?

7. Unfortunately, early American recognition did not help Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary! There are some who will argue that American recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina made the situation worse and accelerated the war. It is possible that some of the opposing political forces in Sarajevo interpreted the recognition as an act of provocation because there was no agreement on the future of the country. The Serbs were
absolutely against Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence. Supported by the JNA, irregular Serbian troops occupied 2/3 of Bosnia’s territory and carried out ethnic cleansing soon after the recognition. Over two million people were forced to leave their homes and over 200,000 died in the war that followed.

7.1. The U.S., most likely, wanted to protect Bosnia and Herzegovina from Milosevich and that was its reason for the quick and early recognition. But, according to Badenter, the country failed to meet even the minimum requirements for recognition. In that respect, the recognition did not deliver on its objectives. U.S. recognition did not hinder Milosevich’s plans and it is unknown, to us, if the recognition, and to which extent, influenced further development of events, which is very likely. But someone else will have to answer this question.

8. The main international actors, led by the U.S., left only Macedonia unrecognized as an independent state. They left it unprotected. Serbia and Montenegro remained in the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the successor of the old federation international recognition was not necessary. Re-admission into the United Nations came in 2000.

9. Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, an early recognition of Macedonia by the U.S. would have stabilized the situation in the country and in the surrounding region. If Macedonia was recognized, then Mitsotakis, Samaras and Milosevich would not have had discussions about dividing it. Age-old Bulgarian appetites to make Macedonia Bulgarian would not have had a future. Albanian aspirations would have been curbed... and the Albanians would have behaved differently towards Macedonia. They would have not gone against official U.S. policy, highlighted by the recognition of Macedonia. But the U.S. decided to leave Macedonia wide open… it undertook nothing to help. There can only be one reason for this: “different interests”.

10. The period from 1991 to 1993 was extremely difficult for Macedonia. It was financially bankrupt (before the breakup Serbia and Slovenia had virtually robbed the financial system),
economically drained (with huge inflation, mainly generated by Belgrade), left in a security vacuum (the JNA when it withdrew took the entire armament stationed in Macedonia) and threatened by its neighbours (who were making arrangements for its division)... So, in place of giving it its support, if for no other reason than for being the only successor of Yugoslavia to behave peacefully, Washington, supported by Paris, London, Berlin and Brussels, left Macedonia in the lurch. Why?

11. In the meantime some states began to recognize Macedonia. On January 15, 1992 Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia. Immediately afterwards Sofia started to hesitate and did not establish diplomatic relations. They missed the opportunity to score some points. There were some calculations regarding Macedonia’s future upon which Bulgaria wanted to capitalize. What if Macedonia did not survive? Where would the “sheep”, who had not yet realized that they were “Bulgarians”, go? According to Bulgarian logic, the simple act of recognizing Macedonia was like recognizing a second “Bulgarian” state.

The situation where the United States, followed by the EC, showed refusal to accept and support the existence of an independent Macedonian state was a sufficient signal to declare to Macedonia’s historic enemies that it was now open season on Macedonia...

12. The Turkish Ambassador was the first to arrive in a fully independent modern Macedonian state. According to protocol, before being received by the Head of State, copies of the Ambassador’s credentials were to be delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately, at the time, the Minister was away and there was no Deputy Minister. So the honour to receive the Ambassador’s credentials had fallen on myself as Undersecretary, the third person in the Ministry. But due to lack of experience, instead of the next day’s official event taking place in Gligorov’s (the President’s) office, all Macedonian foreign affairs journalists, cameramen and photographers appeared at the Ministry. A disaster was in the making which would cast a shadow on the main event, the next day. Fortunately, we succeeded in persuading the media to ignore the prior
information given to them and concentrate on the President’s reception of the first Ambassador.

13. The first group of six EC members (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark) led by Great Britain took no less than two years to recognize Macedonia after recognizing Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The recognition took place on December 16, 1993, eight months after Macedonia’s admission to the UN. They only recognized Macedonia by its UN reference and not by its constitutional name. Following that, they immediately established diplomatic relations and sent ambassadors to Skopje. Other states followed suit.

14. The United States recognized Macedonia as an independent state on February 9, 1994, almost two years after it recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another year and a half passed before Washington decided to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia, which took place on September 13, 1995, immediately after Macedonia signed the Interim Accord with Greece, which was orchestrated by the United States. The U.S. had established diplomatic relations with the other three former Yugoslav Republics three years earlier! Why?

The American embassy was opened in Skopje in February 1996 and an ambassador arrived at the end of July, four years after the American ambassadors had arrived in Zagreb, Ljubljana and Sarajevo. Even though wars flared up all around the region, even though the Macedonian southern border was blocked by Greece for two years and destroyed Macedonia’s economy… the Americans were totally silent on the matter and continued to tolerate the destruction of the Macedonian state. They were in no hurry to do anything. Why? Obviously it was dictated by their long-term interest in the region.

14.1. The way the U.S.A. acted during Macedonia’s recognition process; its establishment of diplomatic relations; its opening of an embassy; its dispatching of its ambassador… these were all classic indicators of a real U.S. policy being implemented. A policy which is still in effect to this day. This is proof that
Macedonia does not fit into America’s plans in the Balkans. Is there anyone who truly believes that Washington did not recognize Macedonia for a long time because it was willed by Athens? One has to be very naïve to believe that. You can be sure that America works for its own and only for its own and no one else’s interests, least of all Greece’s.

We should always remember that the Americans work for their own interests and approach that fact with our eyes wide open. Everything that has happened can be argued in half a dozen different ways but the fact remains that during and after Yugoslavia’s breakup, U.S. policy was aggressive and remains hostile towards Macedonia, pushing the country to the edge of a deep abyss. Given what was just said above and given that the U.S. is a big player in the Balkans, as well as a superpower, and it has the ability to do what it wants, it is only normal to conclude that the United States was and remains the main source of the problems that have faced Macedonia in the last 20 years. Had the U.S. exercised the same policy on Macedonia as it did on the other three ex-Yugoslav states, it would have recognized Macedonia then and there, together with the other republics. The fact is it didn’t! Let’s say for now that the Americans would have recognized Macedonia if they had had no other plans for it. The reasons why the Americans did not recognize Macedonia is because it would have been an obstacle to the realization of their long-term interests in the Balkans. More about this will follow.

15. It should be obvious to everyone that Athens couldn’t possibly have had a substantial role in American policies being implemented against Macedonia all these years. There are no facts or arguments upon which it could be argued that the U.S. had delayed Macedonia’s recognition because of Greece. Or that Macedonia’s admission to the UN and the imposition of the reference was in support of Greek fears of Macedonian irredentism. The same applies to the Bucharest NATO meeting in 2008. There is also the fact that in December 1993, Macedonia was recognized by six EC states, led by Britain, France and Germany, which immediately established diplomatic relations with Macedonia. As European countries, members of NATO and the EU, they had more than double the obligation to support
Athens (U.S. only through NATO!). If anyone should not have recognized Macedonia because of Athens, it should have been these EC countries and not the U.S.A. However, they did take that step. But not the U.S.A! In fact it took Washington over another two and a half years before it dispatched an ambassador to Skopje. Why?

16. A positive step in American policy towards Macedonia was taken in December 1992 with the arrival of UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR was a UN military peace keeping mission sent to the former Yugoslavia and to Macedonia. It consisted of about 600 soldiers of whom about three hundred were Americans. Later, on March 31, 1995, the mission became independent and was renamed UNPREDEP.

In the beginning it looked like the U.S.A. had changed its attitude toward an independent Macedonia, at least in principle. Bringing UNPROFOR to Macedonia was interpreted as some kind of security guarantee for the unrecognized Macedonian state. Soon afterwards however, it was discovered that the purpose of the operation was not to secure and stabilize Macedonia but to stop it from falling into Serbian hands. It turns out that the Americans did have secret information concerning Milosevich’s aggressive intentions towards Macedonia. So, the UNPROFOR mission was dispatched to Macedonia in order to prevent a Serbian invasion. Later we will see that this was part of U.S. policy implemented in support of the Albanians in Macedonia and in the wider region.

UNPROFOR, later UNPREDEP produced positive results. Even though Macedonia was not recognized by the U.S., the preventive mission’s presence curbed Milosevich’s appetite. However, in spite of the mission’s presence, Macedonia still remained extremely vulnerable. The Americans were certainly aware of that and, according to a number of facts based on events that followed, it can be said that it was part of the American plan all along: to save Macedonia from Serbian interference with all other options remaining open. We can say that UNPREDEP was an interim solution that hid America’s true intentions and postponed the real solutions.
17. Will history show why the Serbs did not intervene in Macedonia? The intervention did not take place probably because a) Milosevich did not have sufficient military capabilities because he was already fighting in Croatia and preparing to start a war in Bosnia; b) Milosevich believed that Macedonia would not be able to survive without Serbia and would return to Serbia on its own... His setback certainly was not because of UNPREDEP, even though U.S. troops were stationed on his border. If Belgrade had decided to go south, UNPREDEP would have been no obstacle. If anything like that were to happen UNPREDEP had its own, well-known exit plan. In fact UNPREDEP had no mandate to protect Macedonia, it was there to only monitor and report on the situation at the borders. It was there to act as an early warning system.

18. Milosevich was convinced that Macedonia would come back to Serbia on its own. Serbia’s influence on Macedonia was long and very strong. With regards to security, Serbia felt that Macedonia was incapable of stopping Albanian irredentism on its own. With regards to economy, Serbia was Macedonia’s largest trading partner... Personal and family ties were also numerous and deep...

According to some analysts, Milosevich’s assumptions concerning Macedonia were among his biggest mistakes and delusions.

19. Looking at the problem another way, with UNPREDEP’s dispatch in Macedonia, the Americans sent a clear message to Milosevich; stay out of Macedonia. Serbia’s story about “Vardarska Banovina” being Serbian, suspended on August 2, 1944, was no longer valid. But apart from that, U.S. policy towards Macedonia ever since and to this day (2013) has been unclear. A stable and prosperous Macedonia, it seems, does not fit into American plans. While telling Serbia to keep its hands off Macedonia, the U.S., it seems, had no similar message for Macedonia’s other neighbours. There was no such message for Bulgaria or Greece, or least of all for the Albanians, who enjoyed broad U.S. support and were treated as their best allies. The Albanian leadership inside Macedonia, in other words, took the
lead from the Americans and started to look down on Macedonia and demonstrate little to no loyalty to the country that was their home.

Without a warning from Washington to keep their hands off Macedonia, like that issued against Serbia, aspirations towards Macedonia by its neighbours remain - “legitimate”.

20. All those who argued that, in the critical years and even today, the Americans are doing their best to guarantee Macedonia’s survival and that the U.S. is even Macedonia’s strategic partner, should be asked to explain a) why did Washington recognize Macedonia two years after it recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and b) why did it take four years for the U.S. to dispatch an American ambassador to Skopje? Was it because of financial difficulties? Was it because of Greece? Was it because Macedonia and the U.S. are “really” good “strategic partners”? Or was it because of “some other American interest” not yet obvious to us?

21. Some people believe that if the Americans did not want a Macedonian state to exist they would have easily extinguished it in the early 1990’s. But had the Americans done that, they would have expanded and intensified the wars raging in the region by far, which could have easily gotten out of control. It would have certainly involved all of Macedonia’s neighbours who had traditional claims on Macedonia. The entire Balkans could have gone up in flames with unforeseeable consequences, just like it happened in 1913. The risk was too great, even for the U.S., and as Macedonians say, “fear guards the vineyard”.

From that perspective, the peaceful conduct of Macedonia was the most desired option for the region. Macedonia is of great strategic importance for the entire Balkans and must not be allowed to catch fire. In return, Macedonia got nothing. Perhaps it is held in the present status quo situation as a (sacrifice!) means for resolving the other Balkan problems?

22. The United States has always and everywhere led its own American policies. The only time they pay attention to others is...
when their interests align. Greece does not play a significant role in shaping U.S. policy, regardless of what the Greek lobby says. America’s behaviour towards Macedonia has unambiguously revealed the true U.S. interests in the region, which have very little to do with helping Greece. On the contrary, U.S. policy in the Balkans, in the long term, is dangerous even for Greece.

Our first task in our diplomacy, politics and science must be to research, analyze and clarify U.S. policy in the region. If we don’t do that we will be going around in vicious circles.

23. When it was inevitable that an independent Macedonian state was about to emerge from the Yugoslav federation breakup in the early 1990’s, Greece became very nervous. It began to fabricate reasons why an independent Macedonian state would be a danger to peace and stability in the region and launched a massive propaganda campaign in order to keep Macedonia’s status undefined. Greece’s propaganda campaign of “crying wolf” had a strong impact and sounded convincing. But such claims, including the one that “if Macedonia was called Macedonia it would have claims on its northern region also called Macedonia”, were dismissed by the “Badenter Commission”. Even so, 20 years later Greece still uses the same rhetoric to deny Macedonia its place in the world. In the beginning no one was sure if such hazards existed but today everyone knows that “such dangers” do not exist. For the past 20 years Macedonia had proven over and over that it has no claims on Greece. Even if it did, Macedonia has no military might or Great Power backing to be able to attack Greece and “liberate the whole of Macedonia”...

24. In spite of all attempts on Macedonia’s part to alleviate all fears, these unsubstantiated “arguments” and manipulations were used against Macedonia at the UN to deny its entry by its constitutional name, of course as implementation of certain policies. Greece does not have that kind of clout on the world scene to push its agenda. Only major powers have that kind of pull! But because Greece initiated this process, i.e. “Macedonia must change its name”, Greece alone will have to answer to it and explain itself every time “why Macedonia must change its name”? This question must be asked every day, everywhere all
the time… Someone should pose this question to the Americans continually as well because they have kept their fingers in this process and have managed it from the outset.

But if there are no real reasons for harassing and holding Macedonia back, then there should be an immediate stop to it. This shameful political tragicomedy must end now!

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25. In the context of the post Yugoslav republic recognitions, it is interesting to note what Canadian political analyst Jonathan Paquin (Jonathan Paquin: “Managing controversy - US stability seeking and the birth of the Macedonian state”) has to say.

The delayed U.S. recognition of Macedonia, according to Paquin, was a result of American policy against “secessionist states that did not demonstrate a clear ability to maintain internal and external stability”! He bases his argument on the assertion that there was danger that a Macedonian-Greek military conflict might break out! In the same text, the author justifies the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1992, but without applying the same criteria as in the case of Macedonia – “sustainable stability”. He forgot to mention that when the United States recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina the country was already deeply divided, faced with dangers and completely dysfunctional. The war was at its doorstep, started soon and lasted nearly three years. Paquin, like Washington and Brussels, used double standards, which do not serve his honour, to justify Washington’s policy towards Macedonia, while falling into his own trap.
III – It was the U.S. and not Greece who challenged our name at the UN and overpowered us with a reference. The U.S. is also managing Nimetz’s mediations.

A. Admission to the UN

1. On July 23, 1992 the Macedonian government made a proposal to parliament for joining the United Nations. On July 29, 1992 the Macedonian parliament adopted a resolution to join the UN and on July 30, 1992 President Gligorov sent a letter of request to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, formally requesting admission to the world organization.

2. The fact that Macedonia applied to the UN for admission late was not by choice. Macedonia was held back by its non-recognition by the U.S. and the EC (Washington, London, Paris, Berlin...). These countries were not willing to recognize Macedonia and thus would not open its admission to the UN. They were the same countries that would eventually decide Macedonia’s fate (with regards to its admission to the UN). And thus Macedonia found itself in a vicious circle. The “Macedonian Question” was put in the hands of the EC and its Edinburgh Summit, held in December 1992, and it failed to find a solution. The problem was then shifted to the United Nations and ended up directly under American control.

3. By then the U.S. had pledged its support to the Albanians, which became obvious some time later. But that does not mean that Washington was not working on the case right from the start. The Americans, being engaged in the Balkans, simply could not stay out of Macedonia’s problems and sit on the sidelines, especially in critical times. Therefore, it is inconceivable to believe that Washington was not involved in the processes that were shaping Macedonia’s future. Washington’s delayed recognition of Macedonia proves that the Americans were active players in the game.

4. Even Macedonia’s late filed application for admission to the UN was not in accordance with the advice of the main factors. It was premature and that’s how it was treated. UN Secretary
General, Boutros Ghali, kept it in his desk drawer for over five months and pulled it out only after a way was found to contest Macedonia’s name. The procedure for admission was then opened in January 1993. It was no “coincidence” that several years later Boutros Ghali was rewarded by the Greeks with some kind of prize which, if my memory serves me right, was one million dollars! This was Athens’s appreciation for Ghali’s role in Macedonia’s delayed entry. This was one of the key conditions designed to cripple the Macedonian state, especially after being slapped with a reference instead of its proper name.

Did Ghali keep our application for membership in his desk drawer on his own or with American blessings…? you decide!

5. On May 22, 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia were admitted to the UN without any problems. Even though there was a war starting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems that it was not a problem for the U.S. and for all the others. Macedonia on the other hand, which had none of those problems, was not recognized. Why? Let’s say it was not because of the delayed application, or because of some policy errors, or because of some concocted plot of Gligorov’s, as some critics now claim.

6. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the ultimate authority or governing body of the United Nations. Procedure dictates that the UNSC make proposals to the UN General Assembly as to which countries should be admitted. The UNSC consists of 15 members, of whom five are permanent and belong to major powers. They are the U.S., Britain, France, Russia and China. These members also have veto power. The other ten are elected members with a two year mandate and every year five are changed.

6.1. It was the UNSC that disputed Macedonia’s name and suspended its use. On behalf of the EC, Britain, France and Spain, as a non-permanent UNSC member, proposed that Macedonia be admitted to the UN with a reference. The U.S., at the time, did not get directly involved. However, do you think that if Washington had even the slightest concern about how Macedonia was treated it would have sat on the sidelines and
done nothing? I don’t think so. If Washington had given its blessings to Macedonia’s entry do you think it would have entered the UN nameless? I don’t think so.

6.2. There is no doubt that the UNSC is and always has been dominated by the U.S., which is the main financier of this world organization. And there is no doubt that the U.S. had already made its position about Macedonia very clear while Macedonia was waiting to be admitted. In 1992-3, besides China which sat on the sidelines and weak Russia which was thrown into chaos before it went bankrupt, it can be said with absolute certainty that Macedonia’s entry into the UN was managed by the United States. Of course this was done in agreement with its EC proponents, whose “merit” in this should not be minimized. Greece, on the other hand, in spite of its posturing, had no direct role in this process because it was not part of the UNSC.

6.3. One of the key arguments that points to American involvement in denying Macedonia its rightful name is the flagrant violations of the UN’s normal admission procedures. Even though the UN Charter was precise in determining qualifications for membership, in Macedonia’s case two new conditions were added which the country had to meet before it could be admitted into the UN!? This was a classic move of unprecedented blackmail, forcing Macedonia to join the UN without a name! It was this illegal manipulation of rules that forced the so-called “name dispute” on Macedonia and pushed it into limbo. Macedonia was forced to deal with an imposed obligation to seek a solution to its own name, which was disputed and could not be used internationally.

6.4. No one, apart from the U.S., can permit itself to ignore the UN Charter and proceed with illegal procedures for the admission of a new member as it happened to Macedonia. None of the other UNSC members have that authority. Not Britain, not France, not Spain and not even all three put together. This dance, no doubt, was led by the United States. Greece was completely out of the picture.
6.5. Considering that the UN Charter of Rights was illegally tailored for Macedonia to deny its entry into the UN with its rightful name and to impose a reference on it, we can freely conclude without risk of making a mistake that it was done by none other than the coordinated effort of the United States. Everything else was technical and tactics. There are no facts or arguments to point to anyone else. If the United States was in favour of Macedonia entering the UN with its constitutional name, the reference would not have been imposed. If Washington felt that the reference proposed by Britain, France and Spain was not a good idea it would not have been accepted. This confirms that there were prior agreements of these three countries with the United States.

6.6. There is no doubt that there will be a historical black mark left on the UN for the way it conducted itself in Macedonia’s admission. This also clearly shows that the political interests of “certain” powers are placed ahead of respect for the UN Charter of Rights, which is a gross violation of International Law. The UN was put in place to avoid actions such as these and protect the rights of the weak and innocent, not to ignore them. This is usually how terrorists operate, working outside of the law.

7. Boutros Ghali assured Gligorov that admission to the United Nations with the reference would be brief, for only a few months, but that did not happen, which goes to show that the problem was not with Greece alone but also with someone else, someone very powerful. Did Greece alone have the clout to influence Ghali to pull such a stunt and get away with it? Or was this someone else’s doing? No doubt it was not Greece alone. It had to be someone else in addition to Greece, someone much more powerful and experienced. So I ask you, how is it possible for a top international political organization to stoop so low and unscrupulously lie to a president of a country?

7.1. Looking at the problem from today’s perspective, was Boutros Ghali bluffing or was this someone’s plan all along? Ghali should have known, of course, that no solution, no matter how simple, could be realistically expected to be found in just a few months. So the question is why did Boutros Ghali make the
promise to Gligorov? Was he convinced that Macedonia was not going to last long and would fall apart very soon? Was Ghali of the same mind, like that Greek extremist Samaras, who openly discussed Macedonia’s quick demise? We can now say, with enough certainty that many analysts and politicians then were of the belief that Macedonia was not going to last long. Why? What did they know that we didn’t?

Did the Americans have similar thoughts? Is that why they delayed Macedonia’s recognition? The probability of the U.S. having such thoughts was high. Why else delay Macedonia’s recognition for almost two years? Why tolerate Greece’s illegal blockade on Macedonia knowing that the UN had already placed sanctions against Serbia and had cut off Macedonia from its largest trading partner? Everything was set in place to “strangle” Macedonia.

8. Not knowing what was going to happen, many countries delayed their recognition and waited for a final outcome. Macedonia of course survived the critical period and evolved into a relatively successful country despite all the huge external obstacles placed in front of it. It survived its domestic divisions, in good part stimulated, orchestrated and paid for from abroad. And it also survived its own mistakes.

Thus the old story was confirmed that Macedonians are indestructible!

9. We would like, at this point, to take the opportunity to address some politically motivated accusations, demeaning Macedonians for accepting the reference as a condition for Macedonia’s admission into the UN in 1993. Was this treason or some kind of irresponsibility on the part of the Macedonian leadership? Let’s say, right at the outset, that what took place in the UN was not the Macedonian leadership’s doing and such accusations are baseless and only serve to further deepen the divisions among the Macedonian people!

9.1. News that a fully independent modern Macedonian state was about to emerge from the Yugoslav breakup had caused some
alarm in the region. In August 1988 Greece was first to take measures to rename its “Northern Territories” to “Macedonia and Thrace”. This was done by decree issued by the then Greek Prime Minister. Of the 13 administrative districts in the country, three were renamed. The new names given were “Western Macedonia”, “Central Macedonia” and “Eastern Macedonia and Thrace”. This was the first time ever that Greece officially used the name “Macedonia”. Use of the word “Macedonia” was practically forbidden in Greece because it was associated with the Macedonians living there, who, as a minority in Greece, have never been recognized and since Greece’s acquisition of Macedonian territories in 1913, have been subjected to continuous oppression, abuse and several genocides. Greece understood that a discernible independent Macedonian state would inevitably affirm the Macedonians as a distinct people with their own language, culture and traditions... And, as it had done in the past, Greece did everything in its power not to allow a Macedonian state to emerge. And by renaming some of its districts to “Macedonia”, Greece made it clear that the name “Macedonia” belonged exclusively to Greece and no one else (i.e. Macedonia) had the right to use it.

9.2. In other words, it was not the name that was a problem for Greece - it was the people. So, right from the start the “existence of Macedonians” was a problem for Greece. But how could Greece openly challenge this problem without revealing its real motive and being accused of human rights violations? It used the next best thing and focused its objections on the country’s name instead. Because the real culprits behind Greece, as we have seen from our research, bearing their full weight, were first the U.S.A., then France, Germany, Great Britain... This was a coordinated effort with Greece visibly standing in the fore…

9.3. Left alone, and with all those wars raging on the territory of former Yugoslavia, Macedonia had no room to manoeuver. Washington, Paris, Berlin, London... all had sent Macedonia a crystal clear message: “If you want to join the United Nations, whose membership will open access to the IMF, the World Bank… you cannot do that with your Constitutional name. If you stay out of the UN then you will shoulder the responsibility for
your people being isolated and all alone.” It was hard to imagine a greater threat of blackmail than this. Macedonia was already impoverished by the huge inflation generated by Belgrade. On top of that it lost the market it shared with the Yugoslav federation. It had insufficient production of energy and was depending heavily on imports from the outside. The biggest problem was the shortage of foreign currency to pay to import oil. Total state reserves were less than 30 million US dollars, not enough to pay the oil bill for three months. At the same time because of the illegal Greek embargo on one side and the UN sanctions on Serbia on the other, the northern and southern border were blocked making export and import impossible.

9.4. Macedonia was left with little choice. The main international actors were determined not to allow Macedonia’s integration into the international scene. Given the circumstances, the question was not whether but how long Macedonia was going to last? Many figured weeks or perhaps several months maximum; certainly not years. At the same time Macedonia’s neighbours were discussing plans for its division... In such circumstances the normal thing to do was to look for an easier way out because the alternative would have been complete collapse.

9.5. Macedonia’s admission to the UN was illegally implemented with suspension of its Constitutional and historic name. Instead a temporary reference – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – was imposed. Macedonia never accepted or recognized the reference and never signed any documents with it. Macedonia never used the reference itself but simply swallowed it as it had no other choice. The reference does not oblige Macedonia in any way. This is a fact which must be constantly emphasized. Macedonia could not prohibit others from using the reference since this is how our country was registered in the UN. However we do have the right and it is our obligation to intervene each time the reference is used and to explain to people that it is an illegal reference imposed on the Macedonian people... and that our historical and constitutional name is and always will be Macedonia. If we keep silent and don’t intervene people will use the reference in ignorance thinking that it is our name, which we
chose for ourselves. We must do our best to not allow its use in anything. It is our joint responsibility to stop its use.

9.5.1. Our Macedonian diplomats in New York and Brussels (NATO and EU), after Macedonia’s admission to the UN, made a huge unpardonable error by allowing the reference to take widespread use, which is not only offensive to the Macedonian people but it has plunged our country into a bogus dispute. We literally walked into a Greek trap with our eyes wide open because the decision of the UNSC was that the reference be used only within the UN system.

When tackling this problem our diplomats abroad demonstrated diplomatic and political amateurism. They did not need any instruction to defend fundamental state interests.

9.6. We will now take a look at Macedonia, comparing its situation in the early 1990’s and today (2013) in order to fully understand why some things, including the reference, were tolerated.

9.6.1. In that respect there are no major changes looking at Macedonia from the outside. Like before, Macedonia today is open to the same heavy pressures, blockades and blackmail it was exposed to two decades earlier when it was trying to join the UN. Today Macedonia is pressured with the same ultimatums to change its name and give up its Macedonian ethnic identity in order to join NATO and the EU. But Macedonia today is not the same Macedonia that it was in 1993. If Macedonia continues on the same economic course that it is on today, it can hold out for the next 100 years without having to join NATO or the EU. Macedonia’s long-term interest is to join them but not at any cost. The situation in 1993 was completely different and much worse for the country.

9.6.2. As mentioned earlier, from an internal perspective things today are radically different in Macedonia than they were two decades ago. Macedonia is moving forward. The country’s economy is functioning relatively well despite the severe crisis that is shaking up the world. The foreign currency reserves are
high, several billion euros… Macedonia has sufficient manoeuvering space to move forward and even to say “no” to outside pressures pushing it to change its name. Today Macedonia can say “No thank you!” something it could not afford to say in the 1990’s without consequences. Macedonia had no such options in those days because its survival as a state was seriously challenged. At that time Greece and many others, including some of the major global players, did not expect the country to survive. Now it is clear that Macedonia is here to stay and the Macedonian people are working hard to keep it that way, despite all the challenges it is still facing.

9.7. Macedonians are not proud that they were forced to swallow the name dispute and the imposed reference. In fact they were insulted and feel bitter about the whole experience! The New York experience was not only a major setback for the Macedonian people; it was an injustice to humanity and decency! It was an attack on global justice and democracy! It was a severe disregard for International Law. And these things were not done by rogue nations or dictatorial powers, they were perpetrated by states that call themselves democracies… the U.S., France, UK, Germany… They committed illegal acts in flagrant violation of the UN Charter of Rights. They took a helpless fledgling nation and, at its weakest moment, tortured it with intentions of extinguishing the life out of it. Why? Macedonia had no role in anything that was happening around it; not in the wars and not in Balkan politics. Why did these powerful states want to extinguish it? Macedonians should examine the facts and see the truth for what it really is and stop blaming each other for what happened to them in those critical times. The Macedonian leaders did what they had to do in order to survive. Their choices were limited because Macedonia was a victim of unscrupulous and dishonest Major Power manipulation, perpetrated purely for self-interest. Acceptance of the “real-politic” was probably the only move they could have made to assure the survival of our state. Everything else included unacceptable risk. Macedonia’s existence today is the best proof that the moves made then were the correct ones. In spite of all the obstacles placed before us, we not only survived but today we are thriving; exceeding all expectations.
Any attempts made to stay completely out of the UN in 1993 would have been dangerous for Macedonia no matter how we look at it. That, however, does not mean that, had we been a bit more persistent and stubborn, we wouldn’t have gotten some gains out of it? Macedonia had no idea and could not have guessed how far it was going to be pushed by the main factors leading its case. Perhaps one day, when the archives with all these secrets are opened, we will find out. Looking at the situation from today’s point of view we should stop arguing and have no doubt that in 1993 we acted reasonably and responsibly.

9.8. Looking at the situation from the outside in, today, like yesterday, the same factors are treating us no differently. The same forces a) ignore the Copenhagen Criteria which they themselves have implemented, b) ignore the judgment of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, c) are using force against all democratic rules and principles, just to prevent Macedonia from joining NATO and the EU, d) work, again and again, outside of international legal limits... in order to “rename” Macedonia... What does this tell us? It tells us that there is incredible concentrated effort, primarily by the U.S., of countries to attain their own regional aspirations at Macedonia’s expense. There is little that they will not do to achieve their goals. However, if 20 years ago we could not resist their will, today we can but it is certainly not going to be easy. It is no joke going against the will of superpowers. Our main weaknesses are a) the largest domestic opposition party has a slender spine and is ready to bend to outside pressure, and b) Albanian aspirations for a “Greater Albania”. Albanian leaders are ready to solve their “Albanian national question” which is not only supported by the U.S. but it is internally managed directly by Washington.

B. The mediation process

10. The UNSC Resolution 817/93, by which Macedonia was admitted to the UN, asked for mediation designed “to overcome the differences over the name of the state and to encourage confidence-building measures between the parties”. There is very little doubt that Washington was behind putting first Vance and later Nimetz in charge of the mediation process, which shows
that the Americans were extremely interested in the outcome of this dispute. There are many indicators that point to the mediators as being only formally under UN patronage, and they were actually extended arms of the State Department, through which the U.S. implements its own policy towards Macedonia.

First, both Vance and Nimetz were top State Department people with their base and logistics located in the U.S. where they are still stationed to this day.

Second, from March 1994 to November 1997, while Vance was mediator, Matthew Nimetz was special envoy to U.S. President Bill Clinton in the mediation process, regarding Macedonia’s name.

Third, if it was really a problem between Macedonia and Greece then why did the American President need a special envoy to monitor it? Why was the United States so interested in this dispute? It was still between two neighbours, which did not put into question the safety of the two countries involved or the wider region, let alone the U.S.? If Washington did not have secret strategic interests in the Balkans, in which unfortunately Macedonia was embroiled, the American president would not have had a need for a special envoy in the mediation! There are all kinds of conflicts and disputes going on around the world every day without American president’s “special envoys” or the U.S. being directly involved. Why was it so closely involved in Macedonian affairs if it didn’t have interests in Macedonia? Which means…?

Fourth, in November 1997, the UN Secretary-General appointed Nimetz as Cyrus Vance’s deputy and when Vance resigned in 1999 Nimetz became special envoy. This shows that the mediation process between Macedonia and Greece, conducted on behalf of the UN, was actually in the hands of Washington all the time. Could this be only a coincidence? Do Americans get involved in other people’s affairs unless it serves U.S. interests? Do the Americans ever appoint special envoys in matters that don’t relate to their specific needs and plans? Records show that Americans don’t get involved unless it serves their interests!
Twenty years or so later we still get the same result, which confirms that this is all part of the same scenario, part of the same Balkan regional U.S. anti-Macedonian foreign policy.

Years ago, at the OSCE summit in Vienna, the United States insisted that an American be assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina but the EU wanted the person to be a European, so the meeting ended without an agreement. A few months later there was a news release naming an American as functionary in Bosnia and Herzegovina! When the United States wants something and it is in its interests to get it, it will do anything, including ignoring international law, agreements, democratic principles, procedures, practices and even justice… to succeed.

Why would they act any differently about our name?

Fifth, Nimetz was a lawyer working for a law firm and, as a mediator, he was working alone. He did not have a team but the UN legal services were at his disposal. Now if he truly used the UN legal services, would it have been possible that UN experts would have advised him and guided him to illegally widen his mandate, on account of Macedonia’s fundamental interests, that practically was happening all these long years? There is no UN requirement that forces a country to change its name, rename its language and to erase the true identity of its people! There was no such thing written in the UN Security Council resolutions either. If Nimetz is an expert and an independent mediator who is trying to find a “just” solution to the dispute and if he indeed was pushed by his UN advisors into the forbidden and prohibited zone, then why did he listen to them? Why follow their advice? And if the UN experts did not supply him with his logistics then who did? Saying that his proposed solutions to the problem came of his own invention, is pure fantasy. He does not have the capacity to do that and he wouldn’t dare do it on his own, as well. He is well aware that his responsibility is huge. The fate and the future of an entire country are in his hands; not to mention the peace and stability of the entire region.

Sixth, although the problem, formally, is the responsibility of the UN, there is no budget for Nimetz. The function that Nimetz
performs, on behalf of the UN Secretary General, is practically voluntary. His salary is symbolic, $1.00 a year. There are several explanations as to why this is: a) to minimize UN interference in his work, b) for the UN not to call into question his terms, and c) for the UN not to require regular reports of the achievements of the mediation. If the UN had to allocate annual funding for Nimetz’s work then his work would come under constant UN scrutiny. No UN funding, no UN poking its nose into his business! If the UN is not the real manager of the dispute then who is? The real manager of the dispute is the U.S., which has carte blanche to do whatever it wants. The question that remains open here is not whether Nimetz is being paid for his services, but who is paying for them? And, of course, who is paying for the experts that prepare his proposals? And whoever is paying - is his real boss. Even though Nimetz spends little time in his “mediation” role, someone is paying for it. And nothing comes for free in the United States.

Seventh, because of such financial arrangements, i.e. not being financially obligated to the UN, Nimetz was not obligated to send the UN Secretary-General regular progress reports. Normally, when the Secretary-General met with the Macedonian representatives Nimetz only informed him on current developments and that was it. Someone else paid his expenses and dealt with the headaches associated with the process. It cost the UN nothing… No money and no headaches…

Eighth, the fact the Nimetz delivered proposals that were absolutely unacceptable to the Macedonian side, or to others, proposals that were well-aligned with American interests, which were in turn perfectly aligned with those of Greece, certainly explains who Nimetz’s boss was. Every proposal Nimetz offered was fully compatible with American policy towards Macedonia and the wider region. Who else then, if not the U.S., guided and encouraged Nimetz to spread his mandate and call into question the Macedonian people’s national identity and their language?

Ninth, the simplest logic compels us to believe that the architect of Nimetz’s proposals was none other than Washington. Either the State Department or possibly a panel of experts were
appointed and paid for by it! What other plausible explanation is there?

C. There are no negotiations taking place in New York

11. The terminology we use to describe this basic problem which involves the future of our state is embracing. The vocabulary we use hardly describes the issue or at minimum describes it incorrectly. In the beginning all politicians called it “negotiations”! Now only a handful of so-called “experts” and frequently journalists call the mediation process in New York “negotiations”. Fortunately there are no “negotiations” taking place and there never were. Who in fact can, or is given the authority to “negotiate” the name of the state which is immortalized in the Constitution?

11.1. Without going into too much detail, we would like to emphasize that a) there was no mention of the term “negotiations” in the UN Security Council documents. Who could compel a sovereign state to negotiate its own historic and constitutional name with another state? The language used in the UN Security Council document was “to encourage the parties to continue to cooperate” to “achieve a quick resolution to their differences”; b) at issue here is the classic mediation process. The question must be closed the same way it was opened – on a multilateral level. The solution does not depend on a bilateral agreement between the parties involved; c) both sides have delegated representatives who in diplomatic circles are called “liaison officers”. Being in charge of the process and proposals, the mediator communicates through them with the two governments; d) the mediator, through them, filters his ideas and tries to come up with a proposal that would be acceptable to both sides; e) the “liaison officers” (on the Macedonian side represent Macedonia’s President) take those ideas to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and wait for a response. When they receive a response they take it back to the mediator. And here their role ends; and f) the mediator assesses received information and tries to formulate an acceptable proposal for both sides…
And this is what has been happening in New York for almost 25 years…

11.2. Those who consistently speak of “negotiations” and “negotiators” owe an explanation: a) who is negotiating with whom? b) are the liaison officers negotiating with Nimetz, or among themselves? If it is both then it is some kind of trilateral deal, not mediation; c) if they have indeed “negotiated” something then what have they “agreed” on? d) if the “negotiators” are “negotiating”, then why does Nimetz come up with proposals that are usually unacceptable to both governments? Who is responsible for that? The “negotiators”? Nimetz …? Who? Following the logic of how things work, if someone is negotiating something and brings home a resolution that does not correspond to the interests of his or her country, then that resolution will be immediately revoked and, if necessary, the party making the decision will be punished; e) If the “negotiators” “negotiate” then how is it possible that they don’t know what Nimetz is going to offer? If they “negotiated” something and presumably “agreed” to that, how then did the “negotiators” not know what that “something” was? Does Nimetz disregard their “agreement” and surprises them with his own proposal? f) whose suggestions did Nimetz put forward, theirs, his, or someone else’s? If the liaison officers “negotiated” something then that something must be what is offered by Nimetz, not something else! g) in order to “negotiate” at an international level, a previously prepared and agreed upon platform for the “negotiations” must be put in place at home. This is an old and obligatory practice used by countries which are serious and committed when entering such a process. Otherwise everything would be done irresponsibly, unprofessionally and ultimately illegally, which will be harmful to the country. Is there proper protocol applied in these so-called “negotiations”?

There are more questions to be asked but what was put forward up to now is sufficient to show that the use of the terms “negotiation” and “negotiators” in the New York process is improper. It only shows the low political level and “professionalism” of the users.
11.2.1. That fact that it is exactly like that was proven in a statement made by Nimetz (“Dnevnik”, November 22, 2012), after a meeting in New York: “The two sides have expressed willingness to overcome the issue, I believe that it is not just rhetoric. The situation in the region requires that this problem be solved. The intermediates will bring these ideas to their governments, to see if they can be useful to go forward.” Isn’t everything crystal clear now?

11.3. Let us also not forget that this terminology serves Athens to the maximum because it puts Macedonia in a subordinate position where it has to “negotiate” its own name. More will be said about this in the Interim Accord section.

11.4. After any successful negotiating process there usually is the signing of an agreement between the parties involved. This is also not in Macedonia’s interest. This process, for us, has a multilateral character and this is how it must remain to the end. The process works the opposite for Athens. Athens wants a multilateral solution, as she has a stronger international position, but will finalize it with a bilateral agreement in order to impose its interests.

D. An agreement with Greece is not only impossible but absolutely unnecessary

12. At first glance, hidden in Nimetz’s mediation process is a minor but serious and extremely important segment of American policy towards Macedonia. It is the persistent insistence that any solution found to the problem must have direct agreement from Greece, which is utterly unacceptable to Macedonia. Macedonia has no problem with its own name and therefore has no need of such an agreement, nor was such an agreement a requirement in the UN Security Council documents.

12.1. If Macedonia were to enter into a bilateral agreement with Greece, then every outstanding issue on both sides must be addressed and resolved. One of the greatest outstanding issues is the situation of the Macedonian people living in Greece. The
rights, not only of those Macedonians living inside Greece but of all those exiled and their properties confiscated since 1913 must be addressed... And that’s only one issue... It seems that no one, least of all Greece, cares about issues that are important to Macedonia. So it goes to show that this one-sided problem has only been concocted in order to exterminate Macedonia, not to help her overcome age-old issues created by Greece.

That is why this entire process must end where it started: at the UN Security Council.

If a final agreement with Greece is signed, covering only a solution to our name, ipso facto, it will mean that all other outstanding issues between the two countries simply – do not exist. That is how it works in diplomatic practice. In other words, if we don’t manage this process properly we could end up losing out on all outstanding issues that Macedonia has with Greece. It would mean that there is no Macedonian national minority living in Greece, that there is no problem with the rights of Macedonians exiled from Greece...

Therefore, under no circumstances we should sign such a one-sided agreement with Greece.

12.2. Even though it will be very difficult, better to say impossible, to get the desired results, we still need to participate in a mediation process. A solution should and must be sought only through a multilateral process and never bilaterally. From the outset, this problem had been internationalized by Washington and Athens because it suited them that way. The US and Greece together have more clout in tackling the problem and at the same time Greece is avoiding being fingered as the main culprit in this issue. This way, from the very beginning, the dispute lost its bilateral character and became the subject of many multilateral bodies. First the EC, then the UN... and more recently NATO and the EU...

12.3. However, after the Americans achieved what they set out to do on the international scene (suspending Macedonia’s name and imposing a reference in the UN, blackmailing and blockading her...
entry into NATO and the EU...), effectively after Macedonia was crippled, Washington decided that the country, once again, has to look for a bilateral solution - with Greece. So, Athens again has a leading role ready to impose its aspirations. At the beginning, having wide international support, Greece was stronger on a multilateral level. Now they are much better positioned if Macedonia has to search for a solution and tries to sign an agreement with – Athens! Nowhere is Macedonia at greater disadvantage than there.

The well-orchestrated U.S. policy towards Macedonia has come to the fore. American insistence on Macedonia signing the Interim Accord in 1995, among other things, paved the way for signing future and perhaps the final agreement with Greece, which Macedonia cannot afford to sign. No such demands, however, have ever been made on Macedonia by the UN Security Council in any of its documents. According to the Security Council, the problem was opened by the Security Council and therefore it should be closed by the Security Council.

12.3.1. As we have said earlier, the Interim Accord with Greece has no organic connection to the UN Security Council resolution for admitting Macedonia into the UN. It is purely a bilateral agreement, even though it is connected to the same issue. The logic is clear – after a temporary agreement a final agreement must follow! In the analysis of the agreement, which will be provided later in this text, it is not foreseen in this dimension of the Interim Accord – Macedonia’s obligation to sign a final agreement with Greece. The fact that the U.S. is insisting on a final agreement with Athens was confirmed by Nimetz in an interview that he gave to Voice of America before the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest (details to follow later) when he announced that the Interim Accord no longer applied and a new agreement was required.

12.3.2. The Interim Accord is an American diplomatic vision, which has taken the UN Security Council resolution out of place and settled Macedonia with new and difficult commitments! It opened the way for Macedonia to be obliged to negotiate with Greece, which is utterly unnecessary and insulting for the
country. To negotiate about what? About Macedonia’s own name?! To ask for permission when, where and how to use its own name? Obviously, the idea is for Macedonia to willingly capitulate!?

12.4. The aim of a permanent agreement with Greece may have a dual purpose, a) to force Macedonia into a humiliating situation where it accepts the unacceptable, and or to b) put Macedonia into a deadlock because Athens will not yield to anything that Macedonia wants. There is no doubt that an agreement with Athens is not possible. The only way Greece will agree to anything is if Macedonia is willing to capitulate. Is that what the U.S. really wants and is that why it is playing that card?

12.5. In continuing the mediation process, our efforts should now be concentrated on putting the talks under the UN Security Council mandate. We should not allow any more excursions to take place outside of it, as was the case for many years. As was the case with Nimetz’s final draft which he produced in April 2013, for which he had no authority. Such indecent proposals we should ignore or tear apart immediately. If we don’t do that it would mean that we accept discussions for our own elimination as a nation.

12.6. In the near future our goal should be to convince the mediator to conclude that attempts to “overcome our difference” with Greece, regarding the name of our state, have failed despite 20 years of trying and persistent effort. When this is done, and I am sure Washington will not agree, Nimetz, nonetheless, will have to inform the UN Secretary General and tell him that the ball is now in his court. And such a development would be most beneficial for Macedonia.

12.6.1. In parallel, while we are convincing the mediator to end the process, we have to go back to the United Nations and initiate new procedures to register our official, constitutional and historical name, which the old process illegally denied us. First, we have to come up with a precise strategy for this, supported by facts and arguments of which we have plenty. In this strategy, among other things, we must emphasize exactly what the UN
Security Council’s Resolution 817/93 directed us to do: “…difference should be resolved in order to preserve the peace and good neighbourly relations in the region…” which to this day has been done without our difference being resolved. In spite of the “difference”, peace in the region has not been disrupted in the last 20 years. The “difference” was not resolved either and it does not look like it will be resolved anytime soon. As far as neighbourly relations are concerned, if “relations” are measured by one state challenging another state’s name while ignoring the people, then Greece is absolutely a terrible neighbour. Not Macedonia.

12.7. We promised the UN that we will “cooperate with the mediator to get a quick resolution in order to overcome the differences on the name of the state”. This in no way implied that we needed to have an agreement with Athens. The “difference” can and must be overcome by another means without an agreement. It can be done by a new UN Security Council resolution. There are hidden dangers in that procedure also, but for Macedonia it is much worse when Greece is involved in the process. Being forced into an agreement with Athens puts us in an inferior position. If there is no agreement with Athens then Washington too would have no means of forcing us to change our country’s name, which for them is far worse than bridging the “difference”. There is no doubt that Nimetz, certainly at Washington’s request, has illegally and unjustifiably included our identity in his proposals. Under the current circumstances, Washington’s insistence on an agreement between Skopje and Athens does nothing else but add pressure on Macedonia to capitulate or to start waving a white flag. There is no third option.

12.8. The U.S. is absolutely aware that an agreement with Greece, which would incorporate minimum Macedonian interests, is not a realistic option. Athens will never agree to anything less than erasing the Macedonian people and removing them from the global ranking of nations. Greece will not be content with just renaming our country and Washington knows that very well. Renaming Macedonia is no gain for Greece if the Macedonian nation “survives”. If the U.S. is well aware of this, and it certainly is, then why do they insist on Macedonia’s
agreement with Greece? How can we agree with Greece? To accept capitulation? To eradicate our own nation?

12.9. For anyone, including the UN and the U.S., emphasizing that Macedonia must seek a solution through an agreement between Skopje and Athens is absurd, counterproductive and places Macedonia at a great disadvantage. There is no requirement from the UN Security Council for Macedonia to have an “agreement” with Greece, so why look for one? We could have had such an alternative but before the country’s name was suspended at the UN putting Macedonia in a totally unequal position. Before we could consider different ways to look for a solution. Only then could we sign a bilateral agreement with Greece in which all open issues that really exist between the two countries would be included. Also, an arbitrator could then be invited and proceed like Croatia and Slovenia did, or even take the case to The Hague. As things are today, there is no way we can work on an equal footing with Greece because we are held hostage, blockaded and blackmailed by NATO, EU… Now, forced to search for understanding in Athens, Macedonia is being left without options and sacrificed for the interests of others. Is that the kind of democracy favoured by Washington and Brussels? There are rules, procedures and principles even in politics, like there are in boxing for example. Boxers box by category; those are the rules. No heavyweight is allowed to box with a lightweight because we all know what the outcome will be well in advance. The rules, it seems, don’t apply when it comes to Macedonia. Macedonia, being illegally handicapped, cannot be forced to negotiate the survival of the country and the nation with somebody who is not touched by the problem, not interested in its solution and a privileged user of wide, unprincipled international support.

12.10. Washington’s insistence on “agreeing” with Athens has placed us in a precarious position where we have to beg for mercy from the torturer.

12.11. So it seems that our “partners” or those who we perceive to be our “partners” are pushing us into self-destruction… for us to crash and burn… at the hands of Athens who can’t wait to see
us disappear. And as long as we are here the U.S. will do anything in its power to help Greece achieve its greater aspirations; see our country crash and burn and the Macedonian people disappear from the face of this earth. And that, my friends, today is America’s real-politic towards Macedonia.

12.12. In the end, what is interesting about all this is the fact that Washington has no clear stance on the Greek position in the dispute. Washington, it seems, supports Greece for no apparent reason. The Americans insist that we “find a name” and that we make some “tough decisions”... (Reeker), but never once have they mentioned what the other side (Greece) is expected to do, if anything. The fact is, however, that Washington wants to achieve this goal differently than Greece. While Athens insists on an instant solution immediately with erga omnes, Washington offers bait on a hook: “a new name for external use as a substitute for the reference”! This too is erga omnes but in stages and with a slight delay. But then, a few years or so later, it will become erga omnes because we will need to change our passports, customs documents and a whole slew of other things... and in the end, our Constitution. And as such, we will be renaming ourselves step by step.

But by now it should be clear to everyone that whoever supports Greece holds the idea of sacrificing Macedonia and the Macedonian people. Why else would Washington publicly advocate for Macedonia to change its name, intending that the Macedonian people would have to abandon their identity?

E. Could the name issue have been resolved in the early 1990s?

13. Some time ago a thesis was launched that implied that it was possible to solve Macedonia’s name problem in a favourable manner in the early 1990’s and it was possible for Macedonia to have smoothly joined the UN. One of the main advocates of this thesis was Denko Maleski, first foreign minister of an independent Macedonia. As undersecretary, I worked with Maleski in the then Ministry of Foreign Relations for about a
year or so. There was no Deputy-Minister, meaning that I was second in line, after the Minister.

13.1. There is no doubt that Maleski was involved (though not completely) in the events of our country’s foreign policy of that time and his testimonies undeniably carry considerable weight. However, the main role was played by Gligorov, who controlled all levers of foreign policy by his own hands. The duty of the minister then was to strictly carry out Gligorov’s instructions. However, regardless of what Maleski claims, his ideas, given the circumstances, have no merit.

13.1.1. Speaking to the media, Maleski, many times reiterated that in 1992 there were other options open to Macedonia to join the UN. Maleski claims British Prime Minister John Major, at a meeting in Downing Street, proposed that we use the name Republic of Macedonia (Skopje). Source: Utrinski, April 9, 2013, story devoted to the 20th anniversary since Macedonia’s accession to the UN. This time, as he did other times, Maleski conveyed to the media that he believed that the U.S.A. stood behind Major’s proposal.

In a column published in “Utrinski” on June 5th and 6th, 2004, Maleski claimed that John Major’s message was for us to accept the addendum (Skopje)… “Then they (Britain) and the U.S. will issue a joint declaration in which they will conclude that the problem was solved”!? “Ride the wave and solve the problem now while the tide is high because the great powers will lose interest in your problem,” was supposedly the message from the British!?

13.1.2. However, in his book “Bebeto od Katran”, Maleski, while describing the meeting he and Gligorov had with Major in Downing Street, in London on September 3, 1992, does not mention anything about the U.S. From his and Gligorov’s conversation with Major, documented in great detail on pages 405 to 409 in his book, there is nothing conclusive that would suggest that there were “other options” available. The fact is that Major proposed that we immediately change our country’s name to “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” because he said “it would
have increased our chances of joining the UN”. (This is more proof that Macedonia’s admission to the UN was blocked!) Major said that without this change “it would be difficult for your friends to help you”. When Gligorov asked what Great Britain’s position was on this matter, Major openly said: “I can not give you a definite answer!” He then added: “The EC cannot reach a consensus because Greece will not agree to anything”. Major frankly admitted that: “I am afraid that the same will happen even with any compromise you offer!” So, according to Maleski’s own notes, Macedonia would have been blocked no matter what alternatives it was prepared to offer. When Gligorov insisted that Major give him an answer, Major said: “If you accept the name with ‘Skopje’ then you will give us a chance to help you”. When Gligorov asked for guarantees, Major clearly said that he could not guarantee anything. Major’s last words ended with: “I can understand your reluctance to change the name of your country!”

Where Maleski found these “other options” is not clear.

Maleski not only does not mention the U.S. in his book but obviously has pulled this other information of some sort of joint US-British declaration on our behalf, from his sleeve! And to those who have firsthand information about this it is clear that such a thing in diplomacy is unthinkable! Titans don’t stick their noses in tiny waters. It is hard to believe that Maleski thought that if we accepted the addendum (Skopje), Athens would be placated? Such a thing neither was, is, nor will be possible under current circumstances.

Only Maleski knows why there is such a vast difference between what he wrote in his book and what he wrote for the column. And about some “other options” that he spoke about he will have to explain what he means by those himself.

Speaking of the column, Maleski made another unforgivable mistake when he concluded that: “In the general euphoria, let us not forget that over the last few decades Macedonia’s constitutional name has been changed three times; People’s Republic of Macedonia, Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the
Republic of Macedonia, while our identity has remained unquestioned"!

How is it possible that a professor of international law, without regards that he was a foreign minister or not, did not know that we did not change the name of our state, which has always been Macedonia, and that only references were added to reflect its current political status which has no connection to its name? We today will have no problem calling our state “Democratic Republic of Macedonia” or “Parliamentary Republic of Macedonia”... and thus the problem is solved. That, however, has nothing to do with the identity of the people, the language...

But these possible and acceptable changes to us are not acceptable to Washington, Brussels, Athens... Because they do not achieve their goals! Because they do not take into consideration changes to the Macedonian people’s identity, which is at the core of this problem.

13.1.3. With the addendum (Skopje) we were expected to unilaterally concede, as a gesture of goodwill, without getting anything in return, which in diplomacy rarely, if ever, happens at all. Major suggested that we voluntarily make a change to our name and accept the consequences at own expense just to attempt to join the UN... with no guarantees... But before we changed our name we would have to change our Constitution, which enshrined the name of our state. Was Major expecting Gligorov to act on his own in this regard? And who had the authority to arbitrarily change the Constitution without committing a crime. Taking such a step was unimaginable back in Macedonia.

At minimum it would have been an unpardonable mistake to accept Major’s suggestion which was not even a formal proposal. During the Edinburgh Summit in December of the same year (1992) Athens rejected an identical proposal made by Robin O’Neill without even giving it a second thought. Thus it would be only logical to assume that Major was not aware that our problems with Greece were much deeper than our name. Major may not have been aware that Greece wanted no less than to obliterate everything Macedonian and nothing less that was
offered would have been acceptable. However, the fact is that Major, and Britain as a whole, had some sympathy for our efforts and sincerely wanted to help us. This I also confirmed through my personal experience, while I spent time in London as Ambassador (1993-1997). Unfortunately, the British too had no room to manoeuvre to do anything more for us.

13.1.4 The meeting with Major took place in September 1992, during which time Gligorov had already formally submitted our application for membership to the UN. The application was submitted at the end of July of the same year. This is another proof that Boutros Ghali did not process the application because Macedonia’s entry into the UN was blocked by somebody.

13.1.5 Ambassador Robin O’Neill was the one who came up with the idea of adding “Skopje” to the end of our name. He represented the United Kingdom while chairing the EC Presidency when he proposed this solution. O’Neill was familiar with our problems with Greece and I had several opportunities to meet with him and discuss them during his visits to Skopje in the second half of 1992. O’Neill was also supportive of our aspirations and remained a true friend of Macedonia.

13.2. So, it would appear that the necessary conditions for solving the name issue in the early 1990’s were simply not there. Then why was the government blamed for this debacle? The government was blamed because people had no understanding of what was happening behind the scenes and that Greece had already made up its mind a long time ago that it did not want a Macedonia or Macedonians to exist. The only reason this problem surfaced when it did and the way it did was because Greece was caught by surprise when Macedonia was about to declare its independence. What people also did not know and unfortunately many still are not aware of is that Greece is not alone in this… the U.S., Germany, France... are behind Greece. Many just don’t understand that the “Macedonian Question” has been reopened with the obvious intent of closing it forever. Everything else that was done was done to tie and bog down the Macedonian people and make them turn against one another. Right from the start, everything was technique and tactics well-
managed from the highest level, from the world’s only superpower, the United States itself. Let’s put it another way, if the Americans wanted to solve this problem in Macedonia’s favour, with minimum eligibility and without calling into question the identity of the Macedonian people, the problem would have been solved a long time ago and it now would have been part of history. American interests, unfortunately, were quite different from Macedonia’s.

14. The “Macedonian Question” which practically was the essence of the problem, or rather Greece’s need for Macedonia and the Macedonian people to disappear from the face of this earth, at least in those early years, were not known to the majority of European politicians. The best confirmation of this was Lord Owen’s visit to Skopje and Athens in January 1993. Owen was meeting with President Gligorov when he first heard the Macedonian story which left him incredibly optimistic. It was obvious that he had come to the wrong conclusion, assuming that the problem was with us and thought that if this was the case then he should be able to solve the problem in Athens!

Included in Lord Owen’s delegation was also renowned German Ambassador Geert Ahrens. While continuing on his way to Athens, Owen left Ahrens in Skopje. I knew Ahrens personally; we had both served in China in the early 1970s. He told me that Owen left him in Macedonia so that he could liaise with Gligorov and, through him, finalize the details of the deal that Owen was expecting to hammer out with Greece!

Of course, nothing like that ever happened. A cold shower revived Owen in Athens. The plans for meeting in Skopje were cancelled after his return from Athens. Instead of having a formal meeting in Skopje, we met him at Petrovets Airport. During the talks nothing was mentioned about why Owen had come to this region. The meeting went about as if nothing had happened in the previous few days. Our conversations had no theme! He told us nothing about what had happened in Athens. Obviously, he got the point that the problem was there and not here.

In question was not his naivety but his ignorance!

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IV – Renaming Macedonia and addressing the “Albanian national question” are two parallel processes separately coordinated by Washington - Or - The name dispute, Kosovo and the 2001 war are part of the same scenario

1. To fully understand America’s role in the Troubled Macedonian Journey to International Recognition, after the Yugoslav breakup, one would have to uncover all organic connections that exist between the so-called “name dispute” and the resolution of the “Albanian national question”. One would also have to understand American policy in the Balkans, events that took place in Kosovo in 1999 and the 2001 war in Macedonia.

2. We have already shown that Macedonia’s entry into the UN, by its official name, was denied and the name suspended from international use by the UNSC. We have also shown that all this was orchestrated by Washington. Careful analysis of the puzzle has revealed and confirmed that the denial of Macedonia’s name is closely connected and imbedded in American strategic interests in the Balkans. What we don’t know is who initiated the name issue first, Athens or Washington, but it has become quite clear that the U.S. used it as a tool to implement its regional plans in the Balkans. We have also demonstrated that, when it came to Macedonia, the U.S. was willing and prepared to violate the UN Charter of Rights, ignore the International Court of Justice ruling in The Hague, not to mention international principles and procedures, to rob our country of its name and our people of their identity...

This is how America behaves not only in Macedonia and in the Balkans but worldwide. America always exercises its global policy in its best national interests. Macedonia is only in its way because we don’t fit with its main goals. So, given America’s desires and superpower status in the world, it is only natural to conclude that American desires supercede those of Greece. So, it is only natural that the U.S.A. is using Greece to achieve its own aims. For Macedonia it is crucial to understand that the U.S.A. is the main (if not unique) factor in all efforts to rename Macedonia.
and to deprive the Macedonian people. It means that the key for the solution to the problem is in Washington, not in Athens.

3. It is extremely important for Macedonians to understand that what the Americans are looking for is not an isolated and arbitrary concession from Macedonia. In question is the realization of American interests in the region. Our name is a means for America to achieve its goals in the Balkans. The main role for American strategy is played by the Albanians. Greece and Bulgaria are just additional tools that are needed to achieve its goals. Serbia no longer has a strong role because it has already been sacrificed for other American plans.

4. Along with the name problem, and in correlation with it, runs the process for solving the “Albanian national question”. There can be no doubt that the manager of this process is none other than Washington. There can be no mistake that the U.S. used military force in order to create Kosovo as a second Albanian state. This goes to show that American interests are directly aligned with Albanian interests and the U.S.A. will do anything in its power to protect those interests even if it has to erase Macedonia and its people from the world map. So, the Americans have latched onto existing disputes, such as the one with Greece about the name, and have taken them to new heights. The name is not a problem but the Macedonian identity is. Solving the so-called “Albanian national question” heavily depends on removing the Macedonian identity, which Washington has no qualms about doing. U.S. Balkan policy heavily depends upon strengthening the Albanian position in the region. This is an important American project in the long-term which unfortunately has negative consequences for Macedonia and the Macedonian people. Not just for the Macedonian state and the Macedonian nation but also for the entire region. The first victim of this policy was Serbia. Now the U.S. is focused on Macedonia. In the long term, this American policy is absolutely contrary to Greek strategic interests, as well. Blinded by anti-Macedonian hysteria and historical emotions, Athens does not recognize those dangers.

4.1. I had an interesting personal experience during my tour as Ambassador in Tirana (1998-2002). Sometime in June 1998, I
received information that the Albanian Academy of Sciences, at the request of the country’s President, Redzhep Meidani, was preparing a platform to address the “national question”. I immediately informed the ambassadors of France, Germany, Italy... and, of course, the U.S.A. stressing that such a document was not in the interest of peace and stability in the region. Nobody reacted and the “Platform for the solution of the national Albanian question” was published in October of the same year. The document, openly or indirectly, advocated for a greater Albanian state. Or, in other words – for all Albanians to live in one state!

4.2. When he was asked what the American position on this document was, newly appointed American Ambassador Limpreht first ignored its significance. When we insisted that this document promoted a “Greater Albania”, which included territories belonging to three or four of Albania’s neighbours, Limpreht thought for a moment and said he would read it again. His final judgment was that there was nothing contentious in it and that it did not call for use of force to achieve Albanian national objectives. At that time it seemed the Americans had no problem with Albanian nationalism and extremism. But soon it became evident and proved that Washington was strongly behind it. That the “Greater Albania” project was directly supported to serve American interests in the Balkans! At that time we did not know that the U.S. was already deeply involved in secret Albanian military preparations in Kosovo and that the document was just another tool in their overall strategy.

Limpreht was assured that his judgment of the document was not correct with a special analysis prepared on three pages listing the facts of the “Platform…” leading to different conclusions. It was true that it did not directly call for using force but it was accurate as well that the aims put in the “Platform…” could not be achieved – peacefully! The very near future, the wars in Kosovo in 1999, and in Macedonia in 2001, proved who was right.

This episode clearly reveals the real U.S. policy towards Albania and the Albanians and Washington’s support of Albanian objectives and national aspirations. During the period when these
conversations were taking place, American military experts were secretly engaged in the recruitment of KLA operatives and their preparation in secret camps in Albania. Naturally, the use of force followed not only with extensive U.S. support but also with sophisticated American weapons. So, it soon became clear why the U.S.A and Ambassador Limpreht stood behind the Albanian document calling for a resolution to the Albanian National Question... This did not happen by accident; clearly it happened with American blessings. Events that followed absolutely confirmed that!

5. Washington never had any great trust in the “Slavs” in the Balkans or in the Greeks. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed turned the Albanians into a major U.S. partner. Credit for this, of course, must be given to Milosevich and his extreme policies, which took the region hostage for almost a decade. During and after Yugoslavia’s breakup, America’s main opponent was Milosevich. Albanians, on the other hand, were traditional enemies of the Serbs and were directly confronted by Milosevich. Thus, the way was now clear for a new partnership to open between the Albanians and the Americans. At the same time, the Albanians were willing to die for the realization of their dream, a “Greater Albania”, for which the Americans were more than willing to oblige them. So, with interests aligned a great partnership was in the making.

6. The U.S.A. in the Balkans was playing the Albanian people’s card and not particularly Albania’s as a country. But, even avoiding support for Albania, by supporting the Albanian people, Washington gave its direct support to Tirana which constantly advocated on behalf of all Albanian people, wherever they lived even though Tirana had no mandate, much less the right to represent Albanians outside of Albania. Albanians live in Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, southern Serbia, Greece, etc... even in the United States. The same was also practiced even by the Albanian ambassadors to Skopje. They often used unacceptable vocabulary, speaking for “Albanian territories” in Macedonia, for example, or in the name of the Albanians living in the country. Unfortunately, all these provocations were ignored by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6.1. During Albania’s 100th anniversary celebration, a six metre Albanian flag was hoisted in the village Greshnitsa, in Kichevo Region inside Macedonia, with Ahmeti’s blessings. Source: “Nova Makedonija”, November 20, 2012. The flag-raising was illegal but its purpose was to show that the Albanian celebration was possible in all so-called Albanian territories. This part of sovereign Macedonia is considered “Albanian territory” by the Albanians. According to Ahmeti: “The Albanians will not allow any daring black hand to reach for it (the six metre flag) and take it down...”

The Albanian Ambassador to Macedonia in Skopje said: “The dimensions of this unusual flag in the ‘Albanian territories’ today is an expression of respect...” If the Macedonian government could do nothing about Ahmeti, it should have at least expelled the Albanian Ambassador for making such a disrespectful comment. This, unfortunately, was not done...

6.2. Because no one in Macedonia reacted to this incident, the famous Jason Miko took it upon himself to react (“Flaw in the Framework Agreement”, “Dnevnik”, November 29, 2012). He quoted a statement made by Bujar Osmani, DUI spokesman, in which he said: “As a sign of mutual respect, all Macedonian citizens should share the Albanian joy and should not raise the question whether it is legal to fly the Albanian flag, because the Albanians will interpret it as a provocation?!?!” Ascertaining that: “You Bujar, obviously do not understand the concept of the rule of law!”

The highly respected Jason Miko was absolutely right, but no doubt everything was clear to Bujar also. The statement is an expression of DUI’s hypocritical policies; it was a severe provocation and direct insult for the Macedonians.

And nothing happened. The only conclusion is that Bujar was right!

6.3. It was common practice for Tirana and for Albanians everywhere to use the term “Albanian lands” when referring to
regions outside of Albania which is nothing less than open and classic irredentism.

7. As was already mentioned, events in Kosovo, which culminated in 1999, were secretly prepared by the U.S. and the UK special services. Their military instructors, private military companies, like the MPRI, trained the KLA (in Kosovo) military operatives in secret camps in Albania. The U.S. and the UK were instrumental in providing them with arms and ammunition. It should not be underestimated though, that the arsenal that was robbed from Albanian military depots during the chaos that took place in Albania in 1996/7, also ended up in their hands. These activities were carried out to fulfill the prerequisites of two primary American goals: a) the destruction of Milosevich and b) the unification of all Albanians.

8. Following the successful military operation in Kosovo in 1999, a brief war took place in Macedonia in 2001. There is little doubt that the war in Macedonia was deliberate, planned and started in Kosovo, which at the time was a U.S. protectorate, although formally, under UN auspices. The NLA was created and prepared by the same forces that created the Kosovo KLA. After achieving positive results in Kosovo, it was only logical that the next Albanian target would be Macedonia (and the three municipalities in Southern Serbia, which we will not discuss here). The original intent was to “liberate” the parts of Macedonia that the Albanians considered “Albanian territories”. This would have been the shortest path for achieving a “Greater Albania”. But when that plan failed, the Albanians and their supporters resorted to plan “B”. In the centre of plan “B” was the Ohrid Agreement, which was to achieve the same goal - to recompose Macedonia contrary to all world experiences and practices. Where a minority would be elevated to the status of ethnic community and Macedonia would become a pluralistic society and divided more than ever before. Means were created where the majority could be manipulated, paving the way for the state’s gradual destruction. Ethnicities were institutionalized and with that, in place of overcoming the divisions, they were cemented in the Constitution. The achieved concessions, however, are a temporary solution. So, the questions were – what
the next step would be and, of course, what kind of final solution should be expected?

9. The independence of Kosovo was the decisive step towards the creation of a so-called “Greater Albania”. After separating Kosovo from Serbia, the question was no longer if, but when this project would be completed? By “liberating” Kosovo and creating a second Albanian state, 70% of the total project was already completed. The next step was to tackle the “liberation of Albanian lands” from Macedonia. The three municipalities in Southern Serbia and the four in Montenegro were of less importance. And, for now, liberating Chamiria from Greece was not in the plan.

10. The concept of a “Greater Albania” is not “imaginary” as some want to assert. The dream of all Albanians living together in a single state is not a pipe dream. It is enshrined in the preamble of the Albanian Constitution and it is in its advanced stages of implementation. Pandeli Maiko, Former Albanian Prime Minister, in a TV interview in Tirana, at the beginning of the new millennium, clearly stated that: “The process has been initiated and is now irreversible”. Many Albanians in Albania share this opinion, including political, scientific and intellectual elites. In the period from 1998 to 2002, over 100 top Albanian elites were asked the question of what a “Greater Albania” means to them. Only Gramos Pashko, Vice President in the first Berisha government, after the democratization of Albania, now deceased, said that it was a meaningless pipe dream. None of the others rejected the concept as impractical. The explanations given, in general, were not brilliant, sound and precise but the term itself was not questioned. Nobody had a clear idea of what it really meant but no one was also distanced from it.

11. During the celebration of Albania’s 100th anniversary, at the end of 2012, Albanian Prime Minister Berisha used the occasion, while speaking in Valona, Albania, to remind everyone that (Greater) Albania’s borders are from Preveza in Greece, to Presho in Serbia, and from Skopje to Podgoritsa in Montenegro (“Nova Makedonija”, 28.11.2012). Even though his statements
challenged the territorial integrity of four sovereign states, no one reacted.

11.1. A series of nationalistic provocations followed, originating in Tirana. They are no doubt the result of Albanians achieving a number of successes in the region and now they feel the need to put their demands forward. A culmination was recently reached when an illegal Albanian monument was removed from the centre in Preshevo, Serbia. To this Berisha responded with the words: “This shows that Serbia is a racist country” and that “one day ethnic Albanians will unite in one country in the Balkans”, and that “this act proved once again that there is only one way that the Albanian people can enjoy their freedom, which they have acquired with their blood and that is by the unification of the Albanian people!” (“Dnevnik” 21.01.2013)

12. The “Greater Albania” project was masterfully run right from the start. Activities on the project intensified sometime in the 1960’s, in Kosovo, and culminated (but not finished) with Kosovo’s independence. Everything done to this day (2013) was done without any technical, tactical, or strategic errors. The project progressed at a slow pace, millimetre by millimetre, and eventually reached its main goal - independence. Tirana played a role in all this; there should be no doubt about it. However, although the Albanian state was established in 1912, it lacked the statesmanship and necessary experience to do this. The Albanians in Tirana definitely lacked the capability to manage such a process and so did the Albanians in Kosovo. So the question is, who and from where were the strings pulled? The answer is yet to be determined. For now we can only say that, with little doubt, in the period after the Yugoslav disintegration, this process was managed by the USA.

12.1. The Albanians, all these years, did not work on these plans alone. This is confirmed by a small but concrete example. There is no question that the well-known American analyst and activist Janos Bugaiski is a major Albanian lobbyist. Sometime in the early 2000’s he participated in a regional conference in Tirana. Manifestations in his vocabulary, although disguised, advocated for a greater Albanian outcome in the region. It was a
provocation to find out who financed Bugaiski’s trip to Tirana for this particular conference? It was confirmed that the American Embassy in Tirana covered his expenses! Would the Americans have been willing to pay for someone with whose views they did not agree?

13. Milosevich, in his tribulations, not only crippled Serbia but also turned the Balkans into a victim of violent American policies, including the policy to solve the “Albanian national question” by force. In its attempts to impose its own interests in the Balkans, the United States has blocked all positive regional processes. Up to date the collateral damage has been Serbia and Macedonia and indirectly Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the future, without a doubt, U.S policies will also prove extremely harmful to Greek interests.

13.1. In regards to Macedonia, this American policy began by blocking Macedonia’s recognition in the early 1990’s and reached its peak during the Kosovo crisis and the 2001 war in Macedonia. Had the crisis in Kosovo not taken place, the 2001 war in Macedonia would have been unthinkable. In fact, the war in Macedonia was a continuation of the Kosovo war, with the sole aim to finalize the “Greater Albania” project.

14. The “Greater Albania” project is not only alive and well but is reaching fruition. In order to complete the entire project, which means liberating Macedonian territories, it is absolutely essential for the Albanian nationalists to rename Macedonia and the Macedonian people. It would definitely solve “the Albanian national question” and pave the way for the unification of (almost) all Albanians.

14.1. Up until now, for purely tactical reasons, the Albanians in Macedonia have not been much involved in resolving the so-called “name dispute”. They were waiting for others to build up the case. Now, however, Ali Ahmeti, under the American umbrella, has launched an international offensive trying to search for a solution. So, very soon, we can expect that Albanians in the country will put their real requests on the table. Similar to what Bulgaria did in December 2012. This means that pressure from
these sources will mount and grow. Ahmeti will push Macedonia to join NATO and the EU as quickly as possible, which means it must change its name. With his political pamphlet “It’s time to join NATO” (“Dnevnik”, April 13, 2013), published right after the local elections, after Kichevo was albanized, which Ali Ahmeti confirmed. He did this, no doubt, in coordination with Washington where the regional scenario had been planned. There is a strong impression that the published text, which looked like a political manifesto, was probably not even formulated by Ahmeti’s party.

14.2. Our assumptions above have been confirmed by DUI spokesman Bujar Osmani, in an interview given for “Utrinski Vesnik” dated July 14, 2013 in which he said: “Two months ago, after returning from the U.S.A., Ahmeti announced that in June a public debate must be opened in Macedonia and in the region regarding the problem with the name. And that is exactly what he did. That it was done in Sofia, where he was visiting, is purely a coincidence”! Any doubt that this was coordinated between DUI and the U.S., from where Ahmeti returned with clear instructions, is removed by the fact that Philip Reeker arrived in Skopje in the middle of June and openly sought public dialogue around the “name dispute”!?! (“Dialog za sporot za imeto”, “Nova Makedonija”, 20/21.06.2013) He also asked that we follow the example of negotiations being conducted between Belgrade and Prishtina (Dachich and Thachi). This naturally caused a storm of protests and objections from the top Macedonian journalists, experts, columnists... This was the first time Reeker was treated negatively by the media.

During the same interview, Osmani repeated exactly what Reeker had said: “We are looking to start a dialogue, to open public discussions on Nimetz’s proposal and its details. Then the two sides must sit down and begin direct dialogue under the auspices of the international community, just like the Kosovo-Serbia talks”! In the face of complete American failure on the name issue it only makes sense that they are asking us the impossible; to push ourselves against the wall. But what do the Albanians really want? Was it not clear to them that Nimetz’s latest proposal was immediately rejected by Athens? Should we,
therefore, still publicly debate it...? What would be the purpose? Greece already rejected the proposal! In every case, however, Washington’s goal is not for us to come up with a solution but to ruin our position and push us closer to the abyss... To prepare us for capitulation! There is no third option.

15. While we are on this subject, it will be interesting to get some insight into what Stoian Andov had said in his columns in the weekly magazine “Focus”, published on March 15 and 22, 2013. From a historical perspective, Andov has reminded us that while Fascism was penetrating the Balkans at the beginning of World War II, in order to get the support of the Albanians, Mussolini also played the “Greater Albania” card. In August 1942, Italy announced the formation of a “Greater Albania”, which included Kosovo, parts of Montenegro and parts of western Macedonia. This, as well as eastern Macedonia’s occupation by the Bulgarians, was a fascist creation. Pavelich’s Independent Croatia also fell into this category. Interestingly, then, as it is now, the Greek part of “Albanian lands”, called Chamiria, was left out even though it was under Italian occupation.

Andov’s explanation is important to us because, like fascist Italy of the 1940’s, nowadays the U.S. is attempting to realize its own plans in the Balkans, on the same basis – through the “Greater Albania” concept. Andov, of course, did not elaborate on this, but the similarities are crystal clear: the Americans are trying to “purchase” Albanian cooperation by offering them what they want the most, to realize their hundred year old dream. What else can they be but happy because, thanks to the Americans, they now have an independent Kosovo, with which the main part of their project is complete. What remains now is the part in Macedonia.

15.1. Andov has also highlighted the fact that Austro-Hungary too had used the “Greater Albania” card to protect its interests from Russia in 1876 when the two empires came into contact in the middle of Macedonia, along the Vardar valley. In that agreement, confirmed in 1897, “Macedonia and the Macedonian people were deliberately not mentioned because both empires saw them as a major obstacle to achieving their imperial interests
in the Balkans,” concludes Andov. The same scenario, it appears, is being repeated in the 21st century with Macedonia still being the “main obstacle”, this time for the realization of American interests in the region, again through a “Greater Albania” and by using the so-called “name dispute” to remove the Macedonian people from the picture.

15.2. It is true what Andov asserts - “today there is no Austro-Hungary, there is no Kaiser’s Germany, there is no Nazi Germany, or Mussolini’s Fascist Italy that supported the ‘Greater Albania’ project”. But it seems that he forgets or does not want to see that the same project today is developed by the Americans, with great success. To separate Kosovo from Serbia was not a small thing, regardless of Milosevich’s historical errors. Kosovo was by far the biggest bite around the “Greater Albania” project. Now, everything else is a matter of time.

15.3. For reasons only known to Andov, he concluded that the “Greater Albania” project in the past was “devastating for the Albanian people”. Without showing any fact or argument, he claimed that: “A large number of Albanian people know that changes in the Balkans as well as the ‘Greater Albania’ project, in the past, have brought the Albanian people and the other people living amongst them, much suffering and tragedy.”

This thesis, however, has nothing to do with reality. Only the last part of it is true and that is that the Albanian people’s neighbours have done all the suffering. Also, to assess that the ‘greater Albania’ dream is over at this time when, quite unexpectedly, its greatest part has been achieved with Kosovo’s independence, achieved by use of force by a world superpower no less, at least is put out of mind for now! Or perhaps Andov has no idea what is really happening in this region or is he thinking of something else?

When we also add developments in and around Macedonia from the 2001 war until today, we discover that Macedonia too is being slowly and unscrupulously albanized; everything is becoming crystal clear. Let us also not forget that there was a “Platform for the solution of the national Albanian question”, a
state document, prepared in 1998 by the Albanian Academy of Sciences, which highlighted the concept of a “Greater Albania”. As we have said, not one of the “main” players condemned it and, as we have proved, this concept was secretly supported by the biggest players of them all, the United States of America!

Andov himself will have to explain how he arrived at his conclusion, which we believe is completely wrong with regards to what is happening today.

15.4. Andov’s assessment is ignoring the frequent messages sent to us by Fatmir Dehari, Musa Xhaferi, Thaci, Fatmir Besimi, Ali Ahmeti, etc.; all leading Albanian politicians in Macedonia; when the Albanian hymn is played in Macedonian schools, instead of the Macedonian, when illegal Albanian flags are waved inside Macedonia, etc. Albanian flags flying alone on 30-metre masts, forceful change of schools and street names, the incident in Slupchane… are not just temporary and symbolic gestures. There are also public statements by Albanian leaders that the country’s future is - federalization… All these are manifestations of an irreversible “Greater Albanization” happening inside Macedonia, which people like Andov do not want to acknowledge, try to ignore, or simply tolerate.

15.5. Let us remind Andov and all those like him, of what Mexhiti, the Deputy President of DUI and Mayor of Chair municipality in Skopje, said in the Diaspora before the local elections in 2013. “On March 24, during the elections”, he said, “we want national unification, we want an ethnic Albania! We don’t need a war or a crises, we need quiet, peaceful and democratic legitimacy, with a pen in hand to circle the number around the name of our commander Fatmir Dehari and you will make Kichevo part of ethnic Albania. It depends on you and us whether Kichevo will be part or remain outside of the ethnic Albanian map…!” (“Republika”, 15.03.2013) According to the same source, Fatmir Dehari, then candidate, now mayor, said: “I am telling you that the unification of Kichevo will be the unification of Albanians. The merger of Kichevo is not just a dream of the people of Kichevo but of all Albanians. We want one Albanian administration from Tirana with its Mayor Basha
extending to other Albanian communities, stretching over to Struga in Macedonia where another Albanian mayor will wait for us going to Kichevo where, there too, you are to be welcomed by another Albanian mayor and from there to Gostivar and Tetovo, reaching the capital Skopje of Izzet Mexhiti, City of Skender Bey, Hasan Prishtina and others, continuing to Kumanovo. All these are Albanian administrations, exactly what we all desire; all this is part of Albania, our dream!”

Is there anything more to be said? We must be blind and deaf not to see and hear what is going on in our own country! Is everything not crystal clear? There is nothing clearer than the definition of this policy! Is this part of the “Greater Albania” dream or not, Andov and everyone like him, should judge for themselves!

15.6. Let us also mention that in the fall of 2012, during the opening of the new school year, the Albanian national anthem was played on at least three separate occasions, not to mention at the University of Tetovo! (“Obvinetelot se zakanuva, himnata si echi”, “Dnevnik”, September 21, 2012) The festivities were attended by top Albanian leaders from DUI including the leader, Ahmeti. What else do they have to do for us to understand what is going on?

About the Albanian national anthem being played at the opening of the new high school in Lipkovo, Prosecutor Svrgovski, according to the same source, said: “It is a benign form of offense because the school was built with foreign donations!” This statement was verified to be true! So there you go. We are not only deaf and blind, we are stupid as well!!!

The prosecutor should have at least explained why only the Albanian national anthem was played when the funds were in fact donated by the EU’s IPA-funds and by a Bulgarian municipality? It would have been logical to have played the EU or the Bulgarian, or both anthems. How was this connected to the Albanian anthem? In various announcements published in the press, about the enrollment of new students at the Tetovo State University, the name of the university is given first in the
Albanian language, then in English and finally in Macedonian. Most probably, it is printed the same way in the diplomas, memos, letters, etc... in all the university’s documents.

15.7. The ecstasy experienced by the Albanians celebrating Albania’s 100th anniversary engulfed even Suleiman Rexhepi, head of the Islamic Religious Community. He said: “The unification of Albanian lands is God’s will and therefore we have an obligation to go back to the way it was before... and Albania will have a unique border created by God. The Islamic Religious Community, with all its facilities, is ready to contribute to the national cause and respond to every call towards the unification of all Albanians!” ("Rexhepi: It is inconceivable for Albanians to live in five countries", “Nova Makedonija”, November 28, 2012)

15.8. In late April 2013, DUI announced that Ahmeti, its leader along with a delegation that was to include Medzhit and Dehari, was going on an official visit to the United States in May at the invitation of our proven “friend” Philip Reeker. Like the announcement said, the purpose of the visit, among other things, was to thank the Albanians, living there, for their large numbers that turned out to vote in local elections; an election which achieved their goals. Let us remember that their vote, as they do not live in Macedonia - was illegal.

Need we say any more? Except to add that Mexhiti is DUI’s Vice President and DUI is the largest Albanian party in Macedonia, which is also part of the ruling coalition in Macedonia’s government. Is there anyone who does not understand what’s going on here?

15.9. Let us also not forget the Albanian party in opposition. According to “Republika”, December 7, 2012, DPA leader Thachi, on many occasions, declared: “When in Chair we will not allow the song ‘Makedonsko Devoiche’ to be sung and the Albanian flag will never be smaller than the Macedonian”, “… the Republic of Macedonia has no future, but to be a bi-national state, with two constituent peoples - Macedonian and Albanian”; “there will be no Macedonia, there will be no Macedonian people, if Macedonia wants to survive it needs to be a state of the
Macedonian and Albanian people”; “you will have to accept the demands of the new agreement (with the Albanians in place of the Ohrid Agreement) and you will be asking if there is more!” (A TV interview with Robert Popovski)...

16. We can underline that this is new public behavior by Albanian politicians in Macedonia. Until recently, if this was what members of DUI were thinking up until now, which certainly it was, they did not articulate it publicly. Now they have entered a new phase. In fact, they no longer hide anything. This change took place after Kosovo was separated from Serbia and after the 2001 war in Macedonia. If Kosovo had not become independent, the war in Macedonia would not have taken place and there would not have been such a change in public policy, at least. The old Albanian policy had been to have five or more children in order to achieve the “Greater Albania” dream through demographic (r)evolution in Macedonia. This process was well on its way and had received a lot of help from the mosques. The young believers were not allowed to attend religious services until they had at least five children. This is how they were aiming to “invade Macedonia” and achieve their “Greater Albania” dream... This strategy was elaborated in the “Platform…” as well. Today, however, they have a new strategy called – albanization of parts of Macedonia...

There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that all this is done with Washington’s blessing; the true manager of these new Albanian processes. There should also be no doubt that this new strategy was most likely also initiated by Washington.

16.1. With the changes in Kosovo in 1999 and in Macedonia in 2001, the geopolitics of the Balkans entered a new, previously unimaginable stadium. This was only possible thanks to the U.S.A. bombing of Serbia and Belgrade and to the American-Albanian aggression, which has remained an unfinished story because the expected disintegration of Macedonia in 2001 failed to materialize. Now everything is done from the inside to gradually albanize Macedonia.
17. Not to leave things unsaid, it is important at this point to mention the so-called “conflict” that took place between Tirana and Washington, which occurred at the beginning of 2013. In one of his statements, as we already mentioned, Berisha made a claim that Albanian territories extended from “Preveza to Preshevo…Podgorica…” This statement apparently caused some dissatisfaction in Washington, which replied that “there will be no new border changes in the region”. There are reports that claim that Washington presented Tirana with a memorandum (probably a verbal note) which criticized extreme Albanian nationalism exercised in the region. Some rejoiced at the prospect thinking this may be the end to the “Greater Albania” project but, unfortunately, it was only wishful thinking on their part. Tirana got its nose bent out of joint because it ran ahead of itself. It unwittingly revealed its true future intentions. By doing so Berisha jeopardized the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, between Dachich and Thachi, which were an absolute priority for the Americans at the moment. The U.S. wanted to open up prospects for Kosovo with the agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, and succeeded. The Albanian nationalist rhetoric got in the way, which may have adversely affected the negotiations. In other words the sharp American criticisms were not about “challenging” the “Greater Albania” project but helping it along, which for the most part, has already been achieved.

Tirana got one on the nose because it got too ambitious. Berisha spoke outside the script, which was only intended for home use right before the elections there and, by doing so, put a knot in American interests in the region.

But statements made by Medzhiti and Dehari about albanizing parts of Macedonia did not bother our “partners” in Washington. Why should Washington be concerned when American plans for not revising borders by force, are peacefully effected with Macedonia’s destruction, from the inside?
V – Year 2001 – key stone in the mosaic of American policy towards Macedonia

Or

For Kosovo and Macedonia - “humanitarian” wars!

1. Macedonia did everything it could to avoid the wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. It allowed the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to take away huge caches of arms, technical equipment, transport equipment and other military means... common property worth billions of dollars, just to avoid confrontation. And in place of being rewarded for its peaceful and civilized behaviour, Macedonia became a victim of someone else’s interests. Worse than that was the short, 2001 staged war which had devastating consequences for Macedonia.

2. A large part of what had been done and created in the 10 years after Macedonia’s independence, with hardships, sacrifices and unimaginable conditions was destroyed by the 2001 war. Macedonia was thrown back at least for another 10 years. Of course this was by no accident. Terrorists, trained and armed in Kosovo, attacked Macedonia and inflicted immeasurable damage. All this was directed by the U.S., with aims of realizing its own interests in the Balkans.

3. Macedonia’s army and police suffered unprecedented indignity in this war. A handful of terrorists, as they were initially referred to by NATO Secretary-General, Robertson, put the Macedonian forces and political structure of the country to shame... starting with the country’s President and Supreme Commander of the army, the government, General Headquarters and the Ministry of Internal Affairs... A small gang of mercenaries held the entire country hostage from the Tetovo fortress. Our huge investments in security forces up to that time proved to be fruitless. We realized that we had no security system and had to improvise on everything. In these dramatic and critical moments, the situation looked more like a deliberate sabotage than an organized defense against the aggressor.
At the time we had no idea that behind the terrorists stood the U.S. Then, as today, very few people were even aware of what was happening behind the scenes. And today, most people don’t want to think about 2001. They either don’t want to know or are not willing to face the truth.

4. Insult on top of injury, an unprecedented disgrace for the Macedonian state was the drafting and signing of the Ohrid Agreement; its content in particular. From our side it was negotiated by extremely inexperienced but particularly ambitious personalities. In contrast, the Albanians employed foreign experts.

A. U.S. and the 2001 War – The Albanians in Macedonia were outside of the project

5. The 2001 war was a key segment and the best benchmark of U.S. policy towards Macedonia. It was the key stone in the mosaic of American politics. Unfortunately the war inflicted historic damage to Macedonia. Macedonians were forced to make strategic and irreversible concessions. The question that would determine the final fate of our country was left open. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the basic aim of the war – “liberation of the Albanian territories” – failed despite the unprecedented weaknesses demonstrated by the Macedonian side.

6. It is extremely important to note that, at the beginning of 2001 the Albanians in Macedonia were left out of the plan and were completely caught by surprise in the events that led to the 2001 war. In the end, the leaders of the DPA and PDP parties had to sign the Framework Agreement, even though at first they had no idea what was going on. This is proof that a) the war was not about the rights of Albanians in the country, and b) the war was not organized by the Albanians but by the Americans. Who else could have had the ability to exclude Xhaferi, Thachi and other Albanian leaders in Macedonia from this fateful historic Albanian event, directly connected with their future?
6.1. Without any doubt it can be concluded that if Albanians, even those from Kosovo, were the real instigators and leaders of the 2001 war, and not someone else, then the war would have been conducted on a Pan-Albanian basis. In other words, it would have been done in coordination with all Albanian leaders in the region, including those in Macedonia. This would have been an all-Albanian project, as was, for example, the case in Kosovo and the KLA, when secret camps were created in Albania and fighters were recruited from everywhere, even from the U.S. If the aggression against Macedonia was done exclusively by Albanians, then why include some Albanians and exclude others? Both Tirana and Skopje (Tetovo) would have had the same role as Pristina. Meaning, to attack Macedonia would have been “an all Albanian plan”. The only logical explanation could be that all Albanians were not included in this plan because it was someone else’s plan. Nevertheless, the plan was convenient for the Albanians, and they realized it.

7. There is no doubt that the entire operation in Macedonia was coordinated in Kosovo. The entire planning, training and other preparations, overall logistics, etc. were carried out in Kosovo. A strong confirmation of this is the fact that in the first three months all military operations in Macedonia were driven from Kosovo. Every day operatives were crossing the border back and forth. This shows that everything was organized and coordinated in Kosovo, including transportation.

7.1. Let us not forget that everything originated in Kosovo, formally a UN protectorate but practically under NATO command, led by American generals. There were tens of thousands of troops, some foreign but mostly American: over 30,000. We should also emphasize that Kosovo, in all its segments, was deeply infiltrated by CIA operatives as well as other relevant U.S. intelligence services which had an eye on everything that was going on inside Kosovo. So, the question that needs to be asked is: how could these Albanians organize, train, raise arms, cross borders on a daily basis and carry out military operations in neighbouring Macedonia undetected and without the knowledge of the U.S.? Is it possible that the NLA leadership
alone, from Prizren, Kosovo, led a war inside Macedonia with NATO and the United States being unaware? It is unthinkable!!!

7.2. Things became clear with the first five NLA releases, which informed the world that the Albanians were fighting for the “liberation of the territories”. Journalist David Binder in “Newsweek”, dated March 22, 2001, quoted Ahmeti as saying: “Our sole purpose is to remove the Slav forces from the territory which is historically Albanian” (article by Jason Miko – “Vrakanje na kolosek”, “Dnevnik”, March 7, 2013).

In the same column there was a quote from an article written by Patrick Bishop for the “Telegraph” published March 12, 2001 entitled “Macedonia began with an attack” in which Patrick wrote: “Albanian rebels in Macedonia want division along ethnic lines and say they are ready to plunge the Balkans into another conflict unless their demands are met.” There was also an article by Peter Beaumont and Nick Wood (“Observer”, March 11, 2001) which quoted a statement made by Shkelzen Malichi, a prominent journalist in Prishtina, who said: “I am familiar with the ideology, mentality and motivation of the forces that caused the armed conflict in Macedonia. I met with them, especially with immigrants from Europe. They tried to convince me that Macedonia is an artificial creation, formed to harm the Albanian nation. They argue that the forced separation of the Albanian nation is a historical injustice. This injustice should be corrected, they say, by dividing the Macedonian Slav from the Albanian part. The Albanian part should be allowed to unite with Kosovo or, better yet, to become part of a united Albanian state.”

7.2.1. Given the circumstances, there truly was no place in this war for Xhaferi, Thachi and Imeri of the DPA and PDP (Albanian parties in Macedonia). No matter how extreme they may have been, in their own way concerning the “Albanian national question” they tried to solve their problems through the institutions to which they belonged. The fact that they were not very successful in this area was because the state leadership made some serious miscalculations. It is evident that after the Yugoslav breakup, Macedonian authorities did not pay enough attention to the Albanian minority in its society, which was in need of urgent
measures to overcome its problems. Its neglect gave the 2001 war some legitimacy, although that was not the reason for it. The basis of the 2001 war was a “Greater Albania” and to serve U.S. interests in the region.

7.2.2 Turning the “war of liberation” into a “humanitarian war” for the rights of the Albanian people in Macedonia was a total farce. This war, right from the start, was led by the National Liberation Army (NLA)! If the original mandate was to “fight for rights” then why did they need a “National Liberation Army”? The war was not started to fight for rights, it was started to fight for something else. The name said it all: their intent was to “liberate” territories, not gain rights! Menduh Thachi was absolutely right when he argued that: “One cannot gain human rights through a war, one can only gain territories…” (KOD TV show, aired on Channel 5 on June 26, 2011)! Robertson’s terrorists, guided by their U.S. mentors no doubt, quickly changed the aim of their war from “liberation of territories” to “fighting for human rights”, when they realized that the basic plan was out of reach, but their intentions unfortunately remained the same!

7.3. It should not be a question for discussion that only Washington could have started a war in Macedonia without including the Albanians of Macedonia and could have changed the “character” of a war after it was started! The evidence is there and there is no doubt that the real intention of the war was to “liberate” Macedonian territories. Had the “liberation” succeeded there would have been no problem for local Albanian non participation. They would have “enjoyed” the fruits of their “liberation” without a single casualty of their own. As “forgotten” Albanians in the war, they would have been unsatisfied… But, no more than that! On the other hand, and more important, the war itself, or the entire operation would not have looked illogical or senseless, like it does now. Now, who can explain why there was a war fought for someone’s rights when that someone did not even participate?

7.4. The KLA was well-trained, had war experience in the Kosovo war and was accustomed to using modern American
weaponry including rifles with night vision equipment. Somewhere down the line, the KLA was regrouped. Part of the force was transferred to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and became the Kosovo army. The rest of the force was demobilized and dismissed. A lot of these former fighters had no jobs... especially the ones from Macedonia. These fighters became the initial recruits for the NLA which later was expanded to include Albanians from Macedonia. And thus a planned breakup of Macedonia was being arranged.

8. According to all indications, in accordance with the completed plans, the breakup of Macedonia was expected to be an easy job. Macedonia was already deeply divided politically and a war would have driven it deeper into the abyss. The chaos, they figured, would have driven the country to collapse, thus making the “liberation” of territories not only possible but easy. Although their predictions were largely correct, that did not happen. This was totally unexpected by Washington… Macedonia did not collapse…

9. Confirmation of the deep U.S. involvement in the 2001 war in Macedonia is the fact that the U.S. had already “taken over” Macedonia’s military. At that time Macedonia’s military was in need of reform, so management of this process was handed over to a private American mercenary organization called Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI). This was an independent organization consisting of U.S. military veterans who followed Washington’s dictates. Private companies such as this received their licenses to operate from the State Department and the Pentagon, and then worked for money wherever they were sent. They basically ran proxy wars. They went everywhere the State Department directed them. Colonel David Hackworth of MPRI wrote: “...in the former Yugoslavia MPRI operated under the shadow of the Pentagon and under the engagement of the State Department…” (See “Wanted: guns for hire...” at http://hackworthe.com/09jul01.html)

This is how MPRI came to Macedonia. In 1998 the Macedonian government signed a contract with MPRI, to reform the Army according to NATO standards. The American veterans came to
Macedonia in 1999, with special plans and ambitious tasks. And, as we shall soon show you, they actually played the role of a Trojan horse. They entered the Macedonian Army General Headquarters through the front door and did everything in their power to prepare the Macedonian military to fail in the 2001 war. In other words, they prepared Macedonia for capitulation...

9.1. In order to understand what happened we need to mention that MPRI, before coming to Macedonia, was in Kosovo. It was first engaged in creating and training the KLA force in secret camps in Albania. After that it became involved in the Kosovo war and, ultimately, in the Kosovo Protection Corps. In 2001 MPRI “harmoniously” coordinated “the liberation of Albanian territories” from Macedonia, from both Skopje and Prishtina. The best proof for that is that, during the evacuation of several hundred NLA terrorists from Arachinovo, in 2001, conducted at the request of NATO (USA), we discovered that there were also 17 American “trainers” belonging to MPRI trapped among the terrorists!

9.2. Upon their arrival in Skopje, MPRI did everything in its power to weaken the Macedonian military and the Macedonian Ministry of Defense. Source material and details for what we are about to tell you, regarding MPRI’s involvement in the Macedonian military, comes directly from Macedonian General Pande Petrovski.

9.3. Before continuing any further, let us say that the MPRI team, while working in Skopje, was in constant contact with its MPRI colleagues in Kosovo. As we mentioned earlier MPRI created the NLA, i.e. the Albanian terrorist group that invaded and attacked Macedonia and led its operations in Macedonia in 2001. So, what we are telling you here is that the MPRI organized a war against Macedonia at the same time as it was conducting reforms in the Macedonian military. In other words, the MPRI was aware of everything that was happening inside the Macedonian military and that classified information, that it was entrusted with, was passed on to the NLA. The NLA knew everything about the Macedonian military; the movement of its unit; its schedules; positions it was occupying... down to the level of morale,
political, security and military readiness. Similar information was sent to Kosovo to inform its colleagues there of the situation in Macedonia and its structures. This was invaluable information for the aggressors. With the MPRI in its ranks, the Macedonian security forces were fighting a foe who knew every move they were going to make before they even made it! But, unfortunately for them, they underestimated the Macedonian military’s capability in the battlefield. Their assumptions turned out to be unrealistic. The Macedonians were a lot tougher than they thought!

9.4. In any case, it wasn’t long before the MPRI handlers in the Pentagon realized that their main goal was unattainable by aggression alone, so they transformed their efforts into a “humanitarian” operation. In other words, they dressed the wolf in sheep’s clothing!

10. That is more concrete proof that the Americans were involved in the operations in Macedonia, not just the Albanians. If the Albanians had run the war on their own they would not have just given up their first aims so easily and so quickly. They would have done everything in their power to achieve their “Greater Albania” dream by detaching lands from Macedonia. They would have even risked a wider confrontation in the Balkans. But, it seems, those steering the war were not prepared to take such an excessive risk. They were top pragmatists who quickly adapted to the conditions and switched to plan “B”. The objective of plan “B” was to accomplish the same thing but peacefully through a “Framework Agreement”. They did not fulfill their initial task by force but the war paved the way for realizing the same thing… gradually… in the not too distant future…

11. Many hidden lies and intentions came to the fore when the “purpose” of the war was changed. How can they say it was a “humanitarian” war when it was started from the outside and it did not include the Albanians inside Macedonia? Instead of being the war leaders, they did not even know what was going on. Was this a rebellion or a war? If it was a rebellion why was it fought by an organized army (NLA)? Who invited the outsiders to come to Macedonia and fight for their human rights without them?
What kind of rights were they interested in? Thus by changing the aim of the terrorists, as Robertson called them, the project lost its foundation. Is this not enough evidence to show that someone else was behind the plan called “NLA” and someone else stood behind the 2001 war in Macedonia and that the Albanians were only the executors?

12. The Albanians in Macedonia were part of the political system. They were MP’s, ministers, directors of public companies ... and had no basis, no logic and no specific and sustainable need to take up arms and begin shooting at their colleagues with whom yesterday they had sat together in Parliament and in government... First, even with the emergence of the NLA in the hills, the Albanians in Macedonia had no justifiable reasons to pick up arms and fight against their fellow Macedonians. Second, there was no critical mass of discontent in Macedonia because, as unusual as this may sound, at that point in time inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia were on a level of mutual tolerance, even though there were many unresolved issues vital to the Albanians in Macedonia. And third, between Xhaferi and Thachi on one side and Ahmeti and his uncle, Veliu, on the other, they had no chance of finding common ground to start a war. It was difficult if not impossible for them to have started the war in Macedonia. Until the U.S. (Frowick) imposed it, Xhaferi had no need to talk to Ahmeti.

The details of what happened in 2001 are not sufficiently known even today, let alone at that time. Something happened that started the war and still, to this day, no one has investigated and analyzed its causes. In 2001 we knew nothing, today at least we have some ideas.

13. The old folks were right when they said “the wolf may change its hair but will never change its nature”. So the Americans, our “partners”, as many Macedonians even today call them, may have changed the nature of the war but not their goals. They adapted new conditions to achieve the same old goals. Their task was reformulated: “If they couldn’t immediately ‘liberate’ those territories all they needed to do was set the
conditions and be prepared to ‘liberate’ them later”. And this is the situation we are finding ourselves in, all this time later!

13.1. If not before, then certainly when the nature of the war was being changed, the Americans initiated the next phase of the project which would eventually be called the “Ohrid Agreement”. By total restructuring of the political system of Macedonia, they found sophisticated ways which, after a certain period of time, would open opportunities for peaceful albanization of parts of the country. Those processes, over time, would lead to federalization of the country and create conditions for a “legal” separation and alteration of boundaries, without use of arms.

Does anyone have any doubt that this is exactly what is happening in Macedonia, all these years after the 2001 war?

14. The sixth announcement made by the NLA was the transformation of the war from “a war of liberation” to “a humanitarian war”, thus creating the opportunity to legitimize aggression. When this announcement was made, the NLA immediately received open support from the United States and NATO. Experts like Peter Feith, and others of similar expertise, all intelligence operatives, were immediately sent to Macedonia to support the efforts of yesterday’s terrorists and today’s humanitarians. We can reliably assess that these so-called experts, had secretly worked very closely with yesterday’s terrorists, even before. Now working in the open, under a new umbrella, they were doing everything possible to help the “humanitarians” reach their new target - the Ohrid Agreement. Everything had already been made public. Without any scruples the Americans were now using NATO and the OSCE to do the same thing openly, which until yesterday they were doing covertly. Macedonia was blockaded and at war and these people were doing whatever they wanted, including allegedly disposing of hazardous waste materials from their helicopters into Macedonian lakes.

15. There is much more evidence and from several different sources that point to U.S. involvement in the 2001 war in Macedonia. For example, basing his evidence on some secret
documents leaked to the Netherlands, Christopher Deliso wrote that “...continuous telephone contact was maintained between the NLA and senior U.S. officials. Such conversations were recorded by European Secret Service personnel. When the Americans found out they broke contact but immediately supplied the NLA with computers that had built-in telephone technology and their communication continued on.” Deliso is an American journalist who lives in Skopje and has written several books about Macedonia.

Another source is Dutch journalist and researcher Hub Jaspers. Jaspers did an interview with KFOR Commander General Klaus Reinhardt, a German officer who served in Kosovo. According to General Reinhardt, “some of the UCK fighters left Kosovo to fight for the NLA in Macedonia.” (“Nova Makedonija”, December 10, 2012, “My story about UCK fighting for the NLA in Macedonia created fears in The Hague”) General Reinhardt also said that “…when KFOR jailed a KLA subject for fighting for the ONA in Macedonia, the next day the Americans ordered his release. The orders always came from the highest ranking American officers in Europe!”

**B. How terrorists became “humanitarians”?**

16. If someone were to ask “if the Americans were truly behind the 2001 war in Macedonia, then how was it possible for NATO Secretary-General Robertson of Britain, in the beginning, to label the NLA “a terrorist organization”? Isn’t NATO under American control?

Yes, the contradiction is undeniable, but only at first glance. In the beginning the Americans were conducting super covert operations in Kosovo (UCK) and in Macedonia (NLA) about which nobody was allowed to publicly speak, let alone support. The alliance was kept out of the loop and could not have been seen as standing behind the Albanians. There was a lot at stake in the beginning and the implementation of classic American “dirty politics” had to be hidden from everyone. Therefore, Robertson may not have known.
17. The next logical question to ask is “why the turn around?” Why did they not liberate the “Albanian lands”? Why did the NLA, in its sixth announcement, declare itself “humanitarian” and turn its military aggression into a struggle for human rights? Was it possible that the Americans were defeated in Macedonia?

The only possible explanation is that whatever they were trying to do proved unattainable! The same happened with the three South Serbian municipalities, where the short war aimed at their incorporation into Kosovo. There were two short unsuccessful wars in the Balkans but with long lasting and unforeseeable consequences. As it turned out ambitions were much greater than the possibilities. The terrorist’s target was not reached despite Macedonia’s non-readiness for war and despite all the efforts that were made by the MPRI to help the Albanian terrorists…

18. The U.S. took all necessary measures, including supplying the Albanians trainers and advisory personnel, for the 2001 war in Macedonia to succeed. All this was unmistakably planned by U.S. services, including Robert Frowick, who was sent to Macedonia with special status in the OSCE Mission to Skopje at the most critical time in our country’s recent history. He was undoubtedly a CIA operative although he claimed to be a former American diplomat. If he was a diplomat he certainly was working for the Agency. Frowick had been in Skopje before, in the early 1990s, when he unscrupulously interfered in Macedonia’s internal affairs, to the detriment of our long-term Macedonian interests. This time he was sent to Macedonia at exactly the time when the terrorists became “humanitarians”. He came with instructions to a) create the right conditions so that the Ohrid Agreement could be imposed on the Macedonian people and gain their compliance and, b) to make sure that the aggressors were included in the political system of the country. There was no better tool than the OSCE for the realization of this project.

18.1. Reconciling the Albanian leaders in Macedonia with the leaders of the terrorists coming from Kosovo was certainly one of the most difficult tasks for Frowick. Convincing the DPA and PDP leaders of the Albanian political parties in Macedonia to
accept the NLA, Frowick in parallel was preparing the text for the future Ohrid Agreement, the draft of which was signed in Prizren. On May 22, 2001, Frowick basically dictated to Xhaferi (DPA), Imer Imeri (PDP) and Ali Ahmeti (NLA) the Prizren Declaration which was to include almost all the basic elements of the forthcoming Framework Agreement. Among other things, there were requirements for serious amendments to the Macedonian Constitution to create “equality between the Albanians and the Slavs in Macedonia” (the word “Slavs” was used and not Macedonians!); for “performing military service in the municipalities of birth” (which practically called for federalization or division of our country!); for “entry of NATO forces into the entire territory of Macedonia”, and so on.

Frowick did all that behind the backs of Macedonian authorities after he was expelled from Macedonia. Did he act on his own or did he follow someone else’s precise instructions? The readers can make up their own minds about that. All we can say with certainty is that a) his father or grandfather did not send him to Macedonia and b) the OSCE had no role in what he did. He used the OSCE to achieve someone else’s interests.

The “Prizren Declaration” is proof that the text for the Ohrid Agreement was an American creation. There is no doubt that the text was prepared in Washington.

18.2. The Albanian parties in Macedonia, the DPA and PDP, had no choice but to accept the NLA because the United States stood behind it. If that were not so, then there was no other chance of drafting the “Prizren Declaration”. One can only imagine how Xhaferi and Thachi must have felt at that time? They were witnessing a war in Macedonia, led by Albanians, in which they were not involved but were forced to support. Do you think that if the United States was not behind all this Xhaferi and Thachi could have been convinced to cooperate with Ahmeti and at the same time be left on the sidelines? Do you think that Xhaferi and Thachi would have listened to some guy named Ali Ahmeti or his uncle, Veliu, and let them be involved in Macedonia’s politics, if not forced by the United States?
And if it was really an “Albanian war” why did they have to be “forced” into it?

18.3. Looking at this from another point of view, if the United States did not lead this dance and did not stand with all its authority behind Ahmeti and his uncle, could the possibility of an armed confrontation have taken place between Xhaferi and Thachi, on one side, and Ahmeti and Veliu, on the other if Xhaferi and Thachi were excluded from this plan? More precisely – would there have been an open inter-Albanian confrontation in Macedonia between these two factions? Most likely yes! Ahmeti and Veliu, the classical aggressors, would have fought for control of what they already had in Macedonia, regardless of the fact that they were all Albanians. The danger was absolutely real. However, the top American diplomacy that pulled the strings from behind eliminated these dangers. That was one of the main reasons why the U. S. was so deeply involved in the conflict – to prevent inter-Albanian misunderstandings.

The relationship between Thachi and Xhaferi (while he was still alive) on one side and Ali Ahmeti on the other, today (2013), is still “uncooperative”! They constantly look at each other through the scope of a rifle!

19. Xhaferi and Thachi were faced with a serious handicap. After the Kosovo war, which gained the U.S. permanent Albanian loyalty, they could not react any differently and ignore American interests. Therefore they had to accept a new secondary and humble role, including the signing of the Ohrid Agreement for which others fought and became their political rivals. The two Albanian parties in Macedonia have sustained “collateral damage” from the 2001 war and are on the margins. (If we exclude the brief period after the 2006 election when the VMRO DPMNE was in coalition with the DPA.)

20. Menduh Thachi, according to an article published by “Dnevnik” on December 30th, 2011, entitled “The Framework Agreement cannot be the reason for a holiday”, confirmed that the DPA knew nothing about the 2001 war at the time. He said: “The 2001 war was a great shame for the Albanian people. It was
a Marxist-Islamist war.” Unfortunately Thachi could not have made this statement in 2001 or 2002, although he certainly was thinking the same. Now he can say that after the Ohrid Agreement the state was irreversibly reconstructed in an unacceptable way, with long and unforeseen negative consequences. He would have been a traitor if he had said that at the time; labeled as someone who worked against the Albanian cause. He would have been labeled an anti-American. Then, he and his kind had no choice but to keep quiet and embrace their new American partners. And now, he can only speak on behalf of the DPA, which lost its prestige and position of power, possibly forever, because of the war. But, overall, the Albanians got more than they ever dreamed of in Macedonia, just like they did in Kosovo.

20.1. The same Thachi, according to Lupevka’s channel 5 TV show KOD, which aired on June 26, 2011, said: “Wars are led only for territories. Human rights are acquired by different means…” He was absolutely right and publicly confirmed that the 2001 war was all about carving out parts of Macedonia as directed by the U.S.

The greatest benefactors of the war, however, were the Albanians.

21. MPRI and general Griffiths, the head of it in Skopje, do confirm that Washington played a key role in the NLA creation and in its operations in Macedonia.

Frowick, through the Prizren Declaration, has uncovered Washington’s intentions in regards to the Macedonian state and the Macedonian people.

The seventeen American military trainers, caught in Arachinovo among the NLA fighters when they were surrounded by the Macedonian Army, proves very clearly that the U.S. was directly involved in the 2001 war in Macedonia. This discovery was the jewel in the crown.
22. Overall, in 2001, Macedonia was put in a precarious situation. The same force (MPRI) that was managing the NLA and aggression against Macedonia was also managing the Macedonian military responsible for defending Macedonia. In other words, the Americans were right in the middle and pulling strings on both sides involved in the war. And we know very well that they were helping the Albanians at the expense of the Macedonian people. It was a classic puppet show! The Americans did whatever they wanted while Macedonia was being destroyed and people were dying. The Americans were waging a war for “rights” on behalf of the Albanians in Macedonia without even letting them know!

23. Let us not forget that the aggression in Macedonia received general and widespread condemnation. The world media supported Macedonia and saw it as a victim of Albanian irredentism. In the beginning not all Albanians supported this aggression either. Some were confused by the attacks and even condemned them. This secret American military operation left many people holding their breath. Among them was Ismail Kadare, a world famous writer and a proven Albanian nationalist. He openly condemned the war. He was afraid, like many others that the gains the Albanians made against Milosevich would be lost and this kind of behaviour would jeopardize Kosovo’s independence. Later, after it was discovered that the U.S. and NATO were behind the 2001 war, Kadare and others changed their opinions.

23.1. It was quite different in Kosovo where the Albanians were seen as fighting against Serbian aggression, primarily due to Milosevich’s stern policies. The world was sympathetic to the Albanians largely due to U.S. and NATO propaganda. The Americans and their NATO allies continued to vilify Milosevich and the Serbians while valourizing the Albanian resistance and completely ignoring and covering up repeated Albanian injustices perpetrated against the Serbian population, not to mention the irredentism that was present in Kosovo for decades. Tens of thousand of Serbians, one way or another, for years were forced to move out of Kosovo because they were harassed, but that did not matter to the Americans. Even at The Hague Tribunal for
former Yugoslavia, there were no Albanians tried for crimes committed against humanity even though many Albanians were guilty of that. A media campaign waged against Serbia covered up all crimes and abuses committed by the Albanian side. Certainly this was a result of American involvement in the war and their support for the Albanian side. Partners do not try partners. The Haradinai case proved that.

C. General Pande Petrovski’s precious “testimony”

24. In order to fully understand the American role in the 2001 war in Macedonia, you will have to read late General Pande Petrovski’s book “Svedoshtva” (Testimony), (Bitola, “Kiro Dandaro”, 2006). It clearly explains, in detail, America’s treatment of Macedonia. Petrovski was a participant in the 2001 war. We hope quotes from his book will clarify a lot of things.

24.1. On page 7 in his book Petrovski wrote: “The then Macedonian government signed an agreement with the American firm MPRI to send a team of instructors, consisting mainly of retired United States military veterans, to Macedonia to reorganize the Macedonian military. MPRI proposed its own plan for the reorganization but Army General Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense were not prepared to accept it. The MPRI plan called for Macedonia to have a single brigade army, i.e. a light infantry brigade with two light battalions and some special units with no artillery, armoured units, aviation, etc.”

Without being a military expert, one can immediately conclude that what General Petrovski is telling us about the MPRI proposal is that Macedonia would actually have no army! The MPRI literally recommended that Macedonia’s defense institutions get rid of their army! This proposal definitely revealed the essential elements of American strategy towards Macedonia as the Pentagon stood behind the MPRI. And so we come to the core: prepare Macedonia for a military defeat in 2001!

24.2. Again on page 7 Petrovski wrote: “Soon afterwards, in January 2000, around 500 officers were retired, including all of
the generals who ‘did not agree’ with the reforms. After the officers were sent into retirement the original MPRI plan was accepted and the army reorganization was launched in 2000 under full MPRI control.”

On page 8 the General explains how and why this was done: “In the beginning of 2001,” he wrote, “before the war had begun, the Army was in its final stages of “reforms” or ‘disbanding’ (3. AK, disbanded, 2. AK – bitolski being disbanded, tank and artillery units disbanded, aviation disbanded) and the border brigade was under formation…” In other words, MPRI had made everything ready for Macedonia to fail miserably if someone were to start a war against it…

24.3 General Pande Petrovski was also included in the group of retired officers. But after the war started and the Macedonian army was facing incomprehensible errors and multiple defeats, President Boris Traikovski requested that Petrovski be reactivated. Surprised by the President’s actions, Petrovski asked Traikovski why he had been retired when he was not of retirement age. Traikovski was honest with him when he said: “General, when I became president I did not know any of the generals. Major General Richard Griffiths of the Unites States, head of MPRI in Skopje, brought me a list of officers to retire and a list of officers replacing them and I signed the lists.” (p. 15)

Griffiths not only retired 500 of the most experienced officers but he staffed General Headquarters with the wrong people. As head of General Staff he appointed an engineer and quartermaster as his deputy! The filling of all top positions with unqualified staff, by MPRI and Griffiths, can only be explained as direct sabotage. From the inside.

In general, this was an unprecedented, audacious American action! The error however was ours and we are to blame for being so naïve and trusting.

25. General Petrovski’s book “Svedoshtva” (Testimony) contains valuable information about the 2001 war and about the role of the main factors that participated in it. On page 160 Petrovski wrote:
On July 21, a KFOR helicopter (Z-47) landed in Shipkovitsa at 16:45 hours and unloaded equipment and people until 17:05 hours. At the same time another Z-47 helicopter landed in the village Brodets. On July 21, 2001 KFOR helicopters of the type Z-47 and Z-53 landed in the village Brodets at 13:53 hours and remained there until 14:30 hours. All of these KFOR flights were carried out without informing the Macedonian authorities... In fact this is when KFOR was preparing to re-establish the NLA command base from Prizren, Kosovo, to Shipkovitsa, Macedonia. During a conversation I had with General Lange of NATO Command in Macedonia, I pointed out to him that NLA command had been moved by KFOR from Prizren to Shipkovitsa. His reply was: ‘You are right, but think of me as a professional that can’t wait to go into retirement’!

25.1. It is interesting to note what General Petrovski had to say about Peter Feith’s behaviour. Peter Feith is an American and was a personal representative of the NATO Secretary-General. About him Petrovski, on page 122, wrote: “Feith was the person who primarily had direct contact with the Macedonian President and from what I observed he behaved quite arrogantly, he was brazen and constantly threw ultimatums at the President, his behaviour was very strange. During an occasion, in front of a room full of state officials I asked him: ‘Mr. Feith are you the commander of the so-called NLA, why are you so sure about their concerns?’ That was the time when we were working towards a ceasefire.” Perhaps the general was right about Feith’s role...

25.2. Another incident that deserves more attention is the part connected with the Arachinovo operation. After the Macedonian security forces penetrated deep into the village it was only a matter of time before the terrorists were cleaned out. When the forces moved near the village they found two wounded Americans (p. 107)!

Then, on June 25, when General Petrovski was meeting with Traikovski, the Macedonian President informed him that NATO was going to move the terrorists out of Arachinovo. At that point the General said: “Well, we will continue to attack until the
conditions are created for extraction”. “No!” yelled the President. “NATO Secretary-General Robertson told me that 30 of his people are in Arachinovo!” “I was dumbfounded as I looked at the President,” Petrovski wrote, “and I could not understand what was happening! So I asked, who are these people and how did they come to be in Arachinovo?” Traikovski looked at me and said: “I don’t know but Robertson promised me that he would give me a list of who these people are!”

25.2.1 What an unpardonable, fatal mistake! In a war, the Supreme commander of the Macedonian Army is told that in the battle zone, surrounded by his forces, among the aggressors were 30 NATO people!!! American, of course! And this information is transferred to him by none other than the General Secretary of NATO!? And that was enough for the Macedonian President to start a rescue operation for our “partners”!? Did they go to the wrong side by chance, by mistake!? So, the President stopped a key operation that would have opened the way for Macedonian victory thus jeopardizing the most fundamental interests of his own country!? And then he permitted the evacuation of the aggressors and their American military advisers and experts, without asking who they were and what they, for God’s sake, were doing in the village!? Even worse, all of them were evacuated fully armed!? However, the President was promised a list, which of course was meaningless and will never be sent.

The NLA fighters and American supporters were transferred to another location where they immediately resumed fighting against the Macedonian Army!?

Everything is obvious; as a nation we have sunk to a new low.

25.2.2 Just to clarify, when preparations for the Arachinovo attack were being made, Traikovski told Petrovski that the Macedonian army had only two days to carry it out (p. 101). Surprised by his comment, the General questioned the President about why only two days? Traikovski replied: “That’s how much time Robertson gave me!”
So when we take this latest information and put it together with the previous information, of the 30 Americans in Arachinovo, then things start to become very clear as to who managed the war in Arachinovo, and in all other places all the time. Robertson began his involvement in the second stage of the war, right after the fifth NLA communication, when the war became a “humanitarian” story (for children only!). Before that, he was left outside of NLA super secret activities.

There is nothing more to be said.

25.3. There is one more important fact noted on pages 77 and 78 in Petrovski’s book. In the middle of May 2001, President Traikovski ordered General Petrovski to meet with a man named David Foley, who was in a diplomatic vehicle with two others, and take him to the village Slupchane, where he was reportedly to negotiate the extraction of civilians. Here is what Petrovski had to say about that: “I requested that my people secretly follow David Foley. The same day I received the following report: ‘Three people were waiting for Foley at the entrance of the village. They were fully bearded and were wearing NLA uniforms. All three welcomed Foley with kisses and embraces’…”

So what else can we say other than the three NLA operatives knew Foley from the days when they were students…

25.4 There is a lot more information in General Petrovski’s book relevant to our topic. For example, on page 195 he wrote about how NATO, by the end of the 2001 war, insisted that Macedonia withdraw all its heavy weapons from the crisis regions, especially the tank battalion with T-22 tanks purchased from the Ukraine. “Knowing the Unit’s ability in combat,” wrote Petrovski, “NATO demanded that the battalion be relocated to Strumitsa, at any price. The daily pressure put on the Macedonian President by NATO was too much so he ordered the tank battalion and the entire military apparatus and officers to relocate to Strumitsa. After that any tank movements out of Strumitsa required NATO approval!”
25.5. Even though the terrorists in Macedonia could have been easily defeated militarily, “President Traikovski”, wrote Petrovski on page 98 of his book, “on June 14, 2001 sent a letter to the NATO Secretary-General asking him to help in resolving the crisis.” The Macedonian Chief of Staff learned about this on July 5, 2001. This information alone was sufficient to conclude everything that was and how it happened in Macedonia in 2001.

It was like in a fairy tale - Traikovski was asking for help from the executioner!

25.6 There were indications in 2001 that then Prime Minister Georgievski advocated for the proclamation of martial law and he came very close to implementing one. If that were the case then why didn’t he do it? Specifically, who opposed it? It is arguable that the U.S. and its satellites were strongly against such a measure because after that it would have been relatively easy to eliminate the NLA.

25.6.1. Georgievski’s attempts, mentioned above, were also confirmed by General Pande Petrovski, but facts have shown essential differences between what Georgievski said and what he did. About this on page 136, Petrovski wrote: “Every time we started a military operation, and before it was finished, the Prime Minister would visit the command post and cancel the operation. Two classic examples of this were the military operations in Kumanovo and Arachinovo. The Prime Minister and some others near him never publicly advocated for the crisis to be resolved by military means. After canceling the operations they never explained why they were cancelled!”

Petrovski had no doubt about President Traikovski’s position: “He always advocated that the crisis be resolved by political means and with NATO, EU and OSCE support…” (p. 136). This was probably our biggest handicap in the war. The Supreme Commander, who had to lead the Army, thought that a military solution was not necessary!?
This is valuable information for historians.

26. From what we know, President Boris Traikovski was an honest man and a patriot. There is personal proof of that. Unfortunately he was a victim of Balkan manoeuvres by the single superpower. General Griffiths through MPRI, Robert Frowick through OSCE, Perdue, Feith and other “facilitators” and “experts”, belonging to the ranks of the CIA and to other similar services, were there undoubtedly implementing U.S. policy, which proved to be disastrous for Macedonia. Unfortunately the Macedonian leadership believed everything it was told and obeyed every command given without question, especially the Macedonian President!

26.1. Unaware of the great games that were played, Traikovski, apparently without objections, followed U.S. guidelines and was unscrupulously exploited by Washington. And exactly as General Petrovski explained, Traikovski, on trust, retired his most experienced military officers and replaced them with inexperienced ones including his staff at General Headquarters, creating enormous and irreparable damage to his own army.

As a matter of fact, Trakovski knew very well what had happened or what had been done in Kosovo and Macedonia. Could he, one day, be a witness to all these misdoings and political abuses? Journalist Lupevska from the TV show KOD on Channel 5, on February 26, 2012, shortly before Traikovski’s death, reported that Trakovski had said that he would tell all about the Kosovo caper! Did he sign his own death warrant by saying that?

26.2 On page 175 General Pande Petrovski wrote: “I am not sure who planned the military crisis in Macedonia. Nevertheless, it was obvious who did not permit the war to be finished by military means. The Army was definitely not responsible. The Army was certainly not allowed to act...” On page 204 he concludes: “We were blocked in every military operation!”

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27. An interesting view on the 2001 war was given by G’zim Ostreni, Chief of the NLA General Staff as noted in the book “A critical review: The 2001 war in Macedonia”, by General Mitre Arsovski, Prof. Dr. Stoian Kuzev and General Prof. Dr. Risto Damianovski, a personal edition, Skopje 2006 (ISBN 9989-2650-1-1).

27.1. On page 25 Ostreni was quoted as saying: “...UNMIK and NATO (KFOR) took strong measures to prevent members of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) from participating in the NLA structures.” Is Ostreni, unwillingly, revealing that all NLA preparations were done in Kosovo? If the war truly was an “uprising” in Macedonia, as Ostreni argued, then what did it have to do with UNMIK and NATO (KFOR)? These organizations were in Kosovo, not in Macedonia! Why was the NLA connected with them, if it was authentically created in Macedonia? This alone is enough proof to show that a relationship was in existence. A very important relationship! How was it possible, for example that Ostreni, Chief of the Kosovo Protection Corps General Staff, paid by the UN, was allowed to transfer to the NLA and perform the same functions? Why were UNMIK’s “strong measures” not valid for him?

27.2. According to what was written in the book, Ostreni does not hide the NLA’s purpose in Macedonia and has repeatedly said that the NLA strove to turn Macedonia into a bi-national state. He also complained that in 1991, in Macedonia’s new constitution, the Albanians “were not recognized as a constituent element in the new state” (p. 34) and this was motive to start a war. At issue is the same grievance that Kosovo had in Yugoslavia, when it strove to become a republic. Being a “republic” in the Yugoslav Federation or having become a “constituent” people in Macedonia means that the Albanians would have the right to secede. There are no differences between the two scenarios.

27.3. On page 90 Ostreni further elaborated on the fundamental causes of the war. He said: “...The parliament, the government and the political parties, including all Albanian political parties in Macedonia, could not find the strength to overcome the problem by political means, a problem created by the Macedonian
Constitution since 1991, by excluding the Albanians from the right to statehood and thus discriminating against all their basic human rights and freedoms…”

Ostreni’s position that the “failure” to receive the right to “statehood” meant discrimination for Albanians is obviously preposterous. That would only be true if Ostreni was thinking of the right to secession. And that is exactly what he was thinking and that is why it was denied. There was nothing else there. Attempting to partition Macedonia has absolutely nothing to do with human rights and freedoms, at least on an elementary level. All citizens are equal before the law. It was pure fabrication by Ostreni to show that indeed there was motive for the 2001 war. Albanian attempts to split lands from Macedonia were reliably confirmed by their own admission. The NLA released five announcements which called for the division of our country. Ostreni is mixing human rights with ethnic and collective ones. However his intent is evident: to break Macedonia’s unitary character, as a step to partition.

27.4. In explaining why the Macedonian security forces were defeated, Ostreni again unwittingly confirmed the NLA’s aims in the 2001 war: “This inability to destroy the Albanian people’s desire for freedom was expressed through the NLA…” In other words, the NLA worked for “freedom” and not for any “rights”. And his army was so appropriately named a “Liberation” army…” (p. 94)

27.5. In the end, Ostreni has the audacity to teach us: “The Macedonians are only Macedonians together with the Albanians,” he says, “if they were with someone else they would be something else!” According to Ostreni, Macedonians have to be grateful for the treatment they get from Albanians!? Enough, isn’t it?

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28. It is worthwhile to note that during the 2001 war, the only country that helped Macedonia was the Ukraine. The Ukrainians sold us weapons and sent pilots to assist in the flying of
helicopters and airplanes that we purchased from them. It is also interesting to note that Condoleezza Rice, in her capacity as National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, put pressure on Kiev to stop all shipments of weapons to Macedonia!

29. At this point there is a need to ask: why did nobody, until today (2013), dare to investigate and document these events so critical to our country? Why didn’t anybody show any interest in examining the period that deformed the Macedonian state? Are we afraid that the United States will retaliate if we reveal its true role in the war? Is there anyone out there who would be willing to show that America’s goal was and still is to break up Macedonia?

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30. According to Petrovski, Slovenia did not accept the MPRI team and Macedonia expelled it in May 2001. But, it is well known that Croatia intensively used the services of MPRI during the War. The MPRI team arrived in Croatia in the fall of 1994 and through it Croatia cooperated militarily with the United States. It is believed that the MPRI had a significant role around operation “Storm” in 1995, which expelled several hundred thousand Serbs from Krajina.

31. Confirmation about the role the Americans played in the wars in Yugoslavia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia was given by the first ambassador to Zagreb, Peter Galbraith. In an interview with the Serbian weekly, according to “Dnevnik” of November 23, 2012 in the article “They achieved ‘Storm’ on account of Srebrenitsa” and the headline “Croatian action joint with the United States”, Galbraith said: “if Bihach fell it would have been much worse than Srebrenitsa, but I had to choose whether to allow another Srebrenitsa or to allow the Croats to attack Krajina”! (Let us remind you that this is how the Croatian operation “Storm” came about to expel nearly 300 thousand Serbs from Krajina!). Galbraith argued that “America would never have allowed the Croats to perform ‘Storm’ if Ratko Mladich had not previously ordered the massacre in Srebrenica”. Nothing remained ambiguous; Galbraith explained that operation
“Storm” would have gone even further if the Croats had not committed abominable crimes in Krajina. Galbraith said: “If the Croats in Krajina had not perpetrated atrocities and if they had not killed civilians and burned their houses, maybe Banja Luka would have fallen. Perhaps they would have had our support to continue their actions!” And if Banja Luka, the capital had fallen, Republika Srpska would have most likely disappeared! Galbraith now confirmed what we originally thought!

31.1. From what we have discovered from Galbraith about America’s role in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there should be no doubt as to who was pulling the strings in the atrocious wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Logically the question follows: “How much American involvement was there in previous operations in Bosnia and other battlegrounds across the former federation?” Is it possible that the Americans had sat “peacefully” on the sidelines before and done nothing? Thus allowing things to proceed without their “interference?” How many times, on other occasions, and elsewhere did they “permit” certain actions to take place or were they “silently” giving their consent?

31.2. Should we wait for some Americans involved in Macedonia to open the 2001 archives and tell us what was done here? Compared to operation “Storm” the war in Macedonia was short and strictly controlled without too many victims. The incursions from Kosovo were fully controlled. However, given the background, the basis for this war and the involvement of dark American figures, all secret service agents and military personnel, it would be very difficult to expect that someone would speak publicly about our war. No diplomats like Galbraith were involved in Macedonia. But for now, following the facts and arguments, part of which were presented in this analysis, we can assess with deep conviction that the Americans gave more than their implied consent and “silent” permission to the aggression against Macedonia in 2001 (Arachinovo…).

31.3. Those who follow world politics know that there is no mystery about the secret roles the Americans have played in the international arena, especially after World War II. The CIA and
other similar American agencies have been active everywhere. They had their own part in many events that changed the history of many countries. This is common knowledge. Unfortunately it may take 30, 40, or 50 years before the archives are opened and before we find out what really happened. But, as was common in the past, when that many years have elapsed no one really gives a damn about what happened. But there is a lesson in all this… history tends to repeat itself… In the last period we have more and more of such cases.

According to a “Dnevnik” story published on August 21, 2013 entitled “The CIA has admitted participation in a military coup in Iran” the CIA organized a coup in Iran in 1953 when Prime Minister Mosadek was ousted and the Shah Reza Pahlavi was put in charge. The reason for the ousting - Mosadek tried to nationalize Iranian oil. Energy was and still is the main reason for odd and inconsistent policies, tolerances, alliances, coups, bombings, etc. They took down Mosadek by launching a strong propaganda campaign against him, by corrupting parliamentarians, politicians and military figures and by organizing various protests and rallies...

Do you think that the CIA has changed its methods since then and it would not use similar tactics in Macedonia today, for example? Of course not, the CIA will do whatever is required of it! They don’t hide the fact that the problem with “the name” is very important to them. If they can ignore the UN Charter so that they can challenge our name, if they don’t respect the judgment of The Hague Court... both of which are internationally respected institutions, do you think they don’t have covert operations in Macedonia? If you add to that various “opinions”, “commitments”, “views”, “policies” and added “analysts”, “columnists”, “journalists”, closed and open societies, NGO’s, etc., that are launched in Macedonia and that they all had only one intention - to undermine the position of the country and to cause confusion... Isn’t it very similar to the actions done by the CIA to push down Mosadek and many others like him over the years?!
31.4. Mosadek certainly was not the only case. There are many others. According to an article published in “Nova Makedonija” on August 22, 2013 entitled “Dictators and democrats assassinated by the CIA”, there have been seven cases of confirmed military coups carried out by the CIA. These are: Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), the Dominican Republic and Congo (1961), Vietnam (1963), Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973).

Compared to these cases, the events in Macedonia were a mild exercise.

31.5 Not so long ago the U.S. military intervened in Grenada, Panama, the Dominican Republic... the last one being an interesting case. The justification for this aggression, which took place in 1965/66, was to restore democracy in the country. About this Henry Kissinger said: “There never was a democracy in the Dominican Republic!”

D. U.S. role in the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement

32. The concept of the Ohrid Agreement, prepared by Washington, is a superb illustration of the U. S. treatment of the Macedonian state and its people. In place of putting the Macedonian people as the central pillar of Macedonia and building everything else around it, they did just the opposite. They marginalized the Macedonian people. In fact, through the Ohrid Agreement, the U.S. prevented the development of a civil society which would have been a foundation for the new structure. Of course, as we now know their intentions were not honourable towards the Macedonian people. Certainly, and not by accident, Washington created a destructive system designed to develop a multi-ethnic confrontational society whose aims ultimately would be to split the country apart. The aim was for the Albanians to take as much control of Macedonia as possible, naturally with Washington’s backing. This is the way the “Greater Albania” project, crucial for the United States’ regional interests, can be realized. Just like the Fascist Italians did in the Second World War.
A civil society is not possible when a country is polarized along ethnic lines. In Macedonia’s case conditions have been set so that a unitary society will not be functional and Macedonia would be directed to become a bi-national state. If a civil concept was implemented, the U.S.A. would not have been able to use the Albanians in Macedonia for their interests. The Albanian factor in the country could not be monolithic and could not be manipulated from abroad.

32. 1. In the annex of the Ohrid Agreement, where changes to the constitution were formulated, the Preamble “Macedonian people” - was deleted! The idea was to annul the Macedonian character of the country! Later, following a number of fierce Parliamentary debates, not all of the proposed changes to the Constitution were implemented. Under Stojan Andov’s insistence the words “Macedonian people” were put back in the Preamble. In many places the Ohrid Agreement used the words “communities which are not a majority in Macedonia” and “majority” in place of Macedonians. The United States turned the Macedonian nation into an “unnamed” nation called “majority”. They did their best to avoid its mention in the entire Agreement as if the Macedonian people did not exist!

32. 2. "Our” negotiators working on the Ohrid Agreement must have agreed that the country had to lose its national, Macedonian character because, according to the Agreement they signed, the words “Macedonian people” had to be removed from the Constitution. Knowing that all neighbouring countries are national (except for Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose future is uncertain) and Greece has even proclaimed national homogeneity of its population, which is inconceivable in this region, then the proposed solutions are perfect proof of the American intentions concerning Macedonia.

32.3. Our politicians and “experts” swallowed all this up without considering its consequences… and it is certain that they will not pass the judgment of history.
32.4. One episode in Parliament that deserves special attention is when the words “Macedonian people” were “restored” to the Preamble of the Macedonian Constitution. Then the true intentions of the Ohrid Agreement creators were revealed. Stojan Andov set the conditions that if the words “Macedonian people” are removed from the Preamble, the amendments to the Constitution would never be passed. At that point the rest of the text was also revised giving the minorities a higher profile. The aim of this move, and we know who was behind the whole project, was to again belittle, degrade and devalue the majority nation (the Macedonian people) and its role in the country. Thus, minorities were “promoted” as “people who are part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serbian people, Roma people, Bosniak people and others...”! The cost of “returning” the words “Macedonian people” back into the Preamble was the elevation of “minorities” to “parts of other peoples”! There is no such solution anywhere in the world. But worse than that is the fact that neighbouring countries have been given an open door to meddle in Macedonian affairs as part of the rights “of their people”. And if at any time there is any perceived “possibility”, these countries can intervene on behalf of these people to “save” their state from being divided! At the same time, Greece and Bulgaria have yet to recognize the existence of any minorities, especially Macedonians, and they have been there for ages!

33. From a Macedonian perspective, the only positive outcome of this Agreement was that the unitary character of the state was left intact. The greatest failing was the lack of precise definition of the Macedonian language as a means for mutual communication. At the same time the limit of use of the Albanian language was not clearly defined. As a result, the portion of the Agreement relating to the Macedonian language is not implemented and is deliberately ignored by the Albanians. This will inevitably lead to problems later. If a country has no common language that everyone will learn and understand then such a country could easily prove to be not functional. The only language that can fulfill a state function is the Macedonian language but in order to achieve that we need to take decisive measures and regulate its implementation in accordance with the spirit of the Ohrid
Agreement before the unitary character of our country is jeopardized. The practice of non-acceptance of the Macedonian language by the Albanian population in Macedonia is not by coincidence but by design. It is designed to lead Macedonia away from its unitary character.

33.1. Essentially there is a fundamental need for the Macedonian language to be implemented and to serve as a unifying factor, which everyone must learn and use. It would have been the strongest guarantee for a stable future. Without a mandatory language for all to speak, there will be no survival for any federal let alone unitary state. If the unitary character of the state is not based on real and functional mechanisms then it means nothing.

33.2. Conversely to the Agreement, the Albanians, en masse, are consistently and illegally pushing and spreading the use of the Albanian language. The Albanian Ministers in the Government use official letterheads printed in Albanian only; documents for external use are printed in both Macedonian and Albanian (Besimi in the Ministry of Defense, for example); as ministers, they use the Albanian language in international communications - in meetings and correspondence; the Albanian presidents of Parliament’s commissions speak in Albanian, ignoring the fact that they represent the state and not the ethnic community; ministers also speak to the Macedonian media in Albanian… Someone could say that these are only small things to which we should not pay attention. That would be true, if the abuse was not deliberate. Unfortunately the abuse here is deliberate and is done for the sole purpose of expanding the use of the Albanian language at the expense of Macedonian. And, once it is an established practice it is not to be discussed.

Exactly because of that, the Macedonian government, in time, must vigorously react to prevent any manipulation aimed at the albanization of part or the whole of Macedonia. Items that are outside of the Ohrid agreement should not be allowed to be implemented unless both sides agree. Everything that is outside of the Ohrid Agreement is illegitimately acquired and should be stopped. These acts, coordinated and orchestrated by the
Albanian parties, and most probably backed by the U.S., are only designed to lead to the destruction of the Macedonian state.

33.3. It is crystal clear to the Albanian leaders that the Macedonian language is left as the last pillar of the unitary character of the state. So, it is obvious that they will do everything possible, well-planned and in the long-term, to break it down from all sides, little by little. Based on the Ohrid Agreement, Amendment B or the new Article 7 of the Macedonian Constitution says: “In the whole territory of the Republic of Macedonia and in International Relations the official language of use is the Macedonian language and the Cyrillic alphabet”. Unfortunately the Albanian leaders in Macedonia are enjoying everything from the Ohrid Agreement that fits their narrow and nationalistic interests, and ignore the rest. So, when you see the total mosaic it becomes obvious that they are interested only in the “Greater Albania” project.

33.4. The consequences are already visible; Albanians are bent on avoiding learning the Macedonian language. That is a technique of ghettoization and a fait accompli. Their purpose is twofold, a) to make the Macedonian language a barrier for communication and b) to create space for two languages, which they are persistently and stubbornly doing at this moment. Such a policy leads to the destruction not only of the unitary but, in particular, the Macedonian character of the state, leading to federalization. Everything moves along at an unprecedented level of absurdity: soon, it would appear, Macedonians will have to learn Albanian if they want to understand the Albanians and not vice versa. It is normal that Macedonians living in areas where the Albanian population is a majority already speak or will learn Albanian, but for their personal need and not as an obligation.

34. Another negative segment of the Agreement, which at first glance does not attract too much attention, was the requirement for new administrative divisions in the country. It may have looked like an easy job since the then 123 or so municipalities could not have survived. About fifty of them were too small and dysfunctional. According to Article 3.2 of the Ohrid Agreement “audit of municipal boundaries will be taken by local and
national authorities with international participation”. Why should the change of municipal boundaries be supervised and approved by foreigners such as the U.S.A.? During the signing of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement nobody from the Macedonian side thought that this was planned as a second stage of the destruction of the Macedonian state. They obviously did not suppose that the idea was to albanize parts of the country.

34.1. While nothing was suspicious on our side, everything had already been planned by the “facilitators” who were preparing the groundwork for the new administrative division leading to the albanization of Struga and Kichevo, and for Skopje to become bilingual followed by a good part of the country.

34.2. The process of albanizing parts of the country started in 2004 and was finalized with the 2013 local elections. That’s when the Albanian candidates openly began to campaign for mayors, claiming that voting for them meant the albanization of their municipalities underlining that it was the result of the new administrative division of the country. They stressed that it meant the realization of their dream. There is not a single argument that Washington was not behind this development. The Americans were active participants in determining the new boundaries of the municipalities in 2004 and they have put this obligation in the Ohrid Agreement. Well planned, isn’t it?

34.3. We have proof that everything that was said before is correct. Let us remind you that a referendum was organized to prevent the country’s devastating new administrative division. But then, quite unexpectedly, just before its eve, Washington partially and temporarily recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name and thus undermined the referendum. This is absolute confirmation that the United States stood behind the entire plan. The albanization of parts of Macedonia was so important to the Americans that they would do anything, even recognize Macedonia’s name, to ensure its success! They obviously took it as a viable and strategic step for fulfillment of their long-term interests.
34.4. After the war of 2001, when the U.S. failed to divide Macedonia by force, it took a different approach. It was clear to them that Macedonia could not be divided from the outside, but only from the inside. That is why they declared that it was no longer possible to change borders in the region. It seems that 2001 can be considered as the last attempt for changing the borders in the region – by force. Later it became difficult because any violent attempt at changing Macedonia’s borders could ignite the entire region. That is why the plans were adopted for Macedonia to be broken down by albanizing parts of it from the inside. The U.S. moves made in 2001 and 2004 are beginning to bear fruit today.

35. Another crucial negative political consequence of the Ohrid agreement was that, ipso facto, the Macedonians accepted a) the Macedonian state to be a Macedonian-Albanian creation, b) Macedonia’s main pillar was to be agreements between Macedonians and Albanians, and c) that everything can and should be negotiated…

Today, looking at all that from a regional aspect, there is not a single doubt that that was exactly what the U.S. wanted to achieve. The manoeuvering space of the Albanians has been enlarged and they misused it to the maximum. They are continually seeking and getting concessions, almost always unprincipled. Millimetre by millimetre they are making irreversible strategic gains. One time even Ahmeti admitted that the Albanians are not in any hurry. Of course, this was not Ahmeti’s policy, he is only implementing it. If the U.S. was not behind them, Albanian behaviour in Macedonia and in the wider region would have been very different.

35.1. On top of everything Thachi is making claims (2012) that the Ohrid Agreement is now dead and that a new Agreement is required, one written by Thachi. Today he has new ideas on how Macedonia should look and tomorrow someone else will present new unprecedented Albanian requests: until the project of “Greater Albania” is finalized. It is a process that flows and its coordination functions flawlessly. This certainly does not mean
that Washington is behind all these Albanian demands. There are also genuine Albanian demands but they are not substantial.

36. The fact is that the Ohrid Agreement truly opened ways for improving the position of the Albanians in Macedonia. In the past, one can argue that they were exposed to many injustices, most of which were inherited from the Yugoslav Federation, which required immediate attention. However, during the Yugoslav breakup Macedonia itself was in a difficult situation. But there is no justification for why the then leadership did not recognize the problem and place it on the table. This was a serious mistake. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that a) the 2001 war was foreign aggression with aims at occupying (“liberating”, for the Albanians) parts of Macedonia, b) the war in no way had a “humanitarian” character and c) the war was definitely not started because of the unresolved status of the Albanians in Macedonia. The “excuse” that the war was started for “humanitarian” reasons, is a textbook lie exploiting our uneasiness to address this problem on time.

37. The Ohrid Agreement a) is one sided, b) it devalues the position of the Macedonians, i.e. the majority of the population, and c) it did not establish bases for long-term stability of the country. On the contrary, the Agreement is worded such that it could easily jeopardize the survival of the Macedonian state. Of course this was not done by accident. All kinds of controversial mechanisms were introduced to regulate, in detail, the Albanian needs without limiting their possible future requests while neglecting the other ethnic communities in the country. On the other hand, the position of the majority, i.e. the Macedonians, is not at all regulated, leaving them very little manoeuvering room.

38. There should be no doubt that the Ohrid Agreement was one of the biggest strategic mistakes of the state. It was not the choice of the country’s leadership, but rather it was imposed by the U.S. That is why Frowick, through the OSCE Mission, Perdue, Feith and all the other bullies, I mean “facilitators”, were sent to Macedonia. The fact that Frowick secretly, without the knowledge of the Macedonian authorities, promoted the draft of the Ohrid Agreement, through the Prizren Declaration, says it all.
It is true, our leaders were under extreme American pressure and influence but as well naïve and ignorant enough to accept the unacceptable. Agreeing, for example, to sign a document that removed the words “Macedonian people” from the Preamble of the Constitution, demonstrates extreme amateurism through unacceptable and unthinkable indulgence. We don’t need any more arguments to describe the level of competence in “our” negotiators in Ohrid.

38.1. By saying this we are not implying or advocating that the Ohrid Agreement should be ignored or disregarded. What was done was done but the Agreement needs to be implemented because we signed it. It is very difficult to correct historical errors. We now must live with it while trying to minimize the damage. Unfortunately it seems that we are repeating our mistakes, making the damage bigger and bigger, as we sit on the sidelines and watch things take shape. What we should be doing is not permit, at any cost, anything to take place outside of the Agreement, or anything that might lead to ruining the unitary status of our country, or to become part of the “Greater Albania” project… which in Macedonia happens almost every day! Even the parts of the Agreement which we erroneously accepted must only permit a selective part to be implemented, only what is convenient for the Albanians but does not harm the state and the Macedonians. We cannot allow all parts to be implemented that only serve the interest of the other side!

39. The above examples partially illustrate how and where the Ohrid Agreement is misused. In a subtle way, without scruples, it is being widened so that illegitimate gains can be made by illegal use of force. Then, while Macedonia is being slowly and progressively albanized, the Macedonian political leaders are concentrating on creating coalitions to hold on to power or combining forces to take over power.

40. It is completely absurd to be in a political situation where the Albanians, as part of the government coalition, almost openly and persistently work on the “Greater Albania” project, while the Macedonian opposition is attacking and condemning the government for not being flexible enough with regards to
Albanian demands! Claiming that the ruling party was holding its coalition partner (DUI) under its control! Anyone, even one with very little political knowledge can see the negative processes at play here. If this was not an unbelievable and pitiful situation it would have been very funny. The reason the opposition is acting this way is very clear - to undermine the coalition and gain power even at the expense of national interests!

40.1. At one point a wonderful solution was found for responsible management of the demographic policy that would not touch very sensitive inter-ethnic relations. The birth rate of the Albanians is very high, probably the highest in Europe, and that of the Macedonian is very low. The proposal was to stimulate higher birth rates in municipalities with low births no matter who lives there. But before such a policy could be implemented, one of the top opposition leaders, Shekerinska, strongly opposed it. She publicly said: “And what will the Albanians and the other ethnic communities think of such a program, that we are working to prevent demographic changes in Macedonia?” (Shekerinska: “How will the Albanians interpret a program for higher birthrates?” “Nova Makedonija”, September 18, 2008)

Shekerinska is probably not aware or is ignoring the fact that balanced demographic development is one of the most important responsibilities for a government to implement. She obviously has no concern for the changes in the Macedonian demographic structure which, for some time now, had extremely negative tendencies with unforeseeable consequences. She does not understand or refuses to admit that these changes are not random but well-planned, a result of Albanian political and religious social forces working behind them. (We already mentioned that religious leaders would not allow their young worshippers into their mosques unless they had five children!). It is high time these tendencies are changed. Shekerinska, obviously, wants to “protect” the Albanians because her political ambitions cannot be achieved without their support. The Albanians know the “Platform for the solution of the national Albanian question”, an official document of Tirana, where it was planned through a high birth rate to increase their numbers in Macedonia in order to achieve their political goals. But Shekerinska has either not read
the Platform, or has not understood it, or is simply ignoring it. There is no fourth possibility.

40.2. What was unclear to Shekerinska was quite clear to the people from the village Dolno Sonje, near Skopje. Sopishte Municipality is mainly inhabited by Macedonians but there are several villages where only Albanians live. In total the municipality has a low birth rate. So a villager from Sonje commented: “Now Albanians from other places will come to the villages in our municipality, with the singular purpose of receiving incentives for the many children they will bear”!

40.3. With regards to the incentives for higher birth rates, nothing happened. The Constitutional Court, for reasons only known to the judges, annulled the law. The explanation given was that it was only for primary school level. The Constitutional Court and its judges should be ashamed of themselves for being uncountable and for the damage they did to our country.

In Macedonia everything is possible. We have people high up in the party’s hierarchies who not only have insufficient knowledge about geo-politics or geo-strategies but also have lack of simple judgment. The top executives of the judiciary, in this particular case, have demonstrated no knowledge of or even a sense of our key social problems, which require urgent attention. But worse than that is that these people think that they know everything and care only about their own careers and/or parties, which seem to be more important to them than the well-being of the state.

40.4. Let us remind the reader that the Albanians have achieved a stage where they can block Macedonians in more senior positions if they have opposed Albanian demands in any way. Thus the Albanians have a kind of control over the Macedonians and they are very careful in addressing Albanian interests. That might hurt their careers. So the Macedonian politicians keep quiet, pretending they do not see the realization of the “Greater Albania” project. As a matter of fact the Macedonian politicians themselves are responsible for the inferior position they are in and why they do not have any influence in the selection of the Albanians, in government and other high positions. We should all
remember, for example, when they said no NLA commander will ever be promoted to a high public position. Very soon, after the first election in which DUI participated, this promise was neglected. Many NLA commanders are and were ministers in the Macedonian government. Even the one who shut down the drinking water supply to the taps from Lipkovo Lake was made minister. Instead of sending him to be tried in The Hague he was made minister... The latest news is that one of them became Minister of Defense!?

41. There is no doubt that the Ohrid Agreement put an end to the 2001 war in Macedonia and helped sort out a number of injustices that the Albanians had been exposed to in Macedonia. These changes must be welcomed. Unfortunately, the Agreement has a serious negative twist as well: it has laid the groundwork for accelerating the “Greater Albania” project tendencies which, unless seriously treated now, will create grave consequences in the future. Even though in principle Macedonia’s unitary character has been left intact, in practice it has been attacked and very little to nothing has been done to stop or reverse its erosion. No agreement can be eternal or irrevocable. The latest proof of this is the Interim Accord, signed with Greece in 1995, which has proven to be worthless. The Americans stand behind that Agreement as well as behind Ohrid. The result is known – the clause in the Interim Accord that obliged Greece not to hinder Macedonia from joining NATO and the EU – is not respected anymore. By the U.S.A. as well! And that was one of the two points of the Accord that were in favour of Macedonia. All the rest defended Greek interests. If they didn’t keep their word for the first agreement, how do we know that the U.S. will continue supporting Macedonia’s unitary character as “guaranteed” by the Ohrid Agreement? Or will they change their position immediately after they assess that it is no longer part of their plans?

42. The fact that, unlike the Macedonian, the Albanian side in Ohrid had foreign experts, speaks for the lack of responsibility of our top leadership. It was an unpardonable mistake. Obviously, they underestimated the historical importance of the event and the consequences of the war.
43. Days before the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, fierce and bloody pressure was placed on Macedonia to capitulate and accept the proposed agreement. Macedonian politicians were intimidated with threats of escalating the war on many fronts. Then shortly before August 13, the terrorists carried out several missions during which they massacred 18 members of the Macedonian Army and wounded many others...

43.1. The Karpalak incident took place on August 8, 2001 when 10 Army reservists were ambushed and killed. According to General Zvonko Stoianovski, commander of the BB and PVO (“Testimony” by Pande Petrovski, p. 181): “At 9:30 a.m. that day a KFOR helicopter flew over the area. At 10:00 a.m. we flew over the Karpalak area with our helicopters where we saw two NATO vehicles (two jeeps). One vehicle drove off and escaped while the other one hid in Novo Selo...” On page 177 Petrovski wrote: “...Karpalak would not have happened if the Supreme Commander had not listened to its ‘advisors’ before signing the Framework Agreement...” and continued - “Even now it is still not clear to me who ordered the withdrawal of the Karpalak police post on August 6, 2001, the Ministry of Defense and General Headquarters were not informed about that!”

The ambush took place at 9:30 am, exactly when the KFOR helicopter flew into the zone. Obviously they wanted to see for themselves if their plan was being implemented properly. Two hundred kilograms of explosives were also placed on the highway to demolish it but the presence of the Macedonian helicopters scared off the terrorists before they had a chance to blow it up.

43.2. On August 9, 2001 five workers were kidnapped from GP “Mavrovo” and then their bodies were “ornately carved” with knives. The “Engravers” were never punished even though the authorities knew who they were.
43.3. After that it was the attack in Radusha. About that, on pages 186 and 187, Petrovski wrote: “We knew that the NLA had a ‘recruit training camp’ near the Krivenik, inside Kosovo, about one kilometre from the border... The terrorists who launched the attack, from the Kosovo side and at the same time from inside the village Radusha, were allowed to freely communicate with Krivenik even though KFOR forces were there beside them on the other side of the border.” There had been a conflict in Radusha earlier but it was not as fierce as this one. The attack began on the night of August 10, 2001 with the offensive originating in Krivenik, lasting three days. According to intelligence sources, 600 terrorists were aided by volunteers from the Kosovo Protection Corps. Their goal was to occupy the water sources in Rasche, which supplied Skopje with water.

43.4. On August 10, 2001, eight Macedonian soldiers were killed and six were wounded when a mine was exploded at the entrance of the village Liuboten.

43.5. Days before the Ohrid Agreement there was news that an imminent NLA attack on Sarai was going to take place on August 13, 2001 (p. 201/202). This was psychological warfare against Macedonia to keep it in constant vigilance and wear it down with fabricated news about the number of NLA attacks that were going to take place...

43.6. If anyone believes that all this escalation, before signing the Ohrid Agreement, was the doing of the Albanians alone, they are lying to themselves. Why was there a KFOR helicopter flying over Karpalak and two NATO jeeps visiting the area at the exact time when the ambush took place? All this was organized and the doing of someone a lot more sophisticated than the Albanians. Someone was monitoring and directing activities from the distance with sweeping strokes. Who could that possibly have been? The readers can decide for themselves.

The Ohrid Agreement was signed on August 13, 2001. The additional pressure obviously did its job. Under the circumstances even more capable negotiators than the Macedonians would have probably found themselves in a bind.
E. Events with broad and long-term consequences

44. Washington’s role in the structuring of the Ohrid Agreement was a logical continuation and an important step in the implementation of the already established U.S. policy towards Macedonia and the Macedonian people, which it has systematically and persistently followed since the breakup of Yugoslavia. Slowly but surely, the space for “Macedonian-ism” narrowed as Macedonia’s roots were being progressively cut. By all indications, if we continue not to resist they will carry on and cut our roots until we disappear. If we remain like this, that moment is not very far.

44.1. What exactly do they want to accomplish with all these policies? Their aim is to close, once and for all, the “Macedonian Question”. What is important to them is that we stand in the way of the realization of the “Greater Albania” project which is very important for U.S. long-term interests in the region. In more than 20 years of an independent Macedonia, Washington has done nothing to help us and everything to push us further down into the abyss. Publicly it has shown us a friendly face but behind the scenes it has played a different card. We can list incident after incident (recognition of the country, UN admission, NATO blockade…) where the United States has always, without exception, worked against even the most basic Macedonian interests.

44.2. The Americans, it appears, are still not fully aware of Macedonia’s vitality and of the Macedonian people’s durability. They have not learned the lessons of history that Macedonians cannot be eradicated without a great war. Their planners, on the other hand, must have considered the realities on the ground and properly respect the Macedonian people’s enormous tolerance.

However, the ball is now in their court but in ours as well. If we don’t soon start a proper, robust action to remain who we are, the future will be extremely uncertain. So far our indecision, lack of coordination, lack of dedication, low level of professionalism... have done nothing to bring us desired results. In fact, the way we
have acted so far has been detrimental to our people and to our country and very convenient for the other side. It is high time we stand up for ourselves and tell the Americans - Enough!

45. The above has already been confirmed by up to date crushing results. With the Framework Agreement, for example, our state has been recomposed in a terrible way, much worst than what the Greeks, Serbians, or Bulgarians have done. Or all of them put together! It should not be forgotten that they all have claims on our territory, our people, our church, etc. The United States however has directly handicapped Macedonia worst than they have done put together.

46. In order to overcome the current impasse Macedonia finds itself in, our historians must, as soon as possible, seriously examine the 2001 war. Without knowing what exactly happened, it will be hard to build a future of this country. We need to speak up loudly as to why the 2001 war took place and who stood behind it. We must specify all the reasons why we were defeated. Someone will have to bear responsibility for us losing the war and for the unacceptable restructuring of our state. Accountability will have to start from the top and work its way down to the advisors who played the role of “Kissinger” in Ohrid. The last ones may have had no command responsibility, but they too will have to bear at least moral consequences for their incompetence in the preparation of the Framework Agreement.

47. Documenting the recent past cannot and should not lead to questioning the position of the Albanians in society. It is undeniable that the Agreement did resolve certain problems that faced our fellow Albanians for too long. That must be respected. But still, we must emphasize that a war was not needed to overcome these problems. But, on the other hand, we cannot tolerate any retaliation, which is present on the political scene.

48. With regards to the position of the Albanians in Macedonia, and the mistakes that undoubtedly were made, it would be interesting to mention the initiative that Tupurkovski launched in the 1990’s. He called for a “historical agreement with the Albanians” in Macedonia. What we don’t know, however, is if he
had something concrete in mind or if it was purely a political bluff. But if we look at this from today’s perspective, Tupurkovski was right, something had to be done. Indeed, in that period Macedonia was confronted with a permanent crisis, but instead of opening up the issue, we held anti-Albanian demonstrations in the park in front of the Assembly and behaved in an uncivilized and shameful manner towards them. The organizers and participants of these demonstrations, instead of being ashamed of themselves for what they did, some of them made political careers thanks to that event!

The government too showed no understanding of the problem and then the opposition party took us back to the beginning of the 20th century advocating its next congress to be held in Solun... The consequences of such immaturity and incompetence, of the main leaders, who then were less than 30 years old, will be felt for a long time.

49. American attitudes towards Macedonia will inevitably have to be analyzed in the context of Greek politics and interests. Washington has supported Greek aspirations but only because of convenience. The near future may show that U.S. policies may be just as dangerous and harmful to Greece, as they have been for Macedonia! There are over one million Albanians currently living in Greece... Around 600 thousand are legal and the rest are illegal immigrants. They control organized crime and generate huge amounts of money... At the same time the issue of “Chamiria” is hanging in the air... which can be activated at any time, especially now that the Greek state is rapidly declining as a result of its deep economic crisis. If this problem is not solved and continues to drag on with the same intensity, the “Albanian national question” is sure to surface there too. It is inevitable.

50. During informal talks in Moscow in 2006 it was proven that this was not a hypothesis. Teuta Arifi, then president of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, said: “I told Ahmeti that it was a great problem, that there are no appropriate conditions in Greece, so we can do there what we did in Macedonia in 2001!” This is not something that Arifi made up on
the fly; it is part of the Albanian political creed. Frightening isn’t it?

50.1. Albanians, so far, have demonstrated complete loyalty and have carried out Washington’s directives to the maximum. The new partnership is working well and the relationship of the two sides continues to strengthen. The crisis in Greece would eventually determine what role the Albanians will play in that country. If the state survives the crisis and restores positive energy and economic growth, the Albanian problem may be delayed. But if the chaos continues and persists, Washington may play its role with the local Albanians in Greece as it did in Macedonia.

The first victim of the new American policy in the Balkans was Serbia (Kosovo and Kraina in Croatia), the second was Macedonia (2001), where the story is not yet over. Will there be a third?

51. This is confirmation that U.S. policy is not complementary to Greece’s long-term interests. Athens had its own merit for denying the Macedonian state’s existence and thus leaving itself on thin ice. Washington is using this at its maximum but, in the end, Greece may turn out to be the biggest loser.

52. Anti American sentiments are very often demonstrated in Greece. Athens keeps flirting with Moscow and buying weapons from Russia even though it has been a long time member of NATO. How does Washington feel about that? In fact after the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, Turkey became the new leader in the Balkans, at the expense of Greece. Socialism is no longer a threat and therefore Greece’s role as a protector from neighbouring socialist countries is no longer required. Turkey is an increasingly important global player. Its presence and influence in the region and beyond is rapidly growing thanks to its fast economic growth. Turkey also plays an important role in the so-called “Turko-phonic” countries in Central Asia (Tadzhikistan...).
U.S. interest in Turkey grows as interest for Greece remains limited and reduced.

53. Finally, it is important to remind the American strategic planners that Albania and the Albanians, after World War II, were at first Yugoslavia’s best friends, then they quickly became best friends with the USSR and finally with China. But then they broke relations with all of them and labeled their former friends a band of criminals. Now they have embraced the Americans but until when? When building its policies towards Macedonia and the Macedonian people, Washington should remember that alliances and partnerships are not forever...

54. If we are to objectively analyze the situation we will find that a stable, lasting and prosperous Macedonia is the best solution for everyone. Starting with Greece and going through Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Kosovo and all the way to Brussels and Washington. Macedonia has not disputed or threatened anyone. Tolerance and patience are the two main characteristics of the Macedonian people. This is how it has been for centuries and this is how it will remain in the future. If you look at the last two hundred years no one has suffered from Macedonian aggression because such an aggression does not exist. Rather, the Macedonians have always been victims of foreign interests and aspirations. This is how it was yesterday and this is how it is today. But this must end, sooner better than later. In the interest of peace in the region. The quicker everyone realizes that, the better it will be for all of us.

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55. As a rule, the big and strong never admit their mistakes but continue to push their agendas to the end. For that reason we will close this section with the fact that the U.S. completed its role in the war of 2001 in a very “logical” way! Two Macedonians were tried in The Hague Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, one was convicted! Albanians were not tried at all. The victims of the war were sent to the Tribunal, most probably in order to justify, verify and validate the war as – “humanitarian”! The aggressors, some of whom had “carved” human bodies; or turned off pipes and left
people without drinking water for days; or blasted buildings with workers tied inside against poles... never reached The Hague. And on top of that, they were fully pardoned.

This, of course, was not done voluntarily by the Macedonian authorities. Even though, some years later former NATO Secretary-General Robertson said: “You amnestied them yourselves! Nobody forced you!” This was only partially true but it was done only because the pressure was fierce. It was others, the non-Macedonians, or so-called “facilitators” that alone led the dance during those times when Macedonia was being beheaded. Still, the message given was crystal clear - ‘you can refuse and be selective!’ Then afterwards they said: ‘it was up to you to defend your position and if you did nobody would have imposed anything on you, by force… it would have been a different solution!’

This is true. But only if the Macedonian side had the means, understanding and proper evaluation of the situation, as well as access to experienced advisors, perhaps the situation would have turned out differently...

Then on the other hand we have the American hypocrisy where the victims were prosecuted yet the aggressors enjoyed the glory of their victory! Absurdity has truly reached new heights and the U.S. demonstrated that it could do whatever it wanted to the Macedonians!

The best film screenwriters should envy the American strategy planners for the scenario they prepared for Macedonia...

56. The fact that The Hague Tribunal played more of a political role than a legal one, was confirmed by Danish judge Fredirik Harhov (“We were pushed to release Gotovina and Markach”, “Dnevnik”, June 15, 2013). Not that this was not clear, but more importantly this testimony comes from the inside. In a letter addressed to his Court colleagues and to 40 or so other people, Harhov claimed that: “The Hague Court does not deal justice, it implements policy decisions.” Harhov accused U.S. Judge
Theodor Meron, President of the Court, of “influencing the other judges in the case of Gotovina and Perishich…”

According to the same “Dnevnik” article, American journalist Chuck Sudetich who reported on the war in Yugoslavia for the “New York Times”, for the “The Economist”, wrote: “Hitler would probably be relieved of all responsibility for the Holocaust if he were tried by the standards now applied at The Hague.”

And now that the U.S. is mixed up in the affairs of the accused persons from Croatia and Slovenia, where the Americans were not directly involved in the wars, how do you think they will fare in comparison to those involved in the 2001 war which was under direct American control? Will the Americans let their partners and executives be tried at the Tribunal? I don’t think so! The Tribunal is there only for the subjects from the other warring side – who will be treated completely different. The Americans, together with the Albanians, are “humanitarians”. The Macedonians – war criminals!
VI – Chossudovsky’s Analysis

1. Another valuable source of information about the 2001 war in Macedonia was from Michael Chossudovsky who wrote a number of articles in 2001, all of which are available online on the internet. Chossudovsky, as we will show, has proof that the 2001 war was led by the U.S. and that Macedonia was, no doubt, a victim of America in that war. One of the most interesting texts he has written is the article: “Macedonia: Washington’s Military Intelligence Ploy”, released on June 17, 2001.

Chossudovsky, a well-known analyst, immediately recognized that the hints given by the Americans that NATO was going to intervene to “save” Macedonia were pure propaganda! Who was NATO going to save Macedonia from? The NLA?! Chossudovsky wrote: “It is well-documented that the NLA terrorists are directly related to the KLA who were armed and trained by Washington. So why would the United States intervene under the umbrella of NATO against the army that represents its own interests?” Chossudovsky estimated that the “U.S. used KLA fighters against the Macedonian military.” According to Chossudovsky, “even though U.S. troops in KFOR were not directly involved, MPRI, which was contracted by the Pentagon, advised the KLA and its NLA representatives in Macedonia.”

According to Chossudovsky “military personnel from the Kosovo Protection Corps had joined the NLA and so did G’zim Ostreni, the Kosovo Protection Corp’s Chief of Staff who at the time was still being paid by the UN. He was appointed ‘Second Commander’ of the NLA.” Ostreni’s UN salary was not terminated even though he left his UN job!

Chossudovsky also said that there was deep friendship between General Richard Griffiths and KLA commander Agim Cheku.

Griffiths, who at the time was director of the MPRI program in Macedonia, according to Chossudovsky, was “the bridge between the two armies”, which gathered intelligence from the Macedonian army and passed it on to Agim Cheku and his MPRI
colleagues who then advised the KLA in Kosovo. He also informed MPRI headquarters in Virginia, which was in close contact with the Pentagon.”

Chossudovsky also acknowledged that in 2001, MPRI’s venture in Macedonia was coordinated with another operation sponsored by the CIA. The head of the OSCE Mission in Skopje was none other than Robert Frowick. Chossudovsky wrote: “Following Washington’s instructions, Frowick managed to engage the NLA directly into the political scene…”

2. Frowick’s role in Macedonia, according to Chossudovsky, was identical to CIA agent William Walker in Kosovo. Walker was head of the OSCE mission in Prishtina. It is well-known that Walker staged an absolutely fictional motive (the armed conflict between the KLA and the Serbian military was presented as a massacre against the civilian population) to justify the bombing of Yugoslavia.

Chossudovsky concluded that “It is public knowledge now in Macedonia that both the Macedonian government and the Macedonian army collaborated with the enemy, called the United States”. Whether they knew that the United States was the enemy or not, that is a different question…?

3. Chossudovsky also confirmed that Frowick was obliged to establish a connection between the Albanian political parties in Macedonia and NLA terrorists because the PDP and DPA were not up to date with current events. This is a key confirmation that the 2001 war in Macedonia was an American project.

In an article published on August 29, 2001 Chossudovsky wrote: “The Framework Agreement had no connection with any ‘peace’! It was a document that required the surrender of a sovereign state to the enemy…” About J. Pardew, who represented himself to the foreign media as a “foreign facilitator”, Chossudovsky concluded: “His military intelligence mandate was to assist, through pressure, intimidation and political manipulation, in the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.”
Chossudovsky also wrote a lot of other articles from which we have taken the following quotes:

“It is now fully documented that Washington was behind the terrorist attacks in Macedonia. While State Secretary Colin Powell reaffirmed U.S. determination to combat terrorism, U.S. military advisors were working together with the NLA terrorists.”

“Among the terrorists retreating from Arachinovo, there were 17 MPRI instructors.”

“When the terrorists were defeated in Arachinovo and raised a white flag, OSCE and NATO were in a panic and immediately ordered a stop to the Macedonian military action.”

“OSCE and KFOR entered Arachinovo and ‘saved’ 500 terrorists and, along with their weapons, took them to the village Radusha, where they renewed their attacks killing civilians and carrying out ethnic cleansing in several Macedonian villages...”

“Macedonian security forces claimed that 70% of the equipment the terrorists used in Arachinovo was U.S. made, including the sophisticated third generation night vision cameras...”

“NATO transported the terrorists from one place to another and re-armed them instead of taking their weapons.”

“In the middle of March 2001, the Pentagon approved the use of a few drones to monitor the Macedonian-Kosovo border. There are indications that the information gathered was sent to the MPRI instructors who were with the terrorists.”

“In Tetovo Region, in villages inhabited by Macedonians, ethnic cleansing was done in the presence of American military personnel who then advised the terrorist commanders.”

“This terrible military intelligence enterprise was made possible because the Macedonian President and some of his associates were American puppets.”
“The British special forces, who trained the KLA terrorists in 1999, also arranged the handover or surrender of NLA weapons.”

“Among the NLA fighters there were Albanian volunteers from the United States who have joined the NLA with agreement from the U.S. government.”

“The International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch are working secretly for NATO and “are an integral part of the military-intelligence enterprise” in Macedonia. “Their job is to influence public opinion in Macedonia and to turn the people against the Macedonian government but not against the U.S., NATO, or the IMF.”

If only ten percent of what Chossudovsky has written is true then there is already enough evidence to grasp the reality of the situation. It is well-known to us that everything he has done is absolutely true.

All of Chossudovsky’s articles can be found online under the heading: “Chossudovsky on Macedonia”.
VII – Why did the U.S.A. recognize Macedonia by its proper name in 2004?

1. Many among us, including numerous politicians, do not know what actually happened in November 2004. If you recall, a referendum was being prepared to prevent new administrative divisions from taking place. The aim of these divisions was to albanize Struga and Kichevo and to introduce bilingualism in Skopje. If there was bilingualism in the capital then it was only a matter of time before a large part of the country became bilingual. And this is exactly what happened because the referendum was prevented from taking place. Now the Albanian language has infiltrated into state agencies, public institutions, clinics, other agencies, etc., and is working its way into the larger firms, service industries, etc.

1.2. In order to achieve the required quota of 20 percent of Albanians in the Skopje community, Skopje region was restructured unnaturally to include rural municipalities and villages that had a predominantly Albanian population. The same was done with Struga and Kichevo... Instead of “tightening up” Skopje to enable it to become rapidly urbanized as a true metropolis of our independent state, we turned it into a provincial city in the worst possible way.

2. Macedonians traditionally don’t like referendums and may have not participated in the prevention of the administrative divisions, especially since the ruling SDSM called for a boycott. The Americans, however, were concerned and did not want to take the chance that the referendum would succeed because it would have prevented their plans to albanize parts of the country. So, clearly intending to undermine the referendum, on its eve, the United States announced that it had recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name! There followed a great eruption of euphoria, all organized by the Macedonian government, which did not want a referendum. It meant – don’t worry, America is with us! It seemed to everybody, with no exceptions, that this was a serious push for the country in the name dispute. Initially, no one knew why the U.S. had recognized Macedonia’s name and very few
were even aware that the recognition was only for bilateral communications. But over time everything became clear.

2. 1. The unexpected American recognition of Macedonia’s historical and constitutional name was received with much fervour and was seen as a significant step forward in relations between the two countries. Unfortunately, our first impressions turned out to be completely wrong. We soon discovered that the recognition did nothing and carried no special meaning. It even turned out to be detrimental to Macedonia’s long-term interests. For the Americans it was a temporary sacrifice of a chess piece for achieving their final victory. It was a calculated American move designed, in the long-term, to aid the implementation of U.S. policy in Macedonia; a policy which ignores the fundamental interests of the Macedonian people. A policy that would irreversibly Albanize Struga and Kichevo and inappropriately introduce broad use of the Albanian language in Macedonia, while the Macedonian people essentially got nothing in return.

3. Even though it was strictly for bilateral communications, Macedonia’s constitutional name was recognized with much glamour by the U.S. However, the same had long been a practice with almost all Western countries. The UK (from 1999), Germany, Italy, Sweden, Austria and even France had all already been using our name for bilateral needs. They all did it quietly, without any fuss, probably because of the great injustice they had committed against the Macedonian people and maybe to avoid objections from Greece.

4. Athens reacted furiously, which in turn increased the pleasure in Skopje. It was reported that it was a violent shock for most Greeks. Today, however, we can see that it was only a good acting job! It was unbelievable that Washington would take such a step without first informing Athens!? But, as it turned out America’s recognition of Macedonia caused no damage to Greece, outside of some short lasting propaganda. There were absolutely no serious consequences of this outcome that proved to be unfavourable for Athens. On the contrary, it led to a total turnaround in U.S. policy in their favour, at the expense of
Macedonia. It was precisely after Bucharest that the U.S. started to openly require Macedonia to change its name, something that had never happened before.

5. The referendum failed but the planned, permanent and irreversible albanization of those territories succeeded. The Americans realized their vision. The new administrative division was one of modern Macedonia’s biggest strategic mistakes. And the American acceptance of the Constitutional name brought no benefits for the country! Just the opposite! After that Washington hardened its treatment of Macedonia which, three years or so later, became apparent in 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest. Here the U.S. did a complete turnaround in its reference to Macedonia and went fully in favour of Greece. Macedonia’s entry into NATO and the EU was blocked and the country was blackmailed to change its name before becoming a member, meaning to change the identity of its people, as well. Such a change in NATO policy could only have be driven by – the U.S. No other country could have done this, least of all Greece. The only power that had such authority was, without a doubt, the U.S.A. The arguments mentioned in this text will prove it. One of these arguments is the fact that Washington is the only entity that permanently and most frequently asks for Macedonia to change its name!

6. After the Bucharest episode, the United States not only started, for the first time, to openly advocate for Macedonia to change its name but also introduced violent pressure to do it. Reeker, U.S. Ambassador to Skopje, made these demanded even through the media! In his interview with “Dnevnik” (“There are no talks about the identity”, June 8, 2009) he openly said: “This country needs to find a name in order to start moving further towards full integration!” In other words if we don’t find a name, according to Reeker, there will be no “integration”! If this is blackmail or not is up to the readers to decide.

If Reeker’s colleague in Athens had acted in Macedonia’s interests, like Reeker did in Skopje, he would have been expelled immediately and relations with the U.S., if not broken, would have certainly been - frozen. But here in Macedonia it is not like
that and that is the reason why people like Reeker can do whatever they want.

7. Another important facet in U.S. policy towards Macedonia is the fact that the Americans insist that we “need to agree” with Greece, emphasizing that if we do, the U.S. will respect our agreement. This message is very clear – if Macedonia changes its name and Greece accepts this, the U.S. will be the first to use it! So the partial acceptance of our Constitutional name by Washington, done so glamorously in 2004, will no longer be valid! This episode will go down in history as the most tragic event in our existence. At the same time, the albanized parts of Macedonia, realized thanks to our acceptance of this, will remain forever! This should be a good reminder for us of what real American politics are and how naïve we are. The partial American acceptance of Macedonia’s name is a textbook case of chess: short term sacrifice for the final victory.

8. At an informal meeting with a top U.S. diplomat from the Embassy in Skopje (in 2010), after it had been assessed by him that the U.S. had accepted Macedonia’s name only for the referendum to fail and that, as a result, parts of Macedonia were albanized, he gave an unexpectedly direct and honest answer. He said “Yes, we achieved our goal.” And then he asked: “What can we now do and what offers can we make to you to accept a new name?!”

American pragmatism indeed has no limits. They pretend to be our friends by using our name in bilateral relations but at the same time they try their best to get Macedonia to change its name. They do not hide that they will be the first to use the new name if we capitulate!

Did Prlichev think of the Americans when he wrote, “They have faces of saints and hearts of wolves?”
A. The Interim Accord

The Interim Accord, signed by Macedonia and Greece on September 13, 1995 was not an obligation derived from the Security Council Resolution with which Macedonia was admitted to the UN. There is no legal connection between the Interim Agreement and the Security Council Resolution, only a functional one. Unfortunately, with the Interim Accord Macedonia’s position in the dispute has been considerably devalued. The language used in the Interim Accord is much worse for Macedonia compared to its use in the UN document.

Since we know that the Interim Accord was an American initiative then we should not be surprised by the formulation of the text, in which hidden are initiatives which are contrary to our long-term interests.

1.1. The Interim Accord was drafted with the active participation of former mediator Cyrus Vance and is naturally a logical segment of Washington’s mosaic of a long-term policy towards Macedonia; a policy which we will try to evaluate in this book. The Agreement was signed under the direct involvement of American diplomat Holbrook, commonly referred to as the “bulldozer”. So the question is - “why was Holbrook involved if this was not a United States initiative, i.e. if the U.S. was not behind the whole name issue”? Holbrook, definitely, did not become involved because the UN Secretary-General asked him!?!?

The way the Interim Accord was handled is clear proof that Washington managed both the name problem and its mediation. Let us not dismiss that Athens too was involved in the preparation of the Accord.

2. The Interim Accord was well thought out and designed to achieve a number of specific goals.
First, the Interim Accord came into being because there was a need to establish normal communication between Macedonia and Greece. Most probably, it was a result of the “tolerance” demonstrated by Macedonia.

Second, the Interim Accord was to be the vehicle by which issues of interest to both parties were to be resolved, even though the accord was designed to favour Greece. But we can’t say it was all bad. Despite the damage it inflicted, there were certain benefits that emerged from it. One being Greek recognition of Macedonia…

Third, with the Interim Accord, Macedonia, for the first time, was forced to officially accept that there was a problem with her name. The document was signed with our country being nameless… i.e. being referred to as “the second party”. It is true that Greece was also referred to as “the first party” but that had nothing to do with Greece’s name because no one was disputing it.

Fourth, another purpose of the Interim Accord was to open new avenues for the achievements of levels not possible through the UN. These, of course, were not put in to benefit Macedonia. By signing the accord, at least indirectly, Macedonia in fact legalized the illegal procedures that challenged our country’s name in the UN.

Fifth, the ratification of the Interim Accord in our Parliament was not only unnecessary but a huge mistake with strategic consequences. There was nothing in the Accord that required parliamentary approval and Greece, rightly so, did not seek such approval. The Interim Accord was entered into force one month after it was signed and no additional procedures were necessary. With its ratification, unfortunately, Macedonia gave the Accord undue importance and the problem with the name received state-wide dimensions. Officially, at the highest level, we approved a document that worsened our position in the dispute.

Sixth, Article 5 of the Interim Accord stated: “The Parties have agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices…” That part
was meaningless because something that does not exist could not possibly continue… There were not, nor could there have been, negotiations between the two sides. Such a formulation was directly degrading our country’s position. It was accepted that the name of the state was subject to negotiation when there was not, nor could there have been such an obligation in the UN Security Council Resolution. No one has the right to impose conditions on us where we had to negotiate our own name. Not as a sovereign state!

A few years later, in an interview, President Gligorov informed the public that the term “negotiations” was adopted because of strong pressure and blackmail from Greece. The Greeks threatened there would be no agreement without “negotiations”! This certainly does not excuse us from making such a mistake, but it makes us more aware of the “games” that were being played at that time. We were far from the level of expertise needed to make for such important decision… At the same time we should have known which side Holbrook and the other Americans were supporting when they were preparing the Interim Accord.

Seventh, the Interim Accord used the term “differences”, while the UN Security Council Resolution spoke of a single “difference” over our country’s name. Normally “differences” (plural!) mean more than one thing and not singularly just the name.

Eighth, with Article 21, Macedonia abandoned the opportunity to go to court and seek legal justice! It robbed us of the opportunity to submit an application to The Hague and legally fight against the illegal procedure by which our country had been admitted to the UN… in flagrant violation of the UN Charter (Constitution)! That is why we must take the problem back to the UN General Assembly, as well as seek advice from the International Court in The Hague, a year after we withdraw from the Interim Accord! That’s the term of notice.

Ninth, with Article 23, Macedonia accepted to sign a “final agreement” with Greece, placing our side in an extremely
unfavourable position. Maybe that was the main American aim in drafting the Interim Accord; to prepare a foundation to bring the issue back to bilateral waters where Macedonia’s manoeuvrability would be minimized. The Americans know perfectly well that Macedonia and Greece would never agree to anything that takes into consideration, at least, our minimal requests. With this move they tied Macedonia’s hands behind its back with practically no chance for a positive outcome. But, as was mentioned earlier, if Macedonia is to sign a lasting agreement with Greece, it must uncover all outstanding issues between the two countries, not just the name. If we don’t do that we would be making yet another strategic, unpardonable political error. This means that any final agreement with Greece must include and regulate the position of the Macedonian minority living in Greece and the needs of the Macedonian people exiled by Greece, including their properties...

Is such a thing possible? You decide!

Tenth, the name was internationalized from the outset and it should and must be treated as such to the end. Macedonia was crippled by the UN Security Council and not by Athens. Therefore we need to go back to where the error was made in the first place and seek a resolution there. A dignified exit for Macedonia must be found in the UNSC. Taking any other route will hurt our interests even more.

Eleventh, given that a solution must be sought from the UN Security Council, our diplomacy must start working overtime with Russia, then China and why not with the UK, as permanent members of the Council to have more understanding for our most legal aspirations. France is closely linked with Greece and we can hardly achieve anything there, however, Paris too must be constantly and directly informed about our position and the moves that we are going to make. Without any doubt, the U.S. is the key to this problem and currently its manager. Therefore, the first thing we need to do is make our policies clear to the U.S., then, over time, ask for their support. They are the only ones who can reverse what has been done so far. At the moment this may seem unrealistic…
Twelfth, the vocabulary used in the Interim Accord has truly revealed America’s aims in narrowing Macedonia’s manoeuvrability. It is a step by step approach and a gradual process of deconstructing everything that is Macedonian, continuously implemented since the early 1990’s.

3. A different thesis could be developed for the timing and motives for drafting the Interim Accord.

3.1. The first assumption is that such an agreement was not needed while the Greek border blockade was exhausting Macedonia’s economy leading to collapse. There were clear indicators that the U.S. also, not only Samaras from Greece, expected Macedonia would not survive. Why else would the blockades of Macedonia’s border from the south (by Greece) and from the north (because of sanctions against Serbia) be tolerated for so long by the main international factors, by the U.S. in first the place, when daily havoc on Macedonia was unprecedented? Why else would the U.S. delay its recognition of Macedonia for years without any public reason? In 1995, four years after the Yugoslav dissolution, Macedonia continued to endure in spite of all hindrances imposed on it. This gave a strong signal that Macedonia was not going to collapse so the U.S. undertook new measures to ensure its destruction. Was the Interim Accord the first step in that direction? You decide!

3.2. The second assumption was that, without a “bilateral agreement”, relations between the two countries would be constantly strained and there would not even be minimal dialogue or cooperation. The border would remain blocked and Greece would not recognize Macedonia and thus the dispute would escalate... And if this were to happen, the entire region might become a security risk, which would require urgent attention. That, in itself, would jeopardize U.S. aims for closing the “Macedonian question”, which could not be done quickly. In such a situation and due to the wars in the neighbourhood having just finished, there was no real room for Macedonia’s immediate partition, or for it to be renamed by force. Thus, the likely conclusion was that the Macedonians had proved themselves to
be tougher than anticipated and thus the U.S. would have to use
different means and stages to achieve its aims.

The steps that follow will confirm this. It is within this
framework that we see: a) the 1999 declaration of friendship and
cooperation between Bulgaria and Macedonia (when with
American involvement and with our consent the Macedonian
language was ignored), b) the 2001 War (when attempts were
made to fragment our state by force and after those attempts
failed, the state was reconfigured by fraudulent means), c) The
United States recognizing Macedonia in 2004 by its
constitutional name (in order to successfully albanize parts of the
country), d) Macedonia’s membership in NATO in Bucharest
being blockaded (when Macedonia was officially Blackmailed to
change its name if it wanted membership in NATO)...

4. Drafting of the Interim Accord was an American initiative. The
final text was, more or less, three times more in favour of Greece
than it was for Macedonia. On top of that there were many
negative implications for Macedonia imbedded in it. Articles 5, 6,
7, 21 and 23 were entirely advantageous for Greece while only
Articles 1 and 11 were favourable for Macedonia. Every other
Article was, more or less, in support of both sides, although there
were more pro-Greek tangible benefits imbedded in it. Key
benefits for Macedonia were: a) Greek recognition of Macedonia
(Article 1), and b) Greece’s obligation not to block Macedonia’s
integration into international organizations (Article 11).
Unfortunately Athens ignores that obligation and continues to
block Macedonia’s integration into NATO and the EU. It is
important to also mention that the Interim Accord put an end to
the two-year long illegal blockade of the border. In fact, ending
the blockade was America’s strongest argument in squeezing
Macedonia to sign the Accord. It is clear that the blockade was
introduced and lasted as long as it did in order to force
Macedonia to sign the Accord. Macedonia suffered enormous
damages daily as a result of the blockade which, no doubt, was
kept for so long in order to weaken Macedonia to the maximum.

4.1. Nevertheless, it should also be emphasized that, thanks to the
Interim Accord, today we have the extremely favourable
judgment by the court in The Hague, as our strongest argument in the dispute.

5. Our biggest advantage has been the fact that after the Accord was signed we somehow were left alone and in peace for several years, which worked well for Macedonia. We have received a number of recognitions under our country’s constitutional and historical name and our country’s international position has continued to strengthen. Nearly two-thirds of the world’s countries have recognized us as Macedonia. According to the number of people, probably four-fifths of the people in our world have accepted our country’s Constitutional name. Greece and its partners in the meantime are losing ground.

5.1. As time passed Macedonia became more stable and prosperous. But, it seems, some international factors did not like that. Which ones, judge for yourself. This positive process lasted until 2001.

5.2. Looking from today’s position (2013) we can say with certainty that the 2001 war, in addition to accelerating the “Greater Albania” project, also aimed to stop Macedonia’s stabilization. Since the plans of the main international factors were not completely realized it was normal to expect new measures. It seems that Washington rang the alarm. So, with the armed aggression from Kosovo, a war was started in Macedonia at the beginning of 2001, which completely changed how Macedonia was treated. It was to end in 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest. The goal was to give Macedonia a punch in the nose and let it know that American interests cannot just be ignored.

5.3. The U.S. not only stopped Macedonia’s progress but pushed it back in time. Without being directly at fault, Macedonia sustained massive damage in all aspects of life, in politics, in the economy, in ethnic relations... The American strategic planners obviously concluded that Macedonia’s membership in NATO could only strengthen its position, making it almost impossible to force it to change its name and rename its people. If Macedonia
was inside NATO then the Americans could not treat it the way they do now…

5.4. It’s clear now that Greece’s obligation not to prevent Macedonia’s membership into NATO become an American problem for the realization of their plans for the country and the region as well. The only way out of this was for Greece to ignore (that part of) the Interim Accord! And that is exactly what it did!

6. The fact that Washington and not Athens made these arrangements was confirmed by Nimetz in an interview given for Voice of America (“Dnevnik”, March 3, 2008, “The Accord is over, now we need a new Agreement”). In the interview Nimetz said: “Compromises were made at that time but the Interim Accord has ended. We are now talking about a new deal and people need to look at what can be done now…” In other words, only a month before the Bucharest Summit, Nimetz announced that the Interim Accord was no longer valid and therefore Greece no longer had obligations not to block Macedonia’s entry! So the stage was set to block Macedonia’s accession into NATO.

6.1. For the first time Nimetz publicly, in this interview, put the “name issue” in historical context. He said: “The ‘Macedonian question’ may be present for hundreds of years…!” There is a strong impression that he may have done this inadvertently or why not on purpose, and uncovered both the essence of the problem and his ultimate goal. In other words Nimetz connected Macedonia’s name with the “Macedonian question” and told us that he was actually working with aims to close it! The key to the problem was not the name but the Macedonian people themselves.

6.2. There is no better proof than this to show that this whole mess we are in is about “the Macedonian people” and not about the name “Macedonia”. Otherwise, why mention the “Macedonian Question” which is much older than the “name dispute”? When it was on the agenda, there was no Macedonian state! The functional relationship made between the “Macedonian Question” and the “name of our state” was strictly done in order to deny the existence of a separate Macedonian nation.
6.3. From whom, if not from Washington, was Nimetz obliged to send us the message mentioned earlier? This statement too is confirmation that Nimetz works for the State Department and not for the UN. Why else would he come out with news that the Interim Accord was no longer valid? The Interim Accord is a bilateral agreement between Macedonia and Greece and has nothing to do with the UN. Why would the UN, much less mediator Nimetz, have an interest in ending its importance? Nimetz, according to his mandate, has no connection with the Interim Accord, which means that he is not authorized to make such judgments.

(In fact, the “abolishment” of the Interim Accord, no doubt would strain relations between Macedonia and Greece because there are no conditions for a new agreement. Thus, the search for a solution would become more difficult. It would also be to Nimetz’s detriment because his function on behalf of the UN would become more difficult).

6.4. We should be grateful to Nimetz because he has been a valuable source of information, although slightly encrypted, regarding the essence and background of U.S. handling of Macedonia. Events that follow will uncover more of this. Nimetz made the statement for someone’s needs, but for whose needs? Clearly there is no other candidate outside of the U.S. According to the mosaic of American long-term policies, the U.S. has special interests in keeping Macedonia from joining NATO… unless it changes its name.

6.5. The U.S. kept silent on the issue of renaming our state and our people until Nimetz made this statement on public radio. In 2008 in Bucharest the U.S was the main instigator who pushed Macedonia to change its name. While making such a request, the Americans openly declaring that they would immediately start using the new agreed upon name!

B. The NATO Summit in Bucharest
7. Macedonia should have been admitted into NATO under its current “reference” during the Bucharest Summit held from April 2 to 4, 2008. It was normal to expect admission because one, all NATO members had confirmed that Macedonia had met all the necessary criteria for admission, including Greece, and two, the Interim Accord “guaranteed” that the attempt could not be blocked.

7.1. Instead of admitting Macedonia, NATO completely changed its own policy toward the country. With the highest conviction we may state that the new treatment of Macedonia was introduced under the dictates of the U.S. The main aim was to block the membership of Macedonia in order to press it to accept changes to the name of the country and the national identity of its people. Nimetz practically announced it in advance in his radio interview. He did it in the name of Washington, not in his personal name. Applying the blackmail combined with the ultimatum – first the name and then membership, NATO and the EU left their doors for Macedonia – shut!

7.2. At the Bucharest Summit, there was a deliberate violation of Greece’s obligation not to hinder Macedonia’s accession into NATO. This was done not by Greece alone. Greece was supported by all its allies in ignoring the Interim Accord, a UN international agreement. This act alone should have disgraced NATO, its leaders and all member states without exception. Macedonia sustained collateral damage and paid for the consequences resulting from hidden interests, manipulation, double standards, unprincipled acts and inconsistencies... not to mention bullying and violations of international law. Law and justice were grossly violated at the Summit. If this is democracy, then what isn’t?

Even though Greece may have profited from this the most, as we will see later in the text, the change of policies in Bucharest was not to her merit.

8. Like all other members of the Alliance seeking support, Greece can count on the solidarity of other members, can use procedural opportunities, or use its veto power. But it is unrealistic to believe
that a small and insignificant country like Greece can make major decisions and impose its will on important matters… Greece does not have the authority to dictate new policies for NATO. New policies cannot be formulated on the basis of the assumption of solidarity among the member states but only on the ground of concrete interests of the leading members. The role of solidarity, one of the basic rules of the Alliance, is very limited in that sense. It can hinder implementation of some policies, can make exemptions but definitely cannot create new ones, as in the case with Macedonia.

9. If in Bucharest, for example, Greece was really the main obstacle to Macedonia’s admission to NATO, at least, there would not have been a change of policy in the Alliance; i.e. to impose a permanent blockade plus the blackmail for Macedonia to change its name. There would be no conditions where ultimatums are formulated, i.e. “change the name first, then membership…” Greece’s doing alone could have resulted in Macedonia’s rejection but without imposing new, massive and unbridgeable consequences for it. That is the maximum that Greece could have done. There was no veto in Bucharest. In order to avoid a direct Greek blockade, all members lined up behind this “new” policy.

Nevertheless, Greece violated the Interim Accord by being part of the consensus. Without it, it was not possible to reject Macedonia’s entry into NATO. Athens, however, indirectly hindered that...

10. As mentioned earlier, there is no other country in the NATO alliance, outside of the U.S. that has the authority to dictate new policies. If Washington, for example, had the slightest doubt that this new policy was inadequate and bad for Macedonia… it would have had no chance of being implemented. Also, if the U.S. had had a different attitude towards Macedonia, than the one described above, then it would have intervened on Macedonia’s behalf and the result would have been quite different. If Washington had thought that Macedonia should have joined NATO under its reference, i.e. if the U.S. respected the Interim Accord, the new policy would not have been invented and
Macedonia would have been admitted into NATO. In fact, generally speaking, the Americans take responsibility for at least 30% of all alliance decisions. In this particular case, however, the Americans undoubtedly took a more dominant role… nearly one hundred percent. No doubt the U.S. also had support from France, Germany... and so on; a kind of support that should not be underestimated.

11. After the Bucharest Summit, the dealings with the name issue were moved from New York to Brussels. But its overall manager remained - Washington. With its new policy towards Macedonia, NATO has exceeded its authority and illegally interfered in the mediation exclusively covered by the UN. NATO established new norms, much beyond the ones described by the UN Security Council, which were silently accepted by Macedonia. In the UN documents, for example, there was no explicit requirement for Macedonia to change its name. So, who gave NATO the right to demand that Macedonia change its name, imposing blackmail?

11.1. Nimetz also got a new role in Bucharest. Since then he has been working for Brussels but as before - directed by Washington. It was especially apparent before the end of 2012 and during the beginning of 2013, when talks of a date for negotiating Macedonia’s membership into the EU were being discussed. After a long break Nimetz was “reactivated” for the needs of the European Union. Nimetz had never worked for the UN and his most recent involvement, yet again, proves that Nimetz always worked for U.S. interests...

11.2. The transfer of the mediation from New York to Brussels, no doubt, was made for pragmatic reasons. While Nimetz from the UN side had no tools to pressure Macedonia, NATO and the EU not only had the right tools but also used them immediately. They started using force by blocking and blackmailing Macedonia to change its name, usurping its universal right to use whatever name it wanted. Nobody has the right to force a sovereign state to change its name in order to be admitted into an institution. This is public humiliation of the candidate.
12. Indications are very strong that the NATO Summit in Bucharest meant the beginning of the final stage of closing the “Macedonian Question”. In fact, from what Nimetz had told “Voice of America”, that a new final agreement with Greece would be necessary, is – unachievable! It is no surprise that after Bucharest a violent offensive was started, using all means including brutal force for Macedonia to capitulate.

13. There is one more point which deserves our attention because it fits perfectly with America’s long-term attitude towards Macedonia. At a press conference, just at the end of the Bucharest Summit on April 8, 2008, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, during a provocation from a Greek journalist (“Macedonians are a fact for the United States”, “Dnevnik”, April 9, 2008), said: “I do not think that the Macedonian language is called as such. The Macedonian language exists. Macedonians exist. As you know, the Macedonian language has been studied by the State Department!” He also said: “There is certainly a historic Macedonian province, which is something different from the state... It is clear that the Government of Macedonia has no pretensions. We recognize the difference between the historic territory of Macedonia, which is certainly larger than the state...”

13.1. The Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis reacted immediately from Athens: “Such statements do not help to resolve the disputed issues between Athens and Skopje.” She then said: “Athens will not be drawn into such discussions...”

13.2. Unfortunately Macedonia remained deaf to Washington’s precious official position and did not take advantage of the comments made. Since then, not a single statement has been made by Washington in support of the Macedonian people, or the Macedonian language... All that followed from the U.S. side were promises that the name and not the identity of the people were under discussion...! More and more lies.

The Americans repeatedly say that they support Macedonia’s NATO membership but do not mention that it can only be done under one clear condition... “first change your name...”
And our politicians not only remain silent about such ordinary bluffs but publicly thank the Americans for their support!? Journalists do the same and no one asks the American officials: “Under what conditions are you supporting us?”

13.3. The roots of Daniel Fried’s assessments were left uncovered by our aide. Fried was a diplomat since 1977 who served in senior positions with the State Department until May 15, 2009, just a few months after President Barak Obama’s inauguration. We can only guess at the reasons for his excellent statements concerning Macedonia and hope that his leaving the diplomatic service was not as a consequence – of them?!

C. Why President Bush’s support was not enough?

14. Not to leave any dilemma about the reality of our previous explanations we need to clarify President Bush’s involvement in Bucharest. At the Summit, Bush had personal ambitions to stabilize the southern flank of NATO by adding Albania, Macedonia and Croatia to it. His statement that the three countries would become members, meaning Macedonia as well, was overridden after less than 24 hours! Nothing like that had ever happened to another American president! Obviously, the administration did not share Bush’s personal interests any longer, as his mandate was finishing and Macedonia was left in the lurch. We can only guess that the recycled plans for Macedonia, prepared in the meantime, proved that its membership in NATO, even with the UN reference, would make it impossible to proceed with pressure for changing its name. Such an outcome was definitely not acceptable to Washington.

While Bush went into history, the American bureaucracy is still there. In any case, Bush deserves our respect and we have to look for ways of rewarding him in return.

15. According to unconfirmed reports from Turkish sources, the night before the summit Bush met with Turkish President Gul who he asked not to set any conditions for the admission of Albania and Croatia, without Macedonia. It was speculated that
Turkey could support Macedonia’s condition that all three join NATO, or none. Bush did not want to risk the summit to experience a total failure without admitting any new member. Ankara, despite its undeniable commitment to Macedonia’s membership, apparently was not ready to confront the U.S., the sole superpower. And who would?

16. The fact that Turkey did not voice its support for Macedonia in Bucharest, also confirms that the U.S. stood behind Macedonia’s rejection, not just Greece. If Athens was the bearer of this blockade and the architect of the new policy, Ankara would have certainly and vehemently opposed it and would done everything in its power to help Macedonia join NATO. But because the United States was behind the rejection, Turkey had some normal concerns.... The bite would have been too much for Turkey.

16.1. According to information received from reliable sources, Macedonia officially did not request that Turkey play the three card hand; all three candidates together or none. If that was true then there was a serious error made by the Macedonian side. It has to be done. If Ankara was prepared to take such a step it would have been up to them. Whether it was going to succeed or not, would have been another matter. Our initiative, in any case, would have obliged Turkey to act in our favour, to the maximum.

17. In Macedonia there was speculation that the government, in collusion with President Tsrvenkovski, did not play well in Bucharest. That Bush was left in the lurch, by not giving him a chance to help us because our people did not come out with a clear position on Nimetz’s latest proposal (“Republic of Macedonia – Skopje”). Unfortunately, all these accusations are baseless because Macedonia had no role in the “high politics” played in Bucharest. It was a play for foreign ideas, plans and interests. So, no matter what our position was the outcome would have been the same... Nimetz’s proposal was unacceptable to Athens and thus the U.S. did not permit Macedonia’s entry into NATO with the reference. Our officials were powerless to change anything. The decisions had already been made in advance.
17.1. A higher level of manipulation was in fact staged in Bucharest to prevent Macedonia’s full integration into the international community. In the UN admission Macedonia was seriously handicapped. Its name was illegally suspended and a reference was imposed. There is only one reason for this: to rename the state and the people. Since attempts to change the name thus far had failed, NATO began to use pressure (blockade, blackmail…) in Bucharest to achieve the American aim. This was done by the same countries that had already impeded Macedonia in the UN. In both cases Macedonia was a victim of secret and illegal policies with no chance of influencing the outcome.

The first time international rules were ignored, with regard to Macedonia, was in 1993 in New York. The first “victim” of abuse was the UN Charter of Rights. The Charter of Rights was ignored in order to “depersonalize” Macedonia.

In 2008 in Bucharest, at the NATO summit, the Interim Accord was ignored because it turned out that it had some favourable items for Macedonia.

17.2. Aside from Macedonia, another collateral victim in Bucharest was President Bush, who showed support for Macedonia. After the Summit, Bush invited Tsrvenkovski and Gruevski for a meeting in Zagreb, where he was visiting. After that, on his initiative, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Security and Cooperation in Washington. This is the best proof that our leaders did not make any wrong moves in Bucharest. These gestures were top honours for Macedonia. We got the special consolation prize!

D. The Hague verdict

18. After the Interim Accord was violated at the Bucharest Summit, Macedonia filed charges against Greece before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Macedonia needed to take this case to court because it could not afford to sit idle and be bullied. Macedonia was quite surprised that the Court unanimously ruled it its favour. The Court clearly specified that
Greece was in breach of the Accord as it hindered Macedonia’s attempt to join NATO.

18.1. Unfortunately the verdict changed nothing. At first, Washington, followed by Brussels, vehemently opposed starting the Court application and later completely ignored the verdict. That, however, did not diminish its importance. The Court ruling is the strongest weapon in Macedonia’s hands. At the same time it weighs heavily on Washington and Brussels, even though they refuse to acknowledge it. After arranging Macedonia’s illegal admission to the UN, now they are again grossly violating the international legal system.

18.2. There was an article in “Dnevnik”, published on April 10, 2013, under the heading “Serbian to be or not to be” in which the following was written: “Gruevski spoke of having major disagreements and a fight with an ‘important ambassador’ who was angry because the Prime Minister did not accept his recommendation not to file a lawsuit at The Hague.” We are absolutely certain that that “important ambassador” was none other than Philip Reeker, American Ambassador to Macedonia. There should also be no doubt that had something more than a “recommendation” taken place, Reeker would have been very upset. Reeker was known to get into fits of uncontrolled rage when something was done against his will.

18.3. Washington finally tipped its hand concerning Macedonia, with the treatment of its intention to go to The Hague and after that by ignoring the verdict. These gestures definitely confirm that our opposition in the name dispute is not Greece but the U.S.A. We could see that Washington - a) had hidden intentions towards Macedonia, b) would not accept anything that did not fit with its plans, and c) not only managed but also fully controlled the so-called “name dispute”. We can clearly see that there is firm American determination to achieve goals, even at the expense of the Macedonian nation. Washington would not hesitate to violate the UN Charter of Rights, to ignore The Hague ruling or not to take into consideration obligations coming from the Interim Accord, an international agreement prepared just by them! Why else would the U.S. oppose The Hague verdict?
18.4. Looking at this from another angle: why would the United States oppose Macedonia going to The Hague and ignore the Court’s verdict? Because of Greece? Why were the Americans and not the Greeks telling us that we need to solve our problem through dialogue without use of a court? How can we have dialogue with Greece, a country that does not accept that we exist as a separate nation? In fact, how can such a dialogue even be possible with someone who does not respect its contractual obligations even after it was tried in court?

19. If the United States had no ulterior motives and was serious about helping Macedonia, it would have abided by international law. Unfortunately, as much as the United States likes to hide its true intentions, they are still calculatingly hostile and diametrically opposed to Macedonia’s interests. If American intentions were positive towards Macedonia, the United States would have had no logical reason to oppose The Hague verdict. And if the problem was in some U.S. obligations toward Greece then The Hague verdict would have been an excellent opportunity to say – we are very sorry but we must respect the judgment of the court!

20. What do you think, why does the United States, and all the other countries standing behind it, have qualify this problem to be a “political” one? The answer is simple – just to be able to use force in solving it! And, the problems are becoming “political” only in cases when the powerful are – not in the right! The “political problems” tend to be resolved by force, military or otherwise, through a revolution, through a dictatorship, by bombing (Belgrade, for example...), through a coup... Let us not fool ourselves, the world has always been and still is ruled through power. Democracy, diplomacy, etc., are devices designed to serve the powerful. The moment a ruling did not serve their purpose it was no longer valid; including The Hague verdict! If there was really the rule of law then all of us would have been equal, but we are not. That is a fact. The strong and wealthy are always “more equal” than the rest. This is how it was 100 years ago, this is how it is today and this is how it is going to be for a long, long time. There is no difference in what kind of society
you live: socialist, capitalist… It is the same everywhere. The ordinary citizen was, is and always will be “less equal”.

21. NATO instantly ignoring The Hague verdict has given us further evidence that Washington, and not Brussels or Athens, was behind the Alliance’s negative attitude towards Macedonia. This was confirmed by NATO Secretary General, Rasmussen, who rejected the verdict just a few hours after it was released. He said it does not apply to or implicate NATO.

The Secretary-General had no mandate to decide about the matter himself. His reaction was possible because he must have been briefed well in advance or instructed on the fly just as the verdict came out – only by Washington. The Alliance could not have a common position because there was not enough time to consult the members! And even if an Alliance meeting was held, there would have been members who would have needed extra time to consult their headquarters. Would there have been a consensus on how to react? It seems certain that Washington wanted no controversy surrounding this issue and made a decision on its own. So in order to avoid any complications, Rasmussen was authorized to distance NATO from the verdict. The job was done and there was nothing more for the member states to say or do. Yet another stab with a knife at democracy…

22. In order to avoid any misunderstandings, let us explain that, formally, The Hague court has no legal authority over NATO. The Alliance is an international organization outside of the UN system and is not under the Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless that is only in principle. But, even though NATO acts independently, it still must respect international institutions, international agreements and documents and abide by codes of conduct, rules, principles and procedures… All these also apply to NATO because the Alliance is part of this same international legal order.

22.1. It is important to mention the fact that all NATO members are part of the UN and as such are bound by UN rules and must respect the UN Charter. No country can be admitted to the UN if it refuses to abide by it. UN member states and all UN organs, except for the Security Council, are also bound by the ruling of
the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Greece is even among 60 or so countries which has additionally committed itself in writing to respect the Court’s verdicts.

22.2. NATO is nothing without its members. Without members, there is no Alliance. NATO consists of countries that are also members of the UN and they all bring with them obligations, commitments and responsibilities already made within the UN. All that must be respected and implemented by NATO as well. NATO cannot ignore The Hague verdicts related to its members. It is a disregard of international law; a practice adhered to by terrorist organizations.

22.3. There are no practical reasons why NATO should ignore the UN obligations and international agreements of its members, especially The Hague verdicts. The Alliance must implement all of them. If this is not done then NATO is disregarding its doctrine and devaluing its international position.

22.4. It would have been different had the Court declared that there was some irregularity with Macedonia’s admission at the Bucharest Summit. Then both Washington and Brussels would have been right, The Hague could not have judged NATO’s actions. However Macedonia never asked for such a ruling and the Court did not follow that path. The Court found Greece guilty of breaching the Accord at a NATO Summit, meaning that the Alliance would have to accept, respect and implement the ruling. Athens received this verdict because of its behaviour at the NATO Summit in Bucharest; not at the Olympic Games in Peking!

22.5. NATO (and Washington) must respect the Court’s judgment even if it comes through member states and not directly from it. If it is not so, why then have Washington and Brussels tried so vehemently to deter Macedonia from initiating proceedings in The Hague? If the Court’s judgment had nothing to do with NATO and the EU, then why did they engage themselves in preventing it? NATO needs to build its policies by respecting the international obligations of its member states, otherwise the Alliance would be working outside of the law.
22.6. NATO should have respected the verdict against Greece and should not have allowed Greece to prevent Macedonia’s membership. If for example, a soccer player from the team “Peniarol” was banned from playing for a year by the Uruguay Football Federation, and if the same player then went to Athens and became a member of “Olympiakos”, a local Greek team, would he be able to immediately start playing for the new team before his sentence had expired?

Of course the soccer Federation of Uruguay, or of any other country, had no authority over the Greek Federation. However, the player, let’s call him Pedro Rodriguez, should not be allowed to play until his sentence expires. The Soccer Federation in Greece must respect the punishment. Such obligations are derived from the International legal codex. Otherwise the world would be thrown into chaos.

22.6.1. Here is another example: Could a Greek man who was married in Greece and moved, say to Germany, Russia, China, or Zimbabwe, marry someone in the new country before he had divorced his spouse in Greece?

Marriage has separate regulations in different countries and no legislation in one country has impact on another country. Yet Vassilakis, let’s call him that, would commit fraud if he were to ignore his present wife and re-marry without a divorce. This is a punishable offense.

So, if on an individual level, no matter where we are, we are obliged to honour our contractual obligations, then how can a country, a member of a serious international organization such as NATO, not do so?

22.6.2. Both examples given have shown that obligations undertaken in one place cannot be ignored in another. Their importance is valid everywhere, unless one happens to be living in a lawless and otherwise unregulated society. Refusal to assume responsibility is not only unacceptable, it is considered criminal behaviour. This also must apply, by all means, to Greece and to
NATO... That is why Greece was found guilty by The Hague court. And let us not forget that the examples given here also illustrate how Athens, Brussels and Washington behaved towards the Interim Accord before The Hague judgment. It has been proven by the verdict delivered that their behaviour was indeed illegal… which should have been an embracing slap on their faces. Unfortunately they continued to function as if nothing had happened.

23. NATO’s consensus regarding Macedonia was again reaffirmed during the Chicago Summit in 2012, at a time when the entire Alliance was well-aware of The Hague verdict and Greece’s condemnation by it. On what legal grounds was this consensus reached for the entire Alliance to refuse Macedonia, yet again, from joining NATO? This is another confirmation that NATO is functioning by using force… Chicago confirmed yet again that the Americans care only for their own interests.

24. It is important at this point for us to mention that we all should be happy that Macedonia did not succumb to Washington and Brussels’ fierce pressure not to take Greece to The Hague. It is also important to recall that President Tsrvenkovski, was also against going to the court. What is interesting about this is that after The Hague verdict was announced the same people inside Macedonia ignored the judgment just like the Americans did (Andov called it a decision, or something else, but not a verdict). It is not realistic or logical to assume that those Macedonians, who refused to accept the verdict for what it was, did it without foreign influence. Whether it was politically motivated or purely lucrative for them, only time will tell. Is there anyone who can explain why they were against seeking justice for their own country after it had been exposed to so much injustice? Who were they vying for?

E. What happened further on with the Interim Accord and with Nimetz’s mediation?

25. Athens became a victim of the Interim Accord by being condemned by the International Court of Justice in The Hague for
its breach. The Interim Accord, if we recall, was a document drafted by the United States and imposed on Macedonia through blackmail and by hanging the crippling illegal blockade of the border over its head. So if the United States stood behind the “creation” and “execution” of the Interim Accord, then it surely is guilty of Greece’s condemnation! A lot of questions are opened. Why, for example, did American planners not foresee that the Interim Accord would not only become a bottleneck that would bring Greece international shame, but it would hurt American interests as well? To what extent were the American mistakes connected with their wrong expectations for a quick closure of the “Macedonian question”? Had the U.S. calculations been proved right, the Interim Accord by 2008 would have been part of history and quickly forgotten with no consequences for Athens. Fortunately for us, all measures taken to force Macedonia to capitulate, so far, have shown to be insufficient and unsuccessful. The price for that had to be paid by Athens!

26. The U.S. usually does not leave its allies in the lurch. Greece was well-compensated and received full satisfaction at the NATO Summit in Bucharest when the United States completely reversed its policy towards Macedonia. At the Summit the United States, a) blocked Macedonia’s membership into NATO and imposed a new condition – “first the name, then membership”, and b) by it passed the responsibility for blocking Macedonia’s entry to Brussels, releasing Greece from its obligation.

Thus Athens is no longer directly exposed to blocking Macedonia but its commitment to the Interim Accord still remains in force.

27. By adapting this new attitude towards Macedonia in Bucharest, Washington most probably was hoping to reward Greece for the “trauma” it suffered by America’s recognition of Macedonia by its constitutional name in November 2004. A recognition which did no damage to Greece, except for the short-lasting negative propaganda. Washington’s reversal in Bucharest was another great victory for Greece.

28. We should not be expecting Greece to abandon the Interim Accord. Even though Greece made a couple of announcements to
that effect, they were not genuine. Such a move will have negative consequences for Greece because neither Washington nor Brussels would allow it. It will also show that the problem was with Greece. Clearly the Article in the Interim Accord that “guarantees” Macedonia entry into international organizations is as much of a problem for Washington as it is for Athens. And because of that single Article, Athens delegated the problem to the United States to solve. Nimetz, as well, had to deliver an inconvenient public statement and we will have to wait for the next steps to be taken.

29. It should be noted that, even though NATO and the EU are now blocking Macedonia’s membership, as mentioned earlier, Athens is still not completely off the hook from having to continue to impede Macedonia. Greek participation in NATO and the EU consensus against Macedonia means a new violation of the Interim Accord. And if Greece decides to distance itself from making such decisions, which the Interim Accord requires, then there will be no consensus and Macedonia can join NATO. Blocking Macedonia from NATO is not possible without a consensus. And a consensus is not possible without Greece violating the Accord!

30. Macedonia’s efforts would be counterproductive if it now withdrew from the mediation process led by Nimetz or from the Interim Accord. Such unilateral steps would cause serious damage to Macedonia’s interests. Macedonia will gain absolutely nothing by it but it may lose much. Needless to say it would first be confronted by the United States, then by NATO and then by the EU; no doubt to Athens’s delight. By pulling out we would also show that we don’t know what we want or what we are doing!

Article 11 of the Interim Accord is extremely important for Macedonia and it must continue to exist because there will be an Accord violation each time a consensus is reached to not allow Macedonia into NATO or the EU. Each time Greece is part of a consensus against Macedonia and blockades its entry into an international institution, it violates international law for which it could be sued in The Hague. This is where we have support from
the law and we must strive not to lose it. If Macedonia does not get a date to start negotiations for EU membership by the end of 2013, which is very likely, then we should immediately, and without hesitation, open new proceedings at The Hague. Justice must be looked for. We must constantly challenge and marginalize the “political character” of this dispute in legal waters. There lies our opportunity. Thus, we will have a verdict for Greece’s blockade in the EU just like we already have one for NATO. A second verdict would further strengthen our position.

And even if all rulings are ignored by the major powers, their burden of disregarding international law will - triple. To this end we need to have a strong and tested team and money must be no object. At stake is the fate of our state and our people.

30.1. Both the mediation process and the Interim Accord need to survive because they are important to resolving the name issue. We should only be canceling them after we develop a new strategy to seek justice. We must also recognize that our main opponent in this fight is the United States, which has the support of the most important international factors in this world.

30.2. Getting out of the mediation process and the Interim Accord is not currently an option. Otherwise, we should find ourselves under severe pressure. Nevertheless, if after some time still there is not any solution to the problem and Macedonia is being isolated or the present blockade and blackmail are continued for a long time, then Macedonia must reconsider its position concerning the mediation and the Interim Accord.

30.3. In such a case Macedonia will be obliged to stop the mediation and ignore the Accord, completely or partially. At the same time a new strategy must be developed. We should always keep in mind that Article 21, paragraph 2 of the Interim Accord does not allow us to initiate an application before the court in The Hague against the Security Council for the irregularities it applied during Macedonia’s admission. To start such a procedure, first we will have to abandon the Interim Accord whose term of cancellation is one year. Only after that period can we start the new initiative.
30.4. Going to court and challenging the Security Council means confrontation with the most powerful. If we are determined to go that way, we will need, beforehand, to build a) domestic consensus about the name issue, even at a minimal level. Today (January 2013) a prospect like this may look unreachable but we will be sunk without one, and b) stronger and more concrete support for such a strategy from important countries like Russia, China, Turkey… Nobody stands behind us…

31. Now to say a few words about the announced referendum on the name, also backed by the opposition.

In principle, such a referendum is essentially unacceptable because it is about fundamental issues relating to universally guaranteed rights, such as the identity of a people and the name of a country which requires no further decision. The argument was that no one in today’s generation of Macedonians has the right or is authorized to test his or her own identity and the identity of their ancestors and all future generations. There are some who said that a referendum carries some risks and they are right. This is especially true for us today having been put under extreme pressure with blockades, blackmail and threats of usurpation… which, for the last 20 years, have placed us under extreme stress.

31.1. Every problem must be looked at and a solution sought through the circumstances in which it was introduced. Not from a theoretical or from some historical and distant point of view. Today, as it has been for the last 20 years, Macedonia is being confronted by arrogant and non-caring international factors who do not hesitate to use force and blackmail to get their way. They don’t care how they achieve their goals and will unscrupulously ignore everything that stands in their way. On the other hand, any support Macedonia receives from them is small, incomplete, occasional, conditional and in many ways not enough. This has been going on for more than 20 years with no end in sight. In fact it has been getting worse. Instead of getting some relief we are continually being put in new situations, in different complexities and under the scrutiny of new factors that work against our
country. In December 2012, Bulgaria too came out and firmly stood against Macedonia. Slowly but surely the Albanians are also heading in the same direction, all orchestrated by Washington no doubt. The maneuvering space of our country, instead of widening, is slowly narrowing...

“Indecent” proposals are mounting. Pressure is increasing in geometric proportions. It is becoming obvious that our current strategy is not yielding the desired results and needs to be changed. A referendum can be used to save us but only as a last resort. A referendum must be the last tool to use when there are no other options left. The violent refusal of the referendum demonstrated by Washington, Brussels, Athens... is the best proof that it could be useful for Macedonia. No one will have the right to go against the people’s wishes expressed through a referendum. Surprisingly some Macedonians are also against a referendum just like most Westerners.

31.1.1. Greece calling for a referendum of its own concerning our name is an empty threat or a bluff at best. Greece has no jurisdiction over our name. Can Macedonia call a referendum to decide whether Britain should remain a monarchy or become a republic?

However, if we do, by some chance, arrive at a bilateral agreement with Greece, which the U.S. insists that we do, then Athens can put the proposed agreement to a referendum. Not our name. This is another strong argument why, at all costs, we must avoid arriving at a bilateral resolution with Greece.

31.2. In 1992, 1993 I was in favour of conducting a referendum with a simple question: “Do you agree to change our country’s name?” If people voted “no” then it was going to be a done deal. The same tool can be used today. There should be no doubt that a huge percentage of Macedonians will turn out and vote just like they did in the September 8, 1991 referendum, just to end this indignant humiliation that they are being put through on a daily basis. We should not fear our own people and trust that they will do the right thing… after a properly conducted campaign, of
I am sure many Albanians will also give their fellow Macedonians their support, if approached properly…

31.3. Our position, regarding a referendum, must be made very clear: Yes we will hold a referendum but only as a last resort, when there is no other choice, leading to isolation or punishment for the country. Such a situation may be hardly imaginable but it should not be ruled out. We must be prepared for all possibilities.

It is also extremely important that the political opposition stand behind such a plan because it is in the interest of the state and the people.

31.4. During a conversation with a senior U.S. diplomat in the American Embassy in Skopje, sometime in 2011, reacting to his extremely negative perception of the proposed referendum, I explained to him that the U.S.A. cannot force the country into a position to have a referendum! No matter whether the results would be positive or negative the consequences will be catastrophic as the future of the people and the country would be questioned. Macedonia will be brought to a very delicate situation in every aspect, including inter-ethnic relations. In particular, one cannot go back from such a move once it is made. The very fabric of the state will be torn apart. The earth will boil. The divisions between the various political parties would deepen immensely and irreversibly. Inevitably extreme behaviour will be generated that would not be good for the country or the region.

I predict that we will quickly and easily again find ourselves at the beginning of the 20th century…, with rebels, rebel bands, etc…

The diplomat listened very attentively. Let us hope that he sent the message to his superiors and that they understood it. And hopefully they will not be playing the same card!

31.5. It is interesting that in 2003 a book was published in Greece by the publisher Papazisis, entitled “Athens-Skopje, the seven-year agreement (1995-2002)”. It was a joint collaboration between a group of scholars from Northern Greece mentored by
professors Evangelos Kofos and Vlasis Vlasidis. (“To Vima”, December 24, 2003.) In part the book reads:

“In those seven years, regulating the name (by the Interim Accord) was not part of the strategic priorities of the Greek side;

Greek diplomacy is content by the fact that it managed to keep “de jure” the name “FYROM” locked in major international organizations for seven years;

After seven years of futile practice, it is completely understandable if Greece decides to use the EU accession process to bring a lasting solution to the problem…”

F. Replacing the reference with a name for use outside of Macedonia is a fatal solution

32. Attempts to replace the reference with a permanent name for external use, with Macedonia’s consent, would be an irreparable mistake.

32.1. According to a telegram sent from Athens to the State Department by the American ambassador, as leaked by WikiLeaks, confirmed by Reeker and others, Washington considers that the name for external use, replacing the UN reference is the right solution! This kind of “encouragement” from Washington is what is convincing political parties, journalists, analysts, experts... in Macedonia to unwittingly commit suicide! They do not understand that it does not mean an acceptable solution for Macedonia but dying miserably, in installments.

33. Unfortunately nothing is clear and there are many fabrications. The best evidence of a great lie is the so-called Greek “red line” which is nothing more than a pure bluff and unscrupulous manipulation. Athens has taken the most extreme stand followed by Washington where they don’t think that their erga omnes can pass. Is there anyone who thinks that they can rename us at home? That we will re-write our Constitution and
call our country “Upper Macedonia” or “Slavo-Macedonia”? They cannot do that even if they occupy us. The Serbians did that for some 30 years… for nothing…

33.1. Their insistence on the impossible is hiding a dangerous trap: planting the seeds for Macedonia’s destruction to be achieved in some sort of “humane” way. They can simply achieve it by replacing the “reference” with a name for external use! We will be happy to get rid of the UN reference and they will achieve their aims! The identity of the Macedonian people will be sacrificed but not immediately, in stages. Practically, they have no other alternative to exterminate Macedonia’s national identity. They have nothing else to offer that Macedonia can swallow, thinking that it is positive while losing everything.

By using its position to the maximum, Greece (not alone) is trying to open space for Macedonia to accept an unacceptable solution, which it considers to be better than its “Red line”.

34. Replacing the reference with a new, permanent name for our country, regardless of how it is used, will undoubtedly mean deletion of the Macedonian national identity. From that moment we will no longer be seen as Macedonians by the world, but rather by the derivative of the new name. In other words, we will become something else, something… not Macedonian. Then Greece will have full international monopoly on the name, the concept, the brand… “Macedonia” with all its adjectives, nouns, verbs… from people, language, history, culture… to products… will all belong to Greece. And the true and genuine 2.5 million “Macedonians” will become fictional characters in this world. “Macedonia” will be their wines, tomatoes, lemons… We the real Macedonians will not be able to export under that brand. That will be the result no matter what Nimetz writes in his proposal. Even if his offer looks good for Macedonia, at first glance, in practice it will be ignored in less than a year! Only the most stupid and most naïve will ask for our identity to be guaranteed. Such guarantees are not worth the paper they are written on!

34.1. From the moment we agree to change our name, all our documents intended for external use will have to bear the new
name; from passports, to customs declarations, certificates, personal statements... It would be expected of us as because we have accepted such a solution – a distinct name for abroad. It will no longer be possible to do anything differently. Macedonia will have two names and two identities– one for inside and one for outside our country. At home we will be “Makedontsi” and our language “makedonski”… Outside we will be... well... something else. Then, for example, our national sport teams will certainly be obliged to use the new name even when they play at home! They will register us with the new name for external use no matter where we play. The name cannot change.

34.2. Let’s also not forget that the reference is not a name or a denomination of our country, but an interim code for addressing our country! If we are to change that then everything... conferences, summits, Olympics... and all other international events organized not only outside but also inside our country... will bear our new name. Even at home, in the halls of Skopje, in Ohrid... when we host foreigners we will have to play host under our new name.

And as such we will go from one absurdity to another... At home, in the halls with foreigners we will be one thing and out of the halls –something else! Magicians!

35. If by any chance someone in authority was convinced, paid for, or politically motivated to agree to change the name of our country, then be aware that this person would be committing a serious crime. The acceptance of a new name for external use will undoubtedly lead to the change of our Constitution, putting us in a deliberate position of renaming ourselves.

36. The crucial problem for Washington, Brussels and Athens is the fact that they cannot permanently rename the country, replacing the UN reference, without our consent. Better to say – without our capitulation. That is why we are subject to violent pressure, blockades, blackmail... (Name first, then membership)...
36.1. It should be crystal clear to us that nothing can be changed without our consent and this is our most precious asset that we must not squander. If, however, for some reason we agree to drop the reference in exchange for a “new name” then we must be fully aware that we will actually legalize the irregular admission of our country into the United Nations, with flagrant violation of the UN Charter of Rights. We would give up the possibility of one day legally challenging this violation, as well. Under the current conditions, this may be our last bargaining chip to save our people and our state. Looking at it another way, why should we now, after suffering tremendous damages over so many years, accept to change the reference that was illegally imposed on us by force? What would we gain by it? Or, how can we change something that is not ours and is working against our interests… for something worse?

36.2. It would be a strategic, fundamental and historical error for us to change the reference for a permanent name of our state. The reference for us is not valid and it should not exist. If we accept a permanent name other than Republic of Macedonia we will face many obstacles and it will be the beginning of another traumatic experience for our people. It will be the first step in the final extinction of the Macedonian nation. We will be opening the door for our enemies to do as they please with us, as we will prove that nothing of ours is sacred to us. By doing that we will make it clear to everyone that the Macedonian nation was indeed the problem, and not the name of the country!

36.3. Our goal should be for the reference to depart from diplomacy as soon as possible, without a name change, and enter the halls of history as proof of the abuses, illegal policies and unscrupulous games international factors played with us for many years, inflicting incalculable, massive damage on Macedonia.

37. And we, instead of speculating this and that, must only ask ourselves a simple question: “What is our name for, if not to be recognized in the international arena?”

If anyone, however remote, accepts to change our name, even for external use, history will vehemently condemn them as the
biggest traitor guilty of the extermination of the centuries old Macedonian nation… which inevitably will follow.

38. Fortunately, while the deep crisis continues in Greece, the Greeks still refuse to accept a change to the UN reference, for a permanent name of our country for external use. Washington known that very well and continues to put brutal pressure on Macedonia, permitting NATO and the EU to keep the country in front of theirs gates, only to buy them necessary time. For them, only Macedonia is guilty; no one else! To prove that they use “arguments” such as; there is no freedom for the media in Macedonia… there is no political dialogue in Macedonia… the judiciary does not function in Macedonia… which are purely diplomatic maneuvers to full the naïve. Washington and Brussels are capable of triggering a host of such “arguments” at a moment’s notice.

G. U.S. and Bucharest in 2008, The Hague in 2011...

39. As always, all moves made by Washington start and end with U.S. interests. Others, including the Greeks, play a small role if any, except when they are complementary to the Americans. All steps that the United States has taken with regards to Macedonia and its name in the last 20 years are a result of U.S. needs and plans and nobody else’s. U.S. policies are never ad hoc but well-designed and long-term. But at the same time it is also possible for the Americans to be wrong. Our case is a striking example of this. It would be neither the first nor the last.

Madeleine Albright, as U.S. Secretary of State, said that U.S. policy towards Latin America, for many years, was wrong. It would not be a surprise if after 20 years, one of her successors re-evaluates the current American policy towards Macedonia as – mistaken!

40. The dramatic change of NATO policy, in Bucharest in 2008, of course, was a result of discontent from Washington for the failure of U.S. foreign policy in Macedonia. Fifteen years had passed and they had not achieved their goals. Macedonia did not collapse and Nimetz solved nothing. There is no sign of
capitulation in Skopje. The opposition, which is prepared to bend its spine, will likely not come to power anytime soon. Probably because of its own poor policies! This of course has prompted Washington to change its approach towards Gruevski’s government. While before they completely ignored him and left him in the street in Washington to improvise a press conference, now in a serious parliamentary and political crisis, caused by the opposition at the beginning of 2013, they openly sided with him. A few years ago, the United States supported SDSM’s boycott of Parliament, even though such an act is unthinkable in a western democracy. But nothing happened so now they are playing the other card. Now they are trying to appease Prime Minister Gruevski and the VMRO-DPMNE, probably hoping to get them to give in a little and change the name of our state and people. It can be argued that this kind of relationship would only bring new failures.

41. Based on the information, assessments and views given here, we can conclude that removing Macedonia and the Macedonian people from the scene appears to be extremely important to the United States. So far the Americans have been risking their own reputation by defying international law and by ignoring international court rulings. Why and how is that possible? It is unimaginable that the United States, backed by NATO and the EU, is doing everything in its power, to rename Macedonia and the Macedonian people! Why? What do they have to gain in return? What is so important that they are willing to risk so much? What are they attempting to achieve? Why are they acting like terrorists towards peaceful little Macedonia who is threatening no one? And in the end, why are we so much in their way? If The Hague, the highest international court on the planet, ruling in favour of Macedonia is not good enough for them to accept the universal aspirations of the Macedonians to stay what they are, what is? What choices are left for the Macedonian people?

For now, there are no answers to these questions.

41.1. The greatest American ambition to make the Albanians a major factor in the region, at least in its southern part, may prove
extremely counterproductive. The means by which the Americans were building the “Greater Albania” project will bring them constant and lasting headaches. There will be problems inside, among the Albanians, and outside in the three municipalities in southern Serbia, the four municipalities in Montenegro, in Chamiria, etc. The pan-Albanian plan has no chance of reaching consensus on any issue except on the Albanian national question. When that is completed, and it is on its way now, then fierce fighting among their political leaders will begin, significantly more serious than it is right now. In the internal political field, in the struggle for power, they look at each other only through a gun! The same is the situation in Albania (Berisha-Rama), in Macedonia (Ahmeti-M. Thachi), in Kosovo (H. Thachi-Haradinai)... And then, in Greater Albania, the pie will be much larger and so will the appetite for it… It will be impossible to prevent or control their confrontations and the region will explode, with lasting consequences.

41.1.1. Another thing we should not forget is that the Albanian mafia is growing elsewhere, not just in Western European countries. It generates a lot of money and it knows how to channel it where it is needed. If we add all these ambitions together, which would normally grow over time, then the question will be: Will Washington be able to maintain control of all of this? Will Washington have the ability to direct the Albanian factor in the realization of U.S. interests only?

It would be mission impossible…

Will history also repeat itself? Will the Albanians remain America’s friends or will they do like they did after WWII when they initially were Yugoslavia’s best friends, then the USSR’s and China’s after that. As a rule, the previous best friend became the greatest enemy!

The Balkans was and still is the “European minefield”! Every step must be taken with the greatest of care even today…

41.2. The “Greater Albania” project must be finished with Kosovo. Extirpation of Macedonia and the Macedonians is not
possible without a war. No one should be allowed to unnecessarily play with fire.

42. Washington has repeatedly taught us to obey the law, and that is positive. We have been criticized for the situation in our judiciary, and that is also correct. What Washington is not telling us is that they only obey the law when it suits them! The Americans ignore judgments that do not respect their interests! Such judgments simply do not even exist for them. The same way the Americans treat the terrorists: the ones working for them are good guys. The others – bad! The same logic is also valid for dictators…

H. Who is obstructing Macedonia from joining NATO?
   The U.S. or Greece?

43. Summarizing this section we need to conclude that the assessment that Greece is blocking Macedonia from joining NATO and the EU is a big mistake. There is no doubt that they play a role, but pointing at Greece means hiding the real manager of the project. The blockade and blackmail for joining NATO (and the EU), after Bucharest in 2008, are coming from Brussels not from Athens. That is the best proof that shows that the back of this case is completely different than it appears.

43.1. Greece never was in a position to set up blockades and blackmail in Brussels. No member of NATO or the EU has that much authority or is able to impose its own policies. It is theoretically impossible.

44. The only exception is the U.S. role in NATO. The U.S. is the only NATO member that can pull off something like this. No one else...

The U.S. role is specific because America is a major NATO financier and has an important role in ensuring Europe’s safety. Not one of America’s main NATO partners in Europe today has the clout or the nerve to challenge or to oppose U.S. policies regarding NATO. As a matter of fact it happened once when we
had “New” and “Old” Europe. Nevertheless, all NATO members, one way or another, depend on Washington. Of course the United States looks after the fundamental interests of its partners and its excellent diplomatic service takes maximum care to avoid any confrontation with them.

45. The established practice of first joining NATO and then the EU is inconvenient for Macedonia. Thus we must first pass through the sieve set by Washington before we can join the EU. Had it been the other way around or if NATO was not there, it would have been less of an ordeal. When Washington develops a policy for NATO it is a done deal, the other members are not given much of a choice other than to rubber stamp it. These countries are also members of the EU and, in practice, whatever is adopted in NATO is also valid in the EU. This is a kind of solidarity.

46. To leave no doubt we must underline that if the U.S. does not share Greek interest for extermination of Macedonia and the Macedonian people, or is against such a plan, then it is absolutely certain that such policies would have never passed. According to the standards by which the Alliance operates, there is no chance of substantial change in policy - without U.S. approval. So, what took place in Bucharest, in the least, meant that it was a coincidence that Athens and Washington had similar interests. If Washington was not behind the whole project it would have been absolutely impossible for peace and stability to be achieved in the region, which is still extremely vulnerable, and can/will be jeopardized by a small and corrupt country like Greece.

46.1. Let us ask the question a little differently: If the United States firmly believed and worked for Macedonia to join NATO in Bucharest in 2008, could Greece (or any other country) have prevented it? The answer is simple: Definitely not! This shows that, even in the least, the U.S. was not interested in Macedonia joining NATO. If it really was, then it would have bulldozed everyone out of its way and got what it wanted!
I. Will membership in NATO deliver better security for Macedonia?

47. At the end of this segment we will try to determine whether joining NATO would bring Macedonia better security or not? There is no doubt that belonging to NATO in principle, and from a ceremonial point of view, is a plus for Macedonia. You are a member of an eminent and respectable company. The membership is an important recommendation and reference for the country on economic, political and security plans. Nevertheless, given the irregularities and obstacles placed before us, we need to ask ourselves: Will membership in NATO bring any new qualities to our stability and security?

It is known that NATO guarantees security for its members from outside threats (an attack against one member state is an attack against all member states). However, it does not guarantee internal threats which are common inside Macedonia. Internal security remains the responsibility of each member state. If that is the case then: Are there any threats made against Macedonia from the outside? Or, more accurately, who is threatening Macedonia from the outside?

47.1. Given that Bulgaria, Greece and Albania are NATO members themselves, we can assume that they will not invade Macedonia without agreement from the Alliance?! In other words, there is no conceivable threat unless approved by Washington or perhaps Brussels. Similar to what happened to Serbia in 1999.

47.2. The only other neighbours are Kosovo and Serbia.

47.2.1. We were attacked from Kosovo once but those attacks were with the agreement and cooperation of the U.S. If they attacked us before, there is no reason why they won’t do it again if it serves their interests. This could happen even if Macedonia joined NATO. Who will guarantee that the 2001 scenario won’t be repeated again if the Americans will it? It wouldn’t be important at all if the destabilization of the country comes from
Kosovo, as it did before, or from inside Macedonia. Let us remind you that “the main Albanian factors in Macedonia today (DUI) are the same people that effected the war in 2001”, managed by the Americans. We would be extremely naïve to believe that their relations are no longer very close. Of course, the new possible destabilization would again be in the name of “human rights”, just like it was the last time.

47.2.2. The biggest danger to Macedonia is the repetition of the Serbian scenario, when Kosovo was separated. Fortunately for us the differences between Macedonia and Kosovo are huge. The conflict in Kosovo was maintained within its border. That will not work in Macedonia. If a war is started to fragment Macedonia it would become a regional war. Macedonia managed to avoid it after the Yugoslav breakup because the “powers” did not want a regional and out of control war. That is the main reason why the U.S. did not want an escalation of war that would include Macedonia, and that was and still is the best guarantee for the security of the country. And this is why the U.S. has taken the slow and peaceful way of attempting to break up Macedonia from the inside. From that point of view the aspirations for Macedonia coming from Bulgaria and Greece can be deemed positive!? Practically, they are preventing Macedonia from breaking up into pieces! As long as there are fears of a new and wider Balkan war “Greater Albania” plans and aspirations are at a standstill and limited at best. And that is why the U.S. has chosen to “albanize” Macedonia from the inside. But, it is certain that this process will not work because, even though the Macedonian people are tolerant and patient, but they will explode if pushed too far. It looks like their time is coming nearer and nearer...

From what we have already said above it is clear that the situation in and around Macedonia will not be stabilized anytime soon and therefore, for us, it is crucial that we understand in depth what is going on and monitor and analyze the situation so that we are not again surprised by what is logically to follow.

47.2.3. Our other neighbour, Serbia, has no intention of joining NATO anytime soon. As we saw at the end of 1992, UNPREDEP, including several hundred American soldiers, were
sent to Macedonia to make sure Serbia did not make a move on it. This was not done in order to defend Macedonia and the Macedonians. The reason was valid then and it is valid now; the Americans do not want a Serbian occupation of Macedonia because it is not in the interest of the Albanians!!

For now the U.S. is continuing to play the card that dismisses any threat from the north. How long will that last, is entirely another matter.

The aspirations of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards the Macedonian Orthodox Church are still there and remain current. They are objectively there to make room for Serbia should it one day want to further its political ambitions towards Macedonia, depending on the local situation. In case Macedonia is being divided… again…

47. 2.4. Albanizing parts of Macedonia is obviously a project supported by the U.S. It is a serious step in finalizing the “Greater Albania” project. Should Washington decide to formalize the existence of “free Albanian territories” tomorrow, the first step would be – federalization. Then, if followed by tearing out Macedonian territories, besides those for Bulgaria and Greece, there must also be a portion of “cake” for Serbia. Can such a partition take place without a prior agreement? – is not important.

Yes, all this sounds good but it cannot be achieved without a new war. Let’s not forget that the Allies of the First Balkan War in 1912 fought each other over Macedonia in the Second Balkan War, in 1913. This kind of confrontation of the neighbours was also repeated during WWI and WWII for the same reason, to get more of Macedonia! History has a tendency to repeat itself.

47.3. This, of course, is only a hypotheses, but nonetheless a realistic scenario. Who expected the USSR and Yugoslavia to break up, let alone for Kosovo to break away from Serbia? You can be sure that all this was planned somewhere and by someone. The strategy planners always have a lot of impossible scenarios on their tables…
47.4. In other words, we can objectively conclude that, for now, there is no immediate and real threat to Macedonia from the outside. So in general we can say that there are no major security gains for Macedonia from becoming a NATO member. From what we said earlier, it should be clear that Macedonia’s territorial integrity is not under any direct external threat. Or rather, there is no direct external threat without NATO or American participation. In other words, any threat to Macedonia would have to be approved by NATO and behind NATO stands the U.S.

U.S. dominance in the region, conducted in partnership with the Albanians, can generate but also control hazards in Macedonia. Of course this is done in accordance with American interests. For now the generator is very active!

47.4.1. It is a fact that current trends are negative for Macedonia. Washington so far has worked against Macedonian interests. Fortunately their plans are unrealistic and dangerous for the region. It is a matter of time before they will have to be reassessed. Our goal, therefore, should be to “convince” the United States to come to this conclusion as soon as possible.

47.4.2. If we agree that the territorial integrity of our country, for now, is not threatened from the outside, then the key security elements for Macedonia are its constitution and its unitary character and their guarantor, over the Ohrid Agreement, is the U.S.

If the Americans are true to their word then our country’s future is guaranteed. If not...

Past experience, based primarily on the Interim Accord, has shown not to be very promising.

47.5. On the other hand, dormant dangers are a reality for Macedonia’s security. We are witness to many roundabout steps that clearly question Macedonia’s existence and threaten Macedonia’s survival. Today all these activities are supported, or better to say are led, by the U.S. Some of them even openly!

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Some come from the outside but most come from the inside. That is the case because the only guarantor we have is the unitary character of our state, which so far is permanently, continuously and unscrupulously being ignored. Part of it has been elaborated in this text. At the same time the Constitutional order of the country has been questioned with direct initiative for fundamental changes (Musa Xhaferi for federalization; albanizing municipalities...)…

47. 6. If we started this section with a hypotheses then let’s finish it the same way. The question is: Did the U.S. hinder Macedonia’s accession into NATO in order to have a free hand in restructuring the future of our country and the region as the final outcome to the post-Yugoslav crisis?

Even though there are no clear cut answers to that question, many facts point in that direction…

For now, the only certain thing is that the key to Macedonia’s future is held in Washington.
IX – Washington’s role in relations between Skopje and Sofia

In order for us to fully clarify America’s policy towards Macedonia, we need to look at one more important event.

1. On January 15, 1992 Bulgaria was the first to recognize independent Macedonia. It was an extremely important move for us, especially since we knew that Sofia would not accept the existence of a Macedonian nation, language... From Bulgaria’s point of view however, what Bulgaria in fact was recognizing was probably a second Bulgarian state populated by Bulgarians who had not yet realized that they were Bulgarians. Diplomatic relations were not immediately established because Sofia suddenly got cold feet. From then on Bulgaria took the wait and see position - is Macedonia going to survive?

2. Because Sofia considered that the Macedonian language did not exist and is a Bulgarian dialect, relations between the two countries stagnated. There were 22 agreements drafted and waiting because bilaterally they needed to be signed in both languages. But since mention of the Macedonian language was needed, unacceptable to Bulgaria, the agreements could not be signed.

Years passed without any movement.

3. Finally there was a breakthrough in 1999. The stalemate was broken only because of American “interference” forcing Macedonia to concede on very important strategic issues. This happened under Stroub Talbot’s watch, a well known American diplomat, then Deputy Secretary. This was when Sofia and Skopje signed the famous 1999 “Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation”. In a statement to Bulgarian television, Talbot “revealed” that he was being helped by the U.S. ambassadors (Christopher Hill) in Skopje and (Avis Bolin) in Sofia.

4. By looking at the Declaration we can see that, without any doubt, we have allowed our language to be devalued and to be treated as if it were invented. Talbot’s participation in this matter “proves” that the devaluation of the Macedonian language was
done with American assistance and with strong U.S. pressure. According to the formulation used, the Declaration was signed under the words “relevant official languages of the two countries, in accordance with the terms used in the Bulgarian Constitution for Bulgaria and the terms used in the Macedonian Constitution for the Republic of Macedonia!” The Bulgarian language has no bearing because it is not in dispute. For the Macedonian language this meant that the language was not timeless and indigenous but belongs to a constitutional category and as we all know constitutions can be changed.

5. The second, completely unnecessary Macedonian concession made refers to the section in the Declaration that says: “Nothing in the Macedonian constitution could be interpreted as grounds for interference in Bulgarian internal affairs, in terms of defending the status of people in Bulgaria who are not citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.”

6. According to popular Bulgarian analyst, Kamen Minchev, Macedonia, with this Declaration, has made two concessions and Bulgaria has made only one. (“Relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia following their joint declaration signed on February 22, 1999”, from the Weekly Commentary, March 1-5, 1999) According to Minchev, Sofia “recognized” that the Macedonian language was used on Macedonian territory but not on Bulgarian territory. He considers that as a step positive for Macedonia. However, so that there is no confusion, Minchev concluded that: “With this, Bulgaria does not recognize the Macedonian language or the Macedonian people.”

Minchev assesses that with the second part - “Macedonia declares that it has no longer the right to say that a Macedonian minority exists in Bulgaria and to insist that it is granted certain rights and freedoms.” Minchev immediately recalled that this was contrary to Article 49 of the Macedonian Constitution, with which Macedonia was obliged to look after the rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece and Bulgaria. In the end, Minchev cited Marin Raikov, current interim Bulgarian Prime Minister (at the beginning of 2013), then Deputy Foreign Minister, who led the Bulgarian delegation in the Declaration
negotiations, who said: “We have achieved more than we expected.”

If he was honest to the end he would have cried like the Croatians: “Thank you, Talbot! Thank you, USA!”

7. We should be comforted that no matter what we sign, the Macedonians in Bulgaria cannot just be erased; they are a reality that cannot be ignored. For now and for the sake of the ones who have survived.

However, it is never that easy.

When their country of origin gives them up because they live as a minority in another country, their chances of survival are reduced to practically zero. The process of erasing the Macedonians in Bulgaria has been ongoing for a long time and without us formally renouncing them. From the hundreds of thousands who existed in the past, it remains to be seen if tens of thousands still remain Macedonian in Bulgaria today?

However, the fact is that regardless of its constitutional obligation, Macedonia up to now has done nothing for the Macedonians in Bulgaria, during and after the Yugoslav Federation. So, the concessions made in the Declaration, are on the top of irresponsible policies that are bringing disastrous historical consequences for that part of the Macedonian national fabric.

8. Both concessions made in the Declaration are of strategic importance for Macedonia. The “credit” for devaluing the legitimacy of the Macedonian language and for giving up on the Macedonians in Bulgaria, without a doubt, belongs completely to the U.S. Nevertheless, the guilt is ours because we signed the Declaration. The U.S. gave Sofia more than it would have ever dreamed (according to Raikov) - with our consent.

9. With the formulation used, the Macedonian language was put in an inferior position to all other languages. It looks as if it is not real and is defined only by our Constitution. By signing the
Declaration, Macedonia, in fact, has accepted grounds for the Macedonian language to be disputed. Unfortunately, this precedent carries severe consequences. Through it, Bulgaria will never allow the Macedonian language to be registered as such during Macedonia’s EU accession, if that ever happens. The Bulgarians will insist on the use of the wording as specified in the signed Declaration. After all, we have given them our consent. Thus, in the EU nomenclature we will find languages registered as French, Croatian, English, Bulgarian... and in place of “Macedonian” we will find “in accordance with the terminology of the state’s Constitution”. Meaning fictional and artificial...

10. In the Interim Accord with Greece, we signed that the name of the state is a problem! In the Declaration with Bulgaria we accepted that our language is a problem... We entered the UN without a name. In the EU they will only accept us if we change our name and give up our identity and language... Where does it all end? All that is missing now is for someone to sign a document that says that the Macedonian people were invented by Tito... and we alone will end our story...

11. One thing however is clear: The common denominator of all these procedures has been the United States. Time after time the U.S. has studiously and persistently clipped Macedonia’s wings and cut Macedonia’s roots one by one. The days when Macedonia can no longer fly and will dry up and wither away are not far off. Unless we wake up in time and together say - “ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!”

12. If Washington was a “partner” and a “friend” as many Macedonians still claim it to be, then why did it force us into this position, knowing very well Bulgaria’s attitude towards Macedonia? Looking at the problem from another angle, the U.S. has insistently and persistently put Macedonia in a lose-lose situation, wearing it down until it capitulates! So far the U.S. has done everything in its power to destroy Macedonia... its policy has been nothing but consistent... Pressuring Macedonia to sign the Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation with Bulgaria in 1999 was part of the same goal... to weaken Macedonia by all means possible... This time by attacking its language!
Not a “random coincidence”! They want us to change our name for external use, replacing the UN reference. At home, they “permit” us to call our country – Macedonia. Now they want us to do the same with our language; Macedonian for internal use only! What great coordination! Do you still think these are “random coincidences”, or are there powerful forces at work, in parallel, behind all these issues? How many times do we need to be shot before we understand that they are trying to kill us?

What more validation and evidence would you need, to not see the same scenario repeated again and again under different circumstances and coming from the same centre?

13. Nowadays (late 2012) the 1999 Declaration has again resurfaced. Bulgaria, logically, wants to raise the Declaration to the level of an “Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation”. “Declarations” and “agreements” are completely different documents. It’s like comparing a Mercedes 350 to a Fiat Uno. Both are cars, but... One cannot put in the same basket an “Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation” with any other accord. It is a top document signed between two countries confirming that there are no open issues between them. We know very well that with Bulgaria there are unresolved issues of fundamental importance for Macedonia. So the question here is: Is Sofia insisting on signing such a document to confirm that everything is fine between the two countries? In other words, that we agree to being “Bulgarians” with our language as a dialect of Bulgarian?

13.1. There must be another reason for attempting to impose such an agreement. Are we to assume that Sofia is “concerned” that the “Declaration” is not a strong enough document for Brussels to register our language in accordance with the formulas used in it? Even though, according to diplomatic practices, the precedent with the declaration is enough. So to be sure that our language will be “devaluated” Bulgaria wants an iron clad “agreement”, not just a simple “declaration”… Bulgaria wants a “guarantee” which only comes with a solid “agreement” and not by waving some declaration in Brussels...
14. Declarations are never subject to parliamentary ratification. A Cooperation Agreement must pass parliamentary procedure, otherwise it cannot be enforced. And if we do that then we will confirm, in a much stronger way to Bulgaria, all the embedded strategic concessions we made in 1999. It will then mean that the Macedonian state would finally and officially abandon its language and the Macedonians living in Bulgaria. You can also be sure that Sofia will not sign the Agreement without the wording it wants to see on it.

If, however, we accept, sign and ratify such a text, we will definitely show the world that we are incapable of holding and managing our own Macedonian state.

15. Sofia is dissatisfied because Macedonia has not implemented the 1999 Declaration. It is our duty to constantly remind them that everything that was imposed by force, everything that was dishonestly, unfairly and abnormally imposed... cannot succeed. We have to stress to them that even, God forbid, through blackmail, blockades, etc., if we are again forced to accept unacceptable and non-reciprocal agreements it will also remain as only text on paper. Unfortunately this document will leave deep traces in the Macedonian people and our relationships will slide. It’s pure physics. Macedonians will be angry about the Bulgarian intimidations and they will not be forgiving.

Sofia is wasting time. The Bulgarians are needlessly making fools of themselves, asking for the impossible. Even if they are healing their hang-ups with it, they are wrong. They cannot take what is ours. Even if they take it, it will never be theirs. Neither the people nor the language... They are creating enemies unnecessarily...

Both nations are close in so many ways. Languages, traditions... History also connects us in so many ways. In many events it could be treated even as common. When there was no Macedonian state, many extraordinary Macedonians lived and worked in Bulgaria. A large number of the top Macedonian intellectuals, revolutionaries and activists studied, lived and
worked in Sofia and throughout Bulgaria. There are dozens of events that we have to celebrate together but as two separate nations, as we are. We are not, nor have we ever been Bulgarians. We are Macedonians and speak the Macedonian language.

In the past many people declared themselves Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Macedonians, Muslim Turks... because they had no other choice. No one officially accepted them as Macedonians. All of the neighbours were pretending that they were their own people... My grandfather, Itso Pope, in Resen, during the Serbian occupation, at a census taking was asked: “Your nationality?” He replied: “Macedonian!” Very angry, they told him there was no such thing. He then said: “Then write down whatever you want!” We can imagine that the same was happening in Bulgaria.

After Bulgaria understands and swallows all this, and its historic syndromes are dumped onto the compost heap, then it will be time for new unlimited horizons to open between our two countries and our two peoples.

Until then... Sofia will be on the move.
X – Statements

1. Jan de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General (“Utrinski Vesnik”, July 16, 2008):

“You have to realize that our friends in Skopje want to join NATO, and not vice versa. You know, Greece is inside and Skopje is not. In other words, flexibility is needed from everyone but it should not be forgotten that a country aspires to join NATO. And that is the issue.”

At one time the same rule applied to the blacks. The issue, according to Scheffer, was that there was no other reason other than they were black! The statement is pure racism!

2. Dean Pitman, assistant to Secretary of State John Kerry (“Republika”, September 27, 2013):

“The name issue falls into the category of frozen conflicts, the same as the territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”

“...I know this is not a small matter because if it was it would have been resolved by now.”

This statement was made during a briefing before the UN General Assembly. Pitman actually verified (for us) that a quick solution to the problem is not possible! From what it looks like, he showed us Washington’s true assessment. So here we are left to wonder… why are Reeker, Wohlers... constantly speaking about a quick solution to the dispute?

3. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General (“Dnevnik”, February 17, 2012):

“First a solution to the name, then membership!”

In Athens, Rasmussen, was trying to please the Greeks.

4. Soon after that (“Nova Makedonija”, March 1, 2012) both Ambassador Wohlers and Rasmussen, obviously in a coordinated way, informed us that we should not expect anything from the
NATO summit in Chicago in May, 2012. The pretext was the same; “First change your name then membership!” According to Rasmussen, “The decision was made in Bucharest in 2008 and is still valid!”

These statements confirm and make it crystal clear that the blockades were not Greek but from NATO and the EU.


“The name issue must be resolved... because without a solution it would be difficult to achieve consensus on the country’s entry into NATO and start negotiations with the EU.” Merkel also said: “The Hague verdict is an undeniable success for the Macedonian Government.” And added that: “The verdict should be recognized because obligations for Greece will arise from it!”

This statement was made after Merkel’s talks with Prime Minister Gruevski. It is confusing because Merkel at the same time calls for consensus and for the Court judgment to be recognized by Greece, as well. If that happens there will be no consensus! She also did not say why Germany tolerates Greece ignoring and not implementing The Hague judgment. She is also responsible for that. The final conclusion is that Merkel just showed how much the Court’s verdict is weighing heavily on everyone. When The Hague sentence is mentioned they don’t know where to look or what to say.


“The time has come for Macedonia to not miss this historic opportunity. Identity issues are certainly important, but more important is for the past to not hold the future hostage.”

After that statement, who now can truly say that this problem is “only” about Macedonia’s name and nothing else? Barroso spoke on behalf of the European Union and, in fact, called on our
people to change their own identity… for the sake of the future… right!!!!?

7. Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States responsible for Europe, and former ambassador to NATO (“Nova Makedonija”, November 15, 2013):

“I, myself in the past, especially in 2008 at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, personally rolled up my sleeves on behalf of Macedonia. I remember meeting with Prime Minister Gruevski and with the Greek leaders in my office where we were trying to resolve the dispute. I believe that there are two or more formulations which should be acceptable to both sides. We are working to bring dialogue, leadership and make options for the two parties to choose from.”

Well now, who are we to believe? While Reeker, Wohlers and others have repeatedly assured us that the U.S. will not interfere in the dispute and that this is a job for the two countries to work out, Vicky here has assured us to the contrary; that she personally rolled up her sleeves to solve it!? And the “two or more formulations” that should be “acceptable to both sides”, you can be sure are not Greek but American solutions to the problem. In any case, the fact is that between the U.S. and Greece there are “differences” which are not strategic, but only technical. Greece, for example, wants to close the issue immediately through erga omnes while the U.S. is more committed to our gradual annihilation. In stages that may take several years, through replacing the reference with a permanent name for international use! They insist that this process will be “less painful” and easier for us to cross the torrent.


“The U.S. has a big task and is investing a lot of diplomatic effort, including people at the highest levels, to find a solution together with the Greek and Macedonian governments. One can only guess as to why this has not already happened.”
This must be a revelation for who is handling this case: The U.S. with all its bulldozers at the “highest level” has failed to wipe out little Macedonia!


“We understand that Prime Minister Gruevski has to make a heavy decision which is always difficult in situations like this. But I think it is important for the Macedonian leadership to focus on going forward with a solid future in NATO and the EU, which is tempting!?”

There is no ambiguity in the American position - they are openly asking for our capitulation. There is no bilateral agreement with Greece and no mediation... Macedonia must die... everything else is for show.


“The government in Skopje needs to know that it will not be able to make progress in its European integration until it resolves the name issue and, on the other hand, it is obvious that Greece must be ready to accept that solution!”

It cannot be said any clearer: a) in the name of the United States, Mrs. Clinton has told us point blank, “no NATO and EU” as Macedonia!, b) In parallel she also told us that Greece must accept the solution! This means that we need to be ready to serve Greece as well! Of course when the time comes, if it ever comes! And now why should we talk to Athens and not directly to its manager, the U.S., who set the conditions?

11. WikiLeaks: “U.S. supports an international name with a geographic qualifier” (“Dnevnik”, March 30, 2011). According to a telegram sent from U.S. Ambassador to Athens, Daniel Speckhard, the Obama administration believes that the main element in deciding on the name is using “a name with a geographic determinant for general use internationally without
having to tamper with the identity (and the identity is not to be mentioned until certain stages of the EU integration process)!”

Thanks to WikiLeaks the American game and trap have been revealed. Trap us and annihilate us step by step. First change our name for international use. Then change our identity. Of course, in “stages” and no hurry.

12. Lawrence Eagleburger, former U.S. Secretary of State, to MRTV:

“If Macedonia decides to keep its constitutional name there is no power which can force it to change it. It is up to you to decide whether you want to change your name or not!”

This is the strongest card in Macedonia’s hand. No one can change our country’s name and identity without our consent. Except for the person(s) who will authorize the renaming…

13. Hillary Clinton, as Secretary of State, for the 20th anniversary of independence on September 8, 2011, decided not to send her congratulations to Macedonia’s leaders. It is common practice to send congratulations through the embassies of countries. Ignoring the Macedonian leadership, she sent her greetings directly to the Macedonian citizens through the State Department web page! This was not only unprecedented but an insult to the Macedonian leadership, illustrating American displeasure with Macedonia’s unwillingness to capitulate.

This was during the period when Washington was openly boycotting Gruevski’s government. In February 2011, while visiting the U.S. and in meetings with the State Department, Gruevski was forced to organize a press conference on the street...

13.1. U.S. hostility towards Macedonia’s government peaked when Reeker (“Gruevski ignores messages from Washington”, “Dnevnik”, March 4, 2011) said: “The situation in Macedonia has not changed even though we voiced our concerns to the
Prime Minister at the meetings in Washington. On the contrary, after February 16 U.S. concerns have spiked!”

14. Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, during his visit to Skopje (“Dnevnik”, October 27, 2010): “Washington is still interested in Macedonia’s membership in NATO. With all this waiting it is Macedonia who is losing and not Greece. There is no long-term damage from failure to resolve the dispute for Athens.”

What more can we look for? Is it possible to get any “stronger support” from our “strategic partner”?!?

15. Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, in an address to the Foreign Affairs Senate Subcommittee, talking about the prospects of Balkan countries for NATO membership (“Nova Makedonija”, May 20, 2011): “Macedonia will join after the name issue is resolved.”

If the U.S. was not blocking Macedonia why would Gordon have to explain to the Senate who is obstructing Macedonia’s entry into NATO? Is the problem consensus or...? The most important thing to notice here is that he did not distance the U.S. from that policy!

16. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State (“Dnevnik”, October 28, 2008): “Take Nimetz’s latest proposal and make a bright future for your children. They will be grateful for it. After Macedonia accepts the name change, the EU will pressure Greece to respond positively!”

Regarding Macedonia’s insistence on preserving its identity, Fried said: “Success of the country is its best proof of identity!” He also added: “I would rather be a hero 100 years later than be a hero now!”

This is the most beautiful anatomy of American politics yet: a) you accept first and then Greece will accept! And if Greece does not accept, which is most possible, then what? Greece is not likely to accept anything outside of our permanent demise! Then
will follow the next stage. What we have accepted would be only a starting point for new concessions. Logical, isn’t it? b) How can the United States affirm that after our acceptance, the “EU will push Greece ...?” How do they know that the EU will push Greece? Isn’t this an excellent confirmation that Washington is indeed managing this dispute?! c) Is there anyone who would prefer to be a hero 100 years from now instead of today?

17. Sean McCormack, spokesman for the U.S. State Department (“Utrinski” September 11, 2008): “Macedonia has said that it wants to be called Macedonia and we recognized that name. If Macedonia tells the international community that it wants to be called by a different name, which will be fully supported by the Macedonian people and the government, then I do not believe that the U.S. would oppose it.”

He said that the U.S. did not suggest any solutions but has participated in finding one. How? Are they waiting for someone else to make suggestions?

This is indeed another confirmation that without our consent there can be no name change. The spokesman, it seems, did not understand that Macedonia does not want to change its name. If it did it would have happened a long time ago.

The statement confirms as well that the U.S. will be the first country to use the new name, if Macedonia capitulates.


“In Macedonia’s case, NATO members have made it clear that an invitation will only be offered after the name issue is resolved.”

What more do we need to say? Our NATO membership is definitely not decided by Greece alone. Greece may bear responsibility for Macedonia’s predicament but others are behind it…
19. According to “Nova Makedonija” (“Wishes one, sincerity another”, February 24, 2012), James Steinberg, a high level State Department employee, in 2009 said: “To simplify the matter, come to an agreement and what has been agreed will be confirmed by UN resolution. This will apply to everyone in the international community.”

With whom can we agree? With Greece? There is the problem. Everything else is easier. Indeed, that is why we are always sent to Athens!

20. Aivo Orav, Head (Ambassador) of the EU Mission in Macedonia, speaking about the Ohrid Agreement to the European Parliament (“Dnevnik”, November 17, 2012): “This agreement is very important for the government coalition between the ethnic Albanians and the Slav Macedonians, even though the ethnic communities may understand it differently.”

He used the term “Slav Macedonians” a few times. What do you think, the idea of renaming us to “Slav Macedonians” was his or ordered by Brussels? We can guarantee that it was not his personal choice! So do you still think our identity is not at stake? We have been told a thousand times that the identity, the language… are not part of the problem. When are you, “Slav Macedonians”, going to understand that?!

21. Now will follow statements by Philip Reeker, first as ambassador to Macedonia (2008-2011) and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in Washington.

(From 1997 to 1999, Reeker was a diplomat in Skopje and spokesman for Ambassador Hill, who was special envoy to President Clinton on Kosovo. Through Hill, Reeker was directly involved in the various wars of the time. Both Hill and Reeker attended the Rambouillet Conference where Reeker acted as spokesman. Everything possible was prepared for the Serbians to reject the offensive and unacceptable proposed agreement with the Albanians from Kosovo, in order to make way for bombing Serbia, including Belgrade. So we can conclude that Reeker has
been directly involved in the “Greater Albania” project since the late 1990’s).

21.1 “This is a young country; it became independent for the first time only 18 years ago. There is evidence of this in the UN and around the world. What needs to be addressed here is what is referred to as “the name dispute”. Your country needs to find a name with which to start moving further towards full integration. Your identity is yours, with every individual and with every group. This is something that cannot be negotiated.”

“Something can be found that will strengthen Macedonia’s European identity, to resolve the name issue so that the country can join institutions and become a true member of the Euro-Atlantic community.”

“For us Americans being bilingual or multilingual is an asset, something from which the people of this country can benefit. It should be borne in mind that diversity can also bring benefits here and you will be more secure if you accept the other languages and cultures that exist in Macedonia.”

The quotes shown here were taken from an interview with U.S. Ambassador Reeker entitled “The identity is not negotiable” given for “Dnevnik” on June 8, 2009.

Reeker told us almost everything: that our country is only 18 years old (he doesn’t recognize Macedonia’s statehood during the period of Yugoslavia?!); that we should change the name of our country; that our identity is not and cannot be negotiable, which is absolutely true. But what he did not tell us is that the name change automatically leads to identity change: that we need to build a **European identity** (something that Wohlers repeated in December 2013 in Tetovo!); that Macedonians should learn Albanian (for personal benefit!)… He did not mention that the Albanians need to learn Macedonian! The Albanians have no need to become more “secure”, as per Reeker’s advice to the Macedonians. They are, of course, protected by the Americans...
This interview is a kind of summary of American policy implemented in Macedonia after 2008.

21.2. “I believe it is possible to have a solution relatively quickly ... focus on what needs to be done and that is finding A NAME FOR INTERNATIONAL USE, to which both sides would agree.” (“Nova Makedonija”, January 18, 2010)

This is the biggest scam, trap and hook for Macedonia. …give us a name for home use and rename us, or erga omnes, for outside which can never be achieved. But if it is done with our consent for external use, it will not be long before it becomes erga omnes for all! We may conclude that the Americans want us to choose a name for international use to which Greece will agree!? Why should Greece be Macedonia’s godfather?

21.3. “This is a very important spring for Macedonia; the name issue should be resolved in the next few months.” (“Nova Makedonija”, March 4, 2010)

No pressure here!

21.4. According to “Dnevnik” (“Public to help government with the name issue”, August 30, 2010) Reeker said: “I think the public should stand up and take responsibility and become interested in the issues, listen to what people have to say.”

This was probably the starting point of the idea for public debate, which was the topic in the summer of 2013. The idea here was to create more confusion and bring Macedonia closer to capitulation. Reeker took over three years to turn this into a project.

21.5. “I hope you don’t have to spend another two and a half years to come up with a solution to the name issue, which is a condition for receiving your invitation for NATO membership. Macedonia has met the criteria and the country will be given an invitation as soon as the name issue with Greece is resolved. We are disappointed that it is still not resolved. However, the responsibility to find a final solution lies with your leaders and
with the people of Macedonia.” (“Nova Makedonija”, November 23, 2010)

No doubt everything depends on us! Reeker opened the cards: Greece has no role here! Nor responsibility for not having a solution! The manager (U.S) knows who needs to capitulate…

21.6. In an interview with “Nova Makedonija” (“If it was up to the United States, the name would have been resolved,” March 26, 2011), Reeker said:

“It is not important to think about the past or the present, but to think of forming a strategy for the future.”

“We have not seen any real discussion taking place about what is acceptable to you, we have heard more about what is not.”

The first quote is part of the constant American deception and fog about the future which requires us to sacrifice our past and present. The second quote is true, but Reeker’s intention is not for Macedonia to come closer to a solution but to start auctioning. When we say what is acceptable to us it will immediately be only the starting point for new concessions. That is the simplest diplomatic technique. Again, Reeker insists on “public debate” about our name!

21.7. “Not to prejudge the decision of the International Court of Justice but the basic situation with NATO is still the same: NATO very clearly stated on numerous occasions and repeatedly that Macedonia will only receive an invitation to join NATO when it resolves the name issue!” (“Dnevnik”, December 3, 2011)

And some “experts” constantly claim that it is the Greeks who are blocking and blackmailling us for NATO membership!? 

21.8. “The International Court of Justice has delivered its opinion concerning the dispute between Greece and Macedonia. We hope that both sides take this opinion and resolve the problem. NATO’s position has not changed, which means that
after you solve the name dispute, regardless of how you decide to settle it, Macedonia will advance into NATO!”

“We can help, but we cannot make the difficult decisions on your behalf. These are the very things that you have to do!” (“Nova Makedonija”, January 10, 2012)

Our journalists (let alone politicians) never asked Reeker “since when do courts deliver “opinions” and not judgments?” Second, he is clearly saying that the NATO alliance is blocking us! Third, the qualification that “it is us that needs to make the hard decisions” and not Greece, has revealed American intentions. When you are forced to sacrifice something important or precious it is really a tough decision! Normally, Greece is again out of the game!

21.9. “We have offered ideas and the UN is leading a process and would like to come to a solution. If you truly want to go back in history, THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION HAS PLAGUED NOT ONLY THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION BUT ALSO IN WIDER EUROPE. We believe we have the answer to that question, with the current structure and existing boundaries. That is the answer.” (“Dnevnik”, March 29, 2012)

This is an extremely important statement. It is crucial that Reeker, perhaps for the first time, has associated the “name dispute” with the “Macedonian Question”. If it was truly troubling both the people in the region and Europe, as he said, then the Americans are right in trying to shut it down! Is Reeker accidentally showing the roots of the dispute? What did he mean by saying – “we have the answer to that question”? Did he mean – extinction of the Macedonians? Or, why are they constantly pushing us to “agree” with Greece, when they have the answer – there will never be an agreement with Greece unless we are willing to self destruct? Finally, he precisely confirms that the key to the case is in their hand and that Greece is only – extra!

This is how Reeker justified Defense Minister Fatmir Besimi’s unauthorized and secret visit to an NLA monument in Slupchane.

22. Paul Wohlers, current U.S. ambassador to Skopje (2011 - ), is not as aggressive as his predecessor Reeker and gives the impression that he is more sincere and restrained. Wohlers:

22.1 “This is an issue which goes beyond the name, it is about identity.” (“Nova Makedonija”, July 20, 2011)

Wohlers said this while being questioned in Congress, during the confirmation of his nomination as ambassador to Macedonia. And he was right. But what can we do, when Reeker and the others are trying to convince us otherwise, all the time?

22.2. “Greece is going through major political and economic changes and until that process is over it will complicate the progress of other proceedings, not just the name issue.” (“Dnevnik”, November 9, 2011)

If that is the case, and it surely is, why then is the United States insisting almost daily on a quick solution? Is this not pure manipulation and a lie?

22.3. “No institution has the right to tell NATO who to accept and who not to when it comes to membership.” Wohlers, according to “Nova Makedonija” of March 19, 2012, was angry when he said this.

This says it all: NATO is blocking Macedonia, not Greece.

22.4. “You, as citizens of Macedonia, have to decide how to define yourselves and based on what values. You cannot be defined by ethnicity, which is different, nor by faith, which also differs, or by culture, which is similar but not the same.” Wohlers then added: “Some people are trying to create an identity by returning far back in history, but as I said in my speech, it is a dangerous way to create an identity that way because some people may be left out. I think many people in this country feel left out by taking this path. This is why shared values are much
better and more important for the future and we should all participate in that debate!?” (“Dnevnik”, November 27, 2013)

At a lecture in Tetovo at the “Stoel” University, Wohlers fully exposed his cards regarding U.S. policy towards Macedonia. He treated the Macedonian people like they were an impersonal object or an amorphous heap which needed renaming. He wanted erasure of Macedonia and the Macedonian people through “public debate”. There can be no more direct appeal to annihilate the Macedonian people. This is the real policy the U.S. has been leading for over 20 years towards Macedonia.

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23. Analyzing statements made by Reeker and comparing them with those of his predecessors in Skopje, ambassadors Aenik, Butler and Milovanovic, we find a striking difference. Reeker’s predecessors never publicly mentioned the name issue. They never asked Macedonia to change the name, to take heavy decisions... to accept capitulation. There was not a single attempt to change our identity, language…

Based on the facts presented we can conclude that America’s policy towards Macedonia brought the dramatic change at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 regarding its membership. There, through blockade, the doors were closed to NATO (and the EU) for our country, with a parallel imposition of blackmail and an ultimatum - “First the name, then membership!”

It was exactly at the same time, in 2008, when Ambassador Reeker came to Skopje and persistently and aggressively started to implement the new American policy. No space was left for any other solution except total destruction of Macedonia and the Macedonians.

After Bucharest in 2008, all U.S. officials began to sing the same new song... “First the name, then membership!”

If Greece was truly responsible for NATO’s (and the EU’s) policy turnaround in 2008, then why were U.S. officials, all
quoted above, so active in pressuring Macedonia to change the name, to make “tough” decisions, to be “brave” and “quickly”, in a few months, to solve the problem...?

Did they do all these things to make Greece happy? Please… let us not be so naïve...

23.1. After Bucharest in 2008, having experienced stagnation and defeat over this issue for the previous 15 years, Washington decided to grab all the strings in its own hands in order to bring a quick solution to the “Macedonian Question”. Once and for all!

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24. Finally, some relevant information that showed interference in Macedonian affairs by foreign diplomats (mostly Ambassadors):


“Perhaps I shouldn’t say more than is needed, but the first time I heard the idea of a wider joint front against this government was from the international representatives.”

24.2. According to “Nova Makedonija” on June 3, 2010, “The Albanian parties cannot unite, even though foreign diplomats have suggested to them to form a common platform.” The article also said that Selmani, former leader of New Democracy, had written invitations to the DUI and DPA leaders to “unite” in order to resolve outstanding Albanian issues!

Against whom were these Albanians leaders expected to “unite”?

24.3. Vladimir Milchin, executive director of the Soros “Open Society Institute” Foundation, according to “Dnevnik” on August 30, 2010, said that foreign diplomats had tested the option of having a referendum without support from the government!

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We might only guess which diplomats suggested a common platform or a wider Albanian front against the Macedonian government, or assign a referendum... They must be from Malta or Senegal... What do you think? Who else would have the interest and would dare to unscrupulously interfere in our affairs?

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At the end, a little “chanson”: “Dnevnik” on October 25, 2012, wrote about the case of the American named Candy Dunlap, who was arrested at the airport in Petrovac on September 28, 2012. Found on her were about 256 ancient coins, two pendants of lead and bronze and a few other items of archaeological value, all priceless. She stayed in Macedonia for only six days and her visit was “humanitarian” in nature, or more precisely, she was here on a “medical” mission. At her trial she claimed that the villagers of Krivolak, Seltse and Lozovo in Shtip Region, in appreciation for her “medical services” gave her the items and that they were only souvenirs!? She thought the coins were buttons!? The court found that she had no permission to provide “medical services” and no written documentation that showed that she was with a humanitarian mission...

It was quite clear that a dangerous swindler and smuggler had been caught. She must have belonged to an organized smuggling ring, stealing our cultural heritage.

What do you think, dear readers, how many years of jail was our dear guest Candy given?

Candy received no time in jail! All she got was a suspended sentence of two years and banishment! Practically, she was found not guilty, like it was some sort of joke. Due to “mitigating circumstances” i.e. being a stranger, a family woman, a mother of six children who has an obligation to take care of them, she was set free to go...!? What kind of message did we send to would be thieves? We will just apologize to you for the inconvenience and send you back home!!?
Candy was caught, but how many Americans (and others!), here on “humanitarian” missions, have gotten away with our stolen treasures?

And let us be objective here: do you believe that this court misery and shame was possible without direct interference of the American Embassy in Skopje? Can you imagine that their consuls (and Ambassador!) were enjoying life until a U.S. citizen was on a trial in a country with no name, called by its people - Macedonia? It is simply – impossible.

Nevertheless, it is entirely our fault. We are responsible for making our country a laughing matter.

For a similar crime in the U.S. a Macedonian would be made to sit on the electric chair?

Rightly so!
XI - Closing Remarks

1. It is truly sad and inexcusable that, 20 years later, we still don’t know the reasons of such unacceptable, unchallenged U.S. policy towards Macedonia? Why they reopened the “Macedonian Question”? Why did they do nothing to stop the illegal Greek blockade of our border that lasted almost 2 years destroying Macedonia’s economy? Why did they keep silent? Why didn’t Washington intervene when the European Commission ignored the so-called “Badinter Commission’s” recommendation for Macedonia’s recognition and strongly supported Bosnia and Herzegovina even though it did not meet minimum conditions for recognition? And why they tolerated the 1992 EC’s Lisbon Declaration, prohibiting us to use the word/name Macedonia?

We can conclude through arguments that all these years the United States has done nothing positive or in favour of Macedonia. Perhaps the only exception was in the beginning of the 1990’s when it sent UNPREDEP troops, demonstrating a kind of interest for Macedonia. Unfortunately that too, again and above all, was done for its own (and Albanian) interests. The aim then was to prevent Milosevich from invading and occupying Macedonia and not to strengthen the security of our country. There is nothing else positive.

1.1. A survey of U.S. policy towards Macedonia could have been taken a long time ago. It made no sense to have left Macedonia in the lurch after it had done everything in its power, unique among the ex-republics, to secede from Yugoslavia peacefully. Why was Macedonia not rewarded politically and economically for its constructive behaviour? Then, in 2008 in Bucharest, why did they permit, if not organize, the total turnaround concerning Macedonia leading to her blockade, blackmail and ultimatum – “First the name, then membership”?

1.2. Let us put the question in a different way: what mistakes did Macedonia make to provoke such policies towards it? In Serbia’s case Milosevich, no doubt, brought U.S. wrath upon himself for the way he behaved in the region. But what did Macedonia do? The answer is simple: No matter what Macedonia did or would
have done any differently, nothing would have mattered. The outcome would have been the same or similar because the United States had made up its mind a long time ago about what to do in the region and how to go about achieving its goals. Unfortunately for us, Macedonia and the Macedonian people stood in America’s way and they needed to be removed. At issue here is not what Macedonia did or did not do, but what the U.S. wanted to do with regards to its regional geopolitical interests.

2. It is however never too late to effect change, despite the long time lapse. One of the first attempts to be made is to assess the American policies implemented in Macedonia since the breakup of Yugoslavia. The idea here is to inspire today’s Americans to do a more in-depth analysis of what was done in order to pinpoint mistakes made in drafting the U.S. Balkan policy. Were these mistakes made at the State Department or at other relevant institutions is not important. Wherever they were made they need to be reviewed and revised. The Americans need to be guided to face the real situation in Macedonia and in the region, as seen from local objectives and aspects and not from global. It is, in fact, in their interest to understand us better. Pragmatism, which was and remains their strong suit, must prevail in this situation.

3. The findings presented, conclusions reached and opinions given in this write-up are all based on facts, but we have to admit that further research is required for a final conclusion. This needs to be done in order to put all the pieces of the puzzle together and uncover the entire U.S. strategy and policy towards Macedonia and the wider region. It is always possible to make mistakes in politics because you cannot always foresee the real intentions. Sometimes there are hidden goals that cannot be easily detected and can lead to wrong conclusions. And our study here is not excluded. Unfortunately, thanks to all available elements, our judgments are generally correct and speak the truth.

4. We have already explained that U.S. policy toward Macedonia is part of American interests in the Balkans, which are to be realized through the Albanian factor. This inevitably puts into question Macedonia’s territorial integrity. Serbia’s territorial integrity was compromised when Kosovo was separated and
made into an Albanian state. Albanian appetites, openly supported by the United States, however, cannot be satisfied without part of Macedonia’s territory. This process is already advanced and in many ways irreversible.

4.1. As a tradition, the Americans do not trust the Slav people in the Balkans. At the same time, most probably they consider the Macedonians as problematic because of their disunity and permanent and traditional mutual confrontations. As such they cannot guarantee stability, security and prosperity for the country and cannot be a solid partner for the U.S., for example. That is why they are building a partnership with the Albanians. There is also the fact that all Albanians have shown loyalty to the U.S. and a willingness to meet all their requirements to the maximum if they are given the opportunity to decisively solve their own national question.

4.1.1. On the other hand, all neighbours have problems with Macedonia and with the Macedonians! Not vice versa! Maybe it looks strange but the fault lies with them not with us. Except maybe for the fact that we are here, that we exist on this territory and that we are what we are. Apart from defending ourselves from outside aggression and aspirations, we have not committed acts of unfriendliness towards our neighbours. Nevertheless, the result is extremely bad: for many, Macedonia is a direct obstacle for the stabilization of the region and for the solution of a nice part of the open questions. This is our historical heritage with which we have to live.

Macedonia has only developed a kind of “defensive instinct” because it has often been the victim of foreign intrigues.

The reason for the situation that Macedonia has been in for a century at least may be summarized by the words of former Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasich (1945 – 1926) who, according to Iambev Mikhail Leonidovich (“The armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001 and the development of the political situation in the country”), said: “History has shown that he who had Macedonia was always first in the Balkans.”
4.2. From what we have seen, the Albanian leaders in Macedonia have a serious role in the implementation of U.S. policy in the Balkans. Everything started with the 2001 war when, by armed force, new, radical Albanian leaders were brought into Macedonia. If then, in 2001, Ahmeti and his NLA were American protégés implementing their regional interests and policies, and that is a fact, why would they behave differently today? Why would they now ignore American aspirations in our country and the region? Could Ahmeti and his commanders turn their backs on the U.S. today after all that the Americans have done for them including bringing Ahmeti to power? How can they forget their patrons who conceived and organized the 2001 war (also because of their own interests) in favour of the Albanian cause, through which they made inconceivable gains? There is no objective reason to do so. On the contrary!

4.3. There should be no doubt that the cooperation and coordination that was started in 2001 has continued at its full capacity in all kinds of circumstances to this day. So we openly need to ask: Is it possible that the evident lack of loyalty towards Macedonia, so often manifested by the Albanian leaders, even quite openly lately, is done with American blessings? Or are they stimulated to play the role of a Trojan horse, on account of the Macedonians? The answers are clear.

4.4. It is like that because the natural enemy to both Americans and Albanians for finalization of their common “Greater Albania” project is – Macedonia! Only at the expense of Macedonia can they finish what they started in Kosovo in 1999 and continued in Macedonia in 2001, as it was precisely formulated in the first five announcements of the NLA.

Now let us have a look at the latest facts that confirm the above:

- Defense Minister Fatmir Besimi, accompanied by several uniformed officers from his Office, along with the Deputy Prime Minister and a number of government and party people including some DUI functionaries, all Albanians attended an unauthorized and illegal function where they stood before a monument in Slupchane and paid tribute to the dead NLA fighters. Besimi
claimed that it was an act of reconciliation. U.S. Ambassador Paul Wohlers immediately backed the minister publicly and used the same words, thus justifying the incident. The same was repeated by Reeker who said he “welcomed Besimi’s message of reconciliation which was not easy to do”;

- In the beginning of the 2012 school year, the Albanian national anthem, instead of the Macedonian, was played in several elementary schools and at the Tetovo University. (“The prosecutor threatened but the anthem echoed on”, “Dnevnik”, September 21, 2012). Wohlers was unresponsive despite the deep dissatisfaction reported by the media;

- The Deputy Prime Minister Musa Xhaferi gave a speech at the “John Hopkins” University in the United States concluding that Macedonia’s future lies in federalization (“Integrating the Shadow of Federalism”, “Gragianski”, October 13, 2012). There was not a word from the U.S. even though Xhaferi had been invited by the Americans to make the speech. And here we thought that the United States had guaranteed our state’s unitary character through the Ohrid Agreement. Does that mean that the Ohrid Agreement is going to go by the way of the Interim Accord which guaranteed that Greece would not impede our way into NATO and the EU? The Ohrid Agreement was “prepared” in the same manner as the Interim Accord. Its treatment shows that the U.S. cares about no agreements that are not in favour of its interests. When the Ohrid Agreement becomes “favourable” for Macedonia then it will be ignored just as the Interim Accord was. Why should we believe that it is any different?

- The same Musa Xhaferi initiated holding a “National Congress of Albanian Mayors from Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro”!? (“Musa Xhaferi gathers Balkan Albanian mayors”, “Nova Makedonija”, January 30, 2012). We could only ask – what for?

- The Chair Municipality in Skopje illegally renamed some schools using the names of fallen NLA fighters. Wohlers, of course, said nothing and did nothing. This is more proof that
albanization of Macedonian territories started with plan “B”, officially called the Ohrid Agreement;

- Former Ambassador Reeker, along with a number of top Albanian politicians, was present during an Albanian nationalist rampage at a basketball game. There was no reaction from any of them. No one did anything to stop it. They just witnessed and maybe enjoyed the Albanian nationalistic hysteria;

- During a ceremony at the Military Academy, Defense Minister Besimi addressed the cadets in Albanian even though Chief of Staff Koteski warned him that the official language in Macedonia was Macedonian. (“Besimi spoke to the cadets in Albanian”, “Nova Makedonija”, October 2, 2012);

- Bekim Fazliu, DPA Albanian party candidate for mayor of Skopje, said: “After our victory we will not allow the song ‘Makedonsko Devoiche’ to be sung in Albanian settlements inside Macedonia!” (“Republika”, December 7, 2012);

- Ziadin Zela, DPA Albanian party candidate for mayor of Struga said: “Vote en masse to show that Struga is in fact an Albanian town!” (“Republika”, April 12, 2013);

- Here are a few statements made by DPA leader Thachi:

  “Macedonia is an artificial country, a ‘state experiment’, and it would be good if all Albanians lived in one country!” (“Ours and Kosovo’s Thachi are in line for a Greater Albania”, “Dnevnik”, March 19, 2012);

Thachi called on “Albania and Kosovo to stop the violence against the Albanians in Macedonia.” (“Thachi seeks international intervention”, “Dnevnik”, March 10, 2012);

In an interview for “Dnevnik” (“The Tetovo Albanians are traitors because they voted for Ahmeti”, May 17, 2013) Thachi said: “Let’s be honest. We do not want to live in Macedonia; we want to live in another country. But they openly told us that there is no such dream!” (This may seem contradictory but it is not. First, who do you think told them that? Iceland or Norway?!)
Second, from our analysis it is clear that Washington’s aim is to break up Macedonia from the inside. So the dream remains alive, but it may take slightly longer than expected to achieve it. However, the plan will be achieved in different ways than imagined in 2001. Armed changes of the borders became too risky.

- During Albania’s 100th anniversary celebration, a monument of Adem Jashari was uncovered in Radusha. Adem Jashari was a member of the KLA in Kosovo and had nothing to do with Macedonia (“Adem Jashari rose in Radusha”, “Dnevnik”, November 19, 2012)

- Berisha initiated the formation of a national soccer league of Albanian clubs in the Balkan countries. It was supported by a “civil” movement in Macedonia called “Awaken”. (“Albanian soccer league is marketing propaganda for Berisha”, “Dnevnik”, January 8, 2013)

The above examples and many others have shown the real face of American politics as well as their relations with local politicians. They support all steps taken by the Albanians that are undermining and destroying our country... At the same time they are signing documents in which the Macedonian language becomes a “state” language...

There are too many “occurrences” and “coincidences” to be ignored and for us to continue to remain naïve and blind.

4.5. When world renowned Albanian writer Ismail Kadare was accused by the press of being a willing anti-Vlach and even a racist, he immediately reacted with a response in the “Shekulli”, published on November 10, 2003, in which he deemed this to be a “vulgar provocation” and reminded everyone to respect all ethnic minorities in accordance with basic European principles. He also stressed that “loyalty to the country where minorities live is necessary and, if it is absent, people need to ring the alarm bells.”
Unfortunately in Macedonia no one has taken Kadare’s “advice” to heart.

5. On the other hand, in addition to the pro-Albanian policy, Washington is aggressively pressing us to negotiate a name solution with Greece, not specifying what constitutes an acceptable solution. Washington knows better than anybody else that the Greek problem is not the name but the existence of the Macedonian nation, which they would like to eliminate. If the Americans already know that, and there should be no doubt that they know it perfectly, then why are they pretending that the problem is not of any great importance? When the question for the Macedonians is practically – to be or not to be? In all their moves, the Americans have completely and consistently supported Greece. Why? While setting ultimatums for Macedonia, so far Washington has never set any condition for Athens. If Washington is truly seeking a solution why has it not made it clear to Greece that it must not demand the impossible?

5.1. The aggressive U.S. insistence that we negotiate with Greece, especially in recent years, is more proof of their real policy towards Macedonia. Washington is undoubtedly also aware that, while Greece is in a deep crisis, no agreement is possible. This was also admitted by Ambassador Wohlers in Skopje, as mentioned before.

If there is no space for a solution that would be minimally acceptable to Macedonia, and there will not be, then the aim of the all United States actions can only be – for Macedonia to capitulate! If someone forces you to take poison, surely they are not wishing you good health.

5.2. Washington knows that the problem is completely asymmetric. The core of it is Greece’s (and the U.S.)!, but the consequences are exclusively - Macedonia’s. Here, perhaps, lies our greatest handicap. No matter what we do, we pay the price. Everything falls on Macedonia’s shoulders. That is why no one understands the problem, and blames Macedonia for it.
However, in the end, if there is any justice left in the world, if there is any political accountability and fairness, if there are any principles left and if democracy works... the solution to this problem must also be asymmetrical. Only such a solution can be permanent and lasting without new earthquakes to follow. That is the only way that Macedonia can be saved. Abraham Lincoln once said: “Nothing is completely finished if not resolved fairly!”

5.2.1. Creating the “name problem” did not reflect negatively on Greece, or anyone else. It was used against the fundamental interests of the Macedonian people and their state (UN, NATO, EU...). Thanks to the “name dispute”, Macedonia was left without a full legal international identity; its euro-Atlantic integration was blocked... thus causing our people economic, social and political suffering and further undermining inter-ethnic relations... which were already vulnerable enough...

At the same time, even if Macedonia keeps its historical and constitutional name intact, there will be no consequences for Greece. In other words, Athens has nothing to lose apart from the fact that it unnecessarily wasted a lot of energy and money in the last 20 years or so...

5.2.2. Greece’s initial accusations (1991/1992/1993) that the name “Macedonia” implied irredentism and threatened Greece’s territorial integrity proved to be completely wrong and unsustainable as an argument. Here we are, over 20 years later and nothing has happened. And these were not just ordinary years. All these years Macedonia had been a victim of Greek psychological torment, cold and calculating roadblocks and an endless anti-Macedonian propaganda war; Greek aggression that brought the Macedonian people immeasurable harm. And yet, Macedonia did not retaliate! So if Macedonia did “nothing” to Greece during these 20 or so turbulent years, when will it do it?

Let us one more time mention the EC’s “Badinter Commission”, mentioned a few times earlier in this write-up, which concluded that our name Macedonia in no way has threatened Greece.
6. So that there is no confusion, we must underline that publicly and verbally the Americans are strongly in support of Macedonia’s membership in NATO (and the EU). Unfortunately this turned out to be empty, useless and worthless because it is conditional. The fact is that the U.S. wants to see Macedonia in NATO but - renamed! And the U.S. does not hide that fact. And our response should be loud and clear - NO THANK YOU!!! Please, we beg you; don’t give us your support under such conditions. We don’t want to commit suicide; it is not an option for us. The price set for joining is too high and no normal person in Macedonia will accept it.

Hillary Clinton, according to the magazine “Republika”, November 9, 2012, said: “Everyone wants to see you in NATO as soon as possible and we sincerely hope that the obstacle will be removed (the obstacle for Mrs. Clinton is that we are Macedonians) as soon as possible and a practical and fair solution (she was probably thinking in accordance with the Greek erga omnes ultimatum?) for the name can be found. We are ready to help” (surely with a list of possible new names!)!

According to a friend, Mrs. Clinton is telling us “if my grandmother was the British Queen, I would be a princess”. But then she concludes that “the trouble is that I am not!”

7. The Americans have insisted that we change our country’s name, arguing that it will not compromise the national identity of our people. However, Ambassador Wohlers, before taking office in Skopje, during a talk with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (professionally called “crosstalk” ahead of confirming an office), said: “This is more than a name. This is a question of identity!” (“Wohlers: Dispute and the question of identity”, “Nova Makedonija”, July 15, 2011)

Wohlers was absolutely right: there is no identity without a name!

He quoted Ambassador Philip Reeker who, when asked a question on October 19, 2012 at the State Department, replied: “…‘compromise’ is not a bad word and does not include ‘esoteric’ concepts such as identity or anything else…”

Miko said and proved that the expression “esoteric” is senseless and “when someone tells you that your identity is ‘esoteric’ it is an insult”.

Miko also provided his comment regarding a statement made by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, for “Al Jazeera” in July 2012, when he said that once the problem with the name is solved: “The people will stop being obsessed with it...” Miko said the word “obsessed” is a strong word and “Gordon is trying to belittle the Macedonian people, while his own name and identity are sacred…”

8. From what we have presented in this write-up we can conclude that the U.S. is leading a long-term accurate, consistent and resolute regional policy in the Balkans which, so far, has worked against fundamental Macedonian interests and has threatened Macedonia and the Macedonian people’s existence. There is no real basis to believe that this policy will be ending with some positive surprise for Macedonia. It would be naïve to have such expectations. If the U.S. unleashed a real war against Macedonia in 2001 in order to achieve its objectives how can it suddenly change its policies after all that happened in the last 20 and more years?

What the Americans are doing in Macedonia is an integral part of their regional policy that relies on the implementation of the “Greater Albania” project, which is evidently being implemented.

9. America’s treatment of Macedonia, during the toughest years of its history, judging from all the cited facts, cannot be called - friendly. To also call the U.S. “our partner” or as some say in Macedonia - “our strategic partner” is absolutely wrong, inappropriate and far from the truth and even harmful for the country. America’s overall long-term policy is to sacrifice Macedonia for America’s greater good!
10. There is no doubt that the U.S. is a dominant factor in world politics and will remain as such in the foreseeable future. The U.S. is the chief arbiter in the Balkans as well. At the same time it can be said, without doubt, that Macedonia’s future is entirely in Washington’s hands. Washington is the key that can also open different perspectives for Macedonia. So far, the treatment of our name symbolizes exactly how Washington feels about Macedonia.

11. It must be clear that without the smallest respect from America towards Macedonian aspirations, it will be very difficult for us to succeed. So we need to do everything we can to gain that respect because all roads lead through Washington. We must also not leave out Moscow, Beijing, London, Berlin, Paris and Rome when seeking support for the survival of Macedonia and the Macedonian people. A possible positive reaction from any one of these capitals can influence Washington into becoming a bit more flexible towards us. Athens plays no important role in all this.

We have lost a lot of time and made some serious mistakes but there are still salvation opportunities. It depends on our wisdom and readiness to defend ourselves. Not if we continue like before...

12. There is still room to seek ways and opportunities that would lead to change in the current U.S. policy towards Macedonia. At least concerning the survival of the Macedonian people and our country. We must keep trying, either through direct dialogue or through other channels, to open all American cards for the region and Macedonia. To face all their options. This should be first and main task of our Embassy in Washington.

12.1. The very first move that we need to make must be made at home. It is high time that we re-energize our relations with the United States by using correct terms. Without taking proper steps we will end up going around in circles, with no prospects for progress. The question for us is “to be or not to be” which requires some serious thinking and immediate action. Therefore it
is imperative to figure out exactly what the American interests are in and around our country.

12.2. The most efficient way to accomplish this is to formulate a memo which will crystallize America’s positions on many issues of concern relating to Macedonia, even those that have an air of interference in our internal affairs. There should be no problem because the U.S. is already deeply involved in that particular segment of our affairs through the Ohrid Agreement. We need to survey the U.S. and get some straight answers as to what exactly they are looking for with regards to: a) the name of our country, b) the identity of our people c) the Macedonian language and its role in our country, d) the unitary character of our country e) the Albanian position in our country and the extent of use of the Albanian language..., f) our entry into NATO and the EU (in real terms not if…), g) Greek aspirations towards Macedonia, h) Bulgarian aspirations towards our language and people, h) The “Greater Albania” project…

In the document it must be stressed that the Macedonian language must be learned and used by all citizens from the earliest age, in order to be a unifying and cohesive factor of the state.

We need to draft such a document as soon as possible, without delay. As we can easily guess, their initial response might be negative but we must not give up and think that we have done our part. It is we who need them… not the other way around… Persist and we will prevail. For us it is crucial to open a dialogue and put all open questions on the table, as they are from our point of view. That is the way that Macedonia can survive. To succeed, we must definitely remove our heads from the sand.

12.3. If we fail with direct contact, then we will have no other choice but to give publicity to our points, facts and arguments concerning the American policy towards Macedonia. If we don’t show them that we are serious, our chances for success are - zero. Remember what happened in Vietnam. Dedicated but unarmed people won over the world superpower.
The wise Confucius (551-479 BC) once said: “You cannot make joint plans with people who aspire to different aims”! Of course this also applies to countries!

12.4. Once we discover their true intentions we will be able to reason with them as well as seek broader international support for our universally recognized rights.

By knowing exactly what they want from us we can then formulate appropriate policies to deal with the situation realistically and look for ways to get us out of this impasse. Only then, can we start to defend the legitimate rights of the Macedonian people. But until we face the real American plans and goals, we stay in a vicious circle. Once we come face to face with the actual American interests, we will be able to deal with them accordingly – a) to try to become part of them and b) to try to achieve at least a minimum acceptance of the Macedonian legal and universal aspirations.

13. We have enough arguments but they are worthless unless we use them at the right time and in the right place. With much hard work our final aim should be to obtain American support of our views. This is not impossible…

14. The final outcome of the post Yugoslav crisis is still ahead and Macedonia can easily be its main victim. Most probably that is why we have been kept so long neither in the skies nor on the ground. The aim is for Macedonia to stay vulnerable as long as possible, to be available for any risky and dangerous solutions that can completely jeopardize its future.

There are no objective prospects in sight for a sustainable stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Just the opposite – the centrifugal forces there are more and more dominant and the survival of this federal state is seriously challenged.

Kosovo too, as the new Albanian state, is not likely to sail in calmer waters in the near future and fully establish itself on the international stage. Joining the UN seems unattainable and thus the story remains untold. The fact that five EU member states are
not willing to recognize Kosovo means that the EU approach will be limited at best. There are serious challenges for Kosovo, one of which is Serbia’s refusal to recognize it, which does not bode well for its future. The agreement between Dachich and Tachi (2013) is a significant step that will somewhat ease tensions between Belgrade and Prishtina but will not solve their problems.

It would be difficult for Kosovo to join the UN, if not impossible, because both Moscow and Beijing oppose it and have veto power in the Security Council. They have serious reasons for not giving the green light to Kosovo’s precedent.

At the same time, Kosovo will probably get a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU without membership. U.S. aid will undoubtedly continue but the question is whether it will be enough for its sustainable development? Status-quo can last for decades, which could lead to increased crime, which will have consequences for the entire region including Macedonia.

15. One more thesis deserves exploring. Do you really think that the U.S. wants to fully settle all the problems in the Balkans? If that happens Washington will lose its role and its services will become unnecessary. The EU, with its economic programs, will become the major factor in the region. There is no argument that such development is acceptable to the United States. Especially when we know that there is serious speculation that Russia is coming back in the Balkans. This is unacceptable to Washington and that is the best guarantee that it is going to stay in the region.

15.1. The Americans invested quite a bit in the Balkans and it will not be easy for them to withdraw. They created Kosovo as a new state, built the Bonsteel military base and a huge embassy in Skopje… The period when the region was at the top of American political commitment, because of the wars that were under way, is over and that is positive. We have to be happy as well because there are no indications for new arms confrontations. Today the Americans are concentrating on problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt... and that is normal and logical. Nevertheless, the American interest and presence in the region is permanent. This
is important for all Balkan countries and especially for Macedonia.

So whoever thinks that the U.S. is losing interest in the Balkans and is withdrawing is just speculating.

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16. America’s policy towards Macedonia in the last 20-odd years has been deeply wrong. It has not achieved the desired results at all and has inflicted enormous and immeasurable damage on Macedonia. The U.S. has been completely dedicated all these years to the realization of the “Greater Albania” project, totally ignoring Macedonia’s basic interests. This policy is inevitably leading to the destruction of Macedonia. If the Americans paid even minimal attention to Macedonia’s aspirations: a) They would not have been insisting so vehemently for Macedonia to change its name, b) they would have understood relatively early that the Albanians had received more than enough from separating Kosovo from Serbia and did not need any more, c) they would not have underestimated the far-reaching negative effects of placing too much emphasis on the Albanians as the key factor in the region… These reflections are already present and much more will follow…

Giving Macedonia to the Albanians, as they are doing, will inevitably stimulate their new and uncontrollable ambitions for getting more. And, easily, their new target for expansion could be - Greece. There are over a million Albanians living in Greece. They control the Mafia there, which generates huge amounts of money which tomorrow could be used for political purposes, especially if the economic crisis continues to persist.

It is very important to emphasize that if Washington was paying minimal attention to Macedonian interests up to now, trying to help us, the U.S. would have definitely experienced considerable success in stabilizing the Balkans, despite the “Greater Albania” project.

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17. We are deeply convinced that the Americans made a strategic mistake ignoring the Macedonians. If Macedonians were not a hard nut to crack, they would have disappeared a long time ago. They survived the Bucharest and Versailles Treaties of the early 20th century, they survived the Bucharest NATO fiasco of 2008 and the Chicago of 2012… They will survive the EU manipulations from Brussels when they play with the destiny of the country and its people by putting illegal blockades and blackmail… If they have survived terrible ordeals and genocides in the first half of the 20 century… why should they give up today? There is no chance of the Macedonians being exterminated! No one can achieve it, including the U.S.

18. In the end let us conclude that if someone today tries to break up and appropriate Macedonian territory it would mean a new war. The process of albanization that is aggressively taking place is leading exactly in that direction. It is our common duty to stop it because such things cannot go on forever without consequences. Besides some initial achievements this development has no chance of final success. If there are no timely activities for a complete change of the negative processes a new and wider armed confrontation will be certain.

We have a deep division among Macedonians which will probably not be easy to overcome but, in certain situations when our existence is at stake, our differences will have to be put to the side. This is what we have done over the centuries and this is what we will need to do today. Macedonia must not allow its enemies to succeed, regardless of who they are and where they are. Macedonians have always endured. We need to stand together or we will pay the ultimate price.

Macedonia, as it is now, is by far the best solution for the region, for Washington, for Brussels… including all our neighbours. Destroying it will introduce many new risks…

The sooner Washington realizes that the better it will be for all of us. Traditionally, the others will follow the Americans.

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A person with whom I once worked at the large OHIS chemical plant, in a random encounter at the market once said: “Americans are hypocritical. They would say go, do not worry, we are with you. But once we turn our backs they will immediately release the dogs on us to catch us!”

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Churchill perhaps left a useful message for us when he said: “As long as you are going through hell, keep going!

We have no other choice but to keep going. Perhaps this experience will unite us. Torture and suffering usually bring out such qualities. Hopefully it will be the case with us too.